Special Report No 11 // 2015#Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission? #(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Date: 2015-07-15
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: Community fisheries, audit, coastal region, fishery management, fishing agreement, fishing area, fishing permit, negotiation of an agreement (EU), sea fishing, third country

EN 

2015 

NO 11

Special Report  Are the Fisheries 

Partnership Agreements 
well managed by the 
Commission?

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi 
1615 Luxembourg 
LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

Email: eca-info@eca.europa.eu 
Internet: http://eca.europa.eu

Twitter: @EUAuditorsECA 
YouTube: EUAuditorsECA

More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu).

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015

Print 
PDF 
EPUB 

ISBN 978-92-872-2748-5 
ISBN 978-92-872-2727-0 
ISBN 978-92-872-2731-7 

ISSN 1831-0834 
ISSN 1977-5679 
ISSN 1977-5679 

doi:10.2865/300270 
doi:10.2865/760820 
doi:10.2865/2404 

QJ-AB-15-010-EN-C
QJ-AB-15-010-EN-N
QJ-AB-15-010-EN-E

© European Union, 2015
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
For any use or reproduction of the map on page 46, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder.

Printed in Luxembourg

EN 

2015 

NO 11

Special Report

Are the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements 
well managed by the 
Commission?

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Audit team

02

The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and 
public interest. 

This performance audit was produced by Audit Chamber I — headed by ECA Member Augustyn Kubik — which special-
ises in preservation and management of natural resources spending areas. The audit was led by ECA Member Jan Kinšt, 
supported by the head of his private office, Alejandro Ballester Gallardo; Colm Friel, head of unit; Maria Luisa Gómez-
Valcárcel, principal auditor; Oana Dumitrescu, auditor and Frédéric Soblet, auditor.

From left to right: F. Soblet, M. L. Gómez-Valcárcel, C. Friel, J. Kinšt,  
A. Ballester Gallardo, O. Dumitrescu.

Contents

03

Paragraph

Abbreviations

I–XIII 

Executive summary

1–13 

1–3 

4–8 

Introduction

The need for international fisheries agreements

Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs)

9–13 

The European distant water fleet and FPAs

14–16  Audit scope and approach

17–83  Observations

17–53 

Part I — Negotiation of the FPAs

17–25 

The Commission negotiated and renewed the FPAs in time to avoid any interruption in fishing activities

26–28 

The Commission has negotiated a relevant network of agreements, but consistency within the Indian Ocean 
region could be improved

29–32 

The FPAs’ objective of ensuring that the negotiated fishing opportunities concern only surplus fisheries 
resources was difficult to achieve

33–46 

The cost of the FPAs negotiated by the Commission was relatively high, considering past rates of use

47–53 

The information provided by ex post evaluations was not always useful in the decision‑making process and 
negotiations

54–83 

Part II — Implementation of the FPAs’ access rights and sectoral support components

55–60 

The fishing authorisation (licensing) process was lengthy and cumbersome, yet the Commission had not 
taken measures to identify what could be improved

61–65 

The central monitoring of catches was not adequate, putting at risk the timely identification of problems 
and the correct calculation of payments

66–70 

The Commission and the partner countries agreed on the relevant activities to be funded using sectoral 
support, but coordination with other partners in the sector was lacking

71–76 

The Commission’s control of sectoral support actions was limited and the actions actually implemented by 
the partner countries were in some cases different from those agreed

77–83 

Payments made by the Commission for sectoral support were not linked to progress achieved by the 
partner countries in implementing agreed actions

 
Contents

04

84–95  Conclusions and recommendations

Annex I  — 

 Fisheries Partnership Agreements: further information on their negotiation and 
implementation

Annex II  —  Fisheries Partnership Agreements in force for 2015

Annex III  —  Fisheries Partnership Agreements

Reply of the Commission

 
 
 
 
Abbreviations

05

DG: Directorate-general

ECA: European Court of Auditors

EDF: European Development Fund

EEZ: Exclusive economic zone

ERS: Electronic reporting system (or electronic logbook)

EU: European Union

FAO: Food and Agricultural Organisation

FPA: Fisheries Partnership Agreement

IOC: Indian Ocean Commission

IOTC: Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

MSY: Maximum sustainable yield

PC: Partner countries

RFMO: Regional fisheries management organisation

STECF: Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries

Unclos: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

VMS: Vessel monitoring system

Executive  
summary

I
The European Union (EU) negotiates agreements 
with coastal countries in order to obtain access rights 
for the EU external fleet to these countries’ fishing 
grounds. These agreements have evolved from the 
simple access agreements of the 1980s into Sustain-
able Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) which 
seek to sustain fishing resources, while also develop-
ing the partner country’s fishing sector through the 
provision of sectoral support. The Commission is look-
ing to extend the network of agreements as they offer 
significant advantages not only to the EU fleet, but 
also to the partner countries.

II
The Court audited fisheries agreements for which 
a financial contribution is made from the EU budget 
(i.e. agreements based on fishing quota exchanges 
were excluded). The Court examined four of the 
12 agreements in force at the time of the audit: 
Mauritania (a multi-species agreement in the Atlantic 
Ocean), Madagascar, Mozambique and the Seychelles 
(tuna agreements in the Indian Ocean). These four 
FPAs represented 77 % of FPA payments in 2013.

III
The objective of this audit was to evaluate whether 
FPAs are well managed by the Commission. This 
involved examining the negotiation of FPAs, and the 
implementation of access rights and sectoral sup-
port. The audit concluded that FPAs are generally well 
managed by the Commission, but that there are still 
several areas for improvement, as regards the negotia-
tion process and the implementation of the protocols.

06

IV
The procedures for negotiating and renewing FPAs 
are often complex and lengthy, yet the Commission 
handled these difficulties well and, with few excep-
tions, managed to avoid interrupting the fleet’s fishing 
activities. The network of agreements negotiated was 
relevant to the needs and priorities of the EU fleet 
concerned.

V
Where lengthy negotiations of new protocols jeop-
ardised the continuation of fishing activities, vessels 
were allowed, as provided for in Article 9 of Regulation 
(EC) No 1006/2008, to apply to the third party country 
concerned for fishing authorisations through the Com-
mission, pending the signature of the new protocol. 
However, this is not consistent with another regulatory 
requirement, namely ‘the exclusivity clause’, and its 
application led to misunderstandings between a part-
ner country and the Commission.

VI
The FPAs are presented as instruments that ensure the 
sustainability of the fisheries concerned. As estab-
lished in the basic common fisheries policy regulation, 
the fishing opportunities negotiated should allow EU 
vessels to fish only the surplus resources of partner 
countries. However, the concept of surplus is very dif-
ficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable infor-
mation on fish stocks and the fishing effort of domes-
tic fishing fleets, or of other foreign fleets which have 
also been granted access by the partner countries.

Executive summary 

07

VII
The actual unit cost paid for a tonne of fish was fre-
quently higher than the unit price negotiated. While 
the negotiations considered catches reported from 
previous protocols, the reference tonnage agreed 
in the most recent protocols often remained higher, 
leading to their regular underutilisation. However, 
the EU financial contribution was paid in full regard-
less of the fishing opportunities used. The underuse 
of the protocols and resulting high costs could be 
partly attributable to the technical conditions negoti-
ated with the partner countries to comply with their 
national legislation or to ensure the sustainability of 
fishing activities.

VIII
The information given in independent ex post evalua-
tions of FPAs is not always sufficiently complete, con-
sistent or comparable, thus reducing its usefulness in 
informing decisions when negotiating the protocols.

IX
The audit concluded that the management of the 
implementation of the access conditions was not suf-
ficiently robust. The Commission did not appropriately 
monitor the workflow of lengthy and cumbersome 
licensing processes to identify the reasons for delays 
and areas for improvement.

