AVMS-RADAR AudioVisual Media Services- Regulatory Authorities’ InDependence And Efficiency Review Update on recent changes and developments in Member States and Candidate Countries that are relevant for the analysis of independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies : final report.
Date: 2015-11-09
Institutions: Directorate-General for the Information Society and Media
Subjects: European audiovisual area, application of EU law, audiovisual communications policy, audiovisual industry, broadcasting, directive (EU), governance, regulation of telecommunications

AVMS-RADAR 

AudioVisual Media Services- 
Regulatory Authorities’ 
InDependence  
And Efficiency Review 

Update on recent changes and developments 
in Member States and Candidate Countries 
that are relevant for the analysis of 
independence and efficient functioning of 
audiovisual media services regulatory bodies 
(SMART 2013/0083) 

FINAL REPORT 

A study prepared for the European Commission 
DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology 
by: 

Digital 
Agenda  for 
Europe 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study was carried out for the European Commission by 

Authors: 

Prof. Dr. Mark D. Cole 

Gianna Iacino 

Peter Matzneller, LL.M. Eur. 

Jenny Metzdorf, LL.M. 

Sebastian Schweda 

Internal identification 
Contract number:  30-CE-0676525/00-67 
SMART number:  SMART 2013/0083 

DISCLAIMER 

By the European Commission, Directorate-General of Communications Networks, Content & Technology.  

The  information  and  views  set  out  in  this  publication  are  those  of  the  author(s)  and  do  not  necessarily 
reflect  the  official  opinion  of  the  Commission.  The  Commission  does  not  guarantee  the  accuracy  of  the 
data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may 
be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. 

ISBN 978-92-79-52686-2 

doi:10.2759/49838 

Copyright © European Union, 2015. All rights reserved. Certain parts are licensed under conditions to the 
EU.  

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abridged Table of Contents 

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... 9 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 11 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 17 

1.1.  Objectives of the study .................................................................................... 17 

1.2.  Methodology of the study and structure of the report ...................................... 18 

1.3.  List of regulatory bodies and abbreviations ..................................................... 20 

2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL .................................. 26 

2.1.  Requirements concerning implementation of the relevant EU law in 

form of the AVMSD ........................................................................................ 26 

2.2.  Specific  rules  in  the  AVMSD  governing  the  independence  and 

efficient functioning of regulatory bodies........................................................ 29 

2.3. 

Implementation of the AVMS Directive in non-EU Member States............... 32 

2.4.  Other  European  sources  concerning 

the 

independence  and 

effectiveness of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies ....................... 33 

3. 

ISSUE-BASED  ANALYSIS  OF  LEGAL,  INSTITUTIONAL  AND 
REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  IN  EU  MEMBER  STATES  AND 
CANDIDATE  COUNTRIES  AND  ITS  IMPLEMENTATION  AND 
EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE ....................................................................... 40 

3.1. 

Independence ................................................................................................... 41 

3.1.  Effective functioning ....................................................................................... 68 

3.3.  Accountability .................................................................................................. 86 

3.4.  Stakeholder survey ......................................................................................... 103 

3.5.  Schematic overview on extent of changes ..................................................... 108 

4.  CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 110 

4.1.   Independence ................................................................................................. 110 

4.2.  Effective functioning ..................................................................................... 115 

4.3.  Accountability ................................................................................................ 117 

4.4.   Overall Conclusion ........................................................................................ 119 

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 121 

3 

 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... 9 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 11 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 17 

1.1.  Objectives of the study .................................................................................... 17 

1.2.  Methodology of the study and structure of the report ...................................... 18 

1.3.  List of regulatory bodies and abbreviations ..................................................... 20 

2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL .................................. 26 

2.1.  Requirements concerning implementation of the relevant EU law in 

form of the AVMSD ........................................................................................ 26 

2.2.  Specific  rules  in  the  AVMSD  governing  the  independence  and 

efficient functioning of regulatory bodies........................................................ 29 

2.2.1. 

Independence  of  competent  regulatory  bodies  (Art.  30 
AVMSD) .............................................................................................. 29 

2.2.2.  Cooperation (Art. 30 AVMSD) ............................................................ 31 

2.3. 

Implementation of the AVMS Directive in non-EU Member States............... 32 

2.4.  Other  European  sources  concerning 

the 

independence  and 

effectiveness of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies ....................... 33 

2.4.1.  Council of Europe................................................................................. 33 

2.4.1.1.  European Convention on Transfrontier Television .................... 33 

2.4.1.2.  Recommendation Rec(2000)23 ................................................. 34 

2.4.1.3.  Declaration of 26 March 2008 ................................................... 35 

2.4.2.  European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA) ........................ 36 

2.4.3.  European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 

(ERGA)................................................................................................. 38 

3. 

ISSUE-BASED  ANALYSIS  OF  LEGAL,  INSTITUTIONAL  AND 
REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  IN  EU  MEMBER  STATES  AND 
CANDIDATE  COUNTRIES  AND  ITS  IMPLEMENTATION  AND 
EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE ....................................................................... 40 

3.1. 

Independence ................................................................................................... 41 

3.1.1.  General Remarks .................................................................................. 41 

3.1.1.1.  Legal status ................................................................................ 41 

4 

 
 
 
3.1.1.2. 

Independence as a value ............................................................. 43 

3.1.2.  Governance rules .................................................................................. 43 

3.1.2.1.  Composition and appointment of the highest decision-

making organ ............................................................................. 43 

3.1.2.1.1.   Number of Board members .............................................. 44 

3.1.2.1.2.   Socio-economic background of Board members ............. 45 

3.1.2.1.3.   Qualification and experience of Board members ............. 47 

3.1.2.1.4   Rules to prevent conflicts of interest................................ 48 

3.1.2.1.4.1.   Conflicts of interest before appointment ................ 49 

3.1.2.1.4.2.   Conflicts of interest during term of office .............. 51 

3.1.2.1.4.3.   Conflicts of interest after end of Board membership ..... 52 

3.1.2.1.5   Procedural issues .............................................................. 53 

3.1.2.1.5.1.   Appointment ........................................................... 53 

3.1.2.1.5.2.   Term of office ......................................................... 56 

3.1.2.1.5.3.   Dismissal ................................................................ 58 

3.1.2.2.  Staffing and budget of regulatory authorities ............................. 60 

3.1.2.2.1.   Staffing ............................................................................. 60 

3.1.2.2.2.   Budget .............................................................................. 63 

3.1.3.  Funding ................................................................................................. 64 

3.1.3.1.  Sources of funding ..................................................................... 64 

3.1.3.2.  Procedural  rules  concerning  the  establishment  of  the 

budget ......................................................................................... 66 

3.1.  Effective functioning ....................................................................................... 68 

3.1.1.  Adequate powers .................................................................................. 68 

3.1.1.1.  Regulatory powers ..................................................................... 68 

3.1.1.1.1.   General policy setting powers .......................................... 68 

3.1.1.1.2.   General policy implementing powers .............................. 70 

3.1.1.1.3.   Binding decisions on third parties .................................... 70 

3.1.1.1.4.   Limitations of the regulatory powers ............................... 71 

3.1.1.2.  Monitoring powers ..................................................................... 72 

3.1.1.2.1.   Systematic monitoring ..................................................... 73 

3.1.1.2.2.   Ad-hoc monitoring ........................................................... 74 

3.1.1.2.3.   Information collection powers ......................................... 75 

5 

 
3.1.1.2.4.   Monitoring only after complaints..................................... 76 

3.1.1.3.  Sanctioning powers .................................................................... 77 

3.1.1.3.1.   Warning ............................................................................ 77 

3.1.1.3.2.   Fines ................................................................................. 78 

3.1.1.3.3.   Publication of decisions in the media .............................. 79 

3.1.1.3.4.   Suspension/revocation of license ..................................... 80 

3.1.1.3.5.  Penalty payments in case of non-compliance .................. 81 

3.1.1.4.  Complaints handling procedures................................................ 83 

3.1.2.  Cooperation between regulatory authorities ......................................... 84 

3.1.2.1.  Cooperation between regulatory authorities at national 

level ............................................................................................ 84 

3.1.2.2.  Cooperation  between 

regulatory 
European and international level ............................................... 85 

authorities 

at 

3.3.  Accountability .................................................................................................. 86 

3.3.1. Formal Accountability .............................................................................. 87 

3.3.1.1.   Bodies regulators are accountable to ......................................... 87 

3.3.1.2.   Accountability means ................................................................. 89 

3.3.1.3.   Reporting obligation .................................................................. 90 

3.3.2.   Transparency ........................................................................................ 92 

3.3.2.1.   Decision-making process ........................................................... 92 

3.3.2.2.   Public and external advice ......................................................... 94 

3.3.2.3.   Publication obligations .............................................................. 98 

3.3.3.  

Judicial Review .................................................................................. 100 

3.3.3.1.   Internal and External Appeal Procedures ................................. 100 

3.3.3.2.   Appeal bodies and status of complainants ............................... 101 

3.3.3.3.   Reasons for Appeal .................................................................. 101 

3.3.3.4.   Pending Appeal ........................................................................ 102 

3.3.3.5.   The power to overturn decisions .............................................. 102 

3.4.  Stakeholder survey ......................................................................................... 103 

3.5.  Schematic overview on extent of changes ..................................................... 108 

4.  CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 110 

4.1.   Independence ................................................................................................. 110 

4.1.1.   Legal status and resources .................................................................. 110 

6 

 
4.1.2.  Governance rules ................................................................................ 111 

4.1.3.  Funding ............................................................................................... 114 

4.1.3.1.  Funding sources ....................................................................... 114 

4.1.3.2.  Budget-making process ............................................................ 114 

4.2.  Effective functioning ..................................................................................... 115 

4.2.1.  Adequate powers ................................................................................ 115 

4.2.1.1.   Regulatory powers ................................................................... 115 

4.2.1.2.   Monitoring powers ................................................................... 115 

4.2.1.3.   Sanctioning powers .................................................................. 116 

4.2.1.4.   Complaints handling procedures.............................................. 117 

4.2.2. Cooperation between regulatory authorities ........................................... 117 

4.2.2.1.   Cooperation between regulatory authorities at national 

level .......................................................................................... 117 

4.2.2.2.   Cooperation  between 

regulatory 
European and international level ............................................. 117 

authorities 

at 

4.3.  Accountability ................................................................................................ 117 

4.3.1. Formal Accountability ............................................................................ 117 

4.3.2. Transparency .......................................................................................... 118 

4.3.3. Judicial Review ...................................................................................... 119 

4.4.   Overall Conclusion ........................................................................................ 119 

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 121 

Annex 1: List of experts .......................................................................................... 121 

Annex 2: Questionnaire ........................................................................................... 125 

Annex 3: Stakeholder survey ................................................................................... 129 

Annex 4: Updated INDIREG tables ........................................................................ 134 

Annex 5: Answers of correspondents to questionnaire ........................................... 135 

7 

 
 
AVMS-RADAR 

AudioVisual Media Services- 
Regulatory Authorities’ InDependence  
And Efficiency Review  

Update on recent changes and developments  
in Member States and Candidate Countries  
that are relevant for the analysis of  
independence and efficient functioning  
of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies 

– Final report – 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 

(en) 

The  study  AVMS-RADAR  (AudioVisual  Media  Services-RegulatoryAuthorities’ 
InDependence And Efficiency Review) has been jointly conducted by the Institute of 
European  Media  Law  (EMR)  and  the  University  of  Luxembourg  on  behalf  of  the 
European  Commission  (SMART  2013/0083).  With  a  particular  view  on  criteria 
affecting authorities’ independence, the study  aims to  provide  an updated analysis of 
the  institutional,  legal  and  regulatory  framework  governing  the  regulatory  bodies 
competent  for  audiovisual  media  services  in  EU  Member  States  and  candidate 
countries  to  the  EU.  It  also  comprises  the  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  said 
framework in practice and its effectiveness. 

The report comprises information resulting from desk research, country reports drafted 
by  correspondents  of  the  EMR’s  Media  Network  and  responses  by  regulatory 
authorities  and  interested  stakeholders.  They  result  in  a  comprehensive  analysis  that 
identifies  differences  and  common  traces  of  the  different  national  legal  systems 
governing regulatory authorities. Besides the description of the legal framework at EU 
level  and  a  criteria-based,  comparative  analysis  of  the  rules  in  place  for  national 
regulatory authorities, the report is supplemented by a 1700+-page annex which gives 
a country-by-country perspective in table form (based on the country overview tables 
from  the  study  “INDIREG”  conducted  in  2010  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Commission) and the extensive answers to the questionnaires used.  

--- 

(de) 

Die  AVMS-RADAR-Studie  (AudioVisual  Media  Services-Regulatory  Authorities’ 
InDependence  And  Efficiency  Review)  wurde  gemeinsam  vom  Institut  für 
Europäisches  Medienrecht  (EMR)  und  der  Universität  Luxemburg  im  Auftrag  der 
Europäischen  Kommission  erstellt  (SMART  2013/0083).  Auf  der  Basis  einer 
speziellen Betrachtung der Kriterien, die die behördliche Unabhängigkeit beeinflussen, 
zielt die Studie darauf ab, eine aktualisierte Analyse der institutionellen, gesetzlichen 
und  aufsichtsrechtlichen  Rahmenbedingungen  zur  Verfügung  zu  stellen,  die  die 
Kompetenzen  der  Aufsichtsbehörden  audiovisueller  Mediendienste  in  den  EU-
Mitgliedstaaten  und  den  Beitrittskandidaten  der  EU  regeln.  Ferner  umfasst  sie  die 
Analyse der Umsetzung dieses Rahmens in der Praxis und seiner Effizienz. 

Der  Bericht  umfasst  Informationen  aus  Sekundärerhebungen, durch Korrespondenten 
erstellte  Länderberichte  und  Antworten  von 
des  EMR-Mediennetzwerkes 
Aufsichtsbehörden  und  interessierten  Kreisen,  die  eine  umfassende  Analyse  ergeben, 
welche  Unterschiede  und  Übereinstimmungen  der  verschiedenen  nationalen 
rechtlichen  Rahmenbedingungen  aufzeigt.  Neben  der  Schilderung  des  auf  EU-Ebene 
geltenden rechtlichen Rahmens und einer kriterienbasierten Vergleichsanalyse der für 

9 

 
die nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden geltenden Regelungen wird der Bericht durch einen 
über 1700 Seiten umfassenden Annex, der eine nach Ländern gegliederte Übersicht in 
Tabellenform  gibt  (welche  auf  den  Ländertabellen  der  2010  von  der  Europäische 
Kommission in Auftrag gegebenen „INDIREG“-Studie basiert) und die ausführlichen 
Antworten zu den verwendeten Fragebögen ergänzt. 

--- 

(fr) 

L'étude  AVMS-RADAR  (AudioVisual  Media  Services-Regulatory  Authorities’ 
InDependence  And  Efficiency  Review).a  été  menée  conjointement  par  l'Institut  du 
droit européen des médias (EMR) et l'Université du Luxembourg pour le compte de la 
Commission  européenne  (SMART  2013/0083).  Axée  en  particulier  sur  les  facteurs 
ayant un impact sur l'indépendance des autorités, l'étude met à jour l'analyse du cadre 
institutionnel,  juridique  et  réglementaire  régissant  les  organismes  de  régulation 
compétents pour les services de médias audiovisuels dans les Etats membres de l'UE et 
les  pays  candidats  à  l'adhésion.  Elle  comporte  également  une  analyse  de  la  mise  en 
œuvre pratique et de l'efficacité de ce cadre. 

Le rapport regroupe des informations issues de recherches documentaires, des rapports 
nationaux rédigés par les correspondants du Media Network de l'EMR et des réponses 
fournies  par  les  régulateurs  et  les  parties  prenantes.  Il  en  ressort  une  analyse 
approfondie qui révèle les disparités et les points communs entre les différents cadres 
juridiques nationaux régissant les autorités de régulation. Outre le descriptif du cadre 
juridique au niveau européen et une analyse comparative méthodique des dispositifs en 
place régissant les autorités nationales de régulation, le rapport comporte une annexe 
de  plus  de  1700  pages  qui  fournit  un  panorama  de  la  situation  pays  par  pays  sous 
forme de tableau (basé sur les tableaux récapitulatifs des pays de l'étude « INDIREG » 
menée en 2010 pour le compte de la Commission européenne), ainsi que les réponses 
détaillées aux questionnaires utilisés. 

10 

 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 

1.  This  final  report  of  the  study  “Update  on  recent  changes  and  developments  in 
Member  States  and  Candidate  Countries  that  are  relevant  for  the  analysis  of 
independence  and  efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services  regulatory 
bodies”  (SMART  2013/0083)  has  been  prepared  jointly  by  the  Institute  of 
European Media Law (EMR) and the University of Luxembourg (hereinafter: the 
consortium)  on  behalf  of  the  European  Commission,  following  the consortium’s 
successful  bid  to  the  Commission’s  invitation  to  negotiate  of  28  July  2014.  The 
acronym  of  the  study  is  AVMS-RADAR  (AudioVisual  Media  Services-
Regulatory Authorities’ InDependence And Efficiency Review). 

2.  The  main  objective  is  to  update the findings of a previous study, commissioned 
by the European Commission  in  2009, entitled “Indicators for independence and 
efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services  regulatory  bodies  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  the  rules  in  the  AVMS  Directive”  (SMART  2009/0001, 
hereinafter: INDIREG study). The study therefore aims to provide updates of the 
detailed  description  and  analysis  of  the  institutional,  legal  and  regulatory 
framework  governing  the  regulatory  bodies  competent  for  audiovisual  media 
services  in  EU  Member  States  and  candidate  countries  to  the  EU  (Objective  1) 
and  the  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  said  framework  in  practice  and  its 
effectiveness (Objective 2). 

3.  The consortium pursued an integrated approach to both objectives since the legal 
paradigms and their practical implementation are interlinked and both can have a 
significant impact on the real degree of independence of a regulatory body. In this 
vein, similar tasks foreseen under Objectives 1 and 2 have been linked, resulting 
in  a  single  set  of  issues  to  be  investigated,  comprising  both  objectives.  The 
analysis covers both  the competent  regulatory bodies overseeing the activities of 
public  service  audiovisual  media  services  providers  as  well  as  those  for 
commercial audiovisual media services providers. Regulatory bodies are included 
in  the  scope  of  the  study  regardless  of  their structure and actual legal  status,  for 
example  whether  it  is  an  internal  oversight  Board  within  a  public  service 
broadcaster or a co-regulatory body. 

4.  The  chosen  methodology  included  an  intensive  desk  research  phase  aimed  at 
gathering  information  about  the  different  legislative,  regulatory  and  institutional 
frameworks  present  at  the  international,  supranational  and  national  levels  with 
regard  to  the  scope  and  activities  of  the  audiovisual  media  services  regulatory 
bodies in the countries to be covered by the study. In parallel, the existing data on 
the  specific  national  situations  were  extensively  complemented  and  updated  by 

1  

The final study report exclusively contains the English version of the executive summary. For the 
other  two  mandatory  language  versions  (German  and  French)  see  the  separately  submitted 
document. 

11 

 
                                                 
to  a  questionnaire  developed  by 

country  reports  produced  by  correspondents  of  the  EMR’s  Media  Network  in 
response 
the  consortium.  Appropriate 
consideration  of  both  regulatory  authorities’  and  stakeholders’  viewpoints  was 
secured  by  including  in  the  overall  analysis  an  evaluation  of  their  feedback  to 
another  questionnaire  and  online  survey  which  were  designed  specifically  for 
these  two  groups  by  the  consortium.  Following  the  thorough  evaluation  of  the 
the  further  material,  a 
country  reports  and  with  due  consideration  of 
comprehensive  comparative  analysis  was  conducted  with  a  view  to  identifying 
differences and common traces of the different national legal frameworks.  

5.  The structure of the final report is composed of two parts. The first part includes 
a  description  of  the  legal  framework  currently  in  force  at  EU  level  including  an 
overview  of  relevant  texts  from  the  Council  of  Europe.  In  the  second  part,  an 
updated description of the legal, institutional and regulatory framework in place in 
EU  Member  States  and  candidate  countries  and  its  efficient  implementation  in 
practice  is  given.  A  list  of  the  experts  that  have  contributed  to  the  study  with 
country  reports  is  included  in  Annex  1  of  this  report.  Annex  2  contains  the 
questionnaire sent to these experts. Screenshots of the online-survey are included 
in  Annex 3 of this  report. In order to complement the issue-based description of 
the  final  report,  Annex  4  contains  the  country  overview  tables  from  the  former 
INDIREG study for each monitored country, but in the version as they have been 
updated  by  the national  experts. In order to  make the numerous changes visible, 
the track changes mode has been used. Finally, Annex 5 contains the answers of 
the national experts to the questionnaire drafted by the EMR. 

6. 

It  emerges  from  the  comparative  analysis  that  all  regulatory  authorities  are 
separate legal entities whose independence is explicitly or implicitly recognized 
by  the  national  legal  framework  with  the  exception  of  one  authority  that 
constitutes  a  governmental  organisation.  While  the  regulatory  framework  has 
remained stable in most countries investigated in the study, in a few countries new 
regulatory  bodies  have  been  established.  Staffing  and  budget  are  heavily 
dependent on national conditions and thus show great variety across all countries. 
It seems as if problems concerning staffing and financial resources are more likely 
to  occur or become evident in case of “small” regulatory authorities in countries 
which have limited resources to fund them.  

7.  Both the financial and human resources of the regulatory bodies responsible for 
audiovisual media services need to be acquired from external sources. With regard 
to the highest decision-making organ within the regulatory body (the Board), this 
situation requires careful selection of its members so as to ensure that all relevant 
views  are  represented  in  it  in  a  balanced  way.  The  size  of  regulatory  bodies’ 
Boards spans from three to 13, except for a few countries where in certain cases 
an  individual  person  acts  as  the  highest  decision-making  body  and  a  few  other 
countries  which  have  significantly  higher  numbers.  While  the  sizes  of  Boards 
have  remained  unaltered  in  a  majority  of countries, when changes occurred they 
typically  came  about  as  a  consequence  of  extensive  reforms  of  the  entire 
regulatory body. 

12 

 
8.  A  balanced  representation  of  stakeholder  views  within  the  Board  is  also 
dependent on the socio-economic backgrounds of its members. In most countries, 
Boards are legally required to be composed of members acting for diverse social, 
economic  and  political  groups.  In  nearly  two  thirds  of  the  countries  experts  in 
fields related to (audiovisual) media are represented in the Board. In a few others, 
members  do  not  explicitly  represent  certain  groups,  but  are  actually  nominated 
and/or appointed by these.  

9.  Of  equal  importance  for  the  proper  fulfilment  of  the  Board’s  functions  is  the 
professional  qualification  and  expertise  of  its  members.  However,  while  in 
most countries requirements in this regard exist, they are missing completely in a 
considerable  number  of  countries.  Where  legal  requirements  are  in  place,  they 
vary  substantially.  In  some  countries,  only  some  education,  but  no  work 
experience  is  required,  whereas  others  only  require  a  certain  degree  of 
professional experience.  

10.  Existing rules to prevent conflicts of interest at all stages of Board membership 
are a strong indicator for the independence of Board members, as they can ensure 
that  undue  influence  on  the  decisions  of  the  Board  is  reduced  to  a  minimum. 
While  specific  conflict  of  interest  rules  preventing  candidates  from  being 
appointed in case of existing incompatibilities are widespread, they are missing in 
seven  countries.  In  the  majority  of  countries,  specific  incompatibility  rules  also 
apply at senior staff level. As far as they exist, the rules mostly cover a wide range 
of potential conflicts of interest, from incompatibilities with Government, political 
parties and sometimes the legislature as well as the regulated branches. The laws 
of more than half of the countries prohibit Board members from holding any other 
position  during  their  membership  in  the  Board,  and  they  also  provide  for  a 
cooling-off  period  after  the  Board  member’s  term  of  office  in  order  to  prevent 
members  from  abusing  their  position  regarding  decisions  taken  in  favour  of  a 
potential future employer. 

11.  In  procedural  terms,  the  rules  governing  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of 
Board members (including the chairperson) and their practical implementation call 
for a closer look  as  they may have an impact on the independence with which a 
Board  member  conducts  his  or  her  functions.  Candidates  for  the  Board  are,  in 
most  countries,  selected  through  a  two-stage  procedure,  featuring  separate 
nomination and (subsequent) appointment stages. Often, however, this procedure 
does  not  apply  to  the  chairperson.  On  the  other  hand,  in  some  countries,  the 
chairperson is elected directly from among the Board members. As far as a two-
stage  model  is  applied,  it  is  mostly  a  legislative  or  executive  organ  of  the  State 
(Parliament,  Head of State or (a part of) the Government) that is responsible for 
the actual appointment. State bodies or individual Members of Parliament are also 
usually in charge of the nominations. In the majority of countries, the Government 
is involved either at the nomination or at the appointment stage of the procedure. 

12.  Board members are, in most countries, appointed for a term of between four and 
six  years.  Shorter  terms  of  one  or  two  years  are  foreseen  in  very  few  cases  for 

13 

 
chairpersons.  Noteworthy  are  long  terms  of  seven  and  nine  years  in  a  few 
countries.  Particularly  where  these  terms  have  only  been  extended  in  the  past 
years,  this  might  point  to  a  potential  democratic  deficit.  In  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  countries,  laws  to  protect  Board members against  arbitrary dismissal 
are effective. In these countries, a Board member can only be dismissed for one of 
the  reasons  specified  in  law,  which  mostly  include  health  conditions,  cases  of 
serious misconduct, violations of conflict of interest rules, a request by the Court 
of  Auditors  or  by  the  Board  member  him  or  herself.  Changes  in  this  area  have 
remained  minimal  in  the  past  years  and  mostly  did  not  touch  upon  substantial 
issues. In practice, dismissals ahead of schedule have been limited to a handful of 
cases in the past five years.  

13.  Since  the  regulatory  body  cannot  produce  its  own  resources,  its  financial 
independence is determined by the way in which the regulatory body can enforce 
the  funding  entity’s  financing  obligation.  Generally  spoken,  in  all  countries,  the 
regulatory body is involved, at some stage, in the decision-making process about 
the  financial  needs.  In  the  great  majority  of countries, regulatory bodies are to  a 
large  part  or  exclusively  financed  by  the  State.  In  some  countries,  a  mainly  fee-
based  funding  model  applies,  whereby  fees  are  collected  either  from  the 
broadcaster  (licence  and  authorisation  fees)  or  from  the  end-user  (broadcasting 
fee)  or  from  both.  In  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  countries,  the  final  decision 
concerning the regulatory body’s annual budget lies with the Parliament. In seven 
countries, the regulatory body itself decides on its budget. In three countries, the 
Government  or  the  competent  Ministry  takes  the  ultimate  decision  over  the 
regulatory body’s budget.  In the years after the INDIREG study, there have only 
been  very  few  changes  in  this  regard,  most  of  which  brought  about  a  more 
prominent role of the Parliament in the decision-making process. 

14.  The  range  of  powers  granted  to  regulatory  authorities  is  indicative  of  their 
independence. The more comprehensive their powers are, the more they can assert 
themselves  within  the  national  context  (e.g.  vis-à-vis  the  Government  or  the 
industry). While less than half of the regulatory authorities examined in this study 
have  been  given  policy  setting  powers,  all  bodies  are  entrusted  with  policy 
implementing  powers.  The  power  to  take  decisions,  which  are  binding  on  third 
parties,  is  attributed  to  all  regulatory  authorities  and pertains  to  the core of their 
powers. Changes with regards to the existence of regulatory powers have occurred 
in  a  handful  of  countries  where  regulatory  bodies  have  gained  such  powers.  To 
this end, their independence was strengthened. 

15.  In  order  to  effectively  enforce  the  law,  regulatory  authorities  are  equipped  with 
different monitoring powers. With the exception of two regulatory authorities, all 
other  regulators  have  been  empowered  to  conduct  systematic  monitoring. 
Similarly, all regulatory authorities but one have been granted ad-hoc monitoring 
powers,  and  all  regulatory  authorities  are  authorized  to  collect  information  from 
third parties. Complaints may be initiated by the general public in many countries.  

14 

 
16.  Apart  from  monitoring  powers  by  which  regulatory  authorities  oversee 
compliance with national media laws, the power to impose sanctions constitutes 
another  indicator  of  the  independence  of  regulators.  Typically,  national  laws 
prescribe  a  graduated  sanctioning  scheme  comprising  a  number  of  sanctions  of 
different  intensity.  While  almost  all  regulatory  authorities  may  impose  warnings 
and fines, considerably less regulatory authorities are endowed with the power to 
order  publication  of  their  decisions  in  media  outlets  of  the  concerned  providers. 
Furthermore,  the  power  to  suspend  a  service  or  revoke  a  license  has  been 
attributed to  all but  a few regulators and is mostly regarded as a sanction of last 
resort,  but  not  all  regulatory  authorities  have  the  power  to  impose  penalty 
payments  in  case  of  non-compliance  with  their  decisions.  It  follows  from  the 
analysis that all regulatory authorities seem to have adequate sanctioning powers 
to be able to enforce the law. 

17.  The  position  of  a  regulator  within  the  national  regulatory  arena  may  also  be 
indicative  of  its  independence.  At  national  level,  collaboration  with  other 
regulators  operating  in  different  fields  is  indispensable  in  implementing  the 
Government’s  policies  consistently.  Thus,  all  regulatory  bodies  cooperate  with 
other  bodies  regulating  the  media  or  different  aspects  of  the  market  for 
audiovisual  media  services.  Cross-sector  cooperation  (with  consumer  or 
competition agencies) is equally common. In most countries, such collaboration is 
voluntary and designed in rather loose fashion. Cooperation between regulators at 
European or international level has increased in the last years. Bilateral or multi-
lateral cooperation exists between neighbouring countries or countries sharing the 
same  language,  history  or  culture.  More  institutionalized  forms  of  cooperation 
such  as  EPRA  and  ERGA  have  been  established  at  European  level  and  are 
actively supported by the regulatory authorities. 

18.  There  have  been  very  few  changes  regarding  the  bodies  to  which  regulatory 
authorities are formally accountable. Overall, there has been a small increase in 
the  amount  of  regulators  that  are  accountable  towards  the  Parliament,  a  specific 
ministry, the Government or the Head of Government. Whereas there has been a 
small increase in the amount of regulators being obliged to undergo an audit by a 
public audit office, there has been no change regarding the periodicity of such an 
obligation.  In  the  same  vein,  there  has  almost  been  no  change  in  the  reporting 
obligations of the regulatory authorities towards statutory organs (e.g. Parliament 
or  Government).  While  a  few  more  obligations  have  been  introduced  for 
regulatory authorities to conduct public consultations, there have been almost no 
changes  in  the  question  of  who  needs  to  be  consulted  and  the  period  of 
consultation.  Further,  no  changes  could  be  detected  regarding  the  publication 
obligations of regulatory authorities. 

19.  Concerning  judicial  review  of  the  decisions  of  regulatory  authorities  that  might 
have  an  impact  on  regulators’  independence,  it  can  be  noted  that  little  has 
changed. Similarly, there have been no changes at all regarding the appeal bodies 
and the status of complaining persons or companies. While the possibility of the 
appeal body to suspend the regulator’s decision has been newly introduced in two 

15 

 
countries,  it  has  been  abolished  in  one  country,  and  limited  in  another.  In  two 
countries, appeal bodies are newly empowered to replace the regulator’s decision 
with their own, whereas in one country the appeal bodies of the second and third 
stage of the appeal procedure have lost this power. 

20.  As an overall observation, it is noteworthy that there have been only a few major 
changes in the national landscapes governing regulatory authorities. Where these 
occurred  they  were  indeed  significant  such  as  for  example  the  establishment  of 
new bodies in some of the monitored countries. In many cases there have been a 
series  of  smaller  amendments,  for  example  the  extension  of  regulatory  powers, 
prolongation of terms of office for chairpersons and Board members, increase of 
consultation  obligations,  or  changes  in  judicial  review  procedures. However, the 
study  supports  the  conclusion  that  in  general  regulatory  authorities  in  the 
audiovisual  sector  are  both  independent  to  a  sufficient  degree  and  function 
efficiently. 

16 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The present document is the final report for the study “Update on recent changes and 
developments  in  Member  States  and  Candidate  Countries  that  are  relevant  for  the 
analysis  of  independence  and  efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services 
regulatory bodies” (SMART 2013/0083), which the Institute of European Media Law 
(EMR)  and  the  University  of  Luxembourg’s  Research  Unit  in  Law  (hereinafter:  the 
consortium) jointly conducted on behalf of the European Commission, following their 
successful bid to the Commission’s invitation to negotiate of 28 July 2014. The title of 
this  study  is  AVMS-RADAR  (AudioVisual  Media  Services-Regulatory  Authorities’ 
InDependence And Efficiency Review). 

1.1.  Objectives of the study 

The study’s main objective is to update the findings of a previous study, commissioned 
by  the  European  Commission  in  2009,  entitled  “Indicators  for  independence  and 
efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies for the purpose of 
enforcing  the  rules  in  the  AVMS  Directive”  (SMART  2009/0001,  hereinafter: 
INDIREG study).2 It therefore aims to provide updates of 

 

 

the  detailed  description  and  analysis  of  the  institutional,  legal  and  regulatory 
framework  governing  the  regulatory  bodies  competent  for  audiovisual  media 
services in EU Member States and candidate countries to the EU (Objective 1); 

the  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  said  framework  in  practice  and  its 
effectiveness (Objective 2). 

In contrast  to  the INDIREG study, the territorial  scope of the  present  study has been 
limited  to  the EU Member States and candidate countries to  the EU as at  the end of 
July  2014  (Albania,  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Iceland, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) totalling 34 countries. 

Since the legal landscapes and their practical implementation are interlinked and both 
can have a significant impact on the real degree of independence of a regulatory body, 
the  consortium  is  pursuing  an  integrated  approach  to  both  objectives.  In  order  to 
ensure  efficient  working  procedures,  similar  tasks  foreseen  under  objectives  1  and  2 
have been linked, resulting in a single set of issues to be investigated, comprising both 

2  

„Indicators  for  independence  and  efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services  regulatory 
bodies  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  rules  in  the  AVMS  Directive“,  the  study  including  its 
annexes  is  available  at  www.indireg.eu;  after  the  study  several  members  of  the  consortium  were 
also  involved  in  the  preparation  of  a  book  dealing  with  the  topic  of  Independence: 
Schulz/Valcke/Irion,  The  independence  of  the  media  and  its  regulatory agencies,  Bristol/Chicago 
2013.  

17 

 
 
                                                 
objectives. In particular, the comparative analysis is based on country reports, prepared 
by  country  experts,  covering  both  aspects.  These  country  reports  include  both  an 
update  of  the  original  issue tables prepared in  the context  of the INDIREG study, as 
well  as  answers  to  an  additional  new  wide-ranging  questionnaire  summarizing  the 
legal situation and its implementation in the 34 countries.  

The analysis covers both the competent regulatory bodies overseeing the activities of 
public  service  audiovisual  media  services  providers  and  those  competent  in  view  of 
commercial  audiovisual  media  services  providers.  Regulatory  bodies  have  been 
included in the scope of the study regardless of their structure and actual legal status, 
e.g.,  as  an  internal  oversight  board  within  a  public  service  broadcaster  or  a  co-
regulatory  body.  However,  purely  self-regulatory  bodies  have  only  been  considered 
where this has been deemed appropriate due to their prominent role in the regulatory 
setting. 

1.2.  Methodology of the study and structure of the report 

The report is divided mainly into two parts. The first part includes a brief description 
of  the  legal  framework  currently  in  force  at  EU  level  (see  chapter  2).  In  the  second 
part,  an  updated  description  of  the  legal,  institutional  and  regulatory  framework  in 
place in EU Member States and candidate countries and its efficient implementation in 
practice is given (see chapter 3). 

The  consortium  pursued  an  integrated  approach  since  the  legal  paradigms  and  their 
practical implementation are interlinked and both can have a significant impact on the 
real  degree  of  independence  of  a  regulatory  body.  In  doing  so,  a  number  of  criteria 
were identified that contribute to a regulatory authority’s independence and efficiency 
of its work (detailed presentation of the criteria at the beginning of section 3). These 
are  grouped  by  three  main  areas  which  determine  the  structure  of  this  section  of  the 
report: independence, effective functioning and accountability. For each of these areas 
a  number  of  relevant  questions  were  developed  that  were  used  as  basis  to  collect 
information about the situation in the 34 countries covered by this study.  

A  major  share  of  the  data  used  for  the  comparative  analysis  has  been  obtained  from 
country  experts  carefully  selected  from  the  EMR’s  Europe-wide  network  of  contacts 
(EMR  media  network).  A  list  of  the  experts  that  have  contributed  to  the  study  is 
included  in  Annex  1  of  this  report.  The  country  reporters  were  asked  to  revise  the 
tables from the INDIREG study which give bullet point-style answers to a wide range 
of  topics,  mainly  collecting  factual  information.  In  addition,  they  were  asked  to 
complete a detailed set of questions covering all relevant aspects for the study (Annex 
2  contains  the  blank  questionnaire  as  it  was  sent  to  the  experts).  The  completed 
questionnaires  and  updated  tables  are  found  in  the  additional  annexes  joined  to  this 
report (see below).  

In addition to the country reports the results of the study reflect answers received from 
an adapted version of the questionnaire that the regulatory authorities received via the 

18 

 
 
European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services.  (ERGA)  for  which  the 
European  Commission  acts  as  secretariat.  Although  not  all  authorities  answered,  the 
vast majority did or supplied the requested information in other form to the consortium 
so that there was an additional source used to verify the findings of the study. 

The  final  study  report  also  includes  the  insight  gained  from  an  online  stakeholder 
survey, which was carried out between July and August 2015. The survey, which was 
conducted using the online tool LimeSurvey3 was answered by about 15 stakeholders 
which had been informed in multiple ways about the possibility of participating in the 
survey.  Screenshots  of  the  survey  are  included  in  Annex  3  of  this  report  and  a 
summary  of  responses  is  to  be  found  in  section  3.4.  Chapter  3  is  completed  by  a 
schematic overview in table form that shows the main trends of changes that occurred 
since the INDIREG study using traffic light-style indications. 

In order to complement the issue-based description in Chapter 3 of this report, Annex 
4  contains  the  (former)  INDIREG  tables  for  each  analyzed  country  in  the  form  they 
have  been  updated  by the national  experts. In order to  make the changes  visible  that 
occurred since the last study or differences in the perception of certain information, the 
annex  displays  the  questionnaires  using  the  track  changes  mode.  The  annex  is  very 
large and covers about 1,300 pages, which is why it is joined separately to this report. 
Finally,  Annex  5  contains  the  answers  of  the  national  experts  to  the  questionnaire 
developed  by  the  current  consortium  (see  Annex  3)  sorted  by  country.  Again,  this 
annex is very extensive and covers about 400 pages, which is why it can also be found 
as  a  separate  document.  In  addition  to  the  summarized  findings  of  chapter  3  of  the 
study,  these  two  annexes  allow  an  in-depth  study  of  the  situation  in  each  of  the  34 
countries  by  taking  a  closer  look  at  the  questionnaire  answers  and  accompanying 
tables.  For  a  comparative  evaluation  of  the  situation  in  the  analysed  countries,  the 
findings  of  the  report  itself  in  chapter  3  and  the  conclusions  in  chapter  4  are  the 
suggested reading.  

