COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE TEMPORARY CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR BULGARIA AND ROMANIA
Date: 2015-08-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, EU visa policy, Romania, Schengen Information System, action programme, border control, distribution of EU funding, evaluation method, external border of the EU, fund (EU)

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 3.8.2015  
SWD(2015) 157 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE 
TEMPORARY CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA 

{COM(2015) 387 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  

REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN PART OF THE 
TEMPORARY CASH-FLOW AND SCHENGEN FACILITY (2007-2009) FOR 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... 1 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 2 

1.  CONTEXT OF THE SCHENGEN FACILITY II IMPLEMENTATION......................................................... 3 

2. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II ................................................................................ 4 

3.  EX-POST EVALUATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II......................................................................... 8 

3.1.  ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION AND THE METHODOLOGY ............................................ 8 

3.2.  RELEVANCE ............................................................................................................................. 9 

3.3. 

EFFECTIVENESS ..................................................................................................................... 12 

3.4. 

EFFICIENCY............................................................................................................................ 15 

3.5.  COMPLEMENTARITY AND COHERENCE.................................................................................. 18 

3.6. 

SUSTAINABILITY.................................................................................................................... 20 

3.7. 

IMPACT .................................................................................................................................. 23 

4.  CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................ 24 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

The Cash-flow and Schengen Facility was created by Article 32(1) of the Act of Accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union1 (hereinafter referred to as the Accession Act) 
as a temporary instrument to help Bulgaria and Romania to finance actions at the new external 
borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  external  border 
control and to help improve cash-flow in national budgets.  

Article 32(3) of the Accession Act stipulates that at least 50% of the funding provided by the 
instrument  should  have  been  used  to  support  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in  their  obligation  to 
finance  actions  at  the  new  external  borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the 
Schengen acquis and external border control.  

The  total  eligible  expenditure  under  the  Schengen  part  of  the  Cash-flow  and  Schengen 
Facility (hereinafter referred to as Schengen Facility II) amounted to EUR 476 million (EUR 
351 million in Romania and EUR 125 million in Bulgaria). The instrument was implemented 
in the period 2007-2010.  

The purpose of this report is 

− 

− 

to provide a summary information on the implementation of the Schengen Facility II; 
and 

to present the results of the ex-post evaluation of the instrument which was carried out, 
under the responsibility of the Commission, by an external evaluator (Matrix Insight 
Ltd.),  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  18(3)  of  Commission  Delegated 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1268/20122.  The  evaluation  report  is  published  in  the 
Commission's  evaluation  database3  and  in  the  online  EU  bookshop,4  both  accessible 
via the Europa website. 

1 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the adjustments to the 
treaties on which the European Union is founded. OJ L 157, 21.6.2005, p. 203.  
2  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  No  1268/2012  of  29  October  2012  on  the  rules  of  application  of 
Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  966/2012  of  the  European Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  financial  rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union. OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1.  
3 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=12413265 .  
4 http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=DR0215024 . 

3 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
1.  CONTEXT OF THE SCHENGEN FACILITY II IMPLEMENTATION 

Schengen  Facility  II  was  a  second  generation  of  a  financial  instrument  designed  to  assist 
newly  acceding  EU  Member  States  in  their  preparation  for  the  full  application  of  the 
Schengen acquis at the external borders. 

Under  the  first  generation  of  the  instrument,  Schengen  Facility  I,  support  for  the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and for the upgrade of the border controls at the EU's 
new external borders was provided to seven out of the ten countries which joined the EU in 
20045. Schengen Facility I was implemented in the period 1 May 2004 – 31 December 2007. 
The total eligible expenditure under Schengen Facility I amounted to EUR 910 million.6  

The  creation  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  was  closely  related  to  the  fact  that,  in  accordance 
with Article 4 of the Accession Act, only certain provisions of the Schengen acquis listed in 
Annex II to the Accession Act were applicable to Bulgaria and Romania from the date of their 
accession to the EU (1 January 2007), while other provisions, not listed in Annex II, should 
only  apply  in  these  two  countries  pursuant  to  a  Council  decision  to  that  effect  after 
verification,  in  accordance  with  the  applicable  Schengen  evaluation  procedures,  that  the 
necessary  conditions  for  the  application  of  all  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis  have  been  met. 
The Council shall take this decision by unanimity. 

In  order  to  prepare  for  the  full  application  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  Bulgaria  and  Romania 
drafted  their  Schengen  Action  Plans  which  identified  and  prioritized  actions  to  be  taken  for 
the  accomplishment  of  the  pre-conditions  for  the  accession  to  the  Schengen  area.  The 
Schengen  Action  Plans  envisaged  actions  in  the  field  of  border  controls,  visas,  migration, 
asylum,  police  co-operation,  judicial  co-operation,  fight  against  drugs  trafficking,  firearms 
and ammunition, Schengen Information System (SIS) and personal data protection.  

Some of the actions identified as priorities under the Schengen Action Plans were supported 
under the Schengen Facility II.  

Following  declarations  of  readiness  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  to  start  the  Schengen 
evaluations  (in  2007  and  2008),  the  Working  Party  for  Schengen  Matters  (Schengen 
Evaluation)  verified  the  preparations  for  the  application  of  all  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis 
through  a  questionnaire  and  a  series  of  supplementary  questions  and  answers,  followed  by 
visits  of  teams  of  experts  to  evaluate  the  situation  in  the  field  of  data  protection,  police 
cooperation, visa-issuance, land, sea and air borders and the SIS. On 9 June 2011, the Council 
adopted  conclusions  on  the  completion  of  the  process  of  evaluation  of  the  state  of 
preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania to implement all provisions of the Schengen acquis.7 
For both countries, the Council concluded that they were on the whole sufficiently prepared to 
apply  both  the  non-SIS  related  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis  as  well  as  its  SIS  related 
provisions  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  Even  though  some  remaining  issues  still  required 

5 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
6 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on implementation of the Schengen 
Facility (2004-2006), COM(2013) 115 final.  
7 Council conclusions on completion of the process of evaluation of the state of preparedness of Bulgaria to 
implement all provisions of the Schengen acquis (9167/4/11); Council conclusions on completion of the process 
of evaluation of the state of preparedness of Romania to implement all provisions of the Schengen acquis 
(9166/4/11).  

4 

 
 
 
                                                            
additional follow-up efforts, these did not constitute an obstacle to full application of all parts 
of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania. 

Despite  these  conclusions,  the  necessary  unanimity  in  Council  for  a  decision  on  the  full 
application of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania has not yet been reached.   

2.  IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II 

In  accordance  with  Article  32  of  the  Accession  Act,  the  Commission  paid  to  Bulgaria  and 
Romania during the period 2007-2009 the annual lump-sum payments under Cash-flow and 
Schengen Facility in twelfths (for the total amounts, please see the table below).  

Table 1: Schengen Facility II payments and eligible costs - overview 

Total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual payments (million 
EUR - 2004 prices)8 

Bulgaria 

Romania 

239.5 

559.8

Total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual payments  (million 
EUR – current prices) 

257.9 

602.5

50% of the total Cash-flow and Schengen Facility annual 
payments (million EUR – current prices)9 

Total programmed amounts (million EUR - current prices) 

Total declared and certified expenditure (million EUR - current 
prices) 

Ineligible expenditure (million EUR- current prices) 

129.0 

161.0 

128.2 

2.7 

301.2

404.4

353.6

3.1

Total eligible costs chargeable to the Schengen Facility II (million 
EUR- current prices) 

125.5 

350.5

Amounts recovered by the Commission (million EUR- current 
prices) 

3.5 

0.0

In accordance with Article 32(5) of the Accession Act, the Commission adopted a decision on 
the  management  and  control  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II.10  The  decision  stipulated  that  the 
following types of actions were eligible for support under Schengen Facility II: 

8 Article 32(2) of the Accession Act defined the annual payments in 2004 prices.  
9 In accordance with Article 32(3) of the Accession Act, at least 50% of the allocation under the Cash-flow and 
Schengen Facility had to be used for actions at the new external borders of the Union for the implementation of 
the Schengen acquis and external border control. 
10 Commission Decision C(2007)1417 of 4 April 2007 on the management and control of the Schengen part of 
the Cash-flow and Schengen Facility.  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
− 

− 

Investment in construction, renovation or upgrading of border crossing infrastructure 
and related buildings; 

Investments in any kind of operating equipment (e.g. laboratory equipment, detection 
tools,  Schengen Information  System  (SIS II), hardware and software, the creation of 
the IT systems needed to implement Schengen, means of transport); 

−  Training of border guards; 

−  Support to costs for logistics and operations, including payment of the salaries of the 
personnel required to fulfil the obligations of the beneficiary Member State in respect 
of the Schengen acquis.  

As far as the eligibility period is concerned, the decision stipulated that the eligibility period 
started on 1 January 2007. The final date for payments was set as 31 December 2010, but all 
actions must have been carried out by 30 September 2010. This provision was subsequently 
amended by Commission Decision C(2009)673711 which stipulated that all actions must have 
been carried out by 31 December 2010. 

According to Article 1 of Commission Decision C(2007)1417 on the management and control 
of  Schengen  Facility  II,  the  beneficiary  Member  States  were  responsible  for  selecting  and 
implementing individual operations under the instrument.  