X
The audit identified shortcomings in catch data 
management, as illustrated by differences between 
the catch data provided by Member States, the Com-
mission and the ex post evaluations. Since payments 
under the FPAs are based on catch data, this gives rise 
to financial risk.

XI
While the planning of sectoral support has improved, 
the Commission’s role in monitoring the implementa-
tion of the protocols audited was still limited. There is 
no clear framework laying down eligibility and trace-
ability rules for the actions funded. Furthermore, the 
Commission does not have sufficient control rights; 
for example, partner countries have in some instances 
implemented different actions than those planned, 
and these may not contribute effectively to the 
achievement of the FPA’s objectives.

XII
Finally, the protocols allow for a suspension of pay-
ments, but not for partial reductions of sectoral sup-
port payments when agreed actions or results are only 
partially achieved. Moreover, despite sharing the same 
development concept, the conditions for payment of 
sectoral support are different from those for Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) budget support, which 
sometimes led to inconsistencies.

XIII
The Court has the following recommendations.

To improve the negotiation of new FPAs and protocols, 
the Commission should:

(a)  review dormant agreements and consider how 
to address the interruption of fishing activities 
imposed by the exclusivity clause while respect-
ing the principles of the common fisheries policy. 
Furthermore, the Commission should clarify and 
include in the protocols appropriate provisions 
to ensure the continuity of fishing operations 
between two protocols;

(b)  define regional strategies for the development of 
fisheries governance and ensure that protocols 
negotiated within the same region are consistent 
with the relevant regional strategy and with other 
EU funds;

Executive summary 

08

(c)  when negotiating the fishing possibilities of new 

(i) 

protocols, consider the utilisation rates of previous 
protocols and endeavour to better link payments 
for access rights to actual catches, while ensur-
ing that the fishing activities are not adversely 
affected;

for new protocols, propose the introduction of 
eligibility requirements to assess actions being 
considered for sectoral support funding (other 
requirements could relate to traceability, selection, 
reporting and performance measurement, and 
control rights for the Commission);

(j)  ensure effective coordination on the subject of 

FPA sectoral support with other development 
partners active in the fisheries sector;

(k)  ensure that sectoral support disbursements are 
consistent with other EU budget support pay-
ments and based on the results achieved by the 
partner countries in the implementation of the 
matrix of commonly agreed actions.

(d)  better analyse the potential impact of SFPA claus-
es on the use of the protocol, while safeguarding 
the mutual benefits for the EU and the partner 
countries concerned, perhaps by consulting the 
relevant stakeholders to identify where more de-
tailed assessments of critical clauses are necessary;

(e)  better focus ex post evaluations to obtain a con-
sistent and comparable analysis of the return on 
public money spent under the protocols as well 
as a comprehensive and critical analysis of their 
effectiveness for the EU and the partner country 
concerned.

To improve the implementation of FPAs, the Commis-
sion should, without delay:

(f)  establish procedures to monitor each of the steps 

in the licensing process, including time taken by 
Member States, partner countries, and the Com-
mission services, in order to identify and follow up 
on weaknesses in the procedure;

(g)  promote the acceptance of electronic licences or 
of a list of authorised vessels for the whole period 
of validity of the licences;

(h)  ensure that the new catch database is fully used 

by flag Member States and provides reliable catch 
data which can be consolidated, monitored and 
kept up to date;

Introduction

09

1 

Fishing vessels that fish 
outside their national waters.

The need for international 
fisheries agreements

01 
The principle of free access to the high 
seas gradually disappeared from the 
mid-1970s onwards and in the wake 
of the third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (Unclos III). 
Entering into force in 1982 after 9 years 
of negotiations, the Convention es-
tablished in international law the right 
of states to claim sovereignty over 
waters up to 200 nautical miles from 
their shorelines (the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ)), for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources in 
these waters. More and more countries 
decided to extend their sovereignty 
to the 200 mile limit and, as a result, 
about 90 % of fish resources came 
under the control of coastal countries. 
Many distant water fleets1, which had 
previously fished these waters, were 
then obliged to enter into access 
agreements with coastal states.

02 
As a result of this, the EU (or ‘the 
European Community’ as it was at 
that time) began to negotiate bilat-
eral fisheries agreements with coastal 
states, mostly developing countries. 
These agreements were initially simple 
access agreements, providing fishing 
opportunities for the EU distant water 
fleet and an important revenue source 
for these developing states. The agree-
ments were commercial in nature and 
generally based on the ‘pay, fish and 
go’ principle.

03 
Since 1981, the EU has also negotiated 
a number of ‘northern agreements’. 
These are reciprocal agreements in-
volving an exchange of fishing oppor-
tunities between EU fleets and those 
of Norway, Iceland and the Faeroe 
Islands, with no financial contribu-
tion. This report does not cover these 
agreements.

Fisheries Partnership 
Agreements (FPAs)

04 
The simple access agreements were 
subject to criticism, notably with re-
gard to their effect on over-exploited 
stocks, their lack of transparency and 
of enforcement and compliance with 
regulations, their exploitation of the 
weak negotiation and enforcement 
capacity of developing coastal states, 
and for not being an appropriate 
means of delivering development 
cooperation in fisheries.

05 
In response to these criticisms, the 
2002 reform of the common fisheries 
policy introduced the concept of ‘part-
nership’ to emphasise the EU’s objec-
tives of supporting the development 
of the national fisheries sector in its 
partner countries (PCs), fostering and 
enhancing policy dialogue between 
the EU and developing countries, and 
promoting sustainable fisheries. This 
new generation of agreements were 
called Fisheries Partnership Agree-
ments (FPAs) (see Box 1). The financial 
contribution was split into two distinct 
parts: access rights to the EEZ and ‘sec-
toral’ financial support, which aims to 
promote sustainable fisheries develop-
ment in the partner countries.

Introduction

10

1
x
o
B

Objectives of the FPAs2

 ο To ensure the rational and sustainable exploitation of living marine resources in the partner countries (in-

troducing the notion of surplus from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)3

 ο To safeguard employment in the regions of the Union dependent on fishing

 ο To secure the continued existence and competitiveness of the EU fisheries sector

 ο To ensure an adequate supply for the Union market

 ο To generate added value for the Union

 ο To improve the administration of partner countries’ fisheries by developing their fisheries resource man-

agement and control capacities

 ο To promote the economic development of the fisheries sector in partner countries, as well as employment, 

health conditions and the business environment within the sector

2  Conclusions of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, 19 July 2004 and 19-20 March 2012.

Most of these objectives were also in Council Regulation (EC) No 861/2006 of 22 May 2006 establishing Community financial measures for the 
implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy and in the area of the Law of the Sea (Article 7) (OJ L 160, 14.6.2006, p. 1).
Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, 
amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) 
No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22) sets out the principles and objectives of Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements.

3  Article 62(2) of the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) refers to this surplus as the share of the allowable catch which the 

coastal state cannot or does not wish to exploit itself.

 — FPAs foster scientific cooperation 
between the EU and its partner 
countries. The protocols provide 
for scientific committee meetings 
to review stock levels and consider 
resolutions of the regional fisher-
ies organisations. The partner 
countries sometimes collaborate 
with EU scientists working on fleet 
activities in their countries.

06 
The Commission considers that FPAs 
offer significant advantages over other 
ways for the European distant water 
fleet to gain access to third countries’ 
waters and resources. In particular:

 — FPAs give the European fleet 

access to fishing grounds under 
a clearer, uniform and more stable 
legal framework, offering greater 
legal certainty than private agree-
ments between European vessel 
owners and non-EU countries. 
European shipowners have also ex-
pressed a preference for FPAs and 
asked the Commission to extend 
the network of agreements, even 
at the cost of an increase in their 
contribution to access rights.

 
11

4  Data from the 2014 Annual 
Economic Report on the EU 
Fishing Fleet (STECF 14-16), 
corresponding to the 2012 
distant water fleet. The 
European distant water fleet is 
defined in this report as 
comprising all EU-registered 
vessels over 24 metres 
operating in Other Fishing 
Regions (OFR), including some 
EU outermost regions.