3  

See http://avms-radar.limequery.com/index.php/264918/lang-en  

19 

 
 
                                                 
1.3.  List of regulatory bodies and abbreviations 

The  following  list  is  intended  to  give  an  overview  on  the  relevant  regulatory  bodies 
active  in  the  areas  covered  by  this  report.  At  the  same  time,  it  provides  for  the 
abbreviations used in the subsequent comparative analysis.4 

Albania 

AMA   

Austria 

Autoriteti i Mediave Audiovizive 
Audiovisual Media Authority 

KommAustria 

Kommunikationsbehörde Austria 
Austrian Communication Authority 

Belgium 

MRat (de)  Medienrat der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens 

Medienrat of the German speaking Community of Belgium 

CSA (fr) 

Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel 
High Audiovisual Council 

VRM (fl) 

Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media 
Flemish Regulatory Authority for the Media  

Bulgaria 

CEM   

Croatia 

AEM   

Cyprus 

CRTA  

СЪВЕТ ЗА ЕЛЕКТРОННИ МЕДИИ 
Council for Electronic Media  

Agencija za elektronicke medije 
Agency for Electronic Media of the Republic of Croatia 

Αρχή Ραδιοτηλεόρασης Κύπρου 
Cyprus Radio-Television Authority  

4  

To the extent that other abbreviations for organisations or bodies are  used in this report they are 
explained when they are first mentioned. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
CzechRepublic 

RRTV  

Rada pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání 
Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting  

Denmark 

RTB 

Estonia 

TSA 

Finland 

Radio og tv-nævnet 
Radio and Television Board 

Tehnilise Järelvalve Amet 
Technical Surveillance Authority 

FICORA 

Viestintävirasto 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority  

France 

CSA 

Germany 

brema  

BLM   

LFK 

LfM 

LMK   

LMS 

Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel 
High Audiovisual Council 

Bremische Landesmedienanstalt 
State Media Authority Bremen 

Bayerische Landeszentrale für neue Medien 
State Media Authority Bavaria 

Landesanstalt für Kommunikation Baden Württemberg 
State Media Authority Baden-Württemberg 

Landenstalt für Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen 
State Media Authority North Rhine-Westphalia 

Landeszentrale für Medien und Kommunikation Rheinland-Pfalz 
State Media Authority Rhineland Palatinate 

Landesmedienanstalt Saarland 
State Media Authority Saarland 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LPR Hessen  Hessische Landesanstalt für privaten Rundfunk und neue Medien 

State Media Authority Hesse 

mabb   

Medienanstalt Berlin-Brandenburg 
State Media Authority Berlin-Brandenburg 

MA HSH  Medienanstalt Hamburg/Schleswig-Holstein  

State Media Authority Hamburg/Schleswig-Hostein 

Medienanstalt Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
State Media Authority Mecklenburg-Western-Pomerania 

Medienanstalt Sachsen-Anhalt 
State Media Authority Saxony-Anhalt 

Niedersächsische Landesmedienanstalt 
State Media Authority Lower Saxony 

Sächsische Landesanstalt für privaten Rundfunk und neue Medien 
State Media Authority Saxony 

Thüringer Landesmedienanstalt 
State Media Authority Thuringia 

MMV   

MSA 

NLM   

SLM 

TLM   

Greece 

NCRTV 

Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ραδιοτηλεόρασης  
National Council for Radio and Television  

Hungary 

NMHH 

Agencija za elektronicke medije 
Agency for Electronic Media of the Republic of Croatia 

Iceland 

IMC 

Ireland 

BAI 

Fjölmiðlanefnd 
Icelandic Media Commission 

Údarás Craolacháin na hÉireann 
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 

AGCOM 

Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni  
Communications authority 

Latvia 

NEPLP 

Nacionālā elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome  
National Electronic Media Council  

Lithuania 

RTCL  

Luxembourg 

ALIA   

Macedonia 

AVMU 

Malta 

Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija 
Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania  

Autorité Luxembourgeoise Indépendante de l'Audiovisuel 
Independent Audiovisual Authority of Luxembourg 

Агенција за аудио и аудиовизуелни медиумски услуги 
Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Services 

MBA   

Malta Broadcasting Authority  

Montenegro 

AEM   

Netherlands 

CvdM  

Agencija za elektronske medije 
Agency for Electronic Media of Montenegro  

Commissariaat voor de Media 
Dutch Media Authority 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland 

KRRiT 

Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji  
National Broadcasting Council  

Portugal 

ERC 

Romania 

NAC 

Serbia 

REM   

Spain 

Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social 
Regulatory Authority for the Media  

Consilul National al Audiovizualului  
National Audiovisual Council  

Регулаторно тело за електронске медије 
Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije 
Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media  

CNMC 

Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia 
National Authority for Markets and Competition  

CAC 

CAA 

Sweden 

SBA 

Slovakia 

CBR 

Consell de l'Audiovisual de Catalunya 
Audiovisual Council of Catalonia  

Consejo Audiovisual de Andalucía 
Audiovisual Council of Andalusia  

Myndigheten för radio och tv  
Swedish Broadcasting Authority 

Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu 
Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission of the Slovak Republic 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slovenia 

AKOS   

Turkey 

RTÜK  

Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve Republike Slovenia
Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of
Slovenia 

Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu 
Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council 

United Kingdom 

OFCOM 

Office of Communications 

25 

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 

In  this  chapter  a  brief  overview  will  be  given  of  the  relevant  legal  framework  at 
European  level  that  regards  the  regulatory  bodies  entrusted  with  monitoring 
audiovisual media services. Focus is put on rules or positions that were stated in view 
of such regulatory bodies’ independence. Whilst the main source of relevant texts are 
from  within  the  EU  framework  an  additional  view  will  be  taken  on  other  relevant 
actors.  

2.1.  Requirements  concerning  implementation  of  the  relevant  EU  law  in 

form of the AVMSD 

This  section  provides  an  overview  of  the  relevant  legal  framework  at  EU  level 
concerning the implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Directive 
2010/13/EU, hereinafter: AVMSD)5. 

The  Directive  itself  requires  Member  States  to  ensure,  among  others,  compliance  of 
media service providers with the relevant provisions of national law: Art. 2 AVMSD, 
establishing the home-state-control (better known as the country-of-origin-) principle, 
states in its para. 1 that Member States must; 

“ensure that all audiovisual media services transmitted by media service providers under 
its  jurisdiction  comply  with  the  rules  of  the  system  of  law  applicable  to  audiovisual 
media services intended for the public in that Member State”; 

Additionally, Art. 4(6) AVMSD sets a focus on the obligation of the Member States to 
ensure,  “within  the  framework  of  their  legislation”  and  by  “appropriate  means”,  that 
media service providers effectively comply with the provisions of the Directive.  

The  AVMS  Directive  deliberately  does  not  prescribe  by  which  means  it  must  be 
secured that there is compliance. Provided that the respective rules are in accordance 
with Union law, Member States may enact more detailed or stricter rules in the fields 
coordinated  by  the  Directive  (Art.  4(1)  AVMSD).  The  openness  about  how  the 
implementation takes place also concerns the structures with which it is ensured (what 
this means for the design of the regulatory authorities is discussed below under 2.2.1.).  

5   Directive  2010/13/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  March  2010  on  the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States  concerning  the  provision  of  audiovisual  media  services  (Audiovisual  Media  Services 
Directive, OJ of 15.4.2010, L 95, p. 1. See also Corrigendum, OJ of 6.10.2010, L 263, p. 15. The 
AVMS-Directive is the codified version of the Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination 
of  certain  provisions  laid  down  by  law,  regulation  or  administrative  action  in  Member  States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC and 
Directive 2007/65/EC.  

26 

 
 
                                                 
This first obligation that Member States have to fulfil relates to the “implementation” 
of the Directive’s provisions into their national legal order. Implementation, applying a 
narrow meaning, primarily refers to the transposition of the Directive’s rules into the 
national system of law. The transposition period ended on 19 December 2009.6 

In  order  to  ensure  effective  compliance,  Member  States  are,  secondly,  under  an 
obligation  to  provide  for  a  correct  application  of  the  transposed  rules.  This  entails 
monitoring of the media service providers’ actual pursuit of their activities as falling 
under the scope of the Directive. The Member States enjoy some leeway in respect of 
how this is secured (“appropriate means”). In particular, as long as such systems prove 
effective,  a  random-based  monitoring  of  television  broadcasts  or  of  the  provision  of 
on-demand audiovisual media services may be sufficient. In general, the same applies 
to  a  monitoring  system  based  on  complaints  by  the  viewers  or  competitors,  for 
instance.  

All  Member  States’  branches  of  power  are  obliged  to  ensure  that  a  Directive  is 
properly implemented in national law, entailing the legislature, the administration and 
the judiciary. However, in respect of broadcasting, there is a long-standing tradition in 
almost  all  Member  States  to  have  specialised  media  authorities  in  place  which  are 
responsible,  as  the  case  may  be,  for  licensing  and  monitoring  the  providers  of 
(television)  broadcasting  or  other  (audiovisual)  media  services.  In  this  respect,  the 
Commission has in the past placed some emphasis on a sufficient level of staffing and 
funding of regulatory authorities in the media field.7 

As  regards  the  application  of  the  relevant  provisions  as  well  as  sanctioning  of 
infringements,  the  actual  text  of  the  Directive  using  “appropriate  means”  reflects  an 
earlier  discussion  about  this  issue.  When  the  original  Television  without  Frontiers-
Directive  was  revised  for  the  first  time  (by  Directive  97/36/EC),  the  need  for 
prescribing more in  detail  what  kind  of measures should be used by Member State’s 
competent  authorities in order to avoid or, where violations had previously occurred, 
prevent  future  infringements  of  the  Directive’s  provisions  in  the  way  they  had  been 
implemented in national law.8 Where a EU Directive does not specifically provide any 
sanction for an infringement of the substantive provisions or refers for that purpose to 

6  

7  

8  

under 

found 

The national implementing measures as they were communicated to the European Commission can 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32007L0065 
be 
&qid=1441368589096. An unofficial English translation of all Member States laws transposing the 
AVMSD including synposes can be found at the AVMSD project of the University of Luxembourg 
at 
(http://wwwen.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/droit_des_medias/audiovisual_ 
media_services_directive/national_execution_measures).  

www.medialaw.lu 

  “Furthermore,  the  Commission  notes  that  Member  States  have  devoted  adequate  resources  to 
apply  national  legislation  implementing  the  Directive  effectively.  Independent  regulatory 
authorities have been established and budgets for technical resources as well as staff have been 
considerably increased where they were insufficient.” Fourth Report from the Commission to the 
Council,  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  application  of  Directive  89/552/EEC  “Television  without 
Frontiers”, COM (2002) 778 final, point 2. 

  Scheuer/Ader,  Comments  on  Art.  3  TWFD,  in:  Castendyk/Dommering/Scheuer  (ed.),  European 

Media Law, Alphen a/d Rhijn 2008, paras 6 et seq., 54 et seq. 

27 

 
                                                 
national  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions,  the  Member  States  have  to 
take  all  measures  necessary  to  guarantee  the  application  and  effectiveness  of  Union 
law.  For  that  purpose,  while  the  choice  of  sanctions  remains  within  their  discretion, 
they  must  ensure  in  particular  that  infringements  of  EU  law  lead  to  consequences 
under conditions – both in procedural and substantive aspects –, which are analogous 
to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance 
and  which,  in  any  event,  make  the  sanction  effective,  proportionate  and  having  a 
deterrent effect.9 With regard to employment law for instance, the Court has held that 
where  a  Member  State  chooses  to  penalise  a  breach  of  the  prohibition  on 
discrimination by the award of compensation, that compensation must be adequate in 
relation to the damage occurred and have a deterrent effect.10 

Where recourse to co-regulation is being made, it follows from the AVMS Directive, 
but also from primary European Union law, that the Member States remain responsible 
for the achievement of the results of the Directive. Therefore, independent regulatory 
bodies must be vested with instruments to oversee the actual performance of the self-
regulatory  component  of  the  co-regulatory  system,  and  be  able  to  intervene  where 
necessary. This is to be derived particularly from Art. 4(7) AVMSD: the regime has to 
provide  for  effective  enforcement.11  As  the  study  on  co-regulation  measures  in  the 
media  sector12  has  shown,  co-regulatory  regimes  ‘often’  provide  for  a  sanctioning 
system,13 in other words, not all of the investigated regimes do. Other parameters for 
effectiveness of co-regulatory models include in particular incentives for participation, 
transparency, safeguarding of process objectives, openness to all relevant stakeholders, 
broad  acceptance  by  stakeholders  and  society  (necessitating  complaints  mechanisms 
and awareness campaigns), effective means of enforcement of the co-regulatory rules, 
as  well  as  a  regular  evaluation  of  the  system  together  with  ‘patience’.  Also  a  ‘legal 
back-stop’  is  necessary;  this  is  referred  to  by  Recital  44  as  a  Member  State’s 
possibility to intervene should the objectives of the co-regulatory regime not be met.14 

9  

  CJEU,  Case  68/88,  judgement  of  21  September  1989,  Commission  v.  Greece,  para  23  et  seq., 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:339;  Case  C-7/90,  judgement  of  2  October  1991,  Paul  Vandevenne,  para. 11, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:363;  Case  C-382/92,  judgement  of  8  June  1994,  Commission  v.  United 
Kingdom, para. 55, ECLI:EU:C:1994:233; Case C-383/92, judgement of 8 June 1994, Commission 
v.  United  Kingdom,  para. 40,  ECLI:EU:C:1994:234;  Commission,  COM  (2001)  330  final,  pp. 1 
et seq.;  Hans-Bredow-Institut/Institut  für  Europäisches  Medienrecht,  Study  on  Co-Regulation 
Measures  in  the  Media  Sector,  2006,  pp. 160  et seq.;  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ 
information_society/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/coregul/final_rep_en.pdf. 

10     CJEU,  Case  14/83,  judgement  of  10  April  1984,  von  Colson  and  Kamann,  para. 23  et seq, 

ECLI:EU:C:1984:153. 

11   Cf. also Recital 44 Directive 2010/13/EU. 
12     Hans-Bredow-Institut/Institut für Europäisches Medienrecht (EMR), op.cit (fn. 8). 
13     Kleist/Scheuer,  “Neue  Regelungen  für  audiovisuelle  Mediendienste  –  Vorschriften  zu  Werbung 

und Jugendschutz und ihre Anwendung in den Mitgliedstaaten”, [2006] MMR 206. 

14     Scheuer/Ader, Comments on Art.  3 AVMSD, in:  Castendyk/Dommering/Scheuer (ed.), European 

Media Law, op. cit., p. 863. 

28 

 
 
                                                 
2.2.  Specific rules in the AVMSD governing the independence and efficient 

functioning of regulatory bodies 

2.2.1.  Independence of competent regulatory bodies (Art. 30 AVMSD) 

The  establishment  of  independent  regulatory  bodies  in  the  audiovisual  sector  is  not 
explicitly  prescribed  in  the  AVMS  Directive.  However,  Art.  30  provides  for 
cooperation  rules  among  Member  States  and  between  Member  States  and  the 
Commission,  “notably  through  their  competent  independent  regulatory  bodies”  and 
thereby  mentions  in  the  passing  independent  regulatory  bodies  seemingly  expecting 
their existence already. It is controversial what this wording implies not last due to the 
evolution  of  the  provision  in  the  drafting  stage  where  a  clear  controversy  about  the 
content of such a provision occurred between Commission and Parliament on the one 
side and the Member States’ view in the Council on the other, which ultimately led to 
this compromise.15 It may seem that the provision obliges Member States to introduce 
some specific form of authority which has a certain status, but it could also be seen in 
conjunction  with  the  above  mentioned  provisions  as leaving it to  the Member States 
how  to  organise  (including  the  bodies)  the  Directive’s  implementation  and  this 
provision  only  indicating  that  these  (assumed  pre-existing)  bodies  are  active,  they 
should be involved in the cooperation.  

Article 30 is accompanied by a Recital 94 which is much more detailed as far as the 
regulatory authorities are concerned.16 When applying a strict interpretation, Recital 94 
AVMSD,  which  states  that  the  freedom  is  left  to  the  Member  States  to  choose  “the 
form of their competent independent regulatory bodies” (emphasis added), it could be 
understood that Member States may decide on the concrete design of the body, but not 
on the question whether to establish such body at all.17 Under these preconditions, one 
would have to draw the conclusion that there is an obligation to establish independent 
regulatory  bodies.  However,  this  interpretation  is  too  far-reaching  as  the  substantive 
provision clearly does not go as far as the Recital does which merely contributes to the 
interpretation  but  is itself not binding. This holds especially true as the original draft 
for  the  provision  which  would  indeed  have  supported  such  an  interpretation  was 
quashed in  favour of the current wording (see also infra). Therefore, another opinion 
claims the text does not provide a decision in favour of a duty to establish independent 

15   On  this  development  cf.  Kleist/Scheuer,  “Neue  Regelungen  für  audiovisuelle  Mediendienste  – 
Vorschriften zu Werbung und Jugendschutz und ihre Anwendung in den Mitgliedstaaten”, [2006] 
MMR  206  et  seq.;  Stevens,  Media  regulatory  authorities  in  the  EU  context:  Comparing  sector-
specific  notions  and  requirements  of 
in:  Schulz/Valcke/Irion  (ed.),  The 
independence of the media and its regulatory agencies, Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 83, 87 et seq.  
16   On the distinctions cf. again  Stevens, Media regulatory authorities in the EU context: Comparing 
sector-specific  notions  and  requirements  of  independence,  in:  Schulz/Valcke/Irion  (ed.),  The 
independence of the media and its regulatory agencies, Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 83, 87 et seq. 
17     Cf. on this possible position (if the provision is narrowly analysed by the wording of the Recital) 
in: 
the  general  discussion  at  Scheuer/Palzer,  Comments  on  Art.  23b  AVMSD, 
Castendyk/Dommering/Scheuer (ed.), European Media Law, p. 996. 

independence, 

29 

 
                                                 
regulatory  bodies,  but  would  only see an independent  regulatory body as  optimum.18 
According  to  Art.  30  AVMSD,  the  effective  information  exchange  required  by  this 
provision  can  “notably”  be  ensured  “through  their  competent  independent  regulatory 
bodies”. If one follows this view, under the AVMS Directive Member States may still 
choose whether (and how) to establish an independent regulatory body at all. However, 
where such bodies exist, they would have to be independent.19 

Another  question  which  is  not  clearly  answered  by  the  Directive,  is  what  the  term 
“independent”  means.20  According  to  the  initial  proposal  introduced  by  the 
Commission,  Art.  23b  (1)  AVMSD  would  have  imposed  on  Member  States  the 
obligation to “guarantee the independence of national regulatory bodies and ensure that 
they  exercise  their  powers  impartially  and  transparently”.  Recital  47  of  the  draft 
Amending Directive 2007/65/EC  stated that independence in  this sense should entail 
independence  from  both  national  governments  and  audiovisual  media  service 
providers.  Some  Member  States,  however,  claimed  that  these  rules  were  an 
inappropriate  interference  with  their  national  legislative  competence.  Therefore,  and 
strikingly,  the  original  draft  of  the  provision  requiring  the  setting  up  of  independent 
regulators  was  dropped  together  with  the  formulation  of  the  Recital  due  to  doubts 
based on competency and subsidiarity.21 That draft Recital and the original draft of the 
provision  have  thus  not  been  transferred  to  the  final  version  of  the  Directive  as 
adopted. Hence, a clear legal definition of what, in the context of the AVMS Directive, 
is meant by “independent”, is not available.22  

The current version of Recital 94 AVMSD has, however, retained the idea of Recital 
47 of the draft Amending Directive inasmuch as independence can, at least, be seen as 

18  

Ibid.; Jakubowicz, Keynote speech, EPRA meeting May 2007, available at http://epra3-production. 
s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/1380/original/EPRA_keynote_KJ.pdf?1323685662,  p.  1  et 
seq.; Mastroianni, IRIS Special 2/2009, p. 120. 

19   Scheuer/Palzer,  Comments  on  Art.  23b  AVMSD,  in:  Castendyk/Dommering/Scheuer  (ed.), 
European Media Law, p. 996;  this view is supported more recently by  Stevens, Media regulatory 
the  EU  context:  Comparing  sector-specific  notions  and  requirements  of 
authorities 
independence,  in:  Schulz/Valcke/Irion  (ed.),  The  independence  of  the  media  and  its  regulatory 
agencies, Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 83, 89 et seq., 104.  

in 

20   On the general difficulty of defining the concept of “independence” in the current context  Schulz, 
Approaches to independence, in: Schulz/Valcke/Irion (ed.), The independence of the media and its 
regulatory  agencies,  Bristol/Chicago  2013,  p.  3  et  seq.  In  the  same  volume  it  is  discussed  in  a 
further contribution in contrast to what influence independence should be understood, cf.  Dreyer, 
Locating  a 
the 
operationalization of independence,  in: Schulz/Valcke/Irion (ed.), The independence of the media 
and its regulatory agencies, Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 111, 115-119. 

the  governance  structure:  A 

framework 

theoretical 

regulator 

for 

in 

21   Cf.  briefly  on  this  Dörr,  Die  Kommunikationsfreiheiten  im  Recht  der  Europäischen  Union,  in: 
Dörr/Kreile/Cole  (ed.),  Handbuch  Medienrecht  –  Recht  der  elektronischen  Massenmedien, 
Frankfurt a.M. 2011, no. B 101. 

22   And  even  with  the  original  wording  would  not  have  been  available  immediately,  but  could  have 
been derived from other secondary law in which specific independence requirements are foreseen, 
cf. on this e.g. Stevens, Media regulatory authorities in the EU context: Comparing sector-specific 
notions and requirements of independence, in: Schulz/Valcke/Irion (ed.), The independence of the 
media  and  its  regulatory  agencies,  Bristol/Chicago  2013,  p.  83,  92  et  seq.,  and  would  have 
ultimately been open for interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union.  

30 

 
                                                 
a factor to ensure that the national regulatory bodies’ tasks are carried out impartially 
and transparently and that they contribute to the promotion of media pluralism:  

“[Member States] are free to choose the appropriate instruments according to their legal 
traditions  and  established  structures,  and  notably  the  form  of  their  competent 
independent  regulatory  bodies,  in  order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their  work  in 
implementing  this  Directive  impartially  and  transparently.  More  specifically,  the 
instruments  chosen  by  Member  States  should  contribute  to  the  promotion  of  media 
pluralism.” (emphasis added) 

In addition to the wording of the Directive one can turn to non-EU-documents which 
further  discuss  independence  in  an  attempt  to  define  it  for  regulatory  bodies  in  the 
audiovisual media sector. The Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2000)23 (see 
infra, at 2.4.1. for more details) mentions in point 5, second indent, of the appendix, 
that  members  of  the  regulatory  bodies  “may  not  receive  any  mandate  or  take  any 
instructions  from  any  person  or  body”.  Interference  by  public  and  private  bodies 
should  also  be  prohibited  with  regard  to  the  funding  (see  points  10  and  11  of  the 
appendix) and to the supervision of the regulatory bodies’ activities, which should be 
limited  to  a  legal  oversight  (see  point  26  of  the  appendix).  These  descriptions  are 
attempts  at  shaping  the  content  of  “independence”  with  more  easily  to  discover 
features than just an overarching concept. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning the 
public  consultation  of  the  Commission  held  from  March  to  June  2013  and  directed 
towards collecting views on the issue of independence of national regulatory bodies.23 

2.2.2.  Cooperation (Art. 30 AVMSD) 

Art. 30 AVMSD establishes a specific duty on Member States to cooperate with each 
other and with the European Commission. This cooperation shall consist primarily in 
the  provision  of  information  in  relation  to  the  AVMSD.  When  it  comes  to  the 
information  of the Commission,  such duty on Member States can already be derived 
from  primary  EU  law  as  well,  since  the  Commission  is  entitled  to  request  all 
information  necessary  executing  the  tasks  attributed  to  them.  When  referring 
particularly to Articles 2, 3 and 4 AVMSD, the duty to inform as laid down in Art. 30 
AVMSD aims at achieving a high level of mutual cooperation in such fields that show 
significant  importance  in  relation  to  Member  States’  effective  implementation  of  the 
Directive, foremost having regard to cases in which the key principles of the Directive 
–  home-state-control/country-of-origin-principle  and  freedom  of  reception  and 
retransmission – are at stake. This is highlighted by Recital 95. Both in this Recital as 
well  as  in  Art.  30  AVMSD  it  is  suggested  that  the  information  exchange  from  the 
Member  States’  side  could  be  “notably  [achieved]  through  their  competent 
independent  regulatory  bodies”,  which  puts  the  regulatory  bodies  in  the  focus  of  the 
provision. 

23     The  contributions  to  the  consultation  are  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/ 

public-consultation-independence-audiovisual-regulatory-bodies-read-contributions.  

31 

 
 
                                                 
As  regards  cooperation,  Art.  29  AVMSD  is  worth  mentioning  in  addition.  Therein, 
provision is made for the setting-up and the related tasks of the Contact Committee to 
be composed, on the part of the Member States, of representatives of their competent 
bodies. In this context, it becomes clear that Art. 29 AVMSD reflects on the outcome 
of  the  TWFD  review:  in  its  work  programme  for  the  revision  of  the  TWFD,  the 
Commission  stated  that  the  Contact  Committee  would  play  a  key  role  in  the 
application of the Directive by the Member States and would further constitute an ideal 
forum  for  the  exchange  of  views  and  information  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Member States and among the Member States. Therefore, the Commission decided to 
involve the Contact Committee closely in the implementation of the work programme. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  in  addition  to  this  existing  structure,  in  February 
2014  the  Commission  established  the  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual 
Media  Services  (ERGA),  comprising  high-level  representatives  of  the  national 
audiovisual  media  services  regulatory  authorities.  ERGA  has  been  tasked  with 
advising  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  AVMS  Directive  and  shall 
complement the work of the Contact Committee (see also infra 2.4.3.). 

2.3.  Implementation of the AVMS Directive in non-EU Member States 

Before joining the EU, countries are under the obligation to bring their national laws in 
line with  the EU  acquis, including  – in  the audiovisual field  – the AVMS Directive. 
Promoting the alignment with European standards on media legislation and the AVMS 
Directive  is  one  of  the  initiatives  of  the  European  Commission’s  pre-accession 
strategy. The alignment of legislation and practices with European standards on media 
in  accordance  with  fundamental  democratic  principles  is  an  element  of  the  so-called 
“Copenhagen  criteria”,  and  is  crucial  for  the  promotion  of  cultural  diversity  and  the 
AVMS Directive. 

The  current  pre-accession  countries  have  already  made  substantial  efforts  to  meet 
European  standards  on  media,  and  the  process  of  reform  is  ongoing.  Information  on 
their progress towards meeting the membership requirements in the audiovisual field is 
provided in the EU’s annual progress reports for the candidate and potential candidate 
countries.24  Candidate  countries  and  Iceland  are  included  in  the  study  and  therefore 
observations concerning the situation of the regulatory authorities there are to be found 
in chapter 3 of this report. 

24   The current status of the negotiations including progress reports is available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 

enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm. 

32 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.4.  Other  European 

sources 

concerning 

the 

independence  and 

effectiveness of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies 

2.4.1.  Council of Europe 

On 6 and 7 March 2014, the Council of Europe held a Regional Conference in Tirana, 
Albania,  to  start  a  process  of  defining  key  indicators  for  the  independence  of  media 
regulatory bodies.25 The conference underlined the role of the CoE in setting standards 
and  in  assessing  and  assisting  implementation  processes  in  the  field  of  media.  As  a 
result  of  the  event,  it  was  mentioned  that  the  aim  of  Governments,  Parliaments  and 
civil  societies  should  be  to  establish  and  strengthen  independent  and  efficient  media 
regulatory agencies. 

On  4  June  2014,  in  the  framework  of  the  Project  “Promoting  freedom  of  expression 
and information and freedom of the media in South-East Europe (SEE)” the Council of 
Europe organized a Regional Meeting in Becici-Budva, Montenegro.26 On the basis of 
the  Tirana  Conference  and  with  the  representatives  of  the  regulatory  bodies  from 
Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Macedonia,  Montenegro,  Serbia  and  Kosovo,  the 
CoE  continued  the  work  on  the  definition  of  specific  indicators  for  establishing  and 
monitoring  the  transparency,  responsibility  and  operational  efficiency  of  media 
regulatory bodies.  

As a part of the conference, the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of 
the Republic of Slovenia (AKOS) published a report examining the independence of 
the audiovisual regulators from the perspective of a converged authority.27 The report 
presented  the  positive  and  negative  effects  of  a  converged  regulatory  authority  and 
came to the final conclusion that an existing legal framework is essential, but without a 
“culture of independence”, not even the best legal solutions will have the desired effect 
of independence of the audiovisual regulators. 

2.4.1.1. 

European Convention on Transfrontier Television   

Independent  of these more recent  developments, which are partly directed at specific 
situations  of  regulatory  authorities  in  some  countries,  the  Council  of  Europe  has 

25   See  Council  of  Europe,  Tirana/Albania:  Regional  Conference:  “Indicators  for  Independence  of 
Media  Regulatory  Bodies”  –  Conclusions,  available  at  http://epra3-production.s3.amazonaws. 
com/attachments/files/2337/original/6-
7%20March%20Conclusions%20indicators%20Regulators% 
20independance%20.pdf?1396963062  

26     See  Council  of  Europe,  Becici-Budva/Montenegro:  Regional  Meeting:  “Defining  specific 
indicators  for  establishing  and  monitoring  the  transparency,  responsibility  and  operational 
efficiency 
http://epra3-
media 
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2435/ 
original/CoE%20Regional%20Meeting%20Conclusions%20Final%20Version%20.pdf?14041558
93 

regulatory 

available 

bodies”, 

of 

at 

27   See  Kersevan  Smokvina,  Becici-Budva/Montenegro:  Independence  of  the  audiovisual  regulators: 
the  perspective  of  a  converged  authority, available at http://epra3-production.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
attachments/files/2434/original/SI_CoE_independence_%20IRA_Budva_0614.pdf?1403185733 

33 

 
                                                 
contributed  to  the  discussion  about  independence  and  functioning  of  regulatory 
authorities in the broadcasting or audiovisual media services sector since a long time 
now.  This  is  not  surprising,  as  one  of  the  core  treaties  of  the  CoE  is  the  European 
Convention on Transfrontier Television (ETS No. 132) of 5th May 198928 which was 
developed in parallel to the original Television without Frontiers-Directive. 

The  convention  itself  does  not  deal  with  implementing  structures  in  the  ratification 
states  as  it  concerns  mainly  substantive  provisions  about  goals  and  joint  values  in 
broadcasting policies as well as some fundamental rules which reflect the Directive’s 
provisions.  Article  6  of  the  Convention  about  supply  of  information  by  broadcasters 
does mention competent authorities (licensing authorities) and this can typically be the 
regulatory  authorities  in  charge  of  monitoring  audiovisual  media  services.  Such 
authorities can be the same as the ones communicated by the Member States (if it is 
not  a  competent  ministry)  according  to  Art.  19  (2)  CTT  which  are  in  charge  for 
contributing to  supporting each other in applying the convention. Both provisions do 
not, however, indicate any specific information about what type of authority (and even 
whether it has to be the regulatory authority) this should be. 

Because of the relevance of regulatory authorities in connection with the aims pursued 
by  the  CTT  and  the  human  rights  impact  –  especially  concerning  Art.  10  ECHR  – 
which is a core activity of the CoE, the Council has contributed with important texts 
by its different bodies. 

2.4.1.2.  Recommendation Rec(2000)23 

Recommendation  Rec(2000)23  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  the  Member  States 
on  the  independence  and  functions  of  regulatory  authorities  for  the  broadcasting 
sector29 sets out that with regard to the regulation in the broadcasting sector 

 

 

independent regulatory authorities should be established (item a), 

regulatory authorities should be vested with powers required to fulfil their missions 
in  an  effective,  independent  and  transparent  manner  and  in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines set out in the appendix (item b). 

The  guidelines  include  detailed  recommendations  on  all  three  aspects  referred  to  in 
item  b):  the  effective  functioning  of  the  regulatory  authorities, their independence as 
well  as  their  transparency.  It  should  be  noted,  that  recommendations  adopted  by  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  under  Art.  15  lit.  b  of  the  Statue  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
address the governments of the CoE member states, but being recommendations only 
encourage these to act in that sense without having legally binding force. However, the 

28   The consolidated version reflecting the amendments by the Protocol (ETS No. 171) is available at 

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/treaties/Html/132.htm.  

29     The  Recommendation  Rec(2000)23  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  the  Member  States  on  the 
independence  and  functions  of  regulatory  authorities  for  the  broadcasting  sector  is  available  at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec%282000%29023&expmem_EN.asp 

34 

 
                                                 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  draws  on  these  recommendations  when 
interpreting the ECHR.30 

2.4.1.3.  Declaration of 26 March 2008 

In  its  more  recent  Declaration  on  the  independence  and  functions  of  regulatory 
authorities for the broadcasting sector31, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe  refers  to  the  above-mentioned  Recommendation  and  again  stresses  the 
importance  to  provide  for  adequate  and  proportionate  regulation  of  the  broadcasting 
sector, in order to guarantee the freedom of the media. In this vein, the Committee of 
Ministers affirms that 

“the  ‘culture  of  independence’  should  be  preserved  and,  where  they  are  in  place, 
independent  broadcasting  regulatory  authorities  in  member  states  need  to  be  effective, 
transparent and accountable.” 

In particular, the Declaration calls on Member States to 

“provide the legal, political, financial, technical and other means necessary to ensure the 
independent functioning of broadcasting regulatory authorities, so as to remove risks of 
political or economic interference.” 

The Committee of Ministers also addresses national regulatory authorities and invites 
them to 

“be  conscious  of  their  particular  role  in  a  democratic  society  and  their  importance  in 
creating  a  diverse  and  pluralist  broadcasting  landscape  [and  to]  contribute  to  the 
entrenchment  of  a  ‘culture  of  independence’  and,  in  this  context,  develop  and  respect 
guidelines that guarantee their own independence and that of their members.” 

Declarations of the Committee of Ministers evidently also have no binding force, but 
reflect important conclusions of Member States’ representatives in this organ. 

30   On the role of the ECtHR in deriving key elements concerning independence of authorities mainly 
from  Art.  10  ECHR  cf.  Valcke/Voorhoof/Lievens,  Independent  media  regulators:  Condition  sine 
qua non for freedom of expression?, in: Schulz/Valcke/Irion (ed.), The independence of the media 
and its regulatory agencies, Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 55, 66 et seq.  

31     The  Declaration  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  on  the  independence  and  functions  of  regulatory 
is  available  at 

the  broadcasting  sector,  adopted  on  26  March  2008, 

authorities  for 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM 

35 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.4.2.  European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA) 

The  European  Platform  of  Regulatory  Authorities  (EPRA)  gathers  52  national 
regulatory  bodies  in  Europe.32  It  provides  an  open  platform  for  discussions  and 
particularly exchange of information on a wide variety of relevant topics to regulators. 

Some  EPRA  members  (Austria,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Estonia,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Israel,  Italia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey) issued a common Statement on 
9  May  200333  emphasising  the  importance  of  the  independence  of  broadcasting 
regulators, particularly with regard to the dismissal of members, which should only be 
possible in cases of incompatibility, incapacity or on the grounds of an offence, subject 
to a final court sentence. 

Recently,  the  topic  of  independence  and  the  structure  of  (converging)  regulators  has 
been in the focus of attention of the organization. EPRA inter alia devoted important 
parts of its two meetings in 2014 to independent regulatory bodies. For this purpose, 
EPRA announced, in its annual work programme for the year 2014,34 on the one hand 
to  analyse  the  responses  to  the  consultation  of  the  European  Commission  on  the 
independence  of  national  regulatory  bodies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  association 
intended  to  look  at  tools  and  best  practices  to  strengthen  independence  and  try  to 
explore whether the definition of independence is changing. 

An  analysis  of  the  above-mentioned  consultation  took  place  at  EPRA’s 39th meeting 
from  4  to  6  June  2014  in  Budva,  Montenegro.  EPRA  analyzed  the  responses  of  the 
national  regulatory  bodies  to  the  Commission’s  consultation  on  independent  media 
regulation  and  the  freedom  and  pluralism  of  the  media,  which  was  held  in  spring 
2013.35  

As  a  basis  for  this  meeting,  a  report  explained  that  there  is  still  a need to  assess the 
concept  of  independence  from  the  point  of  view  of  recent  developments  and 
initiatives.36  According  to  the  report,  the  existing  provisions  and  especially  those 

32     The European Commission and the Council of Europe participate in the work of EPRA as standing 

observers, and so does the European Audiovisual Observatory. 

33   EPRA, Statement on the independence of broadcasting regulators with the list of signatories, 17th 
EPRA  meeting:  Naples, 
http://epra3-
8-9  May 
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/1355/original/Statement_amended_signed_en.pdf
?1418057900 

available 

2003, 

Italy, 

at 

34     See 

EPRA  Annual  Work 

http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2321/original/ANNUAL_WORK_%20PROGRA
MME_2014_EN.pdf?1393239456.   

Programme 

available 

2014, 

for 

at 

35     See 

EPRA  Annual  Work 

http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2321/original/ANNUAL_WORK_%20PROGRA
MME_2014_EN.pdf?1393239456. 

Programme 

available 

2014, 

for 

at 

36     See Culahovic, Budva/Montenegro: Introduction, Objectives and Structure of the Working Group, 
http://epra3-production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2391/original/WG 

at 

available 
IndependenceNRA_intro.pdf?1401177725. 

36 

 
                                                 
contained  in  the  AVMS  Directive  (particularly  Art.  30)  do  not  offer  adequate 
safeguards for the establishment of an independent regulatory agency. 

According to the EPRA report, the responses have confirmed that the independence of 
national  regulatory  bodies  is  a  very  important  aspect  for  the  efficient  functioning  of 
regulatory  agencies  and  that  –  with  regard  to  the  existing  connection  between  the 
media and the regulatory bodies – a lack of independence can have a significant effect 
on  freedom  and  pluralism  of  the  media.37  EPRA  also  made  assessments  on  the 
influence  of  the  independence  of  national  regulatory  bodies  on  the  exercise  of 
regulatory tasks.38 It pointed out that the indicators defined by the INDIREG study of 
February  2011  are  a  good  tool  for  measuring  independence.39  Finally,  the  objectives 
and  the  content  of  the  initiatives  of  the  Council  of  Europe  concerning  the 
independence of regulators were mentioned and discussed. 

The  discussion  about  tools  and  best  practices  to  strengthen  independence and on the 
potential changes to the definition of independence took place at the 40th meeting in 
Tbilisi, Georgia, from 8 to 10 October 2014.40 The session also aimed at exploring key 
prerequisites  and  essential  work  processes  to  ensure  independence,  the  impact  of 
effectiveness and transparency on independence and the role of industry, civil society, 
European  and  international  institutions  in  ensuring  independence  from  political 
pressure.  The  meeting  featured  a  presentation  and  panel  discussion  on  methods  of 
measurement  of  de  facto  independence  and  an  overview  of  the  findings  of  the 
INDIREG  stakeholder  survey  with  regard 
to  positive  correlations  between 
transparency  and  accountability  on  the  one  hand  and  an  impartial  regulation  on  the 
other. 

Already  at  prior  meetings,  EPRA  had  dealt  with  questions  referring  to  the 
independence  and  efficiency  of  national  regulatory  bodies.  For  example,  the  33rd 
meeting  was  directed  towards  the  analysis  and  discussion  of  some  key  factors  for 
independence of regulatory bodies as a precondition for their effective functioning in 
the  light  of  the  then  running  INDIREG  study.41  In  addition,  this  meeting  included  a 
presentation  of  commercial  broadcasters  that  took  the view that political  pressure on 

37     See  Culahovic,  Budva/Montenegro:  Summary  of 

the  WG,  available  at  http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2436/original/Budva%20WG2%20summary.pdf?
1405508378 

38     See Culahovic, Budva/Montenegro: Background document – Analysis of NRAs Responses to the 
Commission’s  Consultation  (Final  public  version  of  15  July),  available  at  http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2392/original/WGIndependenceNRA_paper_revi
sed_final.pdf?1405507179 

39     See  Culahovic,  Budva/Montenegro:  Summary  of 

the  WG,  available  at  http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2436/original/Budva%20WG2%20summary.pdf?
1405508378 

40   See the meeting documents at http://www.epra.org/meetings/tbilisi-40th-epra-meeting. 
41     See Culahovic, Ohrid/Macedonia: Effective functioning of Regulatory Authorities: Focus on issues 
of Independence and Governance of Regulatory Authorities as a follow-up to the INDIREG study 
– 
the  Session,  available  at  http://epra3-production.s3. 
amazonaws.com/attachments/files/1814/original/Plenary2_Introduction_Objectives_final.pdf?1328
692934. 

Introduction  &  Objectives  of 

37 

 
                                                 
broadcasters  is  constantly  growing  and  multiplying.42  Therefore,  a  truly  independent 
national regulatory body could function as an essential ally to the broadcasters. 

At the 34th Meeting, EPRA took a detailed look at the way national regulatory bodies 
are practically ensuring and controlling compliance with relevant legal provisions.43 In 
this  vein,  the  meeting  looked  at  the  monitoring  of  on-demand  audiovisual  media 
services and discussed the specific challenges that these new media services can cause 
for  the  tasks  and  the  duties  of  national  regulatory  bodies.  EPRA  also  analyzed  the 
cooperation between national regulatory bodies in Europe in the field of monitoring. 

These  texts  provide  helpful  background  information  and  they  contribute  to  the 
discussion about  regulatory authorities’ independence and how this  affects  efficiency 
from an “insider view” of the concerned regulators.  

2.4.3.  European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) 

On 3 February 2014, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 
(ERGA) was established by a decision of the European Commission in view of Art. 30 
AVMSD and the cooperation requirement set forth in that provision. ERGA consists 
of the heads of the independent regulatory agencies in the field of audiovisual media 
services, whilst the European Commission provides the secretariat. 

In  both  its  work  programmes  for  2014  and  2015,  ERGA  defined  the  topic  of  the 
independence of audiovisual regulatory bodies as one of two main subjects for the year 
2014.44 

Therefore,  ERGA  established  a  subgroup  that carries out  an in-depth  analysis on the 
term  of  independence  applied  to  audiovisual  regulatory  bodies.45  With  regard  to  a 
different  understanding  of  the  term  of  independence  in  the  various  countries,  the 
ERGA  subgroup  shall  consult  the  work  already  done  on  this  area  by  EPRA, 
academics, the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the Council of Europe 
and others, in order to create common conclusions on this subject. 

