The representation of the labour world in national and European institutions : the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures : study.
Date: 2015-10-29
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: EU institution, European Economic and Social Committee, business policy, collective bargaining, competence of the institution, labour law, labour market, operation of the Institutions, participatory democracy, social conflict, social dialogue (EU)

The representation of the labour world  
in national and European institutions:
the role of the national and 
European economic and 
social committees and of 
other dialogue structures

STUDY

European Economic and Social Committee

The representation of the labour world  
in national and European institutions: 

 the role of the national and European  
economic and social committees  
and of other dialogue structures 

STUDY 

This  study  was  carried  out  by  University  of  Verona  following  a  call  for  tenders  launched  by  the 
European Economic and Social Committee. The information and views set out in this study are those 
of  the  author(s)  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  official  opinion  of  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee. The European Economic and Social Committee does not guarantee the accuracy of 
the data included in this study. Neither the European Economic and Social Committee nor any person 
acting  on  the  Committee's  behalf  may  be  held  responsible  for  the  use  which  may  be  made  of  the 
information contained therein. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors: Antonio Pedro Baylos Grau, Donata Gottardi, Zoe Lanara, Jean Lapeyre, Matteo Nicolini, 
Francesco Palermo, Marco Peruzzi, Tiziano Treu, Valentina Vasile 

Project Manager: Donata Gottardi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Summary 

Table of Contents 

a) Models ............................................................................................................................................ 3 

b) Competing fora ............................................................................................................................... 4 

c) Beyond labour ................................................................................................................................. 5 

d) Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................... 7 

Final Report 

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 11 

2. The representation of the labour world in national and European institutions: the role of the 
national economic and social councils, the European Economic and Social Committee and other 
dialogue structures ............................................................................................................................ 13 

2.1 Paths to representation. A historical and legal comparative background ............................. 13 

2.2 The places of representation. Second chambers based on vocational interests .................... 14 

2.3 Dialogue structures as places of representation: the economic and social councils ............. 15 

2.4 The roots of the economic and social councils ..................................................................... 17 

2.5 Addressing the National Council for the Economy and Labour (CNEL) from a comparative 
perspective .................................................................................................................................. 18 

3. The European Economic and Social Committee: development of its role in the EU institutional 
framework and possible future perspectives ..................................................................................... 21 

4. The CNEL, Italy's economic and social council: reform or abolition? ......................................... 26 

5. The French Economic, Social and Environmental Council .......................................................... 37 

5.1 An uninterrupted process of economic and social democracy from 1924 to 2010 ............... 37 

5.2 A consultative body with wide-ranging and proven expertise .............................................. 37 

5.3 Budget, organisation and operation of the CESE ................................................................. 38 

5.4 An exercise in decentralised economic and social democracy with the regional economic 
and social councils ...................................................................................................................... 41 

5.5 Representation of Council members in French civil society bodies ..................................... 42 

5.6 A window on Europe and the world ..................................................................................... 43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 43 

6. Social dialogue institutions under pressure: the case of Greece ................................................... 44 

6.1 Social dialogue and partnership in Greece: background....................................................... 44 

6.2 Social dialogue structures and social partners ...................................................................... 45 

6.3 The pre-crisis state of play: an assessment ........................................................................... 46 

6.4. The disruption: context, rationale and content ..................................................................... 47 

6.5 Social dialogue institutions as collateral damage ................................................................. 48 

6.6 Concluding remarks .............................................................................................................. 51 

7. The Economic and Social Council in Spain .................................................................................. 53 

7.1 Difference between the constitutional approach and the legal approach .............................. 53 

7.2 Institutional participation in draft laws on social and economic issues: a supplement to the 
social dialogue. ........................................................................................................................... 54 

7.3 Economic crisis, political crisis and the critical situation of the CES .................................. 54 

8. The Economic and Social Council in Romania ............................................................................ 56 

8.1. Introduction: overall legal and economic context ................................................................ 56 

8.2. Legislative framework for the social dialogue in Romania ................................................. 59 

8.3. Special features of the organisation and role of the ESC in Romania ................................. 62 

8.4. The impact of the crisis on the functioning of TSD in Romania ......................................... 65 

8.5. Other dialogue structures in the context of social and political pluralism ........................... 65 

8.6. Brief conclusions and policy recommendation for enhancing civil society dialogue at all 
levels ........................................................................................................................................... 67 

References and Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………….71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Summary 

1.  The  role,  representative  function  and  representativeness  in  practice  of  what  are  referred  to  as 
"intermediate bodies" are central to the current debate, at European and national level, on labour law 
and industrial relations. 

These subjects are also of general interest, however, shaped as they are by the underlying framework 
of  "social"  constitutional  democracies  and  legal-regulatory  systems  that  have  given  rise  to  a  model 
that  is  consistent  with  them  and,  for  present  purposes,  prioritises  a  cooperative  approach  to  social 
conflict,  including  by  means  of  consultation  and/or  worker  participation  in  the  management  of  the 
firm (Rhine capitalism). 

The austerity measures imposed by the European Union's troika to tackle the crisis bring into question 
not only the standards of protection under regulations on labour relations, but also internal systems of 
collective bargaining, which have undergone a trend towards decentralisation within companies and a 
decline  in  the  representativeness  of  existing  fora  and  organisations  because  of  the  convergence  of 
models, with the Rhine model of capitalism now resembling the US model. 

On the one hand, the unions have had to scale down their own "representative strength" in a number 
of areas; and on the other, they are no longer in a position to represent jointly the category covered by 
company agreements, with the agreements themselves not always differentiated to take account of the 
various types of workers employed on the same premises. This has a number of consequences: equal 
legal  and  financial  treatment  of  workers  belonging  to  the  same  categories  can  no  longer  be 
guaranteed; the range of decentralised offices issuing contracts undermines the unity of what might be 
defined as the "political line" followed by the union at national or individual sectoral level; workers, 
whether with permanent or temporary contracts, have lost faith in the unions; and the involvement of 
the unions has been limited almost exclusively to crisis management and dealing with staff cuts. 

A contributory factor here lies in the difficulty in attributing an identity to European labour law, partly 
because of the way in which the economic and financial crisis has whittled away the social model, as 
has already been mentioned. 

Discussions are also focussing on the "fate" of the economic and social councils, institutional bodies 
with  the  function  of  representing  interest  groups;  this  role  has  been  challenged  nationally  and  at 
European  level  and,  with  rare  exceptions  such  as  that  of  the  French  Economic,  Social  and 
Environmental Council (CESE), has been emasculated by the simultaneous weakening of the system 
of industrial relations and by cost-cutting reforms. A comparison can be drawn, by way of example, 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

between  the  French  CESE,  comprising  233  members,  and  the  Italian  National  Council  for  the 
Economy  and  Labour  (CNEL),  which  saw  its  membership  was  slashed  from  120  to  64  in  2011  by 
national  legal  provisions,  adopted  in  view  of  the  economic  and  financial  situation  with  the  aim  of 
balancing the budget1, and which now seems set to be abolished altogether. 

2. The  main  area  of  focus of this research  project is  to  analyse the  role  of  the economic  and  social 
councils in the current context of recession-driven reforms. In addition to examining the question with 
reference to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the main objective is to analyse 
and  compare  five  national  models  (namely  the  Italian,  French,  Spanish,  Greek  and  Romanian 
councils) and their recent development. 

Although  the  names  of  these  councils  in  the  respective  countries  may  be  similar,  their  origins  and 
functions differ widely, as does the impact of austerity measures on the process of reform that they are 
undergoing at the present time of economic and financial crisis. 

Whilst  the  French  and  Italian  councils  are,  for  example,  long-standing  institutions  and  provided  a 
model  for  the  European  EESC  when  it  was  set  up  under  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  the  Greek  council  is 
relatively recent and drew its own inspiration from the European model. 

Furthermore,  under  the  French,  Italian  and  Spanish  regulations,  the  fact  that  the  principle  of  trade 
union  freedom  is  recognised  under  their  constitutions  has  resulted  in  informal,  alternative  fora  for 
consultations between the social partners and the government developing alongside the economic and 
social councils, posing a challenge to their very role and necessitating a review of their functions. By 
contrast, under regulations such as those prevailing in Romania, it was the very lack of a developed 
system  of  autonomous  industrial  relations  that  legitimised  the  role  of  the  council  as  a  forum  for 
dialogue  between  the  social  partners  and  the  government,  a  council  which  in  fact  fulfilled  the 
functions  typical  of  a  trade  union,  including  collective  bargaining  -  a  "relic",  obviously,  from  the 
socialist  model  which  sought  to  do  away  with  industrial  relations  in  the  wake  of  the  abolition  of 
differences (in economic and bargaining strengths, class and ownership of the means of production) 
characteristic  of  liberal  states,  precisely  because  this  abolition  was  instrumental  to  establishing  a 
socialist society. 

Moreover, whilst the French CESE has recently renewed and broadened its membership and functions 
to  keep abreast  of  new  requirements  on  the  part  of  civil  society,  talks  are  under  way  to  abolish  the 
Italian CNEL and the Greek council is having to contend with ever more drastic cuts in the wake of 
the country's austerity measures. 

1 

Article 2 of Law No 936/86, as amended by Article 23(8)(a) of Decree Law No 201 of 6 December 2011. 

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UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

This clearly highlights one of the strengths of this piece of research, coupled with way in which the 
findings  have  been  presented,  namely  the  fact  that  the  research  methodology  has  made  use  of 
legislative  comparisons.  This  has  proven  useful  in  collecting  and  presenting  the  range  of  data 
analysed, has allowed important new facts to emerge and, in particular, has made it possible to draw 
up  a  ranking  system  and  models.  This  has  ensured  a  sound  scientific  approach,  with  significant 
findings drawn from a detailed comparative analysis of the research material. 

3. In the course of comparing national regulations, and subsequently comparing these with European 
ones, the analysis of the role of the economic and social councils has shown that they have a number 
of points in common: 

a) Models 

The  first  commonality  is  the  concept  of  "model".  It  is  not  the  intention  here  to  revisit  the  familiar 
events that, following the second industrial revolution, have given rise to industrial relations in their 
contemporary form. The aim is simply to show that the historical and comparative study reveals two 
different institutional  models  of  industrial  relations: the  first  consisting  of  a  parliamentary  house  or 
chamber  for representing  social,  economic  and  professional  interests  politically  organised  in  such a 
way that they are involved in shaping decisions taken by the state, and the second of ad hoc organs 
designed to complement the traditional political representation structures. Starting with the historical 
and  constitutional  background,  a  comparative  public  law  approach  has  been  used  to  examine  the 
historical systems of representation: "corporative bicameralism" and the "economic council". By dint 
of their "exemplary" past, they have acquired the status of models, offering a perfectly adequate legal 
basis  for  operations  such  as  legal  borrowing  and  legal  transplant  and  promoting  their  own 
dissemination through use and take-up. 

It has to be said that, when given the choice between the two models, not many countries have in the 
past opted to base their regulations on a chamber representing economic interests. Examples are the 
Seanad  Éireann  introduced  under  the  Irish  Constitution  in  1937,  the  National  Council  introduced 
under the third Estonian Constitution in 1937, the Bavarian Senate (abolished in 1998), the Slovenian 
Council of State and the Moroccan House of Councillors. In Italy, the Constituent Assembly proposed 
adopting  a  chamber  representing  categories  and  interests,  but  in  the  end  the  country  opted  for  an 
economic council. 

The  reason  for  this  decision  lay  partly  in  the  fact  that  Article  165  of  the  Weimar  Constitution 
contained  provision  for  a  Reich  Economic  Council  (Reichswirtschaftsrat).  This  was  a  consultative 
body  based  on  corporate  representation  of  regional  and  professional  groups  and  trade  unions,  but 
which  did  not  cover  the  economic  concerns  of  the  interest  groups  represented.  Nonetheless,  it  was 
consistent  with  the  requirement  that  economic  and  social  interest  groups  should  be  accorded 
institutional importance to prevent them from entering into "competition with the principle of liberal 
democracy".  As  a  result,  the  Economic  Council  came  to  assume  the  role  of  a  "model"  for  the 

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UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

institutional representation of economic interest groups at state level that has influenced subsequent 
constitutions. In addition to the CNEL, established under Article 99 of the Italian Constitution, there 
is the Conseil économique set up under the French Constitution of 1946 and, at European level, the 
Economic and Social Committee. These are all made up of representatives of the productive sectors 
with  the  task  of  advising  parliament  and  the  government  and  -  in  the  case  of  Italy  -  initiating 
legislation in the economic and social arena. 

b) Competing fora 

As has already been said, the role of the economic and social councils as an institutional forum for 
representing interest groups is facing  competition from the increase in alternative representative 
fora. Historically, the competition originated on the one hand with the introduction of the principle of 
universal  suffrage,  which  meant  that  the  interests  of  the  working  classes  became  the  subject  of 
political debate in parliament (Ventura 1994, p. 8) or, as was the case with the European Economic 
and Social Committee, with the direct election of MEPs introduced in 1979 (Smismans 2000) and, on 
the  other,  with  the  recognition  of  the  principle  of  trade  union  freedom  and  the  development  of  an 
autonomous  system  of  industrial  relations,  where  dialogue  between  the  social  partners  and 
consultations  between  them  and  the  government  and  parliament  developed  in  a  diverse,  more 
informal, way (Ventura 1994). In other words, dialogue is guaranteed elsewhere, as happened in post-
Maastricht Europe, with the institutionalisation of the "European social dialogue" (Cadin 2004). 

It is this second factor that explains the distinctive composition and role of the economic and social 
councils  in,  amongst  others,  eastern  European  countries  with  a  history  of  authoritarian  regimes.  In 
their  case,  the  councils'  liaising  function  between  interest  group  representatives  and  political  power 
was the direct consequence of the fact that it was impossible for trade union organisations to establish 
themselves and express themselves freely (Ventura 1994, p. 63); moreover, the tripartite composition 
of the councils, with government bodies occupying a pre-eminent position, is evidence in itself that 
they operate as a dialogue platform for defining the country's economic and social policy and cannot 
therefore be defined as a forum for representing wider civil society. 

Competition  with  a  system  of  industrial  relations  based  on  trade  union  freedom  has  in  the  past 
relegated  the  economic  and  social  councils  to  a  marginal  and  secondary  role  as  a  forum  for 
comparison between institutions and the social partners. 

However,  it  is  not  only  the  positive  and  negative  trends  in  trade  union  representativeness  and  the 
nature  of  industrial  relations  that  have  drained  the  economic  and  social  councils  of  their  own 
representative  potential.  This  can,  rather,  be  attributed  to  their  partial  exclusion  from  the  economic 
and  political  decision-making  process  which  in  practice  -  despite  their  constitutional  basis  -  has 
prevented them from effectively covering the interests of the categories represented. The real game of 
representation  (even  if  only,  or  primarily,  the  representation  of  "interests")  tends  to  be  played  out 
elsewhere than in the economic and social councils. This is not to say that it takes place beyond the 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

confines  of  the  democratic  system,  however:  in  view  of  the  councils'  inadequate  representativeness 
and  perceived  incapacity  to  mediate,  "splinter  groups"  tend  to  by-pass  the  mediation  of  the 
institutional  representatives,  though  only  with  the  aim  of  representing  themselves  in  the  decision-
making process. 

The model no longer sets out to incorporate specific interests within the more general ones through 
the  "modern"  representative  process,  but  rather  to  strike  pacts  between  interest  groups  (and  their 
leaders) conducting their own representation and the political powers. 

The widespread phenomenon of concertation between bodies standing for economic interests is one of 
the factors that has triggered the crisis in the role of the economic and social councils as representative 
institutions. It is in fact quite clear that they do not have the appropriate instruments for coming up 
with  prompt  proposals  for  settling  and/or  adjusting  the  outcome  of  consultations  to  be  put  to  the 
categories  and  their  representatives.  As  a  result,  interest  groups  are  inclined  to  duplicate  the  fora 
where they are represented. 

Nevertheless, the fact that the procedures for concertation and social dialogue have become outdated 
in countries in like Italy has not created a pull in the opposite direction - on the contrary. 

c) Beyond labour 

This state of affairs has forced, and continues to force, councils to revise their own role, to diversify 
and to specialise, both in relation to the informal concertation structures, for which they can provide 
technical  support  together  with  research  and  preparatory  assistance,  and  more  generally  in 
relation to the interest groups represented, the aim being to expand its remit to include all groups of 
organised civil society. 

With  regard  to  first  of  these  roles,  the  proposals  for  reform  put  forward  by  the  Italian  CNEL,  for 
example, are based on an understanding with the government and productive sectors to the effect that 
the  council  will  conduct  surveys  and  analyse  information  in  support  of  social  dialogue  and 
concertation at central and regional level. 

Regarding the second, there is an effort on the part of the councils to act as catalysts on behalf of all 
organised civil society groups at both European and domestic level. 

At European level, the role of the EESC, as the specialist institution for civil society dialogue since 
this was first proposed in a Committee opinion in 19992, has also been recognised in the Treaty, first 
in the amendments to Articl  257 of the TEU in the Nice Treaty, explicitly referring to the Committee 

2

EESC own-initiative opinion 851/1999 of 22 September 1999 on The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the 
building of Europe. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

as the forum for "representatives of the various economic and social components of  organised civil 
society", and subsequently in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, acknowledging the need for the Committee to 
be  representative  of  all  civil  society  parties,  not  just  economic  and  social  interest  groups  (Article 
300(2) TFEU). The role of the EESC as a forum for civil  society dialogue was indirectly promoted 
and  reinforced  by  the  affirmation  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  of  the  principle  of  participatory  democracy 
(Article  11  TEU)  (Bolognini  Cobianchi  2005).  In  this  respect,  it  is  interesting  to  note  how,  in  the 
climate  of  participatory  democracy  and  with  reference  to  the  new  body  for  citizens'  initiatives  (the 
European  Citizens'  Initiative,  ECI)  also  established  under  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  the  EESC  has 
promoted its own role both as "catalyst", putting organisers of initiatives in touch with each other and 
on occasion meeting them, and as "mentor", organising hearings and producing an opinion to assist 
the Commission in evaluating the initiatives (EESC, Your guide to the European Citizens' Initiative, 
2012). 

At national level, again with the expansion of the representative functions of the economic and social 
councils  in  mind,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  French  CESE,  made  up  of  233  members  with 
precise indications on gender parity has, as a result of the recent reform in 20103, undergone a change 
in  its  structure,  and  now  includes  33  representatives  of  environmental  and  nature  conservation 
organisations  and,  among  the  66  members  of  the  group  on  social  and  territorial  cohesion  and 
community  life,  4  representatives  of  young  people  and  students  (the  minimum  age  for  becoming  a 
member of the council has been reduced from 25 to 18 years). This compares with the 140 members 
representing  economic  interests  and  the  social  dialogue.  Of  special  significance  is  the  clause, 
introduced in the constitutional law of 20084, allowing citizens to lodge a petition provided it has  a 
minimum  of  500 000  signatures.  To  date,  the  only  petition  that  successfully  garnered  the  required 
number of signatures was the one calling on the CESE to intervene in the bill on same-sex marriages. 
Even though the petition was not considered admissible, the CNEL acted on the request by presenting 
an own-initiative opinion entitled "The evolution of the contemporary family and its consequences for 
public policy".5 

As  regards  the  Italian  CNEL,  amended  by  Law  383/00,  membership  of  the  council  has  also  been 
opened up to participation by the third sector with the appointment of 10 members – a figure that was 
reduced  in  2011  to  6  following  measures  to  cut  the  number  of  representatives  (reduced  in  general 
from  120  to  64, see  footnote  1). The  reform  proposals  also  call for  legal  clarification regarding  the 
function of the CNEL as a forum for open representation and free discussions between all the groups 
operating within a system of social and economic pluralism. 

3 

4  
5  

Organic Law No 2010-704 of 28 June 2010 on the Economic, Social and Environmental Council. 

Constitutional Law No 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 modernising the institutions of the Republic. 

On 30 June 2014 the Administrative Court of Paris overturned the decision of inadmissibility of the petition, ordering the CESE 
to pay EUR 1 500 to cover the legal costs of the organiser of the petition (Philippe Brillault). 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Turning to the Greek economic and social council, referred to as the OKE, this deserves a chapter to 
itself, particularly in light of the fact that it has been established relatively recently compared to the 
councils in the other Member States: it was founded in 1994 but was not recognised as an institution 
under the constitution until 2001. Its relation to the European model, as has already been mentioned, 
has  followed  a  completely  different  trajectory  compared  to,  for  example,  the  French  and  Italian 
councils.  Whereas  the  European  EESC,  already  established  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  is  a  bottom-up 
model drawing inspiration from national models tried and tested in the founding Member States, in 
particular  the  Dutch  Social-Economische  Raad  which  served  as  the  model  for the  original  proposal 
(Smismans  2004),  the  Greek  economic  and  social  council  has,  in  contrast,  followed  a  top-down 
process, taking the European EESC as its source of inspiration. Finally, unlike the other economic and 
social  councils,  the  Greek  OKE  has  not  been  marginalised  or  jeopardised  by  the  proliferation  of 
informal fora for concertation and negotiation. Quite the contrary: it was set up at the same time as the 
reforms in the early Nineties aimed at reducing state interventionism in interest group dynamics and 
promoting the development of a collective autonomy as the primary source of regulation. Against this 
background, the OKE provides an institutionalised and permanent setting for national social dialogue 
on social and economic policies and helps to shore up the development of trade union freedom. Under 
the management of the social partners, the OKE provides tripartite representation for stakeholders of 
social and occupational interest groups, i.e. employers, workers and a third group composed of other 
representatives  of  civil  society  (more  specifically,  the  local  authorities,  the  farming  sector,  the  self-
employed, consumers and organisations in the areas of environmental protection and gender parity). 
The  effect  of  the  recession,  with  the  attendant  austerity  measures  on  which  the  bail-out  package 
offered to the Greek State was conditional, has put the clock back to the state interventionist model 
which  prevailed  prior  to  the  reforms  in  the  Nineties.  There  has  been  an  increase  in  unilateral  state 
measures, involving direct cuts to salaries, pensions and welfare services, a reduction in the individual 
and  collective  guarantees  provided  for  under  labour  law  and  the  undermining  of  the  unions' 
bargaining  power.  Alongside  the  increase  in  state  interventionism,  collective  bargaining  at  national 
and  sectoral  level  has  been  decentralised  to  the  level  of  the  individual  company,  allowing  for 
company agreements to take precedence over sectoral ones (suspension of the principle of the most 
favourable  treatment)  and  granting  so-called  "associations  of  persons"  the  right  to  sign  collective 
company agreements without the involvement of the unions and with primacy over all other company 
agreements.  Under  these  changed  circumstances,  the  marginalisation  of  the  social  partners  has 
inevitably been followed by that of the institutional role of the OKE, compounded by cuts of almost 
50% to its budget. 

d) Effectiveness 

The comparative analysis of the economic and social councils brings to light another ongoing issue, 
namely  the  competences  of  the  various  economic  and  social  councils  and  their  institutional 
effectiveness. This is relevant for any assessment of the impact of their work and the way in which 
they fit in with the industrial relations system and, more generally, to the social constitutional model. 
Here,  too,  the  comparative  analysis  has  yielded  important  results.  Examining  the  councils  from  the 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

perspective  of  the competences assigned to them  means  taking  a  functional approach:  this  makes  it 
possible to look not so much at the instruments for intervention at their disposal, but more at how the 
constitutional  regulations  establishing  the  councils  set  about  offering  similar  solutions  to  common 
problems. 

The comparative analysis highlights the difficulties encountered by the councils in having an efficient 
impact  on  the  institutional  decision-making  process,  deriving  both  from  the  lack  of  instruments 
serving as an incentive to the institutions to take into consideration the opinions of the councils, and 
to the generic nature or tardiness of the opinions themselves. 

