Literature review and identification of best practices on integrated social service delivery : part 1.
Date: 2015-08-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Subjects: EU employment policy, economic growth, labour market, social integration, social policy, social services, social-security benefit

Literature review and identification of  

 best practices on integrated 

social service delivery  

Part I 

March 2015   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
Directorate D – Europe 2020: Social Policies 
Unit D2 – Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction 

E-mail:  EMPL-D2-UNIT@ec.europa.eu  

European Commission 

B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature review and identification of  

 best practices on integrated 

social service delivery  

Part I 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 

ISBN 978-92-79-48091-1 
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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

Executive summary ........................................................................... 5 

The external drivers of welfare reform ........................................... 5 

The policy context ....................................................................... 5 

Policy adaptation: drivers and barriers ........................................... 6 

The potential benefits of service integration .................................... 7 

Lessons and recommendations...................................................... 7 

Introduction ................................................................................... 10 

PART I ........................................................................................... 11 

1. The external drivers of welfare reform ........................................... 11 

Technological change and globalisation ........................................... 11 

Demographic trends ..................................................................... 11 

New labour market risks ............................................................... 12 

The global financial crisis .............................................................. 14 

2. The policy context ....................................................................... 16 

3. Policy adaptation: drivers and barriers ........................................... 19 

3.1. The size and nature of the policy challenge ............................... 19 

3.2. The role of actors and their interests ........................................ 21 

3.3. The role of institutions ........................................................... 22 

4. The potential benefits of service integration ................................... 23 

5. Lessons for Europe ...................................................................... 26 

The first stage: political commitment and goal setting ...................... 26 

The planning stage: policy design .................................................. 27 

Implementation ........................................................................... 28 

Monitoring, evaluation and review .................................................. 29 

6.  Recommendations ..................................................................... 30 

7.  References ............................................................................... 31 

Appendix ....................................................................................... 37 

Explanations ............................................................................. 37 

Details ..................................................................................... 38 

5 

 
 
 
 
List of figures and tables 

Figure 1 - Female participation rate in selected countries, 1969-2013…………….…………….… 14 

Figure 2 - Fixed term and part-time contracts in the EU15, 1993-2013…………………………… 15 

Figure 3 - The unemployment rate by regime type, 2007-2013…………………………................... 16 

Figure 4 - Government deficit by regime type, 2007-2012……………………………………………….. 17 

Figure 5 - The changing focus of welfare support to the non-employed…….…………………...18 

Figure 6 - The share of registered unemployed among the non-employed working age 

population, 2000-2012…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 19 

Figure 7 - The employment rate by regime type, 2007-2013……………………………..…………….. 21 

Table 1 - Role division between PES and municipalities in EU Member States in 2014….. 20 

Table 2 - Examples for vertical and horizontal integration…………………………………………..….… 26 

Table 3 - Selected cases of service integration reforms in Europe………………..…………………. 27 

Table 4 - Successful integration reforms by institutional context………………..……………………. 31 

Table A.1 - Country groups based on welfare regime type and government efficiency…. 38 

Table A.2 - Institutional structure following the Dutch reform of 2000-2002………………….. 39 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature  review  and  identification  of 
best practices on integrated social service 
delivery (one-stop-shops) 

Executive summary 

This study investigates the literature and practice of integrated social service delivery (one-
stop-shops), reviews the evolution of the main approaches to integration and identifies best 
practices in Europe.   

The importance of the topic is highlighted by the European Commission’s Social Investment 
Package (SIP), which calls for Member States to adapt their social models to achieve smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. Beside stabilising the economy and strengthening social 
investments, this would also require the improvement of access to social services, especially 
for  disadvantaged  groups.  The  integration  of  social  services  has  emerged  as  a  possible 
response  to  this  challenge:  it  may  contribute  to  improving  access  and  take-up  or  coping 
with new types of social risks,  as well as to meeting  the  growing need for  prevention and 
coordination between increasingly complex services. 

The external drivers of welfare reform 

The recent global crisis and its labour market consequences have posed multiple challenges 
to welfare states and especially employment services and social protection. Most of these 
challenges  are  not  new  as  post-industrial  labour  markets  have  been  subject  to  frequent 
structural  changes  induced  by  technological  development,  demographic  trends  and 
globalisation.  

The nature of labour market risks has changed profoundly in the post-industrial economy: 
the  frequency  of  labour  market  transitions  between  jobs  and  vocations  has  increased,  as 
well as the participation of women and of other, potentially disadvantaged groups. This has 
been accompanied by an increased share of part-time jobs and fixed term contracts. 

In addition to these structural changes, the crisis has intensified labour market volatility and 
has augmented fiscal and political pressures to increase the effectiveness of public services 
in most EU Member States. The social consequences include not only rising unemployment, 
long  term  unemployment,  but  also  deep  poverty,  social  exclusion  and  long  term 
detrimental effects on educational investments and social cohesion. 

The policy context 

The policy response to the complex challenges must extend to a wide range of services and 
institutions.  In  this  study,  the  focus  will  be  on  activation,  and  particularly  on  the 
coordination between employment policy and social policy for low income households, as 
this is one of the areas where service integration may provide a solution. 

5 

 
The mission or main function of employment and social services is generally determined by 
the broader objectives of national governments’ policies. While  these  policies may vary in 
several ways, the dimensions most relevant to shaping service provision are those relating 
to  the  generosity  of  provisions  and  the  commitment  to  labour  market  activation  (i.e.  the 
flexicurity approach). 

The  recent  changes  in  the  nature  of  labour  market risks  necessitate  an adjustment  of  the 
coverage  and  structure  of  unemployment  protection  systems,  which  had  been  originally 
designed  to  provide  unemployment  insurance  for  the  temporarily  unemployed  male 
breadwinner  and  social  assistance  to  those  unable  to  work.  In  particular,  the  adjustment 
requires  the  partial  or  full  integration  of  unemployment  insurance  and  poor  relief.  The 
implication for Public Employment Services (PES) is that they may be expected to extend 
their services to cover a wider range of groups either assuming the main responsibility for 
their activation or by cooperating more closely with other government agents charged with 
their activation. 

Policy adaptation: drivers and barriers 

Though  external  challenges  are  similar,  the  policy  response  of  European  welfare  states 
shows considerable variation. This may be  in  part  explained by cross-country variations in 
the magnitude  and nature  of the challenge and in  part  by the actors and institutions that 
shape the policy making process in these countries.  

The external shock of globalisation and the changing nature of labour markets proved more 
of a challenge to Continental welfare regimes that are based on insurance, compared to tax 
financed  Liberal  or  Social-Democratic  welfare  regimes.  Continental  welfare  states  have 
tended  to  give  priority  to  wage  equality  and  budgetary  stability  over  full  employment, 
which  resulted  in  low  employment  levels  compared  to  Nordic  or  Liberal  states.  As  social 
security  is  mostly  provided  through  insurance  schemes,  low  labour  market  participation 
threatens the stability of the Continental welfare system. 

The influence of actors and institutions on policy formation may be exerted through several 
channels. Cross country variations in policy outcomes may arise from the differences in the 
views and interests of citizens, organized elites, political parties or external actors, such as 
the EU Commission, as  well as from the differences in the institutions that mediate  these 
interests.  

Uncertainties about the expected outcomes of welfare reform may introduce a status quo 
bias  against  change.  Similarly,  the  level  of  trust  and  credibility  garnered  by  political 
institutions  can  also  be  crucial.  This  might  affect  outcomes  not  just  by  having  an  impact 
upon  regulation  but  also  by  having  an  independent  effect  upon  the  success  of  the 
implementation of the new rules. 

The  institutions  of  interest  mediation  also  affect  policy  responsiveness,  such  as  those 
concerning  the  electoral  system,  the  ease,  necessity  or  tradition  of  forming  a  coalition 
government,  the  strength  of  the  opposition,  the  devolution  of  state  functions  to  levels  of 
governance,  de  facto  veto  points  given  to  various  actors,  or  the  political  framework  of 
industrial  relations.  Features  determining  whether  a  broad  consensus  is  necessary  for 
change seem particularly important.  

6 

The  quality  of  public  administration,  i.e.  its  capacity  to  articulate  goals  and  find  and 
elaborate  policy  solutions,  may  also  affect  policy  outcomes,  especially  in  the  case  of 
complex institutional reforms.  

Lastly, path dependency theories claim that institutional change may be constrained by the 
historical roots of welfare regimes, which set nations on distinct trajectories that tend to be 
difficult  to  reverse.  Differences  in  the  bureaucratic  tradition  or  institutional  culture  of  the 
organisations that are  supposed to be  cooperating have  also  been identified as important 
barriers  of  successful  service  integration.  The  existing  legal  and  governmental  framework 
and  management  structures  can  also  impede  the  integration  process.  Such  rigidities  are 
likely  to  affect  the  transferability  and  success  of  particular  arrangements  in  service 
integration.  

The potential benefits of service integration 

The growing literature on service integration has documented several advantages of well-
designed  integrated  approaches,  such  as  tailor-made,  flexible  and  responsive  policy 
options;  cost  effectiveness  and  efficiency  by  sharing  knowledge,  expertise  and  resources 
across  cooperating  actors;  capacity  building  and  innovation,  etc.,  along  with  considerable 
challenges in how to reach these outcomes. Concerning labour market services, one of the 
main challenges is the coordination and balancing of the provision of income support with 
job search incentives and other forms of activation.  