In Bulgaria, the instrument was managed by the Committee for Management, Monitoring and 
Control  of  the  Schengen  Facility  chaired  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  Tasks  related  to 
public  procurement,  contracts  and  payments  were  entrusted  to  the  Central  Finance  and 
Contracts Unit of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance also performed the tasks 
related to the certification of the declared expenditure (National Fund Directorate) and audits 
(Audit of European Union Funds Directorate).  

In Romania, Schengen Facility II was managed by the Ministry of Interior and Administrative 
Reform (Schengen Directorate). Tasks related to public procurement, contracts and payments 
were entrusted to the Central Finance and Contracts Unit of the Ministry of Public Finance. 
The  certification  of  the  expenditure  was  the  responsibility  of  the  General  Directorate  of 
Finance  within  the  Ministry  of  Interior  and  Administrative  Reform  and  the  Audit  Authority 
beside the Court of Accounts was responsible for audits. 

The  Bulgarian  and  Romanian  authorities  drafted  multi-annual  and  annual  indicative 
programmes  which  described  needs  related  to  the  implementation  of  Schengen  acquis  and 
border controls, a strategy to address the needs, objectives to be achieved with the Schengen 
Facility II support and specific measures to be supported under the instrument. 

Under the Schengen Facility II indicative programmes, Bulgaria defined eight objectives. The 
breakdown of the programmed Schengen Facility II allocations per objective (and the actual 
declared expenditure) is presented in table 2: 

11 Commission Decision C(2009)6737 of 8.9.2009  amending Commission Decision C(2007)1417 of 4 April 
2007 on the management and monitoring of the Schengen part of the Schengen Facility.  

6 

 
 
                                                            
Table 2: Programmed financial allocations and the declared expenditure per objective – 
Bulgaria  

Objective 1: Acquisition of new technical equipment for 
surveillance and control of the external borders 

Objective 2: Special technical equipment for joint police 
operations in the border area 

Objective 3: Modernisation and development of the 
national communication systems 

Objective 4: Information systems and computer networks 
related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis 

Objective 5: Renovation and modernisation of the existing 
border infrastructure 

Objective 6: Other activities directly related to the border 
control of the external EU borders 

Objective 7: Increase of the qualification of the staff, 
including language training 

Objective 7: Development of the National Visa System 
and connection to the EU Visa Information System (VIS) 
and the consultation network VISION 

Programmed 
(EUR) 

Total declared 
and certified 
expenditure 
(EUR) 

97 324 000.00 

80 393 650.78

7 454 000.00 

4 509 320.63

21 279 000.00 

20 688 213.42

12 650 000.00 

8 458 239.17

4 400 000.00 

4 077 125.06

2 808 000.00 

654 711.43

1 510 000.00 

521 649.45

13 575 000.00 

8 891 301.83

Total 

161 000 000.00  128 194 211.77

More than 60% of the Schengen Facility II funding for Bulgaria was programmed and spent 
on objective 1. Most resources under objective 1 were programmed and spent on the purchase 
of  three  helicopters  (one  medium  and  two  light  helicopters),  nine  vessels  (one  large,  two 
medium  and  six  small  patrol  ships)  and  on  the  setting-up  of  an  integrated  system  for  the 
control and surveillance of the Black Sea border consisting of fixed and mobile observation 
posts equipped with radars, cameras and communication equipment.  

The investments under objective 3 with the second largest allocation concerned the expansion 
of the digital radio communication system TETRA to cover the border area along Bulgaria's 
border  with  Serbia  and  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  as  well  as  its  further 
extension along the borders with Turkey and along the Black Sea coast. 

It  should  be  noted  that  Bulgaria  programmed  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  more  than  the 
minimum 50% of the Cash-flow and Schengen Facility allocation (EUR 128 963 004), but the 
total declared and certified expenditure (EUR 128 194 211.77) did not reach this threshold. 

Moreover, following an ex-post audit carried out by the Commission, ineligible expenditure 
amounting  to  EUR  2 708 124.07  was  identified  and,  in  consequence,  the  total  amount 
recognized as chargeable to Schengen Facility II amounted only to EUR 125 486 087.70. The 

7 

 
 
 
 
difference  between  this  amount  and  the  50%  of  the  Cash-flow  and  Schengen  Facility 
allocation was recovered by the Commission. 

The  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programmes  for  Romania  defined  three  objectives.  The 
breakdown of the programmed Schengen Facility II allocations per objective (and the actual 
declared expenditure) is presented in table 3: 

Table 3: Programmed financial allocations and the declared expenditure per objective – 
Romania  

Objective 1: Strengthening the external border control and 
the external border area surveillance and protection 
against cross border crime 

Objective 2: Enhancement of control ability by increasing 
the capacity for data provision and data access 

Programmed 
(EUR) 

Total declared 
and certified 
expenditure 
(EUR) 

199 700 000.00  174 970 037.61

192 121 240.00  177 792 172.57

Objective 3: Support to costs for logistics and operations 

14 565 504.00 

478 673.92

Total 

404 383 744.00  353 593 864.85

Under  objective  1,  Romania  purchased  33  vessels  and  boats  (surveillance  vessel,  patrolling 
and  intervention  vessels/boats),  1 278  vehicles  (all-terrain  vehicles,  cars,  minivans,  dog 
transportation vehicles), as well as special surveillance vehicles and border surveillance and 
border  checks  equipment.  Objective  1  also  covered  a  rehabilitation  of  31  border  police 
stations / border crossing points. Eleven Romanian consular offices were upgraded.  Buildings 
for another five consular offices and a building for a consular training centre were purchased. 
Equipment for 73 consular offices was also purchased. 

Under  objective  2,  Romania  supported  various  information  and  communication  systems, 
including  the  national  part  of  the  second  generation  of  SIS  (N.SIS  II),  SIRENE  office,  the 
national part of the Visa Information System (N-VIS), National information system for alerts 
(NISA) and the digital radio communication system TETRA.  

It  should  be  noted  that  Romania  programmed  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  more  than  the 
minimum  50%  of  the  Cash-flow  and  Schengen  Facility  allocation  (EUR  301 234 674)  and 
even  the  total  declared  and  certified  expenditure  (EUR  353 593 864.85)  exceeded  this 
threshold. 

Although an ex-post audit carried out by the Commission ascertained that EUR 3 085 704.82 
of the declared expenditure were not eligible under the Schengen Facility II, no amounts were 
recovered  by  the  Commission,  as  any  amount  exceeding  50%  of  Cash-flow  and  Schengen 
Facility payments could have been used by Romania for any purposes, including for actions 
considered ineligible under the Schengen Facility II. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
3.  EX-POST EVALUATION OF SCHENGEN FACILITY II 

3.1. ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION AND THE METHODOLOGY 

The ex-post evaluation of Schengen Facility II was carried out in 2014, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 18(3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 which 
stipulates  that  "all  programmes  or  activities,  including  pilot  projects,  where  the  resources 
mobilised exceed EUR 5 000 000 shall be subject of an interim and/or ex-post evaluation". 

In order to ensure the highest credibility for the evaluation findings and in order to mobilise 
professional evaluation expertise, the ex-post evaluation of Schengen Facility II was carried 
out  by  an  independent  external  evaluator  (company  Matrix  Insight  Ltd.),  under  the 
responsibility of the Commission and under the close supervision of a steering group set up 
for this evaluation. 

The  independent  external  evaluator  was  requested  to  assess  the  relevance,  effectiveness, 
efficiency, complementarity and coherence, sustainability and impact of Schengen Facility II.  

The evaluation methodology consisted of the following data collection tools: 

−  Desk  research  (review  of  the  relevant  legislation,  statistical  data,  programming 

documents, monitoring and final reports, national strategic documents etc.); 

−  Semi-structured  interviews  with  policy  makers,  Commission  officials  and  national 
civil  servants  involved  in  the  Schengen  Facility  II  implementation  as  well  as 
beneficiaries; 

−  Direct observations during on-site visits of selected projects; 

−  Surveys of beneficiaries.  

The data collected through the above mentioned tools was analysed through 12 case studies 
(five  for  Bulgaria  and  seven  for  Romania)  which  covered  79%  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
expenditure in Bulgaria and 76% of the expenditure in Romania.  

The findings of the case studies served as a basis for responses to nine evaluation questions 
defined by the Commission.  

The report of the ex-post evaluation of Schengen Facility II was accepted by the Commission 
in  September  2014.  The  Commission  considers  the  evaluation's  findings  and  conclusions 
presented  below  credible,  as  the  evaluation  demonstrated  that  they  were  based  on  evidence 
derived from reliable data and sound analysis. 

The evaluation report, as well as the case studies and a quality assessment are published in the 
Commission's evaluation database12 and in the online EU bookshop,13 both accessible via the 
Europa website.  

12 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=12413265 ; 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=12418342 ; 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=12408188 ; 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=12398034 .  
13 http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=DR0215024 ; 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=DR0215025 ; 

9 

 
 
                                                            
3.2. RELEVANCE 

Under the evaluation of Schengen Facility II against the criterion of relevance, it was assessed 
to  what  extent  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  were  pertinent  to  the  needs.  In  addition,  the 
relevance of the actual Schengen Facility II effects (outputs, results and impacts) to the needs 
(utility) was assessed.  