Regarding  the  first  of  these  issues,  taking  the  European  EESC,  despite  the  fact  that  in  the  2001 
Interinstitutional  Agreement  the  Commission  pledged  to  issue  quarterly  reports  explaining  how  the 
Committee's  opinions  had been  used,  there  is a  widely  held  view  that the Treaty  should  include  an 
explicit  requirement  to  issue  a  reasoned  response,  obliging  the  institutions  to  account  for  how  they 
have acted on the positions taken by the Committee (Smismans 2004; Hönnige, Panke 2012). 

With regard to the French CESE, it should be pointed out that the government is obliged to consult 
the  council  on  draft  laws  in  the  areas  of  economic,  social  and  environmental  planning  and 
programming.  Likewise,  under  the  Spanish  system,  the  government  is  required  to  ask  the  Consejo 
Económico y Social to issue obligatory opinions on draft laws. 

In  Italy, however, the opinions of the  Italian CNEL are merely optional, and may be requested by 
each  house  of  parliament,  by  the  government,  acting  on  a  proposal  from  the  prime  minister  or  the 
relevant  minister,  and  by  the  regions  (Article.  11,  Law  No  936/86).  Precisely  for  this  reason,  in  an 
endeavour  to  increase  the  incentive,  it  has  been  proposed  that  referrals  for  opinions  should  be 
mandatory, although not binding, with a requirement on the part of the requesting institution to five a 
reasoned response. 

Regarding  the  second  issue  -  weak  points  in  the  operation  of the  councils  arising  from  the  generic 
nature  or  belated  delivery  of  opinions  -  it  emerges  that  the  councils  need  to  concentrate  their 
resources  on  a  few  priority  areas,  adopt  opinions  more  swiftly  and  include  specific  proposals  for 
amendments to the draft laws. 

In the Spanish system, for example, the opinions on draft laws submitted by the Consejo Económico 
y Social at the request of the government are highly detailed and include a close analysis, article by 
article, on the content of the bill, together with a series of observations on the impact of the proposed 
changes to existing regulations (Astrid 2011). 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

With respect to the timing of the opinions, it is noted that the French model has urgent procedures that 
can be set in motion either by the government where it is responsible for delaying an opinion, or by 
the CESE itself in the case of an own-initiative opinion. 

At  European  level,  a  great  many  studies  have  demonstrated  the  excessively  general  and  vague 
character of the EESC's opinions arising from the fact that they are based on a consensual procedure: 
EESC opinions do not contain detailed amendments, article by article, to the Commission's proposals, 
with a clear comparison to the original text. Secondly, it has been noted that the EESC's intervention 
is  not  sufficiently  timely  in  the  political  process,  and  all too  often  comes  after  the  Commission  has 
drafted  its  proposal.  In  order  to  increase  the  impact  of  the  Committee  in  the  decision-making 
procedure, recent studies have pointed to two types of requirement. On the one hand, the Committee 
should  adopt  its  own  recommendations  swiftly,  sending  them  to  the  recipient  before  the  internal 
drafting  process  has  been  completed;  in  this  respect,  some  authors  assert  that  to  incentivise  the 
Committee's work, it should be detached and independent from specific legislative proposals, as is the 
case  with  its  exploratory  opinions,  which  the  Commission  also  undertook  to  consider  in  the 
Interinstitutional  Agreement  of  2001.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Committee  should  select  the  areas  for 
intervention on the basis of ranked priorities, something that would also take into account the scant 
resources available, so as to provide the institutions with new information, expert interpretations and 
convincing  arguments  on  the  subject  chosen.  In  this  respect,  the  Committee  should  select  issues 
where,  partly  thanks  to  its  wider  contacts  with  civil  society,  it  can  provide  an  input  based  on  its 
specific representative nature and competences (Smismans 2004; Hönnige, Panke 2012). 

As  for  the  Italian  CNEL,  with  the  prospect  of  reforms  to  strengthen  the  function  of  legislative 
initiative that has been a traditional part of the council's role, it has been proposed that the council and 
government/parliament  should  jointly  draw  up  an  annual/multiannual  programme  of  priorities.  This 
would  help  to  prevent  the  CNEL  from  spreading  its  resources  too  thinly  and  would  make  its 
interventions more incisive and better targeted. 

Furthermore, when assessing the impact of the economic and social councils on institutional decision-
making procedures and with a view to reform, it is also necessary to take account of staff and budget 
cuts affecting the councils in the current climate of austerity and anti-crisis measures. 

As  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  Greek  OKE  has  seen  its  budget  slashed  in  half.  At  European 
level too, the EESC, like the other EU institutions, is facing staff cuts of 1% for 5 years and its budget 
(including  salaries)  has  been  frozen.  The  impact  of  the  EESC's  spending  review  has  been  further 
affected  by  the  entry  of  Croatia  into  the  European  Union,  raising  the  number  of  members  to  353, 
temporarily exceeding the ceiling of 350 fixed in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 300(1) TFEU. The 
Italian CNEL has also, as mentioned, been subject to a drastic reform in 2011 introduced in the form 
of a decree law, halving the number of members from 120 to 64. The Italian model is thus now more 
closely  aligned  in  terms  of  membership  to  that  of  the  Consejo  Económico  y  Social  (60  members, 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

comprising 20 union representatives, 20 employers and 20 representatives of the third sector), with an 
ever greater distance from the  French CESE which, on the contrary, has recently not only had the 
increase in its members confirmed by the constitution (raised from 231 to 233 in 2007), but has also 
been granted wider functions and competences in view of its role in the participatory democracy and 
as representative of all components of organised civil society. 

4.  The  advantage  of  a legal  comparison  lies  in  its  ability  to  better illustrate and  explain the  way  in 
which each regulation operates. In this respect, the survey draws attention to a number of paradoxes 
affecting the Italian CNEL in its present moment of crisis: 

1)  whilst  it  is  true  that  the  representativeness  of  the  council  has  been  undermined  by  the 
unprecedented parallel growth in informal fora for concertation and bargaining, it is also true that at 
the  present  moment  in  time,  where  austerity  policies  are  placing  domestic  models  of  industrial 
relations  under  great  strain,  the  CNEL  can  provide  a  setting  that  can  strengthen  the  identity  of 
intermediate bodies and help to overcome the rifts between them; 

2)  the  abolition  of  the  CNEL  contained  in  the  Boschi-Del  Rio  proposal  for  constitutional  reform 
(DDL 1429), currently under discussion, would come at a time when historically the function of the 
council has been strengthened and integrated at both the legislative level and in terms of agreements 
between unions. Specifically, Law No 15/2009 conferred new competences on the CNEL in terms of 
verifying the efficiency of measures undertaken by the public administration in its relations with the 
public,  and  Law  No  234/2012  has  stipulated  that  the  CNEL  is  to  be  specifically  involved  in  the 
process of drafting EU laws. Finally, as is well known, the Single Text on trade union representation 
of  January  2014,  signed  by  the  social  partners,  makes  provision  for  the  council  to  certify  their 
representation. 

Consistent with the move to revise and strengthen it, the proposals to reform the CNEL include giving 
it additional functions in terms of analysing and assessing (ex ante and ex post) public policies, also 
using data from other sources including study and research institutes and centres and universities, so 
as  to  provide  the  government  and  parliament  with  a  detailed  research  picture  and  systematic 
opportunities  for  comparison.  The  reform  proposals  also  include  strengthening  the  CNEL's 
involvement in EU issues and consolidating its relations with the EESC, along the lines of the model 
of participatory EU governance enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 11 TEU. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Final Report 

1. Introduction 

The representation and representativeness of the social partners and civil society is one of the main 
topics of discussion in the current debate on labour law and industrial relations at both European and 
national level. The changes arising from the crisis and the impact of the measures imposed by the EU 
troika  and  the  Euro  Plus  Pact  raise  questions  about  the  role  of  "intermediate  bodies"  and  places  of 
representation;  moreover,  they  question  the  function  and  usefulness  of  the  national  and  European 
economic  and  social  councils  and  of  other  dialogue  structures  in  the  context  of  social  and  political 
pluralism. 

Representation  by  the  social  partners  is  highly  relevant  to  the  perspective  of  European  integration, 
which  needs  to  be  based  on  the  re-launch  of  policies  of  both  economic  convergence  and  social 
cohesion:  this  explains  the  strengthening,  at  European  level,  of  the  institutional  role  of  the  EESC, 
from the Treaty of Rome  in 1957 to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, and the establishment of similar 
committees or councils in almost every EU Member State. In fact, in modern democracies, political 
representation  does  not  fully  cover  the  complex  issue  of  the  representation  of  society.  Moreover, 
economic and social interests need to be granted a direct and autonomous representation so that they 
can express themselves in a constant and institutional manner, without being affected by changes in 
political arrangements and dynamics. 

A study that sets out to analyse this topic must take due account of a multiplicity of aspects. First, one 
must  consider  that,  despite  possible  similarities  in  denomination,  economic  and  social  councils  are 
very different from each other and were established to pursue very different objectives, depending on 
the Member State. An emblematic example is offered by France, on the one hand, where the CESE 
(Economic, Social and Environmental Council) is the third national institution, and Italy, on the other, 
where  the  government  has  recently  announced  the  abolition  of  the  CNEL  (National  Council  of  the 
Economy and Labour), maintaining it has not met the objectives and expectations set out in the Italian 
Constitution. 

Another  important  consideration  that  needs  to  be  taken  into  account  is  that  the  function  of  these 
councils  has  been  subjected  to  deep  changes  over  time,  sometimes  resulting  in  unintended 
consequences  (a  sort  of  "heterogony  of  purposes").  This  is  the  case  with  Romania,  where  one  can 
observe the risk that the council itself might replace the social partners by carrying out their functions, 
collective  bargaining  included  (it  is  not  by  chance  that  in  this  case,  the  third  party  making  up  the 
council is not civil society, but the government itself). 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Based on these two premises, this piece of research intends to focus on the impact of the crisis on the 
functioning of economic and social councils, at both national and European level. 

The analysis will examine, in particular, whether this impact has resulted in budgetary reductions and 
a downsizing of these councils or whether, on the contrary, it has strengthened their role as a place for 
enhancing consensus for adopting measures to combat the crisis. At the same time, this development 
highlights  the  importance  of  assessing  the  need  for  democratic  consultation  mechanisms  involving 
social  agents  and  civil  society  from  a  constitutional  point  of  view,  as  well  as  of  analysing  the 
emergence of the idea of "democratic government" in modern societies and the basis for social and 
institutional  dialogue  in  a  democratic  society.  Specifically,  at  European  level,  the  study  sets  out  to 
investigate  the  role  and  function  of  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (EESC)  in  the 
context  of  multilevel  governance,  especially  considering  the  fragile  democratic  nature  of  the  EU 
structure. At national level, the research will focus on the role,  development and possible reform of 
national economic and social councils in Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Romania, so as to highlight 
the wide range of diversity and exemplary importance of these Member States as far as the topic is 
concerned. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

2. The representation of the labour world in national and European institutions: the role 
of  the  national  economic  and  social  councils,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and other dialogue structures 

2.1 Paths to representation. A historical and legal comparative background 

The topics of representation and representativeness of social partners and civil society have featured 
in  debates  on  constitutional  law,  labour  law  and  industrial  relations  from  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century onwards. 

These  topics  concern  not  only  the  European  integration  process,  but  also  -  primarily  -  national 
systems of labour relations. Hence, representation of the social partners, businesses and workers has 
an historical lineage which stretches back to the dramatic changes which occurred during the Second 
Industrial Revolution in both the United States and Europe (1875-1914). 

Among  other  things,  changes  affected  the  organisation  of  production,  growth  in  some  industries 
(steel, chemicals, engineering and so on), and rapid innovation in technology. As a consequence, there 
was  a  steady  rise  in  economies  of  scale,  and  new  forms  of  management  and  production  were 
experienced. The Second Industrial Revolution thus transformed industries into massive enterprises, 
where  hundreds  –  or  even  thousands  –  of  people  worked.  Poor  working  conditions,  numerous 
accidents  and  the  lack  of  any  form  of  insurance  led  to  conflicts  between  management  and  the 
workforce. These conflicts spread in Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and most of the rest of 
Western  Europe.  The  labour  force  also  began  to  establish  mutual  aid  societies  and  created  labour 
unions to help them to negotiate better rights. 

It was clear that the representative institutions of the bourgeois-dominated state were not construed to 
manage the complexity of these socio-economic and labour conflicts. In fact, the nineteenth-century 
political  representative  institutions  did  not  ensure  complete  representation  of  society  as  a  whole. 
Italian  and  French  scholars  (Orlando  1940;  Romano  1969;  Hauriou  1896)  astutely  pointed  out  that 
traditional  institutions  were  not  capable  of  being  representative  of  the  different  actors,  groups  and 
interests  of  which  the  "new"  political  societies  were  comprised.  Furthermore,  scholars  with  a 
background  in  labour  law  highlighted  the  need  to  establish  innovative  dialogue  structures  for 
collective bargaining (Gianturco 1891; Ratto 1903; Galizia 1907). 

As  a  result,  economic  and  social  interest  groups  asked  to  be  directly  integrated  in  decision-making 
processes  through  autonomous  representation  mechanisms.  This  should  have  allowed  them  to  be 
integrated in the socio-political arena in an institutional manner, without being affected by changes in 
political arrangements and dynamics. Questions arose, however, about the forms of representation to 
which  the  labour  representatives  should  be  entitled.  To  put  it  another  way,  politicians  and  scholars 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

concentrated  on  the  "places  of  representation".  In  particular,  it  was  extremely  contentious  whether 
these  places  should  be  incorporated  in  the  decision-making  process  via  the  political  representative 
institutions, or whether, by contrast, they should be granted separate representation in ad-hoc advisory 
bodies. 

2.2 The places of representation. Second chambers based on vocational interests 

The integration of vocational interests within the representative institutions can be traced back to the 
social  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Church's  Pope  Leo  XIII,  epitomised  in  the  First  Encyclical  Letter 
Rerum  Novarum  (Acta  Leonis  XIII,  11  (1892),  97-144),  which  was  subsequently  followed  by  Pius 
XI’s Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno (AAS 23 (1931), 177-228). 

The  influence  of  Catholic  social  doctrine  can  be  detected  in  how  the  question  of  the  function, 
usefulness and establishment of vocational representation was debated and implemented in practice.  

The quest for representation on vocational grounds led to draft bills and proposals for constitutional 
amendments. In particular, the proposed bills aimed at replacing the "traditional" second chamber – 
i.e. the  Senate  –  with an  upper chamber  whose  members  should be  nominated or  elected  by  panels 
composed  of  persons  having  knowledge  and  practical  experience  of  the  interests  and  services  in 
question. 

In Italy, several scholars (Brunialti 1884; Arcoleo 1907) suggested the Senate be replaced by a second 
chamber  based  on  vocational  categories,  and  a  Senate  commission  delivered  a  report  on  a 
constitutional reform of this type, which would grant adequate representation to economic and social 
interests within the legislative branch (Finali, Fortunato, Borgnini, Caetani, Pellegrini, Rossi, Severi, 
Villa e Arcoleo, Per la riforma del Senato, in Atti Parlamentari, Senato del Regno, Legislatura XXIII, 
sessione 1909-1913, doc. n. CII, 62 et seq.). In France, Germany and Austria scholars also advocated 
the creation of dialogue structures within the state apparatus. These structures were intended to allow 
social and political pluralism to be integrated in the decision-making process (Hauriou 1896; Renard 
1930). 

Despite this, however, Italy, France and Germany did not succeed in amending their constitutions and 
replacing their respective second chambers with vocationally-oriented ones. By contrast, the influence 
of  the  social  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Church  is  evident  in  the  1937  Irish  Constitution:  a  second 
chamber  representative  of  vocational  groups,  socio-economic  interests  and  the  social  partners  was 
effectively established. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Irish Constitution, the Senate (Seanad Éireann) is 
composed  of  sixty  members:  the  President  of  the  Republic  nominates  eleven  members;  forty-nine 
members  are  elected  by  five  panels  representing  vocational  interests  (Culture  and  Education, 
Agriculture,  Labour,  Industry  and  Commerce  and  Public  Administration).  There  are  also  members 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

elected by the graduates of two universities: three each by the National University of Ireland and the 
University of Dublin (Trinity College) (Laver 2002). 

The  responsibilities  with  which  the  Seanad  Éireann  is  endowed  under  the  Constitution  are  those 
typical  of  "traditional"  second  chambers.  Hence,  representation  on  vocational  grounds  through  the 
Seanad Éireann allows for initiating and revising legislation, although the legislative role is restricted: 
it cannot initiate financial legislation, and can only make recommendations to bills of this type. 

It  could  be  argued  that  a  vocational  second  chamber  adds  a  layer  of  complexity  to  the  decision-
making  process:  as  far  as  labour issues are  concerned,  legislative  action  should not  be  limited  by a 
second  chamber,  which  aims  at  acting  as  a  safeguard  against  legislation  being  enacted  too  quickly. 
Moreover, the assumption is that the Seanad Éireann delays legislation which has already been passed 
by the Irish lower chamber [the Dáil Éireann] and cannot initiate bills to amend the Constitution. 

Notwithstanding these objections, there are several arguments supporting the relevance of integrating 
vocationally-oriented mechanisms into state legislative processes. 

First,  the  Seanad  Éireann  is  not  the  sole  second  chamber  based  on  vocational  interests.  The  1937 
Estonian Constitution also established a National Council construed on vocational grounds. Secondly, 
there have also been constituent assemblies that decided to adopt vocational second chambers. As  a 
result,  the  Constitutions  of  Morocco  (1996  and  2011)  and  of  Slovenia  (1991)  introduced  second 
chambers  representing  vocational 
trade  unions,  professional 
organisations of employers and representatives of employees. 

the  social  partners, 

interests, 

Thirdly, there was a proposal to amend the Constitution of Ireland and to abolish the Seanad Éireann. 
The  Thirty-second  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  (Abolition  of  Seanad  Éireann)  Bill  2013  was 
rejected by the electorate in a referendum on 4 October 2013 by 51.7% against to 48.3% in favour. 

In any case, the incorporation of vocational interests within political representative institutions is not a 
frequent  model  –  indeed,  the  vocational  Bavarian  Senate  was  abolished  in  1998  (Schmitt-Glaeser 
1996;  Palermo,  Nicolini  2013).  Despite  this,  the  "model"  of  a  "corporative’"  second  chamber  has 
proved to be a useful mechanism through which it has been possible to ensure adequate representation 
of  the  social  partners  and  civil  society  and  to  grant  them  a  "place  of  representation"  under  the 
constitution. 

2.3 Dialogue structures as places of representation: the economic and social councils 

The  creation  of  a  second  chamber  was  not  the  only  response  to  the  quest  for  representation  on 
vocational grounds. Comparative constitutional studies uphold that several constitutions opted for the 
creation of innovative dialogue structures in order to permit social and political pluralism to emerge at 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

constitutional level. The establishment of a bicameral legislature with the second chamber based on 
vocational categories was perceived as a factor of complexity in the decision-making process. 

Indeed,  constant  disagreements  between  the  two  chambers  led  to  proposals  for  the  creation  of  a 
second chamber whose seats would be apportioned on the basis of geographical constituencies. 

This has led to the creation of ad-hoc committees, which offer a seat of influence to vocational groups 
and  allow  the  interests  of  social  agents  and  the  social  partners  –  as  well  as  of  civil  society  –  to  be 
adopted as the basis for social and institutional dialogue in a democratic society. In Italy, the creation 
of committees or councils can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. Royal decrees were 
enacted and different vocational advisory boards established: the council for agriculture (Decree No 
4619 of 1868); the council for manufacturing and trade (Decree No 5210 of 1869); and the advisory 
commission  for  labour  and  social  policy  (Decree  No  5370  of  1869).  These  were  not  independent 
boards, but fell under the political responsibility of the minister of trade – and, as a consequence, they 
were not representative of the vocational categories. Even the Council for Labour  – created by Law 
246  of  1902  and  amended  under  fascist  rule  –  did  not  represent  the  world  of  labour  and  socio-
occupational  interests,  because  its  composition  and  the  procedure  for  appointing  its  members  fell 
within cabinet responsibilities (De Fina 1959; Ventura 1994). 

After  the  dismantling  of  the  fascist  regime,  the  proceedings  of  debates,  which  took  place  in  the 
Constituent Assembly, encompassed all the most relevant issues related to vocational representation. 
When  addressing  the  structure  of  the  national  Parliament,  the  Constituent  Assembly  proposed  the 
establishment of a second chamber representing categories of professionals, employees and economic 
interests, but the proposal was subsequently abandoned in favour of an advisory ad hoc  council, the 
Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (hereinafter the CNEL), which was then enshrined 
in Article 99 of the Constitution (De Fina 1959; Chiarelli 1961; Ventura 1994; Bonfiglio 2006). The 
creation of a second, vocational, chamber was severely criticised and then rejected. In fact in 1939 the 
fascist  regime  transformed  the  lower  chamber  of  Parliament into the so-called “Camera  dei  Fasci e 
delle Corporazioni” – i.e. a guild-dominated chamber (Law No 129 of 1939). 

Recourse  to  the  vocational  council  "model"  is  also  characteristic  of  French  constitutions.  Whilst 
drafting  the  1946  and  1958  Constitutions,  a  vocational  second  chamber  was  proposed.  The  1946 
constitutional text eventually replaced the second chamber with an ad-hoc council – the "Economic 
Council" (Conseil économique: Article 25) – as did the 1958 Constitution: an "Economic and Social 
Council" (Conseil économique et social) was then inserted in the 1958 Constitution (Articles 69-71), 
and the Constitution amendment Act (23 Jul  2003) modified its official denomination – which is now 
"Economic,  Social  and  Environmental  Council"  (Conseil  économique  social  et  environnemental, 
hereinafter the CESE). 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

The Italian and French constitutions confer upon these  councils manifold responsibilities – amongst 
other  things,  they  act  as  advisory  boards  in  the  decision-making  process  (Aubry  1959;  Frayssinet 
1996; Nicolais 1991). The Italian National Council can also introduce bills relating to socio-economic 
issues (Article 99.3 of the Italian Constitution). 

2.4 The roots of the economic and social councils 

Before examining the origins, organisation and functions of the CNEL, we will explore the historical 
roots and constitutional foundations of the economic and social councils in general. 

It is quite clear that the purpose of setting up such dialogue structures – distinct from second chambers 
in  that  they  are  based  on  representation  of  vocational  interests  –  is  to  integrate  social  and  political 
pluralism  within  the  broader  constitutional  context.  Like  vocational  bicameral  structures,  these 
councils  can  be  traced  back  to  the  social  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Church.  Social  doctrine  is  not, 
however,  the  sole  "ideological"  and  "political"  foundation  supporting  councils  as  the  key  to  the 
problem of labour representation. In this regard, several political and constitutional entities have come 
together to offer support in setting up institutions representing the social partners. 

On  the  one  hand,  there  was  the  British  Guild  Socialism  movement  calling  for  workers’  control  of 
industry through a system of national guilds operating in an implied contractual relationship with the 
public (Cole 1920; Mises 1998). The Guild Socialism movement – which developed in England in the 
first two decades of the 20th century  – has traits in common with the Italian and Portuguese fascist 
experiments  of  the  so-called  "corporative  state"  (stato  corporativo)  (Cassese  2010;  Biscaretti  di 
Ruffìa;  Gomes  Canotilho),  which  dealt  with  conflicts  between  management  and  labour  in  various 
guilds, with working relations being governed by direct bargaining. In this respect, it is clear that in 
the  1930s,  "guild"  or  "corporate"  experiments  were  considered  as  alternative  models  to  vocational 
second chambers within the liberal democracies of the time. 

On  the  other  hand, it should  be  pointed  out  that connections between the  Italian  fascist  corporative 
experience  and  Guild  Socialism  movement  also  emerge  from  the  role  played  by  the  international 
parties of Marxist socialism, from which the Fascist party seceded, once it could no longer pose as 
socialist.  Hence,  studies  aiming  at  analysing  representation  of  the  social  partners  must  take  this 
multiplicity  of  aspects  into  account.  Indeed,  one  must  consider  that,  despite  possible  similarities  in 
denomination,  economic  and  social  councils  may  be  very  different  from  each  other  and  were 
established to pursue very different objectives, depending on the specific circumstances of the states 
concerned. 