42     See  ACT,  Ohrid/Macedonia:  Industry’s  perspective:  private  broadcasters’  viewpoint  on  the 
independence  of  regulators,  available  at  http://epra3-production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/ 
files/139/original/plenary2ACT_rossbiggam.pdf?1323685223. 

43     See  Machet, Brussels/Belgium: Efficient Functioning of Regulators: Approaches to Monitoring  – 
http://epra3-production.s3.amazonaws.com/ 

Background 
available 
attachments/files/1875/original/session2_Monitoring_final.pdf?1328690464. 

document, 

at 

44   See  ERGA  Work  Programme  for  2014,  available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/ 

en/news/erga-work-programme-2014. 

21  October 

45   The outcome of the first subgroup meeting is summarised in the minutes of the 2nd ERGA Meeting 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
(2014) 

of 
information_society/newsroom/ 
cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=7968. More recently, an (internal) survey was conducted by ERGA 
between its members concerning independence factors of regulatory authorities.  

available 

ERGA 

2014, 

14, 

at: 

38 

 
 
                                                 
The  subgroup  also  adopted  a  statement  setting  out  the  need  for  principles  and 
approaches  regarding  independence  of  regulatory  agencies  shared  by  all  EU  member 
states.46 

46   ERGA  statement  on  the  independence  of  NRAs  in  the  audiovisual  sector,  ERGA  (2014)03, 

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=7310. 

39 

 
                                                 
3. 

ISSUE-BASED  ANALYSIS  OF  LEGAL, 
INSTITUTIONAL  AND  REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK  IN  EU  MEMBER  STATES  AND  CANDIDATE  COUNTRIES  AND  ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE 

In  order  to  measure  independence  of  a  regulatory  authority  (de  iure  as  well  as  de 
facto),  a  set  of  criteria  have  been  established  by  the  consortium  on  the  basis  of  an 
evaluation  of  European  requirements,  previous  studies  in  this  area47  as  well  as 
observations by the consortium. They were refined based on the information received 
by correspondents in their country reports.  

These  criteria  can  be  grouped  according  to  three  main  areas  which  determine  the 
structure  of  this  section  of  the  report:  independence  (section  3.1.),  effective 
functioning  (section  3.2.)  and  accountability  (section  3.3.).  For  each  of  the  self-
explanatory criteria the information form the different sources this study is based upon 
–  mainly  the  country  reports  –  were  joined.  Although  a  complete  overview  of  all 
countries is given for each of the criteria, changes compared to the situation in 2009/10 
or important observations in specific countries are highlighted in the analysis.  

While some general  remarks (section 3.1.1.) commence with  an analysis of the legal 
status  of  regulatory  authorities  and  by  discussing  where  independence  is  defined  by 
law as a value, the detailed evaluation of governance rules (section 3.1.2.) is intended 
to  assert  the potential of external  influence on regulatory authorities via appointment 
procedures  for  Board  chairpersons  and  members  and  corresponding  rules  preventing 
conflicts of interest. As the decision on a regulatory authorities’ financial means also 
influences  its independence, the study assesses the kinds and sources of funding, the 
funding  bodies  and  the  involvement  of  different  parties  in  establishing  the  budget 
(section 3.1.3.). 

As the objective of the study is not only to present the legal framework pertaining to 
independence,  but  also  the  question  of  efficiency  of  the  regulatory  authorities’ 
functioning,  in  the  section  on  effective  functioning  an  assessment  of  the  range  of 
instruments  available  to  the  regulatory  authorities  in  order  to  effectively  fulfill  their 
mandate  is  undertaken.  Typically  these  instruments  cover  regulatory, monitoring and 
sanctioning powers (section 3.2.1.). A further indicator of independence in this regard 
is  the  degree  of  international  cooperation  between  regulatory  authorities  in  order  to 
avoid  that  bodies  act  in  an  isolated  way  and  to  better  understand  the  international 
dimension of the authorities’ work (section 3.2.2.). 

47   See inter alia Irion/Ledger, Measuring independence: Approaches, limitations, and a new ranking 
tool,  in:  Schulz/Valcke/Irion  (ed.),  The  independence  of  the  media  and  its  regulatory  agencies, 
Bristol/Chicago 2013, p. 139 et seq; Mutu, The Independence of National Media Regulators across 
Europe:  A  Comparative  Perspective,  available  at  http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/58-
200.pdf;  Gibbons,  „Club  government“  and 
in: 
Price/Verhulst/Morgan  (ed.),  Routledge  Handbook  of  Media  Law,  Abingdon  2013,  p. 47 et seq.  
with a strong focus on the situation in the UK; Puppis//Maggetti/Gilardi/Biela/Papadopoulos, The 
Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies, in Swiss Political Science Review, 
Volume 20, 2014, pages 388 et. seq. 

independence 

regulation, 

in  media 

40 

 
                                                 
A  final  set  of  criteria  affecting  an  authority’s  independence  is  to  be  found  in  the 
obligations an authority has towards other bodies and the public. Formal accountability 
(section  3.3.1.)  is  understood  as  describing  reporting  obligations  towards  statutory 
organs,  while  transparency  requirements  (section  3.3.2.)  are  intended  to  inform  the 
public about the activities of the regulatory authority. Finally, the analysis of judicial 
review processes (3.3.3.) takes a look at the position of an authority and its decisions 
in  the  national  judicial  system  in  order  to  evaluate  the  extent  of  the  legal  effect  its 
decisions have. 

3.1.  Independence 

3.1.1.  General Remarks 

3.1.1.1.  Legal status48  

Except  for  Estonia,  separate  regulatory  authorities  are  established  in  all  countries 
covered by this study.49 These take different forms and are named in a variety of ways 
depending  on  national  legal  orders  but  they  all  are  the  same  inasmuch  that  they 
constitute distinct entities.  

In Estonia, the regulator takes the form of an executive authority which is attached to 
the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Communications.  Under  the  INDIREG  study, 
regulatory  powers  rested  with  the  Estonian  Ministry  of  Culture,  (more  precisely  the 
Department of media and copyright and neighbouring rights) which transferred them in 
2008.  The  Tehnilise  Järelevalve  Amet  (TJA)  is  a  governmental  authority  which 
operates within the ministry, exercising powers of state supervision and enforcement.50 
The  authority  comprises  three  departments,  one  of which being the Communications 
and  Media  services  Department  responsible  for  overseeing  the  market  for  linear  and 
non-linear  audiovisual  media  services.51 The re-structuring in  Estonia has shifted the 
task  of  implementing  the  AVMSD  from  one  governmental  authority  under  the 
umbrella  of  one  ministry  to  another  ministry.  This  is  particularly  striking  as 
reorganisations  undertaken  since  the  publication  of  the  INDIREG  study  in  other 
countries  have  led  to  a  clearer  separation  of  structures  of  the  regulatory  body  on  the 

48   This section also addresses structural changes to existing and the establishment of new regulatory 
bodies  in  some  countries.  In  subsequent  sections,  these  changes  are  not  separately  referred  to 
unless they have also led to an (additional) substantial change with regard to the matter analysed in 
that  specific  section,  although  obviously  a  new  body  typically  means  a  change  in  most  areas 
discussed in this report. 

49   Albania, Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

50  See  Art.  70 

(1)  Government  of 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/517112014001/consolide.  
In  its  annual  report  of  2014,  the  Estonian  Technical  Regulatory  Authority  considers  itself  as  an 
“integral  state  agency”,  p.  6.  The  annual 
in  English  at 
http://www.tja.ee/public/documents/TJA/Aastaraamatud/TJA_aastaraamat_A4_ENG_online.pdf.  

the  Republic  Act, 

report  2014 

is  available 

in  English 

available 

at 

51   See the annual report 2014 of the Estonian Technical Regulatory Authority, p. 48.  

41 

 
                                                 
  
one  hand  and  the  relevant  national  Ministry  on  the  other  hand.  While  the  Estonian 
Ministry  appears  not  to  be  empowered  to  instruct  the  TJA,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the 
regulator remains closely linked to a government body also under the new structure. It 
lacks an independent legal status52 and is moreover integrated in the structures of the 
ministry.  Although there are no signs that this  set-up has  been abused  to  date  by the 
government to influence the decisions of the TJA, a certain risk that this might happen 
in the future is inherent in the current structures. This situation therefore may give rise 
to certain concerns about the independence of the Estonian regulator, if there would be 
a different governmental approach to the issue in future.  

In  Sweden  a  new  legislation  was  passed,  too,  concerning the regulatory authority. In 
mid-2010 the Swedish Myndigheten för radio och tv was installed to replace the Radio 
and Television Authority as well as the Swedish Broadcasting Commission. The new 
Swedish  Broadcasting  Authority  appears  to  have  maintained  ties  to  the  Swedish 
Ministry of Culture but the Ministry cannot intervene in the way the Authority applies 
the law, which includes the way it handles individual cases.    

Another  significant  development  occurred  in  Luxembourg  where  an  independent 
regulatory body, the Autorité luxembourgeoise indépendante de l’audiovisuel (ALIA) 
was created in mid-2013 by a major revision of the law. This new authority  replaces 
the  Conseil  National  de  Programmes  (CNP),  an  independent  advisory  body  and  the 
previous regulatory functions of the Service de Médias et Communications (SMC), a 
department of the Ministry responsible for the media. The SMC continues to exist as a 
governmental service, but all regulatory functions are now solely vested in ALIA. 

In  addition,  several  changes  have  been  effectuated  in  a  number  of  other  countries, 
which explicitly or implicitly impact on the position of the regulatory authority within 
the national legal framework. In Albania and France, new laws were passed in 2013, 
which  underline  the  independent  status  of  the  Albanian  Autoriteti  i  mediave 
audiovizive (AMA) and the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA)53, respectively. 
Furthermore,  constitutional  changes  to  the jurisdiction of  the Austrian administrative 
courts  in  2010  have  had  implications  for  the  review  of  decisions  taken  by 
KommAustria. With this reorganization the review is now no more done internally at 
the  authority  but 
the  Bundesverwaltungsgericht  (Federal 
Administrative  Court).  In  Estonia,  Spain  (at  federal  level),  Hungary  and  Slovenia, 
converged  regulatory  bodies  have  been  established  since  the  conclusion  of  the 
INDIREG  study.  These  amendments  to  national  legislation  were  accompanied  with 
changes in the regulatory framework.       

is  carried  out  by 

52   Art. 2 of the law establishing the TJA makes clear the in performing its duties, the TJA represents 
the state. See the statute of the TJA Tehnilise Järelevalve Ameti põhimäärus of 2007, available at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/102072014002.  

53   For further reading on the French law of November 2013 see Franceschini, Les Points Clés de La 
Loi Du 15 Novembre 2013 ‘Relative À L’indépendance de L’audiovisuel Public, Revue Lamy de 
Droit de l'Immatériel 2014, p. 38-40; Kamina, JurisClasseur Propriété Littéraire et Artistique 2014, 
Cadre Administratif, Communication Audiovisuelle, II., para. 35.  

42 

 
                                                 
3.1.1.2. 

Independence as a value 

The independence of regulatory authorities is reinforced where it is recognized by the 
national  legal  framework.  In  all  countries  except  for  Estonia,  independence  is 
enshrined,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  in  the  national  legal  order.54  In  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  States,  independence  is  expressly  referred  to  in  national 
laws.  Similarly,  national  judiciaries  (typically  supreme  courts)  may  have  carved  out 
and ensured the independence of regulatory bodies according to national constitutions 
as for example in Germany and Poland.  

Where  independence  is  not  recognized  in  legislation,  it  may  find  expression  in 
executive measures. In Denmark, for instance, an internal order of the Radio- og TV-
Nævnet (RTB) refers to its independence. In Finland, by contrast, independence is only 
recognized implicitly.  

Recent  developments  in  certain  countries  have  led  to  more  explicit  forms  of 
recognition of authorities’ independence. As mentioned above, in Albania and France 
the  national  laws  were  changed  in  2013  to  include  an  express  reference  to  the 
independence  of  the  regulatory  authorities.  In  Albania,  in  particular,  such  direct 
wording is crucial to assert the independence of the AMA which is struggling with the 
Communist legacy including impartiality of courts, excessive length of procedures and 
corruption.  What  is  more,  a  new  regulatory  body,  the  ALIA  was  created  in 
Luxembourg  in  2013.  Not  only  does  the  name  of  the  regulatory  body  reflect 
considerations  of  independence,  the  legal  provisions,  which  were  inserted  into  the 
national media law also contain several explicit references to its independence.55  

3.1.2.  Governance rules  

3.1.2.1.  Composition  and  appointment  of  the  highest  decision-making 

organ  

An  important  indicator  for  the  independence  of  a  regulatory  body  from  external 
influence  is  the  set  of  rules  governing  the  appointment  of  members  of  the  highest 
decision-making  organ  within  the  body.  It  is  this  organ  (hereinafter  “the  Board”), 
which has the greatest influence on the actual implementation of the regulatory body’s 
policy  and  on  the  fulfilment  of  its  tasks  in  practice.  Recognising  that  complete 
independence  from  any  third-party  influence  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  be 

54   Albania, Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

55   Art. 35 (1) Loi du 27 juillet 1991 sur les médias électroniques, Mém. A – 47, 30.07.1991, p. 972 as 
amended  by  Loi  du  27  août  2013  portant  création  de  l’établissement  public  « Autorité 
luxembourgeoise indépendante de l’audiovisuel », Mém. A – 163, 09.09.2013, p. 3114.  

43 

 
 
 
                                                 
achieved as the regulatory body is unable to produce its own resources to a sufficient 
extent,  it  is  of  crucial  importance  that  the  Board  members  can  ensure  independence  
e.g.  by  representing  all  stakeholders  in  a  balanced  way,  so  that  no  party  alone  has  a 
decisive say. 

In  this  vein,  a  closer  look  needs  to  be  taken  into  both  the  procedure  that  has  to  be 
followed  when  appointing  the  members  of  the  Board  and  the  substantial  criteria 
candidates  have  to  fulfil  to  be  eligible  for  membership  (qualification,  professional 
expertise, absence of conflicts of interests etc.). 

3.1.2.1.1.   Number of Board members 

The  influence  any  single  member  has  on  the  implementation  of  the  Board’s  powers 
depends  significantly  on  its  total  number  of  members:  the  smaller  this  number,  the 
greater the influence of a single Board member on the decisions taken by the Board. 
However,  if  the  Board  actually  consists  of  a  single  representative  (e.g.  a  Director), 
independence  of  this  person  cannot  be  guaranteed  by  balancing  external  influences 
within the organ. Instead, it needs to be ensured by other means that influence exerted 
by third parties on this person is reduced to a minimum. 

The number of Board members in the countries covered by this study ranges between 
one and 77. An individual acts as the highest decision-making body in Estonia (as far 
as the competences of the Director-General of the Technical Surveillance Authority are 
concerned),  Finland,  Slovenia56  and  –  depending  on  the  issue  to  be  dealt  with  –  in 
some  set-ups  of  the  Austrian  KommAustria.  The  other  end  of  size  of  Boards  is  the 
ZDF-Fernsehrat  (Television  Council  of  the  Zweites  Deutsches  Fernsehen,  a 
nationwide  public  television  broadcaster),  which  is  one  of  the  regulatory  bodies’ 
Boards  in  Germany,  which  features  77  members.57  Because  of  this  very  wide  range, 
the calculation of an average number of Board Members would not allow to derive any 
useful information. However, it can be noted that in most countries apart from the ones 
mentioned  above,  the  number  of  Board  Members  is  between  three58  and  1359.  In 

57  

56   The  renaming  of  the  Agency  for  Post  and  Electronic  Communication  (APEK)  to  “Agency  for 
communication  networks  and  services  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia”  (AKOS)  has  not  led  to  any 
difference in this regard. 
It should be noted, however, that the ZDF-Fernsehrat is currently undergoing a reform, which will 
result  in  the  reduction  of  its  members  to  60.  This  reform  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the  Prime 
Ministers of the German Länder (and is intended to enter into force on Jan. 1st, 2016) following a 
judgment  by  the  German  Federal  Constitutional  Court  which  declared  the  current  composition 
unconstitutional; cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 25 March 2014, case no. 1 BvF 1/11 
and 1 BvF 4/11, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:fs20140325.1bvf000111. See also Docquir/Müller/Gusy, 
Does  the  complexity  of  institutional  structures  in  federal  states  influence  the  independence  of 
in: 
AVM  regulatory  authorities?  A  review  of 
Schulz/Valcke/Irion (ed.), The independence of the media and its regulatory agencies,  op. cit., p. 
249, 267.   

the  cases  of  Germany  and  Belgium, 

58   Belgium,  Flemish-speaking  Community:  VRM  management  board;  Belgium,  German-speaking 
Community: MRat-ADV board (The MRat-Bureau which shall assist the MRat, shall be equipped, 
according to a Government decree, with three staff members. In practice, however, only two staff 

44 

 
                                                 
Germany,  the  number  of  Board  members  (except  for  the  ZDF-Fernsehrat)  varies, 
depending on the regulatory body, between five60 and 7461. 

While  in  some  countries,  the  number  of  members  of  the  Board  has  been  reduced, 
compared to the situation as examined by the INDIREG study62, it has been increased 
in  others63.  In  more  than  half  of  the  analysed  countries,  however,  the  number  has 
remained  the  same.  Where  the  number  of  Board  members  has  changed,  several 
underlying reasons can be observed. In Latvia, where the number was reduced, as well 
as  in  Iceland,  where  the  number  was  increased,  new  regulatory  bodies  have  been 
introduced with new compositions of the highest decision-making organs. In Spain, the 
number of Board members of the newly established market surveillance authority, the 
Comisión  Nacional  de  los  Mercados  y  la  Competencia  (CNMC),  has  been  extended 
from  nine  to  ten,  in  comparison  to  the  previous  authority,  the  Consejo  Estatal  de 
Medios Audiovisuales (CEMA). 

3.1.2.1.2.   Socio-economic background of Board members 

Concerning the composition of the Board, the requirements that members have to fulfil 
vary  to  a  high  degree. Most Boards are composed of members representing different 
socio-economic  groups,  ranging  from  Government  and  Parliament,  civil  society  and 
industry  (particularly  the  sectors  regulated  by  the  regulatory  body)  to  academics, 
professionals and other renowned experts in the fields of regulation. 

In the majority of countries, at  least  some members of the Board need to be experts. 
However, at least 15 countries have not explicitly laid down such a requirement in the 
law. Civil society needs to be represented only in a few countries, including Belgium 
(French  Community  (at  least  1)  and  German-speaking  Community  (5)),  Germany 

have been assigned (part-time) with this task yet. They are financed by the Ministry of the German-
speaking Community and are located within the Ministry’s premises.); Netherlands: CvdM Board. 
59   The Czech RRTV board consists of 13 members. Overall, the number of board members lies in the 
range  between  three  and  13  members  in  the  following  countries:  Albania,  Austria  (some 
KommAustria configurations), Belgium (Flemish-speaking Community; French Community: CSA 
Bureau  and  CAC  board;  German-speaking  Community: MRat-REG board (for the MRat-Bureau 
see  comment  in  fn.  57),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain,  France, 
Germany  (some  Länder),  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Serbia, Sweden, Slovakia, Turkey, UK (Ofcom, ATVOD, BBC Trust). 

60   Executive  Board  of  the  LfK,  the  regulator  for  commercial  media  in  Baden-Wurttemberg,  and 

Media Council of the SLM, the regulator for commercial media in Saxony. 

61   Broadcasting  Council  of  the  Südwestrundfunk  (SWR),  the  main  public  broadcaster  for  Baden-

Wurttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. 

62   Bulgaria,  Germany  (3  regional  regulatory  bodies),  Spain  (CAC),  France,  Italy,  Lithuania, 
Macedonia,  Sweden.  It  should  be  underlined,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  Sweden,  the  new 
regulatory body has been created by merging the Swedish Broadcasting Commission, the Board of 
which  featured  11  members,  and  the  Swedish  Radio  and  TV  Authority,  which  had  no  board  but 
was led by the Director-General as an individual. 

63   Albania, Belgium (German-speaking Community), Germany (three regulatory bodies), Sweden (if 
compared  to  the  former  Swedish  Radio  and  TV  Authority’s  Director-General;  cf.  previous 
footnote). 

45 

 
                                                                                                                                             
(some  Länder)64,  Denmark  (1),  Iceland  (1,  nominated  by  academia),  Lithuania  (15, 
compared to 6, as at the time of the INDIREG study), Montenegro (2) and Slovakia. In 
Albania, civil society groups (as well as some professional associations) may propose 
Board  candidates  upon  invitation  by  the  Parliamentary  commission  competent  for 
nominating  Board  members,  but  these  candidates  do  not  officially  represent  that 
particular group. Industry representatives are usually not allowed to be members of the 
Board. However, in Ireland and Spain, no specific rules exist in this regard. In Belgium 
(French  and  German-speaking  Communities)  and  Montenegro,  at  least  one  of  the 
regulatory  body’s  decision-making  bodies 
industry 
representatives.  The  United  Kingdom’s  Authority  for  Television  On  Demand 
(ATVOD),  in  line  with  its  then  self-regulatory  role,  previously  exclusively  featured 
representatives of the industry sector to be regulated, but has recently been transformed 
into  an  independent  co-regulatory  body,  with  only  four  out  of  its  nine  members 
representing  the  industry.  The  remaining  five  members  are  independent  and  do  not 
have to represent any particular segment of society.65 

is  partly  made  up  of 

The  laws  in  some  countries  do  not  provide  for  certain  socio-economic  groups  to  be 
represented  on  the  Board,  but  instead  require  members  to  be  nominated  and/or 
appointed by these groups.66 

Political  powers,  such  as  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government,  other  Government 
representatives or Members of Parliament, are represented on the Board in a number of 
countries. For example Members of Parliament are in some cases appointed as a Board 
member.  In  other  countries,  they  have  an  active  role  to  play  in  the  appointment 
procedure.  Sometimes,  membership  comes  with  an  explicit  requirement  to  act 
independently.67 In Belgium (French Community), two representatives of Government 
and  administration  attend  the  meetings  of  the  CAV  Board  (without  voting  rights), 
while not being formal members. 

Compared  to  the  INDIREG  study,  the  composition  of  the  Boards,  in  terms  of  the 
members’ role and background, has only slightly changed in a number of countries.68 
In some cases, the change in the composition resulted from the change in size, as is the 
case in Bulgaria, Germany (some Länder) and Denmark, where the ratios of different 
groups represented on the Board could not be kept exactly the same. In other cases, the 

64  

Interestingly,  almost  80%  of  the  members  (equalling  59  out  of  74)  of  the  SWR’s  Broadcasting 
Council need to be civil society representatives. 
65   See also http://www.atvod.co.uk/about-ATVOD 
66   Albania  (cf.  the  explanation  in  this  regard  in  the  previous  paragraph),  Bulgaria,  France,  Iceland, 

Poland. 

67   See also the analysis of conflict of interest rules in section 3.1.2.1.4. 
68   Albania,  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Germany  (some  Länder), 

Iceland, Lithuania, Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Slovakia. 

46 

 
                                                 
changes  have  led  to  a  reduction  of  civil  society  representatives  on  the  Board69, 
sometimes in parallel to an increase of political representatives70. 

Overall, no general pattern in the above-mentioned changes is recognisable. 

3.1.2.1.3.   Qualification and experience of Board members 

For the proper completion of its tasks, the Board needs to dispose of members with an 
adequate  level  of  educational  qualification  and  professional  experience.  Legal 
requirements  in  this  regard  can  also  give  an  indication  of  the  regulatory  body’s 
independence, as they provide objective criteria meant to lead to a configuration of the 
Board  that  is  best  equipped  for  the  fulfilment  of  its  functions,  thereby  limiting  the 
influence of other, informal appointment criteria which might have a negative impact 
on  the  body’s  independence,  such  as  personal  relations  of  a  candidate  with  an 
appointing body or individual. 

Interestingly, a considerable number of countries lack rules defining either the required 
qualification71  of  Board  members  or  their  required  work  experience72.  In  twelve 
countries, for at least some regulatory bodies there are no rules in place regulating any 
of  the  two  aspects.73  In  practice,  persons  holding  the  positions  frequently  have  the 
qualification necessary to fulfil the position’s requirements or experience needed also 
in countries where legal requirements in this regard are not in place.74 

As far as such requirements are laid down in the law, they vary largely. While in some 
countries, qualification is defined as formal education and experience in specific areas 
pertaining  to  the  Board’s  scope  of  work75,  others  require  a  law  degree  or  a 

69   Belgium  (German-speaking  Community), Germany (some  Länder), Lithuania. It has to be noted, 
however,  that  in  other  German  Länder,  the  number  of  civil  society  representatives  has  been 
increased. 

70   Partially  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community),  Germany  (Broadcasting  Council  of  the 

Norddeutscher Rundfunk, NDR), Lithuania. 

71   Albania,  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community:  MRat-REG,  Bureau  and  Instruction  Service; 
Flemish Community: VRM  Management Board; French Community: CSA Bureau, CAC), Czech 
Republic,  Germany  (some  Landesmedienanstalten  and  all  public  service  broadcaster’s 
Broadcasting  Councils),  Denmark,  Estonia,  France  (chairperson  only),  Ireland,  Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal (only general requirements), Romania, Slovakia, UK. 

72   Belgium  (German-speaking  Community:  MRat-ADV,  Bureau  and  Instruction  Service;  French 
Community:  CSA  Bureau,  CAV),  Czech  Republic,  Germany  (almost  all  public  service  and 
commercial  broadcasters‘  regulatory  bodies),  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAA),  France,  Iceland, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Portugal  (only  general  requirements), 
Romania, Slovakia, UK. 

73   Belgium 

(German-speaking  Community:  MRat-Bureau  and 

Instruction  Service;  French 
Community:  CSA  Bureau);  Czech  Republic,  Germany  (some),  Estonia,  France,  Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, UK. 

74   This  has  explicitly  been  confirmed  for  countries  such  as  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg  or 

Netherlands. 

75   Albania, Belgium (Flemish Community), Cyprus, Spain (CNMC, CAA), France (Board), Greece, 

Croatia, Hungary, Iceland (Board), Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia. 

47 

 
                                                 
qualification of judgeship76. In other countries, requirements are less specific and are, 
for instance, limited to a university degree of any kind or even to a lower level, namely 
some form of higher education77. Some laws only ask for informal knowledge or skills, 
from  professional  experience 
to  distinguish 
which  are  sometimes  difficult 
requirements,  described  with  words  such  as  “high  prestige”,  “good  reputation”, 
“eminent  person  of  public  life”,  “high  professional  and  moral  level”  or  “outstanding 
public record”.78 

The  overwhelming  majority  of  countries  where  a  professional  record  is  essential, 
require  specific  experience  which  is  either  closely  related  to  the  (audiovisual)  media 
sector or in another way relevant to the work of the Board, such as experience in law, 
economics,  finance  or  administration.79  Only  in  few  countries,  requirements  in  this 
regard remain vague or of a general nature.80 

In  some  cases,  persons  holding  these  positions  are  required  to  have  either  certain 
qualification criteria or relevant work experience but not both.81 

In  the  years  after  the  completion  of  the  INDIREG  study,  some  countries  have 
intensified  the  requirements,  as  regards  qualification82  and  professional  experience83. 
In  Turkey,  on  the  other  hand,  work  experience  standards  have  been  lowered:  while 
before,  apart  from  ten  years’  experience  in  public  and  private  organisations,  Board 
members  and  the  chairperson  had  to  have  specific  experience  in  any  of  the  areas  of 
journalism, publishing, communication and technology, culture, religion, education or 
law, this requirement has now been abolished. 

3.1.2.1.4   Rules to prevent conflicts of interest 

An important indicator for the independence of the regulatory body is the existence of 
clear rules  designed to avoid conflicts of interest of decision-makers within the body 
and, if they occur, to mitigate their effects as far as possible. 

76   Austria,  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community:  1  member  of  the  MRat-Bureau;  Flemish 
Community: chairperson and 2 members of the VRM General Chamber), Germany (chairpersons 
of  some  commercial  broadcasters’ 
Iceland 
(chairperson). 

regulatory  bodies),  Sweden 

(chairperson), 

77   Bulgaria, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro (Director), Macedonia, Turkey. 
78   Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  Greece,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Montenegro,  Serbia, 

Sweden. 

79   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community:  MRat-REG;  Flemish  Community; 
French Community: CAC), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany (some), Denmark, Spain (CAC), Finland, 
Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia.  Montenegro  (Board  and  chairperson), 
Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia,  

80   Germany  (as  far  as  professional  experience  is  required  at  all),  Estonia  (Director-General), 

Montenegro (Director), Turkey. 

81   Alternative requirements in this respect are laid down in the laws of Cyprus, France (Board) and 

Hungary. 

82   Spain  (CNMC,  as  opposed  to  CEMA).  France  (Board),  Hungary,  Iceland  (Board),  Lithuania, 

Latvia, Macedonia. 

83   Lithuania, Latvia. 

48 

 
                                                 
In  some  cases,  a  decision-maker  may  have  private  interests  in  a  certain  decision. 
Conflicts  arise  when  these  private  interests  contravene  the  interests,  which  the 
regulatory body has  to preserve when carrying out its tasks. If these conflicts are not 
resolved in favour of the latter, they can influence decisions of the regulatory body in 
an undue way, thereby calling the independence of this body into question. 

Conflicts of interest can be avoided during the appointment procedure by setting rules 
concerning the eligibility of candidates, particularly of those who have ties with other 
organisations  involved  in  or  affected  by  the  conduct  of  the  regulatory  body’s  tasks. 
They  can  also  be  mitigated  where  they  occur  in  the  course  of  the  body’s  work  by 
ensuring  that  a  decision-maker  affected  by  a  conflict  of  interest  cannot  unduly 
influence a decision. Conflicts of interest that may occur after a decision-maker’s term 
of  office,  for  instance,  when  that  person  takes  up  another  post  in  an  organisation 
involved in or affected by the conduct of the regulatory body’s tasks, can be reduced 
by  establishing  a  “cooling-off  period”  during  which  a  former  board  member  is  not 
allowed to be affiliated with such an organisation. 

3.1.2.1.4.1.   Conflicts of interest before appointment 

Rules  to  prevent  conflicts  of  interest  even  before  a  Board  member  is  appointed  are 
widespread. In fact, the large majority of the countries analysed provides for such rules 
in  some  form.  No  rules  in  this  regard  exist,  however,  in  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Germany 
(for the position of chairperson in some Länder), Denmark, Iceland, Romania and UK 
(as far as self-regulatory bodies are concerned). There may be various reasons for this 
lack  of  relevant  provisions.  For  one,  although  specific  rules  preventing  conflicts  of 
interest  may  not  exist  in  a  certain  country,  general  rules  on  competency  and 
appropriate  behaviour  may  apply.84  Also,  lax  or  non-existing  rules  on  conflicts  of 
interest during the appointment procedure may be compensated by strict provisions on 
conflicts of interest during a Board member’s term of office.85 Finally, self-regulatory 
bodies are, by definition, composed of representatives of the branches to be regulated, 
which  implies  that  the  interests  of  the  regulated  parties  may  be  introduced  in  the 
decision-making process. While codes of conduct may mitigate some of these effects 
to  the  necessary  degree,  it  needs  to  be  recognised  that  the  representation  of  private 
interests is inherent to this regulatory model and cannot reasonably be expected to be 
fully avoided.  

84   This is the case, for example, in Iceland and the UK. 
85   For  instance,  although  in  Romania  there  are  no  rules  preventing  conflicts  of  interest  during  the 
appointment, the national law provides for a comprehensive prohibition to hold any other public or 
private office in parallel to the Board membership, except from didactical ones, provided these do 
not give rise to a conflict of interest. If a Board member does hold such conflicting position at the 
time of being appointed, he or she may still be appointed, but has to give up the respective position 
within three months. 

49 

 
                                                 
In some countries, conflict of interest rules only apply to the Board’s chairperson and 
its members, but not to senior staff of the regulatory body.86 

Where  rules  to  prevent  conflicts  of  interest  exist,  they  mostly  cover  all  areas  of 
potential  incompatibility,  i.e.  conflicts  with  Government,  Parliament  and  political 
parties  as  well  as  industry  (namely  the  branches  to  be  regulated).  In  some  countries, 
however, not all of these areas are covered. 

For  instance,  no  rules  against conflict  of interest  with  Government  exist in  Germany 
(for  some  Länder  as  well  as  for  the  ZDF87),  Spain  (as  far  as  the  new  CNMC  is 
concerned), Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and UK88. In some countries, rules do 
not  apply  at  the  time  of  appointment,  but  a  board  member  must  give  up  his  or  her 
conflicting activity, once appointed.89 

As regards conflicts with Parliament and political parties, Belgium (all Communities), 
Estonia,  Spain  (as  far  as  CNMC  is  concerned),  France,  Germany  (most  Länder), 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey lack any specific rule. No rules 
in  respect  of  political  parties,  but  a  prohibition  for  Members  of  Parliament  to  be  a 
member of the regulatory body’s Board are in place Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and 
the  UK  (as  far  as  Ofcom  is  concerned).  Provisions  that  only  take  effect  after 
appointment  include  a  provision  in  Cyprus  allowing  for  the  removal  of  a  board 
member who, while in office, takes up a position in a political party, as well as a legal 
obligation  in  Lithuania  to  suspend  any  membership  of  and  active  participation  in  a 
political party. 

Only a small number of countries, including Belgium (for some regulatory bodies, i.e. 
the management board of the Flemish VRM and the advisory boards, in the French and 
German-speaking communities, CAV and MRat-ADV), Germany (only as regards the 
RBB’s  and  RB’s  board  members),  Estonia,  Spain,  France  and  Serbia  have  no  rules 
dealing with possible conflicts of interest with industry.90 

On  the  other  hand,  Lithuanian  law  provides  for  a  very  strict  rule,  barring  from 
membership in the LRTK board also persons who have held a management position or 

86   No specific rules for senior staff exist, for example, in Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 

The Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Croatia and Turkey. 

87   According to the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional Court, recently confirmed in a ruling on 
the  composition  of  the  ZDF  TV  Council,  the  rules  implemented  have  to  safeguard  that  the 
authority/the  board 
influenced  by  Government  representation, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht,  Judgment  of  25  March  2014,  case  no.  1  BvF  1/11  and  1  BvF  4/11, 
ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:fs20140325.1bvf000111. 

is  not  unduly 

total 

in 

88   For the  Ofcom, only the general rules, which can be found in the Communications Act 2003 and 

the Bribery Act 2010, apply. 

89   France, Italy. According to Italian legislation, a direct transition from a government position to the 
AGCOM board is permitted, but the two positions may not be held simultaneously. Some countries 
require  candidates  having  a  conflict  of  interest  to  resolve  this  conflict  within  a  certain  period  of 
time after he or she has been appointed a Board member.  

90   However,  France  and  Serbia  provide  for  an  obligation  to  give  up  conflicting  activities  in  the 

industry sector upon appointment. 

50 

 
                                                 
have an interest in organisations active in sectors covered by LRTK for up to one year 
preceding the appointment as board member. 

The majority of countries analysed also  have rules which prohibit Board members to 
hold other public or private offices during their term of office in the board.91 However, 
some  of  these  allow  research  and  teaching  activities  as  well  as  creative  work.92  In 
Sweden,  while  no  explicit  prohibition  exists  to  take up other  accessory positions, all 
such positions and other sources of income must be declared and must be approved by 
the government. 

3.1.2.1.4.2.   Conflicts of interest during term of office 
With  the  exception  of  Denmark,  Luxembourg  and  Iceland,  all  countries  analysed 
provide  for  specific  conflict  of  interest  rules  for  members  of  the  Board  during  their 
term  of  office.93  In  Luxembourg,  general  incompatibility  rules  apply.  In  Iceland,  the 
Broadcasting  Act  includes  rules  on  confidentiality,  in  addition  to  general  conflict  of 
interest rules laid down in the Administrative Procedure Act. 

In some of the countries with conflict of interest rules for active Board members, these 
rules are the same as those applying to the appointment phase. In others,  different or 
additional rules apply during the Board members’ term of office. 

Most  countries  feature  rules  to  prevent  conflicts  of  interest  with  their  Governments 
during  term  of  office.  Provisions  in  this  respect  do  not  exist  in  Poland,  Slovenia, 
Turkey and, in Germany, for the Fernsehrat (Television Council) of the ZDF. It should 
be noted, however, that a judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal 
Constitutional  Court)  of  2014  ruled  unconstitutional  certain  provisions  of  the  ZDF 
Interstate  Treaty,  which  concern  the  composition  and  scope  of  tasks  of  the  ZDF  TV 
Council.94  In this  ruling, the Court  also  criticised the lack of incompatibility rules in 
the Treaty and requested the Länder as competent legislators to remedy this situation 
by 30 June 2015. An amendment to the Treaty, which has been signed by all Länder 
Heads of Government on 18 June 2015, is envisaged to come into force on 1 January 
2016.95  

91   Albania  (for  the  chairperson),  Belgium  (all  communities;  no  such  rule,  however,  exists  for  the 
German-speaking community’s MRat-Bureau and Instructions Service), Cyprus (emanating from a 
general  incompatibilities  clause  in  the  Constitution),  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France, 
Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey. 

92   Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia. 
93   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia, 
Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia,  Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and UK. 

94   Bundesverfassungsgericht,  Judgment  of  25  March  2014,  case  no.  1  BvF  1/11  and  1  BvF  4/11, 

ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:fs20140325.1bvf000111. 

95   17th  Interstate  Treaty  Amending  Interstate  Treaties  on  Broadcasting  Law;  available  at: 
https://www.rlp.de/fileadmin/rlp-stk/pdf-Dateien/Medienpolitik/17__RaeStV.pdf.  The  amendment 
aims to eliminate the shortcomings of the current Treaty, as set out by the Court. It includes a new 

51 

 
                                                 
Nine countries lack specific provisions regulating incompatibilities of the membership 
in the Board with functions in political parties.96 In some of these, however, conflict of 
interest  rules  barring  Members  of  Parliament  from  membership  in  the  Board  are  in 
place, e.g. in Ireland, Malta and the Netherlands. The above-mentioned provisions for 
Board  members  of  the  Lithuanian  LRTK  and  of  the  Cypriot  Radio-Television 
Authority  to  abstain  from  any  active  membership  in  political  parties  after  their 
appointment97 remain in force throughout the whole term of office. 

In nearly all countries, rules to prevent conflicts of interest with actors of the regulated 
sector are in place. For the Flemish VRM, however, these are limited to a prohibition 
for  Board  members  to  take  part  in  decisions  in  which  they  have  a  direct  or  indirect 
interest.  No  rules  exist  in  this  regard  for  most  German  public  service  broadcasters 
(except for WDR, RBB and ZDF). 

In Montenegro, a member discovering that he or she has a conflict of interest regarding 
a particular subject has a duty to inform the Board of this fact. As a consequence, he or 
she will be excluded from the further consideration of that subject by the Board. If a 
decision  on  that  subject  has  already  been  taken  by  the  time  the  conflict  of  interest 
becomes  known,  the  decision  must  be  reconsidered  and  may  be  annulled,  if  it  was 
taken with the participation of the Board member concerned. 

3.1.2.1.4.3.   Conflicts of interest after end of Board membership 

The laws of a considerable number of countries also provide for a cooling-off period 
after the Board member’s term of office in order to prevent members from considering 
to take decisions in favour of a potential future employer while still in their position of 
the  regulatory  authority.98  The  period  foreseen  ranges  between  six  months  (UK)  and 
four years (Italy). 

Soft  (implicit)  rules  in  this  regard  can  be  derived  from  the  laws  in  Iceland,  which 
provide  for  a  confidentiality  rule  that  remains  applicable  after  the  member’s  term  of 
office  has  ended,  and  in  Slovenia,  where  a  cooling-off  period  may  be  regulated 
contractually. 

rule  providing  that  members  of  the  TV  Council  may,  among  others,  not  be  members  of  the 
European  Parliament,  the  European  Commission  or  any  Parliament  or  Government  at  federal  or 
Länder  level  in  Germany;  see  Art.  1  Nr.  15  of  the  17th  Interstate  Treaty  Amending  Interstate 
Treaties on Broadcasting Law (§ 19a (3) ZDF Interstate Treaty). 

96   Belgium (Flemish community, German-speaking community as far as the Medienrat‘s Bureau and 
Instructions  Service  are  concerned),  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Ireland  (conflict  of  interest  rules 
only  cover  Members  of  Parliament),  Malta  (conflict  of  interest  rules  only  cover  Members  of 
Parliament), Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia. 

97   Cf. the previous section on „Conflicts of interest before appointment“. 
98   Albania,  Bulgaria,  Spain,  France,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia,  Montenegro, 

Macedonia, Malta, Portugal, Serbia and UK (for Ofcom). 

