Possible scenarios for radiation measurements and sampling using unmanned systems.
Date: 2015-08-12
Institutions: Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements
Subjects: data collection, data processing, metrology, nuclear physics, nuclear research, nuclear safety, radiation protection, research report, sampling, testing

Possible scenarios for radiation 
measurements and sampling 
using unmanned systems 

ERNCIP thematic group 
Radiological and nuclear threats 
to critical infrastructure 
Task 3 deliverable 2 

Frank E. Schneider, FKIE 
Bastian Gaspers, FKIE 
Kari Peräjärvi, STUK 
Magnus Gårdestig, Linköping University 

March 2015 

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union 
as part of the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection project. 

Report EUR 27225 EN 

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European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 

Contact information 
Georgios Giannopoulos 
Address: Joint Research Centre, Via Enrico Fermi 2749, TP 721, 21027 Ispra (VA), Italy 
E-mail: erncip-office@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +39 0332 78 6211 
Fax: +39 0332 78 5469 

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/ 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 

JRC 95791 

EUR 27225 EN 

ISBN 978-92-79-48073-7 

ISSN 1831-9424 

doi:10.2788/60148 

© European Union, 2015 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

Printed in Italy 

 
 
 
   
  
     
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ERNCIP thematic group for Radiological and nuclear threats to 
critical infrastructure  

Possible scenarios for radiation measurements 
and sampling using unmanned systems 

March 2015 

Kari Peräjärvi   
Frank E. Schneider  FKIE  Germany 

STUK  Finland 

Coordinator of the Task Group 
Lead scientist for the development of this report 

Other main contributors to the report 
Bastian Gaspers 
Magnus Gårdestig 
Harri Toivonen 
Kari Peräjärvi   
Jonas Nilsson  

Fraunhofer FKIE Institute 
Linköping University 
STUK   
STUK   
Lund University 

Germany 
Sweden 
Finland 
Finland 
Sweden 

RN thematic group members who also attended the reachback meetings 
Per Reppenhagen Grim 
Olof Tengblad  
John Keightley 
Jan Paepen 
Hubert Schoech 
Jolien van Zetten 
Kamel Abbas   
Peter Gattinesi 
Carl-Johan Forsberg   

DEMA   
CSIC 
NPL 
JRC 
CEA 
NEN 
JRC 
JRC - ERNCIP Office  
JRC - ERNCIP Office  

Denmark 
Spain 
UK 
EC 
France 
Netherlands 
European Commission 
European Commission 
European Commission 

Related ERNCIP documents 

1.  List-mode data acquisition based on digital electronics, EUR 26715. 
2.  Critical parameters and performance tests for the evaluation of digital data acquisition 

hardware, EUR 26976. 

3.  Remote expert support of field teams — Reachback services for nuclear security, 

EUR 27099. 

4.  Current state-of-the-art of unmanned systems with potential to be used for radiation 

measurements and sampling, in preparation. 

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Executive Summary 

There  is  significant  potential  for  the  use  of  unmanned  remote  control  vehicles  in  sampling  and 
measuring  radiological events. No attempt to standardise sampling and measurement methods using 
these types of vehicles has been made so far. Common standards would simplify the use of remote 
control vehicles in an emergency scenario and  would thus be very valuable in critical  infrastructure 
protection. The main advantage of using unmanned systems in radiological events is the protection of 
the involved human personnel. 
This document focuses on possible scenarios for remote control radiation measurements and sampling 
using unmanned systems. We identified scenarios that can be separated in two categories. First, there 
are  prevention  scenarios  where  unmanned  systems  can  be  used  to  prevent  incidents  involving 
radioactive  material  and  deterrence.  Second,  there  are  response  scenarios  where  unmanned  systems 
can be used to gather information after incidents with radioactive material have occurred. We further 
condensed three main tasks (spatial mapping, search of sources and sampling) for unmanned systems 
in the identified scenarios. 
In  addition,  this  report  summarises  possible  standards  for  unmanned  systems.  A  very  widely 
recognised  standard  collection  of  software  frameworks  for  robot  software  development  is  the  robot 
operating system. Further important standards concerning communication with robots and control of 
unmanned systems are battle management language, interoperability profile and joint architecture for 
unmanned systems. 

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Contents 

1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 
2  Scenarios for radiation measurement with unmanned systems ................................................... 9 
2.1  Possible applications for unmanned systems .......................................................................... 9 

2.2  Critical parameters ................................................................................................................ 10 

2.2.1 

Time and space ............................................................................................................. 10 

2.2.2 

Number of available robots .......................................................................................... 10 

2.2.3 

Sensors .......................................................................................................................... 10 

2.3  Types of incidents and scenarios .......................................................................................... 10 

2.4  Prevention scenarios ............................................................................................................. 11 

2.4.1 

Exploration (harbour, re-locatable, illicit trafficking).................................................... 11 

2.4.2 

Patrolling, search for source, change detection, major public event ........................... 12 

2.4.3 

Background mapping, change detection ...................................................................... 13 

2.5  Response scenarios ............................................................................................................... 14 

2.5.1 

Suspicious object ........................................................................................................... 14 

2.5.2 

Isocurves (contour mapping) ........................................................................................ 15 

2.5.3 

Terror lab, mapping ...................................................................................................... 16 

2.5.4 

Scrap metal (sort out piece by piece) ........................................................................... 16 

2.5.5 

Sampling ........................................................................................................................ 17 

2.5.6 

Map and search radioactivity, map and search hotspots and identification of nuclides . 
....................................................................................................................................... 17 

3  Possible standards for unmanned systems ................................................................................ 18 
3.1  Robot operating system ......................................................................................................... 18 

3.2  Battle management language ................................................................................................ 19 

3.3  Interoperability profile .......................................................................................................... 20 

3.4  Joint architecture for unmanned systems .............................................................................. 21 

3.5  Fundamental standards for unmanned ground vehicles ........................................................ 24 

3.5.1 

Data standardisation commonly used with unmanned systems (not exhaustive) ....... 24 

