Case C-20/13: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 9 September 2015 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin — Germany) — Daniel Unland v Land Berlin (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2000/78/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Articles 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) — Direct discrimination on grounds of age — Basic salary of judges — Transitional arrangements — Reclassification and subsequent career advancement — Different treatment perpetuated — Justifications)
Date: 2015-09-09
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: age discrimination, equal pay, equal treatment, judge, remuneration of work, social policy








C_2015363EN.01000201.xml










3.11.2015   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 363/2





Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 9 September 2015 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin — Germany) — Daniel Unland v Land Berlin
(Case C-20/13) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Directive 2000/78/EC - Equal treatment in employment and occupation - Articles 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) - Direct discrimination on grounds of age - Basic salary of judges - Transitional arrangements - Reclassification and subsequent career advancement - Different treatment perpetuated - Justifications))
(2015/C 363/02)
Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings


Applicant: Daniel Unland

Defendant: Land Berlin

Operative part of the judgment







1)


Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that pay conditions for judges fall within the scope of that directive.










2)


Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the basic pay of a judge is determined at the time of his appointment solely according to the judge’s age.










3)


Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, establishing the detailed rules governing the reclassification of existing judges within a new remuneration system under which the pay step that they are now to be allocated is determined solely on the basis of the amount received by way of basic pay under the old remuneration system, notwithstanding the fact that that system was founded on discrimination based on the judge’s age, provided the different treatment to which that law gives rise may be justified by the aim of protecting acquired rights.










4)


Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, laying down detailed rules for the career progression of judges already in post before the entry into force of that law within a new remuneration system and securing faster pay progression from a certain pay step onwards for such judges who had reached a certain age at the time of transition to the new system than for such judges who were younger on the transition date, provided the different treatment to which that law gives rise may be justified in the light of Article 6(1) of that directive.










5)


In circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, EU law does not require judges who have been discriminated against to be retrospectively granted an amount equal to the difference between the pay actually received and that corresponding to the highest step in their grade.
It is for the referring court to ascertain whether all the conditions laid down by the case-law of the Court are met for the Federal Republic of Germany to have incurred liability under EU law.










6)


EU law must be interpreted as not precluding a national rule, such as the rule at issue in the main proceedings, which requires national judges to take steps, within relatively narrow time-limits — that is to say, before the end of the financial year then in course — to assert a claim to financial payments that do not arise directly from the law, where that rule does not conflict with the principle of equivalence or the principle of effectiveness. It is for the referring court to determine whether those conditions are satisfied in the main proceedings.






(1)  OJ C 86, 23.3.2013.