REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE TEMPORARY CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR BULGARIA AND ROMANIA
Date: 2015-08-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, EU visa policy, Romania, Schengen Information System, border control, distribution of EU funding, evaluation method, external border of the EU, fund (EU)

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.8.2015  COM(2015) 387 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE TEMPORARY CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR BULGARIA AND ROMANIA {SWD(2015) 157 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE TEMPORARY 
CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR BULGARIA AND 
ROMANIA 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

The Cash-flow and Schengen Facility was created by Article 32(1) of the Act of Accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union1 (hereinafter referred to as the Accession Act) 
as a temporary instrument to help Bulgaria and Romania to finance actions at the new external 
borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  external  border 
control and to help improve cash-flow in national budgets.  

Article 32(3) of the Accession Act stipulates that at least 50% of the funding provided by the 
instrument  should  have  been  used  to  support  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in  their  obligation  to 
finance  actions  at  the  new  external  borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the 
Schengen acquis and external border control.  

The purpose of this report is 

 

to  provide  summary  information  on  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  part  of  the 
temporary  Cash-flow  and  Schengen  Facility  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  Schengen 
Facility II); and 

 

to present the results of the ex-post evaluation of the instrument.  

1 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the adjustments to the 
treaties on which the European Union is founded. OJ L 157, 21.6.2005, p. 203.  

2 

 
 
 
                                                            
2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II 

In  accordance  with  Article  32  of  the  Accession  Act,  the  Commission  paid  to  Bulgaria  and 
Romania during the period 2007-2009 the annual lump-sum payments under Cash-flow and 
Schengen Facility in twelfths (for the total amounts, please see the table below).  

Table 1: Schengen Facility II payments and eligible costs - overview 

Total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual payments (million 
EUR - 2004 prices)2 

Bulgaria 

Romania 

239.5 

559.8 

Total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual payments  (million 
EUR – current prices) 

257.9 

602.5 

50% of the total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual 
payments (million EUR – current prices)3 

Total programmed amounts (million EUR - current prices) 

Total declared and certified expenditure (million EUR - current 
prices) 

Ineligible expenditure (million EUR- current prices) 

129.0 

161.0 

128.2 

2.7 

301.2 

404.4 

353.6 

3.1 

Total eligible costs chargeable to the Schengen Facility II (million 
EUR- current prices) 

125.5 

350.5 

Amounts recovered by the Commission (million EUR- current 
prices) 

3.5 

0.0 

The Commission adopted a decision on the management and control of the Schengen Facility 
II.4 The decision stipulated that the following types of actions were eligible for support: 

 

 

Investment in the border crossing infrastructure; 

Investments in the border control equipment; 

  Training of border guards; 

  Support to the operational costs.  

The eligibility period started on 1 January 2007 and ended on 31 December 2010. 

The  beneficiary  Member  States  were  responsible  for  selecting  and  implementing  individual 
operations under the instrument.  

The  Bulgarian  and  Romanian  authorities  drafted  multi-annual  and  annual  indicative 
programmes  which  described  needs  related  to  the  implementation  of  Schengen  acquis  and 

2 Article 32(2) of the Accession Act defined the annual payments in 2004 prices.  
3 In accordance with Article 32(3) of the Accession Act, at least 50% of the allocation under the Cash-flow and 
Schengen Facility had to be used for actions at the new external borders of the Union for the implementation of 
the Schengen acquis and external border control. 
4 Commission Decision C(2007)1417 of 4 April 2007 on the management and control of the Schengen part of the 
Cash-flow and Schengen Facility.  

3 

 
 
 
                                                            
border controls, a strategy to address the needs, objectives to be achieved with the Schengen 
Facility II support and specific measures to be supported under the instrument. 