52 

 
                                                                                                                                             
3.1.2.1.5   Procedural issues 

In procedural terms, the rules governing the appointment, term of office and dismissal 
of Board members (including the chairperson) and their practical implementation call 
for a closer look as they may have an impact on the independence with which a Board 
member conducts his or her functions. 

3.1.2.1.5.1.   Appointment 

In  the  majority  of  countries,  a  two-stage  procedure  applies,  featuring  a  separate 
nomination stage preceding the actual appointment.99 Some countries, however, apply 
a  uniform  appointment  procedure,  not  further  subdivided  into  different  stages.100  In 
other  countries,  the  structure  of  the  appointment  procedure  depends  on  the  body  or 
organ to be appointed. In these countries, while the appointment of the board follows a 
two-stage procedure, the chairperson of the board is frequently appointed directly, with 
no previous nomination phase.101 In Estonia, the members of the Communications and 
Media  Department  of  the  new  Technical  Surveillance  Authority  (TSA)  are  directly 
appointed  by  the  Director-General  of  the  body,  whereas  the  Director-General 
him/herself  is  appointed  by  the  relevant  minister  upon  a  recommendation  by  the 
chancellor  of  the  ministry.  In  Lithuania,  the  chairperson  and  three  members  of  the 
LRTK  board  are  nominated  jointly  by  the  Education  and  Culture  Committee  of  the 
Parliament  and  the  Information  Society  Committee  of  the  Communications  ministry 
and, in a second step, appointed by Parliament. The other board members are directly 
appointed by the relevant bodies or organisations. 

Since 2010, there has only been little change with regard to these rules. Aside from the 
establishment of entire new regulatory bodies – which, however, in most cases has not 
led  to  any  substantial  changes,  as  far  as  the aspect  analysed here is  concerned  –, the 
appointment  procedure  has  been  restructured  fundamentally  only  in  Lithuania. 
Compared  to  the  situation  analysed  in  the  INDIREG  study,  the  actual  act  of 
appointment  of  the  LRTK  chair  is  now  also  preceded  by  a  nomination  stage,  in  the 
same way in which this was already true for the three board members to be appointed 
by  Parliament.  The  countries  where  the  establishment  of  a  new  regulatory  body  has 
also  led  to  a  modification  in  the  appointment  procedure’s  subdivision  into  different 
stages  are  Estonia  and  Slovenia.  Before  the  reform,  both  the  chairperson  as  well  as 
individual  board  members  of  the  former  Estonian  Public  Broadcasting  Council  (the 
ambit of which was limited to public service broadcasting) were appointed following a 
two-stage  procedure.  In  Slovenia,  while  the  new  AKOS  Director  is  –  comparable  to 

99   Albania, Austria, Germany (for some regulatory bodies), Spain, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, 

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and UK. 

100   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany  (for  some  regulatory  bodies), 

The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden.  

101   This is the case in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Iceland, Latvia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Portugal, 
Serbia,  Slovakia  and  Turkey.  Usually,  candidates  are  elected  by  board  members  from  among 
themselves,  with  the  exception  of  Iceland,  where  the  chairperson  is  appointed  by  the  competent 
minister. 

53 

 
                                                 
the  Director  of 
the  previously  competent  Agencije  za  pošto  in  elektronske 
komunikacije (APEK) – still appointed following a public competition, the successful 
candidate  is  now  first  nominated  by  the  AKOS  Council  for  appointment  by  the 
Government. 

In countries where the appointment procedure is divided into two stages, a very diverse 
range of models can be found as regards the bodies competent for each of the stages. 
While in most cases, the chairs and members of the board are appointed by either the 
Parliament,102  the  Head  of  State103  or  (a  member  of)  the  Government,104  the  bodies 
involved in the nomination stage vary widely. 

Where  the  Head  of  State  is  the  appointing  body,  candidates  are  nominated  by  either 
Parliament105 or (members/the head of the) Government106, or jointly by both107. 

Candidates appointed by Parliament are in most countries nominated by one or more 
parliamentary committee(s) or by political groups in the Parliament.108 Sometimes, the 
parliamentary  committee  only  issues  a  public  call  for  nomination  of  candidates  by 
certain  stakeholder  groups,  such  as  academia,  professional  associations  or 
representatives and social and religious communities and, as the case may be, prepares 
a  shortlist  of  suitable  candidates.109  In  some  of  these  cases,  the  parliamentary 
committee  or  individual  Members  of  Parliament  are  also  authorised  to  nominate 
candidates besides the stakeholder groups.110 

No  parliamentary  activity  seems  to  be  involved  at  the  nomination  stage  in  Bulgaria, 
where stakeholders can directly nominate their candidates which may then be selected 

102   E.g. in Albania, Bulgaria (for three of the five board members), Czech Republic, Croatia, Latvia, 

Montenegro, Macedonia, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Turkey. 

103   E.g.  in  Austria,  Bulgaria  (for  two  of  the  five  board  members),  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and 

Malta. 

104   E.g. in Spain, Ireland (except for four of the eight members of the BAI’s Contract Awards and of 
the Compliance Committees, respectively, who are appointed directly by the BAI Main Board) and 
Slovenia.  In  Spain,  however,  the  (central  or  regional,  as  the  case  may  be)  Government  has  no 
decisive power, i.e. the appointment of the nominated candidates is merely a formal act. 

105   This is the case in France and Italy (for the AGCOM commissions’ members). 
106   This is the case in Luxembourg (nomination by Government) and Malta (nomination by the Prime 

Minister, together with the leader of the opposition) 

107   As is the case in Austria and Italy (for the AGCOM President who is nominated by the competent 
parliamentary  committees,  following  the  designation  by  the  Prime  Minister  on  the  advice  of  the 
competent minister). 

108   This  is  the  case  in  Albania  (for  the  nomination  of  the  chairperson),  Czech  Republic,  Latvia. 
Portugal  and  Turkey.  In  Greece,  candidates  are  nominated  by  the  President  of  Parliament  and 
appointed by the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents. On the lengthy negotiations in Greece see 
Psychogiopoulou/Casarosa/Kandyla,  The  independence  of  media  regulatory  authorities  and  the 
impact  of  the  socio-political  context:  A  comparative  analysis  of  Greece  and  Italy,  in: 
Schulz/Valcke/Irion, The independence of the media and its regulatory agencies, (op. cit.), p. 213, 
220 et seq., 224 et seq., 236 et seq.  

109   This applies to the nomination of candidates for the board in Albania and Montenegro. 
110   E.g. in Macedonia and Serbia. 

54 

 
                                                 
and  appointed  by  either  the  Parliament  (for  three  of  the  five  board  members)  or  the 
President (for two of the five board members). 

In  Croatia,  candidates  are  nominated  by  the  Government,  whereas  in  Romania,  the 
Government,  both  houses  of  Parliament  and  the  President  are  called  upon  to  make 
proposals  for  board  member  candidates,  who  are  then  heard  by  specialised  standing 
commissions in both houses of Parliament. The standing commissions present a joint 
notification to the Parliament who then appoints members finally by majority vote. 

In  countries  where  the  Government  decides  about  the  appointment  of  chairs  and 
members  of  the  Board,  candidates  are  nominated  either  by  the  Board  itself,111  the 
Parliament112  or  the  competent  minister  following  an  advice  of  a  parliamentary 
committee.113 

A small number of countries have established other procedures for the nomination and 
appointment of candidates. In Estonia, for example, both the Director-General and the 
Board members of the TSA are nominated by the chancellor of the competent ministry 
and appointed by the competent  minister. Also in  Iceland, the Board is appointed by 
the competent minister; candidates are nominated by the Supreme Court (2), academia 
(1) and the Journalists’ Association (1). 

No  definitive  pattern  can  be  recognised  in  the  case  of  Germany:  while  some  Board 
members of the Länder’s regulatory bodies competent for commercial broadcasters are 
elected  by  the  State  Parliaments,  others  are  directly  appointed  by  socially  relevant 
groups, the latter of which is also the default case for the public service broadcasters’ 
regulatory  bodies.  In  most  cases,  the  chairperson  of  a  regulatory  body  of  one  of  the 
Länder competent for commercial broadcasters as well as the chairperson of a public 
service broadcaster (Intendant) is elected by the Board itself. 

In Hungary, the new regulator's Board consists of four members plus the chairperson. 
Board  members  are  nominated  and  elected  by  an  ad-hoc  parliamentary  committee 
where  all  parliamentary  factions  are  represented  according  to  their  voting  power  in 
Parliament.  They  are  elected  by  unanimous  vote  or,  if  unattainable,  by  a  two-thirds 
majority vote. The President of the NMHH is automatically nominated as candidate for 
the  chairperson  of  the  Board.  The  chairperson  is  then  elected  by  the  parliamentary 
committee  pursuant  to  the  same  procedure  as  applicable  to  Board  members.  The 
(single) candidate for NMHH President, in turn, is nominated by the Prime Minister, 
after  considering  the  recommendations  made  by  different  stakeholder  groups  and 
bodies,  and  is  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  NMHH  President’s 
mandate  automatically  extends  if  Parliament  fails  to  elect  a  new  President  and  until 
such election has taken place. 

111   As is the case in Spain (for the chairpersons of the CAC and the CAA who are nominated by the 

other members of the board) and Slovenia. 

112   As is the case in Spain (for the chairperson and board members of the CNMC). 
113   As is the case in Ireland. 

55 

 
                                                 
The  Lithuanian  regulatory  body’s  Board  is  composed  of  two  members  that  are  
appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  three  members  appointed by Parliament, 
five appointed by professional associations and one by the Bishops’ Conference. The 
three  candidates  that  are  to  be  appointed  by  Parliament  are  nominated  jointly  by  the 
competent  parliamentary  committee  and  a  committee  under  the  competent  ministry. 
The  chairperson  and  deputy  chairperson  of  the  Board  are  appointed  from  among  the 
Board  members  by  the  Parliament  upon  joint  recommendation  by  the  competent 
parliamentary committee and a committee under the competent ministry. 

In the UK, a real nomination stage is only foreseen in the case of the ASA chairperson 
who  is  nominated  by  the  ASA  Council’s  Nominations  Committee.  In  all  other  cases 
(i.e.  Ofcom,  ATVOD,  BBC  Trust  and  ASA  Council  members),  the  candidates 
appointed are selected by a competition, following a public tender. 

Overall,  changes  in  the  appointment  procedure  have  been  moderate  in  the  countries 
analysed.  Most  significant  changes  have  been  caused  by  the  establishment  of  new 
regulatory  bodies,  as  is  the  case  in  Albania,  Estonia,  Spain,  Hungary,  Iceland, 
Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Sweden  and  Slovenia.  In  Lithuania,  some  modifications  have 
resulted from the reduced size of the LRTK’s Board. 

3.1.2.1.5.2.   Term of office 

Most Board members are appointed for a limited period of time, in a similar manner as 
democratically  elected  State  bodies.  Only  in  Finland, members are appointed for life 
and remain,  in  principle, on duty until they resign or retire.  In the UK (for Ofcom114 
and ATVOD), no term is stated by law. In Macedonia, the law does not state whether 
the chairperson shall serve the full term of office of the Board (i.e. seven years). The 
concrete terms of limited mandates vary remarkably among the analysed countries. 

The period in office usually ranges from between four to six years.115 Shorter periods 
are  foreseen  in  a  small  number  of  countries.116  Longer  periods  are  rare.117  Most 

114   However, terms in practice usually end after three or four years for Board members, five years for 

chairpersons.  

115   Four-year terms in Belgium (German-speaking Community: all bodies; French Community: CAC, 

CAV), Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Lithuania: from 2015, Montenegro (Director).  
Five-year  terms  in  Albania,  Belgium  (Flemish  Community:  all  bodies;  French  Community:  CSA 
Bureau),  Estonia,  Spain  (CAA),  Croatia,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Montenegro  (Board  and 
chairperson), Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia.  
Six-year  terms  in  Austria,  Bulgaria  (Board),  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC), 
France, Poland, Romania, Slovakia (chairperson; Board: 6 years or less), Turkey (Board). 
In Germany, periods for Board members vary between four and six years, for chairpersons between 
five and nine years. 

116   Bulgaria (1 year for the chairperson), Lithuania (2 years for the chairperson, until 2014), Turkey (2 
years  for  the  chairperson),  Sweden  (3  years),  UK  (3  years,  ASA).  In  Malta,  while  terms  may, 
according to the law, last up to 5 years, they generally end after two to three years. 

117   Italy (7 years), Macedonia (7 years), Hungary (9 years). In Germany, the chairperson (Intendant) 
of  the  Hessischer  Rundfunk  (public  broadcaster  in  the  State  of  Hesse)  is  elected  for  five  to  nine 

56 

 
                                                 
 
 
 
changes  that  have  been  made  in  this  regard  since  the  completion  of  the  INDIREG 
study have remained within the four- to six-year range.118 Otherwise, tenure extensions 
have been introduced from six to seven years in Macedonia and from four to nine years 
in  Hungary.  In  Lithuania,  Board  members  and  the  chairperson  will  be  appointed  for 
four  years  from  2015.  Before,  the  Board  members’  term  was  aligned  to  that  of  the 
appointing body, whereas the chairperson served for a period of two years. 

Apart from  the length  of the mandate, also  its relation to the election cycles of State 
bodies  can  give  an  indication  about  the  independence  of  the  Board  (including  its 
chairperson)  from  the  bodies  in  charge  of  appointing  and  ultimately  overseeing  its 
activity. In almost half of the countries analysed, the Board’s period of office does not 
correspond to the election cycles.119 In the remaining cases, a staggered term of office 
is either explicitly not foreseen or not regulated at all.120 Changes in this area remain 
very  limited  and  have  only  affected  three  countries,  where  previously  foreseen 
staggered  terms  have  been  abolished  (Romania),  are  no  longer  regulated  explicitly 
(Macedonia) or now result newly from an extended term of office (Hungary). 

Particularly where mandates have a moderate length,  renewals  of Board membership 
or chairmanship can be a way to improve continuity in the work of the Board. While a 
one-time renewal is possible in twelve countries121, the term may be renewed twice in 
Bulgaria122 and Ireland. In many countries, however, there is no limit as to the number 
of  possible  renewals.123  In  Germany,  rules  vary  among  the  Länder:  Board  members 
and  chairpersons  may  at  least  be  re-appointed  once;  in  some  cases,  the  number  of 
renewals is not limited. 

years; the chairperson of the Landesmedienanstalt Saarland (LMS, media authority for the State of 
Saarland) is appointed for 7 years. 

118   This includes Belgium (German-speaking Community), which switched from a 5- to a 4-year term; 
Latvia,  which  switched  from  4  to  5  years;  Montenegro,  which  switched  from  5  to  4  years 
(Director), and Serbia, which switched from 6 to 5 years. 

119   Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC:  partial  renewal  every  2  to  3  years), 
Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Montenegro (Board and chairperson), Malta, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Slovakia (partial renewal), Turkey (Board; partial renewal), Italy, UK (Ofcom). 

120   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium 

(German-speaking  Community;  Flemish  Community:  VRM 
Management Board’s term explicitly has to coincide with the election cycle; French Community), 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain (CAA, although in practice, the 5-year term does not coincide 
with the 4-year election cycle), Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
(Director),  Macedonia,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Serbia,  Slovenia,  Turkey 
Montenegro 
(chairperson), UK (ATVOD). 

121   Albania, Cyprus (chairperson), Czech Republic (Board), Spain (CAA), Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Montenegro,  Netherlands,  Serbia,  Slovakia,  UK  (ASA;  Ofcom;  the  Code  of  Practice  of  the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments recommends a maximum of two terms). 

122   For the Board. However, renewals may not be granted consecutively. 
123   Austria, Belgium (German-speaking Community: MRat-REG, ADV; Flemish Community; French 
Community),  Bulgaria  (chairperson),  Cyprus  (Board),  Czech  Republic  (chairperson),  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Finland,  Croatia,  Iceland,  Lithuania  (deputy  chairperson),  Luxembourg,  Macedonia 
(Director and deputy Director), Malta, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Turkey, UK (ATVOD). 

57 

 
                                                                                                                                             
In  some  countries,  no  renewal  is  possible.  This  is  the  case  particularly  where  longer 
terms of office apply124, but is not limited to these cases.125 

3.1.2.1.5.3.   Dismissal 

Another indicator of independence from external influence is the regime according to 
which Board members can be dismissed. The less specific these rules are and the less 
they are related to an individual misconduct or another failure of the member to carry 
out his or her tasks properly, the greater is the risk that members might be dismissed 
on an arbitrary basis. 

In  only  a  few  countries,  no  specific  rules  exist  to  protect  Board  members  against 
arbitrary dismissal.126 On the other hand, laws in a few other countries do not permit 
the  dismissal  of  Board  members  on  any  grounds  during  their  term  of  office.127 
However,  in  these  cases,  the  term  provides  for  situations,  such  as  a  conviction  for  a 
criminal  offence  or  a  violation  of  conflict  of  interest  rules,  in  which  an  individual 
Board member’s term is legally deemed to be terminated. 

The  reasons  for  a  dismissal  are  usually  enumerated  in  the  law  and  typically  include 
health  conditions,  conviction  for  a  criminal  offence,  violations  of  conflict  of  interest 
rules, another serious misconduct or breach of law or factual failure or legal incapacity 
of the member to fulfil his or her duties. In Slovenia, a request to dismiss the AKOS 
Director can also be issued by the Court of Auditors. 

The  body  entitled  to  dismiss  a  Board  member  varies  widely  among  the  countries 
analysed. Sometimes, it is the body that has appointed the member.128 In other cases, 
however, the decision lies with the Parliament129, the Government130 or an individual 

124   Spain  (CNMC,  CAC:  6  years),  Hungary  (9  years),  Macedonia  (Board  and  chairperson:  7  years 
(although  the  law  does  not  state  whether  the  chairperson  has  to  serve  the  full  7  years  as  a 
chairperson);  no  limits  as  to  the  times  of  renewals  are  foreseen,  however,  for  the  Director  and 
his/her deputy who also serve 7-year terms), Poland and Italy. 

125   No renewal is possible also in Belgium (German-speaking Community), where the MRat-ADV and 
REG Presidents‘ term of office lasts only 4 years, and in Portugal, where a 5-year term applies. 
126   These  include  Belgium  (Flemish  Community,  for  the  VRM  Management  Board),  Denmark, 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden and Iceland. In some German Länder, no information is available in 
this respect. 

127   Greece, Macedonia (chairperson), Turkey. 
128   Germany (some Länder), Lithuania (individual Board members only upon request by the Board), 

Czech Republic, Montenegro,  

129   Albania, Belgium (French Community: CAC, CAV, after proposition from Government), Germany 
(some  Länder),  Spain  (CAC),  Croatia  (upon  proposal  by  Government),  Latvia,  Montenegro 
(individual Board member: upon decision by appointing body or Board; entire Board: Parliament 
alone),  Macedonia  (Board),  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia,  Slovakia  (Board:  upon  proposal  by 
chairperson). 

130   Belgium  (German-speaking  Community;  Flemish  Community:  if  a  member  of  the  Chambers 
(General  Chamber  or  Chamber  Impartiality  and  Minors) is to be dismissed due to a misconduct, 
the decision cannot be taken without a respective proposition from the competent VRM committee; 
French  Community:  VRM  Bureau),  Cyprus,  Spain  (CNMC),  Finland  (only  Director-General), 
Luxembourg (chairperson), Sweden, Slovenia. 

58 

 
                                                 
minister131.  Some  countries  entitle  the  regulatory  body  itself  to  decide  about  the 
dismissal  of  Board  members,  either  through  the  Board  as  a  whole  (regarding  the 
dismissal of individual Board members)132, the Board’s chairperson (regarding Board 
members)133 or another organ within the regulatory body134. 

While  the  specific  provisions  for  dismissal  in  some  countries  only  apply  to  the 
dismissal of individual Board members135, the rules in other countries also provide for 
a possibility to dismiss the entire Board136. 

The only significant changes that occurred since the completion of the INDIREG study 
were in Lithuania and Estonia. While in Lithuania the chairperson could be dismissed 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  Board,  dismissal  is  now  only  possible  by  the  appointing 
body. Also, the entire Board may now be dismissed, if the annual report was rejected 
by  the  Parliament  and  the  appointing  bodies  refuse  to  allow  the  majority  of  Board 
members  to  continue  their  activities. In Estonia, the TSA Director-General  may now 
be  dismissed  by  the  competent  Minister,  whereas  before  this  was  the  competence  of 
the Parliament and the regulatory body itself. 

In  the  past  five  years,  dismissals  before  the  expiration  of  the  Board’s  term  of  office 
occurred in only four cases. In 2014, an individual Board member of the Danish RTB 
was dismissed at his own request and replaced by a new member, who was appointed 
by the Minister of Culture. The chairperson of the Albanian AMA was suspended  in 
the same year due to a lawsuit filed against her by commercial operators. After that a 
new chair was elected. In July of the same year, a new Macedonian law on audio and 
audiovisual media services, establishing a new regulatory body (the Agency for Audio 
and  Audiovisual  Media  Services),  was  adopted.  Following  this,  the  members  of  the 
Agency’s predecessor, the Broadcasting Council, were dismissed in order to allow for 
the transition to the new structure. 

The entire board of the Polish KRRiT had to step down in 2010, after the Board’s term 
of  office  automatically  expired  as  a  legal  consequence  of  the  rejection  of  its  2009 
annual  report  by  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament,  the  Sejm  and  the  Senate,  which  was 
confirmed by the President. 

131   Ireland  (upon  resolution  by  Parliament),  Estonia  (TSA  Director-General),  Netherlands,  UK 
(Ofcom). In Malta, the decision can be taken jointly by the President and the Prime Minister. 
132   Austria,  Belgium  (German-speaking  Community:  MRat-ADV),  Germany  (some  Länder;  in  the 
case  of  public  service  broadcaster,  sometimes  jointly  with  the  Administrative  Council),  Spain 
(CAA), France, Hungary. 

133   Estonia  (regarding  Board  members)  and  Hungary  (regarding  Board  members,  as  far  as  not  the 

Board as a whole is competent). 

134   Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany (some Länder). 
135   Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Germany  (some  Länder),  Estonia,  Spain, 
Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Macedonia, Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, UK. 
In Finland and Slovakia, the tasks of the regulatory body are carried out by an individual. 

136   Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Lithuania, Montenegro, Macedonia (implicitly), Turkey 
(implicitly).  In  Albania,  Germany  (some  Länder),  Denmark,  Greece,  Iceland,  Luxembourg  and 
Sweden, the situation is unclear.  

59 

 
                                                 
In  Bulgaria,  an  interesting  legal  development  deserves  attention.  A  member  of  the 
Bulgarian CEM had been dismissed in 2008, after his affiliation with the former State 
Security  Services  was  found  to  be  in  breach  of  CEM  membership  requirements.  In 
2013, however, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court declared this legal incompatibility 
rule unconstitutional and inconsistent with international treaties. 

In  a  few  other  cases,  the  Board  or  some  of  its  members  were  not  re-appointed  for 
another  term137,  were  not  allowed  to  stay  in  office  after  the  end  of  term  until  a  new 
Board was appointed.138 Some others resigned or retired.139 

3.1.2.2.  Staffing and budget of regulatory authorities 

A further indicator of independence of regulatory authorities is the staff and resources 
they have at their disposal. As a rule of thumb, it could be said that the more staff a 
regulatory body employs, the less difficult it is to “capture” individual staff members 
and thereby directly influence the regulators’ activities. By the same token, sufficient 
financial  capacities  are  required  for  the  regulatory  authorities  to  fulfil  their  tasks 
independently.  

3.1.2.2.1.   Staffing 

The  number  of  staff  of  regulatory  bodies  covers  a  broad  range  and  is  difficult  to 
specify  exactly.  It  is  first  and  foremost  dependent  on  national  circumstances  and 
conditions.  The  staff  count  may  also  be  imprecise  (in  view  of  staff  responsible  for 
audiovisual  media  services)  where  the  remit  of  regulatory  authorities  (above  all, 
converged  regulators)  covers  tasks  beyond  the  regulation  of  audiovisual  media 
services. Nonetheless, a general overview can be sketched from the up-dated data set. 

In  a  majority  of  national  laws,  the  number  of  staff  is  not  foreseen  specifically.140  In 
more than ten countries, the number of staff is outlined in the laws.141 In Slovakia and 

137   Belgium (Flemish Community): no re-appointment of General Chamber’s chair in 2013; Belgium 
(French  Community):  non-prolongation  of  CSA’s  President  and  one  Bureau  member  for  another 
term for personal reasons in 2012; Hungary: establishment of a new regulatory body in 2010. 
138   Belgium (German-speaking Community): MRat-REG President was dismissed after end of second 

term and thus was not allowed to stay in office until a new MRat-REG was appointed, 

139   Spain:  voluntary  resignation  of  CAC  chair  in  2012  to  facilitate  renewal  of  the  whole  Board; 
retirement  of  a  CAC  Board  member  in  2013;  Italy:  voluntary  resignation  of  chair  for  „serious 
personal  reasons“  in  2013;  Serbia:  resignation  of  chair,  who,  nevertheless,  remained  a  Board 
member, in 2014; Ireland: resignation of Board member, supposedly for political reasons, in 2014; 
Portugal:  resignation  of  an  ERC  Board  member  in  2010  due  to  personal  disagreement  with 
political situation. 

140   Albania,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany  (Landesmedienanstalten),  Estonia,  Spain 
(CNMC  and  CAC),  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Latvia,  Macedonia,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Sweden, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom 

141   Belgium (all Communities), Spain (CAA), Greece, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, 

Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia.  

60 

 
 
                                                 
Italy,  it  seems  to  have  been  outlined  in  the  measures  issued  by  the  respective 
regulatory authorities but not in the legislation. 

two 

from 

ranging 

in  Iceland 
Current  staff  counts  are  extremely  diverse 
(Fjölmiðlanefnd) to 790 in the United Kingdom (OFCOM). Yet, it is clear that due to 
the  converged  nature  of  OFCOM  not  all  of  its  staff  is  actually  involved  in  the 
regulation of audiovisual media services and for some staff members it might even be 
difficult  to  determine.  Similarly,  while  the  Finish  regulatory  body  Viestintävirasto 
(FICORA)  has  more  than  240  employees,  staff  responsible  for  matters  affecting 
audiovisual  media  services  is  estimated  at  only  3  to  4.  The  converged  Spanish 
regulatory  authority  at  national  level,  the  CNMC  (500  of  whom  approximately  160 
deal  with  audiovisual  media  services),  the  converged  Italian  AGCOM  (372)  and  the 
Turkish  RTÜK  (421) also  show high numbers of staff. Apart from Poland (136) and 
Romania  (130),  all  other  regulators  are  staffed  with  less  than  one  hundred.  Several 
regulatory  bodies  have  between  20  and  30  employees.142  Rarely,  regulatory  bodies 
have a staff of less than 10.143     

In a majority of countries, the number of staff is considered appropriate to respond to 
the complexities of tasks undertaken by the regulatory authorities.144 Nonetheless, the 
level of staff is considered problematic in case of several regulatory authorities with a 
comparatively small staff.145   

Importantly, some regulatory authorities may be under more pressure in the future due 
to cutbacks and austerity programmes of States following the economic crisis.146 This 
may  hold  especially  true  where  financing  of  the  regulatory  authority  is  fully  sourced 
from State budget. Small regulatory bodies like the Radio- og TV-Nævnet in Denmark 

142   Belgium (DE: 27, FL: 20, F: 26), Cyprus (26), several Landesmedienanstalten in Germany (LFK: 
25, brema: 21, HSH: 21, LPR: 23, mmv: 20, NLM: 28, SLM: 25, MSA: 22,75, TLM: 30), several 
Broadcasting  Councils  of  German  public  service  broadcasters  (rbb:  29,  RB:  25),  Lithuania  (29), 
Montenegro (21), Malta (28), Sweden (25), Slovakia (30).  

143   Austria (5), Iceland (2), Luxembourg (4 excluding 5 board members).   
144   Austria,  Belgium  (Flemish-  and  French-  speaking  Communities),  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Malta,  the  Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.  

145   German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Greece,  Croatia,  Ireland, 
Iceland  and  Romania.  In  contrast to the assessment by the  consortium’s national correspondents, 
the  regulators  of  Cyprus  and  Croatia,  found  that  they  were  staffed  appropriately  to  fulfil  their 
missions.  Psychogiopoulou/Casarosa/Kandyla  also  consider  the  level  of  staff  of  the  Greek 
regulator as very limited, see The independence of media regulatory authorities and the impact of 
the  socio-political  context:  A  comparative  analysis  of  Greece  and  Italy,  in:  Schulz/Valcke/Irion, 
The independence of the media and its regulatory agencies, (op. cit.), p. 213, 224.  
In addition, several regulators (CSA of the French-speaking Community of Belgium, the Medienrat 
of  the  German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium, the  Rada pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání of 
the Czech Republic) indicated in their responses to the consortium’s questionnaire that they lacked 
personnel.  

146   This  emerges  from  the  responses  of  the  correspondents  in  the  French-speaking  Community  of 
Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands (this is also confirmed by the responses received directly from 
the Dutch regulatory authority, the Commissariaat voor de Media) to the questionnaires.  

61 

 
                                                 
 
or the ATVOD in the United Kingdom have resolved capacity problems by acquiring 
external expertise.147 Such reliance on experts is, however, only possible if backed by 
sufficient funding.  

In addition, concerns have been expressed that several regulatory bodies appear to be 
under-staffed  especially  after  the  expansion  of  their  mandate  to  regulate  on-demand 
audiovisual media services.148 Similarly, the lack of adequately trained or experienced 
staff is considered a problem in some countries.149 

In two other countries, more serious issues regarding staffing appear to have surfaced. 
In  Albania,  significant  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  personnel  occurred  during  the 
past  five  years  resulting  in  over  20  dismissals.  The  substitution  of  staff  may  indeed 
affect  the  stability  and  continuity  of  an  authority.  Since  the  precise  reasons  of  the 
changes are not known, it is, however, difficult to draw concrete conclusions. Similar 
politically motivated dismissals have been noticed in Macedonia but the current level 
of staff seems to be appropriate.  

Although the law provides for three members of staff, the Medienrat of the German-
speaking  Community  of  Belgium  currently  only  employs  two  persons  working  part 
time (at 50 and 25 percent respectively). Above all, these are paid by the Ministry of 
the  German-speaking  Community  and  appear  to  work  for  both,  the  Ministry  and  the 
Medienrat. In addition, the organ responsible for handling complaints has not yet been 
set  up  according  to  the  law.  Similarly,  in  Denmark,  the  RTB  is  supported  by  the 
secretariat  of  the  Danish  Agency  for  Culture,  Center  for  Libraries  and  Media,  an 
agency under the aegis of the Danish Ministry of Culture. The markets for audiovisual 
media services in the German-speaking Community of Belgium as well as in Denmark 
are rather small but the close ties between the Ministry and the regulatory authority in 
terms of staff could have adverse effects on the regulators’ independence and efficient 
functioning.  

With  regards  to  the  technical  facilities,  a  great  majority  of  regulatory  bodies  is  well 
equipped.150  In  Albania  and  Greece,  technical  equipment  seems  to  be  insufficient, 
especially in Albania where it is out-dated and does not comply with current technical 
standards. This may impede the effective enforcement of the law and may put a strain 
on the regulators.     

147   On the use of research by regulatory authorities see Smokvina, Research & Regulators: Towards an 
evidence-based  approach,  41st  EPRA  meeting  of  14-15  May 
in  Berne,  available  at 
http://www.epra.org/attachments/berne-wg3-research-regulators-final-output-document. This paper 
stresses that due to budgetary cuts, regulators have less money to commission external experts so 
that more frequently research is carried out internally (see p. 6).  

148   Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Ireland (due to economic crisis, vacancies have not been filled in 

recent years), Iceland, Latvia, Romania.  

149   Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Serbia, Slovenia.  
150   Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Spain,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.  

62 

 
                                                 
3.1.2.2.2.   Budget  

In  addition  to  staff,  it  is  crucial  that  regulatory  authorities  have  sufficient  funding  to 
cover their activities. In most countries, the budget is not foreseen specifically in the 
national  legislation  while  some  laws  do  provide  for  the  annual  budget  of  the 
regulators.151 

Similar  to  the  discrepancies  in  staffing,  there exist huge budgetary  differences  in  the 
countries  investigated  in  this  study.  The  regulatory  bodies  of  roughly  ten  countries 
have  less  than  €  1  million  at  their  disposal  on  a  yearly  basis.152  This  marks  a  sharp 
contrast  to  the  regulatory  bodies  in  Turkey  (€  90  million  in  2014-2015),  the  United 
Kingdom  (OFCOM:  €  160  million  in  2014-2015),  Spain  (CNMC:  €  53  million  in 
2014), France (€ 35 million in 2013) and several German regional regulators such as 
the BLM (€ 28 million in 2014) and the LFK (10 million in 2014),  

Due to the economic crisis and general austerity policies, some regulatory authorities 
have  suffered  cut  backs  in  recent  years.153  Serious  reductions  of  resources  are 
problematic  and  may  in  the  future  negatively  impact  the  independence  of  regulators. 
Still,  on  an  overall  level,  regulatory  authorities  appear  to  be  adequately  or  well-
financed.  Importantly,  the  Hungarian  NMHH  which  had  an  annual  budget  of  €  25.8 
million  in  2014  seems  to  be  over-financed  in  view  of  having  accumulated  large 
budgetary reserves.  

Furthermore,  of  relevance  is  also  the  situation  in  Latvia:  the  Latvian  Nacionālā 
elektronisko  plašsaziņas  līdzekļu  padome  (NEPLP)  published  an  announcement  in 
2014 in which it informed the public that it had requested an additional budget of more 
than € 100.000 for 2015 in order to effectively fulfill its missions. It stated that without 
the  increase  in  funding,  it  would  only  be  able  to  monitor  one  percent  of  all 

151   The  annual  budget  is  not  foreseen  in  the  laws  of  Albania,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Germany (public service broadcasting), Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy 
(where  parts  of  the  budget  are  nonetheless  stipulated  by  law),  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Turkey, United Kingdom. 
The annual budget is foreseen in the laws of  Austria, Cyprus, France, Finland, Greece, Germany 
(Landesmedienanstalten), Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Iceland, Malta, Poland.  
152   Albania  (€  800,000  in  2014),  German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium  (€  14,000  in  2014), 
Bulgaria (€ 614,000 in 2014), Finland (€ 789,000 in 2014 for audiovisual media services), Iceland 
(€ 190,000 in 2015), Lithuania (€ 724,000 in 2014), Luxembourg (€ 724,000 in 2015), Latvia (€ 
475,500  in  2015),  Montenegro  (€  921,600  in  2013),  United  Kingdom  (Authority  for  Television 
On-Demand: € 705,000 in 2013).  

153   In  their  responses  to  the  consortium’s  questionnaire,  the  two  Belgian  regulators  (the  Vlaamse 
Regulator  voor  de  Media  of  the  Flemish-speaking  Community  and  the  Conseil  Supérieur  de 
l’Audiovisuel of the French-speaking Community), the Cypriot Αρχή Ραδιοτηλεόρασης Κύπρου, the 
Czech Rada pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání, the Dutch Commissariaat voor de Media and the 
Greek  Ethniko  Symvoulio  Radiotileorasis  the  Spanish  Comisión  Nacional  de  los  Mercados  y  la 
Competencia, and the Italian Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni explicitly acknowledge 
a  reduction  of  their  budgets  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  economic  crisis.  The  Finish 
Viestintävirasto  states  that  its  budget  might  have  to  be  reduced  in  the  future  due  to  the  general 
economic recession.   

63 

 
                                                 
 
broadcasters under its jurisdiction. In spite of NEPLP’s apparent lack of resources, the 
Latvian Parliament did not raise the budget for 2015.  

In sum, there is great disparity in the number of staff and the amount of annual budget 
of regulatory authorities. These have to be set in relation to the respective size of the 
national market for audiovisual media services and the number of providers operating 
in  this  sector. It appears that the level of staffing and  financial resources is generally 
appropriate in view of the tasks carried out by regulatory authorities.  

3.1.3.  Funding 

The  second  criteria  for  the  evaluation  of  the  independence  of  the  regulatory  body 
concerns  it’s  funding.  To  examine  whether  the  body  is  financially  independent,  a 
closer look at the kinds and sources of funding, the funding body and the involvement 
of different parties in setting the budget are necessary.  

3.1.3.1.  Sources of funding 

As  has  been  mentioned  before,  the  regulatory  bodies  are  typically  not  capable  of 
generating  their  own resources. They rely, therefore, on external  resources which are 
granted to them or which they are allowed to levy on a legal basis. In general, it can be 
said  that  the  lesser  the  extent  to  which  the  granting  body  has  a  margin  in  deciding 
about its obligation to finance the body, the higher the degree of independence of the 
regulatory body is. 

In this regard, a direct State funding which is not fixed in advance, at least if this is the 
only or predominant source, appears to be the least favourable option. However, in the 
vast majority of countries, an (at least partially) State-financed model is applied.154 In 
many cases,  all155 or nearly all156 financial resources of the regulatory body originate 
from  the State budget.  Only in  few countries,  regulatory bodies do not  rely on funds 
from  the  State  budget  for  their  operations.157  A  small  proportion  of  the  regulatory 
body’s total budget is made up of State funds in Italy (4.8%) and the UK (concerning 
OFCOM, 2%). Regulatory bodies in some countries are net-budgeted by the State, i.e. 

154   Albania,  Belgium  (all  Communities,  of  which  the  French  and  German-speaking  rely  on  state 
financing to 100%), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and UK. 

155   Belgium  (French  and  German-speaking  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 

Estonia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain (CAA). 

156   Latvia, Spain (CAC). 
157   Austria,  Cyprus,  Germany,  Croatia,  Ireland  (state  financing  allowed  under  exceptional 
circumstances),  Macedonia,  Slovenia  and  UK  (only  for  the  self-regulatory  bodies  ASA  and 
ATVOD). 

64 

 
 
                                                 
they only get their deficit funded from the State budget, whereas any surplus generated 
is transferred to the State budget.158 

Changes regarding this source of income that have occurred after the INDIREG study 
are  limited  to  Cyprus  (where  State  funding  has  ceased  a  few  years  after  the 
establishment  of  the  CRTA)  and  Lithuania  (which  switched  from  a  fee-based  to  a 
predominantly  State-budgeted  model).  In  Macedonia,  a  first-time  payment  from  the 
national budget in 2009 appears to have remained the only case when State funds were 
used to finance the regulatory body’s work; they are not foreseen as a regular source of 
income of the body renamed Agency for Audio and Audio-visual Media Services. 

As  far  as  end-user  licence  fees  are  collected  by  the  regulatory  bodies,  they  may,  in 
many cases, not be used directly by them, but must be transferred to the State budget, 
from where they then receive back part of the resources.159 Direct funding from end-
user licence fees is only foreseen in seven countries.160 

Similarly,  spectrum  fees  also  contribute  (directly  or  indirectly)  to  the  regulatory 
bodies’ budget in only seven countries.161 Nearly no changes have occurred here in the 
past years.  

In contrast, licence and authorisation fees paid by broadcasters make for the regulatory 
bodies’  budget  in  a  considerable  number  of  countries.162  In  Ireland,  100%  of  the 
budget is gained from an industry levy imposed on providers on a cost-recovery basis. 
On  the  other  hand,  broadcasters’  fees  (collected  exclusively  from  satellite  providers) 
only  amount  to  2.4%  of  the  budget  in  Italy.  Since  the  publication  of  the  INDIREG 
report,  more  countries  have  turned  to  a  (partly)  broadcaster-financed  model.163  In 
Luxembourg, a draft regulation introducing a provider tax from 2015 has recently been 
adopted.164 

158   This is the case in Albania, Finland, Poland and Serbia. 
159   This is the case, for example, in Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. 
160   Albania, Austria, Belgium (Flemish Community, where end-user licence fees amount to 63% of the 
regulatory body’s total budget), Germany (for the Landesmedienanstalten which draw between 59 
and  99%  of  their  funds  from  licence  fees;  regulatory  bodies  for  the  public  service  broadcasters 
obtain  their  share  of  the  fees  indirectly  from  the  broadcasters  themselves),  Macedonia,  Sweden 
(24% of the total budget) and UK (for the BBC Trust which gains less than 0.31% of the total fee 
revenues for the BBC). 

161   Albania,  Belgium  (Flemish  Community,  42%),  Spain  (CAC  only),  Finland  (30%),  Hungary, 
Slovenia  (54%)  and  UK  (for  Ofcom,  which  obtains  a  57%  grant-in-aid  from  the  central 
government). 

162   Albania,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Spain  (CAC  only),  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Montenegro,  Malta, 

Portugal, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Turkey and UK (for Ofcom). 

163   Bulgaria, Montenegro, Sweden (as an additional source of income aside from state budget and end-

user broadcasting licence fees) and Turkey. 