Though mainly descriptive, earlier studies on integration reforms already offer a number of 
lessons regarding the factors that may determine the success of integration initiatives, such 
as  the  clarity  and  harmonisation  of  goals  across  the  cooperating  agencies  or  the  clear 
division of responsibilities between agents.  A successful integration reform should include 
carefully  designed  financial  or  administrative 
incentives  for  cooperation  and  that 
integration reforms should entail the adjustment of performance indicators to account for 
joint  efforts  in  order  to  eliminate  dysfunctional  competition  between  service  units.  Also, 
when  service  integration  at  the  local  level  entails  increased  autonomy  and  new  types  of 
tasks,  this  should  be  supported  by  capacity  building  in  planning,  evaluation  and  case 
management as well. 

Lessons and recommendations 

Integration  can  be  realized  vertically,  implying  more  systematic,  closer  cooperation 
between  several  levels  of  the  government,  or  horizontally,  linking  services  provided  by 
separated entities.  

This study reviewed nine reform initiatives: three cases of vertical integration reform, and 
six cases of horizontal integration. Based on these, we considered the drivers and barriers of 
service integration reforms in each of the four main stages of the policy making process. 

The  main  lesson  concerning  the  first  stage  of  the  policy  making  cycle  relates  to  the 
importance  of  political  institutions.  Service  integration  is  a  complex  reform  that  typically 
affects  several  stakeholders.  The  existing  examples  of  successful  initiatives  suggests  that 
there are two political constellations in which governments can carry through their reform 
agenda. First, if governance is centralised and there are relatively few strong veto players in 
the  political  system,  as  for  example  in  the  UK.  Second,  in  a  less  centralised  (e.g.  federal) 

7 

system, or if there are strong veto players, reform is only possible if there is a wide cross-
party consensus over the goals and also in the main policy solutions. 

Economic  or  social  tensions  can  in  some  cases  help  to  build  political  consensus.  This  was 
apparently  the  case  in  Austria  and  Germany  where  unfavourable  domestic  trends  in 
employment and income inequalities led to increased awareness of the structural problems 
and generated political support for the reforms.  

The  main  lesson  concerning  the  policy  design  stage  is  to  keep  the  reform  manageable  in 
terms  of  size  and  complexity.  The  reform  process  is  easier  to  manage  and  more  likely  to 
succeed if changes are gradual or are limited to a few well selected areas, especially if the 
planning  and  management  capacities  of  public  administration  are  limited.  The  Estonian 
case is a good example of setting a relatively modest goal that is appropriate to the existing 
quality and capacity of the Estonian public administration.  

The  success  of  integration  reforms  also  depends  on  the  performance  and  cooperation  of 
local  level  agents.  This  requires  well  designed  administrative  and  financial  incentives,  as 
illustrated  by  the  Danish,  Finnish  and  British  cases.  Countries  with  a  strong  regional 
government  may  rely  on  the  alternative  source  of  political  accountability.  This  was  the 
(unintended) outcome of the Austrian reform initiative, where the central government did 
not  succeed  in  introducing  a  standardised  form  of  service  integration  but  several  regions 
implemented  their  own  local  solutions  to  the  problem  of  increasing  poverty  among  the 
unemployed.  

Performance  can  be  further  improved  by  performance  management  techniques  (e.g.  the 
elaborate Danish system that makes PES performance indicators publicly available). If the 
new system allows a high level of local autonomy in designing services and protocols (e.g. in 
the Austrian or Danish cases) there is also a need for close monitoring to ensure that service 
quality and access to services is the same across the country.  

Service integration entails more intense cooperation between agents. Given the complexity 
of the tasks involved, this will only work smoothly and efficiently if roles are clearly divided 
and allocated to the right level of government and the appropriate institutions that have the 
capacity  to  perform  them.  The  Finnish  case  is  an  often  cited  good  example  for  properly 
designed and allocated roles.  

It  follows  from  the  above  that  the  availability  of  high  quality  public  administration  is 
essential in the design stage. This is particularly important in horizontal reforms where the 
appropriate motivation of local actors is crucial. 

The  success  of  the  implementation  stage  clearly  depends  on  the  quality  of  planning,  and 
especially on the design of incentives for the main actors affected by the reform.  

The  pace  of  the  reform  process  also  matters.  Piloting  in  small  scale,  expanding  gradually 
and allowing time for detecting and correcting problems, adjusting staff capacities and skills 
can further improve outcomes even if the initial plan was already good enough to guarantee 
success.  

Service  integration  may  change  skills  requirements  in  several  levels  and  positions  of  the 
system. If these skills are missing or inadequate, there is a need for capacity building at the 
beginning of the implementation stage.  Retraining may be necessary even if existing staff 
is highly trained.  

8 

Involving and informing all parties concerned about the reform and its consequences can be 
crucial. Properly informing the clients is especially important if there are major changes in 
the  physical  location  of  service  providers  or  in  the  procedure  of  accessing  benefits  and 
services. 

Given  the  complexity  of  service  integration  reforms,  the  last  stage  of  the  policy  making 
process  is  particularly  important.  In  successful  reforms,  the  monitoring  of  processes  and 
outcomes  starts  in  the  pilot  phase  and  continues  after  the  full  upscaling  of  the  reform. 
Monitoring  in  the  early  stages  helps  detect  and  correct  problems  before  national 
implementation  and  support  gradual 
improvement  and  adjustment  to  changing 
circumstances as well.  

As we have seen, the existing institutional context, especially political institutions and the 
quality  of  public  administration  should  be  taken  into  account  when  deciding  about  the 
scope  and  aims  of  service  integration  reform  and  to  some  extent  these  factors  also 
determine the appropriate incentive structures for post-reform institutions.  

Based on this, we recommend that Member States looking for inspiration should consider 
examples  that  were  implemented  in  an  institutional  context  similar  to  their  own.  We 
identified  two  main  dimensions  of  the  institutional  setup:  the  efficiency  of  public 
administration,  and  the  degree  of  centralisation  considering  both  the  overall  political 
structure and the institutional arrangements characterising employment and social policy.  

9 

 
 
Introduction 

This study investigates the literature and practice of integrated social service delivery (one-
stop-shops), reviews the evolution of the main approaches to integration and identifies best 
practices  in  Europe.  The  first  part  of  the  study  gives  a  systematic  overview  of  the 
theoretical,  empirical  and  policy  literature  of  integrated  social  service  delivery,  with  a 
particular emphasis on activation services. Based on the existing literature and detailed case 
studies, the first part also offers some policy recommendations for the design of integrated 
service  delivery  related  to  one-stop-shops  and  activation.  The  second  part  of  the  study 
describes  ten  examples  of  social  service  integration  in  the  EU  in  nine  Member  States,  in 
each  case  describing  the  aims,  the  context,  the  main  measures  and  the  outcomes  of  the 
reform and concluding with an assessment of the potential for policy transfer. 

The importance of service integration reforms is highlighted by the European Commission’s 
Social Investment Package (SIP), which calls for Member States to adapt their social models 
to  achieve  smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  Beside  stabilising  the  economy  and 
strengthening  social  investments,  this  would  also  require  the  improvement  of  access  to 
social services.  

The  integration  of  social  services  has  emerged  as  a  possible  response  (or  an  important 
element  in  a  wider  set  of  institutional  reforms  and  policy  measures)  to  this  challenge. 
Service integration deserves attention as it may not only contribute to improving access and 
take-up, but also provide an answer to coping with new types of social risks, the increased 
role of prevention, and the need for coordination between increasingly complex services. 

Member  States  are  committed  to  the  same  goals  outlined  in  the  SIP  and  many  of  the 
challenges  they  face  are  also  similar  (such  as  ageing  or  the  depreciation  of  skills  due  to 
technological  change).  At  the  same  time,  their  welfare  systems  responded  to  these 
challenges in  a  variety of ways, the analysis of  which can yield  useful lessons for Member 
States. We understand this study to be a contribution to such an effort. However, it should 
also  be  kept  in  mind  that,  even  if  the  external  challenges  are  similar,  the  response  of 
institutions  and  policies  are  shaped  not  only  by  the  problem  but  also  by  the  existing 
institutional structures. This implies that lessons derived from an analysis of some countries 
may  not  be  relevant  and  transferable  to  other  countries  with  a  different  institutional 
tradition,  or  only  with  considerable  adjustments  based  on  a  thorough  analysis  of  any 
differences in the local context.  

10 

 
 
PART I 

This first part of the study provides a systematic overview of the theoretical, empirical and 
policy literature of integrated social service delivery, with a particular emphasis on one stop 
shops  and  activation  services.  It  is  divided  into  five  sections.  The  first  section  outlines  the 
economic and demographic processes that pose a challenge to European welfare systems. 
The second section briefly describes the existing institutional framework for the provision of 
unemployment  benefits  and  activation,  and  the  next  section  reviews  the  drivers  and 
barriers to policy change. In the fourth section, we consider the potential benefits of service 
integration. The last section offers some lessons and recommendations.  