Under the Schengen Facility II indicative programmes, Bulgaria defined eight objectives. The 
breakdown of the programmed Schengen Facility II allocations per objective (and the actual 
declared expenditure) is presented in table 2: 

Table 2: Programmed financial allocations and the declared expenditure per objective – 
Bulgaria  

Objective 1: Acquisition of new technical equipment for 
surveillance and control of the external borders 

Objective 2: Special technical equipment for joint police 
operations in the border area 

Objective 3: Modernisation and development of the 
national communication systems 

Objective 4: Information systems and computer networks 
related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis 

Objective 5: Renovation and modernisation of the existing 
border infrastructure 

Objective 6: Other activities directly related to the border 
control of the external EU borders 

Objective 7: Increase of the qualification of the staff, 
including language training 

Objective 7: Development of the National Visa System 
and connection to the EU Visa Information System (VIS) 
and the consultation network VISION 

Programmed 
(EUR) 

Total declared 
and certified 
expenditure 
(EUR) 

97 324 000.00 

80 393 650.78 

7 454 000.00 

4 509 320.63 

21 279 000.00 

20 688 213.42 

12 650 000.00 

8 458 239.17 

4 400 000.00 

4 077 125.06 

2 808 000.00 

654 711.43 

1 510 000.00 

521 649.45 

13 575 000.00 

8 891 301.83 

Total 

161 000 000.00  128 194 211.77 

More than 60% of the Schengen Facility II funding for Bulgaria was programmed and spent 
on objective 1. Most resources under objective 1 were programmed and spent on the purchase 
of three helicopters, nine vessels and on the setting-up of an integrated system for the control 
and  surveillance  of  the  Black  Sea  border  consisting  of  fixed  and  mobile  observation  posts 
equipped with radars, cameras and communication equipment.  

4 

 
 
 
 
The  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programmes  for  Romania  defined  three  objectives.  The 
breakdown of the programmed Schengen Facility II allocations per objective (and the actual 
declared expenditure) is presented in table 3: 

Table 3: Programmed financial allocations and the declared expenditure per objective – 
Romania  

Objective 1: Strengthening the external border control and 
the external border area surveillance and protection 
against cross border crime 

Objective 2: Enhancement of control ability by increasing 
the capacity for data provision and data access 

Programmed 
(EUR) 

Total declared 
and certified 
expenditure 
(EUR) 

199 700 000.00  174 970 037.61 

192 121 240.00  177 792 172.57 

Objective 3: Support to costs for logistics and operations 

14 565 504.00 

478 673.92 

Total 

404 383 744.00  353 593 864.85 

Under objective 1, Romania purchased  33 vessels,  1 278 vehicles and equipment for border 
surveillance and border checks. Objective 1 also covered a rehabilitation of 31 border police 
stations and border crossing points.  

Under  objective  2,  Romania  supported  various  information  and  communication  systems, 
including the national part of the second generation of the Schengen Information System, the 
national  part  of  the  Visa  Information  System  and  the  digital  radio  communication  system 
TETRA.  

It  should  be  noted  that  Romania  programmed  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  more  than  the 
minimum  50%  of  the  Cash-flow  and  Schengen  Facility  allocation  (EUR  301 234 674)  and 
even  the  total  declared  and  certified  expenditure  (EUR  353 593 864.85)  exceeded  this 
threshold. 

5 

 
 
 
 
  
3.  EX-POST EVALUATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II 

3.1. ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION AND THE METHODOLOGY 

The  ex-post  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  was  carried  out  in  2014  by  an  independent 
external  evaluator  who  was  requested  to  assess  the  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency, 
complementarity and coherence, sustainability and impact of Schengen Facility II.  

The evaluation methodology consisted of the following data collection tools: 

  Desk research; 

  Semi-structured interviews; 

  Direct observations during on-site visits; 

  Surveys of beneficiaries.  

The data collected through the above mentioned tools was analysed through 12 case studies 
(five  for  Bulgaria  and  seven  for  Romania)  which  covered  79%  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
expenditure in Bulgaria and 76% of the expenditure in Romania.  

The findings of the case studies served as a basis for responses to nine evaluation questions 
defined by the Commission.  

The report of the ex-post evaluation of Schengen Facility II was accepted by the Commission 
in  September  2014.  The  Commission  considers  the  evaluation's  findings  and  conclusions 
presented  below  credible,  as  the  evaluation  demonstrated  that  they  were  based  on  evidence 
derived from reliable data and sound analysis. 