164   Règlement grand-ducal du 2 février 2015 fixant le montant et les modalités de paiement des taxes à 
percevoir par l’Autorité luxembourgeoise indépendante de l’audiovisuel en matière de surveillance 
des services de médias audiovisuels et sonores, Mém. A- N° 21, 10.02.2015, p. 238. 

65 

 
                                                 
Revenues  from fines imposed on regulated parties are a funding source in more than 
one  third  of  countries,  even  though  they  usually  only  contribute  a  minor  part  to  the 
overall budget of the regulatory body. Often, administrative fees, market surveillance 
or supervision fees or levies and providers’ revenues are also foreseen as a source of 
financing.165 Other sources include savings, the use of reserves and own property and 
interest rates. 

Overall, changes to the funding schemes remained marginal. Only in a few countries, 
more  significant  changes  were  made.  This  includes  Bulgaria,  where end-user licence 
fees partly used to fund the regulatory body’s work are now collected, and Lithuania, 
where  funding  has  switched  from  a  fee-based  to  a  mainly  State-funded  model.  In 
Cyprus and Macedonia, State funding has ceased. 

3.1.3.2.  Procedural rules concerning the establishment of the budget 

In  the  same  way  that  the  mix  of  funding  sources  has  an  impact  on  the  degree  of 
financial  independence,  the  process  of  drafting  and  adopting  the  regulatory  body’s 
annual budget is significant, too. Particularly in countries where the regulatory body is 
mainly financed by the State, its independence may additionally be affected negatively, 
if  the  same  State  body  competent  for  granting  the  money  is  also  the  one  having  a 
decisive say on the adoption of the budget. On the other hand, it should be noted that a 
decision taken by democratically elected State organs can provide the budget with the 
highest democratic legitimation possible. 

Most  of  the  countries  analysed  have  vested  their  Parliaments  with  the  power  to  take 
the  final  decision  on  the  regulatory  body’s  annual  budget.166  In  Croatia,  the  overall 
annual  budget  has  been  fixed  by  an  Act  of  Parliament  to  a  certain  share  of  market 
players’ annual revenues.167 

In some countries, the regulatory body itself has the last say on the annual budget.168 It 
needs  to  be  noted,  however,  that  while  in  these  countries,  the  regulatory  body  can 

165   This  is  the  case,  for  instance,  in  Albania,  Austria,  Cyprus,  Germany,  Finland,  Croatia,  Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Macedonia, Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey. In Italy, the system is currently under 
review  following  a  CJEU  judgment  declaring  the  previous  model  partly  invalid  (see  CJEU, 
Judgment of 18 July 2013, case no. C-228/12 – Vodafone Omnitel et al., ECLI:EU:C:2013:495)  
166   Albania, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain 
(CAC/CAA:  regional  Parliaments),  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal (jointly with regulatory body, only as 
far  as the  State’s share in the regulatory body’s budget is concerned), Romania, Serbia, Sweden, 
Slovakia, Turkey (as far as the State’s share in the regulatory body’s is concerned). 

167   The  budget  is  set  to  0.5%  of  the  total  annual  gross  revenues  gained  by  market  players  from  the 
provision  of  relevant  media  services  in  the  previous  year;  cf.  Art.  66(7)  Zakon  o  elektroničkim 
medijima (Law on Electronic Media) of 11 December 2009, Official Gazette 153/09, 84/11, 94/13, 
136/13;  a  consolidated  version  of  the  law  is  available  at:  http://www.zakon.hr/z/196/Zakon-o-
elektroni%C4%8Dkim-medijima 

168   Austria  (legal  caps  apply;  cf.  §  35(1)  KommAustria  Act),  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy  (adjusted  by 
Ministry  of  Economy,  if  necessary,  Macedonia,  Portugal  (jointly  with  Parliament),  UK  (Ofcom; 
however, a spending cap set by HM Treasury has to be observed). 

66 

 
                                                 
ultimately  decide  over  how  the  money  is  spent,  in  some  of  these,  it  has  no  decisive 
influence  on  the  amount  of  financial  means  at  its  disposal.  In  Germany  and 
Macedonia,  for  instance,  the  total  budget  depends, to  a great  extent, on the revenues 
gained  from  the  end-user  broadcasting  contribution  and  broadcasting  licence  fees, 
respectively,  which,  in  turn,  depend  on other external  factors, such as the number of 
households/service providers liable to pay the contribution or fee, as well as their level 
(which  is  fixed  by  the  legislator).  Also  in  Italy,  the  budget  relies,  to  a  considerable 
degree,  on  annual  contributions  paid  by  operators,  and  the  Ministry  of  Economy  is 
entitled  to  adjust  the  budget  drafted  by  AGCOM,  if  necessary.  In  the  UK,  Her 
Majesty’s  Treasury  sets  spending  caps  valid  for  three-year  periods.  The  Portuguese 
regulator, ANACOM, can adopt the budget only jointly with Parliament. 

In a few countries, it is the competent ministry – often the Ministry of Finance – or the 
Government as a whole that decides on the regulatory body’s annual budget.169 

Even though the regulator may not be in the position of taking the final decision over 
its annual budget, it is involved in the process in all countries analysed, mostly in the 
drafting phase. As regards the other bodies involved in the budget-making process, a 
wide variety of models can be observed: sometimes, apart from the regulator, only the 
executive branch (either a single minister or the Government as a whole) participates 
in the budget-making170, sometimes only the legislator171. In most countries, however, 
both Government and Parliament are involved.172 No direct involvement of any other 
body  than  the  regulator  is  foreseen  in  Austria  (although  market  players  have  to  be 
consulted) and Germany. 

Changes in the budget-making process have remained marginal. New laws in Albania 
and Lithuania now assign the decisive role to the Parliament, whereas before it was the 
regulator (LRTK in Lithuania) or the Government (Albania) who had the final say. In 
Iceland,  the  regulator  is  now  formally  involved  in  the  budget-drafting  process.  The 
Montenegrin Ministry of Finance now has an advisory role, as it is asked for opinion 
(which may also include adjustment proposals), before the draft budget is forwarded to 
the Parliament for final decision. 

It remains vastly unclear to what extent third parties have a de-facto influence on the 
drawing  up  of  the  budget.  Some  external  factors  on  which  the  total  budget  amount 
might  depend  when  the  financial  means  come,  at  least  in  part,  from  fees  and  other 
levies,  have  already  been  mentioned  above.  Other  influences  are  difficult  to  spot. 

169   Greece,  Netherlands,  Slovenia.  For  the  role  of  the  Italian  and  UK  government  in  the  budget-

making process, see the previous paragraph. 

170   Greece,  Netherlands,  Slovenia.  For  the  role  of  the  Italian  and  UK  government  in  the  budget-
making process, see the penultimate paragraph. In Greece, the President of the Parliament receives 
a copy of the budget plan. 

171   Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia (Parliament can only review and demand a new 

budget within 60 days), Turkey. 

172   Albania, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia. In Serbia, however, the Government is only involved if State funds are needed. 

67 

 
                                                 
Although  de-facto  third  party  influence  has  been  confirmed  only  in  a  minority  of 
country reports173, it appears unlikely that in the other countries such influence can be 
completely  ruled  out.  Even  where  no  such  influence  could  be  found  today,  this  may 
only mean that no such case has become known to the author or the public at large so 
far. On the other hand, in some countries, only a rough assessment as to the intensity 
or  the  parties  that  appeared  the  most  likely  or  most  widely  known  to  influence 
budgetary  decisions  was  given.  More  details  were  only  provided  in  one  case:  in 
Ireland, the BAI was  forced to  revise its industry levy order as a consequence of the 
financial crisis and increasing market pressure. 

3.1.  Effective functioning 

3.1.1.  Adequate powers  

The range of powers accorded to regulatory authorities can be seen as another indicator 
of  the  latter’s  independence.  More  precisely,  regulatory  bodies  need  to  be  equipped 
with a minimum of powers (i.e. adequate powers) to ensure their independence as well 
as  the  effective  exercise  of  their  activities.  In  this  report  it is  generally distinguished 
between regulatory, monitoring and sanctioning powers. Regulatory powers mean the 
power  to  act  in  certain  fields  of  regulation  and  take  binding  decisions  against  third 
parties.  Monitoring  powers  denote  the  power  to  exercise  an  appropriate  level  of 
oversight  with  a  view  to  checking  compliance  with  the  law.  In  order  to  guarantee 
effective enforcement of the law and take action against providers whose services are 
not in conformity with legal requirements, sanctioning powers are given to regulatory 
authorities. In addition, the existence of complaints-handling procedures is examined.  

3.1.1.1.  Regulatory powers  

Different types of regulatory powers can be distinguished. These are policy setting and 
policy implementing powers as well as specific decision-making powers. The latter are 
taken  with  regards  to  third  parties  (individually  or  collectively)  and  are  binding  on 
them.  These  regulatory  powers  can  be  limited  by  the  powers  of  other  bodies  to 
overturn the regulators’ decisions and to give instructions.  

3.1.1.1.1.   General policy setting powers  

In 15 countries, regulatory authorities possess policy setting powers.174 More precisely, 
ten regulatory bodies of EU Member States and five regulatory authorities of candidate 
countries are equipped with “the power to decide on the general orientation of the rules 

173   Belgium (all Communities, to a  “limited” degree), France (to a high degree), Hungary (influence 

from political parties), Ireland, Italy, Poland and Sweden (to a low degree). 

174   Albania, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Romania,  Serbia,  Slovenia,  Turkey,  the  United  Kingdom.  By  contrast,  national  regulators  in 
Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain (regional 
regulators CAC and CAA) Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia are not equipped with policy setting powers.    

68 

 
                                                 
to be followed (for instance the power to decide on the amount of quotas)”.175 In most 
of  these  countries,  the  policy  setting  power  of  regulatory  authorities  entails  the 
administration of the licensing procedure and the management of the frequencies and 
other network capacities.176 In Spain (CNMC), Hungary (NMHH), Slovenia (AKOS) 
and the UK (OFCOM), where converged regulators have been established, such policy 
setting powers are common due to the regulators’ activities in both sectors, audiovisual 
media services and telecommunications.  

In several countries, policy-setting powers are associated with regulator’s involvement 
in the legislation making process and the drawing up of the national strategy.177 It is, 
however, questionable to what extent the latter can be considered policy-setting as it is 
contingent on the freedom of the regulator and the respective national context. Where 
the regulatory body simply specifies the policy goals set by the national government, 
this  should  be  considered  policy-implementing  powers.  Where  the  regulatory  body, 
however, is free to develop more clearly objectives and formulate concrete proposals 
in its annual strategy, this is considered to be policy setting powers.  

Moreover, policy-setting powers are typically limited to certain fields of regulation. In 
Ireland, for instance, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland is entitled, among others, to 
draw up advertising codes and regulate the right of reply. In Latvia, the NEPLP, among 
others, determines the remit of public service broadcasters and in Turkey, the RTÜK 
sets out the broadcasting standards including the rules on commercial communications 
and age labelling.  

In  contrast  to  the  INDIREG  study,  the  regulatory  bodies  of  four  additional  countries 
have been endowed with policy setting powers. In Estonia178 and Luxembourg, where 
the national regulatory frameworks have been substantially altered, the regulators have 
gained  the  power  to  set  policy  objectives.  Similarly,  in  Spain  and  Hungary,  where 
institutional  reforms  have  also  been  effectuated  in  2013  and  2010  respectively, 
regulator’s remits have been broadened to include policy-setting powers.  

In  a  great  majority  of  countries  where  the  regulatory  authorities  have  policy-setting 
powers, these are also used in practice. Yet, the Spanish CNMC does not seem to have 
employed  this  power  yet  which  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  it  was  only 
established in June 2013.   

175   INDIREG Study, table 9 and Final report p. 216.  
176   Estonia,  Spain,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Serbia,  the  United  Kingdom.  In 
Serbia,  the  regulator’s  involvement  in  the  licensing  process  is  considered  policy  implementing 
power.  

177   Albania, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey.  
178   Previously,  the  Estonian  Ministry  of  Culture,  which  was  considered  as  a  regulatory  body  by  the 

INDIREG study, exercised policy setting powers.   

69 

 
                                                 
3.1.1.1.2.   General policy implementing powers 

In  all  countries,  national  regulatory  bodies  are  entrusted  with  policy-implementing 
powers  implying  the  power  to  apply  and  enforce  the  obligations  set  out  in  national 
laws  (e.g.  monitor  the  rules  concerning  audiovisual  commercial  communication  and 
interpret provisions in individual cases).179   

In comparison to the INDIREG study, changes have occurred in only a few countries. 
The  powers  of  the  Czech  RRTV  have  been  refined  by  the  amendment  of  the  Czech 
Radio  and Broadcasting Act  of 2010 expanding RRTV’s competences in the field of 
media  literacy.  RRTV  has  henceforth  been  competent  to  publish  opinions  and  draft 
proposals contributing to the media policy of the Czech government in particular with 
a  view  to  enhancing  media  literacy.  In  addition,  the  modification  of  the  Czech  law 
included  a  clarification  that  RRTV  is  competent  to  issue  opinions  in  all  matters 
covered  by  its  mandate.  The  possibility  to  set  forth  its  activities  in  opinions  and 
thereby  give  guidance  to  providers  constitutes  an  important  means  to  implement  the 
country’s media law policy.  

Furthermore, policy-implementing powers have been transferred to the TJA of Estonia 
which inherited this function from the Ministry of Culture in 2008. The TJA operates 
as  an  administrative  authority  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Estonian  Ministry  of 
Economic Affairs and Communications. The new Luxembourgish regulatory authority 
ALIA  was  also  endowed  with  policy  implementing  powers  when  it  was  created  in 
August  2013.  This  constitutes  a  significant  change  from  the  previous  design  of  the 
regulatory  scheme  and  can  be  considered  a  positive  development  concerning  the 
independence and effective functioning in this country.    

Although  all  regulatory  authorities  are  formally  entrusted  with  policy-implementing 
powers,  some  do  not  appear  to  have  actually  used  them.  To  date,  the  Danish  and 
Luxembourgish regulators do not seem to have exercised policy-implementing powers. 
Similarly,  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Spain,  Germany  (with  regards  to  public  service 
broadcasters)  and  Croatia,  it  is  unclear  whether  regulators  have  made  use  of  such 
powers.     

3.1.1.1.3.   Binding decisions on third parties 

The  power  to  take  decisions,  which  are  binding  on  third  parties180  such  as  service 
providers,  is  attributed  to  all  national  regulatory  bodies.181  This  entails  the  power  to 

179   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

180   The  power  to  take  binding  decisions  on  third  parties  was  defined  by  the  INDIREG  study  as  the 
“power to take in a specific case a decision binding on specific operators”. See INDIREG study, 
table 9 and Final report p. 218.  

181   Third-party  binding  decision-making  powers  are  held  by  the  national  regulators  of  Austria, 
Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 

70 

 
                                                 
take  decisions  relating,  for  instance,  to  specific  aspects  of  licensing  but  excludes 
sanctioning decisions which are analysed separately.  

Compared to the INDIREG study, the regulatory bodies of Iceland (where the Media 
Act was amended in 2011) and Luxembourg (where a new regulator was set up) have 
gained  the  power  to  take  binding  decisions  on  third  parties.  While  the  Slovenian 
Ministry of Culture was previously authorized to take decisions vis-à-vis third parties, 
today,  the  Slovenian  AKOS  enforces  such  decisions.  In  Estonia,  this  power  is  no 
longer exercised by the Ministry of Culture but has been shifted to the TJA of Estonia. 
To  this  end,  these  regulatory  bodies  can  take  decisions  more  independently,  which 
allows them to effectively monitor compliance with and take steps to enforce the law.      

Since  the  INDIREG  study,  only  the  Czech,  Danish  and  Spanish  (neither  the  federal 
CNMC nor the regional regulators CAC and CAA) regulators have not employed the 
power to take decisions (other than sanctioning decisions), which are binding on third 
parties. All other regulatory authorities have taken specific decisions affecting market 
operators. 

3.1.1.1.4.   Limitations of the regulatory powers 

In  the  following  we  will  focus  on  the  limitations  of  the  regulatory  powers.  Such 
limitations  arise  from  the  power  of  other  bodies  to  overturn  the  decisions  of  the 
regulatory authorities and to give them instructions. However, the power of courts to 
overturn the regulators’ decisions is not subject of the analysis in this section but will 
be examined further below in the chapter on judicial review.  

The regulatory powers of 21 regulators are not limited. No other body has the power to 
overturn  their  decisions  or  to  give  instructions.182  For  the  regulator  of  Luxembourg 
there has been a change, since the Minister for Communication and Media used to be 
able to give instructions, but is not able to do so any longer. In this regard, for AKOS 
in Slovenia there has been the same change, as the Ministry of Culture used to have the 
power to give instructions, but does not have that power any longer.  

The regulatory powers of four regulators are limited by the power of other bodies to 
overturn their decisions as well as by the power of other bodies to give instructions: all 
Communities  in  Belgium,  and  the  regulator from  Denmark. The regulatory power of 
CvDM of the Netherlands is only limited by the power of other bodies to overturn its 
decisions,  but  no  other  body  has  the  possibility  to  give  instructions  to  the  regulator. 
The  decisions  of  the  regulator  from  the  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium, 
from  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  can  be  overturned  by  a  Ministry,  while  the 

France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

182   Austria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  Greece, 
Hungary,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Poland,  Portugal,  Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey.  

71 

 
                                                                                                                                             
decisions of the French-speaking Community and the German-speaking Community of 
Belgium can be overturned by the Government. Limitations to that power to overturn 
the decisions of the regulator exist only in the German-speaking and French-speaking 
Community of Belgium and in Denmark.  

The  regulatory  powers  of  twelve  regulators  are  only  limited  by  the  power  of  other 
bodies  to  give  instruction,  but  no  other  body  has  the  power  to  overturn  their 
decisions.183 The regulatory powers of the NAC in Romania have been limited, since 
the Parliament is now able to reject the annual activity report. 

Seven  regulatory  authorities  get  instructions  by  a  ministry.184  The  Minister  for 
Communication  and  the  Media  can  no  longer  give  instructions  to  the  regulator  in 
Luxembourg,  and  the  Ministry  of  Culture  can  give  no  instructions  to  AKOS  from 
Slovenia  anymore.  Six  regulators  can  be  subjected  to  instructions  from  the 
Government.185. Three regulators receive instructions from the Parliament,186 while the 
Cypriot  Parliament  can  no  longer  give  instructions  to  the  Radio  and  Televisions 
Authority. There is no limitation of the power to give instructions for the Government 
of  the  Flemish-speaking  Community  in  Belgium,  the  Ministry  in  Ireland,  and  the 
Parliament in Romania.  

Overall  there  have  only  been few changes regarding the limitations of the regulatory 
powers of the regulatory authorities. The power to give instructions to the regulatory 
authority has been introduced in Romania, but abolished in Luxembourg and Slovenia.  

3.1.1.2.  Monitoring powers 

It  is  essential  for  national  regulatory  bodies  to  have  at  their  disposal  the  power  to 
monitor  service  providers  established  in  the  country.  Thereby,  regulators  can 
effectively ensure that providers abide by the law and can take corrective action if this 
is  not  the  case.  Different  types  of  monitoring  can  generally  be  distinguished  such  as 
systematic  and  ad  hoc  monitoring.  Both  of  these  types  are  initiated  by the regulator. 
Complaints-based monitoring on the other hand depends on the active involvement of 
the public. In addition, the power to request information from providers is crucial for 
the clarification of contentious issues.   

The  scope  of  monitoring  powers  is  also  taken  into  account.  National  regulatory 
authorities  may  possess  extensive  monitoring  powers  for  all  sectors  covered  by their 
remit.  Alternatively,  such  powers  may  be  constrained  to  certain  areas  such  as  the 
promotion  of  European  works  (e.g.  in  form  of  quotas),  the  protection  of  minors  or 
audiovisual commercial communications.  

183   Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Sweden, 

United Kingdom.  

184   Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
185   Albania, Belgium (all Communities), Sweden, United Kingdom.  
186   Italy, Malta, Romania. 

72 

 
                                                 
3.1.1.2.1.   Systematic monitoring 

Systematic monitoring entails the continuous supervision of providers operating on the 
national market (under the jurisdiction of that State) on the basis of a set of criteria or 
pre-determined  methodology.187  In  contrast  to  other  types  of  monitoring,  systematic 
monitoring is the most intensive, laborious and time-consuming from the perspective 
of  regulators.  It  allows  for  a  detailed  oversight  of  service  providers  and  the  rapid 
detection of irregularities or infringements of the law.  

Except  for  the  Belgian  regulator  of  the  German-speaking  Community,  the  Icelandic 
and  Swedish  regulators,  all  other  national  regulatory  bodies  conduct  systematic 
monitoring.188  Interestingly,  the  Albanian  AMA  seems  to  monitor  in  a  systematic 
manner only those providers  established in  the capital city whereas operators located 
elsewhere  in  the  country  are  monitored  by  means  of  spot  checks  and  other  ad  hoc 
methods. Such differentiation seems at first glance to constitute unequal treatment but 
may  be  justified  by  national  particularities  (e.g.  the  large  number  of  major  providers 
established in the area of the capital city).  

Importantly,  in  some  countries,  the  scope  of  systematic  monitoring  activities  is 
restricted  to  certain  areas.  The  Austrian  regulator  carries  out  monitoring  only  with 
respect to the rules on promotion of European works and those concerning audiovisual 
commercial communication. The Spanish regional regulatory body CAA concentrates 
its  monitoring  activities  on  the  rules  regarding  minors.  In  Serbia  and  Turkey,  the 
national legal orders do not provide for legal obligations promoting the production and 
distribution of European works. As a result, the monitoring activities in these countries 
merely  encompass  the  fields  of  audiovisual  commercial  communication  as  well  as 
protection  of  minors.  What  is  more,  the  Serbian  regulatory  body  only  resorts  to 
systematic monitoring techniques during election periods.        

Interestingly, where co- or self-  regulatory models have been established, monitoring 
activities  are  shared  between  different  regulatory  authorities.  In  the  Netherlands,  the 
Commissariaat  voor  de  Media  supervises  advertising  standards  and  the  norms 
promoting  European  works,  while  NICAM  is  responsible  for  overseeing  provider’s 
compliance  with  the  provisions  protecting  minors  in  audiovisual  media  services.  By 
the same token, the British co-regulators, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) 
and the ATVOD, monitor the advertising market and the application of the rules to on-
demand service providers respectively.  

In  comparison  to  the  INDIREG  study,  new  powers  for  systematic  monitoring  have 
been  attributed  to  the  regulatory  authorities  of  Estonia  (as  previously  held  by  the 

187   INDIREG study, Final report, p. 218.  
188   Albania, Austria, Belgium (Flemish- and French-speaking Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain  (federal  and  regional  regulatory  bodies),  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro, 
Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia,  Slovenia,  Slovakia, 
Turkey, United Kingdom.  

73 

 
                                                 
Ministry of Culture), Luxembourg (where a new regulator has been founded), Romania 
and Slovenia.      

Although  the  regulatory  authorities  are  formally  empowered  to  carry  out  systematic 
monitoring,  such  does  not  seem  to  take  place  in  Denmark.  Whereas  the  INDIREG 
study  indicated  that  the  Croatian  AEM  did  not  employ  the  tool  to  monitor 
systematically, this appears to have changed and AEM undertakes such monitoring.  

3.1.1.2.2.   Ad-hoc monitoring 

Apart  from  systematic  monitoring,  less  structured  or  ad-hoc  monitoring  techniques 
such as random spot checks are used by national regulatory bodies to gather data and 
evaluate  providers’  compliance  with  the  law.  Ad-hoc  monitoring  allows  for 
unannounced  screening/checking  of  services  and  the  threat/possibility  of  such  spot 
checks  incites  providers  to  keep in  line with  legal  obligations on a continuous basis. 
As systematic techniques of monitoring are not  all-encompassing, ad-hoc monitoring 
is an important technique, which ideally supplements the former.  

All  regulatory  authorities  except  for  the  Spanish  regulators  (at  regional  level)  are 
granted  ad  hoc  monitoring  powers.189  This  method  of  supervision  was  newly 
introduced in Albania (where the law was significantly amended in 2013 extending the 
regulator’s monitoring functions), Estonia (where a transferral of regulatory power has 
taken  place  in  2013)  and  Iceland  (where  a  new  regulatory  body  was  established  in 
2011)  compared  to  the  time  of  the  INDIREG  study.  Ad-hoc  monitoring  is  actually 
performed  in  all  countries  except  for  Cyprus  where  the  regulatory  body  only  rarely 
seems  to  employ  this  tool  and  instead  appears  to  rely  more  heavily  on  complaints 
brought about by the public.    

As with systematic monitoring, ad hoc monitoring is limited to certain sectors in some 
countries.  The  Cypriot  Αρχή  Ραδιοτηλεόρασης  Κύπρου  as  well  as  the  Austrian 
KommAustria  exercise  this  power  only  with  regards  to  the  rules  on  audiovisual 
commercial  communication  and  the  protection  of  minors.190  Similarly,  in  Serbia  and 
Turkey where no legal obligations exist to promote European works, the scope of ad 
hoc monitoring powers consequently does not cover this area. Moreover, co- or self-
regulatory  bodies  such  as  NICAM  in  the  Netherlands  or  the  ASA  and  ATVOD  in  the 
United Kingdom may exclusively or jointly (with the national regulator) perform this 
function. 

With  regards  to  both  ad-hoc  and  systematic  monitoring,  several  observations  are 
noteworthy.  In  Slovenia,  for  instance,  AKOS  reverts  to  ad-hoc  monitoring  methods 

189   Ad-hoc  monitoring  powers  are  granted  to  the  national  regulatory  authorities  in  Albania,  Austria, 
Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

190   In  Austria,  the  power  to  do  ad-hoc  monitoring  in  the  areas  of  commercial  communication  and 

protection of minors is further limited with respect to public service broadcasting.  

74 

 
                                                 
when particular problems  arise. This allows for more flexible oversight. Moreover, a 
small group of regulators uses external services and data compilation agencies in the 
process of monitoring.191 The “outsourcing” of data gathering may be useful where the 
regulator’s resources (in terms of personnel) are limited. Yet, such services may also 
turn out to be relatively costly in the long run. In France and Italy, regional committees 
are  charged  with  the  monitoring  of  regional  or  local  service  providers,  thereby 
exonerating the national regulators to a certain extent. Interestingly, in Italy, Serbia and 
Slovakia,  the  regulatory  bodies  seem  to  be  equipped  with  the  necessary  facilities  to 
record  all  programmes  themselves.  The  Turkish  RTÜK  is  even  entitled  to  set  up  a 
recording system in the studio of a broadcaster. 

Moreover,  some  regulatory  authorities  seem  to  prioritize  certain  instruments  of 
monitoring or apply different ones in different situations. The Bulgarian CEM appears 
to  supervise  more  actively  during  election  periods  and  otherwise  resorts  to  more 
indiscriminate  monitoring  techniques.  Furthermore,  the  Hungarian  NMHH  specifies 
the services, which will be systematically monitored in its annual work plan. In France, 
the  CSA  appears  to  monitor  broadcasting  and  radio  services  on  a  more  continuous 
basis  in  comparison  with  non-linear  provision  of  content.  The  Italian  AGCOM 
monitors services more intensively following complaints by the public.      

In  many  countries,  the  legal  provisions  outlining  regulators’  monitoring  powers  are 
complemented  by  provisions  requiring  providers  to  keep  records  and  archive 
programmes for certain time periods.192 If cases arise or are otherwise brought to the 
attention  of  regulators,  the  latter  may  enquire  about  such  recordings  as  part  of  their 
information collection powers.  

3.1.1.2.3.   Information collection powers  

Apart  from  monitoring  techniques,  regulatory  authorities  have  other  powers  at  their 
disposal, which permit them to effectively act on and react to individual cases. Hence, 
the power to collect information from service providers, whereby certain points may be 
clarified, constitutes an important tool for regulators.  

The  regulatory  bodies  of  all  countries  are  endowed  with  information  collection 
powers.193 These commonly cover all areas and are exceptionally restricted to certain 

191   Albania, Czech Republic, Spain (federal and regional regulatory bodies), Croatia and Italy.   
192   This aspect was not explicitly covered by the scope of this study.  The national correspondents of 
Austria  and  the  French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium  referred  to  it  in  their  responses  to  the 
questionnaire, but it needs to be pointed out that the above mentioned list therefore is expected to 
be incomplete.  

193   Albania, Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain 
(CNMC),  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

75 

 
                                                 
sectors in Serbia and Turkey where national laws do not stipulate quota requirements 
and thus no corresponding information collection powers.194   

In Slovenia, the Ministry of Culture has preserved information collection powers with 
respect  to  the  enforcement  of  the  quota  rules,  exercising  this  power  in  parallel  with 
AKOS. More precisely, it is the Ministry which reports to the European Commission, 
decides  on  exemptions  from  the  quota  requirements,  and  may  request  operators  to 
provide additional documentation.  

3.1.1.2.4.   Monitoring only after complaints 

Another form of monitoring involves the general public including viewers or users of 
audiovisual media services, competing service providers or other stakeholders. Due to 
the  plethora  of  services  and  the  vast  amounts  of  content  made  available,  regulatory 
bodies  are  dependent  on  collaboration  with  the  audience  and  market.  Hence,  a  great 
majority  of  regulators  relies  on  public  complaints  and  has  made  available  special 
complaint  forms  on  their  websites  facilitating  the  handling  of  complaints.195  In 
Lithuania, where the law does not provide for a legal basis, the regulator nonetheless 
relies  on  this  instrument.  This  reflects  the  significance  of  complaints-based 
monitoring.   

In  a  few  countries,  regulatory  bodies  become  active  only  after  a  complaint  has  been 
filed. This is, for instance, the case in Austria (with regards to the enforcement of the 
rules concerning audiovisual commercial communication and the protection of minors 
in  public  service  broadcasting), 
to  public  service 
broadcasting), in the Netherlands (with respect to NICAM in the area of protection of 
minors) and the United Kingdom (regarding public service broadcasting).  

in  Germany  (in  relation 

Moreover,  complaints-based  monitoring  is  increasingly  being  used  by  some  national 
regulatory  bodies.  In  several  countries196,  this  type  appears  to  be  the  predominant 
mode  of  monitoring  the  market,  while  the  Medienrat  of  the  German-speaking 
Community relies entirely on complaints lacking an appropriate level of staff as well 
as any facilities to scrutinize services by itself. In brief, the large majority of national 
regulatory  authorities  is  equipped  with  broad  monitoring  powers.  Regulators  either 
conduct  systematic  or  ad  hoc  monitoring  or  more  commonly  use  both  techniques 
simultaneously.  In  addition,  problematic  or  controversial  issues  are  brought  to  the 
attention  of  regulators  by  the  public  through  well-established  systems  of  complaints. 
They are also endowed with information collection powers.     

194   In  Germany,  the  Broadcasting  Councils  of  public  service  broadcasters  do  not  have  information 

collection powers regarding the set of rules promoting European works.  

195   A precise number of countries cannot be given as the wording of table 10 of the INDIREG study 
was phrased in a manner which lent itself to misunderstandings asking for “monitoring  only after 
complaints”.  Some  correspondents  seemed  to  ignore  the  adjective  “only”  while  others  indicated 
that the regulatory body generally performs monitoring upon complaints.  
196   French-speaking Community of Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece and Sweden. 

76 

 
                                                 
3.1.1.3.  Sanctioning powers 

In order to effectively enforce legal requirements, national laws provide for a range of 
sanctions.  These  may  be  imposed  by  national  regulators  which  have  a  margin  of 
discretion  regarding  the  choice  of  sanction.  When  determining  the  type  of  sanction, 
factors such as the nature of the infringement, its seriousness and providers’ previous 
conduct  may  be  taken  into  account.  Typically,  national  laws  outline  a  graduated 
sanctioning scheme encompassing among others warnings, fines, orders requiring the 
publication of decisions in a media outlet of the infringing provider and suspension or 
revocation of licenses. In addition, the law may envisage penalty payments in case of 
non-compliance with a sanctioning decision. A staggered system of sanctions enhances 
flexibility and allows national regulators to appropriately react to violations of the law. 
It may also incentivize providers’ respect of legal obligations and stimulate (or at least 
not impede) a relationship of trust between operators and regulators provided that it is 
applied  uniformly  and  coherently.  It  is  necessary  that  the  imposition  of  sanctions 
follows clear and transparent guidelines and is accompanied by procedural safeguards 
protecting  providers’  rights  to  defence  including  the  possibility  to  ask  for  judicial 
review of the sanctioning decision.197      

3.1.1.3.1.   Warning  

The  least  intrusive  sanction  constitutes  a  warning,  which  determines  that  a  provider 
has breached the law. It represents a “formal objection” by the regulatory authority and 
demands  that  the  provider  ends  the  infringement.198  As  the  first  of  a  series  of 
sanctions,  a warning implies the imposition of heavier sanctions if the provider does 
not rectify its conduct and bring it into line with the law.  

This  type  of  sanction  is  available  to  all  national  regulatory  authorities.199  In 
comparison  to  the  INDIREG  study,  since  the  creation  of  a  new  regulator  in 
Luxembourg in 2013, this power is firmly vested in the ALIA.200 Similarly, changes in 
the regulatory framework of Estonia have led to the transferral of sanctioning powers 
from the Ministry of Culture to the TJA.  

In  general,  regulatory  bodies  are  endowed  with  sanctioning  powers  in  all  fields  of 
regulation.  Yet,  sanctioning  powers  may  be  constrained  to  certain  areas.  This  is  the 
case  in  Greece,  Iceland,  Romania,  Sweden  and  Turkey  where  the  regulators  are  not 

197   See  also  the  analysis  of  complaints  handling  procedure  (3.1.1.4),  transparency  requirements 

(3.3.2.) and judicial review (3.3.3.) in this report.    

198   INDIREG study, Final report, p. 220. 
199   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

200   Previously,  sanctioning  powers  were  mainly  attributed  to  the  SMC,  a  government  service  unit 
attached to the Ministry responsible for the  media). The  SMC ensured the implementation of the 
government’s  audiovisual  policy.  In  this  respect,  the  SMC  also  monitored  compliance  with 
advertising standards. To this end, the SMC was vested with a range of different types of sanctions.  

77 

 
                                                 
empowered to sanction providers for non-observance of the rules promoting European 
works  including  the  setting  of  quotas.  The  Spanish  regional  body,  the  CAA  has 
sanctioning powers only for the provisions protecting minors.  

Warnings  are  frequently  used  in  practice  by  all  regulatory  bodies  except  in  the 
German-speaking Community of Belgium where investigations by the Medienrat have 
never  led  to  the  imposition  of  sanctions  so  far.  Furthermore,  no  information  is 
available with regards to the Estonian TJA and the Spanish CAA.  

3.1.1.3.2.   Fines 

Another  type  of  sanction  constitutes  the  imposition  of  fines  in  form  of  lump  sums. 
This  power  is  granted  to  all  regulatory  bodies  with  the  exception  of  Denmark  and 
Montenegro.201 The Finish FICORA and the Swedish Myndigheten för radio och tv are 
entitled to impose penalty payments as well as conditional fines. Conditional fines are 
enforceable  if  the  provider  does  not  bring  the  infringement  to  an  end  within  a 
reasonable  period  set  by  the  regulators.  Importantly,  the  regulatory  authorities  of 
Luxembourg, Macedonia and Slovenia have been strengthened by awarding them the 
power  to  fine  service  providers.  In  practice,  almost  all  regulatory  authorities  have 
made use of the power to fine service providers during the past five years.202  

In a number of countries, the imposition of fines is restricted to certain pre-determined 
areas of regulation. The regulatory bodies of Austria, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Serbia 
and  Turkey  are  competent  to  impose  fines  only  for  breaches  of  the  provisions 
concerning  commercial  communication  and  protection  of  minors.  Moreover,  the 
mandate  of  the  Spanish  regional  CAA  solely  covers  the  imposition  of  fines  for 
violations  of  provisions  relating  to  minors.  In  a  similar  vein,  ATVOD and the ASA, 
the  two  British  co-regulatory  bodies  active  in  certain  fields,  are  not  mandated  to 
impose fines themselves but may refer a case for consideration of fines to OFCOM. In 
addition,  several  national  laws  provide  for  different  amounts  of  fines  for  different 
areas.203  

Furthermore, fines may also be differentiated by the type of provider. The Hungarian 
law  enumerates  different  media  outlets204  taking  into  account  their  position  on  the 

201   The  power  to  impose  fines  is  granted  to  the  regulatory  bodies  of  Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all 
Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Spain,  France,  Finland,  Germany, 
Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Macedonia, 
Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom.   

202   The  Medienrat of the  German-speaking Community of Belgium, the Estonian  TJA as well as the 
Serbian  RBEM  do  not  seem to use the power to impose fines.  Similarly, the  Luxembourg ALIA 
which  was  only  established  in  mid-2013  has  not  yet  fined  service  providers.  By  contrast,  the 
Broadcasting  Authority  of  Ireland  has  employed  this  power  in  a  case  of  2009  and  the  Croatian 
AEM as well as the Macedonian AVMU have also relied on this power during the previous years.    
203   Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia.  
204   The  Hungarian  law  explicitly  refers  to  linear  and  non-linear  audiovisual  media  service  providers 
with  significant  market  power,  other  broadcasters,  providers  of  nation-wide  newspapers,  weekly 

78 

 
                                                 
national  market  and  market  power.  Similarly,  the  Polish,  Slovenian  and  Slovak 
legislation  refer  to  broadcasting205  and  on-demand  services.  Legislation  in  Estonia, 
Montenegro  and  Serbia  differentiates  between  natural  or  legal  persons  outlining 
different  lump  sums.  The  structure  of  businesses  operating  on  the  market  for 
audiovisual media services is also acknowledged by the Slovenian law which entitles 
the AKOS to impose fines not only on the provider of a service but also on the natural 
person who has editorial responsibility for the contested programme.   

In  general,  national  laws  specify  the  amount  of  fines  by  stipulating  a  range  or 
indicating  a  maximum  sum  of  money.  In  a  few  countries  fines  are  calculated  as  a 
percentage  of  providers’  annual  turnover  or  other  reference  amounts.206  In  several 
countries, different amounts are due depending on the area of law violated. Moreover, 
the amounts which can be levied/collected by national regulators have been modified 
in  some  countries  mostly  resulting  in  potentially  higher  fines.207  By  the  same  token, 
the method for calculating fines has been altered in a few countries in comparison to 
the findings of the INDIREG study.208  

3.1.1.3.3.   Publication of decisions in the media  

The range of sanctions available to national authorities extends to the power to order 
service  providers  to  publish  decisions  in  their  media  outlet(s).  At  first  glance,  this 
sanction  seems  less  costly  for  service  providers  when  compared  to  the  payment  of 
fines. Nonetheless, it may be intrusive on the provider’s editorial decisions depending 
on  the  conditions  outlined  by  the  regulator  for  the  announcement.  To  inform  an 
audience (of potentially millions of viewers) about an infringement committed by the 
provider  may  have  considerable  adverse  effects,  for  instance,  on  the  provider’s 
reputation. Thus, this power is an important “supplementary” sanction at the disposal 
of regulatory bodies.  

Other than warnings  and fines, which are outlined in all national laws with very few 
exceptions, the sanction to order publication of decisions in the media is not provided 
by  quite  as  many  countries.  Still,  a  great  majority  of  regulatory  authorities  are 

print  media  outlets  like  newspapers  and  magazines,  providers  of  online  press  products  and 
intermediary service providers.  

205   Legislation in Slovakia also refers to IPTV as a category of broadcasting.  
206   In  the  French-speaking  Community  of Belgium, fines are  between € 250.00 and three percent of 
providers’  annual  turnover.  Similarly,  in  France,  the  regulatory  body  may  impose  a  fine  of 
maximum  three  percent  of  providers’  annual  turnover.  In  Poland,  the  law  differentiates  between 
different lump sums for different kinds of providers. Broadcasters may be fined up to 50 percent of 
the annual frequency fee or a fine of up to ten percent of the revenues generated by the broadcaster 
in the preceding fiscal year. On-demand service providers may have to pay an amount of up to 20 
times the average monthly remuneration typical for the sector. In Turkey, fines are calculated on 
the  basis  of  the  revenue  generated  from  commercial  communication  during  the  preceding  month 
and may amount between one and three percent but may not be less than 10000 Turkish lira.  

207   Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey.   
208   Montenegro, Poland and Turkey.  

79 

 
                                                                                                                                             
empowered  to  demand  publication  of  their  decisions.209  However,  this  power  is  not 
given  to  the  regulators  in  Albania210,  Estonia,  the  regional  regulatory  body  CAA  in 
Spain,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  the  Netherlands,  Poland  and  Slovenia.  In 
comparison  to  the  INDIREG  study,  this  type  of  sanction  is  now  available  to  the 
regulatory bodies in Iceland and Luxembourg but no longer granted to the regulator in 
Macedonia.   