Introduction

 — In order to ensure a level playing 
field for the various distant water 
fleets in the coastal countries’ 
EEZ, the protocols also provide for 
a non-discrimination clause. This 
means that the technical standards 
and other sustainability principles 
which apply to FPAs, should also 
apply to agreements between the 
partner countries concerned and 
other fleets present in their EEZ. 
This should also foster the sus-
tainable management of fishing 
resources.

 — In the partner countries, FPAs en-

courage improved governance and 
management of the local fisheries 
sector by supporting the monitor-
ing, control and surveillance of na-
tional and foreign fleets’ activities. 
FPAs provide significant funding 
to contribute to the sustainable 
development of local fishing 
activities.

07 
The 2014 reform of the common fisher-
ies policy introduced the concept of 
the sustainable fisheries partnership 
agreement (SFPAs). The reform aims to 
improve some aspects of FPAs, such as 
the amount of information available 
on the basis of which to determine the 
available surplus in the EEZ of partner 
countries, the promotion of sustain-
able fishing in the partner countries’ 
waters by better targeting and regular 
monitoring of EU sectoral support, and 
the inclusion of a human rights clause. 
The main objective for SFPAs is to pro-
vide a legal, environmental, economic 
and social governance framework for 
fishing activities carried out by Union 
fishing vessels in third country waters, 
where similar standards to those ap-
plicable to Union fishing vessels in EU 
waters should apply.

08 
The Commission has for several years 
introduced an exclusivity clause, ap-
plicable to all FPAs in force, to tighten 
the governance framework for the fish-
ing activities of the EU’s distant water 
fleet. Once an agreement is in force 
between the EU and a partner country, 
EU fishing vessels can only operate 
in the waters of the partner country 
if they possess a fishing authorisa-
tion which has been issued under the 
framework of a protocol for this agree-
ment (see paragraph 10).

The European distant 
water fleet and FPAs

09 
Although the distant water fleet con-
stitutes less than 1 % of the EU fleet, 
with just 335 vessels out of the 86 283 
registered in the EU, it is much more 
significant in terms of fishing capacity, 
with 18 % of the gross tonnage and 
7 % of the engine power4 of the total 
EU fishing fleet. The distant water fleet 
is an important supplier of fish to the 
European market as it is estimated to 
provide 15 % of the total catches of 
the EU fleet. It also accounts for 4 % 
of EU fleet employment. Around half 
of the distant water fleet’s catches 
are made under fisheries partnership 
agreements.

12

5  Negotiations between the 
European Commission and 
Mauritania in view of the 
establishment of a new 
protocol were successfully 
concluded on 10 July 2015. 
This 4-year protocol amounts 
to 59.125 million euro per year. 
It still needs the approval of 
Council and the consent of the 
European Parliament.

Introduction

10 
In drawing up an FPA, the EU and its 
partner countries negotiate an agree-
ment and its implementing protocols. 
This agreement provides a framework 
for long-term cooperation in fisher-
ies, and the protocols set out detailed 
terms and conditions. Protocols 
are generally negotiated every 3 to 
6 years, in agreement with the partner 
country. When referring to FPAs, this 
report mainly concerns the protocols. 
More details on negotiation processes 
and responsibilities under FPAs are 
given in Annex I.

12 
Annex II shows the 13 FPAs in force for 
2015, with an annual financial con-
tribution of 71 million euro. Three of 
the 13 agreements in force are mixed 
agreements allowing the EU fleet ac-
cess to different fish stocks in the EEZ 
of the partner country. The remainder 
are tuna agreements granting fishing 
rights in the partner country’s EEZ to 
EU vessels which follow migratory tuna 
stocks and other highly migratory spe-
cies in their movements around Africa, 
and the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

11 
In 2014, payments of 69 million euro 
were made from the EU budget for 
FPAs, which represents a significant 
decrease from the over 200 mil-
lion euro paid out in the 1990s. This is 
explained partly by the expiry of the 
protocol with Mauritania in December 
2014, for which no payments were 
made in 2014, but 67 million euro was 
paid out in 2013. Morocco alone rep-
resented over 40 % of the 2014 total. 
In addition, the operators also make 
financial contributions to these FPAs in 
exchange for the fishing authorisations 
they receive. Their contribution has 
increased steadily in recent years.

13 
Other FPAs without current protocols 
are Gambia (since 1.7.1996), Equatorial 
Guinea (since 30.6.2001), the Solomon 
Islands (since 9.10.2012), Micronesia 
(since 25.2.2010), Mauritania (since De-
cember 2014)5 and Mozambique (since 
January 2015). When an agreement 
is still in force but its protocols have 
yet to be renewed, as is the case with 
these agreements (‘dormant agree-
ments’), the EU fleet has no access to 
that country’s fishing area, in accord-
ance with the exclusivity clause (see 
paragraph 8).

Audit scope and approach

13

15 
The audit approach involved meet-
ings with relevant stakeholders6, the 
analysis of information obtained from 
the Commission, and on-the-spot visits 
in selected Member States (Spain and 
France) and in four partner countries 
with which the EU has concluded FPAs. 
Three of the partner countries chosen 
for this audit were in the Indian Ocean 
(Madagascar, Mozambique and the 
Seychelles) in order to obtain a region-
al perspective. In addition, Mauritania 
was chosen as an example of a mul-
ti-species agreement and as it is the 
most financially significant agreement. 
In total, the four FPAs audited repre-
sented 77 % of FPA payments in 2013.

16 
The audit evidence was supplemented 
by a survey addressed to the operators 
of the EU distant water fishing fleet. 
Ship owners representing 70 % of this 
fleet replied 7.

6 

7 

Stakeholders included the 
European Parliament, and 
NGOs in the area of 
employment on vessels and in 
the marine environment. The 
Court also visited associations 
of vessel operators and fish 
processors in Spain and 
France.

Twenty-one fishing vessel 
owners/associations answered 
the Court’s survey, together 
operating 319 vessels (of 
which, 233 flagged in EU 
Member States) fishing 
outside European waters. The 
233 vessels represented 70 % 
of the 335 vessels that make 
up the European distant water 
fleet. 79 % of the vessels 
included in the survey, 
operated in the Atlantic and 
Indian Ocean regions, of 
which 32 % are demersal 
fishing vessels, 22 % are 
pelagic trawlers, 7 % are 
seiners, 7 % are longliners of 
high capacity, 7 % are black 
hake trawlers and bottom 
longliners, and 4 % are tuna 
pole-and-line vessels.

14 
The objective of the audit was to eval-
uate whether FPAs are well managed 
by the Commission by addressing the 
following questions:

(1) 

 Does the Commission manage 
the negotiations of FPAs and their 
protocols well?

In order to answer this question, the 
Court reviewed the negotiation pro-
cess for the four FPAs audited and 
looked at whether the Commission 
negotiated or renewed the protocols 
in time to ensure the continuation 
of European fleet activities. Further-
more, the audit assessed whether 
the negotiation of fishing possibili-
ties and the financial contributions 
were consistent with the FPAs’ 
objectives of ensuring the sustain-
ability of fish stocks at a reasonable 
cost for the EU, improving partner 
countries’ fisheries governance and 
fostering the economic develop-
ment of their fisheries sector.

(2)   Does the Commission manage the 
implementation of FPAs well?

In order to answer this question, 
the Court reviewed the Commis-
sion’s management of the licens-
ing process and the reliability of 
the catch data reporting system. 
Furthermore, the audit assessed 
whether the Commission appro-
priately designed, controlled and 
monitored the actions funded 
under the sectoral support compo-
nent of the FPAs.