3.2. RELEVANCE 

Under the evaluation of Schengen Facility II against the criterion of relevance, it was assessed 
to  what  extent  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  were  pertinent  to  the  needs.  In  addition,  the 
relevance of the actual Schengen Facility II effects (outputs, results and impacts) to the needs 
(utility) was assessed.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  objectives  and  actual  effects  of  Schengen  Facility  II 
were relevant to the needs. 

The  investments  relating  to  the  surveillance  of  the  maritime  border  of  Bulgaria  addressed 
clear needs, as the Black Sea coast  had been insufficiently covered by border patrol vessels 
which  became  gradually  depreciated  and  outdated  since  the  1990s  and  did  not  have  the 
capacity to secure the sea borders under severe weather conditions.  

In  a  similar  vein,  investments  relating  to  air  surveillance  addressed  a  situation  when  the 
Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior did not have any air surveillance capacity.  

The investment in the naval and terrestrial mobility of the Romanian Border Police addressed 
a  situation  when  the  fleet  of  existing  vessels  and  vehicles  was  not  adequate  for  the  border 
surveillance purposes.  

The construction and renovation of border crossing points' facilities in Romania addressed a 
clear need as land border crossing points had been neglected and deemed either too old or not-
fit-for-purpose to respond to the requirements of the Schengen borders code. 

6 

 
 
 
3.3. EFFECTIVENESS 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  effectiveness,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the objectives of the instrument were achieved.  

In  particular,  it  was  assessed  to  what  extent  Schengen  Facility  II  contributed  to  the 
preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for the accession to the Schengen area by upgrading 
surveillance  of  and  border  checks  at  the  future  external  border,  increasing  the  capacity  for 
Schengen related data provision and access, as well as upgrading visa management systems.  

The evaluation concluded that, overall, the Schengen Facility II was effective in achieving 
its objectives.  

The  sufficient  level  of  preparedness  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  for  the  accession  to  the 
Schengen area was confirmed by Council conclusions of June 20115.  

The  Schengen  Facility  II  contributed  to  this  preparedness  by  the  upgrading  of  the  border 
surveillance, border checks, IT and communication systems and visa management.  

The setting-up of an integrated system for the control and surveillance at the Black Sea border 
in Bulgaria was highly effective as it transformed the way in which control over the maritime 
border is exerted and ensured continuous surveillance of the maritime borders. Thanks to the 
investment, the border surveillance and cross-border crime fighting capacity of the police has 
increased.  

The  purchase  of  the  helicopters  increased  the  border  surveillance  capacity  of  the  Bulgarian 
police.  The  use  of  helicopters  for  the  border  surveillance  is  particularly  effective  in  remote 
mountain regions, such as those near the Turkish border where sections of the green border 
are  not  accessible  by  patrol  vehicles.    Nevertheless,  there  have  been  issues  with  the 
effectiveness  of  the  air  surveillance  equipment.  The  legal  limitations  on  flying  at  night  and 
lack  of  anti-icing  equipment  allowing  for  flights  in  all  weather  conditions,  in  combination 
with  insufficient  staff  over  the  first  two  years  after  the  purchase  severely  limited  the 
effectiveness  of  the  investment.  The  effectiveness  of  the  investments  in  aerial  surveillance 
was also limited by the lack of fuel and delays in deliveries of spare parts.  

The  investment  in  the  naval,  fluvial  and  terrestrial  mobility  of  the  Romanian  Border  Police 
enhanced  the  capacity  of  the  police  to  carry  out  surveillance  activities  on  the  maritime  and 
land borders. The equipment purchased expanded the capacity to intervene in regions where 
previously  surveillance  coverage  was  difficult  and  not  frequently  carried  out.  Since  2010, 
maritime surveillance has been extended beyond the 24 nautical miles of contiguous zone into 
Romania’s exclusive economic zone, thanks to the increased operational autonomy of the new 
ships.  

