Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 October 2015 on the central register of bank accounts (CON/2015/36)
Date: 2015-10-16
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Czechia, account, bank, data collection, database, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 16 October 2015 

on the central register of bank accounts  

(CON/2015/36) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 4 September 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech Ministry of 

Finance  (MoF)  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  on  the  Central  Register  of  Bank  Accounts  (hereinafter  the 

‘draft law’).  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 

29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national  authorities  regarding  draft 
legislative  provisions1,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  a  national  central  bank.  In  accordance  with  the  first 

sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The main purpose to the draft law is to set up a centralised database of basic information on bank 

accounts in the Czech Republic. A centralised database could significantly simplify and streamline 

the  delivery  of  account  information  from  the  banking  sector  to  the  competent  authorities.  It  will 

enable  the  competent  authorities  to  more  efficiently  identify  who  owns  which  account  and  to  use 

that  information  to  make  further  enquiries  at  the  credit  institution  concerned  with  a  view  to 

prosecuting  eventual  offenders  and  thereby  protecting  the  financial  resources  and  security  of  the 

State. 

1.2  The main provisions of the draft law are as follows: 

 

The  draft  law  sets  up  a  central  database  of  basic  information  on  accounts  maintained  for 

their  clients  by  credit  institutions,  i.e.,  banks,  credit  unions  and  branches  of  foreign  banks 

established  in  the  Czech  Republic  (hereinafter,  the  ‘central  register  of  bank  accounts’  or 

‘CRBA’). 

 

 

The  Czech  National  Bank  (ČNB)  will  administer  the  CRBA  and  be  responsible  for 

supervising the obligations of the above institutions under the draft law. 

The CRBA will hold certain basic data on accounts held by individuals and legal entities with 

the  above  institutions,  namely  data  identifying  the  account  holder  and  the  credit  institution, 

1  

OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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the date of the account’s opening and closing, any change to the identification data and any 

authorisation to dispose of resources held on the account. No information on the resources 

on the account will be collected in the CRBA. 

 

The State commits to pay ČNB for the costs that ČNB incurs in setting up and administering 

the  CRBA.  Detailed  rules  on  the  CRBA  information  system  and  on  the  reimbursement  of 

ČNB’s costs will be covered in an agreement to be concluded between the MoF and ČNB. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Credit  institutions  will  be  required  to  submit  the  prescribed  data  for  the  CRBA  to  ČNB  in  a 

form, structure and frequency to be set out in a ČNB Decree. 

The  CRBA  will  be  accessible  only  to  listed  competent  public  authorities  (e.g.  the  State 

authorities  responsible  for  financial  or  customs  administration,  the  authorities  involved  in 

criminal  proceedings  and  the  State  intelligence  agency,  hereinafter  referred  to  as 

‘applicant(s)’) that are entitled to request data subject to banking secrecy requirements from 
credit institutions, under the conditions laid down by a further law2 and only upon a request 

made via an encrypted electronic data box specifically intended for this purpose. 

ČNB will enable access to the CRBA only if the applicant meets the access conditions and 

follows the stipulated procedures.  

The applicants will be exclusively responsible for ensuring that they are properly authorised 

and  meet  the  other  conditions  for  accessing  data  subject  to  banking  secrecy  requirements 
under the applicable banking laws3. 

ČNB will be obliged to store the aforementioned data on closed accounts for 10 years. 

ČNB will also be obliged to publish an annual report on its website on the operation and use 

of the CRBA, including aggregated data. 

1.3  

It is understood that the MoF intends to bring the draft law into force on 1 January 2016. To allow 

time  to  set  up  the  database,  the  draft  law  stipulates  that  the  CRBA  will  only  be  accessible  to 

applicants  after  fifteen  months  from  the  date  of  the  draft  law’s  entry  into  force.  The  ECB  notes 

however that this provision was not contained in the draft law on which the MoF consulted it, but in 

a later version of the draft law attached to the MoF explanatory memorandum. A number of related 

laws will also consequently need to be amended. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  would  like  to  recall  that  when  new  tasks  are  conferred  on  an  ESCB  member,  it  is 

necessary to assess these tasks against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of 

the Treaty. For this purpose and in the light of that basic need, the ECB has developed guidance in 

the form of general and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether 

2  

3  

Pursuant to Article 38(3) of the Act on Banks No. 21/1992 Coll., as amended, reports on matters concerning a client 
which are subject to banking secrecy may be submitted by a bank without the client’s consent only upon the written 
request  of  certain  listed  authorities.  The  respective  laws  governing  the  activities  of  each  of  the  listed  authorities 
stipulate which individuals(s) may submit the request for such report on the authority’s behalf in the performance of 
its public tasks. Under the draft law however a much narrower list of authorities would be permitted to request data 
from the CRBA.  
See footnote 2 above.  