The general objective of the Schengen Facility II can be deduced from the wording of Article 
32(1) of the Accession Act which stated that the instrument was created "to finance actions at 
the  new  external  borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and 
external border control". The general objective of Schengen Facility II would be therefore to 
ensure the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for the accession to the Schengen area by 
strengthening and upgrading the border controls at the future external border. This would in 
turn contribute to  the prevention  of  irregular migration across these  borders and to the high 
level  of  internal  security  within  the  Schengen  area  after  the  accession  of  Bulgaria  and 
Romania. 

As the objectives defined by the Schengen Facility II indicative programmes for Bulgaria and 
Romania were not consistent and in some cases were formulated as funding priorities, rather 
than  objectives,  the  evaluation  reformulated  the  specific  and  operational  objectives  on  the 
basis of the Schengen Catalogue and on the basis of decision C(2007)1417 on the Schengen 
Facility II management and control. The specific objectives were defined as:  

-  Upgrading surveillance of the future external border; 

−  Upgrading border checks at the future external border; 

−  Increasing capacity for Schengen related data provision and access; and 

−  Upgrading visa management systems. 

The operational objectives were defined as: 

− 

− 

Investment in construction, renovation or upgrading of border crossing infrastructure 
and related buildings; 

Investments in any kind of operating equipment (e.g. laboratory equipment, detection 
tools,  SIS  II,  hardware  and  software,  the  creation  of  the  IT  systems  needed  to 
implement Schengen acquis, means of transport); 

−  Training of border guards; 

−  Support to costs for logistics and operations, including payment of the salaries of the 
personnel required to fulfil the obligations of the beneficiary Member State in respect 
of the Schengen acquis. 

The  needs  of  Bulgaria  in  terms  of  external  border  control  and  the  Schengen  acquis  can  be 
described as inadequate and obsolete fleet at the maritime borders and on the Danube river; 
inefficient maritime surveillance system; inadequate air surveillance; inadequate mobility of 
the  border  police;  obsolete  communication  infrastructure  along  the  external  borders;  non-
existent  national  part  of  SIS  and  inadequate  data  storage  facilities;  inadequate  operational 

http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=DR0215026 . 

10 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
communication  between  the  systems  used  for  border  surveillance;  and  insufficient  staff 
qualification.  

For Romania, the needs can be described as inadequate border infrastructure at the level of the 
border  crossing  points  and  the  operational  units;  lack  of  cohesive  systems  to  counteract 
irregular  migration;  inadequate  border  surveillance  systems;  inadequate  training  of  officers 
and  administration  staff;  inadequate  IT  and  data-voice  communication  systems;  and 
inadequate or not-fit-for-purpose infrastructure at consulates.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  objectives  and  actual  effects  of  Schengen  Facility  II 
were relevant to the needs. 

The investments relating to the surveillance of the maritime and Danube border (Objective 1 
of the Schengen Facility II indicative programme for Bulgaria) addressed clear needs, as the 
heavily frequented Black Sea coast and the Danube River had been insufficiently covered by 
border patrol vessels which became gradually depreciated and outdated since the 1990s and 
did not have the capacity to secure the sea and river borders under severe weather conditions. 
The  surveillance  system  relied  on  individual  reports  sent  from  separate  observation  posts 
which were compiled in the border police headquarters by police officers. The system could 
not provide 90% detection rate for small objects and the coordination was extremely difficult.  

In a similar vein, investments relating to air surveillance (Objective 1 of the Schengen Facility 
II indicative programme for Bulgaria) addressed a situation when the Ministry of the Interior 
did not have any air surveillance capacity, although a strategic document14 identified such a 
need  which  was  regarded  as  an  integral  element  of  a  comprehensive  border  surveillance 
system complementing ground and maritime surveillance.15  

The development and expansion of the digital radio communication system TETRA along the 
western,  south-eastern  and  maritime  borders  (Objective  3  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
indicative programme for Bulgaria) contributed to the modernisation of the communications 
infrastructure  along  Bulgaria’s  external  borders,  which  had  been  identified  as  one  of  the 
problems  and  needs  of  the  country.  Border  police  and  regional  police  directorates  needed 
reliable  and  secure  radio  communication  for  the  management  of  human  and  technical 
resources, interaction among the reaction units and access to centralised databases.   

Finally, the development of the national component of SIS (N.SIS II) was highly relevant to 
the needs and problems identified at the outset of the Schengen Facility II (Objective 4 of the 
Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programme  for  Bulgaria).  The  development  of  the  national 
component of SIS is a precondition for the accession to the Schengen area. 

The investment in the naval and terrestrial mobility of the Romanian Border Police (Objective 
1  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programme  for  Romania)  is  directly  linked  to  the 
main  objectives  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II.  Before  investments  were  made,  the  fleet  of 
existing vessels and vehicles was not adequate enough for the needs of the Romanian border 
police. In 2009, border guards estimated their needs in special vehicles at 5 471 units, while 
only  1 544  were  available.  In  terms  of  sea  and  maritime  capacity,  the  objectives  of  the 
Schengen  Facility  II  were  in  line  with  the  needs  identified  in  the  Romanian  government’s 
2006  strategy,  and  more  generally,  with  the  identified  inadequacy  of  border  surveillance 

14 Chief Directorate “Border Police” (2009) Concept for Air Surveillance of the State Border of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
Sofia: 2.07.2009. 
15 Strategy for Integrated Border Management of the Republic of Bulgaria 2010-2013, p.13. 

11 

 
 
                                                            
systems16.  A  survey  carried  out  amongst  the  users  of  the  vehicles  purchased  confirmed  the 
appropriateness of the specifications of the vehicles.  

The  objective  of  the  construction  and  renovation  of  border  crossing  points'  facilities 
(Objective 1 of the Schengen Facility II indicative programme for Romania) directly reflected 
needs  identified  in  the  National  Strategy  of  Integrated  Management  of  the  Romanian  State 
Border for the period 2007-201017 and the National Strategy for Accession to the Schengen 
Area, as well as the Schengen Action Plan. Moreover, it addressed a clear need as land border 
crossing  points  had  been  neglected  for  a  while  and  deemed  either  too  old  or  not-fit-for-
purpose to respond to the requirements of the Schengen borders code. 

Investment  in  surveillance  vehicles  and  border  control  equipment  (Objective  1  of  the 
Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programme  for  Romania)  also  addressed  the  need  of 
enhancing the surveillance capacity of the Romanian border police at the external borders, as 
defined in the National Strategy of Integrated Management of the Romanian State Border for 
the period 2007 – 2010.  Existing vehicles were outdated and inefficient in terms of running 
costs and operational availability. 

The investments made for the modernisation of the consulates (Objective 1 of the Schengen 
Facility II indicative programme for Romania) reflected the needs to upgrade consular offices 
which  could  not  be  considered  secure  based  on  standards  set  by  the  EU  Schengen 
Catalogue18.  After  the  accession  of  Romania  to  the  EU,  the  number  of  visa  applications  in 
third  countries  soared,  reaching  2.5  million  with  the  majority  coming  from  neighbouring 
Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, staff in these offices lacked the knowledge required for the 
processing  of  the  Schengen  visas.  The  measures  proposed  clearly  addressed  these  needs  by 
setting  up  a  central  training  centre,  offering  continued  training  for  staff  in  third  country 
consular offices and modernising the facilities to improve quality of service and security. 

The  investment  in  TETRA  terminals  (Objective  2  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative 
programme for Romania) addressed the need to improve the mobile communication capacities 
of  the  Romanian  police,  enabling  it  to  contribute  to  the  control  of  the  external  borders  and 
enforcing the Schengen acquis within Romania.  

The  investment  related  to  NISA  (Objective  2  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative 
programme  for  Romania) addressed  the  need to create  a single, national  interface to  SIS II, 
and to enable public authorities to exchange information related to the external border control 
through  a  fast  and  secure  connection.  Moreover,  it  enhanced  the  compatibility  of  the  IT 
systems of all public bodies in charge of public order and national security, and contributed to 
the completion of a joint communication infrastructure.  

16  Conception  for  surveillance  of  the  naval  traffic  and  monitoring  suspect  vessels  on  the  interior  Danube, 
Danube-Black Sea channel, lower Danube and Black Sea as well as Sectorial Strategy of the Romanian Border 
Police on Surveillance and Control of the Maritime border. 
17Article  4.3.1.  (Infrastructure  Subsystem)  of  the  National  Strategy  of  28th  of  March  2007  of  Integrated 
Management of the Romanian State Border for the period 2007 – 2010.. 
18 EU Schengen Catalogue, Volume 3, Issuing of visa. Recommendations and Best Practices, Council of the 
European Union, General Secretariat, March 2003.  

12 

 
 
                                                            
3.3. EFFECTIVENESS 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  effectiveness,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the objectives of the instrument were achieved.  

In  particular,  it  was  assessed  to  what  extent  Schengen  Facility  II  contributed  to  the 
preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for the accession to the Schengen area by upgrading 
surveillance  of  and  border  checks  at  the  future  external  border,  increasing  the  capacity  for 
Schengen related data provision and access as well as upgrading visa management systems.  

