Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 July 2015 on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2015/25)
Date: 2015-07-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Greece, central bank, credit institution, financial intervention, financial stability, financial supervision, investment company, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 20 July 2015 

on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 

(CON/2015/25) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 19 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance 

(MoF)  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  on  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment 
firms1  (hereinafter  the  ‘draft  law’).  The  MoF  asked  for  the  adoption  of  the  ECB’s  opinion  on  an  urgent 

basis. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council 
Decision 98/415/EC2, as the draft law relates to the  Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial 

institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  For 

elements  of  the  draft  law  the  exclusive  purpose  of  which  is  the  transposition  of  Union  law,  the  ECB’s 

competence  to  deliver  an  opinion  is  based  on  Article  25.1  of  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of 

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of 

the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The purpose of the draft law is to implement into Greek law Directive 2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, or ‘BRRD’) 3, thereby 

aligning the Greek legal framework for the recovery and resolution of certain types of entities active 

in financial markets, including credit institutions, investment firms, and financial holding companies 

that have their head office in Greece with the existing Union legislation in this field.  

1.2  Greece  has  enacted  comprehensive  legislation  that  introduced  mechanisms  to  resolve  failing 
institutions since 2011, prior to the adoption of the BRRD 4, on which the ECB has been consulted 5. 

1  

2  

3  

4  

Draft  law  on  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  (transposition  of  Directive 
2014/59/EU) and other provisions. 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29  June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May  2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC,  2007/36/EC,  2011/35/EU,  2012/30/EU  and 
2013/36/EU,  and  Regulations  (EU)  No  1093/2010  and  (EU)  No  648/2012,  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 
See Articles 19, 62, 145 et seq. of Law 4261/2014 (formerly Law 3601/2007) and secondary legislation, Decisions of 
the Credit and Insurance Committee No 21/4.11.2011, 77/30.5.2013. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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This framework authorised the Greek resolution and supervisory authorities to take action in order 

to prevent systemic crises, protect depositors, safeguard public confidence in the banking system 

and promote financial stability. Following the establishment of the new European framework for the 

recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms it was necessary to replace the 

existing  Greek  legislation  with  a  new  framework  addressing  in  a  uniform  manner  all  issues 

associated with the potential failure of financial sector entities. 

1.3  The  draft  law  comprises  20  chapters  which  in  particular  regulate  the  preparation  of  recovery  and 

resolution  plans,  the  provision  of  intragroup  financial  support,  the  exercise  of  early  intervention 

powers,  the  adoption  of  resolution  measures  and  their  objectives,  the  powers  of  the  resolution 

authorities, the provision of public financial support, the protection of the rights of shareholders and 

creditors in the context of resolution, and the  use of resolution financing arrangements. The draft 

law  also  introduces  necessary  amendments  to  relevant  existing  legislation  in  order  to  ensure  its 

compatibility with the new framework. 

1.4  The main provisions of the draft law are as follows: 

- 

The Bank of Greece, which is the national competent authority for supervising Greek credit 
institutions,  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  575/2013 6  (the  Capital  Requirements 
Regulation,  or  ‘CRR’)  and  Council  Regulation  1024/2013 7  (the  ‘SSM  Regulation’),  is 

designated as the national resolution authority for those institutions; and the Hellenic Capital 

Markets  Commission,  which  is  the  competent  authority  for  supervising  Greek  investment 

firms, is designated as the national resolution authority for those firms. The Greek resolution 

authorities  shall  exercise  their  resolution  tasks  separately  and  independently  from  their 
supervisory tasks8.  