Observations

14

Part I  
Negotiation of the FPAs

The Commission negotiated 
and renewed the FPAs in time 
to avoid any interruption in 
fishing activities

17 
Negotiations of agreements grant-
ing the EU fleet access to EEZ coastal 
states’ fishing grounds should aim to 
ensure that access is continuous, in 
order to avoid any negative impact 
on the sector. The Council has asked 
the Commission to prevent any inter-
ruption in fishing activities after the 
expiry of an agreement or protocol. 
Similarly, when negotiating a protocol, 
the Commission tries to introduce the 
possibility of provisional application 
from the date of signature until the 
date of final ratification.

18 
The Court reviewed the Commission’s 
negotiation process for the four FPAs 
included in the audit and in force 
at that time. The audit considered 
whether the protocols were renewed 
in a timely manner and so as to avoid 
interrupting the EU distant water 
fleet’s fishing activities.

19 
The negotiation of new protocols 
is a long and complex process. The 
Commission negotiates on the basis 
of a mandate from the Council, which 
signs the protocol with the partner 
country. The Parliament must then 
give its consent. More details on the 
negotiation process are given in An-
nex I. Therefore for continuity of fleet 
activities, the Commission has to start 
the process of negotiating a new pro-
tocol well in advance of the expiry of 
the current one.

20 
The whole negotiation process for 
the four protocols included in the 
audit — from the Council’s mandate, 
to the date of entry into force after the 
Parliament’s consent or ratification by 
the partner country — lasted between 
71 weeks and 134 weeks (as illustrated 
in Figure 1). The duration of negotia-
tions depends on factors that negotia-
tors cannot fully anticipate or control. 
The Commission has estimated that 
it needs a minimum of 12 weeks from 
the finalisation of negotiations (the 
‘initialling’ of the protocol) to prepa-
ration of the protocol for signature 
by the Council, and that the Council 
needs an additional 6 to 8 weeks for 
scrutiny. The amount of time expected 
to elapse between finalisation of nego-
tiations and signature by the Council 
is therefore a minimum of 20 weeks 
considering that there may be possible 
delays during discussions in the Coun-
cil to adopt the protocol, but in the 
case of Madagascar, Mozambique and 
the Seychelles the time frame ranged 
from 29 to 35 weeks.

Observations

15

1 Duration of the negotiation process
e
r
u
g
i
F

Madagascar (1 round)
1/2013-12/2014

Mauritania (7 rounds)
12/2013-12/2014

Mozambique (2 rounds)
2/2012-1/2015

Seychelles (3 rounds)
1/2014-1/2020

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Weeks

Source: ECA, based on negotiation documents and EU legislation.

Time elapsed between mandate and end of 
negotiations (initialling)

Time elapsed between end of negotiations 
and signature by the Council and PC

Time elapsed between signature and 
Parliament approval or ratiﬁcation by PC

Start of provisional application

21 
The Court found that the Commission 
manages the negotiation process well, 
wherever possible using the available 
legislative tools to avoid interrupting 
fishing activities. However, 83 % of 
operators who replied to the Court’s 
survey, representing around 30 % 
of the distant water fleet, declared 
having been affected by delays in the 
negotiation of protocols, mostly with 
Mauritania and Morocco, which are 
two significant but exceptional cases.

22 
In the case of Mauritania, negotiations 
were lengthy (seven rounds of nego-
tiations lasting a total of 71 weeks) 
and the previous protocol expired 
almost 5 months before a new one was 
signed. Since provisional application 
was not possible before signature by 
the Council, and in order to avoid any 
interruption of EU fleet activities, the 
Commission applied the provisions of 
EU law8 and proposed to the Mauri-
tanian authorities that it continue to 
submit applications for fishing authori-
sations during this 5-month period. 
This possibility was used only by ship-
owners of four categories of fisheries9 
between 1 August 2012 and 15 De-
cember 2012. Fishing was thus able to 
continue for these categories, but not 
for the remaining categories, in which 
fishing had to cease temporarily. The 
Court notes that, while the application 
for fishing authorisations in the ab-
sence of a signed protocol was meant 
to protect the interests of the EU fleet, 
it was not consistent with the exclusiv-
ity clause (see paragraph 8).

8  Article 9 of Council Regulation 

(EC) No 1006/2008 of 
29 September 2008 
concerning authorisations for 
fishing activities of 
Community fishing vessels 
outside Community waters 
and the access of third country 
vessels to Community waters, 
amending Regulations (EEC) 
No 2847/93 and (EC) 
No 1627/94 and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 3317/94 
(OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 33). 
This article provides that 
where a protocol has expired, 
and where a new protocol has 
been initialled by the 
Commission but was not 
signed by the Council or it 
does not provide the 
provisional application, the 
Commission may, for a period 
of 6 months from the 
expiration date of the previous 
protocol, transmit applications 
for fishing authorisations to 
the third country concerned.

9  Categories 2 (black hake), 3 
(demersal other than black 
hake), 5 (tuna) and 6 (pelagic 
freezer trawlers).

 
16

10  European Parliament 

Legislative Resolution of 
14 December 2011 
(P7_TA(2011)0569).

11  According to the Spanish 

authorities, the amount paid 
to the Spanish fleet in 
compensation for the losses 
incurred due to the disruption 
of their activities in Morocco 
was of 4,5 million euro (of 
which 4,3 million euro was 
paid from the European 
Fisheries Fund).

12  Tables 4.2 and 4.4 of the 

‘Review of tuna fisheries in the 
western Indian Ocean’ final 
report, 2014, POSEIDON, 
MRAG, NFDS and 
COFREPECHE.

Observations

23 
Furthermore, even while exploiting 
all the possibilities provided by the 
legislation, the Commission could not 
prevent the interruption of fishing 
activities. The Mauritanian authorities 
considered the activity in the period 
August to December 2012 to have 
taken place under the provisional ap-
plication of the new protocol. Conse-
quently, they enforced an early closure 
of the fishing activities in the four 
categories that had been authorised to 
continue fishing before the new proto-
col’s signature. This caused losses for 
those shipowners who had also paid 
for licences until the actual expiration 
date of 15 December 2014.

24 
In the case of Morocco, the protocol 
was signed in February 2011 and provi-
sionally applied until December 2011, 
when the European Parliament 
rejected its conclusion10. Following 
fresh negotiations, another protocol 
was initialled on 24 July 2013 and rati-
fied by the European Parliament on 
10 December 2013, with no provisional 
application clause due to the fact that 
the Moroccan negotiators did not 
agree to its introduction. It only en-
tered into force on 15 July 2014 due to 
the late ratification by Morocco, which 
led to additional expenditure from 
the EU budget11 and also to a direct fi-
nancial impact on shipowners and the 
EU industry as fishing activities were 
interrupted.

25 
With respect to the Indian Ocean pro-
tocols audited, the continuity of fish-
ing activities in the EEZ of Madagascar 
and the Seychelles was assured since 

the new protocols were signed before 
the expiry of the previous protocols 
and included a provisional application 
clause. In the case of Mozambique, 
there was no protocol in force for a pe-
riod of 1 month (time elapsed between 
the expiration date of the previous 
protocol (1.1.2012) and the provisional 
application of the new one (1.2.2012)), 
but this had no significant impact on 
the EU fleet, as the tuna stocks were 
not available to be fished in Mozam-
bique waters during this period.

The Commission has 
negotiated a relevant 
network of agreements, 
but consistency within the 
Indian Ocean region could be 
improved

26 
The Court considers a coherent and 
relevant regional network of agree-
ments to be important. First, under 
improved conditions of legal certainty, 
the EU fleet can follow migratory spe-
cies. Second, such a network enhances 
the Commission’s negotiating position 
by reducing the pressure to reach an 
agreement when fleet activities risk 
being interrupted. Furthermore, the 
intended positive impact in terms of 
governance for the partner countries 
due to sectoral support and EU control 
over its own fleet can have a catalytic 
impact on regional fishing activi-
ties. This impact is heightened by the 
extent of European fleet activities in 
certain regions (for example EU purse 
seiners accounted for 66 % of purse 
seiner catches in the West Indian 
Ocean in 201112, while purse seiner 
catches in turn accounted for 49 % of 
the total catch in the region that year).