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the  new  task  conferred  on  an  ESCB  national  central  bank  (NCB)  is  to  be  considered  a  central 
banking  task  or  a  government  task  for  the  purposes  of  the  monetary  financing  prohibition4.  This 

guidance is set out in this paragraph 2.1. The concrete assessment of whether the ČNB’s task to 

administer and operate the CRBA is to be considered a central banking task or a government task 

is then undertaken in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2.  

2.1.1  General considerations 

First,  the  systematic  categorisation  of  tasks  assigned  to  NCBs  as  central  banking  or  government 

tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 

the  central  banking  tasks  already  assigned  to  an  NCB.  In  recognition  of  the  different  Member 

States’  legal  frameworks,  central  banking  traditions  and  national  set-ups,  the  tasks  currently 

discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be 

reassessed if their substance is amended. 

Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their 

NCBs  in  a  position  where  they  have  insufficient  financial  resources  to  carry  out  their  ESCB  or 

Eurosystem-related tasks.  

Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in 

Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty. 

Fourth,  new  tasks  conferred  on  an  NCB  which  are  atypical  of  NCBs’  tasks,  or  which  are  clearly 

discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, 

should be considered as government tasks 

2.1.2  Specific considerations 

An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is therefore the impact of the 

task  on  the  institutional,  financial  and  personal  independence  of  the  NCB.  In  particular,  the 

following issues should be taken into account. 

First,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  inadequately 

addressed  conflicts  of 

interests  with  existing  central  banking 

tasks,  without  necessarily 

complementing  the  existing  central  banking  tasks.  If  a  conflict  of  interest  arises  between  existing 

and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in place to adequately address that 

conflict.  Complementarity  between  the  new  task  and  existing  central  banking  tasks  should  not, 

however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 

tasks.  The  assessment  of  the  complementarity  of  a  new  task  should  also  take  into  account  the 

financing of that task. 

Second,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  without  new  financial  resources  the  performance  of  the 

new task places a disproportionate burden on the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB 

and may negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. 

4  

See in the first instance paragraph 2 of Opinion CON2015/22.  

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Third,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  is  aligned  with  the 

institutional  set-up  of  the  NCB,  in  particular  as  regards  central  bank  independence  and 

accountability considerations. 

Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial 

risks. 

Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 

NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and could also impact on 

their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the Governor’s term of office under 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

2.2  Any  final  assessment  on  the  qualification  of  a  task  given  to  an  NCB  as  either  falling  within  the 

scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 

consistent application of the monetary financing prohibition within the Eurosystem and the ESCB. 

3.  

Specific observations 

3.1  Conferral of the task of administering the CRBA on ČNB 

The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  would  assign  to  ČNB  the  administration  and  operation  of  the 

CRBA.  

3.1.1  New task  

The  administration  of  the  CRBA  is  an  entirely  new  task,  which  no  public  authority  has  yet  been 

assigned  to  perform.  In  the  light  of  the  guidance  set  out  in  paragraph  2.1  it  must  therefore  be 

assessed  carefully  whether  this  new  task  and  the  associated  responsibilities  for  ČNB  could 

constitute a breach of the monetary financing prohibition. 

3.1.2  The principle of financial independence   

The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in 

a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB related 

tasks,  but  also  their  national  tasks,  both  from  an  operational  and  financial  perspective.  In  this 

regard the ECB welcomes Article 14(1) of the draft law, which requires the State to reimburse ČNB 

for any costs that ČNB incurs in setting up and operating the CRBA. This statutory commitment by 

the  State  will  alleviate  the  burden  that  the  performance  of  this  new  task  might  otherwise  put  on 

ČNB’s  financial  and  operational  independence  and  which  might  also  negatively  impact  on  its 

capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks.  