- 

The  MoF  is  designated  as  the  competent  ministry  under  the  draft  law.  The  resolution 

authorities  are  required  to  inform  the  MoF  of  their  decisions  pursuant  to  the  draft  law  and 

have its consent before adopting any decision: (a) to transfer to a purchaser shares or other 

ownership instruments issued by an institution under resolution, or all or any assets, rights or 
liabilities of an institution under resolution under the sale of business tool 9; (b) to transfer to a 

bridge  institution  shares  or  other  ownership  instruments  issued  by  an  institution  under 

resolution, or all or any assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution under the 

bridge 

institution 

tool10;  (c) 

to 

transfer  assets,  rights  or 

liabilities  and  contractual 

arrangements  of  an  institution  under  resolution  or  a  bridge  institution  to  one  or  more  asset 

5  

6  

7  

8  

9  

10  

See Opinions CON/2011/72, CON/2011/107, CON/2012/14, CON/2012/25 and CON/2012/39. All ECB opinions are 
available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
Regulation  (EU)  No.  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  prudential 
requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  648/2012  (OJ  L  176, 
27.6.2013, p. 1). 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 

See  Article  4(10)  of  Law  4261/2014  implementing  Article  4(7)  of  Directive  No.  2013/36/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  access  to  the  activity  of  credit  institutions  and  the  prudential 
supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing  Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (CRDIV) (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
See Article 38(1) of the draft law. 

See Article 40(1) of the draft law. 

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management vehicles under the asset separation tool11; (d) to give effect to the bail-in tool12; 

(e) to make a determination that, unless the write down or conversion power is exercised in 

relation  to  a  subsidiary,  the  group  will  no  longer  be  viable;  and  (f)  having  a  direct  fiscal 

impact or systemic implications. 

- 

Competent  authorities  (as  defined  in  the  CRR 13)  are  authorised  to  adopt  early  intervention 

measures and to appoint a commissioner in cases where there is a significant deterioration 

in  a  credit  institution’s  financial  situation  or  where  there  are  serious  infringements  of  law, 

regulations  or  the  statutes  of  the  institution,  or  serious  administrative  irregularities.  The 

commissioner’s expenses must be covered by the credit institution. However in cases where 

the credit institution is not able to discharge such obligations, the Bank of Greece must step 
in  to  cover  the  expenses 14.  The  Bank  of  Greece  will  have  a  claim  against  the  institution  in 

accordance with Article 55E of its Statute. 

-  Resolution  authorities  may  apply  four  resolution  tools  individually  or  in  combination.  These 

tools are the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the asset separation tool, and 

the bail-in tool. It is worth noting that the provisions on the bail-in tool, along with the powers 

of  write  down  and  conversion  associated  with  the  bail-in  tool,  will  be  applicable  in  Greece 
only from 1 January 2016 15. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

When  exercising  their  powers,  the  resolution  authorities  are  required  to  ensure  the  full 

protection of the deposits of the Greek State in any appropriate way. 

The bridge institution shall be a legal person wholly or partially owned by one or more public 

authorities,  which  may  include  the  resolution  financing  arrangement  or  the  resolution 

authority,  and  shall  be  controlled  by  the  resolution  authority.  In  this  respect,  the  draft  law 

deviates from the existing resolution framework which provides that a bridge institution shall 
be owned and controlled by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) 16. 

Public  financial  support  may  be  provided  through  the  adoption  of  the  public  equity  support 

tool or the temporary public ownership tool. 

In  accordance  with  the  no  creditor  worse  off  principle,  shareholders  or  creditors  that  have 

incurred greater losses in a resolution than they would have incurred in a winding-up under 

normal  insolvency  proceedings  are  entitled  to  the  payment  of  the  difference  from  the 

resolution financing arrangement. 

- 

Procedural  requirements  are  established  to  ensure  that  resolution  actions  are  properly 

notified  and  that  resolution  authorities  are  subject  to  an  adequate  confidentiality  regime. 

Resolution authorities, competent authorities and the  MoF are also required to provide one 

11  

12  
13   
14   
15  
16  

See Article 42(1) of the draft law. 
See Article 43(1) of the draft law. 
Article 2, point 5 of the draft law. 

Article 137 of Law 4261/2014 as amended by Article 120 of the draft law. 
Article 132(1) of the draft law. 
The  exercise  of  shareholder  rights  in  bridge  institutions  is  one  of  the  HFSF’s  tasks  under  Article  2  of  the  HFSF 
Statute (Law 3864/2010).  