1. The external drivers of welfare reform 

The recent global crisis and its labour market consequences have posed multiple challenges 
to welfare states and especially employment services and social protection. Most of these 
challenges  are  not  new  as  post-industrial  labour  markets  have  been  subject  to  frequent 
structural  changes  induced  by  technological  development,  demographic  trends  and 
globalisation  (Clasen  and  Clegg  2011;  Ditch  and  Roberts  2002;  Häusermann  and  Palier 
2008).  

Technological change and globalisation 

Technological  development  implies  that  as  new  and  more  effective  ways  to  manufacture 
products  (or  deliver  services)  emerge,  capital  and  labour  need  to  adjust.  By  opening  new 
markets  for  goods  and  capital,  globalisation  generates  further 
incentives  for  the 
reallocation  of  capital  across  industries  or  countries.  Technological  change  has  tended  to 
accelerate  since  the  1990s  requiring  much  more  frequent  adjustments  than  in  previous 
times  (Basu,  Fernald,  and  Shapiro  2001).  In  order  to  stay  competitive,  firms  are  under 
constant  pressure  to  implement  the  innovations  (replace  the  old  machines,  materials, 
management techniques or business strategies with the new and better ones) or cut costs 
by cutting wages or relocating their production to some place where resources and labour 
are cheaper. Workers also need to adjust constantly: they need to learn to operate the new 
technologies, materials and management systems, and retrain in a new vocation if their old 
trade declines. They may also be challenged to choose between lower pay, or moving to a 
new place where they can find better job opportunities. 

Demographic trends 

A rough summary of the main demographic trends characterising the past decades is that 
Europeans have fewer children, but live longer. The smaller size of new generations reduces 
the  labour  force,  which  is  to  some  extent  compensated  by  immigration,  the  increased 
labour  market  participation  of  women,  improving  levels  of  education  and  increased  life 
expectancy in good health. The latter developments can increase the active labour force or 
improve  labour  productivity,  especially  if  supported  by  appropriate  adjustments  in  the 
welfare  system.  The  successful  integration  of  immigrants  requires  efficient  employment 
services, and the labour force participation of women necessitates more and better formal 
daycare 
into  higher  worker 
productivity  only  if  public  education  and  adult  training  can  adjust  to  the  new  needs  and 

institutions.  The  expansion 

in  schooling  will  translate 

11 

teach skills and competencies rather than focusing only on fast-eroding factual knowledge. 
Lastly,  the  improved  health  conditions  of  the  middle  aged  and  the  elderly  will  not 
automatically  increase  the  active  labour  force.  There  is  a  need  for  adjusting  incentives  to 
work built into the unemployment benefits and pension systems, and for strengthening life-
long  learning,  rehabilitation  and  active  labour  market  policies  that  support  transitions 
between jobs and vocations during the working life. 

To illustrate the magnitude of demographic developments, Figure 1 depicts four decades of 
gradual rise in the female labour force participation rate in selected developed economies. 
Apart  from  the  convergence  of  these  rates,  it  is  worth  noting  that  countries  with  a  more 
traditional  attitude  to  gender  roles,  such  as  Spain,  may  go  through  a  very  fast  process  of 
adaptation. 

Figure 1 - Female participation rate in selected countries, 1969-2013 

Source: ILO online database, using national LFS.  

New labour market risks 

The nature of labour market risks has changed profoundly in the post-industrial economy. 
First, workers are much more likely to have several jobs and even several vocations during 
their working life than previously. Technological change implies that people may lose their 
jobs even if they work in a prospering branch of the economy, if they cannot adapt to the 
changing skill requirements of their occupation. Or jobs may be shred in one location and 
moved to another part of the world, even if consumer demand is stable or rising. These risks 
affect manual workers, white collar employees and the self-employed alike.  

Second, following the demographic changes already mentioned above, the labour force has 
become more heterogeneous. The emancipation of women that accelerated during World 
War II, together with the decline in the strength of family ties and a rise in individualisation 
has  expanded  the  ranks  and  types  of  people  looking  for  paid  work,  most  notably, 
economically independent women, whether single or divorced, with or without children. As 
traditional gender roles in the household and the provision of public or private care services 
have  been  slow  to  adjust  to  this  trend,  women  are  more  likely  to  experience  a  conflict  of 

12 

 
 
work and family life (Budig, Misra, and Böckmann 2010; Misra, Budig, and Boeckmann 2015; 
Janus 2012). 

Steadily rising immigration flows have further increased the ethnic and religious diversity of 
the  European  labour  force  (De  La  Rica,  Glitz,  and  Ortega  2013).  Lastly,  human  rights 
movements  (as  well  as  concerns  about  the  sustainability  of  the  welfare  system)  have 
initiated a slow but noticeable improvement in the availability of rehabilitation services and 
legal  provisions  against  anti-discrimination,  which  in  turn  increases  the  labour  market 
integration of people with disabilities (OECD 2010a; Scharle, Váradi, and Samu 2015). These 
groups  are  often  in  a  disadvantaged  position  as  they  may  face  discrimination  in  terms  of 
access to work or level of pay, unstable (precarious) employment, lack of social insurance, or 
lack  of  access  to  welfare  services.  They  may  also  be  less  able  to  protect  their  interests  as 
they  tend  to  be  outside  the  traditional  focus  of  trade  unions  and  advocacy  groups 
supporting  workers’  rights.  These  risks  are  obviously  not  new,  but  their  importance  has 
increased  over  the  last  decades,  as  long-term  socio-economic  trends  expanded  both  the 
size  of  the  risk-groups  and  the  frequency  of  risk  events  within  the  individual  life  course  
(Huber and Stephens 2006). 

Heterogeneity has increased in working hours and contract types as well. Some new labour 
market  groups,  such  as  mothers  with  pre-school  age  children,  or  students  prefer  to  work 
shorter  hours  and  this  has  met  the  needs  of  the  24-hour  service  economy.  As  Figure  2 
shows, the share of part-timers has been particularly high among women, but has also been 
steadily  increasing  among  men  in  the  past  two  decades.  In  the  latest  European  Jobs 
Monitor, Hurley, Fernández-Macías, and Storrie (2013) report a particularly high growth of 
part  time jobs in  Germany, Lithuania, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.  Another notable 
trend is the slow rise in the share of fixed term contracts, reflecting the increased volatility 
of labour demand, and possibly also the increased share of disadvantaged workers who are 
less able to negotiate favourable terms in their contracts (see Figure 2).  

Figure 2 - Fixed term and part-time contracts in the EU15, 1993-2013 

Source: Eurostat on-line database 

13 

 
 
 
The global financial crisis 

In addition to the long term structural changes outlined above, the global financial crisis has 
intensified  labour  market  volatility  and  has  augmented  fiscal  and  political  pressures  to 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  public  services  in  most  EU  Member  States.  European 
employment  declined  on  average  by  2  percentage  points  while  unemployment  rose  by  4 
percentage points between 2008 and 2013. The share of the long term unemployed among 
all  jobseekers  increased  from  about  37%  in  2008,  to  over  47%  in  2013.  The  social 
consequences  include  not  only  rising  unemployment  and  long  term  unemployment,  but 
also  deep  poverty,  social  exclusion  and  long  term  detrimental  effects  on  educational 
investments and social cohesion.   

Unemployment  has  risen  in  all  EU  Member  States,  however,  the  extent  to  which  these 
shocks translated into persistent unemployment varies considerably. Countries with a more 
effective  public  administration  (which  also  implies  more  mature  welfare  systems  and 
automatic  stabilisers)  seemed  to  be  more  able  to  prevent  the  rise  of  unemployment, 
regardless of the welfare regime type.1 For example, the labour market shock was relatively 
small and the build-up of long term unemployment remained modest and even declined in 
the Social Democratic Nordic countries compared to others experiencing a similar increase 
in  unemployment  (see  Figure  3).  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  in  Liberal  regimes  with  a 
relatively less effective government (the Baltic States belong to this group), the initial rise in 
unemployment  and long term  unemployment was  very large, but they also seemed to be 
able  to  contain  it  after 2010,  as  opposed  to  countries  in  the  Corporatist-low  effectiveness 
group (Southern and Eastern Europe). 

Figure 3 - The unemployment rate by regime type, 2007-2013 

Source: Eurostat on-line (Labour Force Survey).  Notes: For regime types see foonote 1. High and low refer to 
government  effectiveness,  which  we  distinguished  according  to  the  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010): countries with an above average score on government 
effectiveness  are  considered  high,  below  average  ones  are  considered  low  efficiency.  All  Social  Democratic 
countries are in the high effectiveness group. For more detail on the grouping please see the Annex. 

1
 Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished three types of welfare system, on the basis of social rights  and the 
main provider of welfare: in Corporatist regimes insurance based rights are granted by the state, in Liberal 
regimes the market is the  main provider and in Social Democratic ones, universal (tax financed) rights are 
granted by the state. For more detail on the country groups please see the Appendix.  

14 

 
 
 
                                    
These cross-country variations can be explained partly by the differential impact of the crisis 
across  industries.  For  example,  the  construction  industry  contracted  in  most  EU  Member 
States  and  it  remained  depressed  in  most  countries  where  the  sector  enjoyed  a  boom 
before the crisis (OECD 2011). The labour market consequences of the crisis also depended 
on composition of the industrial sector as larger, more technology and skill intensive firms 
were able to weather the fall in output without shedding excess labour (OECD 2010b). 