This  is  particularly  true  for  the  ad  hoc  councils  as  "places  of  representation".  In  this  regard,  the 
Economic  Council  (Reichswirtschaftsrat)  of  the  1919  German  Constitution  had  represented  the 
"model"  of  economic  and  social  councils  in  European  democracies  (Article  165  of  the  so-called 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Weimar Constitution) (Tarnow 1951). To this extent, scholars highlighted that it is the antecedent of 
the Italian and French councils – indeed, it is one of the first manifestations of economic democracy. 
The ideological roots can thus be traced back to the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, as well as 
to  the  institutional  conceptions  of  "council  democracy"  (Räterdemokratie),  which  had  already  been 
advocated  during  the  1917  Soviet  revolution  and  by  German  politicians  such  as  Rosa  Luxemburg 
(Ortino  1994).  Moreover,  the  "Weimar  model"  is  very  much  indebted  to  the  social  democratic 
manifesto:  whereas  political  interests  should  be  represented  through  traditional  representative 
institutions,  social  and  labour  actors  stand  for  innovative  vocational  ones  acting  within  state 
institutions.  However,  there  was  a  flaw  between  the  constitution  on  paper  and  the  one  enacted  in 
practice:  indeed,  although  it  was  enshrined  in  the  text  of  the  Weimar  constitution,  the  Economic 
Council was never set up. In any event, it directly influenced the English  Whitley Councils, and the 
homologous councils established in France (1925) and Spain (1929) (Cappuccio 2006). 

2.5  Addressing  the  National  Council  for  the  Economy  and  Labour  (CNEL)  from  a 
comparative perspective 

Economic and social councils comprise a wide range of dialogue structures, incorporating vocational 
interests and socio-economic pluralism within state institutions. The assumption is that these councils 
represent an effective model, which is an alternative to the vocational second chamber. 

When addressing the representation of the social partners and the two sides of industry, the proposed 
classification  –  which  draws  a  distinction  between  vocational  second  chambers  and  economic  and 
social councils – is the outcome of a legal analysis conducted on the basis of the comparative method. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  comparative  method  makes  it  possible  to  detect  analogies  and  differences 
between different forms of representation, integration and participation of vocational categories in the 
decision-making  process.  On  the  other  hand,  it  means  that  the  different  forms  can  be  grouped 
according  to  their  common  traits.  Indeed,  the  purpose  of  the  comparative  method  is  to  devise 
"models"  of  representation  –  i.e.  a  synthesis  of  complexity  by  logical  categories  useful  for  the 
advancement of federal comparative studies (Pegoraro). 

At  national  level, the  number of  councils  has  grown at a  steady  rate. The  French  CESE  and  Italian 
CNEL  are  the  longest-standing  ones.  Recourse  to  dialogue  structures  has  taken  place  in  Romania, 
Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal,  whereas  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  the  council  model  is 
complemented by bilateral agreements between trade unions and organised business which negotiate 
directly. In some cases, there have also been proposals for their reform: in France, for example, the 
transformation of the CESE into a second chamber was rejected under a referendum in 1969 (Nicolais 
1991).  Italian  sub-national  administrative  units  also  established  their  own  economic  and  social 
councils: among others, Puglia (under Article 46 of the Regional Statute and Regional Law No 7 of 
2004), Tuscany (Article 61 of the Regional Statute), Calabria (Article 56 of the Regional Statute) and 
Piedmont (Article 87 of the Regional Statute) (Cappuccio 2006). 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

It should be pointed out that the function of these councils has been subject to radical change over the 
course of time, sometimes resulting in unintended consequences. In particular, there is a flaw between 
the  role  constitutionally  assigned  to  them  and  the  way  in  which  the  economic  constitution  actually 
works:  this  distinction  between  constitutional  form  and  operational  reality  is  mainly  due  to  the 
creation  of  more  informal  places  for  negotiation,  the  role  played  by  trade  unions  and  professional 
business  organisations  and  the  current economic  crisis.  As a  consequence,  one can  observe  the  risk 
that the social partners may replace the councils by carrying out their functions, collective bargaining 
included. Furthermore, it is not by chance that in this case, the third party composing the  council is 
not civil society but the government itself. The creation of dialogue structures as an alternative to the 
councils  affects  these  bodies,  as  well  as  their  capacity  to  represent  the  labour  world  and  socio-
occupational interests. It also has a direct impact on their composition, the procedure for appointing 
members and on the legislative and political impact of their activities. 

This is particularly true of the Italian CNEL. The CNEL is composed of experts and representatives of 
the economic categories, in such a way as to reflect their numerical size and qualitative importance 
(Article  99.1  of  the  Italian  Constitution).  It  serves  as  a  consultative  body  for  parliament  and  the 
government on those matters and those functions attributed to it by law (Article 99(2)). It can initiate 
legislation and may contribute to drafting economic and social legislation according to the principles 
and  within  the  limitations  laid  down  by  law  (Article  99(3)).  The  constitutional  provisions  were 
implemented by Law No 33 of 1957, which was subsequently amended by Law No 936 of 1986. 

We have already observed that the CNEL has its roots in socio-economic and political concepts that 
were  recognised  in  some  relevant  constitutional  questions  between  the  First  and  the  Second  World 
Wars. The organic representation of workers, professionals, businesses and entrepreneurs had already 
been  tested  in  the  Weimar  Constitution  Laboratory,  with  the  outcome  then  being  transplanted  to 
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 

The  CNEL  comprises  111  members:  the  president  and  ninety-nine  representatives  of  the 
manufacturing and service categories in the public and private sectors. Pursuant to Article 2 of Law 
No  936  of  1986,  44  members  are  appointed  in  order  to  represent  the  employees;  18  members  are 
representatives  of  professionals;  and  37  members  are  representatives  of  businesses.  There  also  are 
twelve experts, to be nominated from leading figures in economic, social and legal spheres. Members 
are appointed by the President of the Republic in accordance with a resolution passed by the Council 
of Ministers. Members remain in office for five years and cannot be Members of Parliament. 

The CNEL is endowed with a range of powers and responsibilities. Like the French CESE, it delivers 
advisory  opinions at  the request  of the cabinet and of  the  two  chambers  of  Parliament.  Its  opinions 
and reports may range from guidelines on economic, financial and social policy to any topic which is 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

related  to  or  falls  within  the  field  of  economics  and labour.  It  can  also  deliver opinions  on its  own 
initiative for submission to those institutions. As already mentioned, the CNEL can initiate legislation. 

Despite its constitutional foundations, and notwithstanding the relevance of the powers attributed to it 
under the constitution, the CNEL has not lived up to expectations in terms of the representation and 
representativeness  of  the  social  partners  and  civil  society  within  national  institutions.  It  has  only 
exercised its powers on a few occasions, and the social partners, trade unions and organised business 
have preferred to seek out more informal places for negotiation. 

To some extent, it regained momentum as an institution capable of delivering analysis in the field of 
labour and as a laboratory for new collective bargaining (Balboni 2013). One of the main factors that 
has severely undermined the representativeness of the CNEL is the fact that economic, vocational and 
social  interests have  had  the  possibility  to  develop informal,  direct  and  autonomous  mechanisms  of 
representation. Thus trade unions and businesses can negotiate, collective bargaining included, with 
the  representative  institutions,  without  being  affected  by  changes  in  political  arrangements  and 
dynamics. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  scholars  with  a  background  in  constitutional  law,  labour  law  and  industrial 
relations  have  been  debating  the  future  of  the  CNEL  ever  since  the  Constitution  entered  into  force 
(Mortati 1991; Ventura 1994; Cappuccio 2006). Nevertheless, the current political centre-left cabinet 
has tabled a parliamentary bill for an amendment to the Constitution calling for the Council's abolition 
on the grounds that it has not met the objectives and expectations set forth in the Italian Constitution. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

3.  The  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee:  development  of  its  role  in  the  EU 
institutional framework and possible future perspectives 

The Economic and Social Committee, as it is referred to in the Treaty notwithstanding a request put 
forward by the Committee itself to the intergovernmental conference (IGC) drafting the constitutional 
treaty  (ESC  Opinion  of  24  September  2003)  for  the  epithet  "European"  to  be  added,  is  an  EU 
consultative body with general competence and instrumental and auxiliary functions in respect of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (Article 300(1) TFEU). 

Although  it  does  not  qualify  as  an  institution,  but  merely  as  an  organ,  of  the  European  Union,  the 
EESC  has  full financial  and  administrative  autonomy  (see  Declaration  on the  ESC  appended  to the 
Treaty of Maastricht; financial regulation applicable to the general EU budget - Reg. 966/2012; Staff 
Regulations  of  Officials  of  the  European  Union  –  Reg.  Cons.  259/68)  as  well  as  the  power  of  self-
regulation,  originally  recognised  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  Under  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht,  the 
Committee  became  autonomous  and  was  no  longer  subject  to  approval  by  the  Council  (see  infra) 
(Santini 2014). Precisely because of these characteristics, experts have suggested that the EESC could 
be described as a "quasi-institution", an "institution sui generis" (Toth 1990, p. 184; Cadin 2004, p. 
1209) or an "institutional organ" (see the Preamble to the EESC Rules of Procedure; Santini 2014, p. 
1438). 

The EESC was originally established under the Treaty of Rome (Article 193 ff.). 

The  decision  to  set  up  the  EESC  was  based,  on  the  one  hand,  on  the  model  of  the  consultative 
committee  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC)  and,  on  the  other,  on  the  national 
models  of  economic  and  social  councils  found  in  the  founding  Member  States  (five  of  the  six 
founding countries, with the sole exception of Germany) (Smismans 2004). 

Regarding  the  first  model,  that  of  the  ECSC,  the  establishment  of  a  consultative  committee  to 
represent the interests of producers, consumers and traders in the coal and steel sector was justified by 
the  sectoral  integration  specifically  planned  for  this  economic  community.  The  reasons  for 
establishing a committee of this kind within the EEC were less obvious, however (Smismans 2000). It 
is  not  by  chance  that  the  question  of  setting  up  the  EESC  arose  only  in  the  final  phase  of  the  Val 
Duchesse negotiations, in September 1956, and that a decision was reached only two months prior to 
approving the final text of the Treaty of Rome. 

Regarding  the  second  model,  the  establishment  of  the  EESC  was  originally  in  response  to  the 
expectations of the founding Member States, with the exception of Germany, who wanted to replicate 
at supranational level the model of representation of interest groups that they used nationally in the 
form of formal councils. The initial proposal to use the Belgian model for the EESC was discarded in 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

favour of the Dutch one, based on the  Social-Economische Raad, which originally would also have 
conferred a right of own initiative on the committee. The right of own initiative was not recognised in 
the Treaty of Rome, however, as it met with the opposition of the German Federal Republic as a result 
of its negative experience with the Reichswirtschaftsrat during the Weimar Republic. As will be seen, 
it was only once the German fears of corporativism along the lines of the Weimar Republic had been 
dispelled (see the memorandum presented by Chancellor Brandt at the EEC Paris summit in October 
1972) that the EESC was granted the right of own initiative, first in its 1974 Rules of Procedure and 
subsequently in the Maastricht Treaty as a primary sources (Smismans 2000, 2004). 

The role of the EESC in the European Community institutional framework has evolved in three main 
phases. 

From 1958 to 1979. Initially, the importance of the EESC lay in its specific representative function 
for interest sectors indispensable for economic integration between the Member States that could not 
be provided efficiently by the Assembly (later re-named European Parliament), which at that time was 
not  directly  elected.  In  particular,  the  EESC's  role  was  enhanced  by  the  need  for  Community 
regulatory measures to be supported, on the one hand, by the competences of the economic and social 
interests of the specific sector and, on the other, by the agreement, and hence consensus, of the socio-
economic players directly involved. The role of the interest groups was moreover central to the sector-
by-sector  approach  adopted  by  the  founding  states;  it  was  also  difficult  for  the  interests  of  these 
groups  to  be  represented  in  the  Commission  through  an  indirectly  elected  parliamentary  assembly, 
one in which the parliamentarians were also supposed to represent "the general interest" (Smismans 
200). In view of its representative role, the experts came up with the idea - still valid - of designating 
the  EESC  as  an  "economic  parliament"  or  "functional  organ  with  parliamentary  characteristics" 
(Smismans 2000, 2004). It can be considered a functional organ in that it is called on to provide the 
necessary competences and consensus to secure integration in particular areas of the European project 
and  because  it  is  composed  of  representatives  of  functional  organisations/groups.  The  EESC  is  not 
simply an expert body, however, and its opinions cannot be considered simply as technical reports. 
They  are  the  fruit  of  agreement  between  socio-economic  players,  the  culmination  of  a  negotiated 
process. This is guaranteed by the EESC's parliamentary characteristics in terms of both the status of 
its  members  -  who  are  not  subject  to  a  binding  mandate  and,  as  was  made  clear  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty, enjoy full independence and act in the general interest of the Community - and of the internal 
organisation  and  operation  of  the  Committee.  It  is  particularly  worth  noting  that  the  EESC  is  not  a 
corporative group where the main economic and social groups defend their own interests, negotiate on 
a  specific  issue  and  commit  their  own  organisation:  the  decision-making  process  is  the  outcome  of 
discussions that seek the broadest possible consensus (although the Rules of Procedure do contain the 
possibility for submitting a counter-opinion) (Smismans 2000, 2004). 

Nevertheless,  in  its  early  stages  the  role  of  the  EESC  and  its  ability  to  effectively  influence  the 
decision-making  procedure  were  hampered  by  two  main  factors:  i)  the  lack  of  any  right  of  own 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

initiative, which meant that the Committee's activities were subordinate to the programme and time-
frames  dictated  by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  and  were  limited  to  the  subjects  where  a 
mandatory referral was required or where recourse was occasionally had to an optional referral: ii) its 
own  lack  of  autonomy,  with  the  Committee's  Rules  of  Procedure  being  subject  to  the  control  and 
approval of the Council. It was not until the Germans' resistance was overcome that the Committee 
was given the right of own initiative. This was approved by the heads of government in October 1972 
and was subsequently incorporated into the EESC's Rules of Procedure in 1974 (although it was not 
until the Maastricht Treaty that this was laid down in a primary source, see above). In spite of this, 
part of contemporary doctrine critically pointed to the fact that although the Committee has increased 
influence on the Commission's proposals, the Commission and the Council continued to exercise the 
right  to  ignore  its  opinions  entirely  and,  in  particular,  the  Committee's  position  with  respect  to  the 
supranational institutions continued to be ambiguous. In particular, a number of authors maintain that 
whilst it is a community body, i.e. equipped with a supranational identity, the members of the EESC 
do not represent supranational interests but, rather, individually express national considerations and, 
on  the  basis  of  consensus  and  a  high  level  of  generalisation,  issue  opinions  on  the  Commission's 
policy and questions that it considers useful for community action (Lodge, Herman 1980, p. 277-278). 
It  was  not  until  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  that  the  EESC  was  finally  granted  full  autonomy  over  its 
Rules of Procedure with the repeal of Article 196 TEU requiring approval by the Council. 

From 1979 to 2000. Competition from the European Parliament, following the introduction of direct 
elections in 1979, the institutionalisation of the European social dialogue with the protocol on social 
policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, and the development of other forms of technical consultation 
and corporative pressure have progressively increased the risk of the role of the EESC being gradually 
marginalised in the Community institutional framework. It was on these grounds that, already at the 
outset  of  the  Eighties,  some  experts  were  warning  that  the  Committee  was  at  risk  of  becoming 
obsolete (Lodge, Herman 1980). The political pressure on the Committee to revitalise, specialise and 
bolster the legitimacy of its own work, role and representative function in the EU arena accounts for 
the  emergence  of  its  narrative  on  civil  society  and  civil  dialogue  (see  the  EESC's  own-initiative 
opinion 851/1999 of 22 September 1999, The role and contribution of civil society organisations in 
the building of Europe) and the enhanced role given to organised civil society as the lowest common 
denominator in the various bodies represented. Notably, at the end of the Nineties, the EESC assumed 
the role of "forum for organised civil society": the participative model of civil society is presented as 
being  complementary  to  the  model  of  regional  representation  and  representative  democracy 
characteristic of the  European Parliament. The EESC was the first to make the  connection between 
the  concept  of  civil  society  and  the  democratic  deficit  and  lack  of  legitimacy  of  the  European 
integration  project,  before  it  became  a  core  question  in  the  Commission's  2001  White  Paper  on 
European Governance (Pèrez-Solórzano Borragán, Smismans 2012; Smismans 2004). 

From 2000 onwards. The role of the EESC as the specialised forum for civil dialogue, promoted by 
the  Committee  in  its  1999 opinion,  was recognised  by  the  Commission first  in its  White  Paper  and 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

subsequently in the 2001 Interinstitutional Agreement, by the European Parliament in its Resolution 
on  the  White  Paper  (A5-0399/2001),  and  above  all  by  the  Member  States  in  the  amendments  to 
Article 257 TEU in the Nice Treaty, which referred explicitly to the representation by the Committee 
of the "various economic and social components of  organised civil society". However, the need for 
the  Committee  to  represent  all  civil  society  groups,  not  just  economic  and  social  ones,  was  not 
authorised in a primary source until the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009. It is interesting to note 
that, following the amendments made in Lisbon, civil society is no longer referred to as "organised" 
since - as is also clear from the literature - the specific reference to "organisations" in Article 300(2) 
means that civil society stakeholders that are not part of an organisation cannot be represented by the 
EESC (Santini 2014; Zambrano 2012). Article 300(2) TFEU refers specifically to representatives of 
organisations  of  employers,  of  the  employed  and  of  other  parties  representative  of  civil  society, 
notably in socio-economic, civil society, professional and cultural areas. As a result, it is no longer 
necessary to list individually, by way of example, the various groups represented, as supplemented in 
the  Nice  Treaty,  i.e.  producers,  farmers,  carriers,  workers,  dealers,  craftsmen,  professional 
occupations, consumers and the general interest. It is important to emphasise that whilst the Lisbon 
Treaty confirms and further promotes reference to civil society as the "common denominator" of the 
various components of the EESC, on the other hand it also reflects the tripartite structure that already 
existed in the Committee (Santini 2014, p. 1438). Despite pressure from the unions - the driving force 
behind the establishment of the EESC  -to limit the composition of the Committee to employers and 
workers, since its very inception the Committee has in fact been divided into three groups, a practice 
also made statutory in its Rules of Procedure: Group I, made up of employers, the public and private 
sectors,  commerce,  transport,  banking  and  insurance;  Group  II,  comprising  representatives  of  the 
main  national trade  unions;  and  Group  III,  the  "other  interests"  group,  encompassing  two  "generic" 
groups without any homogeneity, something that has been criticised in the literature: one representing 
farmers, professionals and craftsmen, and the other representing the "general public". It is noted that 
the  treaty  of  Nice  did  away  with  the  clause  requiring  "adequate  representation"  of  the  various 
categories of economic and social life (Cadin 2004). On the other  hand, the explicit reference to the 
Committee's  tripartite  working  method  in  Article  300(2)  provides  a  basis  for  maintaining  that  the 
numerical size of each component should not be disproportionate with respect to the others (Santini 
2014; Orlandi 2014, p. 2337). 

The role of the EESC was indirectly promoted and reinforced by the affirmation in the Lisbon Treaty 
of  the  principle  of  participatory  democracy  (Article  11  TEU).  As  has  already  been  mentioned,  the 
EESC and the Commission, in the 1999 opinion and 2001 White Paper, respectively, refocused the 
debate on democracy in the EU, positioning the issue of participatory democracy at the centre. The 
idea was to give parties with an interest in policies the opportunity to take part in the decision-making 
process, providing an extra resource and enhanced legitimacy in terms of regional and representative 
democracy. In this sense, as non-elected bodies, the EESC and the Commission cast a different light 
on the EP as the EU's only legitimised resource. The definition of civil society promulgated by the 
EESC and endorsed by the Commission in its 2001 White Paper is also consonant with its original 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

conception and the political interests it serves. It also embraces the social partners, not just NGOs, and 
above all it is inclusive of all the levels at which civil society is organised, i.e. not just European level 
organisations,  but  also  national  and  local  ones  (indeed,  the  EESC  is  made  up  of  representatives  of 
national  organisations).  The  same  political  reasons  underpin  the  EESC's  interest  in  examining  the 
question  of  the  representativeness  of  civil  society  organisations  (EESC  opinions  on  European 
Governance  –  A  White  Paper,  357/2002  and  on  The  Representativeness  of  European  Civil  Society 
Organisations in the  Civil  Dialogue,  240/2006).  In  this  respect, it is interesting  to  note  how, in  the 
climate  of  participatory  democracy  and  with  reference  to  the  new  body  for  citizens'  initiatives  (the 
European  Citizens'  Initiative,  ECI)  also  established  under  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  the  EESC  has 
promoted its own role both as "catalyst", putting organisers of initiatives in touch with each other and 
on occasion meeting them, and as "mentor", organising hearings and producing an opinion to assist 
the Commission in evaluating the initiatives (EESC, Your guide to the European Citizens' Initiative, 
2012). 

When assessing the degree of impact the EESC has on the Community decision-making process, in 
other  words  its capacity,  through  voicing  its  views,  to  influence the  stance  of the  target institutions 
and shape the content of the final political outcome, the literature has identified a range of possible 
variables. 

As mentioned above, with regard to the first embryonic phase of the EESC, a number of authors have 
pointed out that the Committee's influence was hampered by the lack of a right of own initiative and 
an autonomous regime enabling it to operate independently of the constraints imposed by the referral 
procedure -whether mandatory or optional - initiated by the Commission and the Council and to self-
regulate without being dependent on the authorisation of the Council. Nevertheless, overcoming this 
dual limitation - in part with its own Rules of Procedure in 1974 and at a primary level not until the 
advent  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  did  not  spare  the  Committee  from  being  described  during  the 
Eighties as "defunct" (R.E. McCarthy, 1997) or as an "unnecessary" item of expenditure (Weatherill, 
Beaumont 1995). Even more recently, and at a political level, a number of MEPs have actually called 
for it to be abolished (see the contribution by Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Prime Minister of Denmark 
and  former  MEP,  to  the  European  Convention; the  statement  written  by  Nils  Lundgren  and  Hélène 
Goudin of the Independence/Democracy Group, presented in 2007; and the Position paper on the EU 
budget post 2013, presented by the ALDE Group in 2011). 

With  a  view  to  possible  reform,  studies  that  have  explored  in  depth the  Committee's  progress  have 
highlighted  the  following  drawbacks  in  its  working  methods.  In  the  first  instance,  the  excessively 
general  and  vague  character  of  the  EESC's  opinions  arising  from  the  fact  that  they  are  based  on  a 
consensual procedure: EESC opinions do not contain detailed amendments, article by article, to the 
Commission's  proposals,  with  a  clear  comparison  to  the  original  text.  Secondly,  the  EESC's 
intervention  is  not  sufficiently  timely  in  the  political  process,  and  all  too  often  comes  after  the 
Commission has drafted its proposal. Finally, the weakness of its relations with the other Community 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

institutions, particularly the Council (Smismans 2004, p. 165). In order to increase the impact of the 
Committee in the decision-making procedure, recent studies have pointed to two types of requirement. 
On the one hand, the Committee should adopt its own recommendations swiftly, sending them to the 
recipient before the internal drafting process has been completed; in this respect, some authors assert 
that  to  incentivise  the  Committee's  work,  it  should  be  detached  and  independent  from  specific 
legislative  proposals,  as  is  the  case  with  its  exploratory  opinions,  which  the  Commission  also 
undertook to consider in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2001. On the other hand, the Committee 
should  select  the  areas  for  intervention  on the  basis of  ranked  priorities, something  that  would also 
take into account the scant resources available, so as to provide the institutions with new information, 
expert interpretations and convincing arguments on the subject chosen (Hönnige, Panke 2013, p. 468). 
In this respect, the Committee should select issues where, partly thanks to its wider contacts with civil 
society,  it  can  provide  an  input  based  on  its  specific  representative  nature  and  competences 
(Smismans 2004; p. 181). Finally, there is no incentive at all for the Commission and the Council to 
pay  due  attention  to  the  opinions  of  the  EESC.  In  this  respect,  despite  the  fact  that  in  the  2001 
Interinstitutional  Agreement  the  Commission  pledged  to  issue  quarterly  reports  explaining  how  the 
Committee's opinions had been used, some authors have proposed that the Treaty should include an 
explicit  requirement  to  issue  a  reasoned  response,  obliging  the  institutions  to  account  for  how  they 
have acted on the positions taken by the Committee. 