In  the  case  of  Romania,  border  checks  have  been  enhanced  through  the  investment  in  the 
modernisation of the border crossing points. The refurbishment of the existing infrastructure 
and  the  improved  working  conditions  at  the  border  crossing  points  increased  the  number  of 
officers that can be accommodated which in turn allows for a greater number of border checks 
during a given period of time.   

5  Council  conclusions  on  completion  of  the  process  of  evaluation  of  the  state  of  preparedness  of  Bulgaria  to 
implement all provisions of the Schengen acquis (9167/4/11); Council conclusions on completion of the process 
of  evaluation  of  the  state  of  preparedness  of  Romania  to  implement  all  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis 
(9166/4/11).  

7 

 
 
                                                            
3.4. EFFICIENCY 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  efficiency,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the desired effects of the instrument were achieved at reasonable cost.  

The evaluation concluded that the efficiency of the Schengen Facility II can be assessed as 
adequate, although the procurement processes were not always optimal.  

The  evaluation  of  the  efficiency  was  based  on  a  comparison  of  costs  under  the  Schengen 
Facility  II  to  costs  under  comparable  instruments  and  on  the  analysis  of  procurement 
procedures  which  were  considered  an  appropriate  proxy  for  the  efficiency,  assuming  that  a 
competitive  procurement  ensures  that  market  prices  are  paid  for  the  procured  goods  or 
services.  

The  prices  paid  for  the  helicopters  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  investment  in  the  air 
surveillance  in  Bulgaria  were  similar  per  unit  in  value  to  the  prices  paid  under  Schengen 
Facility I6.  

In  Bulgaria,  the  procurement  process  for  the  maritime  border  surveillance  had  limited 
competition  in  terms  of  the  number  of  companies  participating  in  the  tender,  as  five  of  six 
bidders were disqualified on technical grounds. The tenders for vessels were dealt with in a 
similar manner. In one case (200 GT ship and 60 GT ships), the tender was cancelled, as the 
only  two  bidders  were  both  disqualified  on  technical  grounds,  and  a  negotiated  procedure 
with one of the bidders was used. In the second case (20 GT and 15 GT vessels), two of the 
three submitted bids were disqualified on technical grounds.  

The same goes for the air surveillance where the tendering procedures were cancelled twice 
before the third one resulted in a contract being awarded. All three tenders were restricted to 
EU bidders and all but one bidder (the same for all three tenders) were dismissed on technical 
grounds  before  they  could  make  a  financial  offer.  In  conclusion,  the  tendering  procedure 
seems to have restricted competition, which puts the efficiency of the measure in doubt. 

In  Romania,  there  were  also  issues  regarding  the  efficiency  of  the  procurement  process, 
although  they  appear  to  have  been  resolved  more  swiftly  causing  fewer  delays  than  in 
Bulgaria.  There was also an issue relating to the indicative values of the contracts often being 
much higher than the bids received. 

Procurement  relating  to  the  terrestrial  and  naval  mobility  had  two  components  for  which 
competition varied. For the maritime tenders, there were fewer bidders per tender, and many 
of  them  were  disqualified  in  the  pre-selection  stage.  For  the  terrestrial  mobility  component, 
only one bidder was disqualified (out of a total of 15 bidders for the five contracts awarded) 
for exceeding the maximum budget. The electronic bidding procedure increased the efficiency 
of  the  procurement.  The  selection  criterion  for  all  tenders  was  the  lowest  price  and  the 
amounts offered by the winning bids were significantly lower than the allocated budget (by up 
to 50% for the terrestrial mobility component). 

6Under Schengen Facility I, support for the implementation of the Schengen acquis and for the upgrade of the 
border controls at the EU's new external borders was provided to seven out of the ten countries which joined the 
EU in 2004.  

8 

 
 
                                                            
 
Under  the  procurement  for  the  modernisations  and  re-configuration  of  the  border  crossing 
points,  only  11  out  of  31  tender  procedures  were  considered  competitive  enough  to  ensure 
best value for money.  