The evaluation concluded that, overall, the Schengen Facility II was effective in achieving 
its objectives.  

The  sufficient  level  of  preparedness  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  for  the  accession  to  the 
Schengen  area  as  of  June  2011  was  confirmed  by  the  Council  conclusions.19  The  extent  to 
which the Schengen Facility II contributed to this preparedness was assessed on the basis of 
the  Schengen  Facility  II  contributions  to  the  upgrading  of  the  border  surveillance,  border 
checks, IT and communication systems and visa management.  

The setting-up of an Integrated System for control and surveillance at the Black Sea border 
(ISBB)  (Objective  1  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programme  for  Bulgaria)  was 
highly effective as it transformed the way in which control over the maritime border is exerted 
and  ensured  continuous  surveillance  of  the  maritime  borders.  Thanks  to  the  investment,  the 
border police surveillance and cross-border crime fighting capacity has increased. The ISBB 
allows  for  the  automatic  detection  of  targets,  and  broadcasts  real  time  video  feed  to  the 
regional headquarters20. It allows for even the smallest mobile objects to be detected with an 
accuracy  of  98-99%,  up  from  90%  before  the  Schengen  Facility  II  investment.  Maritime 
vessels purchased under the Schengen Facility II are being effectively used as demonstrated 
by  their  significant  share  of  the  time  spent  at  sea21.  The  equipment  purchased  under  the 
Schengen Facility II helped to reduce the time to react to threats at the external border. For 
instance the new ships are quicker to leave port (15 minutes, instead of 40) and are up to three 
times faster than the old ones.  

The purchase of the helicopters (Objective 1 of the Schengen Facility II indicative programme 
for Bulgaria) increased the border surveillance capacity of Bulgaria. The use of helicopters for 
the border surveillance is particularly effective in remote mountain regions, such as those near 
the Turkish border where sections of the green border are not accessible by patrol vehicles.  
Prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  had  no  air 
surveillance capacity whatsoever. Nevertheless, there have been issues with the effectiveness 
of the air surveillance equipment. The legal limitations to carry out flights at night and lack of 
anti-icing  equipment  allowing  for  flights  in  all  weather  conditions,  in  combination  with 
insufficient staff over the first two years after the purchase, severely limited the effectiveness 
of  the  investment.  This  problem  was  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  as  many  as  80%  of  illicit 

19  Council  conclusions  on  completion  of  the  process  of  evaluation  of  the  state  of  preparedness  of  Bulgaria  to 
implement all provisions of the Schengen acquis (9167/4/11); Council conclusions on completion of the process 
of  evaluation  of  the  state  of  preparedness  of  Romania  to  implement  all  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis 
(9166/4/11).  
20 Interview with Head of Bulgarian National Maritime Border Communication and Information Centre (Burgas) 
(site visit on 28 March 2014). 
21 Statistics provided by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior – Chief Directorate Border Police. 

13 

 
 
                                                            
green  border  crossings  take  place  at  night22.  The  effectiveness  of  the  investments  in  aerial 
surveillance was also limited by lack of fuel and delays in deliveries of spare parts.  

The  investment  in  the  naval,  fluvial  and  terrestrial  mobility  of  the  Romanian  Border  Police 
(Objective  1  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative  programme  for  Romania)  enhanced  the 
capacity of the Romanian Border Police to carry out surveillance activities on the maritime 
and  land  borders.  The  equipment  purchased  expanded  the  capacity  to  intervene  in  regions 
where  previously  surveillance  coverage  was  difficult  and  not  frequently  carried  out.  Since 
2010,  maritime  surveillance  has  been  extended  beyond  the  24  nautical  miles  of  contiguous 
zone into Romania’s exclusive economic zone, thanks to the increased operational autonomy 
of the new ships. The completion of the Caras-Severin surveillance system and the acquisition 
of  special  surveillance  vehicles  improved  the  surveillance  at  the  Serbian  border,  a 
geographical zone characterised by complex terrain with wooded mountainous areas along the 
Danube River. 

The  investment  in  mobile  laboratories  (Objective  2  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  indicative 
programme for Bulgaria) allowed the border police units to quickly re-allocate resources in 
periods  of  critical  migratory  pressure  or  in  the  case  of  mechanical  failure  of  second-line 
equipment  at  border  crossing  points  (BCPs),  for  example  during  the  2013  crisis  situation  at 
the Bulgarian-Turkish border,23 and increase the capacity for border checks at smaller BCPs. 
However,  at  the  green  border  with  Turkey,  the  effectiveness  of  the  laboratories  has  been 
limited  by  the  fact  that  persons  intercepted  rarely  possess  any  documents  to  be  verified24. 
Mobile laboratories were not used to their full potential because of lack of trained staff at the 
border police regional units, as well as a lack of winter tyres and fuel25. The actual number of 
checks  is  modest:  on  average,  30  checks  per  unit  per  month  were  performed  in  2013  at 
Bulgaria’s  external  borders26.  In  the  winter,  statistics  showed  months  without  any  checks 
being carried out. 

In  the  case  of  Romania,  border  checks  have  been  enhanced  through  the  investment  in  the 
modernisation of the BCPs (Objective 1 of the Schengen Facility II indicative programme for 
Romania).  The  refurbishment  of  the  existing  infrastructure  and  the  improved  working 
conditions at BCPs increased the number of officers that can be accommodated which in turn 
allows for a greater number of border checks27.   

As  far  as  the  information  and  communication  systems  in  Bulgaria  are  concerned,  the 
investments  in  the  TETRA  communication  system  (Objective  3  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
indicative  programme  for  Bulgaria)  increased  the  operational  capacities  of  the  Bulgarian 
border police and provided a more secure channel for information exchange. The network is 
essential to achieving an integrated communications network as it provides connectivity on a 
national  level,  including  to  the  border  police  headquarters  in  Sofia,  and  provides  access  to 
databases  such  as  the  N.SIS  II  which  was  not  available  through  the  previous  analogue 
systems. Part of the external borders (the Black Sea and the Bulgarian-Turkish borders) had 
been partially covered by the TETRA communication system before the Schengen Facility II 
investment which was utilised to connect border areas without  prior coverage (borders with 
Serbia and with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and to enhance the coverage of 

22 Interview with Bulgarian border police official, see case study BG2, p. 8. 
23  Interview  with  the  Director  of  Bulgarian  Regional  Directorate  of  Border  Police  –  Elhovo  (site  visit  on  27 
March 2014). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Confirmed by on-site visits at three locations and by an interview with Bulgarian border police staff. 
26 Statistics provided by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior – Chief Directorate border police. 
27 Confirmed by an on-site visit: the Romanesti BCP could accommodate 80 officers, up from about 20. 

14 

 
 
                                                            
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  borders.  On  average,  a  data  terminal  acquired 
through  the  Schengen  Facility  II  is  used  for  about  13  hours  of  calls  per  month28.  Officers 
using the system were satisfied with the improvement in their efficiency and the security and 
speed of the connection. Bulgarian Border Police can now use the resources of the central SIS 
II and contribute to and use information from the national information systems. On-site visits 
carried out showed that the systems respond without any delay and passengers are processed 
very quickly.  

The effectiveness of the implementation of the N.SIS (Objective 4) can be assessed positively. 
It  speeds  up  the  automated  access  to  alerts  for  searched  persons  and  objects  while 
implementing  border  controls  and  provides  a  possibility  to  connect  with  other  EU  police 
structures.  N.SIS  II  provides  fast  and  reliable  access  at  all  BCPs  to  SIS  II,  with  a  response 
time of three seconds29. The system also allows officers to use a PC (instead of phone calls) to 
enter  information  on  queries,  which  limits  the  probability  of  errors  and  makes  the  work  of 
border  police  officers  more  efficient.  The  statistics  demonstrate  that  Bulgaria’s  authorities 
with  access  to  SIS  II  are  actively  using  the  system  both  for  entry  of  information  and  for 
queries.  

TETRA  investments  in  Romania  (Objective  2)  enhanced  the  reaction  capabilities  of  the 
Romanian  police  by  improving  the  information  exchange  through  a  secure  information 
channel.  The  terminals  also  allow  easier  and  faster  checks30.  Measurable  indicators  at  the 
TETRA  system  level  such  as  encrypted  voice/data  traffic  show  a  significant  increase  in  the 
volume  of  calls  after  the  terminals  acquired  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  became 
operational.  From  March  2009  to  April  2010,  the  number  of  voice  calls  recorded  on  the 
TETRA platform grew by approximately 300%. At the end of the implementation period, all 
end-users were able to access the data they needed via a secure digital radio network. The old, 
analogue VHF radio system did not provide the security required when working with sensitive 
data.  
A total of 197 965 953 queries31 were made from October 2010 to March 2014 on the NISA. 
At the same time, 1 577 37332 input operations were made in the system (creation, updating 
and deletion of alerts) for 2011 – 2013. The large numbers clearly show that there is a take-up 
of  the  system  by  relevant  stakeholders.  N.SIS  data  (Objective  2)  provided  by  the  General 
Inspectorate of the Romanian Police indicate that 100% of the territory is now connected to 
NISA and N.SIS. They are used by police officers on a regular basis, as confirmed by on-site 
visits. The number of accesses to the system between 2011 and 2013 has constantly increased 
(744 121 in 2011; 1 292 146 in 2012; and 1 749 319 in 2013); and in the same period input 
operations  (creation,  updating  and  deleting  of  alerts)  by  the  Romanian  police  amounted  to 
116 390 incidents. This data usage of NISA and N.SIS (number of queries and alerts entered 
in  NISA)  suggests  that  the  measure  has  enabled  the  Romanian  police  to  participate  in  the 
exchange of information related to protection of the external borders through activities within 
Romania. 