Moreover, in the impact assessment on the Committee and with a view to reforming it, it should be 
borne  in  mind  that  staff  and  budget  cuts  introduced  in  2011  have  affected  it,  like  the  other  EU 
Institutions  -  staffing  levels  are  being  cut  by  1%  for  5  years  and  the  budget  has  been  frozen  The 
impact of the EESC's spending review has been exacerbated by the entry of Croatia into the European 
Union, raising the number of members to 353 and temporarily exceeding the maximum of 350 fixed 
in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 300(1) TFEU. 

4. The CNEL, Italy's economic and social council: reform or abolition? 

The Boschi-Del Rio Bill (DDL 1429), which aims at introducing significant amendments to the Italian 
Constitution  and  is  currently  under  discussion,  provides  for  the  abolition  of  the  CNEL  (National 
Council for the Economy and Labour) by repealing Art. 99 of the Constitution. The report attached to 
the  Bill  explains  this  choice  by  arguing  that  to  date  the  Council  has  produced  only  a  few 
parliamentary  initiatives  and  can  no  longer  adequately  fulfil  the  role  of  coordination  of  social  and 
economic categories that originally justified its establishment. 

However, there are interesting proposals for a reform of the CNEL, aimed at updating its functions in 
accordance with current social and economic needs and avoiding the risks of lack of accountability 
and excessive red tape. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

In  this  sense,  a  specific  proposal  drawn  up  by  Professor  Treu  (see  below)  outlines  a  number  of 
functions in the form of new tasks that the CNEL should accomplish in the event of it being reformed. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Document for the reform of the CNEL (Professor Treu, 3 February 2014) 

1. Reasons for reforming the CNEL 

The need to reform the CNEL, bringing it abreast of the times and strengthening its role, is shared by 
many  but  raises  doubts  and  resistance  on  the  part  of  others.  The  future  of  the  CNEL  has  most 
recently been the subject of discussion within the committee on constitutional reform. A variety of 
opinions  was  expressed:  all  of  them  were  critical  of  the  current  status  of  the  CNEL  but  sceptical 
about the reality of being able to remedy the situation, with some members nevertheless convinced 
that reform was necessary and possible providing it was "far-reaching". 

We agree with the latter viewpoint and believe that there are valid reasons for supporting it, in the 
light of social and economic developments in Italy and taking account of the country's position in 
the European Union. Reform of the CNEL is necessary not only to retain a body that has, over the 
years, played an important role in social representation and mediation, but also because it continues 
to meet current social and political needs in Italy. 

Authoritative and institutionalised representation is in fact more urgent than ever, given the radical 
transformations taking place in our society caused by structural factors: globalisation, the primacy of 
the  third  sector  of  the  economy  and  the  diversification  of  labour  forms,  not  to  mention  people's 
individual life paths. These factors mount a challenge to traditional forms of representation and the 
familiar  collective  structures  that  are  necessary  in  any  society.  They  risk  breaking  up  the  social 
fabric, fomenting inequality and exacerbating centrifugal tendencies, along with the populist trends 
that  are  such  a  threat  to  our  democracies.  These  trends  jeopardise  the  very  function  of 
intermediary bodies in a society organised on the basis of political and social pluralism. Under 
these circumstances, it is more than the role and the defence of the CNEL that is at stake. It is 
vital that we are all aware of this: it is a question of safeguarding, albeit at a time of reforms 
and  procedures  designed  to  speed  up  the  process  of  taking  clear  decisions,  the  constitutional 
and social pluralism that are a fundamental feature of our democratic system with a view to 
tackling the crisis afflicting Italy in a participatory way and without cutting corners. 

The weakening of the intermediary representative organisations will, as De Rita has observed with 
consternation, gradually "increase the solitude of all components of society, lead to a proliferation in 
selfish interests and leave situations of social malaise and inequality bereft of filters and intermediary 
mediation". 

Countering  these  tendencies  will  call  for  rethinking  the  type  of  response  to  social  needs  and 
mediation.  This  process  of  reflection  should  take  place  in  the  full  light  of  constitutional  norms 
(Articles  2  and  3)  recognising  that  social  training  performs  an  essential  function  in  terms  of 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

personality  development,  increased  participation  and  strengthening  the  bonds  of  solidarity  and 
cohesion  between  citizens.  Hopefully,  the  review  will  also  be  extended  to  cover  the  European 
situation  and  include  the  principles  set  out  in  the  new  European  treaties.  Of  particular  importance 
among the subjects which fall within our remit are those measures aimed at strengthening the weight 
attached  to the  Union's  social  values and  objectives (Articles  2 and  3 TEU) and  to  those  of  social 
dialogue (Article 152 TFEU). 

Reflection on these subjects is an urgent task which pertains not only to us, but also to all social and 
institutional  stakeholders;  it  must  seek  to  strengthen  all  those  institutions  with  the  capacity  to 
promote social cohesion and manage the complex relationship between the world of economic and 
social interests and the decision-making bodies, primarily those representing states and regions, but 
also the European Institutions. 

Our commitment to reforming the CNEL can be seen as part of this common venture. For the CNEL 
can indeed continue to be just such an institution, provided it is able to bring its functions into line 
with the latest social and economic requirements and resist the temptation to resort to self-referential 
methods and bureaucratic corporatism. Even if for these reasons the CNEL no longer exercises its 
original intervention functions in terms of the social concertation process, which is now directly 
carried  out  by  the  social  partners,  and  as  an  interlocutor  with  the  government,  it  is 
nevertheless important that a renewed and strengthened CNEL should put its complementary 
role and socially authoritative expertise to use in providing support, including joint objectives 
and instruments, for the social concertation process considered essential by many in Italy and 
Europe in order to overcome the crisis. 

2. Meeting the new needs of the country and the social partners 

These considerations show that the reform of the CNEL is quite rightly placed in the context of the 
institutional  reforms  that  Italy  needs,  precisely  because  in  our  modern  democracy,  political 
representation  cannot  subsume  the  forms  of  social  representation  -  it  needs  them  as  a  separate 
adjunct. This was in fact the idea behind Article 99 of the Constitution which conceived of the CNEL 
as  an  institutional  forum  for  social  representation:  this  design  should  still  infuse  any  proposed 
reforms. 

A  revitalised  CNEL  can  serve  the  country  by  contributing  to  the  search  for  a  more  stable  and 
balanced  social  and  democratic  arrangement  and  enhancing  the  role  of  intermediate  groups. 
Nowadays,  the  social  stakeholders  can  make  their  voices  heard  in  a  wide  range  of  fora.  The 
representation  of  the  different  categories  and  social  groups  is  recognised  in  constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Trade  union  organisations  in  particular  have  bolstered  their  legitimacy  and 
membership  numbers  over  and  above  their  presence  in  the  CNEL,  considered  in  the  past  the 
yardstick of representativeness, and are now supported by precise rules agreed on by the trade union 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

confederations. The CNEL has the important task of verifying that these rules are implemented as an 
integral part of our social model.  

However, the voice of civil society is often contradictory, lost in the general background rumblings 
and  frequently  inclined  to  indulge  in  a  self-referential  approach  that  excludes  anything  new.  For 
these reasons, it is a voice that is rarely listened to. 

A forum for debate and representation such as the CNEL, which is institutional but open, where the 
views of civil society groups can be voiced openly among themselves and with society at large, can 
enhance their authority and "rationality". 

A recognised institutional setting not only enhances the functions of intermediate bodies, but can also 
strengthen their identity and iron out internal rifts that may appear. For these reasons the role of the 
CNEL  as  a  forum  for  "social  mediation",  with  the capacity  to  defuse  widespread  social tension,  is 
more important than ever. 

This  proposal  for  reform  seeks  to  contribute,  alongside  the  work  of  the  institutions  and  all  the 
relevant social and political stakeholders, to providing convincing responses to the new demands for 
social representation and mediation that have been voiced, however chaotically, by broad segments 
of the country. Our contribution draws strength not only from the constitutional roots of the CNEL 
but also from its experience over the years, which is both rich and varied. 

The CNEL's work, even in its ninth mandate (2010-2015), has been unremitting, even in the face of 
the major organisational transformations introduced by law at the end of 2011 designed to cut costs 
(in particular by reducing the number of members). As summarised in the appended document, its 
work  has  covered  all  the  main  areas  for  which  it  is  competent:  legislative  initiatives,  replies  to 
specific requests from the government and parliament, drafting reports such as the ones on fair and 
sustainable  well-being  indicators  (BES)  and  levels  and  quality  of  services  provided  by  the  public 
administration  (PA),  and  analysis  and  monitoring  of  key  aspects  of  social  policies  and  the  labour 
market. 

The  value  of  past  experience  should  be  recognised  and  defended,  but  this  must  not  dilute  our 
determination to do more - rather, it should make our work even more efficient. The CNEL has not 
always been in a position to respond to the economic and social challenges facing Italy, something 
that has undermined its credibility with the institutions and other stakeholders. Our response needs to 
be to review our priorities in the light of the country's economic and social transformations, improve 
our working procedures and step up our external activities with our social and public interlocutors. 

One of the priorities in our reform proposal is to outline in an innovative way the areas where the 
CNEL is best placed to respond to the country's needs, areas which cannot adequately be covered by 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

other bodies. Only after this, once the decisions have been made regarding the CNEL's mission, will 
it be possible to adjust its governance, structures and organisational arrangements, fine-tuning them 
with its mission. 

3. Specific aspects of the CNEL's new functions 

The reform, encouraging to country to engage in a wide-ranging, open debate, sets out to update the 
CNEL's tasks in a number of areas that correspond to the country's most pressing needs; we believe 
that the CNEL, by dint of its approach to social representation, can provide a better response than 
other institutions. 

a) An initial area calling for innovation and strengthening is the CNEL's participation in central and 
local  decision-making  processes.  The  objective  is  to  allow  the  Council  to  resume  its  full 
constitutional role without undermining the autonomy of the social partners. The idea is to safeguard 
the  practice  of  free  concertation,  carving  out  a  role  for  the  CNEL  so  that  it  can  improve  the 
management and efficiency of these procedures, first and foremost by gathering information with the 
added bonus of its institutional authority, together with the necessary technical back-up. Its technical 
and  social  credentials  in  terms  of  information  gathering  can  benefit  not  only  the  issues  and 
procedures of concertation between the social partners, but also the drafting of legislation on social 
and economic questions. The role of "institutional partner" can be relevant not only to the major laws 
on economic and social policy, but also to sectoral laws and the various forms of micro-regulation. 
The latter should not be underestimated as they often have a greater impact on the everyday life of 
economic  interest  groups  than  general  regulations.  It  also  has  a  role  to  play  in  public  policy 
programmes  in  those  areas  where  they  are  currently  most  urgently  needed,  in  the  major 
decisions  needed  in  order  to  revitalise  the  competitiveness  of  our  productive  system  and  in 
strengthening our welfare system. 

An  authoritative  and  competent institutional intervention  on  the  part  of a  body  like  the  CNEL can 
help  to  rationalise  these  political,  legislative  and  administrative  measures,  avoiding  the 
unintentional contradictory and fragmentary effects that are regrettably a feature  of our legislation, 
and  can  also  encourage  a  trend  towards  simplification.  The  public,  firms  and  workers  are 
increasingly  aware  of  the  need  to  simplify  rules  and  procedures,  but  attempts  are  thwarted  by  the 
labyrinth of existing legislative and bureaucratic mechanisms, as recent events have demonstrated. 

The significance of this rationalising and simplifying function is not just a technical matter. It is the 
very composition of the CNEL, made up as it is of representatives of the social forces, that means 
that its work can be enriched by its contact with these forces, placing it in a position to express their 
views  in  its  dealings  with  public  decision-makers  at  national  and  local  level.  Our  information-
gathering  capacities,  enhanced  by  direct  contact  with  representatives  of  social  interest  groups,  can 
bring alternative viewpoints to the discussion table based on emerging social trends, reflected as a 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

result in proposals regarding  methods and content. In this way, its efforts to rationalise and gather 
information  can  facilitate  the  work  of  government  and  legislative  bodies,  formulate  informed  and 
authoritative solutions and provide a respite from the often disorganised pressure of lobby groups. 

b) A second way of innovating the institutional participation of the CNEL is to enhance and upgrade 
not  only  its  information-gathering  role,  but  also  its  capacity  to  contribute  own-initiative  and 
legislative proposals. 

This is traditionally one of the CNEL's functions, but has over time become tarnished in part by the 
lack  of  clear  priorities  and  institutional  instruments  to  increase  its  impact  on  political  decision-
makers,  the  parliament  and  national  and  local  government.  In  order  to  rehabilitate  this  function,  it 
needs  to  be  more  closely  targeted  to  priorities  agreed  on  by  the  stakeholders  and  the  institutions 
themselves. We would therefore propose, in line with suggestions put forward by the social partners, 
that priority intervention areas be defined over a number of years (2-3 years), with the agreement of 
the government, the regions and the social partners on the basis of the prior opinion of the relevant 

parliamentary committees. 

To enhance the political impact of these decisions, it would be appropriate to arrange for a special 
assembly  to  hold  an  open  debate  with  the  political  institutions,  the  social  partners  and  the 
participation of the political leadership of the main social organisations represented. 

Secondly,  to  reinforce  the  consultancy  and  legislative  proposal  functions  of  the  CNEL,  we  would 
suggest that it should be mandatory to ask the CNEL to deliver non-binding opinions where major 
economic and social policy decisions are at stake, and for the competent bodies to issue a reasoned 
response to the opinions received. Furthermore, the CNEL's procedures for exercising its power of 
legislative  initiative  could  be  revised  and  supplemented  by  any  necessary  normative  adjustments. 
This  should  include,  in  a  limited  range  of  subjects,  the  possibility  of  appending  to  its  opinions 
amendments in the true sense of the word, to be put to the vote. 

c) The  functions  assigned to  the  CNEL  under  Article  28  of  Law  234  of  2012  (participation  in the 
drafting process of EU law) should be strengthened in the light of the launch of a European debate on 
A  Blueprint  for  a  deep  and  genuine  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  This  document  calls  on  the 
European  institutions  to  strengthen  the  mechanisms  for  ensuring  democratic  legitimacy  and 
responsibility  in  the  new  European  governance  system,  referring  explicitly  to  the  need  for  social 
dialogue to be stepped up at national level also. In a multi-level system of governance such as that 
operating in Europe, the CNEL could, by strengthening its fact-finding role, act as a hub and spoke 
model  on  issues  (primarily  economic  and  social  ones)  where  the  European  Institutions  themselves 
call for closer involvement of the social partners at all levels. The work carried out in conjunction 
with the European Economic and Social Committee, including for example the ongoing revision of 
the Europe 2020 strategy, is one of the areas where, at European level, the CNEL needs to increase 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

the range of its activities, particularly in the light of Italy's six-month presidency. 

With innovations of this ilk, the CNEL will take its rightful place in the process of shaping public 
policy, with the possibility of conveying the views of social interest groups through an independent 
institutional  channel,  particularly  at  national  and  European  level.  The  possibility  of  extending 
participation in the decision-making process to the regions should not be discounted, but will call for 
a  range  of activities  and  structures  that the  CNEL,  even  once  reformed,  would  not  be equipped to 
handle. 

d) An additional function of the new CNEL consists of the analysis and evaluation (ex ante and ex 
post) of public policies. The CNEL is qualified to take on this role, not least because, in cooperation 
with  Istat  (the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics)  and  the  Bank  of  Italy,  it  has  devised  a 
methodology for analysing and evaluating certain public policies based on fair and sustainable well-
being indicators (BES). 

Alongside  the  BES  work  is  the  project,  already  operational,  on  building  an  information  system 
(CNEL, Istat) on the final performance of public administrations, designed to measure and assess the 
quality and level of public services to citizens and businesses. 

The CNEL's function here in fact fills a gap in the Italian panorama, where instruments and activities 
for evaluating public policies have not kept pace with developments in other countries. A set of tools 
of  this  kind  is  extremely  useful  and  increasingly  necessary  in  order  to  intervene  in  the  complex 
contemporary social and economic set-up by  means of aware and efficient legislation, as has been 
borne out by the experience of countries which already have such tools at their disposal. 

Work on this scale would, however, involve gathering a considerable amount of data and expertise - 
this  would  call  for  specially  trained  staff  -  not  all  of  which  are  available  and  which  could  not  be 
activated by the CNEL alone, even if its technical instruments and staffing levels are increased, as is 
necessary in any case. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  representative  nature  of  the  social  partners  present  in  the  CNEL  could 
undermine any direct assessments, leaving it open to criticism on the grounds of potential conflicts of 
interests or partisan views. 

One role suited to the nature of the CNEL would be for it to act as a "control centre" to coordinate 
the analysis and evaluation of public policies carried out by other bodies. 

In this respect, the CNEL could conduct the following activities: 

a) collect and collate evaluations, including sectoral ones, carried out across Italy by various public 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

or private entities, thereby providing a "repository" where the various contributions can be located; 
b) validate the various evaluations, not in the sense of endorsing whatever conclusions might have 
been reached by the bodies concerned, but rather ensuring that the methods used and data collected 
are transparent and verifiable; 
c)  act  as  a  stimulus  for  encouraging  the  evaluation  of  public  policies,  maybe  even  commissioning 
them in sectors where they are most directly pertinent. 

In addition to providing the setting and a "reasoned stimulus" for analysis and evaluations on the part 
of others, the CNEL has the right to carry out one further, even more pivotal, task: that of providing a 
platform for a transparent debate on subjects directly related to economic and social issues on which 
a "technical" assessment has previously been carried out by other bodies. In other words, a kind of 
"secondary"  evaluation,  of  a  political  nature,  putting  forward  the  views  of  the  productive  forces 
present  in  the  Council  that  are  also stakeholders in these policy  areas,  in  that  they  will  be directly 
affected by these policies. 

This  would  provide  a  way  of  ensuring  that  public  policies  are  evaluated  by  the  country's  leading 
forces, which could offer parliament and the government suggestions as to how to reorient policies 
judged to be insufficiently efficient or effective, or to introduce new policies considered essential to 
the economic and social progress of Italy. 

The precise issue to be addressed each time could be decided on independently by the CNEL, on the 
basis of suggestions put forward by its own members, or it could be agreed with parliament or  the 
government as part of the multi-annual programme mentioned under point b). 

The outcome of the discussion, in addition to being made public, could provide the basis for specific 
opinions and benefit from its privileged status in gaining the attention of the chambers of parliament 
and the executive, ensuring that the debate is not merely a rhetorical exercise, but that its findings are 
acted upon to improve public policy in that particular area. 

This proposal is based on the function conferred on the CNEL in Article 9 of Law No 15 of 2009: the 
presentation  of  an  annual  report  to  parliament  and  the  government  on  the  levels  and  quality  of 
services provided by the national and local public authorities to businesses and the public. This is a 
particularly important role, but one that risks having little impact if it takes on subjects that are too 
broad  where it is impossible  to  conduct an  in-depth  analysis.  In  order to  respond  better  to its  new 
tasks, this function should also be fine-tuned, for example choosing a specific topic every year, based 
on the priorities agreed under the programme and to be examined in detail. In any event, given the 
scale  and  difficulty  of  these  evaluation  functions,  they  should  be  tried  out  on  a  pilot  basis  with 
respect to specific subjects, again to be defined in agreement with the government, the regions and 
the social partners. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

These pilot initiatives could have different objectives, and could be based primarily on an analysis of 
the opinions of stakeholders affected by the legislation, hence taking the form of an assessment (ex 
post) of the actual impact of the legislation on the basis of existing indicators, as was done in the case 
of the BES project. 

The pilot period could cover either national sectoral policies - and, following on from this, regional 
ones - or European Union policies, with particular reference to the priorities of the 2014 European 
semester. 

e) Carrying out these new tasks will require, on the one hand, the involvement of all the private and 
public stakeholders and, on the other, a gradual build-up of information of a calibre that is consonant 
with the CNEL's role as the prime "council on social expertise". 

To  this  end,  the  CNEL  has  equipped  itself  with  a  series  of  systematic  sources  of  information  and 
essential  data  bases.  This  has  enabled  it  to  provide  invaluable  reports  to  inform  and  guide  public 
policy-making,  ranging  from  the  labour  market  to  proposals in  the  area  of  industrial  policy.  These 
systematic sources of information must be supplemented by proposals and monitoring, if it is to carry 
out its new consultancy functions to the best of its ability. 

Of fundamental importance here is the collective bargaining archive, set up by the CNEL many years 
ago, which is an essential source of information for all countries on labour law and its development. 
In  addition  to  updating  the  archives  on  collective  bargaining  in  the  private  and  public  sectors,  the 
CNEL  is  committed  to  collecting  information  on  a  broader  and  more  systematic  basis  regarding 
decentralised bargaining, which has come to assume a key role in industrial relations in recent years, 
in part as a result of the promotion of more modern, productive regulatory mechanisms. The work of 
the CNEL should not be limited to that of a database, but should also provide an expert interpretation 
of the data collected to make for a better understanding of changes occurring in the world of labour. 

A  second  key  area  for  the  role  of  the  CNEL  as  an  institution  for  social  representation  is  the 
certification of representativeness of workers' trade union organisations. 

This task was assigned to the CNEL by the agreements signed recently (after 31 May 2013) by the 
trade  union  confederations  on  representativeness  and  trade  union  democracy.  The  database  being 
organised by the CNEL, in cooperation with the social partners and the Ministry of Labour, including 
expertise  supplied  by  the  main  trade  unions,  will  provide  systematic  access  to  information  on  the 
unions'  representative  structures,  including  at  local  and  business  level,  thereby  contributing  to  the 
transparency and smooth functioning of industrial relations in Italy. 

In summary, the new functions of the reformed CNEL comprise the following: 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

1)  Strengthening and expanding of public participation in the decision-making process through 
information gathering, consultation and legislative initiatives, including tabling amendments, 
and  through  issuing  mandatory  opinions  -  non-binding  but  to  be  expressly  taken  into 
consideration  -  on  priority  issues  to  be  defined  in  a  programme  agreed  on  with  the 
government, the regions and the social partners. 

2)  Recognition  of  functions  of  information-gathering,  consultation  and  drafting  of  opinions 
including  on  the  main  laws  and  programmes  promulgated  by  the  European  Union,  in  line 
with the new European governance and in view of the Italian six-month presidency. 

3)  Analysis and evaluation of public policies, with the CNEL acting as organiser and provider 
of second-level evaluation regarding the analyses and assessments produced by other bodies. 

4)  Strengthening of the function of social information and recognition of the certification of the 
representativeness  of  the  social  partners,  including  establishing  a  database  on  social 
representativeness.  Upgrading  and  enhancing  of  the  contents  of  the  archive  on  collective 
bargaining, including decentralised bargaining. 

The pursuit of the ambitious reforms outlined here will call for a broad-ranging consensus on the part 
of the country's political and social forces. 

This cannot be provided in the present climate of economic and political turmoil. It is precisely for 
this reason it is more than ever necessary to strengthen social cohesion, and a revitalised CNEL could 
contribute to this through its tasks of social representation and institutional mediation. It is essential 
that the renewal and upgrading of the functions of the CNEL and the strengthening of its work 
should  be  endorsed  and  supported  from  a  policy  and  institutional  perspective  by  all  the 
organisations in the world of work, by businesses, the third sector and the professions, at their 
highest levels. 