3.5. COMPLEMENTARITY AND COHERENCE 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criteria  of  complementarity  and 
coherence,  it  was  assessed  to  what  extent  other  interventions  contributed  to  the  Schengen 
Facility  II  objectives  and  to  what  extent  the  Schengen  Facility  II  did  not  contradict  other 
interventions with similar objectives.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  Schengen  Facility  II  was  coherent  with  and 
complementary to border control measures financed from other sources in both Bulgaria 
and Romania. 

In  both  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  resources  from  different  funds  were  allocated  to  achieve 
objectives  similar  to  those  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II.  There  was  a  good  level  of 
complementarity and synergies between national strategies for the accession to the Schengen 
area and the Schengen Facility II.  

In the context of the surveillance of the maritime border in Bulgaria, the Schengen Facility II 
funding  was  complementary  to  other  investments  in  the  maritime  border  surveillance 
capacity. Three patrol ships were renovated and six ships were purchased with the support of 
the pre-accession assistance instrument Phare.  

Similarly in the field of air surveillance, Phare financed the purchase of one Agusta АW109Е 
helicopter in 2008.   

3.6. SUSTAINABILITY 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  sustainability,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the positive effects of the instrument lasted after the intervention had 
ended.  

The evaluation concluded that most Schengen Facility II measures would not have had a 
continued  impact  after  their  termination  if  they  had  not  been  supported  by  further 
expenditure  on  maintenance  and  training.  There  have  been  occasions  in  which  a  lack  of 
adequate budgeting resulted in a situation where equipment purchased through the Schengen 
Facility  II  was  not  operational  for  some  time  due  to  high  maintenance  or  repair  costs, 
particularly in Bulgaria. 

Regarding  the  investment  in  the  surveillance  of  the  maritime  border  in  Bulgaria,  evidence 
suggests that the integrated system for control and surveillance  of the Black  Sea border has 
experienced  a  maintenance  problem  despite  being  very  highly  sustainable  in  general.  Since 
the  launch  of  the  system,  it  became  evident  that  there  were  already  difficulties  regarding 
expenses  considered  consumables  and  not  always  covered  by  the  warranty.  The  problem 
which was mentioned most often by interviewees is wear and tear of the radar’s magnetrons at 
the 12 stationary surveillance posts.  

9 

 
 
 
  
As far as the air surveillance is concerned, annual maintenance and operation costs included 
insurance, hangar rent and fuel. The data on flights show that the use of the different classes of 
helicopters was limited after the year 2010. Overall only one of the light-class helicopters (the 
A109-SN11790) was used actively, while the others had limited use, or hardly any use during 
some  years.  The  use  of  light-class  helicopters  is  generally  prioritised  as  they  are  more  fuel-
efficient,  while  having  equal  surveillance  capabilities  as  the  heavier  AW139  helicopter.  The 
difference  in  the  number  of  flights  is  also  explained  by  the  down-time  because  of  one 
significant accident as a result of which one of the A109 helicopters has not been in operation 
since 2012. The increased use of the heavier AW139 helicopter after July 2012 instead of the 
smaller  class  A109  (under  reparation)  increased  the  fuel  costs  per  flight  hour,  and  in  2013, 
despite the significantly lower number of flight hours, the overall cost of the fuel increased.  

Other  initial  problems  were  related  to  the  lack  of  adequate  storage  facilities  for  the 
helicopters.  The  Bezmer  Airbase  for  helicopters  did  not  provide  optimal  conditions,  as  the 
hangar  and  storage  facilities  did  not  have  the  recommended  temperature  and  humidity 
controlled environment. The helicopter will be relocated to a new airbase in Sofia, funded by 
the  External  Borders  Fund  (EBF).  However,  in  the  long-term,  the  availability  of  a  proper 
hangar and operational facilities near the Black Sea and south-east border remains an issue to 
be addressed. 

The  EBF  programmes  also  targeted  basic  training  of  pilots  and  flight  engineers.  Existing 
staffing  difficulties  were  due  to  the  failure  of  some  staff  to  pass  the  exams  during  previous 
trainings  provided  by  the  manufacturer,  and  due  to  the  lack  of  available  pilots  within  the 
Ministry of Interior’s system.  