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another upon request with all the information relevant for the other authority to carry out its 

tasks. 

- 

The  Resolution  Branch  of  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  is  designated  as  the  resolution 

financing  arrangement  for  credit  institutions.  The  Resolution  Branch  of  the  Investment 

Guarantee Fund is designated as the resolution arrangement for investment firms.  

- 

- 

Competent  authorities  and  resolution  authorities  are  authorised  to  impose  administrative 

measures and administrative sanctions. 

With regard to the appointment of a commissioner 17, as outlined above, where the removal 

of  the  senior  management  or  the  executive  board  of  an  institution  is  deemed  to  be 

insufficient to restore that institution’s financial situation, the competent authority may appoint 

one or more commissioners to the institution. This complements the framework under which 
the commissioners are appointed18. 

- 

The civil liability of resolution authorities towards third parties for actions or omissions in the 

performance  of  their  duties  under  the  draft  law  is  limited  to  gross  negligence  and  wilful 

misconduct. Resolution authorities are liable for damages suffered as a result of a decision 
that was annulled19. The civil liability of the governor, the deputy governors, all members of 

collective  bodies  and  members  of  staff  of  the  Bank  of  Greece  towards  third  parties  for 

actions or omissions in the performance of their duties related to any competence exercised 

by  the  Bank  of  Greece  in  its  capacity  as  a  public  authority  has  been  amended.  The  new 

provision  will  expose  these  officers  and  staff  of  the  Bank  of  Greece  to  liability  not  only  for 
wilful misconduct, but also for gross negligence 20. 

- 

The  ranking  of  creditors  in  the  context  of  any  future  special  liquidation  of  credit  institutions 
has  been  amended  so  as  to  rank  claims  in  the  following  order 21:  (a)  preferential  claims 
arising out of insolvency  proceedings 22 and claims in case the public equity support tool or 
the  temporary  public  ownership  tool  are  exercised23;  (b)  claims  arising  out  of  deposits 

guaranteed  under  the  deposit  guarantee  scheme;  (c)  general  claims  of  the  State;  (d)  the 

following  claims  will  be  satisfied  on  a  pro-rata  basis:  (i)  claims  of  the    Resolution  Fund, 

(ii) deposits  above  the  guaranteed  threshold  for  private  individuals  and  micro,  small  and 

medium-sized enterprises; and (e) claims arising out guaranteed investment services. 

2. 

General observations  

2.1  The  draft  law  arises  out  of  the  Euro  Summit  Statement  of  12  July  2015,  pursuant  to  which  the 

Greek authorities committed to enact a series of measures by 22 July, including the transposition of 

17  

18  
19  

20  
21  
22  
23  

Article 29 of the draft law and amendments to Article 137 of Law 4261/2014. 

Article 137 of Law 4261/2014, as amended by the draft law. 
Article 110(3) of the draft law. 

Amendment to Article 62(4) of Law 4261/2014. 
Article 120 of the draft law, inserting a new Article 145a in Law 4261/2014. 
Article 154 of the Insolvency Code. 
Under Articles 57 and 58 of the draft law respectively. 

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the BRRD, with support from the European Commission.  

2.2  The  ECB  would  like  to  stress  that,  given  the  very  short  time  in  which  it  has  considered  this 

important legislation, it has not been possible to assess all of the many legal and regulatory issues 

which this draft law undoubtedly raises. 

2.3  The ECB welcomes the draft law, as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the Bank 

of Greece to carry out effective preventive, early intervention and effective resolution measures in 

line  with  the  common  framework  of  intervention  powers,  rules  and  procedures  laid  down  in  the 

BRRD. 