The  efficiency  of  existing  labour  market  institutions  also  played  a  role  (Basso  et  al  2012). 
Such institutions may help contain the build-up of long term unemployment by keeping up 
the  job  search  intensity  of  the  unemployed  and  by  supporting  the  efficient  matching  of 
labour demand and supply. These processes can be reinforced by legislative measures, such 
as employment protection legislation and minimum wage setting, financial incentives (e.g. 
wage  subsidies  or  the  level,  duration  and  coverage  of  unemployment  benefits),  the 
behavioural conditions to benefit receipt, or training programmes, and other ALMP as well 
as PES services.  

The  speed  and  effectiveness  of  government  response  to  the  crisis  also  mattered.  Many 
Member  States  strengthened  their  existing  unemployment  insurance  system  by  easing 
access or  improving benefit generosity in  order to cushion the negative effects of income 
shocks.  For  example,  Germany  and 
insured 
unemployment  benefit  and  Sweden  increased  the  replacement  rate  (the  percentage  of 
benefit amount compared to previous in-work income) (Basso et al. 2012). Many countries 
however  decided  to  curb  the  generosity  of  unemployment  provisions  either  to  prevent 
benefit dependence and long term unemployment or to cut welfare spending.  

Italy  extended  the  duration  of  the 

Most  Member  States  also  relied  heavily  on  active  labour  market  policies.  Almost  all 
countries  reinforced  activation  by  intensifying  training,  job  search  assistance  and  overall 
public  employment  service  capacities.  Enhancing  the  internal  flexibility  of  labour  markets 
and cutting labour costs represented another set of policy responses. The reliance on work 
sharing schemes (the reduction of working hours combined with a reduction in gross wages) 
increased  in  some  of  the  countries  where  such  schemes  had  already  existed  before  and 
could  be  easily  extended  (e.g.  the  German  Kurzarbeit  scheme,  or  the  chômage  partiel  in 
France; Cazes, Verick, and Heuer 2009). Some countries also invested in  entrepreneurship 
incentives  (e.g.  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  or  Spain),  targeted 
measures focusing on disadvantaged individuals characterised by a high risk of job loss and 
by  low  levels  of  social  protection  (Cazes,  Verick,  and  Heuer  2009;  Basso  et  al.  2012)  and 
direct job creation via public works programmes (e.g. Hungary, Ireland and Latvia). 

15 

 
 
Figure 4 - Government deficit by regime type, 2007-2012 

Source:  Worldwide Governance Indicators, % of GDP.  
Note: For the definition of country groups see notes to Figure 3. 

The crisis put a strain on governments to balance budgets amid falling revenues and rising 
expenditures.  In  2009  and  2010,  almost  all  Member  States  faced  a  government  deficit  of 
over 3% and for many countries it took another year to stabilise their fiscal stance (Figure 4). 
Fiscal constraints have increased pressure on governments to increase the cost efficiency of 
their  Public  Employment  Services  and  ALMP  spending  and  encouraged  an  upsurge  in 
impact analyses in some Member States. 

2. The policy context 

The policy response to the complex challenges outlined in section 1 must extend to a wide 
range  of  services  and  institutions.  In  this  study,  the  focus  will  be  on  activation,  and 
particularly  on  the  coordination  between  employment  policy  and  social  policy  for  low 
income  households,  as  this  is  one  of  the  areas  where  service  integration  may  provide  a 
solution. 

The mission or main function of employment and social services is generally determined by 
the broader objectives of national governments’ policies. While  these  policies may vary in 
several ways, the dimensions most relevant to shaping service provision are those relating 
to the generosity of provisions and the commitment to labour market activation,2 which is 
akin to the flexicurity approach (as described by  European Commission 2007). On the one 
hand,  flexible  labour  markets  are  typically  characterised  by  higher  mobility  between  jobs 
and  occupations  and  between  labour  market  statuses,  which  increases  the  importance  of 
ensuring  high  quality  information  on  vacancies  and  job  matching  services.  On  the  other 

2
  Flexicurity  aims  at  enhancing  the  flexibility  of  labour  markets,  while  ensuring  income  security  and 
reconciliation of work and family life. The overall objective of flexicurity is to facilitate transitions between jobs 
and tackle labour market segmentation, with a view to improve the functioning of labour markets in a context 
of  constant  and  rapid  change  due  to  globalisation,  technological  change  or  even  broader  demographic  and 
societal trends.   

16 

 
 
                                    
hand,  a  welfare  system  that  aims  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  income  security  for  the  non-
employed  calls  for  efficient  activation  and  integration  services  in  order  to  remain 
sustainable. 

The  commitment  to  flexicurity  principles  varies  across  EU  Member  States  (European 
Commission 2006). Liberal welfare regimes tend to focus more on job search incentives and 
matching  jobs  with  jobseekers,  Conservative  regimes  give  priority  to  income  security  and 
provide intensive services mainly to insured unemployment benefit recipients, while Social 
Democratic  regimes  follow  a  balanced  approach  that  includes  widely  available  income 
support  and  intensive  activation  along  with  reintegration  services  to  all  the  working  age 
non-employed. 

As noted in the previous section, the nature of labour market risks has changed profoundly 
in  the  post-industrial  economy,  and  the  crisis  further  intensified  these  risks.  This 
necessitates  an  adjustment  of  the  coverage  and  structure  of  unemployment  protection 
systems,  which  had  been  originally  designed  to  provide  unemployment  insurance  for  the 
temporarily unemployed male breadwinner and social assistance to those unable to work. 
The  traditionally  separate  strands  of  unemployment  insurance  and  poor  relief  need  to  be 
closely  coordinated,  which  may  eventually  lead  to  their  merger  into  a  fully  integrated 
system of benefits and services (Figure 5.). 

Figure 5 - The changing focus of welfare support to the non-employed 

Income  replacement  and  job  matching  for  the 
temporarily  unemployed  male  breadwinner 
with insured unemployment benefit 

Poor  relief  for 
elderly, disabled with no insurance 

inactive  women,  children, 

Integrated services 
- job search condition for all benefit recipients in working age 
- benefits and sanctions to sustain labour supply 
- services for new risk groups: training, rehabilitation, social work, daycare, etc 
- deal with interrelated personal problems/barriers to work 

Clasen  and  Clegg  (2011)  describe  this  adjustment  process  in  three  dimensions  of  benefit 
administration.  The  first  dimension  entails  the  blurring  of  differences  between  tiers  of 
unemployment  provisions  by  weakening  the  link  between  prior  earnings  and  benefit 
amounts, so that insured and means tested benefits become similar in terms of amount and 
duration.  This  reduces  the  penalty  on  weak  labour  market  attachment  and  may  also 
encourage occupational mobility by lowering wage expectations.3  

The  second  dimension  relates  to  the  integration  of  unemployment  benefits  with  other 
provisions  for  working  age  adults  such  as  disability  benefits.  This  may  involve  the 
harmonisation of benefit levels or job search obligations across different benefits. Or it may 

3 This is important as jobseekers in declining trades cannot expect to return to a job in their initial vocation and when they 
retrain, their starting wage can be relatively low compared to their age. 

17 

 
 
 
 
                                    
even  lead  to  a  complete  merger  of  provisions,  in  which  case  the  different  needs  of  each 
particular  client  group  are  reflected  only  in  the  range  of  additional  services  provided  to 
support  their  reemployment.  The  third  dimension  of  institutional  realignment  concerns 
activation, that is, the extension of job-search conditions to all benefit recipients of working 
age. This may take the form of amending existing benefit rules to include further conditions 
on cooperating with  public  employment services, accepting job offers and participation in 
active  labour  market  measures,  or  an  increased  emphasis  of  the  “work  first”  approach 
(encouraging  rapid  return  to  primary  labour  market)  within  active  labour  market  policies. 
This  process  may  culminate  in  the  merger  of  government  agencies  administering 
unemployment benefits and other provisions into one-stop-shops units responsible for the 
activation of all working age benefit recipients. 

The implication for the welfare system is that the role of Public Employment Services (PES) 
needs to be augmented and the PES need to extend their services to cover a wider range of 
groups  (social  benefit  recipients,  disability  benefit  recipients,  non-recipients,  inactive 
working  age  adults  etc.)  either  assuming  the  main  responsibility  for  their  activation  or  by 
cooperating more closely with other government agents (e.g. municipalities) charged with 
their  activation.  Indeed,  recent  figures  depicting  the  share  of  the  registered  unemployed 
among  the  non-employed  population  suggest  a  gradual  (though  uneven)  rise  in  the 
coverage of PES services between 2002 and 2012 (Figure 6).  

Figure 6 - The share of registered unemployed among the non-employed working 

age population, 2000-2012 

Source:  Unemployed:  Eurostat  on-line.  Registered  unemployed:  own  calculations  using  the  EU  LFS.  Notes: 
Population  age  16-64  excluding  full  time  students.  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Germany,  Ireland  and  the  UK  are 
excluded for lack of data. Data for Italy are imputed as a simple average of neighbouring years in 2004. 

Reflecting  the  increased  importance  of  activation,  almost  all  Member  States  have 
implemented  some  reforms  to  improve  PES  performance  during  the  late  2000s.  In  most 
cases,  this  entailed  introducing  administrative  incentives  (new  public  management  tools) 
and  increased  managerial  autonomy  while  several  PES  have  experimented  some  form  of 
decentralisation, typically involving incentives for closer cooperation with social services, or 
even service integration at the local level (Mosley 2011; Struyven 2004). 