The  sustainability  of  the  equipment  acquired  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  has  been  more 
pronounced  in  Romania  where  national  funds  have  been  used  to  pay  for  maintenance  of 
vehicles and vessels.   

3.7. IMPACT 

Under the impact evaluation, intended and unintended long-term effects produced directly or 
indirectly by the Schengen Facility II were assessed.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that,  overall,  the  Schengen  Facility  II  had  the  desired  impacts, 
especially with regards to the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for the  accession 
to the Schengen area. However, although the Schengen Facility II investments impacted 
positively  on  irregular  migration  across  the  future  external  borders  of  Bulgaria  and 
Romania and on the security in these two countries, the full impact of the investments at 
the future external borders to the security of citizens within the Schengen area will only 
materialise when Bulgaria and Romania accede to the Schengen area. The evaluation did 
not  identify  any  negative  impacts,  although  there  were  a  number  of  unintended  positive 
impacts linked to the increased capacity supported under the Schengen Facility II.   

Schengen Facility II had a positive impact on the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for 
the accession to the Schengen area, as evidenced by the upgraded surveillance of the future 
external border, border checks, IT and communication systems and visa management and the 
relevant Council conclusions of June 2011. 

10 

 
 
 
 
As far as the wider impacts of the Schengen Facility II are concerned, the measures funded 
under the instrument had positive effects on the irregular migration across the future external 
borders of Bulgaria and Romania and on the security in these two countries, as demonstrated 
by an increase of the detected irregular border crossings and cross-border crimes, although the 
increase in the detected irregular border crossings could be also attributed to external factors 
(increased  migratory  pressure).  The  Schengen  Facility  II  investment  (in  particular  the 
investments in the border surveillance system) had a deterrence effect, both on the irregular 
migration  and  the  cross-border  crime.  However,  the  impact  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
investments on the security within the Schengen area is limited until Bulgaria and Romania 
join it, as border controls are still performed at the borders between Bulgaria and Romania on 
the one hand and the Schengen area on the other hand. In consequence, any variation in the 
quality of the border controls at the borders between Bulgaria and Romania on the one hand 
and non-EU members on the other hand can have only marginal impact on the security within 
the Schengen zone. 

As  far  as  the  unintended  positive  impacts  are  concerned,  the  evaluation  found  out  that  the 
investments  in  the  surveillance  of  the  maritime  border  also  contributed  to  the  detection  of 
smuggling or environmental crime (waste dumping at the sea).  

4.  CONCLUSIONS 

The Schengen Facility II, an instrument whose objectives were “to finance actions at the new 
external  borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  external 
border control”, was implemented in a successful manner. The Schengen Facility II provided 
a total of EUR 476 million to Bulgaria and Romania. 

Overall,  the  instrument  played  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  that  both  Romania  and  Bulgaria 
could be considered technically prepared to join the Schengen area in 2011.  The investment 
funded  by  the  Schengen  Facility  II  upgraded  the  surveillance  of  the  future  external  border, 
border  checks,  IT  and  communication  systems  and  visa  management.  The  intervention  was 
relevant  to  the  identified  needs,  coherent  with  other  sources  of  funding  and  effective  in 
achieving  its  objectives.  The  efficiency  with  which  these  were  achieved  could  have  been 
improved,  as  well  as  the  sustainability  of  some  of  the  investments  which  required  future 
funding to continue having an impact.  

While  the  investment  in  Schengen  Facility  II  contributed  to  the  prevention  of  irregular 
migration  across the future  external borders of Bulgaria and Romania and  to the security in 
these two countries, the impact of the Schengen Facility II investments on the security within 
the Schengen area remains limited until Bulgaria and Romania join it. 

Although  the  non-accession  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  to  the  Schengen  area  has  so  far  had 
limited  impacts  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  investments,  the  continued 
postponement of accession of these countries to the Schengen area will most likely lead to a 
situation where parts of the investment will require significant upgrades. 

11