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Acronyms 

BfS 
BRD 
CBRNE 
CEA 

CEN 
CENELEC 

CSIC 
DEMA 
EDA 
ERNCIP 
HC 
IAEA 
IND 
IRSN 

JRC 
LHC 
LML 
MORC 
NaI 
NATO 
NEN 
NIST 
NORM 
NPL 
NSDA 
PRD 
RDD 
RED 
RID 
RN 
RPM 
SPRD 
SRPM 
SQL 
SSTC-NRC 
STUK 
WLCG 
XML 

Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Germany – Federal Office for radiation protection (Germany) 
Backpack radiation detector 
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive 
Commissariat  à  l'énergie  atomique  et  aux  énergies  alternatives  —  French  atomic  and  alternative 
energies commission 
Comité européen de normalisation; European Committee for Standardisation 
Comité  européen  de  normalisation  électrotechnique;  European  Committee  for  Electrotechnical 
Standardisation 
Institutional Repository of the Spanish National Research Council 
Danish Emergency Management Agency 
European Defence Agency 
European reference network for critical infrastructure protection (EC) 
Health Canada 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Improvised nuclear device 
Institute  for  radiological  protection  and  nuclear  safety,  French  national  public  expert  in  nuclear 
and radiological risks 
Joint Research Centre, the European Commission's in-house science service 
Large hadron collider 
Linssi markup language (XML) 
Material out of regulatory control 
Sodium Iodide, scintillator crystal used in gamma spectrometer 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Netherland Standardisation Institute 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, US 
Naturally occurring radioactive material 
National physical laboratory, UK 
Nuclear security detection architecture 
Personal radiation detector 
Radiological dispersal device 
Radiation exposure device 
Radionuclide identification detector 
Radioactive and nuclear materials 
Radiation portal monitor 
Spectroscopy-based personal radiation detector 
Spectroscopy-based radiation portal monitor 
Structured query language 
State scientific and technical centre for nuclear and radiation safety, Ukraine 
Säteilyturvakeskus, radiation and nuclear safety authority, Finland 
Worldwide LHC computing grid 
Extensible markup language 

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1  Introduction 

There  is  significant  potential  for  the  use  of  unmanned  remote  control  vehicles  in  sampling  and 
measuring  radiological  events.  For  example,  using  unmanned  aerial  vehicles  (UAV)  to  sample  the 
radioactive plume from a nuclear reactor incident or dirty bomb could provide valuable information to 
emergency  response  personnel.  This  data  could  be  used  as  an  input  in  atmospheric  transport 
modelling calculations that are an important part of the decision support systems in such events. 
No attempt to standardise sampling and measurement methods using these types of vehicles has been 
done so far. Doing so would simplify the use of remote control vehicles in an emergency scenario and 
would thus be very valuable in critical infrastructure protection (CIP). 
Analysis  from  a  CIP  point  of  view  has  not  been  done  for  these  techniques.  Such  analysis  would 
produce useful background information for the possible future standardisation of the techniques. 
This  report  analyses  scenarios,  as  well  as  radiation  measurement  and  sampling  methods,  where  US 
can be used. This allows for standardisation and tests for US to be used in radiological emergencies. 
This report was written for end-users, procurement decision-makers and manufacturers, as well as for 
researchers  and  developers.  We  want  end-users  to  see  the  possible  potential  of  US  for  radiation 
measurements. Manufacturers should be inspired by the scenarios and encouraged to develop products 
to  tackle  the  problems  described  or  at  least  parts  of  them.  Researchers  and  developers  may  find 
inspiration  in  the  real-world  scenarios  and  get  an  idea  of  features  that  are  still  missing  and  require 
more research. 

The  European  reference  network  for  critical  infrastructure  protection  (ERNCIP)  office1  has 
established a thematic group on the protection of critical infrastructure from radiological and nuclear 
threats (RN  thematic  group) that looks  at issues,  such  as  the certification  of  radiation  detectors,  the 
standardisation  of  deployment  protocols  and  the  response  procedures  and  communication  to  the 
public in the event of criminal or unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out 
of  regulatory  control,  for  example.  In  short,  the  focus  of  the  RN  thematic  group  is  to  advise  the 
CEN/CENELEC on standardising formats and protocols used for sending the collected data to enable 
further analysis. The issue is closely related to the opportunity opened by the current developments in 
technology of utilising remote support of field teams (reachback) for radiation detection. 
The RN thematic group works with the following three issues. 

1.  List-mode  data  acquisition  based  on  digital  electronics.  The  time-stamped  list-mode  data 
format  produces  significant  added  value  compared  to  the  more  conventional  spectrum  data 
format.  It  improves  source  localisation,  allows  signal-to-noise  optimisation  and  noise 
filtering, with some new gamma and neutron detectors requiring list-mode data to function. 
The list-mode approach also allows for the precise time synchronisation of multiple detectors 

(1) The ERNCIP office operates within the organisational framework of the Institute for the protection and security of the 
citizen  (IPSC)  of  the  European  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre.  The  institute  provides  scientific  and  technological 
support to European Union policies in different areas, including global stability and security, crisis management, maritime 
and  fisheries  policies  and  the  protection  of  critical  infrastructures.  The  IPSC  works  in  close  collaboration  with  research 
centres,  universities,  private  companies  and  international  organisations  in  a  concerted  effort  to  develop  research-based 
solutions  for  the  security  and  protection  of  citizens.  The  ERNCIP's  mission  is  to  foster  the  emergence  of  innovative, 
qualified,  efficient  and  competitive  security  solutions  through  the  networking  of  European  experimental  capabilities.  The 
ERNCIP  office  has  been  mandated  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG  HOME)  of  the 
European Commission. 

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enabling simultaneous singles and coincidence spectrometry, such as single gamma and UV-
gated gamma spectrometry. 

2.  Expert support of field teams, i.e. data moves instead of people and samples. Fast and high 
quality  response  can  be  achieved  with  fewer  personnel.  Optimal  formats  and  protocols  are 
needed for efficient communication between frontline officers and reachback centres. 