Observations

17

27 
The current Commission strategy aims 
to address these needs by enlarging 
the network of agreements in line 
with the industry’s requirements and 
priorities. In their replies to the audit 
survey, the shipowners expressed 
a primary interest in Angola, Guin-
ea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, followed 
by Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Tanzania, 
Kenya and Senegal. The Commission 
had started initial discussions with 
Tanzania, completed negotiations 
with Liberia and revived the agree-
ments with Gabon, Morocco, Mauritius 
(for which the protocols had already 
entered into force at the time of the 
survey), Guinea-Bissau and Senegal 
(for which the protocols had already 
been signed). However, at the time of 
the audit, negotiations for the renew-
als with Mozambique and Mauritania 
had been suspended due to a lack of 
consensus between the Commission 
and the two partner countries.

28 
However, the audit in the Indian Ocean 
found that there was room for im-
provement in the consistency between 
FPAs and their complementarity with 
other EU regional actions and fund-
ing sources in the fisheries sector. 
For example, this was the case with 
the fisheries monitoring centres. An 
agreement is in place for the regional 
exchange of vessel monitoring system 
(VMS) data between the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC) countries (Comoros, 
Mauritius, Madagascar, Réunion and 
the Seychelles) via the server devel-
oped with the support of the IOC with 
EDF regional funds. Mozambique is 

not part of the IOC and, despite being 
an important partner in the regional 
network of FPAs, does not currently 
have access to this data. Instead of 
supporting Mozambique’s access to 
the existing regional VMS data ex-
change system the Commission sup-
ports Mozambique in developing a re-
gional fisheries monitoring centre by 
financing its feasibility study through 
the ACP FISH II, financed by the EDF. 
In parallel, the Commission has also 
supported the country’s national VMS 
through FPA sectoral support.

13  Article 31 of Regulation  
(EU) No 1380/2013.

14  Fishing effort is the product of 
the capacity and the activity of 
a fishing vessel; for a group of 
vessels, it is the sum of the 
fishing effort exerted by each 
vessel in the group.

15  The MSY, which is an indicator 

of the optimum rate of 
exploitation, is defined by the 
Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) of the UN 
as the maximum catch that 
can be obtained on 
a sustainable basis.

The FPAs’ objective of 
ensuring that the negotiated 
fishing opportunities 
concern only surplus 
fisheries resources was 
difficult to achieve

29 
The key sustainability principle of the 
FPA is that the fishing opportunities 
negotiated in the protocols (quanti-
ties and number of licences) should 
only allow EU vessels to fish surplus 
resources13. This requires reliable 
information on stocks (based on 
the best available scientific advice), 
and on the fishing effort14 of coastal 
states and other agreements. The 
protocols should then grant access 
rights to a specific part of this surplus. 
The Commission should also ensure 
that the FPAs reflect the principle of 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY)15, 
and resolutions and recommendations 
of the regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs) on the state of 
fish stocks.

18

16 

IOTC Resolution 14/02 
foresees the introduction of 
a quota system at the regional 
level.

17  At the regional fishery 

management organisation 
level, the EU is calling for 
greater transparency, notably 
through requiring parties to 
provide all data in relation to 
third country fishing activities 
and access to their respective 
EEZs. The IOTC has adopted 
Resolution 14/05, relating to 
a record of licensed foreign 
vessels fishing for IOTC species 
in the IOTC area of 
competence and access 
agreement information.

18 

IOTC scientific reports from 
2013 and 2014.

19  3155th Agriculture and 

Fisheries Council meeting in 
Brussels, held on 
19 and 20 March 2012.

Observations

30 
The Court reviewed how the surplus 
was calculated and whether or not the 
quantities of fish to be caught under 
the agreement respected the surplus 
concept. The various FPAs negotiated 
were also analysed and compared for 
textual consistency.

31 
The audit found that the surplus con-
cept is extremely difficult to apply in 
practice. Article 61 of Unclos provides 
that responsibility for determining 
the surplus, taking into account the 
best scientific evidence available, lies 
with the partner country. However, the 
audit noted that partner countries do 
not have the capacity to determine the 
surplus. This is particularly relevant for 
mixed agreements (e.g. Mauritania) or 
widely dispersed fishing resources, like 
small pelagic or highly migratory spe-
cies, due to the difficulty of determin-
ing a surplus in the EEZ of a particular 
coastal country, especially where 
there is no system of fishing quotas 
in place at regional level16. Moreover, 
information about the fishing effort 
of domestic fishing fleets or of other 
foreign fishing fleets which have also 
been granted access by the partner 
countries17 is not always reliable. It is 
therefore very difficult for the Com-
mission to calculate the proportion 
of the total fishing effort represented 
by the EU fleet and, by extension, the 
catch limits for the EU fleet in accord-
ance with the surplus approach.

32 
In the Indian Ocean region, the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) has 
recommended maximum sustainable 
yields (MSY) for some species (e.g. 
swordfish) as part of its scientific ad-
vice18 and has adopted resolutions for 
the protection of two species of shark. 
The MSY standard can, however, only 
be applied with difficulty at individual 
country level for highly migratory 
species, such as those targeted by the 
FPAs.

The cost of the FPAs 
negotiated by the 
Commission was relatively 
high, considering past rates 
of use

33 
When negotiating, the Commission 
should ensure that the clauses of the 
protocols with an economic impact 
on the European fleet and the partner 
countries’ economies (i.e. the dura-
tion of the protocol, price, quantities, 
species, technical conditions, vessel 
owner contributions, reporting and 
landing requirements) enable the 
European fleet to make efficient use of 
the agreements and grant it access to 
an appropriate share of the available 
surplus at a fair price for the partner 
countries. The Commission should also 
ensure that the principles of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness are taken 
into account when preparing FPA 
negotiations. The Council has asked19 
the Commission, in cooperation with 
Member States, to commit to optimis-
ing the use of fishing opportunities 
in order to ensure value for money 
and compliance with the principles of 
sound financial management.

19

20  The minimum financial 

contribution for access rights 
is calculated by multiplying 
the reference tonnage by the 
unit price agreed.

21 

In the Indian Ocean region, 
the number of vessels and the 
gross tonnage were frozen at 
the 2006 level for vessels 
fishing tropical tuna and at the 
2007 level for vessels fishing 
swordfish and albacore, 
according to Resolution 12/11 
of the IOTC on the 
implementation of a limitation 
of fishing capacity of 
contracting parties and 
cooperating non-contracting 
parties.

Observations

34 
The EU’s financial contribution to the 
partner countries has two compo-
nents: access rights to the EEZ and 
‘sectoral’ financial support (see para-
graph 5). While the partner country 
has no restrictions as regards the use 
of the first component, which strictly 
governs access to the national fishing 
areas, the payment of sectoral sup-
port funds should be conditional upon 
the realisation of the actions agreed, 
namely concerning the fisheries sector 
governance, between the EU and the 
partner country. This conditionality 
has been enshrined in the new com-
mon fisheries policy and in the subse-
quently signed FPAs. The distribution 
of the total financial contribution 
between the two components is an 
important aspect of the negotiation 
process.

The negotiation of the access 
rights component

35 
The protocols determine the type of 
fish to which access is granted and the 
conditions governing this access in 
terms of number of licences, type of 
vessel and reference tonnage. This ‘ref-
erence tonnage’ represents the catch 
volume in respect of which a minimum 
payment for access rights20 has to be 
paid by the EU. Should this level be 
surpassed, a supplementary payment 
for additional catches will be made by 
the EU. The protocols also specify tech-
nical and operating conditions.