To this end it is vital for the top political leaders represented in the CNEL to launch an appropriate 
initiative calling for their organisations to be formally given responsibility in these areas. Also useful 
would  be  an  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  organs  of  institutional  pluralism  to  draw  up  common 
positions here. 

Once  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  reforms  have  been  agreed  upon,  the  CNEL's  system  of 
governance and its operating bodies and mechanisms will have to be amended so that the objectives 
can be implemented in practice. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

5. The French Economic, Social and Environmental Council 

5.1 An uninterrupted process of economic and social democracy from 1924 to 2010 

The  origins  of  the  current  CESE  lie  in  the  Decree  of  16  January  1925  setting  up  the  National 
Economic  Council.  At  that  time  it  comprised  47  members  and  94  alternates  from  the  most 
representative unions, employer and agricultural organisations together with various associations. Its 
role is strictly consultative. 

It is worth noting that up until 1954, throughout its various phases (apart from the Second World War 
years, when it was dissolved by the collaborationist government), the institution was presided over by 
Léon  Jouaux,  a  trade  unionist  from  the  CGT  (General  Confederation  of  Labour),  subsequently  the 
CGT-FO (General Confederation of Labour–Workers' Force). 

Under  the  Law  of  13  October  1946,  the  Economic  Council  was  enshrined  in  Article  25  of  the 
Constitution  and,  in  1958,  its  name  was  changed  under  the  Constitution  of  the  5th  Republic  to 
Economic  and  Social  Council  (CES),  with  its  headquarters  in  the  Palais  d'Iéna.  Apart  from 
occasional adjustments or vague attempts to introduce radical reforms (in 1954 and 1969), it was not 
until 2008 that there was a major reform of the CES, with the Constitutional Law of 23 July on the 
modernisation  of  the  institutions  of  the  Fifth  Republic  establishing  the  Economic,  Social  and 
Environmental  Council  (CESE).  This  was  followed  by  the  Grenelle  II  Law  of  12  July  2010 
establishing  regional  councils.6  The  Organic  Law  of  28  June  2010  organised  the  composition  and 
representation of the Council. Its membership had been increased to 233 under the Constitutional Law 
of July 2008. This law also broadened the scope for making referrals to the CESE. 

The Economic, Social and Environmental Council is the third constitutional assembly of the French 
Republic. 

5.2 A consultative body with wide-ranging and proven expertise 

Like many other institutions, the French CESE has had to take on board changes in society, lifestyle 
and newly emerging problems such as those linked to the environment and sustainable development. 
It has also been affected by a lack of public and political visibility. The Chertier report submitted to 
the President of the Republic in January 2009 also underscored that "in the interests of the right of 

6 

Article 250 CHAPTER IV: The regional economic, social and environmental council, Article L4134-2, Article L4241-1 II. In all 
these legislative and regulatory texts, the term "regional economic and social council" is replaced by "regional economic, social 
and  environmental  council"  and  "regional  economic  and  social  councils"  by  "regional  economic,  social  and  environmental 
councils". 

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petition, it is imperative that the CESE break out of its isolation in the country and undertake a more 
vigorous external communications policy aimed at the general public and the media"7. 

The  Organic  Law  of  28  June  2010  aimed  to  rectify  matters  by  defining  three  main  areas  of 
representation:  140  members  representing  economic  life  and  the  social  dialogue;  60  members 
representing social and territorial cohesion and associations; and 33 members representing protection 
of natural resources and the environment.8 The 233 members (councillors) are appointed for a five-
year term renewable not more  than once. If, during the course of a term of office, a member of the 
Council no longer possesses the attributes on which his or her appointment was based, he or she is 
obliged to retire and be replaced.9 

The assembly also offers better representation of young people and women, through the appointment 
of  four  representatives  of  young  people  and  students  (the  minimum  age  requirement  was  reduced 
from 25 years to 18) and through clauses on gender equality regarding the appointment of members: 
"In all cases where an organisation is invited to nominate more than one member to the Economic, 
Social and Environmental Council, they are to ensure that there is a difference of no more than one in 
the number of men appointed on the one hand and women on the other. The same rule applies to the 
appointment of qualified individuals."10 

One original feature of the CESE is the appointment of associated individuals who, nominated by the 
government on the basis of their competence, professional experience or geographical place of origin, 
may sit in a section for a limited period and with a particular mission. 72 seats are reserved for these 
members, and they can contribute on equal terms with the other councillors to drawing up opinions, 
reports and studies in the sections to which they belong. Article 13 of the 2010 Organic Law specifies 
that no more than eight such associated individuals may belong to any one section. Whereas they are 
not entitled to vote on opinions, they can vote on studies. 

5.3 Budget, organisation and operation of the CESE 

a)  In 2013, the CESE budget (passed every year by Parliament) was EUR 38.5 million, coming 
to a total of EUR 40.2 including own resources. Members' expenses and allowances (salary, 
accommodation  and  expenses)  come  to  a  gross  total  of  EUR  3 786.76  per  month.  The 
72 associated individuals receive an expense allowance of EUR 946.69. As of 31 December 
2013, the Council employed 136 full-time members of staff (47% women and 53% men). 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Chertier report to the President of the Republic, January 2009 

See Appendix 1 on the distribution of members by category. 

Article 9 of the Organic Law of 23 June 2010. 

Article 7 of the Organic Law of 23 June 2010. 

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b)  The  CESE  is  run  by  its  president (currently  Jean-Paul  Delevoye,  elected  by  secret  ballot in 
plenary  for  a  five-year  term  running  from  2010  to  2015),  a  bureau  of  18  members  +  the 
president and a secretary-general appointed by the government on the proposal of the bureau. 
The terms of the 233 members were renewed in 2010, with 193 of them being appointed by 
the organisations they represented and 40 by the government. Plenary sessions are held twice 
a month, during which opinions presented by the sections are put to the vote.11 The Council 
may  also  set  up  delegations  to  deal  with  subjects  outside  the  sphere  of  competence  of  the 
sections or on particular issues. There are three delegations at the present time: the overseas 
delegation; the delegation on future trends and evaluation of public policy; and the delegation 
on  women's  rights  and  equality.  The  Council  can  also  set  up  temporary  committees  to 
examine particular issues or questions which lie beyond the remit of the sections. There are 
currently four such committees on the following subjects: the annual report on the situation in 
France;  the  social  and  solidarity  economy;  the  Grenelle  environmental  forum;  and 
dependence. 

c)  The Council is structured on the basis of interests and members are divided into 18 groups (no 

group may contain fewer than three members).12 

d)  The different types of referral: 

-  Government referral 

The government makes referrals to the Council on draft legislation, ordinances or decrees. Referrals 
are  mandatory  on  any  draft  laws  regarding  plans  or  programmes  of  an  economic,  social  or 
environmental nature.13 The prime minister can also ask the Council to draw up opinions or studies. 
An  urgent  procedure  exists  whereby,  at  the  request  of  the  government,  the  Council  is  required  to 
deliver its opinion within one month and the opinion may be adopted without a debate (Article 34 of 
the Rules of Procedure). The same urgent procedure may be invoked for own-initiative opinions if the 
bureau  so  decides,  after  consultation  of  the  bodies  involved  in  drawing  up  the  opinion  (section, 
permanent delegation or temporary committee). 

Likewise, a referral by the government or parliamentary assembly may, at the request of the initiating 
body, be subject to a simplified procedure requiring the section responsible to issue its opinion within 
three  weeks.14  The  draft  opinion  becomes  the  opinion  of  the  Economic,  Social  and  Environmental 
Council  three  days  following  its  publication  unless  the  president  of  the  Economic,  Social  and 
Environmental  Council  or at  least  10  of  its  members  request  during  this three-day  period  that  it  be 
debated by the plenary assembly. 

11 
12  
13  
14  

See Appendix 2 for the list of sections. 

Rule 8, Chapter II of the Rules of Procedure. 

Article 70 of the Constitutional Law of 23 July 2008. 

Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure 

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-  Parliamentary referral 

The president of the National Assembly or the president of the Senate may also consult the Council on 
any issues of an economic, social or environmental nature or ask the Council to deliver opinions and 
studies. 

-  Referral in the form of a citizens' petition 

This  is  an  important  innovation  extending  the  right  of  referral  to  the  members  of  organised  civil 
society. This right was laid down in Article 69(3) of the Constitutional Law of July 2008. Article 4-1 
of the Organic Law of June 2010 sets out the practical details for exercising this right, primarily in the 
form of the presentation, by a sole representative, of a minimum of 500 000 clearly legible signatures 
of  adults  with  French  nationality  or  with  their  main  residence  in  France.  The  admissibility  of  the 
petition  is  examined  by  the  CESE  bureau  which  organises  a  hearing  of  the  sole  representative  and, 
where it is declared admissible, the CESE must respond within one year to the questions raised in the 
petition  and  specify  what  follow-up  it  proposes  to  give.  This  opinion  is  then  sent  to  the  prime 
minister,  the  president  of  the  National  Assembly,  the  president  of  the  Senate  and,  of  course,  to  the 
representative  who  lodged  the  petition.  The  opinion  is  also  published  in  the  Official  Journal.15  To 
date,  one  petition  has  successfully  gathered  the  required  500 000  signatures,  asking  the  Council  to 
issue an opinion on the draft law on same sex marriage. Although the bureau acknowledged that the 
criteria had been met in terms of numbers and form, it declared the petition inadmissible as only the 
prime  minister  is  entitled to  refer a  draft  law  to the CESE  for  an  opinion.  Nevertheless, the  bureau 
decided  to  draw  up  an  own-initiative  opinion  on  the  evolution  of  the  contemporary  family  and  its 
consequences for public policy. 

-  Own-initiative work 

Owing to few, if any, requests on the part of the government, this important component of the CESE's 
work has by and large been limited to the period prior to the last reform. The Chertier report, quoted 
above, in fact stated that own-initiative opinions accounted for three quarters of the CESE's opinions 
between 2005 and 2007.16 

The  sections  and  delegations  are  instructed  by  the  Council's  bureau  to  prepare own-initiative  work. 
Rapporteurs are appointed from among the Council's members in the case of own-initiative opinions, 
and from members or associated individuals in the case of a study. Hearings with relevant members of 
the  government  or  with  experts  in  the  field  may  be  organised  while  work  is  in  progress.  Draft 
opinions  and  studies  must  be  subject to  a  roll  call  vote  in  the  section  or  delegation  before they  are 
forwarded to the bureau and, subsequently, to the plenary session. At least half the members must be 
present in order for the votes to be valid. 

15  
16  

Article 69(3) of the French Constitution and Article 4-1 of the Organic Law of 29 June 2010. 

Chertier report to the President of the Republic, January 2009 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

The CESE adopts some 25 to 30 opinions every year, each containing 60-90 pages. Opinions may be 
voted on by show of hands or public ballot; more than half of those voting must be in favour in order 
for the opinion to be adopted.17 Written statements by the groups are appended to the opinions. 

 

It is required by law to follow up on opinions: "Every year, the prime minister shall provide 
information  as  to  the  follow-up  given  to  the  opinions  of  the  Economic,  Social  and 
Environmental  Council"18;  this  procedure  does  not  work  very  well  in  practice,  however, 
forcing the CESE to carry out its own "after-sales service" on its opinions. 

A member of the Council may be designated to make a statement to the parliamentary assemblies on 
the opinions adopted by the Council on the draft laws or proposals referred to it.19 

5.4  An  exercise  in  decentralised  economic  and  social  democracy  with  the  regional 
economic and social councils 

The  regional  economic  and  social  councils  (CESR)  date  back  to  1982,  and  were  established  in  the 
wake  of  a  policy  of  regional  decentralisation.  The  regional  councils  are  comprised  solely  of 
representatives of socio-occupational interests groups and associations. They were given the name of 
"regional economic and social councils" in the Law of 2 February 1992. The name was subsequently 
changed  to  "regional  economic,  social  and  environmental  councils"  (CESER)  in  Article  250  of  the 
Grenelle  II  Law  of  12  July  2010,  dividing  their  members  into  four  colleges:  companies  and  self-
employed professionals; workers' unions; bodies and associations that participate in the  civil society 
life of the region; and qualified individuals involved in regional development. Members (numbering 
between 65 and 128, depending on the region) are appointed for six years by prefectoral decree. 

Referrals to the regional councils are mandatory in the case of all budgetary documents and regional 
development  plans  drawn  up  by  the  region;  referrals  may  also  be  initiated  by  the  president  of  the 
regional council, but the right of own-initiative is strictly limited to issues relating to regional matters. 

As stated by the former president of the CESE, Jacques Dermagne (1999-2010), the regional councils 
"follow a rationale akin to that of the national CESE".20 It was therefore natural for the work of the 
regional councils and the CESE to be based on coordination and synergy, without any "hierarchical 
claims" between them.21 

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  

Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure adopted on 27 November 2012. 

Article 4 of the Organic Law of June 2010. 

Article 69 of Title XI of the Constitutional Law of 23 July 2008. 
Qu’est-ce que le Conseil économique et social? [What is the Economic and Social Council?] Edition L’Archipel 2006. 
Idem. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

The  establishment  in  1999  of  the  Assembly  of  Regional  Economic,  Social  and  Environmental 
Councils  (CESER  of  France),  located  in  the  Palais  d'Iéna,  has  fostered  an  exchange  between  the 
regional councils and the CESE, as well as providing a means of disseminating information about the 
regional councils and promoting their work. 

Today,  the  Assembly  of  French  regional  councils  comprises  26  councils  from  metropolitan  France 
and the overseas departments, including those of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Mayotte (since 
January 2005), Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin (since January 2009).22 

The government's recent decision to redraw the regional boundaries (reducing the regions from 22 to 
13) has had an impact on the number and location of regional councils. 

5.5 Representation of Council members in French civil society bodies 

An important aspect of the CESE's expertise, influence and coverage undoubtedly lies in the fact that 
its  members  sit  on  a  number  of  national  committees,  foundations,  associations,  institutes  and 
observatories, etc. The CESE can in fact appoint some of its members, on the proposal of the groups, 
to represent the Assembly in some bodies. Today, members are present in 31 bodies ranging from the 
Foundation  for  French  Sport  to  the  French  Economic  Observatory,  the  Research  Institute  for  the 
Study  and  Monitoring  of  Living  Standards,  the  National  Council  for  the  Evaluation  of  the  School 
System,  the  National  Water  Board  and  the  Supreme  Council  for  the  professional  and  social 
redeployment of workers with a disability, etc.23 The creation of a delegation to the European Union 

22  
23  

http://www.cesdefrance.fr  

A list of all the bodies where the CESE is represented can be found on its website: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/ceslink/ 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Article 7: Organic Law No 2010-704 of 28 June 2010 
I. - The French Economic, Social and Environmental Council comprises: 
1. 140 members representing economic life and the social dialogue, divided as follows: 
- 69 worker representatives; 
- 27 representatives of private companies in the fields of industry, commerce and services; 
- 20 representatives of agricultural and farm workers; 
- 10 representatives of craftspeople; 
- 4 representatives of the professions; 
- 10 qualified individuals selected on the basis of their experience in the economic sphere, including two representing public 
enterprises and one representing French overseas economic activity; 
2. - 60 members representing social and territorial cohesion and associations, divided as follows: 
- 8 representatives of the non-agricultural mutual, cooperative and fair trade sector; 
- 4 representatives of the agricultural mutual and cooperative production and processing sector; 
- 10 representatives of family associations; 
- Section for European and International Affairs; 
- Section for Economic Activity; 
- Section for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; 

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in 2001 also gave an important boost to work on European issues and led to the CESE appointing a 
representative  of  the  assembly  to  the  French  delegation  to  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee.  The  representative  in  question  is  currently  Evelyne  Pichenot,  a  member  of  the  EESC's 
Group  III.  The  Delegation  to  the  European  Union  subsequently  developed  into  the  Section  for 
European and International Affairs. 

5.6 A window on Europe and the world 

The French CESE played a leading role in the establishment in 1999 of the International Association 
of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS), which currently brings together 
institutions  from  72  countries  in  Asia,  Europe,  Africa  and  Latin  America-the  Caribbean.  The 
AICESIS secretariat was hosted in the Palais d'Iéna (headquarters of the CESE) until 2011, with the 
Council supplying the necessary logistical support. The secretariat is currently based in Brussels, and 
its  secretary-general  is  Patrick  Venturini,  former  secretary-general  of  the  European  Economic  and 
Social  Committee.  The  French  CESE  is  also  heavily  involved  in  the  "CESlink"  network  set  up  in 
2000  by  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  national  economic  and  social 
councils. The French CESE is concerned with incorporating the European dimension into its opinions 
and has dealt with many referrals directly related to the construction of Europe or European policies. 

5.7 Conclusion 

Over and above the expansion of its competences, representative nature and handling of referrals, it 
must be mentioned that the evolution of the position and role of the social partners defined in the laws 
of 31 January 2007 and 20 August 2008 has also had an impact on the role and status of the CESE. In 
a culture that is still broadly state-dominated, the social partners have shouldered new responsibilities 
in  defining  social  norms,  thereby  radically  changing  the  nature  of  the  social  dialogue  in  France. 
Moves  are  now  under  way  to  reposition  each  of  the  social  partners  in  a  new  architecture  offering 
ample new spaces and responsibilities for all. 

- Section for Education, Culture and Communication; 
- Section for the Environment. 

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6. Social dialogue institutions under pressure: the case of Greece 

6.1 Social dialogue and partnership in Greece: background 

Greece’s turbulent historical past and its post-war political economy have had a decisive influence on 
the evolution of the country's institutions and civil society. In the wake of the Civil War (1946-1949), 
the repressive pathology of an authoritarian "guided" parliamentary state and the subsequent military 
dictatorship  (1967-1974)  led  to  an  entrenched,  state-directed  market  economy  and  established  a 
tradition of state intervention over institutional arrangements which meant that civil society and civil, 
political  and  social  rights  were  submerged  (Mouzelis  and  Pagoulatos  2005).  The  transition  to 
democracy  in24  1974  modified  state–civil  society  relations,  introducing  a  polarised  political  system 
that  still  controlled  the  administration  and  supervised  civil  society  via  institutional  structures,  e.g. 
trade  unions,  farmer  cooperatives  and  civil  servant  associations  (Sotiropoulos  1995).  In  sum,  civil 
society and the right to form associations in Greece have evolved under a structural legacy of state 
interventionism,  party  tutelage,  bureaucratic  clientelism,  rent-seeking,  corruption  and  "disjointed 
corporatism"  as  the  main  form  of  interest  representation  (Featherstone  and  Papadimitriou  2008; 
Lavdas 1997:17; Lyrintzis 1984). Notwithstanding this legacy, the democratisation process after 1974 
introduced substantive changes at both socio-political and legal-institutional levels. 

The Constitution of 1975 extended fundamental rights and enshrined freedom of association and the 
right  to  strike.25  In  the  early  1990s  a  series  of  institutional  changes,  particularly  Law  1876/1990  on 
free  collective  bargaining  and  dispute  settlement  substantially  transformed  the  Greek  industrial 
relations landscape. To replace the existing restrictive framework, this legislation elevated collective 
autonomy  to  the  main  source  of  regulation  and  decentralised  collective  bargaining,  enhancing  its 
content (Yannakourou 2004).26 By consolidating collective autonomy and the representational status 
of  worker  and  employer  organisations,  the  new  institutional  framework  sought  to  comply  with 
Greece’s  EU  membership  requirements,  including  the  acquis  communautaire,  and  fostered  the 
gradual disentanglement from state intervention. The abolition of compulsory arbitration, for instance, 
moderated  state  intervention  in  deadlock  resolution,  shifting  the  emphasis  to  bargaining  and 

24  

25  

26  

Lavdas  (1997:17)  describes  disjointed  corporatism  as  “the  combination  of  a  set  of  corporatist  organisational  features  and  a 
prevailing political modality” lacking diffuse reciprocity and “incapable of brokering social pacts”. 

Notably, safeguarding of human dignity (Article 2(1)), the free development of the individual (Article 5(1)), the right to work 
(Article 22(1)), the right to equal pay for work of equal value (Article 22(1)(b)), the recognition of collective autonomy (Article 
22(2)),  the  right  to  social  security  (Article  22(5)),  the  right  to  associate  (Article  12),  the  protection  of  trade  union  freedom 
(Article 23(1)) and the right to strike (Article 23(2)). 

Law 1876/1990 broadened the scope of agreements to include all terms and conditions of work (excepting pensions issues), and 
prioritised the sectoral and the enterprise bargaining levels over occupation based collective agreements. Collective agreements 
fall  under  four  categories:  the  National  General  Collective  Agreement  which  sets  universal  minima  for  wage  and  terms  and 
conditions  of  work,  Industry  wide  collective  agreements,  firm-level  and  occupation  based  collective  agreements.  Legally 
binding, collective agreements function both as contracts and law while the most favourable provisions prevail between different 
applicable agreements. Among others, procedures for acceding to and extending the scope of collective labour agreements were 
articulated (Yannakourou 2004) 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

consensus building between trade unions and employer organisations (Zambarloukou 2006). The time 
was ripe for institutionalising permanent national social dialogue structures. 

6.2 Social dialogue structures and social partners 

The social partners in Greece are designated as the most representative level of employer and worker 
organisations  that  are  signatory  parties  of  the  National  General  Collective  Labour  Agreements 
(henceforth NGCLA). Labour is represented by the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) and the 
Confederation of Public Servants (ADEDY), which are among the few unitary trade union umbrella 
organisations  in  Europe.  Employer  representation  includes  the  Hellenic  Federation  of  Greek 
Enterprises  (SEV),  the  National  Confederation  of  Hellenic  Commerce  (ESEE)  and  the  Hellenic 
Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen and Merchants (GSEVEE). 

Modelled  on  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (EESC),  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council of Greece (OKE) was established in 199427 as a consultative body to provide a formal social 
dialogue platform on social and economic policy. The OKE accommodates a tripartite representation 
of  socio-occupational  stakeholders,  namely  employers,  workers  and  a  third  group  comprising  other 
civil  society  representatives.28  A  constitutional  institution  since  2001,  the  OKE  holds  a  twofold 
competency: to conduct social dialogue with an emphasis on social and economic guidelines, and to 
deliver,  upon  request  and at  its  own  initiative,  opinions  on  proposed  legislation.  The  OKE  is  today 
entirely managed by the social partners. 

Under  pressure  from  the  EU  to  strengthen  social  dialogue  in  line  with  the  European  Employment 
Strategy,  the  government  set  up  new  structures  in  two  key  policy  areas  in  200329:  the  National 
Employment  Committee  and  the  National  Committee  for  Social  Protection,  among  others,  were 
respectively  made  responsible  for  monitoring/assessing  the  National  Action  Plans  for  Employment 
and for Social Inclusion. Other institutions and structures based on social partnership include mainly 
the Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED), the National Institute of Labour (EIE), the 
Hellenic  Institute  for  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  (ELINYAE)  and  the  National  Land  Planning 
Council. The social partners in the 1993 NGCLA agreed to create, jointly finance and administer the 
Fund for Employment and Vocational Training (LAEK). The deployment of EU Support Frameworks 
and particularly the European Social Fund (ESF) helped considerably in developing and maintaining 
social dialogue related processes and institutions. 

In sum, while intense government interventionism in a conflictual setting marked industrial relations 
between  1974–1990,  the  1990s  witnessed  the  gradual  decline  of  state  intervention  in  interest  group 

27  
28  
29  

Law 2232/1994 on the Establishment of an Economic and Social Council and other provisions. 

Local government, agriculture sector, the self-employed, consumer, environmental and gender equality organisations 

Law 3144/2003 on Social Dialogue for the promotion of employment and social protection and other provisions. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

dynamics,  the  democratisation  of  labour  law,  the  consolidation  of  collective  autonomy  and  a  level 
playing field for employers and workers in an institutional context that encouraged decentralised free 
collective bargaining, voluntary dispute settlement and structures of social partnership corresponding 
to  the  challenges  set  by  the  EMU  criteria  (Lavdas  2005:308–9;  Pagoulatos  2003:167;  Tsarouhas 
2008:353). 