3.  Remote  control  radiation  measurements  and  sampling  using  unmanned  vehicles.  There  are 
several  measurement  and  sampling  scenarios  that  are  too  risky  for  humans  to  carry  out. 
Envisaged  scenarios  are  nuclear  reactor  accidents,  the  illicit  release  of  radioactive  material 
(radiological dispersion devices and dirty bombs, for example) and the search of radioactive 
material out of regulatory control. 

This is the second report that deals with item 3, remote control radiation measurements and sampling 
using unmanned vehicles, focusing on scenarios for radiation detection using US. 

The remainder of this document is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes scenarios involving US 
for  identified  radiation  measurements  and  sampling,  while  Chapter  3  discusses  standards  that  are 
involved in the use of US in general. 

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2  Scenarios for radiation measurement with unmanned systems 

There are several measurement and sampling scenarios that are too risky for humans to carry out. For 
these scenarios, remote control radiation measurements and sampling using US need to be developed. 
Note  that  the  use  of  remote  control  devices,  such  as  unmanned  ground  vehicles  (UGVs)  and  small 
sized  unmanned  planes,  may  be  more  cost  effective  than  the  use  of  manned  vehicles  or  piloted 
aircraft, as decontamination of measurement systems and related costs should be taken into account. 
Applications envisaged for remote control measurement and sampling devices are reactor and other 
accidents, such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, dirty bombs and the search of sources out of regulatory 
control, as well as long-term measurements. 
Lessons  learned  from  incidents  like  Fukushima  and  Chernobyl  and  the  decommissioning  of  old 
nuclear  power  plants  show  that  UGVs  have  some  advantages.  Equipped  with  radiation-resistant 
electronics,  these  vehicles  can  operate  in  areas  with  high  radiation  or  danger  of  explosives  (For 
example, boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE), collapsing structures, IED, booby trap, 
heat…).  Additionally,  they  have  the  ability  to  manipulate  the  environment  and  to  take  potentially 
heavy  samples,  as  they  usually  have  a  high  payload.  UGVs  can  also  be  used  in  the  long-time 
surveying of contaminated areas and monitoring the movements of a threat with real-time data from 
multiple mobile sensor sources. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles have their own advantages in a radioactive material dispersal case, as in the 
case  of  the  search  of  sources  or  any  RN  threats.  As  these  systems  can  be  deployed  in  a  short  time 
frame to map large areas (on the order of square kilometres) with regards to dose rate, surface activity 
or  radionuclide  identification,  they  can  collect  vital  data  to  be  used  by  decision-makers.  This  was 
demonstrated by the United States when it used helicopter systems to map the fallout from Fukushima 
in  the  weeks  following  the  accident.  Furthermore,  a  smaller  system  mounted  under  a  UAV  would 
have been very useful for the daily-changing dose rate mapping on the site. 
This chapter investigates possible radiation measurement scenarios where  US could be useful. They 
are  split  into  two types. The  first  covers  scenarios  where  a release  of  radioactivity  or  irradiation  of 
civilians or infrastructure has not yet occurred. The second type covers the release of radioactivity or 
significant irradiation of civilians, infrastructure or the environment.  For clarification purposes, field 
personnel tasked  with  radiation  measurement  and  protection  are  henceforth  referred to  as ‘radiation 
task force’. 

2.1  Possible applications for unmanned systems 

We identified possible applications where US could be helpful. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we developed 
possible  scenarios  that  mainly  focus  on  radiation  measurement.  These  scenarios  include  tasks  from 
the following list of applications: 

repetitive/routine measurements; 

 
  measurements in areas of high radiation and equipped with electronic radiation resistance; 
 
 
  gamma  mapping:  dose  rate,  surface  activities,  point  activities  (including  blank  of  critical 

carrying of heavy equipment; 
search, localisation and identification of possible radiation sources; 

infrastructures and sites); 

  operation  in  dangerous  and  uncooperative  environments  (CBRNE  scenarios,  dirty  bombs, 

inaccessible areas, etc.); 
collection of samples; 

 
  manipulation of the environment; 

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  decontamination and containment actions. 

2.2  Critical parameters 

General  parameters  not  specific  to  any  task  or  scenario  but  critical  for  radiation  measurement  with 
remote control US were identified. These parameters are discussed in this subsection. 

2.2.1  Time and space 

It is usually very important for the radiation task force to quickly deliver the results or assessments of 
a  given  situation,  which  would  render  the  rapid  deployment  of  the  US  possible.  Workspace  for  the 
radiation task force might also be limited, requiring the use of small robots. 
The logistics time is the time it takes to get the equipment to the right place. The deployment time of a 
US  is  the  time  a  specialist  needs  to  get  the  system  up  and  running,  which  includes  unpacking  and 
starting the robot, starting the remote control and driving or flying the robot to the target area. 
The  time  constraint  also  includes  the  operation  time,  which  is  the  time  that  the  system  is  able  to 
operate without leaving the operation to refuel or recharge batteries. 
The space constraint consists of two parts. The first part is the transportation space that a US and all 
control components need during the transportation to the operation. The less space is needed, the more 
likely it will be brought to operation. The second part is the operation space that a US needs to be able 
to  operate.  For  example,  a  ground  robot  needs  some  space to  drive  and turn,  whereas  a fixed  wing 
unmanned aircraft needs space for take-off and landing. 

2.2.2  Number of available robots 

The number of robots is related to the available space for transportation and for the operation itself, 
but  some  operations  include  tasks  that  could  involve  more  than  one  robot,  such  as  setting  up 
infrastructure  for  communication  after  a  disaster.  By  having  several  robots  acting  as  relay  stations, 
this  could  potentially  be  accomplished  faster  than  using  only  one  robot  or  field  personnel. 
Additionally,  a  group of robots sharing  the  task  can save  precious  time  in  searching  for  a radiation 
source or in a scenario where the goal is to map the environment. Groups of robots can easily split up 
and divide the overall problem into smaller ones. 
So a possible group of multiple robots can consist of vehicles from different domains (air, land and/or 
sea), as well as carry various kinds of sensors. The group behaviour might be coordinated by software 
and/or operators. 