2.4   The ECB stresses, however, that it does not opine on whether the draft law effectively discharges 

the obligations of the Greek State to implement the BRRD in Greek law. Rather, the ECB focuses 

primarily  on  those  provisions  that  may  impact  on  the  role  and  tasks  of  the  Bank  of  Greece  as  a 

central bank and as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 

2.5 

It  is  worth  noting  that  the  ECB  has  developed  guidance,  in  the  form  of  general  and  specific 

considerations,  on  the  basis  of  which  it  may  decide  whether  a  new  task  conferred  on  an  ESCB 

national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the 

purposes  of  assessing  such  conferral  against  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  under 
Article 123 of the Treaty24. This guidance applies to genuinely new tasks that either did not exist in 

the  past  or  did  not  form  an  integral  part  of  the  central  banking  tasks  assigned  to  the  NCB  in  the 

past. The tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-

categorised,  but  may  be  reassessed  if  they  are  subject  to  legislative  amendments  of  substance. 

The ECB has clarified that resolution tasks can be considered central banking tasks, provided that 
they do not undermine an NCB’s independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty 25. In 

this respect, it is noted that the Bank of Greece has already been conferred with extensive powers 
to take specific resolution measures vis-à-vis credit institutions since 201126. Hence, the draft law 

does not constitute a substantive change in the supervisory, financial stability, and resolution tasks 

carried out by the Bank of Greece and is expected to have a limited impact on the overall functions 

carried out by it. 

2.6 

It is clear that the draft law does not authorise the Bank of Greece to provide any loan or financing 
under any circumstance to the Resolution Fund27. The provision of such financing to the Resolution 

Fund would constitute a government task, and any such loan or financing by  the Bank of Greece 
would therefore breach the prohibition of monetary financing under the Treaty28.  

24  
25  

26  
27  
28  

See Opinion CON/2015/22.  
See paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/22. This position departs from the one set out in Opinions CON/2015/3 
and CON/2015/2.  
ibid. See also Opinion CON/2011/72. 
Article 18(3)(b) of the draft law.  

ibid. 

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3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Consent of the MoF 

3.1.1  The ECB notes that the Resolution Committee of the Bank of Greece is required, before deciding 

to  take  a  resolution  measure,  to  obtain  the  prior  consent  of  the  MoF  in  a  broad  range  of 

circumstances.  This  provision  purports  to  implement  Article  3(6)  of  the  BRRD.  However,  by 

requiring the MoF’s prior consent for all decisions pertaining to the sale of a business, the setting-
up  of  a  bridge  bank,  asset  separation,  bail-in,  write  down  or  conversion 29,  regardless  of  whether 

they have a direct fiscal  impact or systemic implication, the  draft law seems to  go beyond  Article 

3(6) of the BRRD. Further, it is important that the Bank of Greece should have ultimate control over 

any  decision  related  to  a  resolution  matter  that  could  affect  the  Bank  of  Greece’s  financial 
independence30. 

3.1.2  Moreover,  in  requiring  the  Bank  of  Greece  as  the  resolution  authority  to  obtain  the  MoF’s  prior 

consent before taking resolution actions in a broad range of circumstances, the question arises as 

to whether the MoF may be considered to be a second resolution authority alongside the Bank of 

Greece. The consulting authority is invited to consider whether the MoF’s prior consent should be 

more  appropriately  limited  to  those  cases  in  which  the  resolution  measures  have  a  direct  fiscal 

impact or systemic implications, as required by Article 3(6) of the BRRD. This would avoid the MoF 

acting de facto as a joint resolution authority alongside the Bank of Greece, since if this were the 
case the MoF would need to ensure the operational independence of its resolution function 31. 