In  countries  where  this  sanction  is  set  forth  in  national  laws,  it  may  be  limited  to 
certain  regulatory  areas.  Hence,  in  Austria,  it  only  applies  to  the  regulation  of 
European  works  (“quotas”)  and  audiovisual  commercial  communication.211  In 
Germany,  Greece,  Iceland  and  Serbia,  this  power  is  prescribed  for  the  rules  on 
audiovisual commercial communication and the protection of minors while it is only 
envisaged  for  the  enforcement  of  the  rules  on  protection  of  minors  in  Italy,  Sweden 
and Slovakia.   

The  power  to  order  announcements  has  not  been  exercised  in  a  number  of  countries 
during the past five years.212 This fact may underline the “complementary” character of 
this  type  of  sanction  which  seems  to  be  used  less  often  in  practice  in  contrast  to 
warnings and fines.  

3.1.1.3.4.   Suspension/revocation of license 

The most severe sanction (apart from, e.g. imposing the maximum fine prescribed by 
law) constitute the suspension of a programme or service or even the revocation of the 
license. The latter solely applies in the context of broadcasting for which commonly a 
license  is  required.  The  former  is  applicable  for  both  linear  and  non-linear  services. 
More  in  particular,  providers  of  on-demand  audiovisual  media  services  may  have  to 
temporarily suspend the transmission of individual programmes or the entire service or 
may even be barred from exercising the activity. To this end, this type of sanction is 
the  most  serious  as  it  extensively  intrudes  into  providers’  freedoms  to  conduct 
business. Thus, this sanction is usually “reserved” for grave and repeated violations of 
the law and is typically considered as the ultima ratio, the last resort.  

209   Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain (CNMC 
at federal level and CAC at regional level), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Malta,  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia,  Sweden, 
Slovakia,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom.  According  to  several  country  correspondents,  publication  of 
decisions  may  be  ordered  in  Cyprus,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy  and  Montenegro  whereas  the 
regulatory  bodies  in  their  responses  to  the  questionnaire  of  the  consortium  are  mute  on  this 
sanctioning tool.   

210   The  Albanian  AMA  nonetheless appears to have certain powers in this field. More precisely, the 
complaints  council  (which  has  not  yet  been  established  at  the  time of the drafting of this report) 
may require service providers to publish its conclusions under certain conditions. Similar powers 
are given to the complaints council in relation to the right of reply.  

211   With respect to public service media in Austria, the power to order publication of decisions in the 

media is limited to the areas of audiovisual commercial communication and protection of minors.  

212   Albania, German-speaking Community of Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,  Denmark, 
Finland,  Germany,  Iceland  (no  information  available),  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Serbia  (there  were 
cases mentioned in the INDIREG study), Turkey.  

80 

 
                                                 
The power to suspend a service or revoke a license is attributed to all regulatory bodies 
except  for  one  of  the  regional  regulators  in  Spain  (CAA),  the  Finish  FICORA,  the 
Macedonian  AVMU  and  the  Swedish  Myndigheten  för  radio  och  tv.213  The 
Broadcasting Councils of the German public service broadcasters also do not have the 
means  to  suspend  or  withdraw  licenses  as  the  number  of  programmes  for  the  public 
service broadcasters  are assigned by the broadcasting law (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) in 
the  context  of  the  definition  of  their  remit.  The  powers  of  the  regulators  of 
Luxembourg and Romania have been expanded to include this power in their current 
mandate compared to the situation at the time of the INDIREG study.  

An  important  limitation  to  this  power  is  the  fact  that  regulators  of  a  number  of 
countries are only permitted to exercise this function in specific areas. In Austria, the 
power  to  suspend  or  revoke  licenses  is  limited  to  violations  of  the  rules  concerning 
audiovisual  commercial  communication.  In  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  it  is 
constrained to the provisions regarding minors and in Romania to the rules promoting 
European  works.  Moreover,  in  Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Serbia  and  Turkey,  this 
power is not prescribed for sanctioning infringements of the quota rules whereas in the 
Netherlands, it is not applicable to the rules protecting minors.   

Importantly, other requirements may have to be respected when regulatory authorities 
decide  to  suspend  or  revoke  licenses.  The  exercise  of  this  power  by  the 
Luxembourgish ALIA is contingent on the involvement of the Minister responsible for 
the media. Similarly, the decision to suspend or bar a service is subject to a court order 
for  instance  in  Cyprus  and  Sweden.  The  inclusion  of  these  instances  (be  it  the 
executive  or  the  judiciary)  in  the  procedure  including  an  independent  review  of  the 
decisions,  enhances  the  accountability  of  regulatory  authorities  and  guarantees  due 
process rights of stakeholders.  

Within the previous five years, the power to suspend or revoke a service or license has 
not  been  used  by  a  great  number  of  regulatory  bodies  such  as  in  Austria,  German-
speaking Community of Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, 
Iceland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  the  Netherlands  and Poland. This  underlines the nature 
of this sanction to which regulators in view of the proportionality principle only turn if 
all other measures have been exhausted.   

3.1.1.3.5.  Penalty payments in case of non-compliance 

In case of a provider’s disregard for the decisions taken by regulatory authorities, the 
law  may  provide  for  penalty  payments.  These  may  typically  be  imposed  if  the 
infringement persists and the provider has not taken steps to rectify the situation and 

213   The  power  to  suspend  a  service  or  revoke  a  license  is  attributed  to  the  regulators  of  Albania, 
Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain 
(CNMC at federal level and CAC at regional level), France, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, 
Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg  (here  a  recommendation  to  the  competent 
Minister who formally makes the decision), Montenegro, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

81 

 
                                                 
bring  its  conduct  in  line  with  the  decision  taken  by  regulatory  bodies.  The 
requirements  for  the  imposition  of  penalty  payments  depend  on  the  national  legal 
orders.  

The  power  to  impose  penalty  payments  is  not  granted  to  the  regulatory  bodies  in 
Albania, Austria, the German-speaking Community of Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Spain214, Italy, Latvia and Serbia.215 By contrast, it was newly introduced to 
regulators  in  Estonia,  Iceland,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  in 
comparison to the findings of the INDIREG study.  

Where regulatory authorities have this power at  their disposal, it may nonetheless be 
area-specific.  In  Estonia,  it  is  constrained  to  the  rules  on  promotion  of  European 
works,  while  in  Sweden  and  Turkey  it  is  applicable  to  the  field  of  audiovisual 
commercial  communication.  Moreover,  in  Germany,  Greece  and  Iceland,  regulatory 
bodies  are  not  empowered  to  impose  penalty  payments  for  violations  of  the  quota 
rules. Furthermore, penalty payments in Macedonia and Sweden have to be approved 
by courts.  

In practice, more than half of the regulatory authorities with this power do not actually 
employ it in practice.216  

Other types of sanctions may be stipulated by national laws. In Hungary, for instance, 
providers  may  be  temporarily  excluded  from  tender  procedures.  In  several  countries, 
regulatory  bodies  may  impose  sanctions  on  the  individual  persons,  above  all,  the 
person  bearing  editorial  responsibility  for  a  particular  programme.217  In  Iceland  and 
Turkey,  this  may  encompass  prison  sentences:  In  Iceland,  up  to  six  months;  and,  in 
Turkey,  between  one  and  two  years.  Imprisonment  is  a  harsh  instrument  for  which 
appropriate procedural safeguards must be stipulated in the national legal orders.      

Succinctly,  the  regulatory  authorities  examined  in  this  study  are  generally  equipped 
with  a  variety  of  instruments  to  sanction  providers’  non-observance  of  legal 
obligations.  In  countries  where  the  regulatory  framework  has  been  modified  recently 
(e.g.  Estonia,  Iceland,  Luxembourg  or  Slovenia),  the  sanctioning  powers  of  the  new 
regulatory  bodies  appear  stronger  compared  to  the  situation  before.  Similarly,  minor 
changes for instance in the amount of the fines prescribed by law have mostly led to an 
expansion of the powers of regulatory bodies. Even if individual regulatory authorities 
formally  lack  certain  types  of  powers  (the  Swedish  regulator,  for  example  is  not 

214   While the CNMC is equipped with this power, the two regional regulators, the CAA and the CAC 

cannot sanction non-compliance with their decisions by imposing penalty payments.   

215   The regulatory authorities of the Flemish and French-speaking Communities of Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom have the power to impose penalty payments.   
216   The  power  to  impose  penalty  payments  is  not  used  in  the  Flemish  and  French-speaking 
Communities  of  Belgium,  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC),  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Ireland,  Iceland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Malta, Slovenia. 

217   Iceland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Turkey. 

82 

 
                                                 
entitled  to  suspend/revoke  a  license),  it  does  not  automatically  follow  that  the  rules 
applicable to audiovisual media services in these countries are not effectively enforced.      

In practice, the most frequently used sanctions are warnings and fines while regulators 
appear  to  be  careful  in  the  application  of  more intrusive sanctions (being mindful of 
their negative effect on service providers) like the suspension or revocation of a license 
or the imposition of penalty payments. This also underscores the graduated character 
of the sanctions. The application according to a graduated scheme appears to have led 
to certain irregularities in Hungary. The Media Council of the NMHH seems to strictly 
rely on the principle of graduated response regardless of the seriousness of the breach 
committed.  It  has  disregarded  service  providers’  “records”  under  the  previous  law 
(which  was  amended  in  2010)  even  in  cases  where  the  relevant  (violated)  provision 
remained unchanged. Hence, providers who have committed serious breaches for the 
first  time after the amendment entered into force (but repeatedly if one considers the 
time  before,  too)  were  nonetheless  sanctioned  mildly.  This  has  led  to  concerns  of 
fairness.  The  Czech  RRTV  is  equally  required  to  apply  the  sanctions  in  a  strict 
graduated  manner.  This  emerges  from  the  case  law  of  the  Czech  courts,  which  held 
that the sanction must always relate to the same kind or type of case. In practice, the 
Czech  RRTV  can  only  impose  heavier  fines  (other  than  warnings)  when  the  same 
infringement  takes  place  again.  This  strict  interpretation  of  the  law  seems  to  unduly 
restrict  the  regulators’  sanctioning  powers.  It  follows  from  the Hungarian and Czech 
examples  that  the  criteria  according  to  which  national  regulatory  bodies  apply  the 
sanctions may also be indicative of their independence and effective functioning.   

3.1.1.4.  Complaints handling procedures 

In  every  country,  there  are  procedures  for  handling  complaints  by  viewers.218  In 
Lithuania,  where  pursuant  to  the  INDIREG  study  no  such  procedures  existed,  they 
have  now  been  outlined  and  are  valid  for  all  public  institutions.  In  most  countries, 
procedures are outlined in  sector-specific legislation while  in a small group, they are 
derived from general administrative law.219 In Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Malta, procedures are set out by internal regulations drawn up by the 
regulatory bodies. Procedures are less formalized in Finland where complaints may be 
sent by email or post to FICORA. 

218   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

219   Lithuania,  Latvia,  the  Netherlands  and  Slovenia.  In  more  detail,  in  Latvia,  the  law  regulating 
audiovisual media sets forth a general provision and the NEPLP has also issued internal regulations 
specifying complaints-handling procedures.   

83 

 
 
 
                                                 
3.1.2.  Cooperation between regulatory authorities 

3.1.2.1.  Cooperation between regulatory authorities at national level 

At their respective national levels, regulatory agencies do not operate in a vacuum but 
instead  pertain  to  a  complex  system  of  regulatory  bodies  (including  co-  and  self-
regulators)  operating  at  different  layers  and  in  different  sectors.  The  position  of  the 
regulatory authority within the national regulatory arena is a factor, which can be taken 
into  account  when  determining  its  independence.  Collaboration  with  other  national 
regulators  may  be  crucial  to  implement  government’s  policies  in  a  coherent  manner. 
Yet, the independence of a regulatory authority may be at risk where other bodies can 
give instructions, thereby actively influencing policy decisions and activities.  

as 

such 

All national regulatory bodies cooperate with other authorities at national level.220 This 
encompasses cooperation with other bodies regulating other aspects of the market for 
audiovisual  media 
classification, 
the  press, 
telecommunications,  data  protection,  or  copyright.  Cooperation  may  also  take  place 
across  sectors  and  include  national  authorities  operating  on  a  horizontal  level  like 
competition  authorities  or  consumer  authorities  (including  agencies  representing 
specific  consumers  such  as  children  or  those  suffering  from  disabilities).  Several 
regulatory bodies also regularly cooperate with the national ministry competent for the 
media (e.g. Ministry of Culture).221  

advertising, 

film 

In  most  countries,  cooperation  is  voluntary  and designed in  rather lose form  through 
exchange  of  information,  expertise  and  experience,  the  organization  of  common 
events, working groups or meetings.   

those  competent 

More sophisticated or regular forms of cooperation typically exist between regulatory 
to  regulate 
authorities  for  audiovisual  media  services  and 
infrastructure.222  The  close  collaboration  between  these  authorities  is  essential  to 
guarantee optimal use of the spectrum and a transparent and fair process of allocating 
national  licenses.  In  addition,  regulatory  authorities  of  federal  states  (e.g.  Belgium, 
Spain  or  Germany)  commonly  rely  on  periodical  meetings  to  align  policy  objectives 
and discuss “cross-state” or “cross-regional” issues. In the United Kingdom where the 
ATVOD  and  the  ASA  have  been  designated  as  co-regulatory  authorities,  close 
cooperation  exists  with  OFCOM  which  has  retained  backstop  powers  (e.g.  certain 
types of sanctions can only imposed by OFCOM such as fines) and regularly reviews 
the co-regulatory arrangements.    

220   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

221   Albania,  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC  at  federal  level),  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland,  Romania, 

Slovenia, Slovakia.  

222   In case of converged regulators, this kind of cooperation may take place between the different units 

or departments but is nonetheless essential.  

84 

 
                                                 
Although  many  different  mechanisms  of  cooperation  have  been  designed  at  national 
level,  regulatory  authorities  generally  do  not  receive  any  instructions  from  other 
bodies. Yet, in Cyprus, the Minister of the Interior may give instructions of a general 
nature  to  the  APXH  in  connection  with  the  exercise  of  its  competencies  if  this  is 
necessary  to  defend  the  general  interest.  This  provision,  which  derives  from  the 
Constitution, is applicable to all public law bodies in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the vague 
formulation  of  the  provision  is  worrisome  as  it  gives  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
considerable leeway to interfere with the regulator’s powers and prerogatives.  

Moreover, the authority regulating technical aspects of the infrastructure (the Post and 
Telecom Administration) of Iceland seems to be able to influence the decisions of the 
Fjölmiðlanefnd. To a lesser extent, the Slovenian Ministry of Culture is involved in the 
classification of providers granting them special status, which entails the transmission 
of  programmes  in  the  public  interest.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  OFCOM  may  instruct 
the co-regulatory bodies ATVOD and ASA, the latter of which may also be instructed 
by the Office of Fair Trading.  

3.1.2.2.  Cooperation  between  regulatory  authorities  at  European  and 

international level 

Apart  from  cooperation  at  national  level,  the  rapid  transformation  of  a  globalized 
market  for  audiovisual  media  services  necessitates  cross-country  collaboration.  All 
regulatory  authorities  are  involved  in  different  supra-national  forums  or  groups  and 
have  more  or  less  regular  contact  with  European  institutions  including  the  European 
Commission  or  the  Council  of  Europe.223  In  addition,  bilateral  cooperation  or 
multilateral types of cooperation are becoming more frequent.    

Interestingly, several regional forms of cooperation have been constructed to discuss or 
solve  cross-border  issues  and  exchange  best  practices  and  coordinate,  to  a  certain 
extent, media policies. The Central European Regulatory Forum (CERF) was set up in 
2009 by the regulatory authorities of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia.224  CERF  members  meet  once  a  year.  Similarly,  the 
Spanish  (regional  regulators  CAC  and  CAA)  and  Portuguese  regulatory  authorities 
occasionally  hold  the  Iberian  Conference,  the  Nordic  countries  like  Finland,  Iceland 
and Sweden keep up ad hoc forms of collaboration and Romania, Serbia and Turkey 
assemble in the Forum of Black Sea Broadcasting Regulators (BRAF).    

Smaller  groups  of  countries  have  set  up  tripartite  meetings  which  take  place,  for 
the  German-speaking  regulators  of  Austria,  Germany  and 
instance  between 

223   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.   

224   For more information see http://cerfportal.org/.  

85 

 
 
                                                 
Switzerland, the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania or between the regulators 
of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.  

Beyond the borders of Europe, the Réseau Francophone des Régulateurs des Médias 
(REFRAM)  was  established  in  2007  between  29  French-speaking  regulatory  bodies 
from  three  Continents  including  Albania,  French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Luxembourg and Romania.  

More institutionalized forms of cooperation have been established at European level in 
the  form  of  the  European  Platform  of  Regulatory  Authorities  (EPRA)  to  which  all 
regulatory  authorities  investigated  in  this  study  belong  and  the  European  Regulators 
Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) encompassing the regulators of all EU 
Member States. ERGA, which was created in 2014, facilitates cooperation between its 
members  and  has  become  an  important  forum  of  discussion  and  exchange  of  best 
practices.225  Moreover, regulators  whose mandate covers telecommunications aspects 
are  members  of  Body  of  European  Regulators  for  Electronic  Communications 
(BEREC),  the  counterpart  to  ERGA  for  electronic  communications  networks  and 
services.  

In  brief,  regulatory  authorities  act  in  different  regulatory  contexts.  They  have 
established and maintain good relations and contacts with other regulatory authorities 
at  national,  European and international levels. Such cooperation, especially enhanced 
forms  thereof  may  put  pressure  on  individual  regulatory  bodies  but  do  not  seem  to 
have an effect on the independence of the regulatory bodies.  

3.3.  Accountability 

Accountability is the regulators’ responsibility for its own actions and decisions. Being 
subject to potential consequences for actions taken, can limit the regulators’ autonomy 
of  decision-making.  Therefore,  accountability  can  be  seen  as  a  criterion  for  the 
regulatory authority’s dependence, rather than its independence. However, to round up 
the picture of the independence of regulatory authorities it is necessary to take a look 
not only at criteria of independence – as done above – but as well at such aspects of 
dependence,  not  last  as  these  may  also  contribute  to  effectiveness  in  the  overall 
picture. 

For the analysis of accountability, a subdivision into three significant criteria is useful: 
The  formal  accountability,  transparency  regarding  the  work  of  regulators  and  the 
judicial review of the regulators’ decisions affecting providers.  

225  See  Commission  Decision  of  03.02.2014  on  establishing  the  European  Regulators  Group  for 

Audiovisual Media Services, C(2014) 462 final.  

86 

 
 
 
                                                 
3.3.1. Formal Accountability 

To start with, the formal accountability of regulators will be analysed to identify who 
regulatory authorities are accountable to and by which means they have to give account 
(e.g.  submitting  reports,  hold  public  information  events,  etc.),  as  well  as  concerning 
what issue they are obliged to give account about. 

3.3.1.1.   Bodies regulators are accountable to 

In general, it can be noted that all regulators are accountable to another body, only the 
Radio-  og  TV-Nævnet  of  Denmark  is  solely  accountable  to  the  public.  This  situation 
has  not  changed  in  the  last  five  years.  While  many  other  regulators  are  also 
accountable  to  the  public,  all  of  them  are  accountable  to  either  the  Parliament,  the 
Government as a whole, the Head of the Government or one specific Ministry. AKOS, 
the Slovenian regulatory authority is also accountable to the Broadcasting Council and 
the Electronic Communications Council, and it should be noted that the Cyprus Radio 
and Television Authority is not accountable to the Supreme Court anymore. ASA and 
ATVOD from the UK are accountable to the regulator Ofcom.  

Apart  from  the  RTB  of  Denmark,  seventeen  other  regulators  are  accountable  to  the 
public  at  large.226  The  accountability  to  the  public  at  large  has  been  abolished  by 
Estonia  and  newly  introduced  in  Austria  and  Luxembourg.  Therefore,  in  an  overall 
perspective  there  has  been  little  change  regarding  the  media  regulatory  authority’s 
accountability to the public. 
The majority of regulators are accountable to their Parliament227, only nine regulators 
are not accountable to the Parliament.228 It should be mentioned that the regulators of 
Netherlands  and  Denmark  are  only  indirectly  accountable  to  their  Parliament  since 
they  have  to  report  to  their  Minister  for  Education,  Culture  and  Science  respectively 
their  Minister  for  Transport,  Innovation  and  Technology  and these Ministers have to 
send  the  regulator’s  annual  report  to  the  Parliament.  The  accountability  to  the 
Parliament  has  not  changed  significantly  in  the  past  five  years.  Only  AKOS  from 
Sweden  and  the  Technical  Surveillance  Authority  from  Estonia  are  no  longer 
accountable  to  their  Parliament,  while  for  the  Regulatory  Body  for  Electronic  and 
Media  from  the  Republic  of  Serbia  (RBEM)  such  an  accountability  has  been 
introduced. 
Accountable to the Government as a whole are eleven regulatory authorities229, while 
the  regulatory  authorities  from  Austria,  Poland  and  Germany  are  accountable 

226   Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg, 
Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Serbia,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  United 
Kingdom. 

227   Albania, Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, 
France,  Greece;  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania. Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom.  

228   Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia. 
229   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Cyprus,  Spain  (CAC),  Finland,  France,  Sweden,  Slovenia,  Estonia, 

Serbia.  

87 

 
 
                                                 
specifically  to  the  Head  of  Government.  In  view  of  the  Technical  Surveillance 
Authority from Estonia, and the Serbian RBEM, an accountability to the Government 
has  been  introduced.  In  no  case  such  accountability  to  the  Government  has  been 
abolished since the completion of the INDIREG study. 
Fifteen regulatory authorities are accountable to a specific Ministry230, for four of them 
this  accountability  has  been  introduced  anew231,  and  no  country  has  abolished  the 
accountability  to  a  Ministry.  In  some  cases,  the  regulators  are  accountable  to  the 
minister responsible for press, media and culture.232 In other cases, the regulators are 
accountable  to  the  Ministry  for  communication233,  and  in  again  other  cases  the 
regulators  are  accountable  to  the  Ministry  for  finance,  economy  or  competition.234 
Only  in  Slovakia,  the  regulator  is  accountable  to  three  Ministries  in  parallel  (the 
Ministry  for  finance,  the  Ministry  for  culture  and  the  Ministry  for  education).  There 
has been no change in the actual Ministries the regulators are accountable to. 

Altogether there has been little change regarding the bodies regulatory authorities are 
formally accountable to. There has been a small increase in the amount of regulators, 
which are accountable towards Parliament, a specific ministry, the Government or the 
Head of  Government.  Overall, for  only three regulators new accountabilities towards 
other  bodies  have  been  introduced,  for  two  regulators  accountabilities  towards  other 
bodies  have  been  abolished  and  for  one  regulator  its  accountabilities  have  been 
replaced. While for the CNMC of Spain and the Media Commission of Iceland a new 
accountability  has  been  introduced  only  to  a  Ministry,  for  the  Serbian  regulator  new 
accountabilities have been introduced not only to a Ministry but also to the Parliament 
and 
the  Estonian  Public  Broadcasting  Council  new 
accountabilities  towards  a  Ministry  and  the  government  have  been  introduced  while 
the  accountability  towards  the  Parliament  has  been  abolished.  For  the  Cyprus  Radio 
and  Television  Authority  the  accountability  towards  the  Supreme  Court  has  been 
abolished,  and  for  the  Swedish  Broadcasting  Council  the  accountability  towards  the 
Parliament has been abolished.  

the  Government.  For 

Therefore,  today  four  more  regulators  are  accountable  in  one  form  or  another  in 
comparison to the INDIREG study. 

Furthermore,  most  regulatory  authorities  have  to  undergo  audits.  Some  regulatory 
authorities  undergo  an  audit  by  a  private  audit  firm,  while  others  undergo  public 
audits.  

230   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Finland,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Netherlands, 

Slovakia, United Kingdom. 

231   Spain (CNMC), Iceland, Serbia, Estonia. 
232   Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Iceland, Serbia. 
233   Finland, Ireland, Estonia. 
234   Montenegro, United Kingdom, Spain (CNMC),  

88 

 
 
                                                 
3.3.1.2.   Accountability means 

Accountability  in  the  way  it  is  understood  here,  roughly  entails  the  publication  of 
documents, the submission of reports and the obligation to undergo audits.  

Most  regulators  which  are  accountable  to  the  public  have  the  obligation  to  publish 
their reports and decisions, documents and information on the regulatory framework. 
In  the  following  (in  the  context  of  the  analysis  of  the  transparency  of  regulators)  a 
closer  look  will  be  taken  at  these  publication  obligations.  However,  some  regulators 
are  not  (only)  obliged  to  publish  documents,  but  they  also  have  to  organise  public 
information events like discussions, symposiums, meetings and hearings.235  

Accountability  to  the  Parliament,  to  the  Government  as  a  whole,  to  the  Head  of  the 
Government or a specific ministry, means that most regulatory authorities must submit 
reports to the respective body. Besides the reporting obligations, the accountability to 
those bodies can additionally mean that the regulator is under a general supervision236, 
under a budgetary supervision237 or both238. The budgetary supervision in Iceland and 
the Republic of Serbia has been newly introduced. In some cases, Parliament has the 
right  to  submit questions to  the regulator.239 This right has been newly introduced in 
Hungary and Malta, but has been abolished in Spain. In other cases, the Parliament has 
the  right  to  request  information.240  In  Finland,  the  Ministry  sets  the  regulatory 
authority’s  yearly  general  goals  in  the  form  of  a  contract.  Overall,  in  four  countries 
new  obligations  have  been  introduced241,  while  the  accountability  of  the  CNMC  in 
Spain has been diminished.   
Half  of  the  regulators  undergo  an  audit  by  a  public  audit  office,242  while  four 
regulators  undergo  a  private  audit,243  and  twelve  regulators  undergo  an  audit  by  a 
public  audit  office  as  well  as  a  private  audit.244  Only  the  three  Belgian  regulatory 
authorities  do  not  undergo  an  audit,  but  are  under  budget  supervision  by  the  public 
audit office. For four regulators the obligation for an audit by a public audit office has 
been introduced,245 and the Slovenian regulator undergoes a private audit instead of a 
public  audit  now.  Most  regulators  have  to  undergo  the  audit  annually,246  while  two 

235   Bulgaria, Belgium (Flemish-speaking Community) (newly introduced), Macedonia, Portugal. 
236   Belgium (German-speaking Community) (by the Government). 
237   Belgium (Flemish-speaking Community), Iceland, Serbia.  
238   Belgium (French-speaking Community). 
239   Hungary, Malta, Turkey.  
240   Austria (by the Federal Chancellor), Serbia (newly introduced).  
241   Hungary, Iceland, Malta, Serbia. 
242   Albania,  Austria  (KommAustria),  German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, 
Germany,  Denmark,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  France,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom (Ofcom). 

243   Austria (RTR-GmbH), Estonia, Montenegro, United Kingdom (ASA). 
244   French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Czech 
Republic,  Finland,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Macedonia,  Portugal,  Serbia, 
Slovenia. 

245   Albania, Austria (RTR-GmbH), Luxembourg, Lithuania. 
246   Austria  (RTR-GmbH),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain 
(CAC, CAA), Finland, Croatia, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Macedonia (private 

89 

 
                                                 
regulators  undergo  an  audit  twice  a  year,247  and  the  regulatory  authority  of  Greece 
undergoes  an audit for each expenditure. In some cases the audit takes place  ad-hoc. 
(Albania,  Hungary,  Macedonia  (public  audit),  Romania,  Slovakia).  It  should  be 
mentioned that the regulatory authority of Hungary used to undergo an audit annually. 
The regulator of the Flemish speaking community of Belgium has to undergo an audit 
after  request  of  a  ministry  or  the  government  and  the  regulator  in  France  has  to 
undergo an audit after request of the Court of Auditors. Two other regulators have to 
undergo  audits  continuous.248  There  has  been  no  change  regarding  the  periodicity  of 
the obligation to undergo audits in the last five years. Overall little has changed in this 
area, but there is a small increase in the amount of regulators being obliged to undergo 
an audit by a public audit office. 

3.3.1.3.   Reporting obligation 

All but five249 regulatory authorities are obliged to report about their activities and/or 
their  budget  to  the  Parliament  or  parts  of  the  Government  on  a  regular  basis.  Most 
reports  have  to  be  submitted  to  Parliaments250,  six  regulators  have  to  report  to  the 
Government as a whole251, and the regulators of Austria and Poland have to report to 
the  Heads  of  their  Governments.  Of  the  six  regulators,  which  have  to  report  to  the 
Government as a whole, five have to submit their report to the Parliament as well.252 
KommAustria  has to  submit its report not only to the Federal Chancellor, but also to 
the  Minister  for  Transport,  Innovation  and  Technology.  Eight  regulatory  authorities 
have  to  submit  a  report  to  a  specific  ministry.253  Three  out  of  these  eight  regulators 
have to submit their report to the Parliament as well.254 Only AKOS of Slovenia has 
abolished the obligation to submit a report to the Parliament and the ministry, and the 
Council  for  broadcasting  and  retransmission  of  Slovakia  has  introduced  reporting 
obligations to a third ministry (the ministry of culture). Otherwise there have been no 
changes as regards the bodies regulators have to submit their reports to.  

It is also worth noting that the Danish regulator produces an activity report annually, 
but only for internal use, since RTB is not accountable to another body.  

audit),  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia,  Sweden,  Slovenia,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom 
(ASA).  

247   Netherlands, United Kingdom (Ofcom). 
248   Belgium (Germany), French-speaking Community of Belgium. 
249   Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg.  
250   Albania,  Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain (CNMC, 
CAC, CAA), France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom. 

251   Belgium (all Communities), France, Slovenia, Spain (CAC). 
252   Belgium (all Communities), France, Spain (CAC). 
253   Austria,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  FL,  Greece,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  Slovakia, 

Sweden. 

254   Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium, Greece, Slovakia. 

90 

 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Almost all reports have to be submitted annually255, only the regulators of Bulgaria and 
Finland have to submit a report twice a year. In addition to its annual reports the ERC 
of Portugal has to submit information to the Parliament once a month and the regulator 
of Romania has to  submit an additional report on the Parliaments request. There has 
been no change in the periodicity of the reporting obligation in the last five years. 

The subjects that have to be covered by the reports are mainly the regulators’ activities 
and financial aspects. In some cases, the reports cover only the regulators’ activities256, 
while  in  other  cases  the  report  has  to  cover  the  regulators’  activities  and  financial 
aspects  in  addition.257  Only  the  reports  of  Ofcom  in  the  UK  and  of  the  Swedish 
Broadcasting  Council  are  limited  to  merely  financial  aspects.  For  the  regulatory 
authority  of  the  German-speaking  community  of  Belgium  the  reporting  obligations 
have  been  extended  to  include  a  financial  budget  report.  For  the  Council  for 
broadcasting  and  retransmission  in  Slovakia  new  reporting  obligations  have  been 
introduced together with  the new bodies the regulator has to report to. The reporting 
obligations now include a list of major events together with an according  assessment 
(to be reported to the Ministry for Culture). For the NMHH of Hungary new reporting 
obligations have been introduced as well, e.g. the report shall provide information on 
the  economic  situation  and  on  changes  in  the financial conditions  of media services. 
Furthermore, the report shall provide information on the monitoring of the conduct of 
organisations  and  persons  engaged  in  electronic  communications  activities  for 
compliance with the relevant legislation.  

More  than  half  of  the  regulators  have  to  include  statistical  data  about  their  own 
performance in the report.258 The regulatory authorities of Poland and Portugal always 
include such statistical data into their reports, while not being legally obligated to do 
so.  The  Serbian  RBEM  and  the  LRTK  of  Lithuania,  have  a  newly  introduced 
obligation to include statistical data in the reports. Therefore, there have been only few 
changes regarding the subjects that have to be covered by the reports.  
In 13 countries the report needs to be approved259, but only in four countries a report 
has actually been disapproved.260 It should be mentioned, however, that the Albanian 
report  –  which  was  disapproved  –  has  not  been  formally  rejected.  In  the  Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Romania the rejection of the report is linked to consequences: 
After  repeated  disapproval  by  the  Parliament  of  the  Czech  Republic,  the  whole 

255   Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Spain,  France,  Greece,  Hungary, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom (OFCOM, ATVOD). 

256   Austria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  France,  Hungary,  Ireland, 

Netherlands, Romania. 

257   Albania, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, CR, France, Italy, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, 

Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania. 

258   Albania,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium, 
Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Macedonia, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom. 

259   Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Montenegro, Malta, Netherlands, 

Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia. 

260   Albania, Czech Republic, Montenegro, Slovenia. 

91 

 
                                                 
broadcasting council is dismissed, and in Poland the regulators term of office expires 
immediately. This actually happened in Poland in 2010 for the first time. In Romania a 
new law regulates that the dismissal of the annual activity report triggers – ipso iure – 
the  dismissal  of  the  President  of  the  Council.  The  only  other  change  in  this  area 
occurred in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the Parliament can no 
longer obligate the regulator to submit a new report.  

Next  to  those  general  activity  and  financial  reports,  the  LRTK  of  Lithuania  has  to 
submit an analytical  survey on the implementation  of Lithuania’s audiovisual policy, 
the  development  of  audiovisual  services,  and  statistical  data  on  the  providers  of 
audiovisual media services. In addition to its general report, the CNMC in Spain has to 
submit a balance about the fulfilment of its objectives every three years. This is a new 
obligation for the CNMC.  

Overall,  there  has  again  been  hardly  any  change  in  the  reporting  obligations  of  the 
regulatory  authorities  in  the  past  five  years.  For  AKOS  in  Slovenia  the  reporting 
obligations  to  the  Ministry  and  the  Parliament  were  abolished,  but  the  reporting 
obligation  to  the  Government  as  a  whole  kept.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Council  for 
Broadcasting and retransmission in Slovakia has newly introduced additional reporting 
obligations  towards  two  new  bodies:  the  ministry  of  culture  and  the  European 
Commission.  Further, reporting obligations have been introduced for the regulator in 
the German-speaking community of Belgium as well. And two more regulators have to 
include  statistical  data  about  their  own  performances  into  their  reports.  For  the  first 
time, a report was dismissed in Poland with the consequence of the expiration of the 
term of office for the Polish regulatory authority. On the other hand, the Macedonian 
regulator can no longer be obliged to submit a new report by the Parliament. 

3.3.2.   Transparency 

The  extent  of  a  regulatory  authority’s  transparency  regarding  its  work  can  be 
determined  by  several  factors:  the  general  publication  obligations  of  a  regulatory 
authority, the rules regarding the decision making process as well as the existence of 
complaints  handling  procedures.  As  already  seen  above,  complaints  handling 
procedures are foreseen for all regulators. Therefore, in the following focus is put on 
obligations  to  publish  documents,  e.g.  reports,  minutes  of  meetings  and  especially 
decisions, and on the details of the internal decision-making processes. 

3.3.2.1.   Decision-making process 

For the analysis of the transparency of the decision-making process it is important to 
determine whether the law provides for specific transparency obligations regarding the 
decision-making  process,  whether  obligations  for  the  regulatory  authorities  exist  to 
attach  a  reasoning  to  their  decisions  and  if  obligations  exist  to  include  an  impact 
assessment in the process. 

92 

 
 
 
In  most  countries,  specific  laws  are  in  place  regulating  at  least  some  aspects  of 
the  decision-making  process.261  Only  general  publication 
transparency  during 
obligations  apply  in  Belgium  (German-speaking  and  Flemish  Communities),  Cyprus 
and  Finland.  No  specific  transparency  provisions  exist  in  some  German  Länder, 
Denmark, Finland, Spain (CAC and CAA) and Serbia. Information on the existence of 
transparency rules is missing in Albania, Germany (for some Länder, including almost 
all  regulatory  bodies  overseeing  public service broadcasters) and Spain  (CNMC). As 
far  as  more  details  on  the  content  of  existing  transparency  rules  or  practices  are 
available,  they  usually  include  the  publication  of  decisions262,  although  in  some 
countries not all decisions are published263 or decisions are not published in full264. In 
various  countries,  meetings  are  open  to  the  public  by  default265  or  may  be  held  in 
public  on  request.266  Concerning  obligations  to  publish  agendas  and  minutes  of 
meetings this aspect will be in Section 3.3.2.3. Overall, a trend towards more openness 
of  decision-making  processes  can  be  observed.  Most  changes  in  the  past  years 
extended transparency requirements.267 On the other hand, Macedonia seems to have 
suffered  a  backlash  regarding  transparency,  with  the  public  now  generally  being 
excluded from the meetings and decisions often being taken in camera. Tendencies in 
this respect had already become apparent from factual developments as was explained 
in the INDIREG study.268 

The vast majority of all analysed regulators have to motivate all of their decisions.269 
The  regulatory  authorities  of  Slovakia  and  Montenegro  have  a  limited  obligation 
concerning  the  reasoning  as  it  applies  only  for  some  decisions.  Six  regulatory 
authorities  are  under  no  (explicit)  obligation  to  motivate  their  decisions.270  The 
obligation  to  motivate  all  decisions  has  been  newly  introduced  for  CNMC  of  Spain, 
and it has been expanded from the obligation to motivate only certain decisions to all 

261   Austria,  Belgium  (French  Community),  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Finland, 
Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Montenegro, 
Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, 
UK. 

262   E.g.  in  Austria,  Czech  Republic,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Malta,  Macedonia,  Romania, 

Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia. 

263   In Luxembourg, for instance, only decisions issuing sanctions, dismissing complaints and ordering 
additional  investigations  need  to  be  published.  Also  in  Germany  and  in  Turkey,  only  some 
decisions are published. 

264   Such is the case in Poland, where press releases are published informing about decisions taken. 
265   E.g. in Lithuania, Romania, Montenegro, Slovakia. 
266   E.g. in Malta. In Latvia, the process is not designed to be open, but in practice, many decisions are 

taken in the presence of interested parties. 

267   E.g. in the Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia. 
268   „Indicators  for  independence  and  efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services  regulatory 
bodies  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  rules  in  the  AVMS  Directive“,  the  study  including  its 
annexes is available at www.indireg.eu 

269   Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  Sweden,  United  Kingdom  (OFCOM, 
ASA, ATVOD), Serbia.  

270   Albania, Estonia, Luxembourg , Macedonia, Turkey, Iceland. 

93 

 
                                                 
decisions for the regulators of Poland and Serbia. On the other hand, the obligation of 
the  regulator  to  give  reasons  for  its  decisions  has  been  abolished  in  Albania.  There 
have been only few changes regarding the obligation to motivate decisions; overall the 
obligation to motivate all decisions has slightly increased.  

Most  regulators  are  not  required  to  include  a  public  impact  assessment  into  their 
decision  making  process,  neither  ex  ante  nor  ex  post.271  Seven  regulators  have  to 
include an ex ante impact assessment272 and only the regulator of Ireland has to include 
an  ex  post  public  impact  assessment.  For  the  Council  for  Broadcasting  and 
Retransmission  of  Slovakia  the  obligation  is  only  foreseen  as  part  of  the  license 
awarding procedure, but for no other types of decisions. For the LRTK in Lithuania the 
obligation  to  include  a  public  impact  assessment  in  the  decision-making  process  is 
restricted  to  decisions  establishing  legal  norms.  This  restriction  has  been  newly 
introduced. Otherwise there have been no changes in this obligation to include a public 
impact assessment for any regulatory authority. 

3.3.2.2.   Public and external advice 

The rules  regarding the implementation  of public consultations and the possibility to 
ask  for  expert  (external)  advice  are  important  indicators  for  the  evaluation  of  the 
transparency of a regulators work. Therefore, the procedures for the implementation of 
public consultations and the obtaining of external advice shall be analysed.  

Most regulators are de facto requesting external advice273, typically on a regular basis. 
Only  the  regulators  in  Albania  and  Montenegro  are  taking  external  advice  ad  hoc 
rather than on a regular basis. The regulatory authorities from Cyprus and Iceland have 
started taking external advice.  

Only  seventeen  out  of  the  31  regulators,  which  are  taking  external  advice  have  a 
specific  budget  foreseen  for  that.274  However,  it  needs  to  be  mentioned  that  for  the 
LRTK of Lithuania a specific budget is not foreseen every year; the last time a specific 
budget  for  external  advice  was  foreseen  was  in  2013.  Not  for  every  country  there  is 
information  available  on  the  actual  amount  of  the  specific  budget.  For  example  in 

271   Albania,  Austria,  German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  French-speaking  Community  of 
Belgium,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  ,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC  and  CAA),  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Greece,  Iceland,  Latvia, 
Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Serbia, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Turkey, United Kingdom (ASA).  

272   Germany, Spain (CAC), Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, United Kingdom (OFCOM and ATVOD). 
273   Albania,  Austria,  French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of 
Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA),  Finland, 
France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Montenegro, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, United Kingdom (OFCOM, ASA, 
ATVOD). 