18 

 
 
 
In  most  EU  countries,  the  PES  have  become  the  main  agent  of  employment  and  social 
policy, responsible for both the newly registered and the long-term unemployed. As Table 1 
shows, twelve Member States relegate both benefit administration and services to the PES, 
for  both  the  newly  registered  and  the  long  term  unemployed.  In  three  countries  these 
functions are integrated but served by either joint PES-municipal offices (in Norway) or by 
municipalities  (in  Denmark  and  Poland).  Eight  Member  States  have  integrated  some 
functions (typically service provision) for all unemployed and kept some functions (typically 
benefit  payment)  separate.  In  most  of  these  Member  States,  municipalities  remain 
responsible for administering the benefits of the long term unemployed. In a few countries, 
PES are solely responsible for the insured unemployed, and in a few of these (Germany and 
Finland)  they  are  also  jointly  responsible  for  the  long  term  unemployed  together  with 
municipalities. 

Table 1 - Role division between PES and municipalities in EU Member States in 2014 

Client group 

PES 

Joint offices 

Municipal 

UI only 

UA only 

Cy, De, Fi, It, Nl  

UI for all functions,  
UA for ALMP only 

At,  Be,  Ee,  Hu*,  Lt,  Lv 
Ro, Si  

De, Fi 

De, Nl 

UI and UA for all 
functions 

Bg, Cz, Es, Fr, Gr, Hr, Ie, 
Lux, Pt, Sk, Se, UK 

No** 

Dk, Pl 

Source:  Scharle  et  al  (2014)  based  on  (Mosley  2011),  EEPO  PES  Business  Model  (2014)  and  Peer  Country 
reports.  Note:  UI=  Insured  Unemployment  benefit,  UA=Unemployment  Assistance  (for  those  who  have 
exhausted or have not qualified for UI). *As of March 2015 Hungary moved to the fourth row (PES providing all 
functions). ** Though Norway is an associated state, not a member, it is included as an important example of 
joint offices. 

3. Policy adaptation: drivers and barriers 

Though  external  challenges  are  similar,  the  policy  response  of  European  welfare  states 
shows considerable variation. This may  be  in part  explained by cross-country variations in 
the magnitude  and nature  of the challenge and in  part  by the actors and institutions that 
shape the policy making process in these countries.  

There  are  no  universally  accepted  models  to  describe  the  mechanisms  that  generate 
adaptation  in  welfare  regimes  (Häusermann  2010),  let  alone  a  complete  inventory  of 
potential  explanatory  factors.  We  grouped  the  main  drivers  that  emerged  in  the  existing 
literature  into  three  categories:  the  policy  challenge,  actors  and  institutions.  It  should  be 
noted that these factors relate to welfare reforms in general, though we highlight those that 
seem particularly relevant for service integration. 

3.1. The size and nature of the policy challenge 

The external shock of globalisation and the changing nature of labour markets proved more 
of a challenge to Continental welfare regimes that are based on insurance, compared to tax 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
financed Liberal or Social-Democratic welfare regimes (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). This is 
because  Continental  welfare  states  have  tended  to  give  priority  to  wage  equality  and 
budgetary  stability  over  full  employment,  which  resulted  in  low  employment  levels 
compared to Nordic or Liberal states.  Figure  7  shows that  pre-crisis levels of employment 
were significantly lower in Member States with a Continental welfare regime and the post-
crisis  recovery  also  seems  slow  (in  high-efficiency  states)  or  straggling  (in  low-efficiency 
Continental regimes). 

As social security is mostly provided through insurance schemes in Continental regimes, low 
labour market participation can undermine the stability of the welfare system (Häusermann 
and Palier 2008). Declining employment, increased labour market volatility and fragmented 
work histories also lead to a decline in the coverage of insurance based benefits (especially 
for new risk groups, such as the atypically employed, young families, single mothers, etc.) 
and increase income inequality. A further disadvantage is that Continental welfare regimes 
are dominated by cash transfers (as opposed to services), which implies that it takes more 
effort to develop the  active labour market policies that enable the labour force to cope with 
the new risks of post-industrial labour markets (Esping-Andersen 1996).  

Figure 7 - The employment rate by regime type, 2007-2013 

Source: Eurostat on-line (EU LFS). Population aged 15-64. 

Liberal  regimes  have  fared  better  in  terms  of  employment  levels,  ensured  partly  by 
relatively  lenient    employment  protection  and  less  generous  (and  mainly  tax  financed) 
welfare provisions. However, Liberal regimes lagged behind Social Democratic ones in the 
range and volume of active labour market programmes offered by the PES. The emergence 
of the ‘third way’ policies4 of New Labour in the mid-1990s has mitigated this disadvantage, 
and made the UK an example of employment-friendly welfare reforms. 

Importantly, Figure 7 also suggests that countries with less effective governance, whether 
Continental  or  Liberal,  face  the  double challenge  of  poor  labour  market  performance  and 
underdeveloped welfare services. 

4

  The  core  idea  is  that  the  state  should  enable  citizens  to  care  for  themselves,  rather  than  caring  for  them, 
which implies heavy public investment in services that support labour market reintegration (Lister 2004). 

20 

 
 
 
                                    
By  contrast,  Social  Democratic  (Nordic) regimes  have  had  little  difficulty  in  responding  to 
the globalisation  challenge. Except for the transitory shock of the macroeconomic (and in 
some  cases  fiscal)  crisis  of  the  early  1990s,  Social  Democratic  regimes  saw  little  need  for 
reform as they already had a system that ensured high employment by elaborate activation 
policies  (and  also  by  a  large  public  sector)  and proved  sufficiently  flexible  to  cater  for  the 
new risk groups as well. The high level of activation has also ensured the sustainability of an 
extensive tax-ﬁnanced welfare system (Häusermann and Palier 2008). 

3.2. The role of actors and their interests 

The influence of actors and institutions on policy formation may be exerted through several 
channels. Cross country variations in policy outcomes may arise from the differences in the 
views  and  interests  of  citizens’  and  their  groups  (including  organized  elites  and  political 
parties) or external actors, such as the EU Commission, as well as from the differences in the 
institutions that mediate these interests.  

Left  leaning  governments  have  been  shown  to  be  less  prone  to  undertaking  welfare 
retrenchment  reforms  (c.f.  Schmidt,  2010  or  Jensen  and  Seeberg  2014).  Rueda  (2007) 
argues  that  they  may  also  have  less  interest  in  promoting  ALMPs  considering  that  their 
electoral core are labour market insiders, not the outsiders that allegedly most benefit from 
ALMP  programmes.  The  same  consideration  explains  why  strong  unions  in  Continental 
welfare regimes have made  it difficult to introduce  activation measures  (Häusermann and 
Palier 2008). 

The influence of external actors on employment and welfare policy has tended to increase 
in the past two decades. The role of the OECD in promoting best practice in labour market 
policy can be traced back to the early 1990s when it was commissioned by  member states 
to  explain  their  persistently  high  unemployment  (OECD  1994).  Since  the  mid-1990s,  both 
the  OECD  and  the  EU  have  advocated  the  development  of  active  labour  market  policies, 
with  varying  effectiveness  in  terms  of  their  adaptation  in  EU  Member  States.  Armingeon 
(2007)  argues  that  taking  advice  from  external  actors  is  conditional  on  the  fit  of  the 
proposed  policies  with  path-dependent  national  policies  and  politics.  There  is  also  some 
evidence  that  EU  recommendations  were  more  influential  in  new  Member  States  as 
opposed  to  the  EU-15  (cf.  Mastenbroek,  2003;  Kaeding,  2008;  Börzel  et  al.,  2010  and 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Sedelmeier 2008). This can be traced in the Estonian 
case explored in Part II as well, where policy makers clearly followed the Flexicurity Agenda 
advocated by the EU Commission. 

Uncertainties about the expected outcomes of welfare reform may  introduce a status quo 
bias against change. If potential losers are more concentrated and more certain of their loss 
than  the  diffuse  group  of  potential  winners,  that  alone  builds  a  powerful  barrier  to  policy 
change  (Tompson  2009).  Similarly,  the  level  of  trust  and  credibility  garnered  by  political 
institutions − and actors within them, such as the government or political parties − can also 
be crucial (Keefer and Khemani 2004; Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012). Low levels of 
trust  might  affect  outcomes  by  making  it  difficult  to  involve  and  negotiate  with 
stakeholders and thus creating hurdles in the decision making stage, and also by weakening 
their commitment and motivation during the implementation stage. 

21 

3.3. The role of institutions 

Institutional  factors  that  may  influence  the  reform  process  can  include  the  institutions  of 
interest  mediation,  veto  points,  the  quality  of  public  administration,  culture  and  the 
historical development of the institutional setup.  

The institutions of interest mediation may affect policy responsiveness (Brooks and Manza 
2006) in several ways. This applies to a host of political-institutional arrangements, such as 
those concerning the electoral system, the ease, necessity or tradition of forming a coalition 
government,  the  strength  of  the  opposition,  the  devolution  of  state  functions  to  levels  of 
governance (including federal versus unitary models), de facto veto power given to various 
actors,  or  the  political  framework  of  industrial  relations.  Features  determining  whether  a 
broad consensus is necessary for change seem particularly important (Galasso and Profeta 
2002; Häusermann 2010; Myles and Quadagno 2002; Palier 2010; Tompson 2009). 