36 
When negotiating the ‘access rights’ 
component, the Commission tries to 
obtain the number of licences re-
quested by the Member States (subject 
to the available limits21), considering 
also the external factors that may have 
an impact on the uptake of the fishing 
licences. The partner country usually 
seeks to obtain the greatest possible 
financial contribution, which is then 
‘converted’ into a reference tonnage.

37 
Figure 2 below shows the historic use 
of fishing opportunities (fish catches) 
in the partner countries visited in the 
Indian Ocean region in terms of refer-
ence tonnage. Despite the underuti-
lisation of the fishing opportunities 
negotiated in previous protocols, the 
reference tonnage agreed in the most 
recent protocols has remained rela-
tively stable.

38 
As the EU’s financial contribution is 
based on reference tonnage rather 
than actual catches, the regular under-
use of the protocols leads to an actual 
unit cost paid which is frequently 
higher than the unit price used as a ba-
sis for negotiations. Figure 3 shows 
the actual cost of each tuna agreement 
when taking into account the total FPA 
financial contribution. It shows, for 
example, that the real cost per tonne 
of tuna caught in Mozambique in 2013 
was about six times higher than the 
prices negotiated. This is explained 
by a very high financial contribu-
tion (which was increased further 
in the 2/2012-1/2015 protocol from 
900 000 to 980 000 euro) combined 
with very low utilisation of the fishing 
opportunities.

Observations

20

region

2 Use of tuna fishing opportunities in the partner countries visited in the Indian Ocean 
e
r
u
g
i
F

100 %
90 %
80 %
70 %
60 %
50 %
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0 %

% of reference tonnage unused
% of reference tonnage used

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

Madagascar

Mozambique

Seychelles

Source: ECA, based on DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries data on the use of the fishing opportunities.

3
e
r
u
g
i
F

Unit cost per tonne of tuna paid by the EU

euro
1 000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Actual cost per tonne
Agreed price per tonne corresponding to 
access rights and sectoral support

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

Madagascar

Mozambique

Seychelles

Source: ECA, based on protocols and DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries data on the use of the fishing opportunities.

 
 
 
Observations

39 
The market value of the fish stocks ne-
gotiated in the protocols has a direct 
influence on the value of the protocol. 
The Commission should therefore 
consider this when negotiating the 
overall price of the protocols. However, 
this was not always the case. In the 
most recent protocol (2013-2014) with 
Mauritania, the cephalopods category, 
which has a high commercial value 
and was used at an average rate of 
93 % in the 2008-2012 protocol, was 
withdrawn from the protocol due to 
the application of the surplus concept 
and the national authorities’ deci-
sion to reserve cephalopods for the 
national fleet. Due to the category’s 
high value and high utilisation rate, 
this decision had a significant nega-
tive impact on the EU fleet. The fishing 
opportunities for the pelagic species 
in the 2013-2014 protocol, which have 
a lower commercial value, were in-
creased. The financial contribution for 
access was increased from an average 

of 60 million euro per year in 2008-
2012 (and only 50 million euro per year 
in 2012) to 67 million euro per year for 
2013 and 2014. The new protocol was, 
therefore, relatively more expensive 
for the EU. The ex post evaluation of 
the protocol (which covered the first 
11 months) noted that the direct add-
ed value for all the beneficiaries was 
0.8 euro. However the direct added 
value for the EU, which represents the 
wealth created for the EU for each euro 
invested was only 0.39 euro22. This 
ratio was on average 0.63 euro in the 
period 2006-2009.

40 
Overall, in Mauritania, the final unit 
price per tonne paid was much higher 
than the theoretical access cost based 
on full utilisation. Figure 4 shows the 
estimated cost of access rights for the 
EU based on the actual use of the fish-
ing opportunities23.

21

22  As shown in Table 3 this ratio 
is 5.53 for the Seychelles, 4.09 
for Madagascar and 0.91 for 
Mozambique.

23  Data for 2014 is only available 
until September and amounts 
were adjusted on 
a pro-rata-temporis basis. In 
order to estimate the 
breakdown of the access 
rights payment per category, 
the Court has taken into 
account the reference 
tonnage and the fish market 
price (from the ex post 
evaluation and DG Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries’ data). 
This breakdown is not 
presented for the previous 
protocol as the categories 
were not comparable.

4 Estimated cost of fishing opportunities used in Mauritania
e
r
u
g
i
F

thousand euro

70 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

10 000

0

Access cost paid
Access cost of used opportunities

2013

2014 (until September)

Source: ECA, based on the 2013-2014 protocol, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries data, ex post evaluation 2014.

 
22

24  Pre-fishing inspections are 
required for 33 % of the EU 
vessels authorised to fish in 
Mozambican waters. In their 
replies to the Court’s survey, 
vessel operators considered 
that this requirement was 
excessively costly.

25  The technical conditions were 
very restrictive and following 
very low utilisation rates for 
the first months, the Joint 
Committee agreed to ease 
these restrictions, while 
maintaining the 
environmental considerations. 
The issue with the technical 
conditions has delayed the 
actual implementation of the 
protocol by almost 1 year.

Observations

41 
The acceptance of some clauses that 
led to implementation problems, in 
particular in Mauritania and Mozam-
bique, might have contributed to the 
underutilisation of the protocols. In 
Mozambique, the main issue was the 
requirement for 33 % of vessels to un-
dergo pre-fishing inspections24.

42 
In Mauritania, the main issues were 
restrictive technical conditions, in-
cluding a narrow definition of fishing 
areas, in the 2013-2014 protocol. Most 
of these conditions were designed to 
protect overexploited stocks, avoid 
unwanted catches and protect the 
ecosystems. Over the period Au-
gust 2012 to December 2013, the EU 
fleet segments most affected by the 
technical conditions25 had very low 
utilisation rates: e.g. zero for crabs 
and extremely low for the category 
‘non-freezer pelagic’ and ‘crustaceans’. 

This was confirmed by the replies to 
the Court’s survey where 70 % of the 
operators who replied in relation to 
the Mauritanian protocol said that the 
technical conditions negotiated were 
inadequate and 58 % said that profit-
ability was affected.

The negotiation of the sectoral 
support component

43 
Sectoral support is an important tool 
for achieving the objectives of improv-
ing partner countries’ fisheries gov-
ernance and fostering the economic 
development of their fisheries sector. 
During negotiations, the Commission, 
in an attempt to obtain the country’s 
commitment to improving governance 
in the fisheries sector, seeks to in-
crease sectoral support. However it is 
capped at 50 % of the total EU contri-
bution (see Table 1).

1 Importance of sectoral support in the two most recent protocols reviewed for each 
e
l
b
a
T

partner country visited

Mauritania

Mozambique

Seychelles

Protocol1 and 2

Madagascar

Total contribution1 (euro)

% sectoral support 

Total contribution2 (euro)

% sectoral support

1 525 000

36.1 %

1 526 8753

45.8 %

76 250 0003

21.3 %

70 000 000

4.3 %

650 000

38.5 %

980 000

45.9 %

5 600 000

39.6 %

5 116 6673

49.5 %

1  Previous protocols referred to: Madagascar (2005-2011), Mauritania (2008-2012), Mozambique (2008-2011) and Seychelles (2011-2013).

2   Protocols in force at the time of the audit referred to: Madagascar (2013-2014), Mauritania (2013-2014), Mozambique (2012-2014) and Seychelles 

(2014-2020).

3  An average was calculated for this protocol since the annual contribution changes each year.

Source: ECA, based on the text of the protocols.

 
Observations

23

44 
The Court considers that increasing 
the proportion of sectoral support is 
consistent with the FPA objectives of 
improving the governance of third 
countries’ fisheries and promoting the 
economic development of their fisher-
ies sector.