2.2.3  Sensors 

Depending on the size and the loading capacity of the system, an appropriate sensor is necessary. A 
large sized UGV can carry heavy detectors, whereas small rotary wing unmanned air systems have to 
use small and lightweight sensors. Scenarios and objectives determine which system carrying which 
sensor is best suited for the application. 

2.3  Types of incidents and scenarios 

By taking a look at incidents that involve radioactivity or radiation measurement, we can easily see 
that there is quite a difference between dispersed radioactivity and non-dispersed radioactivity. When 
dealing  with  dispersed radioactivity,  information  has  to  be  gathered  on fallout, radiation  plume  and 
the  level  of  dispersion.  When  dealing  with  non-dispersed  radioactive  material,  the  source  has  to  be 
found and identified, and potential explosive materials have to be located and removed. As the action 

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or reaction differs significantly depending on the situation, three different types of incidents involving 
radioactivity have been identified: 

1.  radioactivity confirmed — dispersed; 
2.  radioactivity confirmed — no dispersal; 
3.  no radioactivity (possible threat). 

These types of incidents are used to categorise scenarios covering radiological incidents. These kinds 
of  scenarios  can  be  found  as  response  scenarios  in  Section  2.5.  Prevention  scenarios  do  not  handle 
incidents and are therefore not categorised in this way. 

Three  different  major  tasks  have  been  extracted  from  the  possible  applications  in  Section  2.1  for 
radiation measurements with US. The main tasks in the scenarios below can be related to one of these 
major tasks: 

a.  spatial mapping of RN sensor data (exploration, change detection, etc.); 
b.  searching for RN sources (active sensing, isocurves, hotspots, etc.); 
c.  sampling (air sampling, sweep sampling and material sampling). 

2.4  Prevention scenarios 

In  the  scenarios  presented  here,  a  radiation  task  force  has  been  deployed  to  prevent  a  radiation 
incident or to deter people from  bringing radioactive sources to a specific location. These scenarios 
focus on periodical inspection. 

2.4.1  Exploration (harbour, re-locatable, illicit trafficking) 

In  this  scenario,  a  specific  area  has  been  determined  to  possibly  contain  a  radioactive  source,  for 
example  a  container  harbour  with  the  possibility  of  illicitly  trafficking  potentially  dangerous 
radioactive material. This is a spatial mapping task (a). 

Figure 1. Two images of container terminals: Hamburg (left) and Barcelona (right). 

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(2) ‘Hamburg Hafen Containerterminal’, photo by Raimond Spekking. 
(3) ‘Puertobarcelona2’, photo by OneLoneClone — http://www.flickr.com. 

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Figure 2. This figure shows an example of a container inspection for the scenario ‘exploration’. There are several containers 
shown in blue that should be inspected one by one. 

Unmanned systems should provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at any time. 
The  aerial  or  ground  vehicle  should  inspect  bigger  objects  one  by  one  (containers  or  cars,  for 
example).  If  suspicious radiation is found,  the  location  of the  measurement  must  be  reported to  the 
operator. After that, the real-time measurements of the US should enable the radiation experts in the 
safety zone or at any distant analysis centre to identify the nuclide or nuclides. After the localisation 
and  confirmation  of  the  source,  the  vehicle  should  map  the  surrounding  area  to  determine  the 
radiation field from the radioactive source. 

2.4.2  Patrolling, search for source, change detection, major public event 

In this scenario, a continuous search for radiation sources in a predefined area or on a specified route 
has to be performed. As this scenario requires mapping, the task that needs to be completed is of type 
(a). 

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Figure 3. This is a sample of a patrolling scenario. The US sweeps a given area of interest and sends an alarm if anything 
suspicious is found. 

Unmanned systems should provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at any time. 
The vehicle has to perform a survey of a predefined area or a specified route. The system should be 
able to compare current measurement results to old ones from the same location/area/route in order to 
reduce false positives. If a suspected radioactive source is found, an alarm with measurement results 
and the location of those measurements must be sent to the operator. Unmanned ground systems can 
be used to carry very heavy devices and operate in dangerous terrain. Unmanned aerial vehicles can 
operate  over  the  area  by  parallel  and/or  crossed trajectories  in  order to  provide  gamma  mapping  or 
simple detection localisation with an embedded gamma detector or spectrometer. 

2.4.3  Background mapping, change detection 

In  this  scenario,  there  is  a  predefined  area  that  has  to  be  continuously  or  periodically  checked  for 
radiation  for  a  longer  period  of  time.  A  map  of  the  background  radiation  therefore  has  to  be  made 
first.  After  that,  inspection  runs  have  to  be  performed  and  the  previously  mapped  background 
radiation measurements have to be compared with current measurements. This scenario requires the 
completion of a type (a) task. 
Unmanned systems should provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at any time. 
The vehicle has to perform an inspection of the previously mapped area. The system should be able to 
compare  current  measurement  results  to  old  ones  from  the  same  location/area/route.  If  a  suspected 
radioactive  source  is  found,  an  alarm  with  measurement  results  and  the  location  of  those 
measurements must be sent to the operator. 

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Figure  4.  This  is  a  sample  of  a  background  mapping  scenario.  Differently  coloured  dots  show  different  measures  in  the 
background radiation map. 

2.5  Response scenarios 

This  type  of  scenario  involves  the  release  of  significant  amounts  of  radioactive  material  in  the 
surrounding  area  or  high  dose  rate  radiation  fields  from  an  unshielded  or  partially  shielded  point 
source. 