6.3 The pre-crisis state of play: an assessment 

While  the  favourable  institutional  framework  strengthened  the  status  of  the  social  partners  and 
fostered  a  climate  of  trust,  it  failed  to  wholly  eliminate  state  and  party  influence  over  industrial 
relations.  Forms  of  political  patronage  persisted  –  along  with  mistrust  –  in  relations  between 
governments  and  organised  interests.  Underscored  by  the  tradition  of  "disjointed"  corporatism, 
fragmentation  in  associational  structures  and  diverging  interests/demands  often  hindered  effective 
consensus  building.  Hence,  progress  in  social  dialogue  has  not  been  entirely  smooth.  Attempts  to 
achieve  result-oriented  dialogue  in  terms  of  concluding  effective  social  pacts  has  been  described  as 
"Sisyphean", relegating Greece to the fringes of the social pact camp  (EIIR 2003; Ioannou 2010). A 
closer  look  affirms  this  view.  The  first  attempt  at  tripartite  dialogue  to  reach  consensus  on  reforms 
vis-à-vis  Greece’s  EMU  accession  in  1997  yielded  a  Confidence  Pact30  that  was  implemented  in  a 
fragmented  manner:  substantive  labour  issues31  were  left  out  of  the  dialogue  (although  they  would 
subsequently be covered by legislation) while points of consensus had no regulatory follow-up (OKE 
2002c).  Starting  in  1997,  national  dialogue  on  social  security  reform  proved  to  be  a  negative 
experience: it was finalised under EU pressure only in July 2002 with a number of false starts owing 
to strong labour opposition and inefficient handling by the government  (OKE 2002a).32 Conversely, 
national concertation on tax reform is held up as a successful example of effective structured social 
dialogue with concrete results (OKE 2002b, 2002c:34). 

Ultimately,  a  seminal  OKE  opinion  (2002c)  provided  balanced insight  into the  state  of  play  in  pre-
crisis  social  dialogue.  The  opinion  identified  both  difficulties  and  progress.  The  OKE  noted  the 
diminishing  role  of  the  state  but  observed  that  regulation  remained  grounded  in  legislation 
perpetuating the presence of the state. Concerns were voiced over the marginalisation of the OKE, e.g. 
the limited use or neglect of its proposals by the Government, which since 1995 referred less than half 
of its relevant draft bills to the Council. Nevertheless, the empowerment of social partnership emerged 
as  an  uncontested  fact  underpinned  by  effective  collective  bargaining,  with  the  national  collective 
agreements  concluded  providing  a  factor  of  stability  in  a  difficult  and  uncertain  economic  climate. 
Overall, notwithstanding difficulties, on the eve of the crisis, Greece had arrived at a working – if not 
perfect  –  rights-based  industrial  relations  order  that  incorporated  institutions  of  social  dialogue  and 

30  
31.  
32  

Trade unions signed the Pact with a marginal majority, and only two employer organisations, SEV and ESEE, signed it. 

For instance local employment pacts and working time arrangements 

Law 3029/2002. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

guaranteed the fundamentals of the European Social Model. As we shall see next, events set in motion 
by Greece’s sovereign debt crisis were to dramatically disrupt this order. 

6.4. The disruption: context, rationale and content 

To  address  its  mounting  sovereign  debt  and  high  current  account  deficit,  in  May  2010  Greece 
received  a  EUR  110  billion  rescue  package,  concluding  with  its  creditor  troika  two  Memoranda33 
(commonly referred to as Memorandum I) that detailed a sweeping economic adjustment programme 
(EAP)  subject  to  deadline  benchmarking  and  periodic  revision.  An  IMF  style  conditionality  clause 
committed the Greek government to successive rounds of fiscal adjustment and structural reform. As 
Memorandum 
recession 
(Dedoussopoulos et al. 2013), a new EUR 130 billion loan was concluded in June 2011 conditional on 
the implementation of another austerity package.34 Memorandum II (MEFP and MoU) for the second 
bailout programme was signed in February 2012, stipulating another round of austerity and structural 
measures despite strong public opposition. 

triggering  unprecedented 

to  achieve 

targets, 

failed 

fiscal 

its 

I 

The rationale of the IMF type adjustment imposed on Greece emphasises competitiveness and export-
led growth sustained by currency depreciation, something that is not feasible in a eurozone country. 
Hence a policy of massive "internal devaluation/deflation" was implemented to bring down wages and 
prices  and  reduce  unit  labour  costs  by  direct  wage  cuts:  labour  market  deregulation  is  key  in  this 
approach  for  eliminating  alleged  rigidities  (Armingeon  and  Baccaro  2012;  Pisani-Ferry,  Sapir,  and 
Wolff  2013).  Yet,  while  described  as  enjoying  strong  employment  protection  legislation  (OECD 
2007), the pre-crisis Greek labour market was characterised by fragmentation, low job growth, wage 
inequalities, precariousness, widespread undeclared work, inadequate inspection, migrant labour and 
high unemployment rates among young people and women, with a high incidence of self-employment 
and SMEs35 completing the picture (INE/GSEE 2012, 2013). 

In this context, on the one hand, harsh austerity measures imposed direct wage and pension cuts, wage 
freezes  and  cuts  in  welfare  expenditure.  On  the  other  hand,  drastic  measures  were  implemented  to 
remove labour market rigidities and radically overhaul the institutional framework which had hitherto 
regulated industrial relations in Greece. In other words, taken as key adjustment tools, labour law and 
labour market institutions were radically reconfigured, massively disrupting the pre-crisis framework. 
A substantial body of legislation affected adversely almost every aspect of individual and collective 

33  

34  
35  

Memorandum  of  Economic  and  Financial  Policies  and  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  Specific  Economic  Policy 
Conditionality (MoU). All texts concerning financial assistance to Greece including the Memoranda, the adjustment programme 
and 
at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/  

Financial  Affairs  website 

the  EC  Economic 

available 

revision 

reports 

and 

are 

the 

at 

Law 3986/2011 on Urgent Measures for the Implementation of Mid-term Fiscal Strategy Framework (2012-2015). 

Greece has the highest share of micro-SMEs, employing one to nine persons, in the EU. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

labour rights in both the public and private sectors. In broad lines36, more than fifteen legislative acts 
led  to  pay  and  benefit  cuts,  intervened  in  collective  autonomy,  contested  both  individual  and 
collective labour law  guarantees and eroded trade  union  bargaining  power. This  body  of legislation 
had far-reaching implications for employment relationships and working conditions, it increased State 
intervention in wage setting, decentralised collective bargaining from the national and sectoral level to 
that  of  the  individual  firm,  eliminated  the  favourability  principle,  banned  any  future  extension  of 
collective  agreements,  retracted  seniority  rights,  made  dismissals  cheaper  and  easier  and  reinforced 
the  managerial  prerogative37  in  setting  work  conditions  (ILO  2012;  Katrougalos  and  Achtsioglou 
2012). Another explicit intervention in collective representation is the conferral of bargaining rights 
on so-called “associations of persons” that can conclude binding agreements with precedence over all 
other agreements in firms without a trade union.38 

It is useful to make the point that the resulting socio-economic climate has amplified the social impact 
of  institutional  disruption.  The  policy  mix  implemented  has  triggered  the  deepest  recession  in 
Greece’s  post  war  history  but  has  failed  to  render sustainable its  sovereign  debt  –  estimated at  177 
percent of GDP.39 The persisting recession has generated a social and economic impasse that cannot 
be  resolved  by  recent  anaemic  signs  of  recovery.40  Unemployment  stands  at  dangerous  levels, 
particularly  among  young  people.41  Historically  higher  rates  of  unemployment  among  women  as 
compared to male unemployment indicate that gender inequalities have been exacerbated. Sharp cuts 
in  wages  and  pensions,  combined  with  direct  and  indirect  tax/levy  hikes,  have  slashed  disposable 
income  and  driven  consumer  demand  down:  the  rate  of  bankruptcies  is  rising,  investment  is 
stagnating, firm and consumer credit is rare while household savings accounts are steadily decreasing 
(Dedoussopoulos  et  al.  2013:56–57).  In  addition  to  salaried  employees,  SMEs  (55%  of  retail 
commerce) and the self-employed (35% of the active population compared to a European average of 
11%)  have  been  gravely  hit  (INE/GSEE  2013).  Welfare  spending  cuts  have  disrupted  health, 
education  and  other  social  provision.  Rising  levels  of  poverty  and  inequality  are  alarming: 
considerable  numbers  of  individuals  and  families  face  extreme  hardship,  particularly  among 
vulnerable groups (Matsaganis 2012; Mitrakos 2014). In brief, alongside the economic crisis, a severe 
social and humanitarian crisis is jeopardising human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural 
rights, in Greece, and is undermining social cohesion (UN Human Rights Council 2014). 

6.5 Social dialogue institutions as collateral damage 

36  

37  

38  
39  
40  
41  

A detailed inventory of the numerous changes is beyond the scope of this paper. The 365th Report of the Committee on Freedom 
of Association of the ILO (Case No 2820) provides a detailed exposé including the views of the Government, the complainant - 
Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), and the Committee’s recommendations. 

Unilateral  imposition  of  shift  work,  increasing  the  maximum  duration  of  fixed-term  and  agency  work  contracts,  reduction  of 
overtime pay, elimination of administrative burden in overtime arrangements. 

Regardless of the total number of workers in a firm, three-fifths suffice to form an association. 

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/countries/greece_en.htm  

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2014_spring/el_en.pdf 

Current figures stand at 27.8% and 56.7% for young persons (15-24 years) (EL.STAT- Labour Force Survey, 1st Quarter 2014). 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

The charged and difficult economic situation examined above raises questions as regards the role of 
the  social  partners and  social  dialogue.  As  a  result  of  their  content  and  socio-economic  impact,  the 
far-reaching measures described previously directly challenge social dialogue and the social partners 
as, in varying degrees, they adversely affect the interests represented in Greece's social partnership. 
The manner of their introduction is also key in assessing the post-crisis state of play and the prospects 
for social dialogue in Greece. 

First,  the  planning  and  imposition  of  measures  indicate  a  de  facto  transfer  of  economic  and  social 
policy-making from national to international actors, gravely violating the constitutional order. More 
specifically,  subsequent  to  prior  binding  agreements  between  the  government  of  Greece  and  the 
EC/ECB/IMF42,  precise  Memoranda  provisions  were  directly  translated  into  applicable  domestic 
statutory provisions by framework laws (Achtsioglou and Doherty 2013, 8). For instance, Article 1(6) 
of Framework Law 4046/2012 implementing Memorandum II stipulates that its labour market clauses 
constitutes directly applicable rules. Second, as emphasised by eminent constitutional law scholars43, 
the  Memoranda,  the  relevant  executive  legislation  and  the  loan  treaties  markedly  deviate  from 
constitutional, European and international legality on procedural and substantive grounds: the  Greek 
parliament has not ratified the loan treaties44, while the incorporation into the treaties of a waiver of 
immunity  for  reasons  of  national  sovereignty  violates  the  guaranteed  respect  and  protection  of 
national sovereignty.45 

Third, unprecedented changes with grave socio-economic implications were introduced in the Greek 
labour  market  institutions  without  effective  tripartite  dialogue  and  in  a  manner  which  appears 
disconnected  from  Greek  reality.  All  the  social  partners  interviewed  for  an  ILO  study  confirm  that 
their  role  was  marginalised  and  that  in  the  few  meetings  with  the  Troika  their  views  were  not 
considered at all: a former Labour minister noted that the “Troika considered the social partners part 
of the problem, not part of its solution”  (Dedoussopoulos et al. 2013:40–41). A case in point is the 
government  intervention  in  collective  autonomy  to  unilaterally  reduce  to  below  poverty  levels  the 
national  minimum  wage  set  by  the  NGCLA46  despite  the  declared  written  agreement  by  the  social 

42  

43  

44  
45  

46  

The  European  Commission,  the  European  Central  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  collectively  denoted  as  the 
“Troika”. 

Joint Statement of 12 February 2012 by Emeritus Professor  George  Kasimatis (University of  Athens),  Andreas Dimitropoulos 
(University  of  Athens),  George  Katrougalos  (University  of  Thrace),  Ilias  Nikolopoulos  (Panteion  University),  Costas 
Chryssogonos (University of Thessaloniki). 

Contrary to Article 36(2) of the Constitution. 

Katrougalos (2013:106 fn.60) notes that a borrowing state may generally “waive its immunity from execution with an express act 
(see,  for  instance,  A.  Reinisch,  European  Court  Practice  Concerning  State  Immunity  from  Enforcement  Measures,  European 
Journal of International Law, vol.17, 2006 p.816 ff.). However, the explicit abandonment of national sovereignty by an official 
statement is unprecedented.” 
The  national  minimum  wage  for  a  new  entrant  single  worker  is  reduced by  22  percent to  a  net  monthly  EUR  476.35  and  for 
young workers by 32 percent to EUR 426.64 violating the principle of non-discrimination and their right to fair remuneration, as 
it  is  below  the  poverty  line  defined  at  50  percent  of  national  average  wage.  See  Council  of  Europe,  Committee  of  Ministers, 
Resolution CM/ResChS(2013)3 (https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2029587&Site=CM). 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

partners.47  The  government  has  routinely  claimed  that  the  chances  of  reaching  consent  were  slim, 
while urgent time frames did not allow for social dialogue (ILO 2012:260–61). 

Throughout  the  adjustment  process,  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  of  Greece  (OKE)  has  been 
increasingly marginalised. Already in 2008, the OKE had proposed a plan for an economic and social 
pact which was never taken on board. While during the crisis the OKE placed itself at the disposal of 
the Government to discuss exit strategies, it was not asked to deliver an opinion on the Memoranda, 
which were adopted via summary procedures. As the OKE explicitly informed the ILO High Level 
Mission, all measures were legislated without effective social dialogue, leaving no time for the social 
partners  to  “plan,  co-decide  and  implement  measures  to  overcome  the  crisis”,  depriving  the  social 
dialogue process “wholly of its meaning”, while creditors did not allow for any dialogue (ILO 2011). 
Additionally,  the  Government  has  either  not  referred  critical  draft  laws  to  the  OKE  or  has  not 
considered its opinions on referred draft laws as well as the OKE’s own initiative opinions. Hence the 
potential for the OKE to play a role in bringing together the social partners to discuss ways out of the 
crisis  has  been  minimised.  Interviewed  for 
the  OKE, 
Mr Polyzogopoulos, confirmed the OKE’s ongoing marginalisation and emphasised that the Council 
was currently confronted with serious drawbacks due to crippling funding cuts. Expressing concern 
for the future  of the  Council,  he  noted  that,  while  cuts  across  public  sector  entities  tended  to range 
between 20 and 30 percent, the OKE’s budget has been reduced by 50 percent, affecting daily every 
aspect of its operations and the fulfilment of its constitutional mandate. 

this  research48, 

the  president  of 

The adjustment  programme  has  met  with  strong  public  opposition. Trade  unions  and two  employer 
organisations49  representing  mostly  SMEs  that  make  up  more  than  80  per  cent  of  businesses  in  the 
country  have  been  particularly  vocal.  The  legality  of  wide  ranging  statutory  interventions  has  been 
challenged  from  2010  onwards  by  trade  unions  before  the  Greek  Council  of  State,  the  ILO,  the 
European  Committee  of  Social  Rights  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.50  The  ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association has observed that the repeated and extensive intervention in 
collective  bargaining  threatens  to  destabilise  the  entire  industrial  relations  framework,  weakening 
freedom  of  association  and  collective  bargaining  as  enshrined  in  Conventions  Nos  87  and  98  (ILO 
2012). The ILO High Level Mission to Greece emphasised the need to ensure collective autonomy, 
proportionality in the implemented measures and to provide for the most vulnerable groups in society 
(ILO  2011).  Repeatedly  urging  the  Government  to  strengthen  the  institutional  framework  for 
collective bargaining and social dialogue, the ILO has recommended permanent and intensive social 

47  
48  
49  

50  

Law 4046/2012 and the subsequent Ministerial Council Decision No 6/28.2.2012. 

Interview conducted by author on 19 September 2014 at the EESC headquarters, Brussels. 

The  National  Confederation  of  Hellenic  Commerce  (ESEE)  and  the  Hellenic  Confederation  of  Professionals,  Craftsmen  and 
Merchants (GSEVEE). 

The  General  Confederation  of  Greek  Workers  (GSEE)  filed  complaints  between  2010  and  2012  for  non-observance  of 
Conventions  87,  98  151  and  154.  For  a  detailed  survey  see  Yannakourou,  Matina.  2014.  “Challenging  Austerity  Measures 
Affecting  Work  Rights  at  Domestic  and  International  Level.  The  Case  of  Greece,”  in  The  Role  of  Fundamental  Rights’ 
Challenges: EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/05, ed. Claire Kilpatrick and Bruno De Witte. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

dialogue on all issues raised, aiming to develop a comprehensive common vision for labour relations 
that  conforms  to  the  principles  of  freedom  of  association,  the  effective  recognition  of  collective 
bargaining  and  the  relevant  ILO  conventions  ratified  (ILO  2012).  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
Government did not take any steps to comply with the recommendations of the ILO to initiate a frank 
social dialogue and evaluate the impact of the measures adopted. 

6.6 Concluding remarks 

This paper has examined critically the changing landscape for social  dialogue actors and institutions 
in  Greece  subject  to  the  conditionality  of  the  adjustment  programme  focusing  on  the  radical 
reconfiguration of the institutional industrial relations framework. This examination was premised on 
the  idea  that  social  dialogue  has  emerged  as  collateral  damage  of  the  adjustment  process  at  a  time 
when it was needed most. Our examination confirms this premise, exposing how a vast programme 
aimed  at  reconfiguring  industrial relations  has  been implemented in  Greece  without effective social 
dialogue, regardless of its manifestly adverse socio-economic impact. By their content and manner of 
implementation, the measures have rendered the social partners redundant and have altered the level 
playing  field  of  social  partnership,  disempowering  the  labour  component  and  eroding  collective 
bargaining.  The  OKE,  the  constitutional  social  dialogue  institution,  has  been  weakened  and 
marginalised.  As  their  representational  capacity  diminishes,  the  social  partners  are  deprived  of  the 
option to examine more appropriate alternatives. Such alternatives could have mitigated the multiple 
direct  and  collateral  effects  of  the  crisis  on  social  groups  represented  by  the  social  partner 
organisations.  The  permanent  character  of  the  measures  does  not  allow  even  the  future  periodic 
reassessment  to  involve  the  social  partners.  More  importantly,  the  non-negotiable  EAP  framework 
and its philosophy inherently preclude the adoption of an alternative exit plan (Ghellab and Papadakis 
2011). 

Taking stock of Greece’s historical background in state-society relations, the crisis episode ironically 
swings  the  pendulum  back  to  the traditional  interventionist  state  model by  reinforcing  unilateralism 
and  eroding  structures  of  dialogue  and  collective  bargaining.  A  new  element  in  the  emerging 
paradigm of interventionism lies in the transfer of economic and social policy-making from national 
to  international  actors. This  new  paradigm  replaces the  consensual  institutional  order  established  in 
the 1990s to conform to EU norms, weakens the existing mechanisms of transfer, redistribution and 
social inclusion and increasingly contests the effective collective representation of civil society. The 
new  paradigm  also  elevates  competitiveness  to  the  main  policy  norm  upon  which  the  whole 
regulatory  system  has  come  to  be  grounded  since  2010  (Achtsioglou  and  Doherty  2013:15–16). 
Hence,  in  the  absence  of  social  dialogue,  other  values  and  considerations  such  as  social  cohesion, 
equality or proportionality are cast out of the policy-making process. 

To conclude, while Greece has been presented as an exceptional case in the crisis discourse, the trends 
identified in this paper are not confined within Greek borders. EU wide policy choices, particularly in 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

the  crisis-hit  peripheral  areas,  are  emblematic  of  a  move  towards  weakening  social  dialogue 
institutions, raising concerns over the future of the European social model (Barnard 2014; Hermann 
2013).  Notably,  the  EU  Commission  reiterates  that  the  conditionality  of  the  loan  agreements  is  an 
integral  requirement  for  social  cohesion  and  a  more  equitable  society  in  Greece,  suggesting  a  new 
vision for a Social Europe based on what is essentially a standard IMF formula51. Under the current 
climate,  in  Greece  as  elsewhere,  only  effective  processes  of  social  dialogue  can  generate  socially 
acceptable  alternatives  geared  at  growth,  employment,  innovation  and  sustainability.  This  option, 
however,  requires  fundamental  redesigning  of  economic  and  social  policies  and  adopting  another 
vision of growth. To this end, finding a meaningful space for social dialogue which validates Europe’s 
strong tradition of social partnership to foster solidarity remains a matter of urgency. 

51  

European Commission, “Growth for Greece” COM(2012) 183 final. 

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7. The Economic and Social Council in Spain 

7.1 Difference between the constitutional approach and the legal approach 

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 included under Title VII on the economy and finance, part of the 
debate,  a  highly  recurrent  one  at  the  time,  on  the  need  to  make  freedom  of  economic  initiative 
compatible with economic planning on the part of the State. Article 131 of the Constitution specified 
that  the  State  could  plan  "general  economic  activity"  for  three  purposes:  meeting  collective  needs, 
balancing and harmonising regional and sectoral development and, lastly, stimulating the creation and 
a fairer distribution of profit and wealth. With this aim, the second part of the article laid down that 
planning projects were to be drawn up by the government, and that to this end a council was to be 
established  with  the  participation  of  the  regional  governments,  the  trade  unions,  professional 
organisations  and  business  and  economic  associations.  This  model  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council, based on economic development and planning, was not followed up in law. The reason for 
this  doubtless  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  was  linked  to  the  objective  of  public  economic  planning,  an 
approach that became outmoded in the Eighties with the acceptance of the dominant political theories 
on the role of the State in relation to the market economy. 

Following a period of intense social conflict beginning in 1988, with the General Union of Workers 
(UGT) and the Trade Union Confederation (CC.OO) embarking on joint action, labour relations were 
in  practice  reinstitutionalised  on  the  basis of  projects  with the  unions.  Against this  background,  the 
unions  advocated  the  need  to  set  up  an  Economic  and  Social  Council  (CES),  although  rather  than 
developing  along  the  lines  laid  down  in  the  Constitution,  it  drew  its  inspiration  directly  from  the 
European  model,  i.e.  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  Law  21/1991  establishing  the 
CES referred in effect to Article 105 of the Spanish Constitution, which recognised in generic terms 
the right  of  citizens to participate in  drawing  up  measures  which affected  them,  and to  Article  9(2) 
committing the government to the right "of all citizens" to participate in economic and social life. 

The CES is comprised of three groups: one made up of representative unions, a second of business 
associations and a third, mixed, group composed of six members nominated by the government and 
fourteen representatives of other professional and social organisations linked to the social economy, 
consumers and users, etc. The CES is headed by a president and secretary-general nominated by the 
government. Its institutional mission is to operate as a consultative body to the government on social, 
economic  and  labour  questions.  To  this  end,  it  issues  opinions  on  preliminary  drafts  of  laws  or 
regulations  which,  in  the  view  of  the  government,  have  particularly  important  implications  from  a 
social,  economic  and  labour  perspective.  Likewise,  it  can  issue  opinions  on  specific  subjects  at  the 
request of the government or acting on its own initiative, and draw up reports on the social, economic 
and labour situation in the Spanish State. 

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7.2 Institutional participation in draft laws on social and economic issues: a supplement 
to the social dialogue. 