45 
Mauritania was the only exception to 
this positive trend of increasing the 
share of the total EU financial contribu-
tion to go to sectoral support. In this 
case, the Commission agreed to sig-
nificantly reduce the sectoral support 
component from 21 % of the total FPA 
contribution in the 2008-2012 protocol 
to only 4 % in the 2013-2014 proto-
col. This reduction was introduced as 
a result of the problems encountered 
by the Commission in obtaining infor-
mation from the Mauritanian authori-
ties regarding the actions financed 
by sectoral support in the 2008-2012 
protocol (as illustrated in Box 2). As 
shown in Table 1 above, the total an-
nual financial contributions negotiated 

by the Commission in the two proto-
cols are similar. This means that the 
Commission reduced the share of 
the sectoral support component and 
increased proportionally the access 
rights component, for which partner 
countries have limited transparency or 
reporting obligations. In the Court’s 
view, this response was not consistent 
with the development objective of 
FPAs.

46 
Moreover, during negotiations the 
Court considers that it is important to 
take into account the total EU financial 
contribution to the partner countries. 
The amounts involved play an impor-
tant role in the development of the 
partner countries, as indicated in  
Table 2. However, FPA and EDF con-
tributions, objectives and implemen-
tation arrangements are negotiated 
independently. The Court considers 
that this does not facilitate the Com-
mission’s position during negotiations 
with the partner countries.

2 EU contributions to the partner countries visited during the audit and their 
e
l
b
a
T

significance in relation to the fisheries budgets and total national budgets (2013)

Mauritania 

Mozambique

Seychelles

Madagascar

2013

FPA contribution in relation to the 
national fisheries budget 

Total EU contribution in relation to the 
total national budget

41 %

5 %

689 %1

11 %

20 %

2 %

250 %2

2 %

1  Budget of the Fisheries Ministry as it appears in the Mauritanian Finance law. It does not include significant expenses such as port expenses.

2  Seychelles Fishing Authority operating costs only, excluding capital investments.

Source: ECA, based on national documents, Commission DG International Cooperation and Development documents, and the FPAs.

 
24

26  Drawing up an ex ante and ex 
post evaluation of the FPAs is 
an obligation under Financial 
Regulation (EU) No 966/2012 
(OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1) for 
all programmes and activities 
that entail significant 
spending (more than 
5 000 000 euro) in order to 
verify that the resources 
allocated and the results 
achieved were consistent with 
the objectives set.

27  2599th Council Meeting, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Brussels, 19 July 2004.

28  Article 31 of Regulation (EU) 

No 1380/2013.

29  The short duration was 

determined by the fact that 
the Commission did not want 
the existing protocols to be 
applied well beyond the entry 
into force of the new common 
fisheries policy, so that the 
changes brought by this 
policy would be applied as 
soon as possible.

Observations

The information provided 
by ex post evaluations was 
not always useful in the 
decision‑making process and 
negotiations

47 
Ex ante and ex post evaluations26 are 
used by the Council, Parliament and 
Commission in the decision-making 
process. They are intended to provide 
reliable information on the use of the 
agreement and the added value for 
the EU and the partner country, assess 
the environmental, economic and so-
cial impact of a partnership agreement 
and verify that the results achieved by 
the FPAs are consistent with the objec-
tives set for them, in accordance with 
the requirements laid down by the 
Council27 and the new common fisher-
ies policy28.

48 
Before providing the Commission with 
a mandate to negotiate a new proto-
col, the Council requires the Commis-
sion to carry out both an independent 
ex post and ex ante evaluation where 
a protocol is already in place, and an 
ex ante evaluation where there are no 
prior FPAs. This obligation has been 
reinforced by including it in the new 
common fisheries policy.

49 
The stakeholders consulted during 
the audit indicated their appreciation 
that an ex post report was available. 
They consider it to be a useful tool 
as it gives an overall picture of the 
use of fishing opportunities under 

an agreement (licences taken up and 
catches) and of the agreement’s func-
tioning and added value. However, the 
catch data presented in the report are 
not the most up to date, although it 
is the role of the Commission, as data 
manager, to make this data available 
to the decision-making stakeholders in 
a timely manner.

50 
The time needed to perform the evalu-
ation must then be added to what is 
already a long negotiation process. 
Prior to the introduction of the new 
common fisheries policy, most of the 
protocols had a very short lifespan 
(of around 3 years29). The evaluations 
could therefore only cover a short op-
erating period, of 1 year or less, of the 
evaluated protocol. This reduced the 
usefulness of the evaluations as a tool 
for decision-making. A positive change 
has been the longer lifespan (of 4 to 
6 years) of the most recent protocols, 
which may have a positive impact on 
the completeness of data contained in 
their ex post evaluations.

51 
The ex post evaluations of the FPAs in 
the Indian Ocean present information 
on stocks and catches at a regional 
level and include non-essential de-
scriptive information which is repeated 
from one evaluated period to the next 
and makes the report too extensive.

Observations

25

52 
On the other hand, the audit found 
that evaluations do not sufficiently as-
sess the extent to which the FPAs meet 
all of their objectives (see paragraph 5 
and Box 1) (e.g. no reference to em-
ployment in EU regions depending on 
fishing, no information on the supply 
of fish on the EU market). Furthermore, 
the evaluations in the Indian Ocean 
did not calculate the value added of 
the FPAs in a consistent manner. This 
did not facilitate the decision-making 
process as the methodologies used to 
calculate value added were not com-
parable between protocols and, in the 
case of Mozambique, produced a very 
different result (Table 3).

53 
During the audit and following an in-
ternal audit of the evaluation process, 
the Commission developed a new 
value-added evaluation methodology, 
which has been applied since Janu-
ary 2015. The methodology used to 
evaluate the protocols with Madagas-
car (February 2014) and Mozambique 
(April 2014) was also relatively new 
(January 2014), but the methods used 
for the calculation of the value added 
were still not comparable.

3 Inconsistencies in the calculation of the return on EU public investment per country, 
e
l
b
a
T

as presented in the ex post evaluations of the Indian Ocean protocols

Calculated return per 
euro of public money 
invested by the EU  
(ex post)

Madagascar
(issued in February 2014)

4.09

Mozambique (issued in April 2014)

2.08

Seychelles (issued in January 2013)

4.5

Comments 

The model includes benefits and costs only in broad categories (e.g. fuel, 
maintenance, port fees, insurance, etc.) which are not always consistent with 
the categories used in other evaluations (e.g. in the Seychelles, they additionally 
specify crew, depreciation of vessels and gear, overheads). However, this model1 
was considered by the Court to assess costs and benefits well.

The evaluators did not divide the benefits between the EU and Mozambique and 
not all the public costs incurred by the EU were included in the calculation (secto-
ral support was excluded). When recalculated by the Court using the same model 
as for Madagascar, the return on public investment would be only 0.91 euro per 
euro invested by the EU.

The shipowners’ payments were included, unlike in the other evaluations, where 
only public money was considered; the costs were correctly distributed among 
parties and all public costs were considered. When recalculated by the Court 
using the same model as for Madagascar, the return on public investment would 
be higher, at 5.53 euro per euro invested by the EU.

1  Ratio: Direct added value delivered to the EU/Total EU Contribution (access rights and sectoral support).

Source: Ex post evaluations.

 
Observations

26

56 
The protocols establish the licensing 
process between the partner countries 
and the EU, such as the submission 
of applications to the relevant public 
authority. The protocols also provide 
for an electronic exchange of informa-
tion on fishing activities. The process 
involves the Commission, the Member 
States, the EU Delegations and the 
partner countries. More details are 
given in Annex I. The Court’s audit 
focused on the data available in order 
to monitor this process and analyse 
any delays.

57 
There are indications that delays in the 
licensing process negatively affected 
fishing activities: 78 % of the respond-
ents to the Court’s survey raised con-
cerns about these delays, which were 
also expressed in communications 
from fishing operators’ representatives 
to the Commission.