Institutions of European countries  also differ in the number of veto points throughout the 
decision chain, which might serve as an explanation for the differences in their capacities to 
adapt social policy to changes in  economic and social environment,5 even when they hold 
similar notions about what solution could work best (Champion and Bonoli 2011).  The sharp 
contrast  between  the  comprehensive  one-stop  shop  reform  in  the  UK  as  opposed  to  the 
more  modest  integration  initiatives  in  Germany  and  Switzerland  (see  the  detailed  case 
studies of the UK and Germany in Part II) is often cited to illustrate this. UK governments 
have  a  high  degree  of  control  over  policy  reforms,  so  there  were  no  institutional  features 
that could block the implementation of a single agency that is responsible for the delivery of 
all  working-age  benefits  and  employment  services.  By  contrast,  a  similar  proposal  in 
Germany was opposed in the upper chamber of the Parliament (Bundesrat) that resulted in 
the  establishment  of  a  separate  network  of  Jobcentres  for  the  long-term  unemployed 
jointly run by the Federal Agency of Work and municipal social assistance offices.  

The quality of public administration, i.e. its capacity to articulate goals (Rubaii-Barrett and 
Wise  2008)  and  find  and  elaborate  policy  solutions  may  also  affect  policy  outcomes, 
especially  in  the  case  of  complex  institutional  reforms  (Prinz  2010).  In  section  5  we  show 
that  this  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  case  of  service  integration  reforms  as  their  success 
crucially  depends  on  the  appropriate  design  of  roles  and  incentive  structures.  Less 
ostensibly,  bureaucratic  institutions  are  often  in  charge  of  implementation  as  well,  thus 
they can affect not just the passage of  regulatory changes, but the speed and extent with 
which they are implemented – or with which they erode (called “internal policy conversion” 
by Hacker 2004).  

Lastly, path dependency theories claim that institutional change may be constrained by the 
historical roots of welfare regimes, which set nations on distinct trajectories that tend to be 
difficult  to  reverse  (Brooks  and  Manza  2006;  Häusermann  2010;  Palier  2010;  Ebbinghaus 
2006). For example, comparing the policy outcomes of similar welfare reform processes in 
Finland  and  Italy,  Genova  (2008)  argues  that  it  is  the  ‘emergency  logic’  of  Italian  social 
services  that  hampered  the  implementation  of  service  integration  as  opposed  to  the 
success of Finland that traditionally has an universalist approach to welfare policy making.  

5  According  to  new-institutionalist  literature,  veto  points  are  the  stages  throughout  the  decision-making 
process where a coalition of actors can block the adoption of a policy reform (e.g. federalism, bicameralism, 
referenda).  The number  of veto points largely  determine the flexibility of the adoption mechanism of policy 
changes (Champion and Bonoli 2011). 

22 

                                    
Differences in the bureaucratic tradition or institutional culture of the organisations that are 
supposed  to  be  cooperating  have  also  been  identified  as  important  barriers  of  successful 
service  integration (Taylor  2009 and McQuaid  2010). The existing legal  and governmental 
framework  (such  as  overly  strict  personal  data  protection  legislation  or  a  fragmented 
municipal  system)  and  management  structures  (such  as  performance  management 
designed for single service or information systems) can also impede the integration process 
(Taylor  2009;  McQuaid  2010;  Angers  2011).  Such  rigidities  are  likely  to  affect  the 
transferability and success of particular arrangements in service integration.  

4. The potential benefits of service integration 

The growing literature on service integration has documented several advantages of well-
designed  integrated  approaches,  such  as  tailor-made,  flexible  and  responsive  policy 
options;  cost  effectiveness  and  efficiency  by  sharing  knowledge,  expertise  and  resources 
across  cooperating  actors;  capacity  building  and  innovation,  etc.,  along  with  considerable 
challenges in  how to reach these  outcomes  (McQuaid 2010).  Clearly, there  is no one-size-
fits-all solution to integrated service delivery (Munday 2007).  

Concerning  labour  market  services,  one  of  the  main  challenges  is  the  coordination  and 
balancing of the provision of income support with job search incentives and other forms of 
activation.  This  is  particularly  critical  in  institutional  structures  where  these  two  functions 
are served by different levels of public administration.  

The existing literature highlights five aspects of service integration that may contribute to 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery (Angers 2011; McQuaid 2010; 
Munday 2007; Nelson and Zadek 2000; Taylor 2009; Lindsay, McQuaid, and Dutton 2008). 
These  include  improvements  in  coordinating  activation  as  well  as  the  administration  and 
service  provision,  responding  to  multidimensional  problems,  access  to  services,  and 
innovation.  

1.  Coordination of activation. Service integration can help resolve the basic problem of 
unemployment benefits, which is that they should provide adequate income support 
(which tends to reduce job search efforts) while encouraging active job search. The 
solution to this problem is to link benefit payment to clear behavioral conditions and 
these are obviously much easier to enforce when benefits and services are provided 
by the same (or closely cooperating) agents. The Estonian case is a good example for 
this aspect: merging the insurance agency with the PES created  an opportunity for 
better coordination and more effective activation of jobseekers entitled to insurance 
based benefit. 

2.  Coordination  of  information  exchange  and  synergies  between  services.  Service 
integration  can  improve  the  efficiency  of  service  provision  by  pooling  fragmented 
resources, exploiting synergies between closely related or complementary services, 
improving communication between service units and improve scale economies (e.g. 
in administrative  functions, IT development  or  staff training). The Dutch reform of 

23 

 
 
2002 is a good example: the establishment of CWI (Centrum for Werk and Inkomen), 
a  new  organisation  to  coordinate  the  work  of  existing  agencies  clarified  the  role 
division  between  municipal  service  providers  and  the  PES  (although  it  did  not 
immediately lead to a significant improvement in cooperation between agencies). 

3.  Response to multidimensional problems. Some jobseekers and especially the long 
term unemployed face multiple barriers to reemployment. In such cases integrated 
services that can offer a wide range of service are better placed to assist the client 
than single-function agencies that can only tackle one dimension of the problem. 
This was the rationale behind the Finnish LAFOS for example. 

4.  Access to services and benefits. One stop shops also have the advantage of making 
it  easier  for  clients  to  navigate  the  welfare  system  as  they  only  need  to  visit  one 
place. An additional advantage may be that multipurpose agencies are less likely to 
attract  a stigma  than highly specialized ones  where  only “troublesome” clients are 
supposed to go. This may be the case in Norway, where job centres serve a very wide 
range of clients. 

5.  Innovative capacity strengthened. Service integration may create more opportunity 
for the interaction of experts from various backgrounds and policy perspectives and 
also a greater scope to test new and innovative approaches (McQuaid 2010). 

Munday (2007) defines integrated social services as a “continuum or ladder of integration” 
in  the  planning,  coordination  and  provision  of  social  services,  including  the  cooperation, 
partnership and cooperation of legally independent institutions, with appropriate methods 
chosen to suit personal  needs, circumstances and possibilities. Integration can be  realized 
vertically,  implying  more  systematic,  closer  cooperation  between  several  levels  of  the 
government, or horizontally, linking services provided by separated entities (see Table 2). In 
a  related  approach,  Snape  and  Stewart  (1996)  propose  three  ideal-typical  forms  of 
partnership working in social inclusion policy: facilitating, co-ordinating and implementing 
partnerships that differ partly in their aims and in the depth of integration as well. Askim et 
al  (2011)  define  a  set  of  key  variables  to  describe  variants  of  the  one  stop  shop  model, 
including  their  task  portfolio,  participant  structure,  autonomy,  proximity  to  citizen,  and 
instruments. 

24 

 
 
 
Table 2 - Examples for vertical and horizontal integration 

National 

Local 

Vertical 

Strong management incentives that improve coordination between 
levels of government 

Horizontal 

Joint Ministry of Labour 
and Welfare 

One-stop-shop for local employment and 
social services and benefit administration 

Source: Based on Ditch and Roberts (2002). 

The  existing  literature  already  identified  several  potentially  successful  attempts  at  service 
integration, mainly from the Nordic countries and from the UK (e.g. Borghi and Van Berkel 
2007; Munday 2007; Lindsay, McQuaid, and Dutton 2008; Minas 2009; Taylor 2009; Angers 
2011; Minas 2014).  

Though  mainly  descriptive,  these  studies  already  offer  a  number  of  lessons  regarding  the 
factors  that  may  determine  the  success  of  integration  initiatives.6  First,  the  clarity  and 
harmonisation  of  goals  across  the  cooperating  agencies  seems  crucial.  Second,  the  clear 
division of responsibilities between agents is a prerequisite to efficiency gains. Although the 
integration process typically entails an increase in  the number of cooperating agents, this 
does not imply that all partners should have equal control. On the contrary, the increased 
complexity  of  interactions  between  agents  necessitates  an  agreement  over  who  takes 
control in which functions. Third, as illustrated by the Dutch reform of 2001 (see Table 2 in 
the  Appendix),  mergers  do  not  automatically  produce  cooperation  between  units  of 
government.  A  successful  integration  reform  should  therefore  include  carefully  designed 
financial or administrative incentives for cooperation. A closely related fourth lesson is that 
integration  reforms  (especially  of  a  horizontal  nature)  should  entail  the  adjustment  of 
performance  indicators  to  account  for  joint  efforts  in  order  to  eliminate  dysfunctional 
competition between service units. Fifth, when service integration at the local level entails 
increased autonomy and new types of tasks, this should be supported by capacity building 
in planning, evaluation  and case management as well, as for example was the case in the 
Danish  reforms  of  2007.  The  case  studies  presented  in  Part  II  have  also  confirmed  the 
importance of these factors.  