The CES came into its own in 1992, giving its input on draft legislation on labour issues. The reform 
of  1994  was  a  particularly  interesting  moment,  prior  to  the  breaking  off  of  negotiations  with  the 
unions and the government's need to reinstate its lost social legitimacy by means of the institutional 
participation of bodies such as the CES. Generally speaking, it is the case that throughout the whole of 
the last decade of the century, the CES played an important complementary role, mostly by providing 
cohesion and drive, in the processes of social concertation and political negotiation in labour relations, 
employment and social security. At the same time, however, informal contacts developed outside the 
institution  in  the  form  of  direct  contacts  with  trade  unions,  employers'  associations  and  the 
government, or of bilateral exchanges between the unions and employers. The complementary role of 
social  dialogue  remained  stable  both  during  the  last  minority  government  of  the  Socialist  Party 
(PSOE) 1993-1996, the first two governments of the People's Party (PP) 1996-2004 and, again, under 
the first Zapatero government, 2004-2008. 

The participatory  function of  the  CES  is in  turn important  as  a  means  of complementing  the  social 
concertation mechanisms in the regions. In this way, the regional economic and social councils have 
come to represent a carbon copy of the national model. The role of the regional councils is, however, 
to  facilitate  the  process  of  consultation  and  negotiation  between  the  unions,  business  entrepreneurs 
and the regional governments. The councils are therefore of greater importance in those regions where 
social interest groups seek to develop a regional model of labour relations that differs to some extent 
from  the  national  one.  One  such  example  is  the  Economic,  Social  and  Work  Council  of  Catalonia 
(CETESC)  and  another  is  the  Basque  CES,  with  a  different  trade  union  set-up  compared  with  the 
national one, comprising four main central unions, two of which are regional (ELA and LAB). Some 
regions  have  set  up  affiliated  "labour  relations  councils"  specialised  in  the  tasks  of  support  and 
mediation in collective bargaining. One of the most pertinent examples is that of Galicia. 

7.3 Economic crisis, political crisis and the critical situation of the CES 

The unleashing of the economic crisis in 2009 generated an initial response prior to the collapse of the 
real estate sector and the consequent devastation in terms of jobs. From May 2010, however, with the 
euro crisis, the political situation deteriorated dramatically: labour law reforms led to the break-up of 
the social dialogue between the unions and the government, on the one hand, and the beginning of a 
process  whereby  all  laws  relating  to  labour,  employment  and  social  protection  were  systematically 
dealt with under the urgency procedure, thus preventing the CES from delivering an opinion on them. 
This trend gradually  took hold during the course of 2011 and became entrenched when the Popular 
Party joined the government with an absolute majority in November of the same year. Cuts in social 
spending, in the public administration and in wages, and a freeze in pensions, on the one hand, along 
with  structural  reforms  in  the  system  of  labour  relations  on  the  other,  were  carried  out  without 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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consultation  or  the  agreement  of  the  most  representative  unions.  They  were  not  even  consulted 
indirectly under the procedure provided for in the CES since the measures were introduced under the 
urgency  procedure.  The  complete  absence  of  social  consultation  and  the  crisis  in  the  normal  legal 
mechanisms  of  law-making  meant  that  the  CES  was  totally  marginalised  with  regard  to  these 
regulatory procedures. 

The public spending cuts had a very serious knock-on effect on the CES itself, resulting in cuts to the 
bulk of its activities and funding, particularly in the realms of publishing and promoting research. The 
negative  effects  have  been  far  more  serious for  some  of the regional economic  and  social councils, 
where budget cuts have led to them being scrapped altogether: legislation has been passed in Madrid, 
Castilla-La Mancha and Cantabria rescinding the councils on the grounds that they are "superfluous" 
or "redundant". 

The protracted situation has left the CES paralysed and powerless to act on the subsidiary implications 
of social and economic legislation. It is currently in a state of crisis, directly bearing the brunt of the 
disappearance of social dialogue between the unions, business entrepreneurs and the public authorities 
and  the  loss  of  its  role  as  an  auxiliary  and  cohesive  body.  Moreover,  its  own  cuts  in  its  financial 
resources  are  preventing  it  from  carrying  out  its  specific  functions  in  terms  of  strengthening  and 
researching social, economic and labour conditions. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

8. The Economic and Social Council in Romania  

8.1. Introduction: overall legal and economic context 

In  Romania,  social  dialogue  is  organised52  with  reference  to  the  two  key  organisations  in  this  area, 
namely the ILO and the EU. 

The economic environment in which social  dialogue takes place in Romania has been characterised 
by  the  transformation  of  its  role  and  content,  which  has  led  to  far-reaching  restructuring  and 
reorganisation of the system of relations and cooperation between the social partners and the public 
authorities. Privatisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) have significantly changed the model of 
social dialogue, which covers trade unionism, in Romania, the various areas of concern, the scope of 
negotiations  and  the  social  partners’  ability  to  promote  their  interests  in  the  face  of  increasing 
economic competition and complex social problems. 

The  effects  of  globalisation,  the  fact  of  EU  accession  and,  in  the  past  few  years,  the  impact  of  the 
economic  crisis  have  resulted  in  an  austerity  programme  introduced  during  the  crisis,  rising 
unemployment, delayed economic recovery and, in the past year (2014), a new phase of recession. 

In this context of multiple economic and social changes, there has been a steady decrease in the rate of 
unionisation (at present fewer than one third of the total number of employees at national level belong 
to  a  union53,  as  compared  to  around  70%  at  the  peak  of  unionisation  in  1993).54  Objective  and 

52  

53  

The  legislative  framework  governing  social  dialogue  consists  of  the  following  laws:  Law  No  53/2003    -  Labour  Code,  as 
amended and supplemented; Law No 62/2011 - Social Dialogue Law, as amended and supplemented; Law No 248/2013 - on the 
organisation  and  functioning  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Council;  Law  No  467/2006  -  Law  on  the  general  framework  for 
informing  and  consulting  employees;  Law  No  217/2005  -  European  Works  Councils  Act;  GD  187/2007  on  informing  and 
consulting employees in European  companies; GD 188/2007 on informing and consulting  employees in European cooperative 
societies;  GEO  No  28/2009  on  the  regulation  of  social  protection  measures  (sectorial  committees);  ILO  Convention  87/1948 
concerning  Freedom  of  Association  and  Protection  of  the  Right  to  Organise;  ILO  Convention  154/1981  on  the  promotion  of 
collective  bargaining;  ILO  Convention  98/1949  on  the  application  of  the  right  to  organise  and  bargain  collectively;  ILO 
Convention 135/1971 on the protection of workers' representatives in the undertaking and facilities to be granted to them; ILO 
Convention 144/1976 on tripartite consultations to promote the application of international labour standards; HG1260 / 2011 on 
sectors established under Law No 62/2011. 

The  latest  available  data  on  the  number  of  members  of  the  main  confederation  are  based  on  official  statements  reconfirming 
representativeness: BNS –254 527 members and 6.02% of total number of employees at national level, in February 2012; Cartel 
ALFA – 301 785 members and respectively 7.16% in January 2012; CNSLR-Fratia – 306 486 members and 7.05% in January 
2013;  CSDR  –  249 264  members  and  5.72%  in  March  2013;  Meridian  –  320 204  members  and  7.64%  in  December  2011)- 
(author’s  estimation  based  on  NIS  database  for  number  of  employees  and  each  confederation  declaration  at  the  date  of 
representativeness 
http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/dialog-
social/info/protectie-sociala/dialog-social/997-reprezentativitate-sindicate and NIS - monthly statistical bulletin). 

reconfirmation 

information 

available 

on 

– 

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subjective factors have led not only to a decrease in the number of members in both private companies 
and in those with majority/total state ownership, but also in the bargaining power of employees and 
their organisations. It has thus led to reduced collective bargaining, especially after collective labour 
contracts were abolished at national level and new legislation was adopted. 

The  new  legal  framework  (Law  No  62/2011  as  amended)  covering  social  dialogue  in  Romania  has 
redefined  the  scope,  level  of  organisation  and  institutional  actors  involved.  The  following  aspects 
have been taken into account: conceptual unity of approach, terminology standardisation, redefining 
"representativeness", extending  the right to join a  trade  union  to  cooperatives and  farmers,  aligning 
social  dialogue  procedures  with  EU  practice,  reorganisation  of  the  Economic  and  Cocial  Council, 
establishment  of  a  new  institution  for  social  dialogue  (National  Tripartite  Committee  for  Social 
Dialogue) and the elimination of the national level of bipartite autonomous social dialogue, etc.55 

Not only was collective bargaining dropped at national level, but it was also scaled back considerably 
at  industry/activity  level.  Bargaining  at  company  level  is  the  predominant  form  of  bipartite  social 
dialogue, with the opinion of employers being the main influence on the prospects for and dynamics 
of negotiation. 

Reform of social dialogue has been accompanied by a gradual process of development on the part of 
the  social  partners  and  qualitative  improvements  in  negotiation  skills  and  conflict  management. 
Unpredictable  conflicts,  difficult  to  manage  and  sometimes  without  a  sound  basis  for  claims  and 
hence negotiations, have gradually been replaced by a social dialogue based on economic and social 
substance, well-handled and motivated by economic and social impact analysis, estimates and careful 
analysis of the potential effects of claims, etc.  

The  social  partners  have  gradually  become  more  experienced  in  the  negotiation  process,  more 
accountable  in  their  role  and  more  attuned  to  the  purpose  of  collective  bargaining.  The  negotiation 
environment has been gradually improved, as has the quality of the negotiation process. The number 
of  strikes  has  been substantially  reduced,  but the  scale  and  difficulty  of  the  negotiation  process  has 
increased. The conflictual approach has gradually given way to communication and cooperation. To 
some  extent,  management  disputes  have  been  preempted  by  prevention.  A  significant  contribution 
here  has  been  the  diversification  of  mechanisms  for  resolving  labour  conflicts.  Under  current 

54  

55  

Chivu  L.,  Ciutacu  C.,  Dimitriu  R,  Ticlea  T.,  (2013)  -  The  impact  of  legislative  reforms  on  industrial  relations  in  Romania, 
International Labour Office, Industrial and Employment Relations Department (DIALOGUE), Decent Work Technical Support 
Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe. -Budapest: ILO, 2013, ISBN 978-92-2-127598-5; 978-92-2-127599-2 
(web pdf) 

See  Explanatory  Memorandum  to  the  Social  Dialogue  Law  No  62/2011,  em185.pdf.Law  gathered  and  fined  earlier  legal 
provisions in this field, namely: Law 54/2003, of trade unions, Law No 356/2001 of employers' organisations, Law 109/1997 on 
Economic and Social Committee, GD 369/2009 regarding Social Dialogue Commissions at public administration and territorial 
levels,  Law on Collective Bargaining and Labour  Contracts No 130/1996; and Law No 168/1999  on the Settlement of Labour 
Disputes 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

legislation,  mediation  procedures  (with  specific  stages  of  mediation,  conciliation  and  voluntary 
arbitration,  set  out  under  Law  No  192/2006)  were  introduced  as  new  tools  for  improving  the 
functioning  of  social  dialogue  and  preventing  workplace  disputes 
through  cooperation, 
communication and the amicable settlement of labour disputes, including the threat of strike action. 

The new model of social dialogue was developed on the basis on the current legal framework and led 
to the following changes: 

a) The organisational structure of the social dialogue takes place mainly at the level of the individual 
firm,  but  the  high  proportion  of  smaller  enterprises  in  the  Romanian  economy  limits  the  scope  for 
negotiation. Collective bargaining is compulsory only for companies with more than 21 employees.56 
For  companies  with  15-21  employees,  collective  bargaining  is  based  on  the  free  initiative  of  the 
employer and the employees' representative. Companies with fewer than 15 employees have no legal 
obligation regarding social dialogue. This legal threshold for compulsory social dialogue development 
at company level, associated with the very high proportion of small enterprises and micro-enterprises 
in the Romanian economy, has led to a significant reduction in the trade union membership rate. The 
ongoing  process  of  privatisation  of  large  public  owned  companies  and  entrepreneurial  activities 
initiated  through  foreign  direct  investment  has  also  steadily  diminished  trade  union  membership. 
Moreover,  the  elimination  of  the  national  collective  contract  has  limited  the  number  of  employees 
protected  by  collective  agreements.57  The  proportion  of  unionised  employees  is  much  lower  in  the 
private sector. 

b)  Changes  in  the  role  and  level  of  interaction  of  the  social  partners,  with  an  increase  in  the 
importance  of  bipartite  social  dialogue  at  company  level  and  the  reorganisation  of  the  tripartite 
structures for social dialogue. 

c) An obligation introduced by law to reconfirm the representativeness of the social partners that can 
negotiate at the level of groups of companies and at sectoral level has not only resulted in a delay in 
the resumption of negotiations, but has generated a reorganisation of the traditional social partners at 
to  form  representative  associations  at 
sectoral 
sector/branch/business  activity  levels  and,  on  the  other  hand,  trade  unions  are  interested  in  the 
protection  of  employees.  This  protection  is  framed  in  a  common  agenda  of  social  issues,  working 

the  one  hand,  employers  seek 

level.  On 

56  

57  

In June 2014, the number of companies/units with more than 21 employees, registered at the Territorial Labour Inspectorates was 
272 386, 365 fewer than in the equivalent period in 2013 (of which 11 842 were state owned, 259 404 private owned, 884 had 
mixed ownership and 256 had other types of ownership). On average, the number of employees under collective agreements in 
state  owned  and  mixed  companies 
tendency  decreasing. 
http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/transparenta/statistici/buletin-statistic/3531 Statistical Bulletin in the field of labour and 
social protection in Q2 – 2014, conditii_TII2014.pdf  

in  private  companies,  but 

is  steadily 

is  higher 

than 

The single collective agreements signed at national level (the last one was in force up to the end of 2010) provided an automatic 
extension mechanism for the contractual provisions negotiated to all employees (erga omnes); also, these provisions become the 
minimum threshold for the lower level of negotiation. 

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conditions, remuneration form and wage level etc., as are efforts to increase employees’ influence in 
the decision-making process at company level. 

d) In Romania, in line with EU trends, there is an opening to an extended social dialogue to include 
other  actors  and  civil  society  representatives,  SMEs  (previously  largely  excluded  from  collective 
bargaining), associations and representatives from rural areas (rural economy actors), representatives 
of  the  social  economy  and  associations  of  migrant  workers  (including  workers  from  other  EU 
Member States), etc. The main problem remains representativeness, which now poses a challenging 
barrier  to  collective  bargaining  at  sectoral  level,  including  for  some  traditional  social  actors.  A 
legislative  initiative  to  amend  Law  No  62/2011  is  currently  being  debated  in  the  Romanian 
Parliament, with the aim of unblocking the social dialogue mechanism. 

8.2. Legislative framework for the social dialogue in Romania 

The main forms of social dialogue are bipartite, tripartite and civil society.58 

Bipartite  social  dialogue  (BSD),  as  an  autonomous  form,  was  altered  from  the  outset  due  to  the 
involvement  of  the  government  (trade  union  membership  is  still  predominantly  in  large  companies 
with  total  or  majority  state  ownership).  Collective  bargaining  is  mandatory  at  company  level.  The 
number of collective labour agreements concluded at company level in Q2, 2014 was 5 290, 359 more 
than in 2013, Q2, comprising 3 893 collective agreements in Q2, 2014 (an increase of 378 compared 
with 2013) and 1 397 additional agreements (a decrease of 19 as against the 2013 figure). In terms of 
type of ownership, there was an increase in collective agreements in private companies (up by 405) 
and  in  additional  agreements  in  state  owned  companies  (up  50).59  In  2008,  the  total  number  of 
collective  labour  agreements  (collective  agreements  and  additional  agreements)  was  11 729,  a 
decrease of 45% in Q2, 2014. This demonstrates the fact that national legislation does not encourage 
the  development  of  collective  bargaining,  but  on  the  contrary  has  actually  led  to  a  decline  in 
representativeness. 35% of employees would benefit from stronger BSD.60 

Collective agreements may also be negotiated at the level of groups of companies and at sectoral level 
(Article  128,  Law  No  62/2011).  The  national  level  for  autonomous  bipartite  social  dialogue  was 
abolished in 2011. At present, the highest level of BSD is the sectoral level, and collective agreements 
can be negotiated and concluded under Government Decision No 1260/2011 (29 sectors of activity, 
based  on  the  NACE  Rev  2  activity  classification).  Up  to  30  September  2014,  only  three  collective 

58  
59  

60  

http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/dialog-social/dialogul-social  
http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/transparenta/statistici/buletin-statistic/3531 Statistical Bulletin in the field of labour and 
social protection in Q2, 2014 and Q2, 2013. 

PDF_2013_13L399EM.pdf, pg.2-3 (Explanatory statement) 

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agreements at sectoral level had been signed: in health and veterinary activities, higher education and 
research, and pre-university education.61 

Romanian  labour  law  has  established  the  social  partners’  representativeness  for  the  purpose  of 
negotiation (based on quantitative criteria that still have to be confirmed by the courts, based mainly 
on the number of members) and the effects and applicability of collective agreements (limited after 
2011 to the signatory organisations).62 An extension of the collective agreement at sectoral level (for 
all  companies/units)  has  been  requested  only  for  the  health  sector.63  Also  worth  mentioning  is  the 
sectoral  level  committee,  organised  at  industry  level,  as  an  atypical  form  of  bilateral  autonomous 
social dialogue (Law No 132/1999, similar to the European sectoral committee, but not functional).  

Forms of BSD with multipartite participation could include: a) a dispute resolution procedure (set up 
at the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and the Elderly (MLFSPE), National Office of 
the 
Mediation 
administration/government and unions or the administration/government and employers on economic 
and social issues in organised meetings (committees or commissions). 

and  Arbitration);  b)  permanent  or  occasional 

consultation  between 

Tripartite  social  dialogue  (TSD)  takes  place  within  the  institutional  structures  of  tripartite 
consultation: the National Tripartite Council for Social Dialogue (NTCSD) established at the national 
level  of  social  partners,  social  dialogue  committees  at  sectoral  level  (SDC),  parliamentary  working 
committees  or  other  ad  hoc  tripartite  structures.  TSD  takes  place  at  different  levels  in  the  form  of 
consultation and information sharing and, as  an advanced form of social partnership, negotiation. It 
refers to the Social Pact negotiation and its conclusions. The NTCSD was created as a continuation of 
the tripartite consultation mechanism (government - trade unions - employers’ associations) and as an 
advisory  structure  of  the  social  partners,  following  the  reorganisation  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  (ESC)  in  2011  designed  to  establish  civil  society  dialogue.  The  TNCSD  legitimates 
government involvement in TSD – it is presided over by the Prime Minister of Romania and can be 
replaced only by the Minister of Labour, Family, Social Protection and the Elderly. The composition 
of  the  NTCSD  Board  includes  members  of  the  representative  trade  union  confederations  and 
employers  nationwide  and  members  of  the  government,  appointed  in  all  ministries  and  at  state 
secretary level by the prime minister. The purpose of the NTCSD is to achieve tripartite consultation 

61  

62  

63  

Available  at:  http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/dialog-social/info/protectie-sociala/dialog-social/951-ccm-ramura:  CCM 
1726-29.11.2013  la  Nivel  de  Sector  de  Activitate  "Sănătate.  Activități  veterinare"  2014-2015;  CCM  59495-2012  Sector  de 
activitate Învăţământ Superior şi Cercetare; CCM 59276-2012 Sector de activitate Învățământ Preuniversitar 

Art 133 of the Law No 62 provide specific conditions: (1) collective bargaining agreements produce effects that are specific to 
the level at which they are concluded (all employees of a company, in the case of contracts passed at this level; all employees of 
the companies that comprise the group/sector of activity for which the collective contract was concluded); (2) only one collective 
agreement may be concluded and registered at a specified level. For each agreement signed, the list of participant companies has 
to be drawn up and signed. The application of  the extension provision is possible only for registered contracts, after a special 
request  addressed  to  the  NTCSD.  By  order  of  the  Minister  of  Labour,  Family  and  Social  Protection,  with  the approval  of  the 
NTCSD, the collective contract may be extended at the level of all units of the respective sector of activity. 

See more details can be found at: http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/info/protectie-sociala/dialog-social/3387  

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

on  the  government's  economic  and  social  strategies,  including  the  gross  minimum  payment 
guaranteed in the settlement of conflict situations. It also ensures a peaceful social climate, reviews 
requests for extension of collective agreements at sectoral level, negotiates and concludes agreements 
or social pacts aimed at achieving peace and social stability and deals with other issues of common 
interest  or  related  to  the  development  and  implementation  of  government  strategies,  policies  and 
programmes.  TSD  at  sectoral  level  operates  in  the  form  of  institutionalised  social  dialogue 
commissions  (SDCs)  established  at  central  level  (ministries  and  other  central  public  institutions). 
SDCs are composed of ministerial representatives and representatives appointed by trade unions and 
employers' organisations at national level. The institutional framework for informing and consulting 
the  social  partners  on  legislative  initiatives  and  other  matters  of  interest  to  them  falls  within  the 
competence  of  the  central  government  ministry  or  institution.  Consultation  is  a  first  step  towards 
establishing binding legislation, as a means of solving real problems in the field of competence of the 
central institutions and also as a means of reporting situations that may generate social tension. TSD 
at  local  level  takes  place  in  the  SDCs  established  in  the  prefectures.  These  are  comprised  of 
representatives of local government and one representative appointed by each of the confederation's 
representatives at national level. Its aim is to inform and consult the social partners on the decisions of 
local  authorities  or  other  issues  of  interest  locally.  Representatives  of  all  local,  business  and  civil 
society organisations may attend as guests, depending on the issues discussed. There are no organised 
and  regulated  institutionalised  TSD  structures  at  regional  level  for  objective  reasons  related  to 
regional administrative organisation in Romania. The Social Dialogue Department of the MLFSPE is 
responsible for coordinating and monitoring the institutional structures of TSD. It is responsible for 
the  efficient  organisation  of  the  NTCSD  and  tripartite  working  group,  dissemination,  dialogue  and 
strengthening social partnerships and regulatory improvements in social  dialogue, including through 
the  implementation  of  European  and  international  standards  in  the  field.  It  also  promotes  cultural 
dialogue and tripartism. In Romania, a delegate from the ministry is designated as coordinator of the 
specific activities.64 

An  advanced  form  of  TSD  and  of  social  partnership  itself  (similar  to  the  ILO  definition  of  TSD 
"plus") is present in Romania by involving civil society organisations in the social dialogue. There are 
no regulations on the purposes of this form of dialogue. In practice there has been an increase in the 
participation of NGOs in tripartite consultations of social dialogue committees, but their status/role is 
limited to that of guest, not member, and their right to express their opinions is limited subject to the 
agreement of each SDC. In terms of the government, dialogue with civil society organisations takes 
place in the framework of  consulting the Romanian Economic and Social Council (ESC) (of which 
they are members) and is based on Law No 52/2003 on transparency in government and Article 51 of 
Ordinance No 26/2000. 

64  

Article (7), Rules of organisation and functioning of the MLFSPE , ROF_MMFPS_2012.pdf 

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DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 

The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Civil society dialogue as an advanced form of TSD. The term "civil society dialogue" has not yet 
been  defined  in  national  legislation.  The  dialogue  between  parliament/government  and  the  ESC, 
although similar to the TFEU's definition of social cooperation between the European institutions and 
the European Economic and Social Committee, is assimilated with social dialogue at national level in 
Romania. 

8.3. Special features of the organisation and role of the ESC in Romania 

Prior to the entry into force of Law No 62/2011, the ESC had an advisory role: a) in economic and 
social  strategies  and  policy  design,  b)  in  the  settlement  of  conflict  between  the  social  partners,  at 
sectoral or national level, and c) in achieving, promoting and developing social  dialogue and social 
solidarity.  The  ESC  was  consulted  by  the  initiators  of  draft  legislation  and  draft  programmes  and 
strategies falling within its field of competence. The consultation process was compulsory. The ESC 
was also established in order to achieve national social dialogue between employers, unions and the 
government and to secure a climate of social stability and peace. 