2.5.1  Suspicious object 

In this scenario, a possibly dangerous radioactive source is believed to be located in a specific area. 
We assume that a radiation task force is already onsite, has closed down the area and has established a 
safety  zone  from  where  it can  operate.  The  main  task  for  the  radiation  task  force  is  to  prevent  any 
further  disturbances  of  the  environment,  to  get  accurate  situation  awareness  and  to  determine  the 
location  and  characteristics  of  the  radioactive  object.  This  is  therefore  a  category  2  scenario,  as 
described  above.  The  location  of  the  object  is  roughly  known,  but  it  is  unclear  if  explosives  are 
involved.  Furthermore,  the  activity  of  the  source  is  unknown.  The  main  task  in  this  scenario  is  the 
mapping of the environment (a). 

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Figure 5. This is a drawing of an example for the scenario ‘suspicious object’. The suspicious object is in the middle of the 
closed area and the radiation task force is operating from a safety zone nearby. 

The  US  should  provide  real-time  sensor  readings  to  the  radiation  task  force  at  all  times.  The  US 
should  approach  the  suspicious  object  from  the  deployment  safety  zone,  where  the  US  operator  is 
located. The  objective  of  the  US  would  be  to  find  the  approximate  or  exact  location  of  the  source. 
Using the instruments in the vehicle, real-time  measurements should enable the radiation experts in 
the  safety  zone  or  at  any  distant  analysis  centre  to  identify  the  nuclide  or  nuclides.  This  would  be 
followed  by  mapping  the  radiation  field  of  the  source  in  the  area  near  to  the  source  in  order  to 
determine collimation and shielding of the source. 

2.5.2  Isocurves (contour mapping) 

If the location of a point source or contaminated area is roughly known, the radiation task forces will 
be tasked with creating iso dose rate curves, which are curves around the source where the dose rate is 
constant. This type of scenario could be of category 1 or 2. The location, activity and dispersion of the 
source, as well as if explosives are involved, are unknown. The main task in this scenario is the active 
search of the RN source (type (b) task). 

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Figure 6. This is a sketch of an isocurve for a radiation source (red square). On every point of the blue curve, the radiation 
level is 100µSv/h, for example. 

The US should provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at all times. The vehicle 
should  identify  the  boundaries  (create  isocurves)  of  the  contaminated  area  with  a  given  criteria 
(100µSv/h,  for  example).  This  should  be  followed  by  a  survey  to  more  precisely  determine  the 
location of the source. 

2.5.3  Terror lab, mapping 

In this scenario, a workspace or laboratory that contains radioactive sources, which are intended for 
illicit  use,  has  been  located.  The  radiation  task  force  is  called  in  to  investigate  the  scene.  This  is  a 
category 1 or 2 scenario. The location, activity and dispersion of the source, as well as if explosives 
are involved, are unknown. The main task is the mapping of the environment (type (a) task). 

The US should provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at all times. The task of 
the vehicle would be to map the radiation field in the area, starting outside and proceeding inside of 
the lab. If a suspected radioactive source is found, an alarm containing measurements and location of 
those measurements must be transmitted to the operator. This should be followed by identifying the 
nuclides present, as well as by a survey of the nearby area. 

2.5.4  Scrap metal (sort out piece by piece) 

In this scenario, an elevated radiation field has been found to originate from a large collection of scrap 
metal (a container or a large pile at a scrap metal yard, for example). Due to the high density of metal 
that collimates the source and the difficulty of separating radioactive scrap metal from non-radioactive 
scrap metal by visual means, every piece of metal has to be separated and checked. This is typically a 
category 2 scenario. The location and the activity of the source might be roughly known, though the 
dispersion is unlikely. It is unknown if any explosives are involved. The main task of this scenario is 
the mapping of the source. 

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Figure 7. Sketch of  a possible ‘scrap  metal’  scenario. On the right is a pile of scrap  metal  with a radioactive source.  The 
robot has to bring the pieces one by one to the stationary scanner for inspection and radiation measurement. 

The  task  for  the  US is  to  scan the pile  piece  by  piece  and  gather  non-radioactive  material  at  a safe 
place, as well as to raise an alarm for active material and separate this from the non-active pieces. The 
US has to repeat this task until every piece has been scanned  and all radioactive  sources have been 
found and removed. 

2.5.5  Sampling 

In  this  scenario,  the  dispersion  of  a  radioactive  source  has  not  been  confirmed.  Sampling  has  to  be 
performed in order to determine the possible dispersion of the source and the extent of this dispersion. 
The radiation task force has already established a safety zone at a safe distance from the source. This 
is a category 1 or 2 scenario. The location and activity of the source are unknown and dispersion is 
possible but not confirmed. The main task of this scenario is the sampling of a source (type (c) task). 
The  task  for  a  US  is  to  gather  samples  and  bring  them  out  of  the  area  containing  the  suspected 
radioactivity. There could be different kinds of samples to gather, including air samples and dust that 
could be gathered by sweeping with a tissue. The US must provide real-time sensor readings to the 
radiation  task  force  at  all  times.  Additional  constraints  may  apply,  as  gathering  evidence  is  highly 
regulated. 

2.5.6  Map  and  search  radioactivity,  map  and  search  hotspots  and  identification  of 

nuclides 

In  this  scenario,  the  radiation  task  force  needs  a  map  of  a  given  area.  In  this  map,  hotspots  and 
radioactivity  sources  have  to  be  tagged  and  nuclides  have  to  be  identified.  The  main  task  of  this 
scenario is a spatial mapping  (type  (a) task) of the environment. This is a category  1 or 2 scenario. 
The location and activity of the source are unknown and dispersion is possible but not confirmed. 
The task for a US is gather geo-referenced RN-sensor readings and put the information together in a 
map. The US must provide real-time sensor readings to the radiation task force at all times. 

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3  Possible standards for unmanned systems 

A rough survey of existing standards for all kinds of US has been done. However, one very important 
precondition  is  that  all  considered  standards  should  be  freely  available  and  without  any  licence 
restrictions. In addition, open source and open science solutions should be favoured. 

The following are some of the ‘standards’ affecting US. 