3.2   Conflicts of interests with other tasks of the Bank of Greece 

3.2.1  The  ECB  has  repeatedly  noted32  that,  in  line  with  the  BRRD33,  staff  involved  in  carrying  out  the 

functions  of  a  resolution  authority  in  accordance  with  the  Directive  must  be  structurally  separate 

and  subject  to  separate  reporting  lines  from  those  involved  in  carrying  out  prudential  banking 
supervision tasks pursuant to applicable EU legal acts 34 or with regard to the other functions of the 

relevant  authority. The BRRD ‘exceptionally’ allows one authority to carry  out both resolution and 

supervisory  functions  on  the  condition  that  adequate  structural  arrangements  are  put  in  place  in 

order to ensure operational independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between that authority’s 

resolution function and its other functions. For example, the BRRD envisages structural separation 

being  achieved  by  keeping  the  reporting  lines  for  staff  involved  in  carrying  out  resolution  tasks 
separate from those used by staff involved in supervision activities 35. That separation should not, 

however, prevent the resolution function from having access to any necessary information which is 
available to the supervisory function36. 

29  
30  
31  

32  

33  
34  
35  
36  

See Articles 38(1), 40(1), 42(1), 43(1) and 59(7) of the draft law. 

See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2015/2 and paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2015/22. 
See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2015/22. 
See  paragraph  3.2.6  of  Opinion  CON/2015/22,  paragraph  4.3  of  Opinion  CON/2015/2,  paragraphs  5.1  and  5.2  of 
Opinion CON/2015/3 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2014/67. 

See the second subparagraph of Article 3(3) BRRD. 
See the CRR; and CRDIV. 
See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2014/67.  
See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2015/2.  

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3.2.2  Pursuant to existing law and the draft law, the Bank of Greece is required to ensure the operational 

and organisational independence of the department carrying out resolution functions and its staff to 

ensure  there  is  no  conflict  of  interest  and  to  provide  for  the  separation  of  tasks  relating  to  the 

resolution function from the Bank of Greece’s other tasks. The ECB welcomes these provisions, as 

they  appear  to  adequately  address  potential  conflicts  of  interest  between  the  resolution  function 

and the Bank of Greece’s other tasks and functions.  

3.3   Liability of the Bank of Greece 

3.3.1  With regard to the provisions in the draft law on the liability of the Bank of Greece 37, the ECB notes 

that  the Bank of Greece, as resolution authority,  will  now  be  held  liable for gross negligence and 

wilful  misconduct.  It  is  not  obvious  why  the  Bank  of  Greece  should  assume  the  burden  of  those 

potential liabilities when the draft law requires it to obtain prior consent from the MoF before taking 
resolution actions in a broad range of circumstances38. Against this backdrop, the ECB notes that, 

under  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  laid  down  in  the  Treaty,  national  legislation  may  not 
require  an  NCB  to  finance  the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties 39.  Given  that 
potential liability issues represent substantial financial risks for the Bank of Greece40, this should be 

taken  into  account  in  determining  the  entity  that  is  liable  to  pay  damages  to  third  parties  and  in 

assessing the Bank of Greece’s ability to recover its resolution-related expenses. 

3.3.2  The  draft  law  contains  provisions  on  the  personal  liability  of  the members  of  the  decision-making 

bodies  and  the  staff  of  the  Bank  of  Greece.  There  may  be  concerns  as  to  the  proportionality  of 

such liability, in particular, given that staff of other Greek public authorities are not subject to such 
personal liability in relation to third parties 41. 

3.4   Ownership of bridge institutions and asset management vehicles 

3.4.1  With regard to the bridge institution tool and the asset separation tool, the draft law sets out that the 

bridge institution or asset management vehicle must be wholly or partially owned by one or more 

public authorities which may include the resolution authority or the Resolution Fund.  

3.4.2  While this provision implements the BRRD42, where a central bank acts as resolution authority,  it 

should  be  clarified,  for  the  avoidance  of  doubt,  that  the  central  bank  will  in  no  event  assume  or 

finance  any  obligation  of  these  entities.  A  central  bank’s  role  as  owner  of  such  an  entity  must 

remain consistent under all circumstances with the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 
123 of the Treaty, as supplemented by Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 43. This prohibits, inter 

alia,  any  financing  by  a  central  bank  of  the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties. 

Moreover, this role must be performed without prejudice to central bank independence, in particular 

37  
38  

39  
40  
41  
42  
43  

Article 72(4) of the draft law. 
See paragraph 3.2.10 of Opinion CON/2015/22. 