The ECB notes that Article 14(2) of the draft law requires an agreement to be concluded between 

the  MoF  and  ČNB  detailing,  among  other  matters,  how  ČNB’s  costs  for  the  establishment  and 

operation of the CRBA will be paid. The ECB would appreciate being provided with a copy of this 

agreement  for  information  purposes,  as  well  as  the  final  draft  of  the  ČNB  Decree  referred  to  in 

Article 17 (enabling provisions) of the draft law.  

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3.1.3   Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public    

entities 

The  ECB  has  previously  opined  that  tasks  entrusted  to  an  ESCB  member  relating  to  the 

establishment of a central register of bank account numbers are not central bank tasks nor do they 
facilitate the enforcement of such tasks5. Similarly, the new task of administering the CRBA does 

not relate to banking supervision, the collection of data for statistical purpose or other existing ČNB 
tasks  whether  under  the  Treaty  or  under  Czech  law6.  The  ECB  considers  this  new  task  to  be 

clearly  a  government  task  since  its  purpose  is  exclusively  to  further  the  State’s  interest  in  being 

able to more efficiently locate bank accounts held in the Czech Republic which may hold proceeds 

of  crime  and  thereby  protect  the  financial  interests  and  security  of  the  State.  It  thus  cannot  be 
regarded in any respect as a central bank task7.   

3.1.4  Complementarity of the new task with existing ČNB tasks and extent to which conflicts of interest 

with existing ČNB tasks are addressed  

The ECB appreciates that one of the main reasons for assigning the administration of the CRBA to 

ČNB is that it is regarded as having the necessary technical experience and integrity for performing 

such  a  task.  It  is  the  only  authority  which  currently  possesses  an  information  system  for  data 

transmission which enables it to obtain from credit institutions information on their clients’ accounts 
in the manner required for operating such a database8. The ECB also notes that the ČNB will be 

bound  by  the  same  secrecy  and  personal  data  obligations  in  respect  of  CRBA  data  as  apply 

currently  to  data  reported  by  credit  institutions  under  the  banking  laws.  Furthermore,  only 

designated  employees  will  be  authorised  to  operate  the  CRBA  and  no  exchange  of  data  will  be 

permitted  between  the  CRBA  and  any  other  legally  prescribed  register.  Taken  together,  these 

elements  should  limit  the  possibility  of  conflicts  of  interest  arising  between  the  operation  of  the 

CRBA and other ČNB tasks. 

The ECB further understands that the reporting scheme that institutions will use to submit account 

data to ČNB for the CRBA will be entirely separate from that used by credit institutions to meet their 

prudential reporting requirements and that only the technical format for the transmitted data will be 
the same9. In the light of the above - particularly the prohibition on sharing CRBA data with other 

registers - the new task cannot be regarded as complementing the ČNB’s existing tasks.  

Nonetheless,  the  ECB  considers  that  -  if  such  legal  restrictions  were  appropriately  amended  - 

administering  the  CRBA  could  serve  additional  purposes  linked  to  ČNB’s  existing  or  foreseen 

ESCB  tasks,  or  other  national  tasks  such  as  banking  supervision  or  the  collection  of  granular 

5  
6  

7  
8  
9  

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/30.  
ČNB  is  obliged  to  carry  out  checks  on  transactions  with  credit  institutions  and  other  obliged  entities  under  the 
domestic  legal acts implementing the EU anti money laundering and terrorist financing directives – principally Act 
No. 253/2008 Coll. June 5, 2008 on selected measures against legitimisation of proceeds of crime and financing of 
terrorism; also ČNB Decree No. 281/2008 Coll. of 1 August 2008 on certain requirements for the system of internal 
principles, procedures and control measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. However those tasks 
do not involve the collection of individual account data.  
See paragraph 2.3.1 (general considerations) of Opinion CON2015/22.  

See the General part of the MoF explanatory memorandum to the draft law (page 7).  
Under the Act on Banks 21/1992 Coll. and the Act on the ČNB 6/1993 Coll.  

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statistical  information  from  credit  institutions10.  Such  new  task  could  then  potentially  complement 

ČNB’s other statutory tasks. 