274   Austria,  Cyprus,  Spain  (CAC,  CAA),  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Croatia,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Malta, 

Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, United Kingdom (ASA, ATVOD). 

94 

 
 
                                                 
Austria  the  budget  for  external  advice  is  a  maximum  of  10%  of  the  sectoral 
expenditure  of  RTR  GmbH’s  broadcasting  division.  Where  there  is  information 
available,  it  shows  that  the  amounts  vary  widely  for  the  different  regulators  and  for 
different years as well. The amounts lay between EUR 5,000 for the CAC in Spain for 
the year 2011 and EUR 763,000 for the CAA in Spain for the year 2012. At the lower 
end of this scale there is LRTK of Lithuania as well with EUR 5,800 for the year 2012 
and EUR 5,500 for the year 2013. Four regulators had budgets of about EUR 100,000 
or less275, and four regulators had budgets well over EUR 100,000 for this purpose276. 
In some cases, budgets also vary widely between different years, i.e. the Cyprus Radio 
and Television Authority’s budget for external advice varied since 2012 between EUR 
30,000  and  EUR  86,000.  Where  there  is  no  specific  budget  foreseen,  the  budget 
depends in some cases on the needs of the regulator and/or can be determined by the 
authority itself.277 Only for the AEM from Croatia a specific budget for external advice 
has been newly introduced. Otherwise there have been no changes.  

With  the  exception  of  the  regulatory  authorities  of  Turkey  and  Luxembourg  all 
regulators  have  to  respect  public  tender  procedures  when  obtaining  expert  advice  on 
regulatory matters.  It  should be noted that RTB of Denmark does not have to follow 
public tender procedures when obtaining advice for legal matters, and seven regulators 
have  to  follow  the  public  tender  procedures  only  in  case  of  exceeding  a  certain 
financial threshold.278 This rule does generally apply in Luxembourg as well, but due 
to the limitations on budgets for individual service agreements, the threshold cannot be 
exceeded in case of expertise requests and therefore, no public tender procedures have 
to be followed. RTÜK of Turkey is not subject to the provisions of the State Tender 
Law. The regulators CAC and CAA of Spain require the agreement of their Board to 
obtain  external  advice.  Other requirements  for the obtaining of expert advice are not 
foreseen in any country. The approval of the budget by the Prime Minister of Malta is 
no longer required.  

Most regulators are under a general obligation to consult with the industry stakeholders 
and the general public.279 However, it should be mentioned that the Estonian regulator 
has  never  actually  consulted  with  stakeholders  or  the  general  public,  and  that  the 
Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission of Slovakia is only under the obligation 
to  cooperate  with  self-regulatory  bodies.  Five  regulators  consult  with  industry 
stakeholders and the general public while not being obligated to do so by law.280 The 
situation  is  similar  regarding  the  regulatory  authorities’  obligation  to  hold  public 
consultations before they make decisions.  

275   Cyprus  (between  EUR  30,000  -  EUR  86,000),  Greece  (EUR  54,000),  Poland  (EUR  102,000), 

Slovenia (between EUR 30,000 - EUR 40,000).  

276   Finland  (EUR  150,000),  Netherlands  (250,000),  Spain  (CAC  with  EUR  150,000  for  2012  and 

CAA with EUR 763,000 for 2013 and EUR 763,000 for 2012).   

277   Belgium (all Communities), Germany, Malta, Sweden.  
278   Germany, Spain (CNMC, CAC, CAA), Finland, Poland, Portugal. 
279   Albania, Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia.  

280   Bulgaria, Denmark, Malta, Netherlands, Poland.  

95 

 
                                                 
Most  regulatory  authorities  have  to  implement  public  consultations  prior  to  certain 
decisions. Only KommAustria is required to hold public consultations prior to all of its 
decisions,  while  fifteen  regulatory  authorities  are  not  required  to  hold  any  public 
consultations at all.281 The obligation for public consultations in Serbia was introduced 
only in 2014. 

Which  decisions  require  prior  public  consultations  vary  widely  for  the  different 
regulatory  authorities.  Just  to  name  the  most  common,  a  change  of  the  regulatory 
framework, especially by introducing new legal norms, requires a prior consultation in 
the case of eleven regulators282, and has been newly introduced for the Albanian and 
the  Lithuanian  Regulator.  Decisions  imposing  obligations  on  network  operators 
require  a  prior  public  consultation  for  seven  regulatory  authorities283,  and  market 
definition  rules  require  a  public  consultation  in  the  case  of  four  regulators284.  The 
strategy or work plan requires a public consultation by the Broadcasting Authority of 
Ireland,  the  Agency  for  Audio  and  Audiovisual  Services  from  Macedonia,  and  the 
National  Electronic  Media  Council  of  Latvia.  For  the  latter,  this  obligation  has  been 
newly  introduced.  New  obligations  to  hold  prior  public  consultations  have also  been 
introduced  for  the  regulatory  authority  of  Serbia  regarding  general  acts  which  are 
directly related to Media Service Providers and for the regulatory authority of Hungary 
regarding  minority  protection  and  product  placement  as  well  as  the  list  of  major 
events. New consultation obligations have been introduced in Turkey as well.  

Besides  the  13  regulators,  which  are  not  required  to  hold  public  consultations,  six 
other  regulators  are  not  bound  by  specific  legal  requirements  on  who  must  be 
consulted  in  a  public  consultation.285  Seven  regulatory  authorities  are  obliged  to 
consult  with  the  general  public286,  and  nine  regulators  have  to  do  so  with  respective 
stakeholders.287 The Agency for Electronic Media of Montenegro is not legally bound 
to  consult  with  the  respective  stakeholders,  yet  the  authority  in  practice  does  it.  The 
same  situation  can  be  found  in  Germany  and  Italy.  CNMC  of  Spain  is  no  longer 
required  to  consult  with  stakeholders.  Other  requirements on who must be consulted 
can  only  be  found  in  Austria,  Slovakia  and  Turkey.  The  regulatory  authority 
KommAustria  has  to  consult  with  the  Federal  competition  Authorities as well, and  – 
regarding  questions  of  journalism  –  with  the  Advisory  Board.  The  Council  for 
Broadcasting  and  Retransmission  of  Slovakia  must  consult  with  the  Regulatory 
Authority  for  Electronic  Communications  and  Postal  Services  regarding  decision  on 
frequency utilisation, and with several Ministries regarding the list of major events and 

281   Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAA),  Croatia,  Iceland,  Italy, 

Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden. 

282   Albania, Denmark, Spain, (CAC), Ireland, Lithuania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Portugal, Romania, 

Slovenia, United Kingdom (OFCOM). 

283   Belgium (all Communities), Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal. 
284   Austria, Belgium (all Communities). 
285   Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, Romania, Serbia. 
286   Austria, Belgium (all Communities), Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia. 
287   Albania,  Denmark,  Spain  (CAC),  Finland,  Greece,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom 

(OFCOM).  

96 

 
                                                 
decisions  on  television  broadcasts  of  foreign  origin.  Next  to  consulting  with 
broadcasters,  RTÜK  of  Turkey  has  to  discuss  with  academics  and  occupational 
organizations as well.  

The consultation period is regulated differently in comparison of the regulators. While 
for some regulators there is no requirement foreseen to hold public consultations for a 
predefined  period  of  time288,  other  regulators  are  required  by  law  to  hold  the 
consultations  for  a  certain  time  period  which  usually  ranges  from  one  to  three 
months.289 In some cases the consultation period varies depending on the subject of the 
consultation.290  

While a few more obligations have been introduced to hold public consultations, there 
have  been  hardly  any  changes  concerning  the  question  on  who  must be consulted  or 
the length of the consultation periods.  

The  obligation  to  hold  public  consultations  does  not  reflect  whether  public 
consultations  were  actually  held.  Six  regulators  which  are  generally  required  to  hold 
public  consultations  have  not  done  so  in  the last five years291, while three regulators 
which  are  not  obliged  to  hold  public  consultations  have  nonetheless  done  so:  CEM 
from  Bulgaria  held  two  public  consultations  in  the  year  2011,  the  Broadcasting 
Authority of  Malta held  one  each  in  2013 and 2015 and two in 2014; and KRRiT  in 
Poland  even  undertook  21  public  consultations  in  the  last  five  years  and  therefore, 
more  public  consultations  than  most  regulators.  Only  CvdM  of  the  Netherlands 
(approx.  40)  and  Ofcom  in  the  UK  (24)  have  held  more  public  consultations  in  that 
time  period.  The  AVMU  in  Macedonia  and  AGCOM  in  Italy  held  21  public 
consultations,  too  ,  followed  by  KommAustria  with  ten  consultations,  the  AEM  in 
Montenegro and ATVOD in the UK with eight, AKOS of Slovenia with seven, and the 
CSA  of  France  with  six  consultations.  All  other  regulatory  authorities  conducted 
between one and four public consultations.292  

It is worth noting that two stakeholders participating in the online-survey – one from 
Albania  and  one from  the Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium  – indicated that 
no  public  consultations  were  held  in  Albania,  respectively  the  Flemish-speaking 
Community  of  Belgium  in  the  previous  years,  while  AMA  of  Albania  has  held  four 
public  consultations  and  VRM  of  the  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium  has 
held one public consultation. 

288   German-speaking Community of Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia. 
289   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Spain  (CAC),  Lithuania,  Portugal,  Slovenia, 

Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, United Kingdom (OFCOM).  

290   Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Turkey. 
291   Spain (CAC), Finland, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey. 
292   Albania  (4),  German-speaking  Community  of  Belgium  (2),  French-speaking  Community  of 
Belgium (1), Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium (1), Lithuania (2), Latvia (1), Romania (3), 
Serbia (1), UK (ASA) 1)). 

97 

 
                                                 
3.3.2.3.   Publication obligations  

The most important indicator for the transparency of the work of regulatory authorities 
is the obligation to publish documents. All regulators are under such an obligation in 
some way or other. However, which documents have to be published varies widely in 
the  countries  analysed.  The  most  common  publication  obligations  concerns  the 
decisions  of  the  regulatory  authorities,  the  responses  to  public  consultations,  the 
activity reports, which regulators are obliged to submit to their Parliament or parts of 
their Government (as discussed above), and the minutes and agendas of the regulator’s 
meetings.  Besides  these  widespread  obligations  a  variety  of  other  publication 
obligations exist in most countries.  

Half  of  the  regulatory  authorities  have  to  publish  all  of  their  decisions.293  The 
obligation  to  publish  all  decisions  has  been  newly  introduced  for  the  regulators  of 
Macedonia and Slovakia, whilst it was not abolished anywhere. Ten regulators have to 
publish  only  certain  decisions294,  such  as  e.g.  decisions  regarding  the  awarding  and 
licences295,  sanctioning  decisions296,  or  decisions  of  principle 
revocation  of 
importance.297 Ten regulators do not have to publish decisions at all.298 But nine out of 
these  ten  regulatory  authorities  publish  decisions  anyway,  without  being  legally 
obliged  to  do  so.299  For  the  regulators  of  Albania,  Luxembourg,  Slovakia,  and 
Montenegro  new  obligations  regarding  the  publication  of  decisions  have  been 
introduced. 

The  obligation  to  publish  the  responses  to  public  consultations  exists  for  18  of  the 
analysed  regulatory  authorities.300  Most  of  these  regulators  have  to  publish  the  full 
responses  and  have  to  prepare  summaries,  which  they  have  to  publish  as  well.  Only 
four of the regulatory authorities do not have to prepare summaries of the responses301, 
while  the  regulators  of  Croatia,  Finland,  Germany  and  Turkey  only  have  to  publish 
summaries.  RTÜK  of  Turkey  publishes  summaries  of  the  responses  to  public 
consultations  without  being  legally  bound  to  do  so.  In  Romania,  the  obligation  to 
publish  summaries  of  the  responses  of  public  consultations  has  been  abolished, 

293   Austria,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  French-speaking  Community  of  Belgium, 
Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Spain (CNMC), United Kingdom (ATVOD), Macedonia, Montenegro.  

294   Albania, German-speaking Community of Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom (Ofcom), Ireland, 

Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia, Spain (CAC and CAA).  

295   Estonia, Latvia, Romania. 
296   Estonia, Spain (CAC, CAA), Luxembourg, Romania. 
297   Denmark, United Kingdom (OFCOM).  
298   Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Iceland,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Sweden,  Slovenia,  Turkey, 

United Kingdom (ASA). 

299   Cyprus, Czech Republic, Iceland, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, United Kingdom 

(ASA).  

300   Albania,  Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Croatia, 

Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom. 

301   Austria, Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium, Sweden, Slovenia. 

98 

 
                                                 
whereas in  Hungary the obligation to publish the full responses has been introduced. 
Otherwise there have been no changes.  

More  than  half  of  all  regulators  have  to  publish  their  activity  reports.302  The  CRTA 
from  Cyprus,  KRRiT  from  Poland  as  well  as  the  regulatory authorities from  the UK 
publish their reports as well, but they are not legally obliged to do so. The obligation to 
publish their reports is new for the regulators of Austria and Bulgaria. The obligation 
has not been abolished for any regulatory authority.  

In  the  majority  of  countries,  regulatory  bodies  do  not  have  to  publish  agendas  or 
minutes  of  their  meetings.303  The  laws  in  13  countries,  however,  provide  for  an 
obligation  to  publish  either  agendas304  or  minutes305  or  both306.  In  Greece,  a  press 
conference  is  held  after  the  meeting;  in  Latvia,  the  meeting  is  followed  by  the 
publication  of  a  press  release.  This  situation  has  not  substantially  changed  over  the 
past  years.  In  Serbia,  new  provisions  foreseeing  the  publication  of  minutes  and 
agendas  have  been  introduced.  In  Estonia,  minutes  and  agendas  were  previously 
published  by  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  the  former  Estonian  Public  Broadcasting 
Council, whereas the new TSA does not publish these documents anymore. 

Aside  from  the  obligations  to  publish  decisions,  consultation  responses,  activity 
reports,  and  minutes/agendas  many  other  publication  obligations  exist  in  most 
countries.  Just  to  name  a  few,  the  regulators  of  Luxembourg,  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands  publish  their  financial  accounts,  an  obligation  which  has  been  newly 
introduced  in  Luxembourg.  For  the  Bulgarian  regulator  the  obligation  to  publish  a 
monthly newsletter has been newly introduced. The regulators of the German-speaking 
community  of  Belgium,  the  AEM  in  Montenegro,  KRRiT  from  Poland,  and  AKOS 
from  Slovenia have to publish information on the regulatory framework. The Cyprus 
Radio  and  Television  Authority  publishes  the  plan  of  radio  frequencies,  while  this 
obligation  has  been  abolished  in  Albania.  Overall,  just  as  there  have  been  only  few 
changes  to  the  accountability  to  the  public  at  large,  only  few  publication  obligations 
have been introduced newly and fewer even have been abolished.  

302   Austria,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  ,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Estonia, 
Spain  (CNMC),  France,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Montenegro,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Serbia,  Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia. 

303   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany  (all  media 
authorities  and  most  regulators  overseeing  public  service  broadcasters),  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy 
(however, minutes are available upon request, as far as deliberations on complaints are concerned), 
Luxembourg,  Montenegro  (however,  these  documents  are  available  on  request),  Malta,  Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, 

304   Greece, Lithuania (minutes are available upon request), Latvia 
305   Czech Republic. 
306   Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Spain  (CAA,  CAC;  however,  only  5  years  after  the  decision  was  taken), 

Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, UK (all regulatory bodies).  

99 

 
                                                 
More than half of the regulators are covered by the media in their country on a regular 
basis.307 However, only in 14 countries the public seems to be aware of the regulatory 
authority and its activities.308 

3.3.3.   Judicial Review 

In  this  section,  the  details  of  the  appeal  procedure  are  examined.  It  will  be clarified, 
whether  the  regulatory  authority’s  decisions  can  be  appealed  either  by  internal  or 
external  appeal  mechanisms  and  how  many stages of appeal  are foreseen against the 
decisions  of  the  regulators.  A  closer  look  at  the  appeal  bodies  and  the  eligible 
applicants  will  follow.  Furthermore,  the  examination  of  the  accepted  grounds  for 
appeal,  as  well  as  the  appeal  body’s  power  to  replace  the  original  decisions  with  its 
own decision completes the analysis of judicial review. 

3.3.3.1.   Internal and External Appeal Procedures 

Decisions  taken  by  regulatory  authorities  can  be  appealed  in  all  countries  either  by 
internal or external appeal procedures, with the only exception of Estonia. Against the 
decisions  of  the  regulatory  authority  in  Estonia  no  specific  appeal  procedures  are 
foreseen. The decisions of all other authorities can be appealed with an external appeal 
procedure, and in some cases with an internal procedure in addition.  

Internal appeal procedures against the decisions of the regulators exist in 16 cases309, 
in nine cases these internal appeal procedures have to be pursued before being eligible 
for  an  external  appeal.310  Therefore,  in  all  other  cases  internal  appeal  procedures  are 
either non-existent or optional for the applicant and therefore a direct external recourse 
is possible. The regulatory authority CNMC of Spain has newly introduced its internal 
appeal procedure, including the obligation to follow such internal proceedings, as well 
as NMHH of Hungary. The regulator AKOS from Slovenia has abolished its internal 
appeal procedure.  

With the exception of the two-stage internal appeal procedure against decisions of the 
Macedonian regulator, all internal appeal procedures have only one stage. The internal 
appeal  procedure  in  Albania  has  changed  from  a  two-stage  procedure  to  a  one-stage 

307   Albania,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Ireland,  Iceland,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Macedonia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. 

308   Albania,  Belgium  (Flemish-speaking  Community),  Belgium  (French-speaking  Community), 
Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Finland,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Latvia,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia. 

309   Albania,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Germany,  Spain  (CNMC),  Greece,  Hungary  (but  only 
regarding  decisions  of  the  “office”),  Ireland,  Montenegro,  Netherlands,  Poland, Portugal, Serbia, 
Sweden, United Kingdom (OFCOM). 

310   Albania,  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain  (CNMC),  Hungary, 

Montenegro, Netherlands, Sweden, Serbia. 

100 

 
 
 
                                                 
procedure.  Apart  from  that  there  have  been  no  changes  in  the  internal  appeal 
procedures against the decisions of regulatory authorities.  

The external appeal procedures have between one and three stages in all countries. One 
stage  of  appeal  is  foreseen  against  the  decisions  of  fifteen  regulators311,  two  stages 
against the decisions of sixteen regulators312 and three stages against the decisions of 
nine regulators313. The only exception is the appeal procedure in Spain, which has five 
stages, and it should be mentioned that a second stage of appeal is possible in Serbia in 
extraordinary cases. In Lithuania, a second stage of appeal has been introduced. Apart 
from these cases no further changes occurred.  

3.3.3.2.   Appeal bodies and status of complainants  

The appeal body for the external appeal is in almost all cases a court. However, against 
the  decisions  of  ASA  and  ATVOD  a  complaint  can  be  lodged  with  the  regulatory 
authority OFCOM. If there are several stages of appeal, the appeal bodies are multiple 
instances of the courts. Only the decisions of OFCOM in the United Kingdom can be 
reviewed by the Competitions Appeal Tribunal for competition matters and decisions 
relating  to  the  provision  of  electronic  communications  services  and  networks.  The 
Competition  Appeal  Tribunal  is  a  specialist  judicial  body  with  cross-disciplinary 
expertise in law, economics, business and accountancy whose function is to hear and 
decide cases involving competition or economic regulatory issues. 

In  all  cases  concerned  or  interested  parties  can  appeal  the  decision.  In  the  French-
speaking  Community  of  Belgium  as  well  as  in  Greece  a  Government  representative 
has the power to lodge an appeal as well.  

3.3.3.3.   Reasons for Appeal 

The accepted reasons for appeal are errors of law as well as errors of fact and therefore 
a  full  re-examination  of  the  regulator’s  decision  takes  place  in  almost  all  countries. 
However,  in  Italy  the  full  re-examination  of  the  AGCOM’s  decisions  is  limited  to 
cases  falling  under  the  electronic  communication  package  and  in  cases  where 
compensation is requested. In all other cases only errors of law are accepted grounds 
for  appeal.  In  the  Netherlands  a  full  re-examination  only  takes  place  when  the 
regulator  has  no  margin  for  appreciation.  Otherwise  only  errors  of  law  are  accepted 
grounds  for  appeal.  It  should  be  mentioned  as  well,  that  in  Macedonia  the  accepted 
grounds for appeal are being determined on a case-by-case basis by the Administrative 
Court. The accepted grounds for appeal have been extended from errors of fact to a full 

311   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Spain  (CAC,  CAA),  France,  Croatia,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Portugal, 

Serbia, Sweden, United Kingdom (OFCOM, ASA, ATVOD). 

312   Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Finland,  Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 

Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia. 

313   Albania, Austria. Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey. 

101 

 
 
 
                                                 
re-examination  in  Latvia.  Otherwise  there  have  been  no  changes  regarding  the 
accepted grounds for appeal.  

3.3.3.4.   Pending Appeal 

The  decisions  of  five  regulatory  authorities  stand  pending  appeal314,  while  the 
decisions  of  seven  regulators  do  not  stand  pending  appeal.315  The  decisions  of  22 
regulatory authorities generally stand pending appeal, unless the appeal body suspends 
the  decision.316  However,  the  appeal  body in  Austria has no longer the possibility to 
suspend the regulators decision, while for the appeal body of Spain such a possibility 
has been newly introduced with regard to the regulatory authority CNMC, as well as 
for the Swedish Broadcasting Authority.  

In the cases of the NEPLP in Latvia, the CBR of Slovakia, and the in CRTA in Cyprus, 
the  answers  whether  the  decisions  stand  pending  appeal  depend  on  the  type  of 
decision.  Decisions  on  the  result  of  tenders  stand  pending  appeal  in  Latvia,  and 
decisions  on  the  suspension  of  broadcasting  of  programmes  or  part  of  programmes 
stand  pending  appeal  in  Slovakia.  On  the  other  hand,  decisions  on  administrative 
violations are not potential decisions for an appeal in Latvia, and decisions imposing 
fines and revoking licences do not qualify for appeal in Slovakia. The decisions of the 
Cyprus  Radio  and  Television  Authority  used  to  stand  appeal  only  in  case  the  appeal 
body did not suspend its decisions. However, the possibility to suspend the regulators 
decisions has been limited to the Supreme Court for cases of injunctions and interim 
decisions. Otherwise all decisions of the Cyprus’ regulator stand pending appeal.  

3.3.3.5.   The power to overturn decisions 

In  some  cases  the  appeal  body  has  the  power  to  replace  the  original  decision  of  the 
regulatory authority with its own decision. In the other cases, the appeal body only has 
the power to either accept the original decision or cancel it and send the case back to 
the regulator for a new decision. 

With regard to the internal appeal procedures, half of the appeal bodies have the power 
to replace the regulator’s decision with their own317, while the other appeal bodies can 
either accept the decision or send it back to the regulator. With regard to the external 
appeal procedures, the situation is more diverse. The decisions of 12 regulators can be 
replaced  with  decisions  of  the  appeal  body318,  while  the  decisions  of  15  regulatory 

314   Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Slovakia, United Kingdom (OFCOM).  
315   Spain (CAC, CAA), France, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia. 
316   Albania,  Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Spain  (CNMC),  Finland,  Greece, 
Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden, Slovenia (APEK), Turkey. 

317   Albania, Belgium (all Communities), Germany, Greece, Portugal, United Kingdom (OFCOM). 
318   Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Serbia,  Sweden,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  UK 

(ASA, ATVOD). 

102 

 
 
 
                                                 
authorities cannot be replaced with the decisions of the appeal body.319 The power to 
replace  the  regulator’s  decision  with  their  own  has  been  newly  introduced  for  the 
appeal bodies in Hungary, Slovakia and Serbia. Otherwise there have been no changes. 

The appeal bodies of the CRTA in Cyprus and of the NEPLP in Latvia have the power 
to lower or increase the fines imposed by the regulators. Otherwise they cannot replace 
the regulators’ decisions with their own. The decisions of the French CSA can only be 
replaced by the Supreme Administrative Court in some specific cases, i.e. in cases of 
conflict between channels and operators and in case of decisions regarding sanctions. 
The appeal body of the Macedonian AVMU can replace the original decisions with its 
own  or  remit  the  decision  back  to  the  regulator  for  a  new  decision,  if  it  determines 
errors of law. However, if it determines errors of fact it has to cancel the decision and 
remit  it  back  to  the  regulatory  authority  for  a  new  decision.  In  this  case  the  Court 
cannot replace the regulators decision with its own. The appeal body of the Portuguese 
regulator  can  generally  replace  the  regulator’s  decisions  with  its  own,  however,  the 
substitution is not possible in certain cases, i.e. in tendering procedures for the award 
of television licences.  

In  Albania,  Austria,  and  Lithuania  the  power  to  replace  the  regulators  decision  with 
their own differs for the different appeal bodies in the different stages of appeal. The 
appeal bodies of the first and second stage of the appeal process in Austria and Latvia 
have  the  power  to  replace  the  regulator’s  decision  with  their  own,  while  the  appeal 
bodies of the third stage of appeal  do not have that power. In the case of Latvia, the 
appeal body of the fourth stage does not have that power either. In Albania on the other 
hand,  the  appeal  body  of  the  first  stage  does  not  have  the  power  to  replace  the 
regulator’s decision with its own, while the appeal body of the second and third stage 
do not have that power any longer. 

3.4.  Stakeholder survey 

Apart from feedback provided by country correspondents and national regulators, the 
views  of  stakeholders  were  sought  to  broaden  the  input  to  this  study  and  verify 
findings. Being the primary subjects of regulation, directly or indirectly affected by any 
changes  in  the  regulatory  scheme,  the  perspective  of  stakeholders  constitutes  an 
important source contributing to a more comprehensive analysis. Yet, the responses by 
stakeholders  are  not  representative  of  the  views  of  the  industry  as  a  whole  and  no 
general  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  them.  They  should  therefore  be  regarded  as 
selective statements, which may serve to reinforce individual aspects examined in this 
study.   

Stakeholders were invited to participate in an online survey consisting of 15 questions 
including  a  comment  section  for  additional  remarks.320  The  first  four  questions 

319   Belgium  (all  Communities),  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Spain  (CNMC,  CAC,  CAA), 

Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Romania, United Kingdom (OFCOM), Turkey. 

103 

 
 
 
                                                 
requested general information about the stakeholder, its name, core business, country 
of  origin  and  relevant  geographic  market.  It  was  also  possible  to  contribute  to  the 
survey anonymously. The second set of questions related to the regulatory authority’s 
remit,  its  agenda-setting  powers,  its  funding  and  staffing  as  well  as  its  composition. 
Two  further  questions  referred  to  the  regulatory  body’s  sanctioning  powers  and  the 
existence of efficient complaints handling procedures. The next two questions related 
to  the  aspect  of  transparency  inquiring  about  consultations  and  the  publication  of 
internal  documents.  Finally,  stakeholders  were  asked  to  consider  the  level  of 
independence of the national regulator in an overall view and indicate any significant 
aspects or particularities of the national context.   

In total, 14 responses by various stakeholders across Europe were received. Of these, a 
great majority of stakeholders operate in the broadcasting business while one of these 
is also active in the distribution of on-demand services. In addition, one representative 
primarily  offers  on-demand  audiovisual  media  services  while  the  core  activity  of 
another  participant  is  teleshopping  focussing  on  the  market  for  commercial 
communications. Most stakeholders operate at national level in different countries, one 
even at European level (hereinafter European stakeholder).  

In  more  detail,  public  service  broadcasters  of  the  Flemish-speaking  Community  of 
Belgium,  France,  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  Slovenia  and  Sweden  and  commercial 
broadcasters located in Germany and Slovenia participated in the survey. Three further 
stakeholders established in Albania, Hungary and Italy did not specify the nature of the 
broadcasting  service  but  indicated  broadcasting  as  their  principal  business.  The 
European  stakeholder, albeit  established in  Belgium answered the questionnaire with 
regards to the German broadcasting market.  

With  respect  to  the  substantive  questions,  stakeholders  confirmed  that  in  most 
countries,  the  remit  of  regulatory  bodies  had  expanded.321  In  several  countries,  the 
scope  of  tasks  carried  out  by  regulatory  authorities  was  regarded  to  have  remained 
stable322 or was characterized as decreasing by one stakeholder.323 A reduction in the 
regulatory  remit  may  be  explained  by  the  activity  undertaken  by  the  stakeholder 
focussing  on  a  specific  segment  of  the  market  for  audiovisual  media  services  (e.g. 
advertising).  A  general  trend  towards  an  extension  of  regulators’  remits  seems  to  be 
supported by a majority of contributions.  

320 The 15 questions are included in Annex 3.  
321   An increase in the remit of regulatory authorities was noted by stakeholders established in Albania, 
the  Flemish-speaking  Community  of  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Hungary,  Italy,  Sweden  and 
Slovenia.   

322   Stakeholders located in the Czech Republic, Germany and Ireland noted that the regulatory remit 
remained  unchanged  throughout  the  past  years.  The  response  by  the  stakeholder  in  the  Czech 
Republic indicated nonetheless that the Czech regulator had gained more competences.  

323   The  European  stakeholder  posited  that  the  remit  of  the  regulator  of  the  German  broadcasting 

market had decreased.  

104 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Similarly,  most  stakeholders consent  that the regulatory bodies are able to  determine 
their  own  agendas.324  The  capacity  to  determine  policy  objectives  and  the  ability  to 
take  regulatory  measures  to  foster  these  may  be  more  prevalent  in  certain  areas  of 
regulation than in others as highlighted by a stakeholder established in Germany. The 
Italian  stakeholder  agreed  that  the  regulator  generally  determined  its  agenda  but 
underlined that from time to time, it was strongly influenced by political and economic 
actors. This stakeholder also pointed to the excessive number of objectives formulated 
by  the  regulator  in  its  agenda  and  remarked  that  the  market  interventions  by  the 
regulator  were  too  numerous  causing  a  serious  backlog  of  current  activities 
(underlined, for instance, by numerous pending public consultations). Importantly, the 
stakeholder established in  the Czech Republic posited that the regulatory body could 
not determine its own agenda, being strongly pressured by the industry.  

Furthermore,  a  majority  of  stakeholders  opined  that  the  regulatory  authorities  were 
adequately  funded  and  relied  on  staff  with  an  adequate  level  of  expertise.325 
Importantly,  the  Albanian  stakeholder  considered  the  financial  resources  of  the 
regulatory authority to be inadequate. In addition, two stakeholders located in Hungary 
and  Italy  raised  concerns  that  the  regulatory  authorities  were  over-financed  due  to, 
among  others,  excessive  industry  levies.  Moreover,  in  Albania,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Ireland,  Italy  and  Slovenia,  the  level  of  expertise  was  criticized  as  inadequate. 
Responses  by  the  Slovenian  stakeholders  differed  with  respect  to  the  training  of 
regulator’s personnel. While one considered the level of expertise adequate, the other 
disagreed.  

When regarding the highest decision-making body of regulatory authorities, a group of 
stakeholders confirmed its independence whereas many stakeholders answered in the 
negative.  The  Albanian,  Czech,  Hungarian,  Italian,  Slovenian  and  European326 
stakeholders claimed that the highest decision-making body lacked independence. The 
Czech  stakeholder  highlighted  that  the  Board  consisted  of  members  of  the  political 
parties represented in Parliament. Importantly, the responses from Hungary pointed out 
that  the  highest  decision-making  body  was  exclusively composed of delegates of the 
party  in  power.  Consequently,  power  was  concentrated  in  this  body,  which  lacked 
neutrality  and  impartiality  according  to  the  stakeholder.  Similarly,  it  was  possible  to 
identify the party affiliations of members of the highest decision-making body in Italy. 
Apart  from  the  political  influence  on  the  Board,  the  stakeholder  stressed  that  some 

324   Stakeholders from Albania, Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium, the European stakeholder, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Sweden and Slovenia. From the responses of the Finish 
stakeholder, it can be deduced that the regulator can generally determine its agenda.  

325   Stakeholders of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden  and  Slovenia  consider  the  level  of  funding  of  regulatory  authorities to be adequate. The 
stakeholder located in the Flemish-speaking Community of Belgium did not specify an answer.  
The  expertise  and  knowledge  of  staff  is  considered  appropriate  in  the  Flemish-speaking 
Community of Belgium, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Slovenia. The 
Finish  stakeholder  emphasized  the  complexities  of  regulating  the  market  for  audiovisual  media 
services and noted that the regulator lacked adequate expertise for some areas of regulation.  
326   The stakeholder operating on European level expressly referred to the regulatory authority on the 

German TV market.  

105 

 
                                                 
 
members were affiliated with media companies, which were directly linked to the main 
Italian political parties.  

All  stakeholders  except  for  the  Albanian  and  Swedish  respondents  confirm  that  the 
regulatory authorities have employed their sanctioning powers during the previous five 
years.  Warnings  and  fines  appear  to  be  the  sanctions  most  frequently  used  by 
regulators.  The  Czech  stakeholder  showed  concern  about  the  coherent  application  of 
fines and pointed out  that many sanctioning decisions by the regulator were quashed 
by courts. The Hungarian stakeholder underlined the large margin of discretion of the 
authority when imposing fines. This stakeholder also criticized that the payment of the 
fine was not suspended until approved of by the courts so that service providers were 
required  to  immediately  pay  the  lump  sums  ordered  by  the  regulator.  Furthermore, 
complaints  handling  procedures  were  considered  efficient  by  a  majority  of 
stakeholders  whereas  the  Albanian,  Czech  and  Italian  representatives  regarded  such 
procedures  as  inefficient.  In  this  respect,  the  Italian  stakeholder  referred  to  the  large 
margin of discretion enjoyed by the regulatory authority. 

Another issue enquired by the survey was the transparency of the activities exercised 
by  regulatory  authorities.  Firstly,  several  stakeholders indicated that they were aware 
of public consultations initiated by regulatory authorities while no such consultations 
appear  to  have  been  held  in  previous  years  in  Albania,  the  Flemish-speaking 
Community of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary. Secondly, most 
stakeholders  took  the  view  that  the  activities  of  regulatory  authorities  such  as  their 
decisions,  annual  reports  or  guidelines  were  transparent.  By  contrast,  from  the 
responses of the Albanian, European327, Czech, Hungarian and Italian stakeholders, it 
emerges that the activities of regulatory bodies were not considered transparent.   

On an overall level, a majority of stakeholders agreed that the regulatory bodies were 
sufficiently  independent  to  accomplish  their  tasks.  The  two  Slovenian  responses 
diverged on this point. While one stakeholder confirmed overall independence of the 
regulator, the other posited that it lacked independence. Importantly, the stakeholders 
located  in  Albania,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Italy  considered  that  the 
regulatory authorities were not independent.    

Briefly,  participating  stakeholders  generally  seem  to  positively  evaluate  regulatory 
authorities’  independence.  In the view of the stakeholders, agenda-setting, as  well as 
sanctioning  powers,  are  established  in  the  mandate  of  regulatory  bodies  which 
regularly  use  such  competences.  On an overall level,  regulatory authorities appear to 
be  funded  and  staffed  in  a  way  which  ensures  their  efficient  functioning.  However, 
some  stakeholders  underpinned  the  lack  of  independence  of  the  highest  decisions-
making body, which appears to be a principal reason for the lack of independence of 
the  entire  regulatory  authority.  Stakeholders  established  in  Albania,  the  Czech 
Republic,  Hungary  and  Italy  seem  to  be  especially  concerned  about  interferences 
primarily stemming from the political sphere. 

327 The European stakeholder expressly linked its responses to the German TV market.  

106 

 
                                                 
These observations might point to difficulties in the application of the rules in practice 
or by defining the composition of important bodies. However, the findings cannot be 
confirmed  in  a  systematic  manner  based  on  a  representative  view  of  all  concerned 
stakeholders nor as a consequence of the underlying legal norms (as has been shown 
above).

107 

 
3.5.  Schematic overview on extent of changes 

This schematic overview in table form shows the main trends of changes that occurred since the INDIREG study using traffic light-style 
indications 

AL   AT 

BE-
DE 

BE-
FL 

BE-
FR 

BG  CY  CZ  DE  DK 

EE  ES  FI 

FR  GR  HR  HU 

IE 

Governance 
rules 

Funding 

Adequate 
powers 

Cooperation  

Formal 
accountability 

Transparency 

Judicial 
Review 

Legend  

No changes 

Minor changes 

Significant 
changes 

Fundamental 
overhaul 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS 

IT  LT  LU  LV  ME  MK  MT  NL  PL  PT  RO  RS  SE  SI 

SK  TR  UK 

Governance 
rules  

Funding 

Adequate 
powers 

Cooperation  

Formal 
accountability 

Transparency 

Judicial 
Review 

Legend  

No changes 

Minor changes 

Significant 
changes 

Fundamental 
overhaul 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 

The  following  concluding  remarks  summarize  the findings of this report along the  
three  main  groups  of  indicators  and the set of criteria as outlined in chapter 3. 

4.1.   Independence 

4.1.1.   Legal status and resources 

The  regulatory  framework  has  remained  stable  in  most  countries  investigated  in  the 
study.  In  a  number  of  countries,  such  as  Spain,  Estonia,  Luxembourg,  Sweden  and 
Slovenia, new regulatory bodies have been established, which has obviously an impact 
for  a  large  number  of  areas  analysed  in  this  report.  The  comparative  analysis  shows 
that  all  regulatory  authorities  are  separate  legal  entities  whose  independence  is 
explicitly  or  implicitly  recognized  by  the  national  legal  framework.  There  is  one 
notable exception and that is the Estonian TJA. This body is a governmental authority, 
which  operates  within  the  Ministry,  exercising  powers  of  state  supervision  and 
enforcement. The TJA is competent to regulate audiovisual media services as well as 
telecommunications  aspects.  Although  no  direct  influence  by  the  Ministry  on  the 
activities  of  the  TJA  appears  to  be  legally  admissible  or  to  have  been  exerted  in 
practice  so  far,  the  legal  provisions  concerning  the  organisation  of  the  authority  still 
constitute a close and direct link to the government structure of Estonia. As mentioned 
in the context of the legal status of regulatory bodies, such a closeness may give rise to 
doubts about the regulator’s independence.328  

What  contributes  to  regulator’s  independence  is  their  adequate  equipment  with 
sufficient  resources,  above  all,  staffing  and  budget.  Both  parameters  are  heavily 
dependent  on  national  conditions  and  thus  show  great  variety  across  all  countries. 
Apart from a large group of regulatory bodies which appear appropriately staffed and 
financed,  country  reporters  have  noted  that  regulators  in  the  German-speaking 
Community of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia 
and  Romania  could  be  regarded  as  under-staffed  in  view  of  the  breadth  of  their 
mandate  while  the  Latvian  regulatory  authority  seems  to  operate  on  a  very  tight 
budget.  It  seems  as  if  problems  concerning  staffing  and financial resources  are more 
likely to occur or become evident in case of smaller regulatory authorities in countries 
which have limited resources to  fund them. Moreover, the trend towards downsizing 
administration, 
i.e.  consolidating  different  aspects  of  regulation  within  one 
(converged) body thereby considerably expanding regulators’ mandates, if continued, 
will  further  put  a  strain  on  smaller  regulators.  Similarly,  where  funding  comes  from 

328   To  the  extent  that  the  TJA  as  converged  regulator  is  also  in  charge  of  regulating  electronic 
communications  –  which  is  not  the  topic  of  this  report  –,  the  independence  requirement  derives 
from  Art.  3 of  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  services 
(Framework Directive), OJ of 24.4.2002, L 108, p. 33 as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC, OJ 
of 18.12.2009, L 337, p. 37 and Regulation 544/2009 OJ of 18.6.2009, L 167, p. 12.  

110 

 
 
                                                 
State  budgets,  ongoing  austerity  schemes  will  put  pressure  on  the  structure  of 
regulatory bodies as designed today. 

4.1.2.  Governance rules 

Complete independence of the regulatory body from any external influence will, if at 
all it is seen as one, remain an ideal which is very difficult to achieve as long as the 
body is  unable to produce to a sufficient extent its own resources. Both the financial 
and  human  resources  of  the  regulatory  bodies  responsible  for  audiovisual  media 
services  need  to  be  acquired  from  external  sources.  With  regard  to  the  highest 
decision-making organ within the regulatory body (the Board), this situation requires 
careful selection of its members so as to ensure that all relevant views are represented 
in it in a balanced way.  

From  a  mathematical  point  of  view,  this  balance  can  better  be  achieved  through  a 
Board  comprising  a  high  number  of  members,  as  different  societal  nuances  can  be 
better mapped in the Board’s decision-making process. In this respect, it is specifically 
the  Broadcasting  Councils  of  the  German  public  service  broadcasters  (with  their 
number of members varying between 25 and 77) that allow for a wide representation 
of different social groups and interests. On the other hand, depending on its scope of 
competence, it can become a cumbersome task to organise the daily work of a body of 
that  size,  which  might  render  this  model  suitable  only  for  internal  self-regulatory 
mechanisms within public service broadcasting providers that have additional smaller, 
purely  internal  bodies  overseeing  the  exercise  of  everyday  executive  functions,  as  is 
the case in the German public service broadcasters’ Administrative Councils. 