•  NATO STANAG 4586 for UAVs 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STANAG_4586 

•  SAE JAUS   

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAUS 

•  ASTM F41 on USV-UUV 

http://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F41.htm 

•  MIL-STD-1760 (SAE AS-1)  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIL-STD-1760 

•  Universal Armament Interface 

http://papers.sae.org/2012-01-2136/ 

• 

IOP  

•  DDS 

•  MAJIIC 

•  BML 

http://www.peogcs.army.mil/ugv.html 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Distribution_Service 

http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/pdf/majic.pdf 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_management_language 

•  EMWARE   

https://www.eda.europa.eu/our-work/projects-

search/embarked-middleware---emware 

•  ROS 

http://www.ros.org/ 

Due to the limited work capacities within the group, only a brief discussion of the listed standards has 
been done. The main reason for including the robot operating system is that it is available for free and 
most of the academic robotics R&D groups are running it on their  US anyway. In addition, the robot 
operating system has the appeal of coming with at least rudimentary interfaces for joint architecture for 
unmanned  systems  and  the  interoperability  profile.  Battle  management  language  is  also  available  for 
free  (https://netlab.gmu.edu/trac/OpenBML)  and,  beside  its  capabilities  to  connect  people,  USs  and 
simulators, it provides a high-level graphical user interface. 

3.1  Robot operating system 

The  ROS  is  a  collection  of  software  frameworks  for  robot  software  development  (see  also  ‘robotics 
middleware’)  that  provides  operating  system-like  functionality  on  a  heterogeneous  computer  cluster. 
The ROS provides standard operating system services, such as hardware abstraction, low-level device 
control,  implementation  of  commonly  used  functionality,  message  passing  between  processes  and 
package  management.  Running  sets  of  ROS-based  processes  are  represented  in  a  graph  architecture 
where  processing  takes  place  in  nodes  that  may  receive,  post  and  multiplex  sensor,  control,  state, 
planning,  actuator  and  other  messages.  Despite  the  importance  of  reactivity  and  low  latency  in  robot 
control,  the  ROS  itself  is  not  a real-time  operating  system,  though  it  is  possible  to  integrate  the  ROS 
with a real-time code. 

Software in the ROS ecosystem can be separated into three groups: 

• 

language- and platform-independent tools used for building and distributing ROS-based software; 

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•  ROS client library implementations, such as roscpp, rospy, and roslisp; 

• 

packages containing an application-related code that uses one or more ROS client libraries. 

Both the language-independent tools and the main client libraries (C++, Python and LISP) are released 
under the terms of the BSD license, and as such are open source software and free for both commercial 
and research use. The majority of other packages are licensed under a variety of open-source licenses. 
These  other  packages  implement  commonly  used  functionality  and  applications,  such  as  hardware 
drivers,  robot  models,  data  types,  planning,  perception,  simultaneous  localisation  and  mapping, 
simulation tools and other algorithms. 

The main ROS client libraries (C++, Python and LISP) are geared toward Unix-like systems, primarily 
due to their dependency on large collections of open-source software. For these client libraries, Ubuntu 
Linux  is  listed  as  ‘supported’,  while  other  variants,  such  as  Fedora  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Microsoft 
Windows, are designated ‘experimental’ and are supported by the community only. However, the native 
Java ROS client library, rosjava, does not share these limitations and has enabled ROS-based software to 
be  written  for  the  Android  OS.  Rosjava  has  also  enabled  ROS  to  be  integrated  into  an  officially-
supported  MATLAB  toolbox  that  can  be  used  on  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Microsoft  Windows.  A 
JavaScript client library, roslibjs, has also been developed, enabling the integration of software into a 
ROS system via any standards-compliant web browser. 

3.2  Battle management language 

Battle management language (BML) is an artificial, unambiguous, human-readable language and open 
standard  used  to  express  and  to  exchange  orders,  reports  and  requests  among  command  and  control 
systems (C2 systems), simulation systems and real units. In addition, BML can also be used to interact 
with robotic forces. In short, BML allows C2 systems and their users to interact with robot systems in 
the same way as with real units or units simulated in simulation systems. NATO developed BML in its 
research groups, MSG-48 and MSG-85. 

BML must be unambiguous to allow for automatic processing, which is not self-evident for a language. 
For example, in English, the lexical term ‘bark’ can refer to the sound a dog produces or to the skin of a 
tree. The interpretation of such ambiguous terms depends on the situational context and on the world 
knowledge  of  the  listener.  As  such,  ambiguity  can  (mostly)  be  handled  by  human  information 
processing systems, but not by artificial ones. 

In order to be unambiguous, BML has been designed as a formal language. A formal language is the set 
of all sentences generated by formal grammar. Formal grammar consists of a lexicon (the words of  a 
language)  and  a  set  of  rules  (how  to  combine  the  words).  In  the  case  of  BML,  this  grammar  is  the 
command  and  control  lexical  grammar  (C2LG).  To  be  more  precise,  BML’s  lexicon  contains  the 
attributes and values provided by the joint consultation command and control information exchange data 
model (JC3IEDM) (see https://mipsite.lsec.dnd.ca/). This set of rules has been developed based on the 
doctrines of ordering and reporting (STANAG 2014, for example) and incorporates the idea of the 5Ws 
(who, what, when, where and why) for individual BML expressions. With respect to orders, the central 
grammatical  rules  are  those  that  assign  a  task  to  a  unit.  These rules  are  therefore  centred  on  the  task 
expression (the what). Rule form (1) illustrates how these ‘tasking’ rules are constructed. They consist 
of a task verb (taskverb) such as ‘advance’, a reference to the one assigning the task (tasker), a reference 
to  the  one  who  has  to  execute  the  task  (taskee)  —  in  our  case,  robots  —  and,  in  some  cases  and 
depending  on  the type  of  task,  a  reference to  something  that  is  affected  by  the  task.  This is  either  an 
object (affected) or another task (action). In addition, a task assignment includes spatial and temporal 
constraints  (where,  start-when  and  end-when),  modifiers  (mod)  and  a  reason  why  the  task  has  to  be 

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executed (why). The task assignment ends with a label that can be used in other expressions to refer to 
that task assignment. 