There  are  some  issues  however  that  are  left  unresolved  by  the  existing  literature.  For 
example,  the  measurement  of  the  quality  and  outcomes  of  integrated  services  and  the 
respective  contribution  of  cooperating  units  seems  to  remain  a  challenge,  as  is  the 
allocation of resources across cooperating units.  

6
 These lessons are drawn mainly from  Ditch and Roberts 2002; Minas 2009; McQuaid  2010; McQuaid et al. 
2007; Konle-Seidl 2008; Genova 2008; Lægreid and Rykkja 2013; Taylor 2009; Lindsay, McQuaid, and Dutton 
2008; Minas 2014; Champion and Bonoli 2011. 

25 

 
 
 
                                    
5. Lessons for Europe 

The lessons and recommendations summarised in this section are based mainly on Part II of 
this  study,  which  provides  a  systematic  review  of  ten  reform  initiatives.  We  documented 
four cases of vertical integration reform, and six cases of horizontal integration (Table 3). 

Table 3 - Selected cases of service integration reforms in Europe 

Vertical 
integration 

Denmark* 
Germany 
Italy 
Poland 

for UI only,  
e.g. insurance 
agency+PES 
Estonia 

Scale of horizontal integration 
for LTU only,  e.g. co-operation bw 
PES and local government 

all functions for all client 
groups 

Finland 
Germany 
UK 

Austria 
Norway 

*The Danish reform included a strong horizontal element as well but we only focused on the vertical, which 
has  been  less  extensively  documented  in  earlier  research.  UI=  insured  unemployed,  LTU=  long  term 
unemployed. 

These  examples  included  more  and  less  successful  initiatives  as  well,  and  the  lessons  are 
drawn  mainly  from  the  comparison  of  best  and  worst  performing  countries.  It  should  be 
noted however that these reform initiatives tended to be rather complex, including aspects 
of vertical and horizontal service integration, as well as adjustments to the benefit system. 
This implies that it is difficult to separate the individual effect of the integration aspect from 
other  elements  of  the  reform.  A  further  complication  is  that  in  most  cases,  the  labour 
market  environment  also  changed  considerably  during  the  implementation  phase  of  the 
reform.  Lastly,  as  with  most  institutional  reform,  results  may  only  come  in  the  long  run 
when actors have fully adapted to the new institutional settings and incentives. 

We  considered  drivers  and  barriers  in  each  of  the  four  main  stages  of  the  policy  making 
process.  The  stages  in  this  process  are  closely  connected:  mistakes  or  failure  in  the  initial 
stages can abort the reform process or reduce effectiveness in the implementation phase. 

The first stage: political commitment and goal setting 

The  main  lesson  concerning  the  first  stage  of  the  policy  making  cycle  relates  to  the 
importance  of  political  institutions.  Service  integration  is  a  complex  reform  that  typically 
affects  several  stakeholders.  The  existing  examples  of  successful  initiatives  suggests  that 
there are two political constellations in which governments can carry through their reform 
agenda. First, if governance is centralised and there are relatively few strong veto players in 
the  political  system,  as  for  example  in  the  UK.  Second,  in  a  less  centralised  (e.g.  federal) 
system, or if there are strong veto players, reform is only possible if there is a wide cross-

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
party consensus over the goals and also in the main policy solutions. This was the case for 
example in Germany7 and Denmark. 

Economic  or  social  tensions  (e.g.  the  global  crisis  or  increasing  inequalities)  can  in  some 
cases help to build political consensus. This was apparently the case in Austria and Germany 
where  unfavourable  domestic  trends  in  employment  and  income  inequalities  led  to 
increased  awareness  of  the  structural  problems  and  generated  political  support  for  the 
reforms. In Estonia and Italy the global crisis played a similar role. 

Service integration reforms tend to bear fruit in the medium and long run. This implies that 
governments without a clear long term strategy in employment policy (or more generally in 
welfare policy) will be unlikely to stay committed to such reforms. The lack of a long term 
policy  vision seems to  be  part of the explanation  for the poor results of the Italian reform 
initiative. 

The planning stage: policy design 

The  main  lesson  concerning  the  policy  design  stage  is  to  keep  the  reform  manageable  in 
terms of size and complexity. Planners need to consider the initial conditions, such as the 
fragmentation  of  existing  institutions,  available  expertise  and  capacities  at  all  levels  of 
government  involved  in  the  process,  the  IT  infrastructure  and  data  collection  and 
management systems, as well as the needs and size of target groups. The reform process is 
easier to manage and more likely to succeed if changes are gradual or are limited to a few 
well  selected  areas,  especially  if  the  planning  and  management  capacities  of  public 
administration  are  limited.  Over-ambitious  initiatives  increase  the  risk  of  failure.  The 
Estonian case is a good  example of setting a relatively modest  goal that is appropriate to 
the  existing  quality  and  capacity  of  the  Estonian  public  administration.  The  Finnish  case 
illustrates the merits of focusing on a narrowly defined target group that needed complex 
services the most. By contrast, the relatively modest success of the Norwegian reform may 
be in part explained by the overly ambitious aims: the initial institutional setup was highly 
fragmented and decentralised, and service integration was meant to cover all functions and 
client groups, which required a major overhaul of the system. 

In  a  similar  vein,  setting  too  complex  goals  for  institutions  may  also  increase  the  risk  of 
failure.  As  already  emphasised  by  the  existing  literature,  the  clarity  of  goals  seems 
especially important as this forms the basis for cooperation between stakeholders.  

local 

As already highlighted above, the success  of integration reforms crucially depends on the 
performance  and  cooperation  of 
level  agents.  This  requires  well  designed 
administrative  and  financial  incentives,  as  illustrated  by  the  Danish,  Finnish  and  British 
cases.  The  German  example  also  points  to  the  importance  of  well-designed  incentives: 
beside  political  will  and  expertise,  successful  implementation  requires  a  design  where 
incentives for cooperation at  the local level are carefully planned (making the local actors 
interested in cooperation with new potential benefits from cooperation). The Polish reform 
(and to some extent the Norwegian one) also seemed weaker in this respect. Countries with 
a strong regional government may rely on the alternative source of political accountability 
as an incentive. This was the (unintended) outcome of the Austrian reform initiative, where 
the  central  government  did  not  succeed  in  introducing  a  standardised  form  of  service 

7 It should be noted though that in Germany, the original plans of establishing a single gateway and one-stop-
shop for all target groups have been vetoed by powerful stakeholders. 

27 

                                    
integration  but  several  regions  implemented  their  own  local  solutions  to  the  problem  of 
increasing  poverty  among  the  unemployed.    For  vertical  reform  initiatives,  it  is  especially 
important to consider and rely on the political institutional setup when designing decision 
making procedures and incentives. The German initiative is a good example of building on 
the tradition of consensual politics in the design of the new system of vertical coordination. 

More room for local autonomy can itself increase motivation and efficiency as in the Danish 
case. The Austrian example also shows how high autonomy allows local actors to use their 
knowledge  of  the  local  context  and  their  own  experience  accumulated  in  local  activation 
programmes, pilots and ESF funded employment projects.  

Efficiency  can  be  further  improved  by  performance  management  techniques  (e.g.  the 
elaborate Danish system in which PES performance indicators are publicly available). If the 
new system allows a high level of local autonomy in designing services and protocols (e.g. in 
the Austrian or Danish cases) there is also a need for close monitoring to ensure that service 
quality and access to services is the same across the country. Denmark is probably the best 
example  for  achieving  this,  although  it  seems,  at  the  expense  of  an  initial  increase  in 
administrative costs.  

Service integration entails more intense cooperation between agents. Given the complexity 
(and also the costs) of the tasks involved, this will only work smoothly and efficiently if roles 
are  clearly  divided  and  allocated  to  the  right  level  of  government  and  the  appropriate 
institutions that have the capacity to perform them. The Finnish case is an often cited good 
example for properly designed and allocated roles. By contrast, the vertical element of the 
German reform has been criticised in this respect: for example, moving the management of 
tendering  external  providers  to  the  regional  level  led  to  inefficiencies  as  the  selection 
process  has  become  overly  formalised,  favouring  low  price  over  quality  and  disfavouring 
specialised local NGOs able to assist special needs clients. 

It  follows  from  the  above  that  the  availability  of  high  quality  public  administration  is 
essential in the design stage. This is particularly important in horizontal reforms (where the 
appropriate motivation of local actors is crucial) but also improves the outcomes of vertical 
integration reforms, as suggested by the comparison of the less successful Italian and Polish 
cases with the more successful German one. 