The size of regulatory bodies’ Boards in almost all countries but Germany spans from 
three  to  13,  except  for  a  few  countries  where  either  an  individual  person  acts  as  the 
highest  decision-making  body,  or  a  body  with  significantly  more  members  exists 
(which  is  true  for  the  advisory  organs  of  the  regulators  in  the  German-speaking  and 
French  Communities  of  Belgium  and  for  the  UK’s  co-regulatory  body  for  television 
on-demand services, ATVOD). While the sizes of Boards have remained unaltered in a 
majority of countries, the changes that occurred in the others typically came about as a 
consequence of extensive reforms of the entire regulatory body. 

A balanced representation of stakeholder views within the Board is also dependent on 
the socio-economic backgrounds of its members. In most countries, Boards are legally 
required to be composed of members acting for diverse social, economic and political 
groups. In nearly two thirds of the countries experts in fields related to (audiovisual) 
media  are  represented  in  the  Board.  In  a  few  others,  members  do  not  explicitly 
represent certain groups, but are actually nominated and/or appointed by these. Since 
the  INDIREG  study, changes in  the composition  of Boards have occurred in  about  a 
third of countries analysed, but were mostly only minor and sometimes resulted from a 
change  in  the  overall  size  of  the  Board.  Noteworthy are reductions in  the number of 
civil  society  representatives  along  with  an  increase  of  the  number  of  political 
representatives  which  could  be  observed  in  Belgium  (German-speaking  community), 
Germany  (for  the  Norddeutscher  Rundfunk)  and  Lithuania.  They  do  not,  however, 
seem to represent a general trend aiming at gaining more political influence in Board 
decisions. 

111 

 
Of  equal  importance  for  the  proper  fulfilment  of  the  Board’s  functions  is  the 
professional  qualification  and  expertise  of  its  members.  However,  while  in  most 
countries  requirements  in  this  regard  exist,  they  are  missing  completely  in  a 
considerable number. Where legal requirements are in place, they vary substantially. In 
some  countries,  only  some  education,  but  no  work  experience  is  required,  whereas 
others  only  require  a  certain  degree  of  professional  experience.  Likewise,  the  levels 
and  relevance  of  education  and  professional  experience  for  the  work  as  a  Board 
member  differ,  although  it  can  be  noted  that  in  the  majority  of  countries  requiring 
either of these qualifications, they need to have been acquired within the (audiovisual) 
media  sector  or  at  least  in  fields  of  relevance  to  the  substantial  work  of  the  Board. 
While in general changes regarding this area have remained marginal compared to the 
INDIREG  study,  requirements  have  been  raised  or  made  more  specific  in  a  limited 
number of countries, but also reduced in one other country (Turkey). 

Existing rules to prevent conflicts of interest at all stages of Board membership are a 
strong indicator for the independence of Board members, as they can ensure that undue 
influence on the decisions of the Board is reduced to a minimum. 

While specific conflict of interest rules preventing candidates from being appointed in 
case of existing incompatibilities are widespread, they are missing in seven countries. 
In  some  of  the  latter,  however,  general  incompatibility  rules  also  applying  to  the 
appointment phase are in place, or the lack of rules is compensated by strong rules on 
conflicts of interest applicable during the members’ term of office. In the majority of 
countries, specific incompatibility rules also apply at senior staff level. As far as they 
exist,  the  rules  mostly  cover  a  wide  range  of  potential  conflicts  of  interest,  from 
incompatibilities  with  Government,  political  parties  and  sometimes  the  legislator  as 
well  as  the  regulated  branches.  The  laws  of  more  than  half  of  the  countries  prohibit 
Board  members  to  hold  any  other  position  during  their  membership  in  the  Board 
(sometimes with an exception for research, teaching activities and/or creative work). 

In  all countries  except  for Denmark, specific or at  least  general  incompatibility rules 
are in  place to  mitigate conflicts of interest during a Board member’s term of office. 
Mostly, these rules again cover all potential incompatibility situations. 

The laws of almost half of the countries also provide for a cooling-off period after the 
Board member’s term of office in order to prevent members from considering to take 
decisions  in  favour  of  a  potential  future  employer  while  still  in  their  position  of  the 
regulatory authority. The periods foreseen range between six months and four years. 

In  procedural  terms,  the  rules  governing  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  Board 
members  (including  the  chairperson)  and  their  practical  implementation  called  for  a 
closer  look  as  they  may  have  an  impact  on  the  independence  with  which  a  Board 
member conducts his or her functions. 

Candidates  for  the  Board  are,  in  most  countries,  selected  through  a  two-stage 
procedure, featuring separate nomination and appointment stages. Often, however, this 
procedure does not apply to the chairperson. On the other hand, in some countries, the 
chairperson is elected directly from among the Board members. 

112 

 
As far as a two-stage model is applied, it is mostly a legislative or executive organ of 
the State (Parliament, Head of State or (a part of) the Government) that is responsible 
for the actual appointment. State bodies or individual Members of Parliament are also 
usually in charge of the nominations. In the majority of countries, the Government is 
involved either at the nomination or at the appointment stage of the procedure. In the 
process,  however,  a  considerable  minority  of  predominantly  Eastern  European 
countries (Member States and candidate countries) only involves the legislative power 
and,  in  some  instances,  at  the  nomination  stage,  other  groups,  such  as  academia, 
jurisdiction, civil society or professional associations. In many German Länder as well 
as  in  Lithuania,  the  majority  of  the  Board  members  are  directly  appointed  by 
stakeholders,  without  any  State  interference.  This  does  not  include  those  Board 
members  explicitly  representing  the  executive  or  legislative  power  of  the  State.  In 
some  other  countries,  the  appointment  is  based  on  a  previous  public  call  for 
candidates. 

Substantial  changes  specific  to  the  appointment  procedure  have,  all  in  all,  remained 
limited to two countries (Estonia, Slovenia). Other changes have resulted from reforms 
of the entire regulatory system, such as e.g. in Luxembourg. 

The  appointment  procedure  applying  to  Board  members  in  Hungary  gives  rise  to 
serious  concerns  about  the  independency  of  the  NMHH:  in  practice,  a  two-thirds 
majority  of  the  governing  party  (coalition)  in  Parliament  implies  that  the  same  can 
elect all members of the Board. The NMHH’s President, who is nominated directly by 
the Prime Minister and formally appointed by the President of the Republic, becomes 
automatically  nominated  as  the  Board’s  chairperson.  Since  he  or  she  was  originally 
nominated  as  a  candidate  for  the  NMHH  President  by  the  Prime  Minister,  the 
governing  coalition  in  the  Parliamentary  election  committee  is  again  able  to  elect  a 
candidate from its own political camp. 

Board members are, in  most countries, appointed for a term of between four and six 
years.  Shorter  terms  of  one  or  two  years  are  in  very  few  cases  foreseen  for 
chairpersons. A three-year term applies to Board members in Sweden and the UK (in 
the latter concerning the Advertising Standards Authority). Noteworthy are long terms 
of  seven  years  in  Italy  and  Macedonia  and  even  nine  years  in  Hungary.  Also  in  two 
German regulatory bodies (the LMS and the Hessischer Rundfunk), chairpersons serve 
seven and (up to) nine years terms, respectively. Some Boards have no fixed term, and 
members might stay on the Board until they resign or retire. This is the case in Finland, 
Macedonia (for the chairperson) and UK (for Ofcom and ATVOD, although terms in 
practice  usually  end  after  three  to  five  years).  Long  terms  –  particularly  where  they 
have  only  been  extended  in  the  past  years  (Hungary:  previously  four  years)  –  might 
point  to  a  potential  democratic  deficit,  but  might  also  mean  a  longer  phase  for  the 
Board  to  carry  out  its  work  independently  from  external  influence  by  appointing 
bodies. Other terms have only changed moderately within the four to six years range. 
The terms of the Board and of the democratic election cycles have different lengths in 
about  half  of  the  countries,  giving  regulatory  bodies  greater  independence  from 
changes  in  the  political  balance  of  powers.  In  almost  as  many  countries,  the  term  of 
office  of  a  Board  member  can  be  renewed  once  or  twice.  It  should  be  noted  that  in 
countries where long terms of office are foreseen, these terms usually (except for the 
two  German  bodies  mentioned  above)  cannot  be  renewed.  However,  seen  together 

113 

 
with  the  problematic  design  of  the  appointment  procedure,  the  extraordinarily  long 
term of office of the Hungarian Board implies a high risk that the composition of the 
Board,  which  only  inadequately  reflects  the  real  political  and  social  situation  of  the 
country, can be preserved over a long period of time. 

In  the  overwhelming  majority  of  countries,  laws  to  protect  Board  members  against 
arbitrary  dismissal  are  effective.  In  these  countries,  a  Board  member  can  only  be 
dismissed  for  one  of  the  reasons  specified  in  law,  which  mostly  include  health 
conditions,  cases  of  serious  misconduct,  violations  of  conflict  of  interest  rules,  a 
request  by  the  Court  of  Auditors  or  by  the  Board  member  him/herself.  The  body 
competent  to  dismiss  Board  members  is  frequently  the  Government.  However,  in  a 
number  of  cases,  it  is  the  Board  itself,  its  chairperson  or  another  organ  of  the 
regulatory body that is entitled to dismiss a member. In other countries, this power is 
conceded  to  the  Parliament,  to  socially  relevant  groups  or  the  body  that  originally 
appointed the member. In some countries, not only individual Board members, but also 
the entire body can be dismissed, e.g. when the annual report is rejected by the body to 
which the regulatory body is accountable. Changes in this area have remained minimal 
in  the  past  years  and  mostly  did  not  touch  upon  substantial  issues.  In  practice, 
dismissals  ahead of schedule have been limited to a handful of cases in the past five 
years. Individual Board members were dismissed due to an incompatibility or at own 
request. In one case, dismissal of the entire Board resulted from the establishment of a 
new regulatory body, in another as an (automatic) legal consequence of the rejection of 
the annual report by the competent body (Parliament). 

4.1.3.  Funding 

4.1.3.1.  Funding sources 

Since the regulatory body cannot produce its own resources, its financial independence 
is determined by the way in which the regulatory body can enforce the funding entity’s 
financing obligation. In the great majority of countries, however, regulatory bodies are 
mainly  or  exclusively  financed  by  the  State.  In  some  countries,  a  mainly  fee-based 
funding model applies, whereby fees are collected either from the broadcaster (licence 
and  authorisation  fees)  or  from  the  end-user  (broadcasting  fee)  or  from  both.  While 
initial or interim state funding of a small number of regulatory bodies has ceased after 
the  INDIREG  study,  one  country,  Lithuania,  switched  from  a  fee-based  to  a 
predominantly  state-budgeted  model  with  the  aim  of  making  the  LRTK’s  financing 
regime  more  transparent,  following  an  advice  by  the  National  Audit  Office.  On  the 
other hand, regulatory bodies in four countries now rely more than before on fees as a 
funding  source.  Where  fines  contribute  to  the  regulatory  body’s  budget  (roughly one 
third of the countries) and details about their share in the overall budget are available, 
this share was found to be small. 

4.1.3.2.  Budget-making process 

In more than two thirds of the countries, the final decision over the regulatory body’s 
annual budget lies with the Parliament. This is of some concern, where the regulatory 

114 

 
 
 
body  draws  its  financial  means  mainly  from  the  State  budget.  In these countries, the 
regulatory body cannot be considered to be financially independent from the State, as 
the party funding the regulatory body also has the last and decisive say over its funding 
needs. In seven countries, the regulatory body itself decides on its budget, only limited 
in some instances by external factors, such as the uncertainty about the real revenues 
that  can  be  gained  from  funding  sources,  such  as  broadcasting  fees  (Germany),  or 
spending caps that may be imposed by the Government (Italy, UK) or are laid down in 
law (Austria). In three countries, the Government or the competent Ministry takes the 
ultimate  decision  over  the  regulatory  body’s  budget.  In  all  countries,  the  regulatory 
body  is  involved,  at  some  stage,  in  the  decision-making  process  about  the  financial 
needs. In the years after the INDIREG study, there have only been very few changes in 
this regard, most of which brought  about a more prominent role of the Parliament in 
the decision-making process. 

4.2.  Effective functioning 

4.2.1.  Adequate powers  

4.2.1.1.   Regulatory powers  

The  range  of  powers  granted  to  regulatory  authorities  is  indicative  of  their 
independence.  The  more  comprehensive  their  powers  are,  the  more  they  can  assert 
themselves within the national context (e.g. vis-à-vis the Government or the industry). 
While  less  than  half  of  the  regulatory  authorities  examined  in  this  study  have  been 
given policy setting powers, all bodies are entrusted with policy implementing powers. 
This finding is not surprising when considering that regulatory authorities are designed 
precisely  for  implementing  the  media  policies  of  their  respective  Governments.  Less 
frequently  so,  they  are  granted  more  extensive  policy  setting  powers  whereby  the 
regulator  can  act  with  more  freedom  and  design  policy  goals  itself.  These  may, 
nonetheless be constrained to certain areas of regulation. In a similar vein, the power to 
take  decisions  which  are  binding  on  third  parties  is  attributed  to  all  regulatory 
authorities  and  pertains  to  the  core  of  their  powers.  Changes  with  regards  to  the 
existence  of  regulatory  powers  have  occurred  in  a  handful  of  countries  where 
regulatory  bodies  have  gained  such  powers.  To  this  end,  their  independence  was 
strengthened.  

4.2.1.2.   Monitoring powers 

In  order  to  effectively  enforce  the  law,  regulatory  authorities  are  equipped  with 
different  monitoring  powers.  With  the  exception  of  the  Icelandic  and  Swedish 
regulatory authorities, all other regulators have been empowered to conduct systematic 
monitoring.  Similarly,  all  regulatory  authorities  except  for  the  Spanish  regulators  (at 
federal  and  regional  levels) have been granted ad-hoc monitoring powers. Moreover, 
several regulatory bodies such as in Albania, Estonia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Romania, 
Slovenia  have  been  attributed  either  power  since  the  INDIREG  study.  By  the  same 

115 

 
 
 
token, all regulatory authorities are authorized to collect information from third parties. 
In  a  minority  of  countries,  either  type  of  power  is  restricted  to  certain  areas.  In 
addition,  complaints  may  be  initiated  by  the  general  public  in  many  countries. 
Regulators seem to revert to complaints-based supervision more frequently. Although 
all  regulatory  authorities  employ  a  mix  of  monitoring  powers  in  practice,  concerns 
have  been  reported  that  under-staffed  regulators  minimize  own  monitoring  activities 
and exclusively rely on complaints by the public. 

4.2.1.3.   Sanctioning powers 

Apart  from  monitoring  powers  by  which  regulatory  authorities  oversee  compliance 
with national media laws, the power to impose sanctions constitutes another indicator 
of  the  independence  of  regulators.  Typically,  national  laws  prescribe  a  graduated 
sanctioning scheme comprising a number of sanctions of different intensity. The least 
intrusive  sanction  constitutes  a  warning  which  can  be  issued  now  by  all  regulatory 
authorities.  Changes  in  so  far  as  the  regulator  has  been  granted  the  power  to  warn 
providers,  have  only  been  made  in  very  few  countries  such  as  Luxembourg  and 
Estonia. Similarly, the power to impose fines is granted to all regulatory bodies with 
the exception of several Nordic countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The 
mandate  of  only  a  few  regulators  was  extended  to  include  this  power.  The  precise 
conditions  for  imposing  fines  including  the  amount  which  may  be  levied,  differ 
considerably from country to country.  

While  almost  all regulatory authorities may impose warnings  and fines, considerably 
less  are  endowed  with  the  power  to  order  publication  of  their  decisions  in  media 
outlets  of  the  concerned  providers.  The  newly  created  regulators  of  Iceland  and 
Luxembourg have been equipped with this particular power.  

Furthermore, the power to suspend a service or revoke a license has been attributed to 
all  but  a  few  regulators  and  is  mostly  regarded  as  a  sanction  of  last  resort.  This 
explains  that  a  great  number  of  regulators  does  not  seem  to  have  used  this  type  of 
sanction recently. In Romania, the regulator has been newly endowed with this power. 
Similar to the power to suspend or revoke a license, not all regulatory authorities have 
the power to impose penalty payments in case of non-compliance with their decisions. 
Yet, this power was newly introduced in Estonia, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and 
the  Netherlands.  In  general,  sanctioning  powers  are  restricted  to  certain  areas  of 
regulation  in  some  countries  but  generally  cover  the  whole  range  of  competences  of 
regulators.  It  follows  from  the  analysis  that  all  regulatory  authorities  seem  to  have 
adequate  sanctioning  powers  to  be  able  to  enforce  the  law.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
Danish and Swedish regulators appear less well equipped (lacking the power to impose 
fines in case of the former or suspend/revoke a license in case of the latter) but seem to 
make  effective  use  of  the  existing  sanctions.  In  countries  where  the  regulatory 
framework has been modified more substantially like in Estonia, Iceland, Luxembourg 
and Slovenia, the sanctioning powers of regulators have been strengthened.  

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4.2.1.4.   Complaints handling procedures 

Complaints handling procedures exist in all countries including Lithuania where they 
have  been  laid  down  in  the  law  recently.  These  are  set  out  either  in  sector-specific 
legislation or executive acts or stem from general administrative law and are thus valid 
for all public institutions. Finland seems to be the only exception with less formalized 
rules.  

4.2.2. Cooperation between regulatory authorities 

4.2.2.1.   Cooperation between regulatory authorities at national level 

The position of a regulator within the national regulatory arena may also be indicative 
of its independence. At national level, collaboration with other regulators operating in 
different  fields  is  indispensable  to  guarantee  coherent  policy  outcomes.  Thus,  all 
regulatory bodies cooperate with other bodies regulating the media or different aspects 
of the market for audiovisual media services. Cross-sector cooperation (with consumer 
or competition agencies) is equally common. In most countries, such collaboration is 
voluntary and designed in rather loose fashion. More structured forms of cooperation 
exist in many countries with regards to the interaction with the regulator governing the 
telecommunications  sector  as  aspects  of  infrastructure  are  essential  for  both.  Close 
cooperation  also  takes  place  between  the  regulators  of  federal  states  (e.g.  Belgium, 
Germany and Spain) and an Industry Forum has been established by the Authority for 
Television On-Demand (ATVOD) in the UK. Such cooperation is generally necessary 
and needed to facilitate exchange of viewpoints and formulation of common positions.  

4.2.2.2.  Cooperation  between  regulatory  authorities  at  European  and 

international level 

Cooperation between regulators at European or international level has increased in the 
last years. The market for audiovisual media services has become global necessitating 
some  kind  of  collaboration.  Bilateral  or  multi-lateral  cooperation  exists  between 
neighbouring  countries  or  countries  sharing  the  same  language,  history  or  culture. 
More  institutionalized  forms  of  cooperation  like  EPRA  and  ERGA  have  been 
established at European level and are actively supported by the regulatory authorities. 
They facilitate mutual understanding of regulatory issues and constitute a mechanism 
to resolve disputes. Yet, they may also be used as mechanisms to put political pressure 
on  regulators  pertaining  to  a  minority  but  the  effect  on  their  independence  appears 
minimal.    

4.3.  Accountability 

4.3.1. Formal Accountability 

There have been only few changes regarding the existence and form of accountability 
of regulators. However, a small increase in accountability obligations can be detected. 
The  requirements  set  forth  for  regulators  regarding  formal  accountability  and 
transparency have increased, while such an increase cannot be detected regarding the 

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rules of judicial review of regulators’ decisions.  Concerning formal accountability, it 
can be noted that in a great majority of countries, regulators remain free from influence 
of other national executive organs in their decision-making. Yet, in very few countries 
(e.g.  Cyprus,  Finland,  Iceland,  and  Slovenia),  the  regulators  seem  to  have  to  follow 
instructions by other bodies including the Government, albeit in limited cases.  

There have been very few changes regarding the bodies to which regulatory authorities 
are  formally  accountable  to,  regarding  their  obligations  towards  these  bodies  to 
undergo  audits  and  to  submit  reports.  Overall,  only  three  regulators  are  newly 
accountable  towards  other  bodies  (Ireland,  Serbia,  Spain)  and  for  two  regulators 
accountability  obligations  towards  other  bodies  have  been  abolished  (Cyprus, 
Sweden).  In  one  country  (Estonia),  accountability  of  the  regulator  has  been  shifted 
from Parliament to a Ministry and the Government. 

The obligation to undergo a public audit has been newly introduced for four regulators 
(Albania,  Austria,  Luxembourg,  Lithuania)  and  changed  from  a  public  to  a  private 
audit  for  AKOS  of  Slovenia.  However,  there  has  been  no  change  regarding  the 
periodicity of the obligation to undergo audits in the last five years.  

There  has  been  almost  no  change  in  the  obligations  of  the  regulatory  authorities  to 
submit activity reports  to other bodies in the past five years: For AKOS in Slovenia, 
such  reporting  obligations  to  the  Ministry  and  the  Parliament  have  been  replaced  by 
reporting obligations to the Government as a whole, since they are still in force. The 
Council  for  Broadcasting  and  retransmission  in  Slovakia  is  now  obliged  to  report 
towards  the  Ministry  of  Culture.  Further  obligations  to  submit  reports  have  been 
introduced  for  the  regulator  in  the  German-speaking  community  of Belgium as well. 
Two more regulators than at the time of the INDIREG study have to include statistical 
data about their own performances into their reports now.  

Remarkably,  for  the  first  time  a  report  has  been  rejected  in  Poland  with  the 
consequence  of  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  office  for  the  polish  regulator;  and  the 
Macedonian  regulator  can  no  longer  be  obliged  by  the  Parliament  to  submit  a  new 
report in case it detects irregularities regarding the financial plan. 

4.3.2. Transparency 

Although only few changes have occurred regarding the transparency of the regulators 
work, those that did occur, point to more transparency. There have been few changes 
in  the  rules  regarding  the  transparency  of  the  decision-making  process,  the  rules 
regarding  the  possibility  to  seek  public  and  external  advice,  and  the  publication 
obligations of regulatory authorities.  

Regarding  the  decision-making  process  –  with  the  exception  of  Macedonia,  where 
meetings are now closed to the public and decisions are frequently taken in camera –
several  countries  (e.g.  the  Czech  Republic,  Iceland,  Luxembourg,  Poland,  Slovakia) 
have  strengthened  their  transparency  provisions.  The  LRTK  in  Lithuania  is  now 
obliged to carry out public impact assessments before establishing legal norms. With 

118 

 
 
this  exception  and  in  addition  to  the  cases  where  whole  new  regulators  have  been 
introduced, there have been no changes concerning the decision-making process. 

While  a  few  more  obligations  have  been  introduced  for  regulatory  authorities  to 
conduct public consultations, there have been almost no changes in the question who 
needs  to  be  consulted  and  how  long  the  consultation  needs  to  last.  Regarding  the 
publication obligations it can be noted that in five countries new obligations have been 
introduced  (Austria,  Bulgaria,  Luxembourg,  Montenegro,  Slovakia),  while  in  two 
countries obligations have been replaced (Albania, Estonia).  

4.3.3. Judicial Review 

The  rules  regarding  the  internal  and  external  appeal  procedures  against  decisions  of 
regulatory  authorities,  have  changed  only  little  in  the  last  five  years  with  overall  no 
impact  on  the  regulators’  independence.  While  in  Spain  a  new  internal  appeal 
procedure for the CNMC was introduced, such a procedure was abolished for AKOS 
in  Slovenia.  Albania  has  reduced  its  internal  appeal  procedure  from  a  two  stage 
procedure  to  a  one  stage  procedure,  while  in  Lithuania  a  second  stage  of  appeal  has 
been introduced in the external appeal procedure.  

Regarding the appeal bodies and the status of complaining persons or companies there 
have been no changes at all. As far as the grounds for appeal are concerned, there has 
been a change only in Latvia. Now, only errors of fact are accepted grounds for appeal, 
and a full re-examination of the decision is no longer possible. The possibility of the 
appeal  body  to  suspend  the  regulator’s  decision  has  been  abolished  in  Austria  and 
limited  in  Cyprus;  while  that  possibility  has  been  newly  introduced  in  Spain  and  in 
Sweden.  With  the  exception  of  the  newly  introduced  power  of  the  appeal  bodies  in 
Slovakia and Serbia to replace the regulator’s decision with their own and the loss of 
that power for the appeal bodies of the second and third stage of the appeal procedure 
in Albania, there have been no further changes in this regard. 

4.4.   Overall Conclusion 

As  an  overall  observation,  it  is  noteworthy  that  there  have  been  only  a  few  major 
changes  in  the  national  landscapes  governing  regulatory  authorities.  Where  these 
occurred,  they  were  indeed  significant  such  as  the  establishment  of  new  bodies  in  a 
number of the monitored countries (such as Spain, Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Slovenia). 

In  many  cases  there  have  been  a  series  of  smaller  amendments,  for  example  the 
extension of regulatory powers (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Spain),  prolongation  of  terms  of  office  for  chairpersons  and  Board  members  (e.g. 
Macedonia,  Hungary),  increase  of  consultation  obligations  (e.g.  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Serbia,  Turkey),  or  changes  in  judicial  review  procedures  (e.g.  Albania,  Hungary, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain).  

119 

 
 
 
The  study  supports  the  conclusion  that  in  general  regulatory  authorities  in  the 
audiovisual sector are both independent to a sufficient degree and function efficiently. 

120 

 
ANNEXES 

Annex 1: List of experts 

The following is a list of experts that have been entrusted with the drafting of country 
reports,  based  on  the  questionnaire,  as  shown  under  annex  2.  Please  note  that  the 
country reports on Germany and Luxembourg have been covered by in-house experts 
of the consortium’s members. 

1.  AL (Albania) 
Ilda Londo 
Albanian Media Institute, Tirana, Albania 

2.  AT (Republic of Austria) 

Prof. Dr. Michael Holoubek and Mag. Hannah Grafl, LL.M. 
Institute  for  Austrian  and  European  Public  Law,  University  of  Economics  and 
Business, Vienna, Austria 

3.  BE (Kingdom of Belgium) 

Flemish Community: 
Dr. David Stevens 
Neerijse, Belgium 

French Community: 
Robert Queck and Elise Defreyne 
Centre  de  Recherche  Informatique,  Droit  et  Société,  University  of  Namur, 
Belgium 

German-speaking Community: 
Dr. Olivier Hermanns 
Ministry of the German-speaking Community, Eupen, Belgium 

4.  BG (Republic of Bulgaria) 
Evgeniya Scherer 
Attorney at Law and Lecturer, Bulgaria/Germany  

5.  CY (Republic of Cyprus) 

Christophoros Christophorou 
Council of Europe Expert in Media and Elections, Cyprus 

6.  CZ (Czech Republic) 

Dr. Milan Smid 
Department of Media Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 

Dr. Vladimir Kroupa 
Attorney at Law, Prague, Czech Republic 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
7.  DE (Federal Republic of Germany) 

Peter Matzneller, LL.M. Eur.,  
Instute of European Media Law, Saarbrücken/Brussels 

Sebastian Schweda 
Institute of European Media Law, Saarbrücken/Brussels 

8.  DK (Kingdom of Denmark) 

Per Jauert 
Associate Professor, Department of Aesthetics and Communication – Media 
Science, Aarhus University, Denmark 

9.  EE (Republic of Estonia) 

Pirkko-Liis Harkmaa, LL.M. 
Attorney at Law for Telecommunication and Media Law, LAWIN Talinn office, 
Estonia 

10. ES (Kingdom of Spain) 

Juan Rodriguez-Pardo 
Professor, Comunicación Audiovisual y Publicidad, Universida de Extremadura, 
Plasencia, Spain 

11. FI (Republic of Finland) 
Päivi Korpisaari 
Doctor of Laws, Professor for Communications Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Helsinki, Finland 

12. FR (French Republic) 
Pascal Kamina 
Prof.  Univ.,  Dr.  iur.,  LL.M.,  Ph.D.,  Attorney  at  Law,  University  of  Franche-
Comté, Besançon, France 

13. GR (Hellenic Republic) 
Petros Iosifidis 
Professor,  Media  &  Communication  Policy,  City  University  London,  United 
Kingdom 

14. HR (Republic of Croatia) 
Zrinjka Peruško, Ph.D. 
Professor, Communications and Media Studies, University of Zagreb, Faculty of 
Political Science, Croatia 

15. HU (Republic of Hungary) 
Dr. Gábor Polyák 
Institute  for  Information,  Telecommunications  and  Media  Law,  Westfälische 
Wilhelms University of Münster, Germany 

122 

 
 
16. IE (Ireland): 

Marie McGonagle 
B.A.,  LL.B.,  LL.M.,  Faculty  of  Law,  National  University  of  Ireland,  Galway, 
Ireland 

17. IS (Iceland): 

Hörður Helgi Helgason 
University of Iceland, Iceland 

18. IT (Italian Republic): 

Dr. Roberto Mastroianni 
Professor of European Union Law, University of Naples, Italy 

Dr. Amedeo Arena 
Assistant Professor of European Union Law, University of Naples, Italy 

19. LT (Republic of Lithuania): 
Ingrida Kruopštaitė 
Directorate  of  Information  Society  and  Action  against  Crime,  DGI  –  Human 
Rights and Rule of Law, Council of Europe 

20. LU (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 

Dr. Mark D. Cole 
Professor, Media and Telecommunication Law, University of Luxembourg 

Jenny Metzdorf, LL.M. 
PhD Student, Media and Telecommunication Law, University of Luxembourg 

21. LV (Republic of Latvia):   
Ieva Andersone 
Attorney at Law, Sorainen, Riga, Latvia 

22. ME (Montenegro) 
Daniela Brkic 
Lawyer, Krug – Communications & Media, Podgorica, Montenegro 

23. MK (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 

Borche Manevski 
Independent Media Consultant, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia 

24. MT (Republic of Malta): 
Dr. Joseph Borg 
Lecturer,  Media  &  Communications,  University  of  Malta,  Faculty  of  Media  & 
Knowledge Sciences, Malta 

123 

 
 
 
 
25. NL (Kingdom of the Netherlands): 

Dr. Lucky Belder 
Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  Economics  and  Governance,  Utrecht 
University, The Netherlands 

26. PL (Republic of Poland): 

Prof. Dr. Krzysztof Wojciechowski 
Lawyer, Lecturer at University of Warsaw, Poland 

27. PT (Portuguese Republic): 
Joaquim Fidalgo  
Assistant  Professor  Communication  and  Society  Research  Centre,  University 
Minho, Braga, Portugal 

28. RO (Romania): 

Eugen Cojocariu 
Radio Romania International, Bukarest, Romania 

29. RS (Republic of Serbia) 
Slobodan Kremenjak 
Lawyer, Živković Samardžić Law Office, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia 

30. SE (Kingdom of Sweden): 

Pam Storr, LL.M., and Christine Kirchberger 
Lecturers  in  Law  and  Information  Technology,  Swedish  Law  and  Informatics 
Research Institute, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University, Sweden 

31. SI (Republic of Slovenia): 
Brankica Petkovic 
Researcher,  Head  of  the  Center  for  Media  Policy,  Peace  Institute,  Ljubljana, 
Slovenia 

32. SK (Slovak Republic): 

Andrej Školkay  
Ph.D.,  Faculty  of  Mass  Media  Communication,  University  of  SS.  Cyril  and 
Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia 

33. TR (Turkey) 

Dr. Zeynep Oya Usal Kanzler 
Assistant Professor of law at Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey 

34. UK (United Kingdom): 
Lorna Woods 
Professor, Deputy Director of Research, Director of the LL.M. in Internet Law, 
University of Essex, United Kingdom 

124 

 
 
 
Annex 2: Questionnaire 

Annex 2 contains the blank questionnaire as it was sent to the national correspondents. 
The completed versions with country-specific information are joined in Annex 5. 

SMART 2013/0083 – Reporting phase 

Instructions for country reporters 

Dear country reporter,  

Thank  you  very  much  for  your  participation  in  the  study  “Update  on  recent  changes 
and developments in Member States and Candidate Countries that are relevant for the 
analysis  of  independence  and  efficient  functioning  of  audiovisual  media  services 
regulatory  bodies”,  the  follow-up  to  the  INDIREG  study  of  2011  conducted  by  the 
Hans  Bredow  Institute  in  conjunction  with  the  Interdisciplinary  Centre  for  Law  and 
ICT,  the  Centre  for  Media  and  Communications  Studies,  Cullen  International  and 
Perspective  Associates.  Since  the  study  was  commissioned  and  published,  many 
changes have occurred in a number of Member States.  

For  this  reason,  the  present  study  seeks  to  look  into  the  institutional,  legal  and 
regulatory  frameworks  establishing  national  regulatory  bodies  in  charge  of  the 
implementation  of  the  rules  set  out  in  Directive 2010/13/EU, the Audiovisual  Media 
Services Directive (AVMS Directive), focussing on the changes which have occurred 
in  the  past  four  years.  It  examines,  among  others,  the  legislative  changes  and 
alterations to the structure and composition, funding and regulatory practice of national 
regulatory bodies. Your answers to this questionnaire should reflect the state of affairs 
as at the end of 2014. 

This  questionnaire  is  composed  of  two  parts.  The  study  takes  the  answers  of  the 
respective country reports of the INDIREG study of 2011 as its basis. In the first part 
(i.e.  section  I  –  Comments  on  INDIREG  country  table  of  2011),  you  are  therefore 
kindly  asked  to  review  the  existing  country  table  for  your  country  of  expertise. 
Please indicate below when the responses are no longer valid or accurate and describe 
in detail the modifications which have been realized in the meantime (e.g. adoption 
of new laws, amendments to existing laws, etc…). The country tables are available on 
the INDIREG website: (http://www.indireg.eu/?p=8; see section “Country Tables and 
Country Questionnaire”). 

In addition to the review of the existing INDIREG country table, you are requested to 
respond  to  the  list  of  ten  questions  outlined  in  the  second  part  of  the  questionnaire 
(i.e.  section  II  –  Additional  questions).  While  questions  1-7  have  a  clear  link  to  the 
INDIREG country tables, questions 8-10 go beyond this setting and inquire about the 
practical application of the AVMS Directive by national regulators. 

Please provide additional information and references where necessary and clearly state 
the sources of your findings. If there is no information available on certain aspects, 
please  indicate  so  and,  ideally,  also  give  an  explanation  for  the  lack  of 
information. 

125 

 
Questionnaire (incl. review of INDIREG country table) 

I. Comments on INDIREG country table of 2011 

Please  comment  on  the  respective  tables  of  the  former  INDIREG  study  where 
necessary. 

Tables 1-5: Comments on general information 

Tables 6-9: Comments on institutional framework 

Tables 9-14: Comments on powers of regulatory bodies 

Tables 15-24: Comments on internal organization and staffing 

Tables 25-27: Comments on financial resources 

Tables 28-35: Comments on checks and balances 

Tables 36-39: Comments on procedural legitimacy 

Tables 40-41: Comments on cooperation 

II. Additional questions 

1. Type of Regulation 

What type of regulatory model has been adopted in your country (state regulation, co- 
or self-regulation)? What is the scope of competence of the individual regulator(s), i.e. 
is  there  one  converged  regulatory  body  competent  for  all  (audiovisual)  media  (and 
possibly  even  for  the  underlying  infrastructure)  or  is  competence  split  between 
separate  entities,  depending  on  whether  a  public  service  broadcaster  or  a  private 
broadcaster,  a  television  broadcaster  or  a  provider  of  another  audiovisual  media 
service is concerned? 

What is the hierarchical structure internal to the regulator? If applicable: can you give 
reasons  or  refer  to  public  debates  why  a  co-  or  self-regulatory  model  has  been 
established in your country? 

[Consider tables 1-4]  

126 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Financing 

How is the regulator financed? Does the state contribute (partly or exclusively) to its 
funding? If yes, are there conditions to receive state funding? Have there been any cut-
backs  in  view  of  the  economic  crisis?  If  so,  please  specify.  Who  manages  the  funds 
available  to  the  regulator?  Is  the  funding  scheme  regulated  by  legislation?  Please 
specify the legal basis.  

[Consider tables 25-27]  

3. Incompatibility Rules  

Do conflict of interest rules exist either in the legislation, in executive measures (e.g. 
guidelines) or in any other documents (e.g. codes of ethics)? If so, do they include the 
prohibition  to  be  remunerated  by  a  service  provider  or  the  prohibition  to  hold  a 
public/political  office?  Please  also  indicate  and,  where  possible,  explain  where 
information is unavailable.  

[Consider tables 20-22]  

4. Staffing and Resources 

How is the regulator equipped in terms of staff, technical and financial resources? In 
your opinion, is the level of personnel appropriate to the complexity of tasks and to the 
number of services regulated? If not, please explain. What kinds of technical facilities 
exist? 

[Consider tables 5] 

5. Monitoring 

Does the regulator conduct monitoring of the services itself or does it entirely rely on 
complaints  by  the  public?  How  does  the  regulator  conduct  its  monitoring  (by  spot 
checks or more indiscriminate monitoring techniques)? 

[Consider table 12] 

6. Sanctions 

What  kinds  of  sanctions  have  been  imposed  in  practice  for  which  infringements? 
Which rules of the AVMS Directive have been violated most frequently? What is the 
“track  record”?  Do fines flow, directly or indirectly, to  the state budget? Please give 
references (to the extent to which information is available). Please indicate explicitly 
and, where possible, explain when information is lacking or not accessible. 

[Consider tables 11, 13, 25] 

7. Transparency and Awareness 

a. Is the regulator obliged to  make its decisions, recommendations, annual reports or 
similar documents summarizing its activities available to  the public? If not, does the 

127 

 
regulator publish such documents on its own initiative? Which form does publication 
take (e.g. publication in the official journal, on the website of the regulator etc.)? What 
information is included in the annual report? 

b.  Is  the  public  aware  of  the  activities  of  the  regulator?  Are  the  activities  of  the 
regulator commonly covered by the media (e.g. television, radio, the printed press)?  

Please indicate and, where possible, explain where information is unavailable. 

[Consider table 29]  

8. Agenda Setting and Enforcement 

a. Can the regulator set its own agenda? Can it determine long-term objectives? If not, 
who determines the policies and goals of the regulator? What issues of the regulation 
of  audiovisual  media  services  have  been  prioritized  by  the  regulator  since  the 
transposition  of  the  AVMS  Directive  (e.g.  interpretation  of  terms,  protection  of 
minors, promotion of European works)?  

b. Can the regulator issue interpretative guidance on the application of rules contained 
in the AVMS Directive? Is this guidance binding on service providers? What guidance 
has  been  provided  for  which  aspect  of  the  regulation  of  audiovisual  media  services 
(please include the reference)? 

Please indicate and, where possible, explain where information is unavailable. 

9. Consultations 

Is  the  regulator  obliged  to  consult  industry  stakeholders  and  the  general  public?  Are 
these  consultations  institutionalized  (e.g.  Industry  Forum)?  If  not,  does  the  regulator 
nonetheless  regularly  seek  the  views  of  the  industry  and  the  public?  Please  give 
examples  of  previous  consultations.  Are  the  responses  by  stakeholders  made  public 
(e.g. on the website of the regulator)? 

10. General Remarks 

Are  there  any  other  aspects  or  particularities  which  you  consider  significant  in  the 
context  of  the  analysis  of  the  regulator’s  independence  and  its  enforcement  of  the 
AVMS Directive in your country? 

128 

 
Annex 3: Stakeholder survey 

The  following  are  screenshots  taken  from  the  online  stakeholder  survey  that  cover  each  of  the  sections  that  persons  accessing  the 
questionnaire were asked to respond to. 

Screenshot 1. Data related to the survey respondent. 

129 

 
 
Screenshot  2.  Data  related  to  the  regulatory  remit,  agenda-setting,  financing,  staffing  and  composition  of  the  highest  decision-making 
organ of the national regulatory authority. 

130 

 
 
Screenshot 3. Data related to sanctioning powers and complaints handling procedures. 

131 

 
 
Screenshot 4. Data related to consultation practice and transparency. 

132 

 
 
Screenshot 5. General assessment of independence and additional remarks. 

133 

 
 
 
Annex 4: Updated INDIREG tables  

Due to its length (approx. 1,300 pages) this annex is joined to the report as a separate document. 

134 

 
 
Annex 5: Answers of correspondents to questionnaire 

Due to its length (approx. 400 pages) this annex is joined to the report as a separate document. 

135 

 
 
 
 
European Commission 

AVMS-RADAR 
Update on recent changes and developments in Member States and 
Candidate Countries that are relevant for the analysis of independence and 
efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies 
– Final report – 
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 

2015 – 136  

ISBN 978-92-79-52686-2 
doi:10.2759/49838 

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doi:10.2759/49838                       ISBN 978-92-79-52686-2