3.3  Interoperability profile 

In  2010,  the  Robotic  Systems  Joint  Project  Office  launched  an  initiative  to  identify  and  define 
interoperability standards to be organised and maintained within a UGV interoperability profile (IOP). 
This  IOP  will  be  employed  by  Product  Manager,  Unmanned  Ground  Vehicle  in  future  programs  of 
record, in the upgrade of fielded systems and in the evaluation/acquisition of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products. 

A  primary  goal  of  this  initiative  is  to  leverage  existing  and  emerging  standards  within  the  unmanned 
vehicle community, such as: 

• 

• 

• 

the society of automotive engineers (SAE) AS-4 joint architecture for unmanned systems (JAUS) 
standard; 

 the  advanced  explosive  ordnance  disposal  robotic  system  (AEODRS)  architecture  description 
documents version 1.0; 

the army unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) project office IOPs. 

With an end goal of: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

facilitating interoperability among new UGV initiatives and legacy systems; 

facilitating interoperability between controllers and unmanned robotic system(s); 

facilitating collaboration between UGV and UAS systems; 

providing a path forward to standardised interoperable technology solutions; 

promoting  payload  and  on-board  subsystem  modularity  and  commonality  across  the  portfolio  of 
UGV systems. 

The  IOP  has  been  developed  using  a  government/industry  working  integrated  product  team  structure 
and  defines  the  interoperable  interfaces  and  protocols  necessary  to  enable  interoperability  and 
modularity  to  be  introduced  to  the  capabilities  that  have  already  been  widely  fielded.  The  RS  JPO 
intends  to  publish  annual  revisions  to  the  IOP  in  order  to  expand  and  evolve  its  scope  as  necessary, 
based on the evolution of warfighter capability requirements and technological advances. 

The IOPs will contain a set of interface definitions and requirements for physical, electrical, software, 
control, data, communications and human elements, as well as implementation guidance for SAE AS-
4/JAUS message sets. 

The following overall process is being utilised for the development and application of the IOPs. 

•  Develop and refine mission profiles and use cases — a summary of operational requirements and 

how unattended ground sensor (UGS) are currently being used. 

•  Decompose  to  understand  functional  requirements  —  a  listing  of  which  functions  the  UGS  fleet 

must perform in relation to interoperability. 

•  Develop IOPs to define software and hardware interfaces — this will lead to the publishing of the 

IOPs themselves. 

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•  Refine IOPs over time to outpace army training and doctrine command (TRADOC) requirements 

and technology advancements. 

•  Utilise robotic system integration lab (RSIL) to validate IOPs and assess conformance to them — 
this will be used in confirming that the IOPs ensure interoperability as planned and in determining 
commercial vendors’ level of compliance with the IOPs. 

• 

Implement  IOPs  in  performance  specifications  for  UGV  acquisitions  —  this  will  ensure  that  the 
actual fielded system acquisitions are interoperable. 

The IOPs consist of the following series of documents. 

•  Overarching  IOP  —  defines  platform  level  mobility,  network,  messaging  and  environmental 

requirements, as well as their conformance/validation criteria. 

•  Mission analysis attachment — includes a summary of operational requirements and use cases. 

•  SAE  JAUS  profiling  rules  attachment  —  includes  specification,  clarification  and  implementation 

guidance on the SAE JAUS standards. 

•  Private  transports  attachment  —  includes  guidance  on  the  formulation  of  messages  not  currently 

within the SAE JAUS message sets. 

•  Payload IOP — defines payload classifications, standards, requirements and conformance approach. 

•  Communications  IOP  —  defines  communication  standards,  requirements  and  conformance 

approach. 

•  Control  IOP  —  defines  operator  control  unit  logical  architecture,  standards,  requirements, 

conformance approach and command and control messages. 

3.4  Joint architecture for unmanned systems 

The joint architecture for unmanned systems (JAUS) is mandated for use by all of the programs in the 
joint ground robotics enterprise (JGRE). This initiative is to develop architecture for the domain of US. 
JAUS is an upper-level design for the interfaces within the domain of UGVs. It is a component-based, 
message-passing  architecture  that  specifies  data  formats  and  methods  of  communication  among 
computing  nodes.  It  defines  messages  and  component  behaviours  that  are independent  of  technology, 
computer hardware, operator use and vehicle platforms and isolated from mission. 

JAUS  uses  the  society  of  automotive  engineers  generic  open  architecture  (SAE  GOA)  framework  to 
classify  the  interfaces.  It  complies  with  the  joint  technical  architecture  and  the  joint  technical 
architecture-army.  JAUS  is  prescriptive  as  opposed  to  descriptive,  and  it  is  sufficiently  flexible  to 
accommodate technology advances. Any US — air, ground, surface or underwater — can use JAUS, be 
it commercial or military. 

The JAUS working group is responsible for defining and implementing the architecture across a variety 
of unmanned vehicles, sensors and munitions. The architecture supports the following objectives: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

support all classes of unmanned systems; 

rapid technology insertion; 

interoperable operator control unit; 

interchangeable/interoperable payloads; 

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5. 

interoperable unmanned systems. 

It also has the following constrains: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

defence acquisition system; 

operational procedures; 

intellectual property and data rights; 

systems engineering; 

research and development; 

product acquisition. 

The architecture furthermore respects the following standards: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

joint technical architecture (JTA); 

4D/real-time control system (4D/RCS); 

rotorcraft open systems avionics (ROSA); 

air vehicle standard interface (AVSI). 

JAUS  defines  11  functional  (command,  manoeuvre,  navigation,  payload,  communication…)  and  five 
informational capabilities (status, world model, library…). 

The  architecture  dictates  a  hierarchical  system  built  up  of  subsystems,  nodes  and  components,  and 
contains a strictly defined message set to support an unprecedented level of interoperability. Significant 
portions  of  the  architecture,  including  the  definitions  for  subsystem,  node  and  component,  have  been 
loosely defined in order to accommodate for the five principles that it is based on. The net effect is more 
efficient development, reduced ownership cost and an expanded range of vendors. 