Implementation 

The  success  of  the  implementation  stage  clearly  depends  on  the  quality  of  planning,  and 
especially on the design of incentives for the main actors affected by the reform. We also 
identified some typical pitfalls relating to the implementation process that may be avoided 
by careful planning.  

The first of these concerns the pace of the reform process. Piloting in small scale, expanding 
gradually  and  allowing  time  for  detecting  and  correcting  problems,  adjusting  staff 
capacities and skills can further improve outcomes even if the initial plan was already good 
enough to guarantee success. The British case of JobCentre Plus is a good example for this: 
it was a gradually enfolding process, with several rounds of pilots and close monitoring of 
problems. This allowed the planners for example to find out at an early stage that PES staff 
did  not  have  the  appropriate  skills  to  handle  Income  Support  clients  and  tackle  this  by 
training them, before upscaling the programme to the whole country. 

28 

This leads us to the second pitfall, of local expertise. Service integration may change skills 
requirements  in  several  levels  and  positions  of  the  system.  It  may  increase  the  need  for 
forecasting, statistical analysis and policy design at the regional or local level to match their 
increased  autonomy.  And  it  typically  requires  new  competencies  from  frontline  staff  who 
need to be able to assess and respond to the needs of new groups of clients, liaise with new 
partners, and possibly handle new IT tools as well. If these skills are missing or inadequate, 
there  is  a  need  for  capacity  building  at  the  beginning  of  the  implementation  stage.  
Retraining may be necessary even if existing staff is highly trained. In Norway for example, 
the reform reduced the need for specialist knowledge in some positions and increased the 
need  for  generalist  competencies,  and  staff  was  not  sufficiently  supported  by  trainings  to 
handle this. Or, the Austrian case pointed to the need for increased capacity in well trained 
social  workers.  Beside  competencies,  staff  attitudes  may  also  need  adjustment.  The 
German  reform  is  a  positive  example  in  this  respect  as  it  was  successful  in  shifting  staff 
attitudes towards the activation of all client groups (as opposed insured unemployed only). 

Third, involving and informing all parties concerned about the reform and its consequences 
can be crucial. Informing the clients may not be essential if the reform does not affect the 
first point of contact (as was the case in Finland, where the PES refers clients to the LAFOS), 
but it is crucial if there are major changes in the physical location of service providers and/or 
in the procedure of accessing benefits and services (as was the case in Norway). 

Lastly, contextual factors may also disrupt implementation.  Economic crises that induce a 
fast increase in  unemployment  may  cause  trouble as staff will find it difficult to deal with 
the  reform  and  increased  caseload  at  the  same  time.  Or,  political  constraints  leading  to 
inefficient  compromise  may  reduce  efficiency  gains  in  the  implementation  phase:  for 
example, unions may successfully block necessary reorganisation or reduction in staff, as it 
happened in Norway. In some cases unforeseen limitations in the existing legal context (e.g. 
personal  data  protection)  or 
implementation.  Data 
management is particularly important given that the integration process typically increases 
the  need  for  high  quality  information  (to  enable  the  assessment  of  client  needs  and 
facilitate  referral  to  the  appropriate  services)  and  also  for  the  smooth  handling  of  data 
transfer between cooperating agents. 

infrastructure  may  hinder 

IT 

Monitoring, evaluation and review 

Given  the  complexity  of  service  integration  reforms,  the  last  stage  of  the  policy  making 
process  is  particularly  important.  In  successful  reforms,  the  monitoring  of  processes  and 
outcomes starts in the pilot phase and continues after the full upscaling of the reform. As 
already mentioned above, monitoring in the early stages helps detect and correct problems 
before  national  implementation  and  support  gradual  improvement  and  adjustment  to 
changing circumstances as well. Monitoring was particularly strong in the British and Danish 
cases, and weak in the Estonian and Polish reforms. It should be noted however that in the 
latter examples, the reform itself led to improvements in data collection and data quality.  

29 

 
 
6.  Recommendations 

As  we  have  seen  the  existing  institutional  context,  especially  political  institutions  and  the 
quality  of  public  administration  should  be  taken  into  account  when  deciding  about  the 
scope  and  aims  of  service  integration  reform  and  to  some  extent  also  determine  the 
appropriate incentive structures for post-reform institutions.  

Based on this, we recommend that Member States looking for inspiration should consider 
examples  that  were  implemented  in  an  institutional  context  similar  to  their  own.  We 
identified  three  main  dimensions  of  the  institutional  setup:  the  efficiency  of  public 
administration (including central administration and local levels of government), the degree 
of  centralisation  considering  both  the  overall  political  structure  (which  can  be  federal  or 
unitary) and the institutional arrangements characterising employment and social policy. In 
Table 3, we provide good examples in four of the possible combinations of these dimension. 
For  countries  with  less  efficient  public  administrations,  we  recommend  starting  with 
modest goals (as did Estonia) and to seek technical assistance from their peers (making use 
of EU programmes and benchlearning networks) or international organisations such as the 
OECD. 

Table 4 - Successful integration reforms by institutional context 

Federal governance 
with strong local 
autonomy 

Unitary governance 
with strong local 
autonomy 

Unitary governance 
with centralised 
implementation 

Low efficiency 
government 

High efficiency 
government 

Germany, Austria 

Denmark 

Estonia 

UK, Finland, the 
Netherlands* 

*the reform initiative of 2002. 

Considering  the  local  context  is  essential  when  selecting  the  aims  and  designing  the 
incentive  structures  and  division  of  roles.  The  above  outlined  lessons  related  to  the 
implementation and monitoring phase are less dependent on the institutional context, and 
can be applied to practically any reform initiative.  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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35 

 
 
 
36 

 
 
Appendix 

Table A.1 - Country groups based on welfare regime type and government efficiency 

Welfare regime type 

Below average government 
efficiency 

Above average government 
efficiency 

Liberal 

Corporatist 

Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia 

United Kingdom 

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain 

Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg 

Social Democratic 

X 

Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, (Norway), Sweden 

Explanations 

We  sorted  countries  into  high  and  low  groups  in  terms  of  government  effectiveness 
according  to  the  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  developed  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and 
Mastruzzi (2010): Countries with an above average score on government effectiveness are 
considered  high,  below  average  ones  are  considered  low  efficiency.  All  Social  Democratic 
countries are in the high effectiveness group. 

To  determine  the  regime  type,  we  used  the  original  typology  of  Esping-Andersen  (1990) 
modified in a few cases. Namely, following  Kautto (2002) that considers service provision as 
well  as  cash  transfers,  we  sorted  Germany  into  the  Social  Democratic  (rather  than 
Corporatist) group and Ireland into the Corporatist (rather than Liberal) group. We grouped 
post socialist countries based on spending on welfare and ALMP ((Aidukaite 2010). 

Welfare regime type  Main provider of 

Financing 

welfare 

Liberal 

market 

taxes 

Dominant form of welfare 
benefits 

Low level, universal, conditional 
on job search 

Corporatist 

state 

insurance  Employment-linked social 

Social Democratic 

state 

taxes 

insurance 

High level, universal, combined 
with activation (both job search 
and ALMP) 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2 - Institutional structure following the Dutch reform of 2000-2002 

Source: (de Koning 2004) 

Details 

Until  1991,  the  Dutch  Public  Employment  Service  (PES)  was  subordinated  to  the  line 
ministry.  In  1991  a  tripartite  structure  was  introduced  in  which  the  government  and  the 
social  partners  jointly  govern  the  PES.    In  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  growing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the PES, the development  of parallel services and 

38 

 
 
the  general  trend towards  privatization  led the government  to relegate  ALMP  budgets  to 
the  agencies  administering  unemployment  benefits.  These  included  social  insurance 
agencies  (UVIs  organised  by  region  and  industrial  sector,  for  unemployment  insurance 
benefits)  and  municipalities  (for  social  assistance  benefits).  First,  both  UVIs  and 
municipalities were obliged to involve the PES as the only service provider, but later were 
allowed  to  hire  private  providers  as  well.  In  a  next  step,  the  PES  units  dealing  with 
reintegration services (Kliq) were privatised. The first procurement procedure was launched 
by  the  UVIs  in  2000  (on  the  implications  for  competition  between  service  providers  see 
(Struyven 2004).  

After  2000,  the  rather  fragmented  system  was  to  some  extent  centralised:  UVIs  were 
merged into one organisation (UWV) and smaller municipalities formed regional platforms 
to  support  local  cooperation.  The  creation  of  UWV  did  not  immediately  lead  to  improved 
coordination  across  regions.  De  Koning  (2004)  notes  that  in  2002,  each  of  the  six  UWV 
districts had a separate procurement procedure and the regional selection committees were 
unable  to  handle  the  large  number  of  bids.  The  national  headquarters  of  UWV  were 
dissatisfied with the outcomes as some providers with a good reputation were not selected 
and modified some of the decisions made at regional level.  

The new public employment offices (CWI) retained a central role. Beside the collection and 
provision  of  information  on  jobseekers  and  vacancies,  the  PES  are  responsible  for  sorting 
new clients into risk groups by profiling  the people entering unemployment. Those  not in 
high risk of long term unemployment can only make use of the services provided by the PES 
(mainly  information  on  jobs  and  benefits).  High-risk  clients  are  sent  to  the  UVIs  and  the 
municipalities and are entitled to reintegration services (de Koning 2004).  

39 

 
 
 
 
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