3.1.5  Extent to which the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the NCB  

In  view  of  the  fact  that  operating  a  bank  account  register  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  central  bank 

task, it might raise concerns as to how such a task would fit into the institutional set-up of a central 

bank.  In  this  case,  the  ECB  notes  that  the  reporting  scheme  is  legally  entirely  separate  from  the 

prudential  reporting  scheme  for  credit  institutions,  and  that  the  data  obtained  is  not  accessible  to 

other ČNB departments carrying out ESCB or other national tasks   

3.1.6  Extent to which the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks 

The State's commitment under the draft law to pay all costs of operating the CRBA should ensure 

that ČNB bears no significant financial risk in taking up this new task. The ECB understands that 

the  State  will  be  primarily  responsible  for  any  damage  or  loss,  including  costs  of  proceedings, 

incurred  by  ČNB  taking  an  unlawful  decision  or  using  the  wrong  administrative  procedure  in 
administering the CBRA11. It is however also noted that the State may request reimbursement from 

ČNB should ČNB be ordered by a court of law to pay damages as a result of its negligence or wilful 
intent when carrying out this task12.  

It  will  also  be  necessary  to  consider  the  exact  financial  terms  of  the  agreement  to  be  concluded 

between the MoF and ČNB under Article 14(2) of the draft law. In order to assuage any monetary 

financing concerns, it needs to be ensured that ČNB will be fully and adequately reimbursed for all 

the costs incurred in performing activities related to the tasks entrusted to it in connection with the 
CRBA13. The reimbursement should be made on the basis of ‘at arm’s length’ commercial terms - 
either in advance of costs being incurred or on a regular and prompt basis as the costs arise14. 

3.1.7  Extent  to  which  the  performance  of  the  new  task  exposes  the  members  of  ČNB’s  Board  to 

disproportionate political risks or could impact on their personal independence 

The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  makes  applicants  exclusively  responsible  for  being  properly 

authorised and meeting the other conditions for accessing data subject to banking secrecy under 

the  banking  laws  when  requesting  data  from  the  CRBA.  This  should  limit  the  risk  of  ČNB  being 

sued for allowing an applicant unauthorised access to the CRBA data. 

However, ČNB will be obliged to perform the new task as any other public function that is assigned 

to  it  by  law.  ČNB’s  Board  will  therefore  be  responsible  for  the  due  and  proper  operation  of  the 

CRBA. It cannot be excluded that ČNB’s Board could be exposed to reputational risks should the 

CRBA  data  –  albeit  of  a  less  sensitive  nature  than  some  of  the  other  data  received  from  credit 

institutions when performing its supervisory tasks - be accessed by a non-authorised applicant or 

10  

11  
12   
13  
14  

This would be for example applicable to the preparatory work launched by the ESCB under Decision ECB/2014/6 of 
the European Central Bank of 24  February 2014 on  the organisation of preparatory  measures  for  the  collection of 
granular  credit  data  by  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (OJ  L  104,  8.4.2014,  p.  72),  subject  to  national 
provisions as regards the re-use of the information for statistical purposes.  
Article 3 of the Act on State Liability No.82/1998 Coll., as amended.  
Articles 16-18 of the Act on State Liability No.82/1998 Coll., as amended.  

See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98 and paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/30.  
See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98.  

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otherwise be ‘leaked’. The fact that the CRBA will contain sensitive information, such as the basic 
data on accounts of politically exposed persons15, could place ČNB’s Board members in a difficult 

position should this information enter into the public domain in breach of the law. This could also 

entail a negative impact on their personal independence.  

3.2  Conclusion 

Whilst  welcoming  the  State's  financial  commitment  to  cover  ČNB's  costs  for  setting  up  and 

operating  the  CRBA,  which  will  deal  with  certain  concerns  over  ČNB's  financial  and  operational 

independence, as regards the terms of such financing ČNB should either be reimbursed for the full 

budgeted costs of setting up and operating the CRBA in advance of these costs being incurred or 

on  a  regular  and  prompt  basis  as  the  costs  arise.  Additionally,  as  the  reporting  scheme  for  the 

CRBA will be entirely separate from the prudential reporting scheme for credit institutions, and the 

data obtained will not be accessible to other ČNB departments carrying out ESCB or other national 

tasks,  the  new  task  of  administering  the  CRBA  cannot  be  regarded  as  complementary  to  ČNB’s 

current ESCB related and other national tasks. In view of these other considerations, the ECB has 

a more general concern about the assignment to ČNB of this sensitive new task.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 October 2015. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

15  

Under Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  amending  Regulation 
(EU)  No  648/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  and  repealing  Directive  2005/60/EC  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Commission  Directive  2006/70/EC  (OJ  L141,  5.6.2015,  p.  73),  NCB 
Board members are also deemed to be ‘politically exposed persons’. 

7