Law  No  62/2011  on  social  dialogue65  altered  the  structure  and  organisation  of  the  Economic  and 
Social Council (ESC66), so that it became a tripartite social dialogue structure at the national level 
of civil society dialogue (between civil society actors) similar to the European Economic and Social 
Committee (government representatives were removed from this structure, the NTCSD being created 
instead). Under to its new role, civil society organisations67 participate with traditional social partners 
in  the  consultation  process  within the  ESC.  In  accordance  with  Article  82  of  Law  No  62/2011,  the 
ESC  is  an  autonomous  public  institution  of  national  interest,  aiming  to  achieve  national  dialogue 
between employers' organisations, trade unions and civil society organisations. The ESC is defined as 
a consultative body of the parliament and government in areas established by its own founding law, 
organisation and functioning. It has an advisory function in working out strategies and economic and 
social  policies.  Its  purpose  is  to  guide  legislative  initiatives  and  report  economic  and  social 
phenomena that require legislative changes and action. Although it has major responsibilities, such as 
giving  its  consent  to  all  normative  acts  in  its  field  of  competence,  in  actual  fact  the  ESC  has  not 
operated  as  a  statutory  civil  society  dialogue  structure  since  the  entry  into  force  of  Law  No 
62/2011.68  Subsequently,  in  an  attempt  to  unblock  its  activity,  a  specific  Law  on  the  ESC's 

65  

66  
67  

68

The social impact of Law No 62/2011 has been defined in the explanatory memorandum to the bill as follows: ensure effective 
social  dialogue  by  clarifying  the  representativeness  of  the  social  partners,  ensure  relevant  employee  coverage  by  collective 
agreements,  allow  involvement  in  the  socio-economic  debate  of  the  civil  society  representatives,  ensure  timely  settlement  of 
labour disputes.  Although it  was  publicly  debated  and has  been  submitted  to  the  ESC  for  approval,  the  Social  Dialogue  Law, 
unamended  notwithstanding  observations  raised  by  the  social  partners  and  other  representatives  of  civil  society,  has  been 
promoted by the Government, which has assumed responsibility without parliamentary debate. 

http://www.ces.ro/economic-social-council/en/1  

In terms of direct dialogue between government and NGOs (also understood as civil society dialogue), in the absence of NGO 
platforms or other types of direct networks, it is limited to information and consultation. 

http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law_latest_country_reports/national_legislation/legislative_developments/ 

prm/109/v__detail/id__3363/category__29/index.html  

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

organisation  and functioning  (248/201369)  was adopted.  The  most  important  changes  in  this  respect 
concern the procedure for designating the representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations 
in  the  ESC,  so  that  each  trade  union  or  employers’  association  representative  at  national  level  is 
entitled to a place in the body. 

The  ESC  plenary  session  has  a  structure  consisting  of  45  members  including  the  president  and  the 
vice-presidents. The distribution of members of the ESC is as follows: 15 members nominated by the 
employers’ confederations representative at national level; 15 members nominated by the trade union 
confederations  representative  at  national  level;  15  members  representing  civil  society  appointed  by 
decision of the prime minister, on a proposal from the MMFPSE, cooperative structures, professions, 
consumer  protection  organisations,  the  scientific  and  academic  community,  farmers'  organisations, 
organisations of retired people, local community organisations, associations representing families and 
people with disabilities and other NGOs (ESC, Rules of Procedure70, Rule 15). The problem of how to 
select members representing civil society has not yet been resolved. 

The ESC is composed of nine permanent sections as provided under Law  No 62/2011 on the Social 
Dialogue: a) Section for Economic Development, Competition and Business Environment; b) Section 
for  Social  Inclusion  and  Social  Security;  c)  Section  for  Industrial  Relations  and  Wage  Policy;  d) 
Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment; e) Section for Education, Vocational 
Training, Health and Culture; f) Section for Consumer Protection and Fair Competition; g) Section for 
Cooperation, Professions and Independent Activities; h) Section for Rights and Freedoms; i) Section 
for Public Administration and Public Order. Problems and draft legislation in the field of research fall 
within the competence of the existing sections and, if necessary, any other temporary sections may be 
established by the ESC Plenary Session (ESC, Rules of Procedure71, Rule 39). 

The  ESC's  competences  have  been  expanded72,  with  new  responsibilities  allowing  it  to  give  its 
consent  to  normative  acts  adopted  in  the  following  fields:  economic,  financial  and  fiscal  policies; 
work relations, social protection and wage policies; agriculture, rural development and environmental 
protection; consumer protection and fair competition; cooperatives, freelance work and independent 
activities;  rights  and  freedom  of  association  and  non-governmental  organisations;  health  policy; 
policy in the spheres of education, research and culture. 

The  ESC  aims  to  step  up  its  activity  in  areas  that  could  be  useful  for  the  development  of  the 
democratic process in Romania, including strategic priorities in the medium term. A major objective 

69  

70  
71  
72  

This  was  published  in  Official  Gazette  No  456,  of  24  July  2013.  The  organisation  and  operation  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council is now regulated in a distinct Act, and all provisions regarding the Economic and Social Council in Law No 62/2011 are 
abrogated. 

ROF-CES-08-04-2012-EN.pdf 

ROF-CES-08-04-2012-EN.pdf 

Law No 248/2013, Articles 2(2) and 5, http://www.ces.ro/legislation/en/9  

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

will  be  to  develop  regional  economic  and  social  councils  and  to  strengthen  cooperation  with  other 
economic and social councils in the other Member States. 

At present, a legislative proposal to amend Law No 248 is currently under discussion and awaiting the 
approval  of  the  Romanian Parliament.73The  main  additions  consist  of including  of  civil  dialogue  in 
specialised ESC areas; 

- 

- 

- 

- 

redefining the ESC as a national level public institution that is tripartite, autonomous and aims 
to  provide  civil  society  dialogue  at  national  level  between  employers’  organisations,  trade 
unions and civil society representatives; 
representatives of civil society will be proposed in accordance with the EESC model and will 
be nominated by decision of the prime minister; 
the  following  civil  society  structures  can  appoint  representatives  to  the  ESC:  human  rights 
organisations  (including  women's,  young  people's  and  child  rights  organisations); 
organisations operating as resource centres; health organisations and organisations for persons 
with disabilities; organisations for social services and poverty eradication; environmental and 
rural  organisations;  academic,  professional  and  consumer  protection  associations;  social 
economy  organisations;  cooperative  organisations;  professional  associations;  farmers' 
organisations;  organisations  of  pensioners;  local  community  organisations  and  other  NGOs 
working in the areas of competence of the ESC; 
the ESC Plenum is to adopt decisions by consensus of its members. 

The operation of the ESC in Romania is faced with some major challenges: 

-  Up  until  the  enactment  of  Law  No  62/2011,  the  ESC  included  government  representatives. 
The  newly  established  National  Tripartite  Social  Council  took  on  the  previous  tasks  of  the 
ESC  in  social  dialogue.  The  place  of  the  third  party  in  ESC  membership  was  replaced  by 
organised civil society. Currently,  it is not functioning as a genuinely  civil society dialogue 
body. 

-  The  opinion  given  by  the  ESC  is  a  consultative  one  and  accompanies  draft  legislation  or 
legislative  initiatives.  If  its  opinion  is  not  unanimously  accepted  by  the  parties,  its  position 
will be recorded and this will take the place of an opinion. In the past, opinions expressed by 
the ESC have often not been taken into account in the final version of legislation; 

-  Local and regional structures aiming to support decentralised civil society dialogue need to be 

developed. 

73  

PDF_2014_14b519FG.pdf 

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UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

8.4. The impact of the crisis on the functioning of TSD in Romania 

The Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and the Elderly includes ESC activity as part of the 
national level social dialogue. In this perspective, and considering the role of the ESC in the period 
2008-2011, it is understandable that during the crisis the role of the social partners was downsized and 
their  level  of  activity  decreased,  even  though  Romania  was  among  the  few  EU  countries  where  a 
severe austerity programme was put in place, with drastic implications for workers' incomes, working 
conditions and job security. 

During this period, the social partners drew attention to the ESC's diminishing role (the reaction of the 
social partners in 2011 is well documented in ILO studies on the Romanian reforms74) and considered 
that institutional reform had been promoted in an undemocratic manner – the social partners’ opinions 
were ignored and the consultation procedure was a pure formality (Dandea P.S., 2014).75 Since 2011, 
ESC activity has mainly been focused on producing opinions on draft legislation (these are approved 
by the executive board during the non-statutory meetings of the plenum). 

During  the  crisis  there  was  also  a  considerable  decrease  of  the  number  of  collective  disputes  (116 
conflicts of interest with 205 000 participants in 2008, 73 with 61 700 participants in 2010, 35 with 
55 600 participants in 2011 and 22 with 7 700 participants in 2013). The reasons for this are twofold: 
on the one hand, there was a lack of response on the part of the government to protests relating to the 
implementation  of  the  austerity  programme  and,  on  the  other  hand,  job  cuts  in  the  public  sector 
reduced confidence in social dialogue and also in the ESC as the national level body for democratic 
consultation and negotiation. 

8.5. Other dialogue structures in the context of social and political pluralism 

In terms of multilevel governance and the TSD institutional framework in Romania, we can observe a 
risk  of  confusion  and  overlap  in  the  role,  initiatives  and  actions  implemented  at  national  and 
local/regional level, and between social dialogue and civil society dialogue bodies. On the one hand, 
there are TSD structures acting in an extended area of responsibility and, on the other hand, the ESC's 
strategic orientation is to develop regional/local structures. In the absence of local level structures of 
the  ESC,  new  forms  and  structures  of  social  dialogue  have  been  developed.  These  can,  in  fact,  be 
considered local mixed structures (of social dialogue and of civil society dialogue), consisting of the 

74  

75  

See  Appendix 5  for  more  detail  -  The  impact  of  legislative  reforms  on  industrial  relations  in Romania  (Chivu  L.,  Ciutacu C., 
Dimitriu  R,  Ticlea  T.,  2013)  -,  International  Labour  Office,  Industrial  and  Employment  Relations  Department  (DIALOGUE), 
Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe. -Budapest: ILO, 2013, ISBN 978-92-
2-127598-5; 978-92-2-127599-2 (web pdf) and in Ch. 12 - Romania: A Country Under Permanent Public Sector Reform (Vasile 
V., 2013), (p. 449-510) in  Public Sector Shock: The impact of policy retrenchment in Europe, Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.) 
ILO Geneva, ISBN 978-1-92-2-126568-9, 652p., ebook isbn 978 1 78195 535 2, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. UK 
and Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.USA, http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/bookentry_main.lasso?id=15209 

Interview with Dandea Petru Sorin –vice-president  Cartel ALFA – 3 October 2014 

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UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

traditional social partners, representatives of local authorities and civil society representatives. Some 
examples are as follows: 

a)  The  first  initiative  could  be  to  consider  the  establishment,  organisation  and  functioning  of 
civil  dialogue  advisory  committees  (CDAC)  for  issues  concerning  the  elderly,  in  the 
prefectures  (Government  Decision  No  499/2004).  Their  work  mainly  aims  to:  a)  provide 
collaborative  relationships  that  allow  ongoing  sharing  of  information  relating  to  specific 
problems regarding the elderly; b) consultation with representatives of older people on draft 
legislation which is to be initiated, including in all matters of economic, social, medical and 
cultural interest. The thematic working sessions of CDACs for issues concerning the elderly 
in  201276,  for  example,  were  focused  on  the  major  socio-economic  problems  with  a  direct 
impact  on  the  lives  of  older  people:  pensions,  health,  tickets for  spa treatments,  partnership 
with the local neighbourhood police and with pensioners’ associations etc.; 

b)  The establishment of an Economic and Social Development Council (CDES) in Iasi County.77 
The  Council  comprises  the  Prefecture  (promoter),  Iasi  County  Council  and  City  Hall, 
business  representatives,  academics  and  NGOs.78  The  CDES  mission  is  to  provide  a 
consultative  framework  to  support  collaboration  between  public  institutions  and  businesses 
with  the  backing  of  academia  and  civil  society.  The  operational  objectives  of  this  body 
include enhancing dialogue and increasing administrative transparency by formalising public-
private  consultations  (Article  7  of  the  Statute).  Activities  of  the  CDES  in  Iasi  comprise: 
organising regular meetings with directors of the decentralised services, improving relations 
between the state authorities and entrepreneurs; organising meetings between representatives 
of the business world, academia, civil society and parliamentarians from Iasi with a view to 
promoting  legislative  proposals  and  amendments  (Articles  22-23);  organising  meetings 
between  representatives  of  business,  academia  and  civil  society  in  order  to  implement 
common projects and identify business opportunities (Article 24); 

c)  Establishment  of  working  groups  involving  trade  unions  and  employers’  organisations  for 
drawing  up  the  county’s  development  strategy  for  the  period  2014  –  2020;  and  also  the 
establishment of the Local Committee for the Development of Social Partnership in TVET, 
comprising  the  representatives  of  the  public  authorities  and  the  social  partners  in  Bistrita-
Nasaud county; 

d)  Establishment  of  a  Local  Partnership  Group  in  Calarasi  County.  The  group  comprises  40 
members  including  representatives  of  the  two  trade  unions  and  the  business  environment, 

76  
77  

78  

Comitetele_consultative_de_dialog_civic_pentru_problemele_persoanelor_vârstnice_în_anul_2012.pdf 

The following examples are presented in Pana D.A. (coord) - Anuarul dialogului social tripartit din Romania 2013 (Yearbook of 
the  Tripartite  social  dialogue  in  Romania 2013),  Social  Dialogue  Division,  Ministry  of  Labour,  Family,  Social  Protection  and 
Elderly. 

http://www.prefecturaiasi.ro/comisii-si-comitete,  http://www.prefecturaiasi.ro/dezvoltare-economica,  Protocol  si  statut  CDE.pdf 
(Protocol and CDE status); Regulament functionare ONG,pdf, (NGO operating rules). 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

SMEs and multinationals, also for the purpose of planning the county’s development strategy 
for the period 2014 – 2020. 

e)  Establishment  of  Regional  Pacts  for  Employment  and  Social  Inclusion  (RPESI)  as  a 
partnership entity and to set up resource centres. These bodies include: the local authorities, 
decentralised  public  services, traditional social  partners,  NGOs,  universities,  companies  and 
other  social  actors.  The  RPESI  mission  is  to  increase  the  capacity  of  stakeholders  to  create 
projects that respond to real problems and to mobilise and empower additional stakeholders to 
address  structural  problems  at  regional  or  local  level  in  the  field  of  employment  and  social 
inclusion. These pacts were created for the development and implementation of employment 
policy at regional level (development of Regional Action Plans for Employment and Social 
Inclusion  -  PRAO)  and  for  increasing  the  take-up  of  EU  funds.  Permanent  technical 
secretariats  for  these  pacts  in  all  8  regions  were  subsequently  created,  providing  technical 
expertise  and  necessary  resources  for  guaranteeing  the  efficient  implementation  of 
agreements. The pacts were, as a result, more dynamic, becoming truly representative of all 
regions, attracting new members and creating their own structures and processes. In the year 
2012,  for  example,  the  8  Regional  Pacts  for  Employment  and  Social  Inclusion  brought 
together 833 stakeholders from all categories. It is estimated that pact members are involved 
in the implementation of approximately 70% of HRD projects currently under way.79 For the 
next  programming  period, an  increase  in  the role  of  sound  project  implementation  for local 
development and social inclusion has been planned. 

f)  Another  consultative  structure  with  relevant  activity  in  dialogue  with  the  government  is  the 
Coalition  for  the  Development  of  Romania,  established  last  year,  consisting  of  20  business 
associations  and  18  permanent  observers  from  the  foreign  embassies  in  Bucharest.  The 
Coalition  holds  regular  meetings  (once  or twice  a  month, including  in the  reporting  period) 
with  the  prime  minister  and  other  ministries,  such  as  the  Ministry  for  European  Funds, 
promoting initiatives and providing expertise. 

g)  Another relevant structure is the Inter-institutional Committee for the Partnership Agreement, 
created  two  years  ago,  a  body  consisting  of  the  most  relevant  stakeholders  (public  and 
private) in terms of attracting funding from the European Structural Funds. It did not have any 
activity in the reporting period, because the ministry in charge (Ministry for European Funds) 
did not convene any meetings. 

8.6. Brief conclusions and policy recommendation for enhancing civil society dialogue at 
all levels 

79  

inclusion 

in  Romania,  Report-  March 

Pactele regionale pentru ocupare si incluziune sociala din Romania, Raport – martie 2012 (Regional Pacts for employment and 
social 
2012), 
2012), 
RAPORT+FINAL+PACTE+REGIONALE.pdf Establishing eight Regional Pacts for Employment and Social Inclusion was the 
initiative of the MLfspe through technical assistance projects Phare RO 2003/005 - 551.05.01.04.04.01 entitled "Support for the 
Ministry  of  Labour  in  developing  and  implementing  employment  policy  and  preparation  for  EDIS  "(EDIS  -  Extended 
Decentralised Implementation system). Such resources centres could be organised also at county or local level. 

I.,  Ghiman  L., 

(Cartarescu 

Isaila  S, 

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UNIVERSITA’ DI VERONA 
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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

i) Elimination of national level collective bargaining removed a powerful tool for the social partners 
to achieve consent on some fundamental issues. In addition, the need to reconfirm representativeness, 
the increase in the minimum threshold and the prolonged crisis resulted in a significant reduction in 
the  number  of  companies  obliged  by  law  to  negotiate  and  settle  collective  contracts.  The  level  of 
negotiation was changed from industry to sector of activity, which effectively blocked BSD at sectoral 
level, as it did TSD. The establishment of the 29 sectors of activity, which partially corresponded to 
the organisational structure of the social partners in terms of activities, led to a need for reorganisation 
and with some of the social partners losing their representative status. Basically, the reforms initiated 
in 2011 create dysfunctions in multi-partner dialogue.80 We also have to point out that participation 
and  involvement  of  the  social  partners  in  institutionalised  social  dialogue  is  uneven.  Trade  unions 
show more interest than employers’ organisations in social  dialogue, both at central and local level, 
which reflects the balance of interests represented. 

ii)  ESC  activity  during  the  crisis  was  basically  a  formality;  the  reform  programme  and  austerity 
measures were undertaken by the government without taking into account the social partners' opinion. 
Virtually  ignoring  the  opinion  of  the  social  partners  has  led  to  reduced  confidence  of  the 
employees/members  in  social  dialogue  effectiveness.  Even  today,  democratic  consultation  is  more 
formal, and fails to take account of many of the opinions expressed by the social partners in the ESC 
on legislative proposals. In terms of formal approach, social dialogue committees in ministries set up 
to  amend  draft  legislation  based  on  their  specific  interests  did  not  achieve  the  expected  outcomes. 
However,  some  officials  consider  that  in  terms  of  an  informal  approach,  these  committee  meetings 
have  proved  to  be  effective  as  a  means  of  maintaining  open  channels  of  communication  between 
ministries and the social partners (Pana D.A.- Delegate Ministry for Social Dialogue).81 

iii)  In  the  case  of  the  ESC,  statutory  civil  society  dialogue  is  inoperative  because  of  problems  in 
selecting  civil  society  representatives  and  there  have  been  delays  in  setting  up  the  new  Tripartite 
Council (NTCSD). For the time being, these institutions are not operating in accordance with the role 
conferred on them by law. 

iv) The abolition of the possibility of extending the system of collective agreements has significantly 
decreased the number and proportion of employees covered, with a negative impact on benefits (level 
of wages, working conditions etc.); in order to reduce inequities created between similar jobs, a wider 
platform of democratic dialogue proved necessary to develop industrial relations and boost business. 

80  

81  

At the beginning of April, the social dialogue with unions – employers’ organisations and the Government was re-started, at the 
initiative  of  the  Delegate  Ministry  for  Social  Dialogue,  Aurelia  Cristea.  At  the  meeting, all  the  organisations  representative  at 
national  level  were  present  and  the  discussion  was  focused  on  suggestions  regarding  the  modification  of  the  Social  Dialogue 
Law. At the same meeting, two new working groups were created, the first to identify economic tools that could generate new 
jobs, and the second to follow up on solving the problems of public sector employees. 

Pana D.A. (coord) - Anuarul dialogului social tripartit din Romania 2013 (Yearbook of the Tripartite social dialogue in Romania, 
2013), Social Dialogue Division, Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly. 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

Developments  in  recent  years  stimulated  multi  stakeholder  dialogue,  especially  at  local  level,  as 
hybrid bodies of civil society dialogue (assumed by officials as extended TSD at local level) – e.g. the 
Economic and Social Development Council at county level, Local Partnership Group at county level, 
Coalition for the Development of Romania, Inter-institutional Committee for Partnership Agreement, 
Local  Committee  for  the  Development  of  Social  Partnership  in  TVET,  civil  dialogue  advisory 
committees for issues concerning the elderly, etc. Territorial pacts have been created (Regional Pacts 
for  Employment  and  Social  Inclusion),  a  multi-beneficiary  mechanism,  in  order  to  solve  local 
problems by bringing together funding for activities undertaken (drawing on the Structural Funds and 
other EU funds). 

v)  Organising  social  dialogue  in  a  relatively  rigid  framework  does  not  facilitate  a  more  accurate 
representation of the interests of significant local actors beyond those established by law. Therefore, 
the  need  to  open  the  dialogue,  especially  to  include  ministries  and  local  interested  social  actors, 
basically  calls  for  openness  to  civil  society  organisations.  In  2013,  such  extended  committees  also 
discussed  problems  raised  by  NGOs;  in  the  main,  those  who  initiated  topics  addressed  in  social 
dialogue committees were as follows: 47% of proposals came from the local authorities, 42% from 
the  trade  unions  and  only  7%  from  employers’  organisations.  Moreover,  the  examples  above 
demonstrate a shift in the social dialogue towards civil society representatives, especially at the local 
level, where they can operate more efficiently and can build up support for sound policy measures in 
order  to  achieve  local  development,  based  on  networks  of  stakeholders  and  smart  distribution  of 
resources. 

vi) Current efforts on the part of the social partners, especially the trade unions, are targeted mainly at 
identifying ways to rebuild the legislative framework in a manner that leads to unblocking social and 
civil  society  dialogue  in  Romania  (currently  efforts  are  focused  on  amending  legislation).  In  this 
respect, it is important to unlock and improve the functioning of the ESC as a  civil society dialogue 
forum at national level and also of the new NTCSD, as the TSD body at national level. 

vii)  Development  of  civil  dialogue  initiatives  recently  initiated  by  the  government.  In  May  2014, 
Aurelia Cristea, from the Delegate Ministry for Social Dialogue, launched a consultative process with 
civil society organisations, inviting them to register and express their areas of interest with a view to 
setting  up  an  NGO  forum  for  reaching  agreement  on  the  major  issues  with  a  social  and  economic 
impact, as mentioned in the government programme. 

The development of civil society dialogue, although initiated in various forms and at various levels of 
organisation, has progressed rather slowly relative to the needs of Romanian society. Inexperience in 
the  exercise  of  democracy  and  too  few  proactive  joint  initiatives  are  a  problem  with  both  the 
traditional  social  partners  and  civil  society  representatives.  Solid  action  is  required  to  create  a 
coherent  framework  for  civil  dialogue  development 
level  – 
completion/updating;  at  institutional  level  -  restructuring  and/or  developing  the  local  and  regional 

in  Romania:  at 

legislative 

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The representation of the world of labour in national and European institutions:  
the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

structure of the network system of cooperation; the development of policies to promote  civil society 
dialogue,  calling  for  a  new  model  of  dialogue  -  multi-beneficiary,  flexible,  ethical  and  the 
responsibility  of  all  social  actors.  Without  openness,  joint  and  enhanced  actions,  parliamentary 
legislative initiatives under discussion cannot be operationalised. In this context, the strengthening of 
the  institutional  role  of  the  ESC  together  with  building  up  the  third  party  of  this  structure  –  that 
representing civil society - are the main components of a coherent framework design for civil society 
dialogue development in Romania. 

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the role of the national and European economic and social committees and of other dialogue structures 

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