See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 29. 
See paragraph 3.2.9.3 of Opinion CON/2015/22. 

See Article 38 of the Civil Servants Code (Law 3528/2007).  
See Articles 40(2)(a) and 42(2)(a) BRRD. 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332 , 31.12.1993, p. 1). 

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its  financial  and  institutional  independence44.  The  principle  of  financial  independence  requires 

NCBs to have sufficient means to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks from an operational 
and financial point of view, but also their national tasks45. For that reason, it should be ensured that 

if  the  Bank  of  Greece,  as  resolution  authority,  decides  to  become  owner  of  such  an  entity,  it  is 

provided  with  sufficient  financial  and  human  resources  to  address  the  operational  burden 

associated with it. 

3.4.3  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  under  the  existing  law,  the  HFSF  is  conferred  with  the  role  of 

shareholder of bridge institutions, and may be best placed in terms of expertise and resources to 

exercise  the  role  of  shareholder  of  bridge  institutions  and  asset  management  vehicles  under  the 

draft law. 

3.5  Cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  between  the  Bank  of  Greece  and  other  relevant 

authorities, including the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission 

3.5.1  The ECB notes that the draft law  provides for cooperation between the Bank of Greece,  which is 

the resolution  authority for credit institutions, and other relevant  authorities, including the  Hellenic 

Capital  Markets  Commission,  which  is  the  resolution  authority  for  investment  firms,  in  performing 

their respective tasks, each keeping in mind the impact of their performance on the other.  

3.5.2  The  ECB  welcomes  these  provisions  as  they  will  enable  the  relevant  entities  to  perform  their 

statutory  tasks  in  a  coordinated  fashion.  In  particular,  they  will  facilitate  the  Bank  of  Greece’s 

performance of its financial stability mandate. Such arrangements are also in line with current ECB 

doctrine  and  the  requirements  under  the  BRRD,  pursuant  to  which  Member  States  must  ensure 

that,  where  the  central  bank  is  not  itself  the  resolution  authority,  the  competent  authority  (i.e.  the 

authority  responsible  for  the  prudential  supervision  of  institutions)  and  the  resolution  authority 
engage in an adequate exchange of information with the NCB 46. 

3.6  Resolution planning 

The  draft  law  provides  that  recovery  plans  and  resolution  plans  drawn  up  and  maintained  by  an 

institution  shall  not  assume  any  access  to  or  entitlement  to  extraordinary  public  financial  support 

beyond  that  granted  by  the  Resolution  Fund.  However,  they  shall  include,  where  applicable,  a 

forward-looking  analysis  of  how  and  when  an  institution  may  apply  for  the  use  of  central  bank 
liquidity in stressed conditions and  what collateral  is to be used  in respect of such47. While these 

provisions appear to be in line with the requirements of the BRRD, the ECB emphasises that they 

do not in any way affect the competence of the Eurosystem to decide independently and in its full 

discretion  on  the  provision  of  central  bank  liquidity,  based  on  the  existing  legal  framework  and 
within the limitations imposed by the monetary financing prohibition under the Treaty48. 

44  

45  

46  
47  
48  

See  paragraph  3.3  of  Opinion  CON/2012/99,  paragraph  5  of  Opinion  CON/2011/84  and  paragraph  3.6  of  Opinion 
CON/2011/39. 
See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. 

See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2012/99. 
Article 18(4) of the draft law. 
See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2012/99, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2014/67 and paragraph 3.4 of Opinion 
CON/2015/22. 

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ECB-PUBLIC 

3.7  Withdrawal of authorisation 

With regard to Article 32(5) of the draft law, the SSM Regulation confers on the ECB the power to 

withdraw a credit institution’s authorisation. This applies both to institutions under the ECB’s direct 

supervision  and  to  institutions  under  the  supervision  of  the  Bank  of  Greece.  The  drafting  of 

Article 32(5) of the draft law should be clarified to reflect this. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 July 2015. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

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