The Schengen Facility II was used in both Bulgaria and Romania for investment in the Visa 
Information System (VIS). The investment included the setting up of national VIS centres, 

28 Data are only for the January-February 2014 time period, as usage statistics are kept for only a month by the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. Therefore comparisons are not possible. 
29  Interviews  with  Bulgarian  experts  from  the  Directorate  for  Communications  and  Information  Services 
(Ministry of Interior), 14 February 2014. 
30 Interviews with local Romanian police officers. 
31 National SIS Centre, Romania. 
32 National SIS Centre, Romania. 

15 

 
 
                                                            
development  of  software  and  provision  of  hardware  for  connection  of  the  national  VIS 
(NVIS) to the central VIS and the visa consultation network VISION. The objectives of the 
investments  have  been  achieved  and  the  initial  tests  of  the  national  connections  with  the 
central  VIS  have  been  successful.  The  national  component,  providing  connectivity  between 
consular  offices  and  the  national  authorities,  is  functional.  However,  the  complete 
functionality  of  the  developed  systems  will  be  utilised  only  when  Bulgaria  and  Romania 
become part of the Schengen area and start issuing Schengen visas. The positive impact is that 
border police at BCPs can check in NVIS visas issued by Bulgarian or Romanian consulates 
abroad. While a basic database check was available prior to the introduction of NVIS, the new 
system  allows  including  biometric  data  which  increases  security.  Thus  controls  are 
strengthened  both  at  entry  and  exit  points.  However,  since  the  accession  of  Bulgaria  and 
Romania  to  the  EU,  the  two  countries  recognise  visas  issued  by  Schengen  area  Member 
States.  Border  police  officers,  though,  cannot  check  in  the  central  VIS  the  Schengen  visas 
issued to third country nationals, but only inspect security features on the visa stamps.33 In the 
case  of  VIS-related  investments,  the  usefulness  of  the  developed  software  and  hardware 
infrastructure will depend on the date of the accession of the two countries to the Schengen 
area. At present the acquired software and hardware equipment is already three years old, and 
is only partially used but its capacity is much larger than the one needed for the operation of 
the NVIS. If accession is delayed beyond 2015, new equipment will have to be purchased and 
software  upgraded.  The  longer  the  period  between  the  investment  and  the  accession,  the 
higher the risk that the funds spent would need to be supplemented with significant additional 
investments. The central VIS is in constant development and the new version of the system 
can only be tested by Bulgaria and Romania in test mode, but not in operational environment.  

In the case of Romania, the effectiveness of the Schengen Facility II on the preparedness of 
visa  management  can  also  be  derived  in  terms  of  the  upgrading  of  the  consular  offices 
(Objective 1). Consular offices are operational and in compliance with the requirements of the 
Schengen  Catalogue.  One  result  should  be  accelerated  and  simplified  visa  issuing 
procedures34. A survey of consular office staff35 confirms that the changes are viewed highly 
positively  and  that  waiting  time  have  decreased,  application  submission  is  better  organised 
and conditions for visa applicants have been improved. Positive impacts have been reported 
regarding faster and better services offered to citizens in the context of visa issues because of 
the enhancement of the consular offices.  High-level diplomats within the Romanian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs were of the opinion that Schengen Facility II investments accelerated visa 
processing  procedures  which  increased  the  efficiency  of  the  work  in  consulates.  They  also 
believed that better conditions were created in waiting areas which provided comfort to visa 
applicants and could have a positive effect on the image of Romania and the EU in general. 
Consular  staff  surveyed  thought  the  modernisation  projects  had  a  positive  effect  on  various 
aspects of the visa application process.  

3.4. EFFICIENCY 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  efficiency,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the desired effects of the instrument were achieved at reasonable cost.  

33 Interview with representative of IT department at the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
34  Comprehensive  report  on  the  implementation  of  actions  and  the  financial  execution  of  the  lump  sum  grant 
payments under the Schengen part of the Schengen Facility with a statement justifying the expenditure (Article 
32 of 2005 Accession Act). Romania. 2011. 
35  Distributed  to  50  Romanian  consular  offices  which  were  beneficiaries  under  the  measure.  31  survey 
questionnaires were returned. 

16 

 
 
                                                            
The evaluation concluded that the efficiency of the Schengen Facility II can be assessed as 
adequate, although the procurement processes were not always optimal.  

The evaluation of the efficiency was based on benchmarking (comparison of costs under the 
Schengen  Facility  II  to  costs  under  comparable  instruments)  and  on  the  analysis  of 
procurement  procedures  which  were  considered  an  appropriate  proxy  for  the  efficiency, 
assuming that a competitive procurement ensures that market prices are paid for the procured 
goods or services.  

An analysis of the funds disbursed for air surveillance (Objective 1 of the Schengen Facility II 
indicative  programme  for  Bulgaria)  compared  to  purchases  of  helicopters  under  Schengen 
Facility  I  indicates  that  the  contracts  awarded  to  the  manufacturer  Agusta  in  Bulgaria  were 
similar  per  unit  in  value  (taking  into  account  that  the  Schengen  Facility  I  contracts  were 
signed several years earlier and that contracts included optional sets of equipment)36. 
Under Schengen Facility I in Lithuania, a mobile laboratory was acquired for EUR 66 02437, 
while  the  10  mobile  laboratories  acquired  by  Bulgaria  (Objective  2)  had  a  unit  price  of 
EUR 57 500. The unit prices of minibuses and vehicles for transportation of detained persons 
were also similar: minibuses were purchased for EUR 26 076 in Bulgaria and for EUR 20 966 
in Lithuania, while the detention vehicles were EUR 18 894 in Bulgaria and EUR 26 363 in 
Lithuania38. 

The  main  issues  experienced  with  regard  to  the  public  procurement  related  to:  (i)  limited 
competition on some of the tenders; (ii) a culture of appealing procurement decisions resulting 
in longer procedures; and (iii) indicative budgets seemingly too high for the bidding process. 

Overall,  the  evaluation  has  found  the  efficiency  of  the  procurement  processes  under  the 
Schengen Facility II in Bulgaria sub-optimal.  

The procurement process for the “maritime and river surveillance” (Objective 1) had limited 
competition in terms of the number of companies participating in the tenders for ISBB, as five 
of  the  six  bidders  were  disqualified  on  technical  grounds.  The  maritime  and  river  vessel 
tenders were dealt with in a similar manner. In one case (200 GT ship and 60 GT ships), the 
tender  was  cancelled,  as  the  only  two  bidders  were  both  disqualified  on  technical  grounds, 
and a negotiated procedure with one of the bidders was used. In the second case (20 GT and 
15 GT vessels), two of the three submitted bids were disqualified on technical grounds.  

The same goes for the “air surveillance” (Objective 1) where the tendering procedures were 
cancelled  twice  before  the  third  one  resulted  in  a  contract  being  awarded.  All  three  tenders 
were  restricted  to  EU  bidders39  and  all  but  one  bidder  (the  same  for  all  three  tenders)  were 
dismissed  on  technical  grounds  before  they  could  make  a  financial  offer.  The  decision  was 
appealed by one of the disqualified bidders. The complaint was dismissed both by the Public 
Procurement  Complaint  Committee  (CPC)  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  In 
conclusion,  the  tendering  procedure  seems  to  have  restricted  competition,  which  puts  the 
efficiency of the measure in doubt. 

For  compatibility  reasons,  the  TETRA  base  stations  needed  for  the  western  border  and  for 
enhancing the coverage on the Black Sea and Bulgarian-Turkish borders (Objective 3) had to 
be  purchased  from  the  manufacturer  who  had  already  supplied  the  existing  infrastructure 

36 Schengen Facility Comprehensive Reports of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Bulgaria. 
37 Contract (21)-16-318(2006), Schengen Facility Comprehensive Report of Lithuania 
38 Schengen Facility Comprehensive Reports of Lithuania and Bulgaria. 
39 Interviewees argued that “the selection of a non-EU candidate may lead to excessive scrutiny on the side of the 
European Commission, and eventual non-recognition of expenses”. 

17 

 
 
                                                            
(EADS).  Competition  was  thus  non-existent.  Four  bidders  participated  in  the  tender  for 
mobile,  portable  and  stationary  TETRA  terminals.  Three  of  them  were  disqualified  for 
technical reasons, a decision which was, again, contested. Since only one bidder was allowed 
to make a financial offer, the selection criterion of lowest price could not be a guarantee that 
the equipment was acquired at the most efficient price. 