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Figure 8. Relations between JAUS, IOP and ROS 
(ref. Robotics Systems JPO). 

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3.5  Fundamental standards for unmanned ground vehicles 

The group also surveyed applicable NATO activities regarding the use of standards and discovered the 
MAJIIC  I/II  projects.  Due  to  the  issues  regarding  licencing,  it  not  possible  to  use  anything  directly 
related to MAJIIC, but the according NATO standards can still be used, which are the following. 

•  STANAG 3277 — air reconnaissance request/task form 

http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/224/standard/4545/4545_documents/4545_ed1_amd1.pdf  

•  STANAG 3377 — RecceExrep message. 

•  STANAG 3596 — air reconnaissance requesting and target reporting guide. 

•  STANAG 4545 — SAR, EO and IR Data (NSIF) 

http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/224/standard/4545/4545_documents/4545_ed1_amd1.pdf  

•  STANAG 4559 — NATO standard image library interface 

http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/224/standard/4559/4559Eed03.pdf  

•  STANAG 4607 — ground moving target indicator format, GMTIF 

http://www.nato.int/structur/ac/224/standard/4607/4607_documents/AEDP-7.pdf  

•  STANAG 4609 — motion imagery 

http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/224/standard/4609/4609_documents/AEDP-8%283%29.pdf  

•  STANAG 4676 — NATO ISR tracking standard, DRAFT 
http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/224/jisrcg/jisrcg.htm  

•  STANAG 5516 — link 16 data exchange, track management. 

3.5.1  Data standardisation commonly used with unmanned systems (not exhaustive) 

3.5.1.1 Character encoding 
The character encoding that is used in all ELROB activities is: 

UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/unicode transformation format) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UTF-8 

3.5.1.2 Position encoding 
The geographic coordinate system that should be used is: 

UTM coordinate system 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Transverse_Mercator_coordinate_system 

The geodetic reference system that should be used is: 

world geodetic system (WGS) 84 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Geodetic_System 

3.5.1.3 Time encoding 
The time zone and time formats that should be used are: 

Central European Time (CET) respectively Central European Summer Time (CEST) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_European_Time 

For example: 1971-05-16T23:46:01 CET 

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And for program use: UNIX time/POSIX time 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POSIX_time 

The following code sample produces a valid ‘full UNIX time stamp’: 

#include <stdio.h> 
#include <sys/time.h> 
int main(void)  
{ 
  struct timeval tv; 
  gettimeofday (&tv, 0);  
  printf ("%d.%06d", tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);  
  return 0; 
} 

It should result in an output such as 915148798.750000. 

3.5.1.4 Graphics encoding 
The graphics file formats that should be used are: 

portable network graphics (PNG) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portable_Network_Graphics 

and/or: 

JPEG (ITU-T T.81, ISO/IEC IS 10918-1 and, if needed, ITU-T T.84) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jpg 

3.5.1.5 Video encoding 
The graphics file formats that should be used are: 

H.264/MPEG-4 AVC 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H.264/MPEG-4_AVC 

and/or: 

high efficiency video coding (HEVC, H.265) 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Efficiency_Video_Coding 

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26 

European Commission 
EUR 27225 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 

Title:  

Possible scenarios for radiation measurements and sampling using unmanned systems  
ERNCIP thematic group Radiological and nuclear threats to critical infrastructure - Task 3 deliverable 2 

Authors:   Frank E. Schneider, FKIE 

Bastian Gaspers, FKIE 
Kari Peräjärvi, STUK 
Magnus Gårdestig, Linköping University 

2015 – 27 pp. – 21.0 x 29.7 cm 

EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1831-9424 

ISBN 978-92-79-48073-7 

doi:10.2788/60148 

Abstract 

There  is  significant  potential  for  the  use  of  unmanned  remote  control  vehicles  in  sampling  and  measuring  radiological 
events. No attempt to standardise sampling and measurement methods using these types of vehicles has been made so 
far. Common standards would simplify the use of remote control vehicles in an emergency scenario and would thus be very 
valuable in critical infrastructure protection. The main advantage of using unmanned systems in radiological events is the 
protection  of  the  involved  human  personnel.  This  document  focuses  on  possible  scenarios  for  remote  control  radiation 
measurements and sampling using unmanned systems. We identified scenarios that can be separated in two categories. 
First,  there  are  prevention  scenarios  where  unmanned  systems  can  be  used  to  prevent  incidents  involving  radioactive 
material  and  deterrence.  Second,  there  are  response  scenarios  where  unmanned  systems  can  be  used  to  gather 
information  after  incidents  with  radioactive  material  have  occurred.  We  further  condensed  three  main  tasks  (spatial 
mapping,  search  of  sources  and  sampling)  for  unmanned  systems  in  the  identified  scenarios.  In  addition,  this  report 
summarises  possible  standards  for  unmanned  systems.  A  very  widely  recognised  standard  collection  of  software 
frameworks  for  robot  software  development  is  the  robot  operating  system.  Further  important  standards  concerning 
communication with robots and control of unmanned systems are battle management language, interoperability profile and 
joint architecture for unmanned systems. 

     
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-

L
B
N
A
-
2
7
2
2
5
-
E
N
N

-

JRC Mission 

As the Commission’s  
in-house science service,  
the Joint Research Centre’s  
mission is to provide EU  
policies with independent,  
evidence-based scientific  
and technical support  
throughout the whole  
policy cycle. 

Working in close  
cooperation with policy  
Directorates-General,  
the JRC addresses key  
societal challenges while  
stimulating innovation  
through developing  
new methods, tools  
and standards, and sharing  
its know-how with  
the Member States,  
the scientific community  
and international partners. 

Serving society  
Stimulating innovation  
Supporting legislation 

doi:10.2788/60148 

ISBN 978-92-79-48073-7