Finally,  in  case  of  the  “SIS  National  Component  (N.SIS)”  (Objective  4),  there  were  two 
tenders, each with two lots. There were eight bids for Tender 1 (two for Lot 1 and six for Lot 
2) and seven for Tender 2 (four for Lot 1 and three for Lot 2). One company, CNSYS, was 
awarded  all  four  lots.  The  selection  criterion  was  “lowest  price”.  Several  bidders  were 
disqualified  but  did  not  contest  that  decision.  It  can  thus  be  concluded  that  the  tendering 
procedure,  with  selection  criteria  ‘lowest  price’,  guaranteed  the  most  efficient  use  of  the 
Schengen Facility II funds in developing the N.SIS for Bulgaria. 

In  Romania,  there  were  also  issues  regarding  the  efficiency  of  the  procurement  process, 
although  they  appear  to  have  been  resolved  more  swiftly  causing  fewer  delays  than  in 
Bulgaria.  There was also an issue relating to the indicative values of the contracts often being 
much higher than the bids received. 

Procurement relating to “terrestrial and naval mobility” (Objective 1), for example, had two 
components for which competition varied. For the maritime tenders, there were fewer bidders 
per tender, and many of them were disqualified in the pre-selection stage. For the terrestrial 
mobility component, only one bidder was disqualified (out of a total of 15 bidders for the five 
contracts awarded) for exceeding the maximum budget. The bidders did not have to be based 
in the EU, and the electronic bidding procedure increased efficiency of the procurement. The 
selection criterion for all tenders was lowest price and the amounts offered by winning bids 
were significantly lower than the allocated budget (by up to 50% for the terrestrial mobility 
component). 

Under the procurement for the “modernisations and re-configuration of BCPs” (Objective 1), 
only 11 out of 31 tender procedures were considered competitive enough to ensure best value 
for  money.  In  consequence,  EUR  1.5  million  was  not  recognised  as  eligible  by  the 
Commission, precisely because the handling of some tender contracts limited competition40.  

Regarding the NISA measure (Objective 2), five out of seven initial bidders were disqualified 
for not meeting the tender requirements or incomplete responses to requests for clarifications 
by  the  selection  committees.  There  were  several  appeals  and  one  litigation  relating  to  the 
technical  specifications.  Following  a  decision  of  the  Bucharest  Court  of  Appeal,  the  NISA 
contract was awarded to the bidder offering the second-lowest price. The value of the winning 
bid was much lower than the amount allocated by the procurement opportunity (56% of the 
amount). 

On  the  other  hand,  all  major  TETRA  terminal  producers  participated  in  the  tender  for  the 
TETRA terminals (Objective 2).  The result of the process again led to the overall value of the 
contract being much lower than the indicative amount. 

The procurement for the “modernisation of consulates” (Objective 1) was the first measure in 
Romania for which electronic bidding was adopted in the procurement process, providing an 
opportunity for multiple bids that led to significant savings in the contracting process.  

For most measures financed by the Schengen Facility II in Romania, the offer with the lowest 
price appears to have won the public tenders, resulting in considerable savings compared to 

40 Schengen part of the Cash-flow and Schengen Facility. Clearance of accounts final audit report. Romania. 

18 

 
 
                                                            
the  maximum  amounts  planned  for  each  measure.  This  can  be  explained  by  inadequate 
planning or lack of market research on the part of the responsible contracting authorities. 

3.5. COMPLEMENTARITY AND COHERENCE 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criteria  of  complementarity  and 
coherence,  it  was  assessed  to  what  extent  other  interventions  contributed  to  the  Schengen 
Facility  II  objectives  and  to  what  extent  the  Schengen  Facility  II  did  not  contradict  other 
interventions with similar objectives.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  Schengen  Facility  II  was  coherent  with  and 
complementary to border control measures financed from other sources in both Bulgaria 
and Romania. 

In  both  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  resources  from  different  funds  were  allocated  to  achieve 
objectives  similar  to  those  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II.  There  is  a  good  level  of 
complementarity and synergies between national strategies for the accession to the Schengen 
area and the Schengen Facility II.  

The investments in border surveillance, border checks, IT systems and visa management were 
supported by loans of the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). The IBRD, for instance, provided a loan to Bulgaria to finance the cost 
of the Second Trade and Transport Facilitation. These funds were used for the reconstruction 
of the infrastructure at seven BCPs, including some of the largest and most important ones at 
the external borders (at Kalotina (EUR 12 million), K. Andreevo (EUR 12 million), and the 
Port  of  Varna  (EUR 2.55  million)).  World  Bank  funding  was  used  to  upgrade  regional 
offices of the border police in Elhovo, Kyustendil, and Dragoman, as well as infrastructures at 
the Port of Burgas.  

Bulgaria  and  Romania  also  benefitted  from  several  bilateral  support  schemes  during  the 
implementation period of the Schengen Facility II.  These include the German federal police 
providing  Bulgaria  with  surveillance  equipment,  Norway 
radio-
communication  structure  for  the  Bulgarian  Ministry  of  Interior  for  high  speed  data 
transmission41  and  a  programme  to  support  Schengen  cooperation  and  combat  cross-border 
crime  in  Romania42.  Finally,  the  Bulgarian-Dutch  cooperation  programme  funded  the 
development  of  the  internal  structure  and  working  procedures  of  the  SIRENE  Bureau-
Bulgaria. As such, they complemented funding under Objective 4 of the Bulgarian Schengen 
Facility  II,  which  targeted  the  technical  procedures  for  automatic  exchange  of  data  with 
SIRENE which are integral parts of the SIS II. 

funding  digital 

The EU has supported Bulgaria and Romania through several successive instruments. Under 
the  Phare  Programme,  which  was  the  main  form  of  financial  and  technical  cooperation 
between  the  EU  and  candidate  countries  during  the  pre-accession  period  until  2006,  much 
emphasis  was  put  on  creating  a  modern  border  police  that  meets  EU  standards.  Projects 
funded  through  Phare  began  the  process  of  establishing  suitable  institutional  structures 
pertaining to border control. This includes the demilitarisation and professionalisation of staff 
as  well  as  the  modernisation  of  equipment  and  infrastructure  for  border  surveillance 

41  Работен  план  за  Фонда  за  двустранни  отношения  на  национално  ниво  за  България  [Work  Plan  on 
Norwegian Financial Mechanism for Bulgaria for 2009 – 2013], p. 5. http://www.eufunds.bg/en/page/45  
42 Norway grant, Programme fact sheet Romania, 2013. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                            
activities43.  The  eligibility  period  of  the  2006  Phare  programme  was  set  for  three  years.  
Therefore, the implementation of the Phare programme in Bulgaria and Romania lasted until 
the  end  of  2009.  As  a  result  there  was  a  two  year  overlapping  period  (2007-2009)  in  the 
implementation  of  the  last  Phare  Programmes  and  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  financial 
instruments. The External Borders Fund (EBF) was set up for the period 2007-2013 as part 
of  the  General  Programme  ‘Solidarity  and  Management  of  Migration  Flows’44.  No  EBF 
funding  was  allocated  to  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in  2007-2009,  as  both  countries  were 
receiving  the  Schengen  Facility  II  payments  during  this  period.  However,  there  was  an 
overlap in the eligibility periods for the two instruments in 2010 due to the Schengen Facility 
II implementation period covering the whole of 2010, while the eligibility period of the first 
EBF annual programmes for Bulgaria and Romania started on 1 January 2010.  

In  the  context  of  the  surveillance  of  the  maritime  border  in  Bulgaria  (Objective  1),  the 
Schengen  Facility  II  funding  was  complementary  to  other  investments  in  the  maritime  and 
river  border  surveillance  capacity.  In  the  period  2006-2010,  a  number  of  patrol  ships  were 
supplied and most of the outdated patrol ships replaced with new vessels45. With the help of 
national funding and under the Phare projects46, three patrol ships were renovated, six ships 
were purchased, as well as a repair facility for border-police ships, rigid inflatable boats and 
specialized clothes for border police officers operating on the vessels acquired. The EBF later 
supported the construction of a new port and administrative and training facilities at the port 
of Sozopol for a value of EUR 825 575.  

Similarly in the field of air surveillance (Objective 1), Phare provided a first opportunity for 
the development of new air-surveillance capabilities with the purchase of an Agusta АW109Е 
helicopter in 2008.  In 2010, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers decided to provide additional 
financing  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  Bezmer  Airbase  administrative  building,  for  the 
acquisition  of  a  cistern  truck,  as  well  as  for  some  additional  repairs.  In  continuity  with  the 
Schengen Facility II, the construction of the EUR 11 million permanent base at Sofia Airport 
(Vrajdebna) for the Specialised Air-Surveillance Unit of the Border Police, supported under 
the  EBF,  started  in  2013.  The  new  hangar  at  the  permanent  base  near  Sofia  Airport  can 
accommodate four helicopters47. 

The  components  of  the  Bulgarian  TETRA  system  that  were  developed  under  the  Schengen 
Facility  II  (Objective  3)  coherently  built  upon  and  complemented  the  pre-existing  radio-
communication  system  set  up  through  various  sources,  including  national  financing.  The 
measure  is  part  of  the  long-term  communications  strategy  of  Bulgaria  and  its  efforts  to 
comply  with  the  Schengen  acquis.  Overall,  the  TETRA  system  was  financed  by  the  Phare 
programme,  the  World  Bank,  EBF,  the  Operational  Programme  “Environment”  from  the 
European Regional Development Fund, as well as the EU's Seventh Framework Programme 

43  European  Commission  (2006),  From  pre-accession  to  accession.  Thematic  evaluation  of  European  Union 
Phare Programme Support to Public Administrative and Judicial Capacity in Bulgaria and Romania.   
44Decision  No  574/2007/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  May  2007  establishing  the 
External  Borders  fund  for  the  period  2007  to  2013  as  part  of  the  General  programme  "Solidarity  and 
Management of Migration Flows", OJ L 144, 6.6.2007, p. 22.  
45  Statistical  data  on  maritime  and  river  vessels  inventory  provided  during  on-site  visit  to  the  Bulgarian  Chief 
Directorate of the Border Police on 14 February 2014. 
46 Project identification number: BG 9911.01, BG 0203.11, BG 0203.11, BG 2004/016-711.08.06, BG 2004/006-
070.03.02 and BG 2005/017-353.07.05. 
47 Interviews at the Bulgarian Chief Directorate of the Border Police on 14 February 2014. 

20 

 
 
                                                            
for  research,  technological  development  and  demonstration  actions  (FP7)48  and  national 
sources. 

Similarly,  the  measure  to  put  in  place  the  N.SIS  (Objective  4)  benefitted  from  investments 
that were implemented both prior to and after the end of  the Schengen Facility II. The first 
contribution  was  made  as  part  of  the  1999  Phare  Programme.  Components  of  the  QUEST 
Automated Information System for Search Activities (the backbone of the future N.SIS), were 
financed from the national budget49. 

In Romania, the Schengen Facility II IT investments were complementary to several related 
investments made prior to and following the Schengen Facility II. In detail, Phare funds were 
used  in  a  pilot  phase  for  NISA  to  secure  the  development  environment  and  the  core  of  the 
testing  environment  for  the  system.  Consistently,  the  enhancement  of  the  police  IT  system 
was achieved on the basis of two previous projects: the national project “Technical and legal 
assistance to set up the National Schengen Information System compatible with the SIS” and 
2004 Phare project “Fight against organized crime – an inter-institutional approach”.  

The Schengen Facility II investment into the Visa Information System (VIS) complemented a 
number  of  VIS-related  measures  that  started  under  Phare  and  continued  under  the  EBF 
programmes50. Under the 2002 Phare project "Information system for processing on-line visa 
requests", an electronic system for visa processing was set up. The initial phases of the rolling 
out of this system were also funded by Phare before a national project funded the last consular 
offices, leading to the complete implementation of Romania’s visa on-line system in 2006.  

3.6. SUSTAINABILITY 

Under  the  evaluation  of  Schengen  Facility  II  against  the  criterion  of  sustainability,  it  was 
assessed to what extent the positive effects of the instrument lasted after the intervention had 
ended.  

The evaluation concluded that most Schengen Facility II measures would not have had a 
continued  impact  after  their  termination  if  they  had  not  been  supported  by  further 
expenditure  on  maintenance  and  training.  There  have  been  occasions  in  which  a  lack  of 
adequate  budgeting  resulted  in  a  situation  where  equipment  purchased  through  the 
Schengen  Facility  II  was  not  operational  for  some  time  due  to  high  maintenance  or 
repair costs, particularly in Bulgaria. 

Regarding the investment in the surveillance of the maritime border in Bulgaria (Objective 
1), evidence suggests that the integrated system for control and surveillance of the Black Sea 
border (ISBB) has experienced a maintenance problem despite being very highly sustainable 
in general. Since the launch of the ISBB, it became evident that there were already difficulties 
regarding  expenses  considered  consumables  and  not  always  covered  by  the  warranty.  The 
problem  which  was  mentioned  most  often  by  interviewees  is  wear  and  tear  of  the  radar’s 

48 FP7 Topic SEC-2012.5.3-4. used for the development of inter-system interfaces to connect the TETRA system 
to Bulgaria and Romania. 
49  Data  provided  by  the  Directorate  for  Communications  and  Information  Systems  (Bulgarian  Ministry  of 
Interior)  in  email  communication  with  Mr.  Ivalin  Iliev,  Communication  &  Information  Systems  Development 
Department, 26 February 2014. 
50  Comprehensive  Report on  the  implementation  of  actions  and  the  financial  execution of  the  lump  sum  grant 
payments under the Schengen part of the Schengen Facility. Romania, p.47 – 49.  

21 

 
 
 
                                                            
magnetrons  at  the  12  stationary  surveillance  posts51.  Upon  reaching  a  certain  level  of 
depreciation of the magnetron, the radar starts to lose track of the smaller targets in peripheral 
zones. The average price for the full replacement of a magnetron in Bulgaria is EUR 1 00052. 
In practice, however, for 2014 the total amount allocated for overall equipment maintenance 
including  ISBB,  maritime  and  river  vessels,  helicopters  and  other  border  facilities  did  not 
exceed EUR 0.6 million, the same as for Romania, which has a smaller Black Sea border area 
to cover (238 km compared to 378 km in Bulgaria). 

In  July  2012,  one  of  the  60  GT  vessels  in  the  Black  Sea  was  damaged  and  the  insurance 
company refused to pay for the necessary repairs worth EUR 1 million. The issue was brought 
before  the  judicial  bodies,  which  resulted  in  the  vessel  being  out  of  service  for  almost  two 
years. The Ministry of Interior finally received additional funding to repair the vessel which 
was  expected  to  be  completed  by  mid-201453.  The  reason  for  the  non-payment  of  the 
insurance is not included in the insurance contract, which is supposed to cover such accidents. 
Interviewees  consulted  as  part  of  the  case  study  attributed  this  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
helicopters (A109) was involved in an accident that took place in the same month, and was 
insured by the same company54. The company, in the opinion of the interviewees, had been 
trying  to  avoid  the  payment  by  going  to  court55.  Moreover,  no  framework  maintenance 
contract  has  been  envisaged  after  the  expiry  of  the  warranty,  potentially  jeopardizing  the 
sustainability of the investment. Instead, funds are provided ad-hoc when a problem occurs. 

Acquired  vessels’  activity  on  Danube  River  has  decreased  over  the  last  three  years  after  an 
initial  increase.  This  is  due  to  regulatory  restrictions  prohibiting  maritime  and  river  border 
patrolling  by  a  single  crew  for  more  than  24  hours56,  as  well  as  budgetary  restrictions.  The 
same  trend  was  observed  with  sea  patrols.  Operational  time  increased  considerably  directly 
after  the  completion  of  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  Facility,  before  decreasing 
slightly57. 

As  far  as  the  air  surveillance  (Objective  1)  is  concerned,  annual  maintenance  included 
insurance (around EUR 1.5 million), hangar rent (EUR 25 000), and fuel58. Fuel costs seem to 
be fairly stable and in line with the use of the helicopters. Additional needs could be satisfied 
on an ad-hoc basis59. It was clear though, that the “needs” (i.e. scheduled flights) were heavily 
influenced  by  the  available  budget.  The  data  on  flights  show  that  the  use  of  the  different 
classes  of  helicopters  was  limited  after  the  year  2010.  Overall  only  one  of  the  light-class 
helicopters (the A109-SN11790) was used actively, while the others had limited use, or hardly 
any use during some years. The use of light-class helicopters is generally prioritised as they are 
more fuel-efficient, while having equal surveillance capabilities as the AW139. The difference 

51  Interviews with  the Head  and Deputy  Head of  the  Bulgarian  Border  Police  Regional Directorate  in Burgas.  
The so called “cavity magnetron” is a key component of marine radars, allowing detection of small objects. It is 
a  high-powered  vacuum  tube  that  generates  microwaves  using  the  interaction  of  a  stream  of  electrons  with  a 
magnetic field. 
52 The magnetrons need to be changed every 4000 hours, after which their effectiveness gradually falls and some 
small  targets  may  not  be  detected  (Interviews  with  the  Deputy  Head  of  the  Bulgarian  Border  Police  Regional 
Directorate in Burgas). 
53 Bulgarian Council of Ministers Decree, No 15, of 21 February 2014. 
54 Discussion with Border Police officers during visit to Sozopol, Bulgaria, 28 April 2014. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Interview with Head of Naval Group Sozopol during visit to Sozopol, Bulgaria, 28 March 2014). 
57 Statistics provided by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior – Chief Directorate Border Police. 
58 Statistical information provided by Mr. Milen Stefanov, Bulgarian Chief Directorate Border Police, 20 March 
2014. 
59 Interviews with Head of Specialised Unit for Air Surveillance (SUAS) at Bezmer Airbase, Director of Elhovo 
Regional Border Police Directorate during visits to Bezmer and Elhovo, Bulgaria, 27 March 2014. 

22 

 
 
                                                            
in the number of flights is also explained by the down-time because of one significant accident 
as  a  result  of  which  one  of  the  A109  helicopters  has  not  been  in  operation  since  2012.  The 
increased use of the heavier AW139 after July 2012 instead of the smaller class A109 (under 
reparation) increased the fuel costs per flight hour, and in 2013, despite the significantly lower 
number of flight hours, the overall cost of the fuel increased60.  

Other initial problems are related to the lack of adequate storage facilities for the helicopters. 
The  Bezmer  Airbase  for  helicopters  did  not  provide  optimal  conditions,  as  the  hangar  and 
storage  facilities  did  not  have  the  recommended  temperature  and  humidity  controlled 
environment. The helicopter will be relocated to a new airbase in Sofia, funded by the EBF. 
However, in the long-term, the availability of a proper hangar and operational facilities near 
the Black Sea and south-east border remains an issue to be addressed61. 
The  EBF  programmes  also  targeted  basic  training  of  pilots  and  flight  engineers62.  Existing 
staffing  difficulties  were  due  to  the  failure  of  some  staff  to  pass  the  exams  during  previous 
trainings  provided  by  the  manufacturer,  and  due  to  the  lack  of  available  pilots  within  the 
Ministry  of  Interior’s  system.  Planned  training  on  the  part  of  AgustaWestland  ran  into  a 
number  of  difficulties  because  of  the  prerequisites  for  pilot  and  engineering  staff  to  be 
trained63. As candidates put forward did not meet these criteria, the trainings included in the 
contractor’s offer were not utilised within the agreed time-frame and new ones needed to be 
purchased,  while  the  company  agreed  to  provide  them  within  the  warranty  period.  Further 
difficulties with the training were also noted with one of the pilots failing to gain a training 
certificate, after failing the exams due to poor command of English64.  

Timely  and  appropriate  training  seems  to  have  been  provided  to  the  users  of  the  TETRA 
communication  services  (Objectives  3).  The  contractor  delivering  the  terminals  provided 
training  for  operators  of  the  equipment.  Training  sessions  were  held  in  April-June  2010  in 
various locations involving 40 trainees. Sessions lasted around one week and covered system 
administration and operators’ modules, including ‘train-the-trainers’ modules. Seventy-seven 
percent  (n=179)  of  surveyed  TETRA  end  users  reported  that  they  received  training,  with 
another 15% reporting that they did not need training. In the summer of 2013, following the 
increased migratory pressure at the Bulgarian-Turkish border as a result of the Syrian crisis, 
the  Ministry  of  Interior  significantly  increased  the  number  of  officers  patrolling  the  green 
border.  They  were  all  equipped  with  TETRA  terminals  from  various  regional  units  of  the 
border police (where the surveillance needs were less urgent).  

The  sustainability  of  the  N.SIS  (Objectives  4)  is  also  guaranteed  by  the  number  of  trained 
users of the system. In 2010, specialized training (‘train-the-trainer’ modules) was provided to 
40 experts financed by the Schengen Facility II. Another 81 experts were involved in training 
workshops in 2012 and 2013, with financial support from EBF. National funding was used for 
additional  13  trainees  who  received  training  in  2011  and  2012.  In  this  case,  the  outputs 
developed  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  were  further  expanded  and  improved  by  projects 

60 Statistical information provided by Mr. Milen Stefanov, Bulgarian Chief Directorate Border Police, 20 March 
2014. 
61  Interviews  with  Head  of  Specialised  Unit  for  Air  Surveillance  (SUAS)  at  Bezmer  Airbase,  and  with  Chief 
Mechanic at SUAS during visits to Bezmer and Elhovo, Bulgaria, 27 March 2014. 
62 Action 17 of the EBF 2010 annual programme, Action 18 of the EBF 2011 annual programme. 
63 For instance all pilots to be trained on the new helicopters needed to have already completed at least 30 flight 
hours, including 10 take-offs and 10 landings as PIC (Pilot in Command) or co-pilot, within the last 12 months 
on the relevant model and more specifically on the AW109E and AW139. (AgustaWestland letter of 15 October 
2010). 
64 AgustaWestland letter of 8 September 2010. 

23 

 
 
                                                            
financed  by  the  EBF  and  by  the  national  budget.  Thanks  to  the  built-in  functionality  of  the 
N.SIS, it can be adapted and modified to respond to the constantly evolving central SIS and 
the national information systems65. 

The  sustainability  of  the  equipment  acquired  under  the  Schengen  Facility  II  has  been  more 
pronounced  in  Romania  where  national  funds  have  been  used  to  pay  for  maintenance  of 
vehicles and vessels (Objective 1).  A significant minority (42%, n=31) of surveyed consular 
personnel were of the opinion that consular offices built using the Schengen Facility II funds, 
are not adequately maintained.  

Survey respondents expressed a high level of satisfaction regarding the sustainability of both 
TETRA  terminals  and  the  NISA  system,  even  though  in  the  latter  case  maintenance  was 
provided  by  the  EBF  after  the  Schengen  Facility  II.  The  EBF  was  used  to  ensure  the  full 
compatibility of NISA with the central SIS II, and also for post-warranty maintenance of the 
IT infrastructure, including hardware and commercial software.   

According  to  interviews  and  surveys  with  end  users,  the  TETRA  terminals  (Objective  2) 
caused  very  few  maintenance  problems  and  did  not  present  a  financial  burden  on  the  units 
they were allocated to. Out of a total of 45 000 terminals, only seven were found faulty and in 
need  of  replacement.  No  post-warranty  maintenance  contracts  have  been  signed,  as  the 
number  of  required  repairs  did  not  justify  this  expense.  When  necessary,  terminals  were 
repaired  utilizing  internal  sources  of  the  Directorate  of  Communication  and  IT  within  the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

3.7. IMPACT 

Under the impact evaluation, intended and unintended long-term effects produced directly or 
indirectly by the Schengen Facility II were assessed.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that,  overall,  the Schengen  Facility  II  had  the  desired  impacts, 
especially with regards to the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for the accession 
to the Schengen area. However, although the Schengen Facility II investments impacted 
positively  on  irregular  migration  across  the  future  external  borders  of  Bulgaria  and 
Romania and on the security in these two countries, the full impact of the investments at 
the future external borders to the security of citizens within the Schengen area will only 
materialise when Bulgaria and Romania accede to the Schengen area. The evaluation did 
not  identify  any  negative  impacts,  although  there  were  a  number  of  unintended  positive 
impacts linked to the increased capacity supported under the Schengen Facility II.   

Schengen Facility II had a positive impact on the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for 
the accession to the Schengen area, as evidenced by the upgraded surveillance of the future 
external border, border checks, IT and communication systems and visa management (please 
see section 4.3 on the effectiveness) and the relevant Council conclusions of June 2011. 

As far as the wider impacts of the Schengen Facility II are concerned, the measures funded 
under the instrument had positive effects on the irregular migration across the future external 

65  Data  provided  by  the  Directorate  for  Communications  and  Information  Systems  (Bulgarian  Ministry  of 
Interior)  in  email  communication  with  Mr.  Ivalin  Iliev,  Communication  &  Information  Systems  Development 
Department, 26 February 2014. 

24 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
borders of Bulgaria and Romania and on the security in these two countries, as demonstrated 
by an increase of the detected irregular border crossings and cross-border crimes, although the 
increase in the detected irregular border crossings could be also attributed to external factors 
(increased  migratory  pressure).  The  Schengen  Facility  II  investment  (in  particular  the 
investments in the border surveillance system) had a deterrence effect, both on the irregular 
migration  and  the  cross-border  crime.  However,  the  impact  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II 
investments on the security within the Schengen area is limited until Bulgaria and Romania 
join it, as border controls are still performed at the borders between Bulgaria and Romania on 
the one hand and the Schengen area on the other hand. In consequence, any variation in the 
quality of the border controls at the borders between Bulgaria and Romania on the one hand 
and non-EU members on the other hand can have only marginal impact on the security within 
the Schengen zone. 

The  evaluation  has  not  identified  any  negative  impacts.  As  far  as  the  unintended  positive 
impacts are concerned, the evaluation found out that the investments in the surveillance of the 
maritime border also contributed to the detection of smuggling or environmental crime (waste 
dumping at the sea).  

4.  CONCLUSIONS 

The Schengen Facility II, an instrument whose objectives were “to finance actions at the new 
external  borders  of  the  Union  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  external 
border  control”,  has  been  implemented  in  a  successful  manner.  The  Schengen  Facility  II 
provided a total of EUR 476 million to Bulgaria and Romania. 

Overall,  the  instrument  played  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  that  both  Romania  and  Bulgaria 
could be considered technically prepared to join the Schengen area in 2011.  The investment 
funded  by  the  Schengen  Facility  II  upgraded  the  surveillance  of  the  future  external  border, 
border  checks,  IT  and  communication  systems  and  visa  management.  The  intervention  was 
relevant  to  the  identified  needs,  coherent  with  other  sources  of  funding  and  effective  in 
achieving  its  objectives.  The  efficiency  with  which  these  were  achieved  could  have  been 
improved,  as  well  as  the  sustainability  of  some  of  the  investments  which  required  future 
funding to continue having an impact.  

While  the  investment  in  Schengen  Facility  II  contributed  to  the  prevention  of  irregular 
migration across the future external borders of Bulgaria and Romania and to the security in 
these two countries, the impact of the Schengen Facility II investments on the security within 
the Schengen area remains limited until Bulgaria and Romania join it. 

Although  the  non-accession  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  to  the  Schengen  area  has  so  far  had 
limited  impacts  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Schengen  Facility  II  investments,  the  continued 
postponement of accession of these countries to the Schengen area will most likely lead to a 
situation where parts of the investment will require significant upgrades. 

25