58 
The audit noted that the partner coun-
tries visited were either reluctant or 
unable, due to national legal require-
ments, to accept electronic fishing 
authorisations, and they all required 
the original of the licence to be kept 
on board the authorised vessel during 
fishing activities.

Part II  
Implementation of the 
FPAs’ access rights and 
sectoral support 
components

54 
The implementation of FPAs in-
volves two main aspects: access of 
EU vessels to fishing opportunities 
(see paragraphs 55 to 65), and sup-
port for the development of part-
ner countries’ fishing sectors (see 
paragraphs 66 to 83). In order for each 
aspect to function well (i.e. to ensure 
that the fleet can fish under good 
conditions, and that sectoral support 
improves fisheries governance in the 
partner countries), the Commission 
needs appropriate systems in place to 
monitor implementation. The audit 
examined these monitoring systems.

The fishing authorisation 
(licensing) process was 
lengthy and cumbersome, 
yet the Commission had not 
taken measures to identify 
what could be improved

55 
The licensing process by which vessels 
obtain permission to fish under the 
protocols should not be unnecessarily 
complex or time-consuming for fishing 
operators. The Commission should 
review the various phases of the licens-
ing process and assess whether ef-
ficiency gains can be made. The Court 
considers that a complete overview of 
the time needed for the various stages 
of the process is essential in order to 
identify and correct inefficiencies. The 
audit found that the Commission does 
not have sufficient information on the 
licensing process timeline.

Observations

27

59 
As shown in Figure 5, while in Mo-
zambique and Seychelles the Delega-
tions and the fisheries attachés had 
information on the amount of time 
that elapsed from the request by 
the operator to the issue date by the 
partner country, in Madagascar the 
information kept at the Delegation 
only related to the time that elapsed 
from the receipt of the application file 
by the Delegation to its forwarding 
to the Commission. In Mauritania, the 
monitoring table was not available.

60 
The Court noted that in some cases 
significant delays occurred before 
the licence application file reached 
the partner countries’ authorities. 
However, for the protocols examined, 

the Commission had no information 
system to help it keep track of the time 
required for each of the steps in the 
licence application workflow it had 
developed and, consequently, it could 
not identify where delays had occurred 
(whether at Member State, partner 
country, or Commission level). Further-
more, while the fishing authorisations 
database required by Regulation (EC) 
No 1006/2008 exists and contains 
up-to-date information on existing 
licences, it does not contain sufficient 
data to analyse any delays. The Court 
was therefore unable to identify the 
reasons for the delays. The revision of 
the fishing authorisation regulation, 
announced in 2011, may help to identi-
fy and reduce procedural bottlenecks, 
but the Commission’s proposal has not 
yet been finalised and submitted for 
co-decision.

5 Known duration of the licensing process
e
r
u
g
i
F

-

r
o
t
a
r
e
p
O

Madagascar

Mauritania

Mozambique

Seychelles

r
e
b
m
e
M

e
t
a
t
S

-
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M

n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C

-
n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C

n
o
i
t
a
g
e
l
e
D

No information available

r
e
n
t
r
a
P
-
n
o
i
t
a
g
e
l
e
D

y
r
t
n
u
o
C

y
r
t
n
u
o
C
r
e
n
t
r
a
P

s
e
i
t
i
r
o
h
t
u
a

41 days

-
y
r
t
n
u
o
C
r
e
n
t
r
a
P

n
o
i
t
a
g
e
l
e
D

n
o
i
t
a
g
e
l
e
D

n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C

-
n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C

e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M

-
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M

r
o
t
a
r
e
p
O

No information available

No monitoring table available

Over 5 months

No information available

126 days

1 day1

19 days

No information available

No information available

Not applicable 
(the licence is sent directly to the operators)

1  The fact that the fishing authorisations were issued on the same day as when the application files they were registered casts doubts on the 
reliability of the registration date.

Source: Monitoring tables provided by the Delegation and the fisheries attachés.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations

28

The central monitoring of 
catches was not adequate, 
putting at risk the timely 
identification of problems 
and the correct calculation of 
payments

61 
The Commission and Member States 
need to monitor and verify the accu-
racy of data regarding actual catches, 
in order to identify implementation 
problems, allow for informed decisions 
when negotiating new protocols, and 
ensure the correct calculation of pay-
ments for additional catches, when-
ever this may occur.

62 
Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 requires 
vessels to submit catch data to their 
Member States on a weekly basis. 
On the basis of this information, the 
Member States must then submit all 
catch data to the Commission each 
month, broken down by fishing area 
across all EEZs (whether subject to an 
agreement or otherwise) and inter-
national waters. More details on the 
role of Member States in this area are 
provided in Annex I. The Commission 
should maintain a catch database with 
this information. This regulation also 
requires the Commission to host a da-
tabase of fishing authorisations that 
should be updated regularly by the 
Member States.

63 
The audit identified shortcomings in 
the Commission’s catch data manage-
ment for the protocols reviewed. The 
Court found several significant differ-
ences among the catch data provided 
by the various sources: from Member 
States, from DG Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries and from the ex post evalua-
tions. Such differences are illustrated 
in Table 4. There was a lack of reliable, 
consistent and complete data on ac-
tual fish catches taken under the FPAs 
at the level of the Commission.

64 
Similar differences were noted be-
tween the data the Court received 
from the Member States and that from 
the Commission. These differences 
may also be explained by the fact that 
Member States sent catch data (bro-
ken down by vessel and species) to 
the Commission in different formats. 
The Commission then processed the 
data manually, but did not consolidate 
it in a central database. The Commis-
sion has recently taken measures to 
remedy this situation. In January 2015, 
data management was transferred to 
the service responsible for the FPAs. 
In addition, historic data on catches 
has been consolidated, although this 
consolidated information was not 
available for the period covered by the 
protocols audited. Finally, the Com-
mission has put a database (catch data 
since 2013) in place, although this was 
not operational at the time of the audit 
as Member States were not yet compli-
ant with their reporting requirements.

Observations

29

4 Examples of differences in catch data between DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and 
e
l
b
a
T

ex post evaluations for the Indian Ocean protocols

(tonnes) 

Total catches ex post evaluation

Total catches DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Difference (t)

Difference (%)

Total catches ex post evaluation

Total catches DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Difference (t)

Difference (%)

Total catches ex post evaluation

Total catches DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Difference (t)

Difference (%)

na: not available.

2009

2010

2011

Madagascar

Mozambique

Seychelles

14 596

14 653

– 57

0 %

3 840

3 426

414

12 %

na

23 762

na

na

10 055

9 916

139

1 %

4 261

4 261

0

0 %

na

41 668

na

na

10 282

9 870

412

4 %

2 330

1 442

888

62 %

40 545

40 078

467

1 %

2012

8 053

8 083

– 30

0 %

1 156

1 132

24

2 %

na

34 779

na

na

Source: DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries at the time of the audit and ex post evaluations.

65 
The lack of consolidated and verified 
data can have negative consequences. 
For example, if the final catch is higher 
than the reference tonnage, an ad-
ditional payment may be required, 
thus giving rise to financial risk. In 
fact, the Court has already identified 
a case where inadequate monitoring 

of catches resulted in unforeseen 
expenditure for the Commission30. In 
addition, the regular monitoring and 
updating of catch information would 
allow up-to-date information to be 
used and facilitate decision-making in 
negotiations where the information in 
the ex post evaluations is not the most 
recent (see paragraph 49).

30  As reported in the Court’s 2011 
Annual Report, section 4.46 
concerning the 2008-2012 
protocol with Mauritania. In 
this case, the national 
authorities informed the 
Commission that the 
300 000 tonne quota for the 
year ending 31 July 2010 had 
been exceeded. The 
Commission had to pay 
1.9 million euro to Mauritania 
for 47 346 tonnes caught in 
excess of the quota. Better 
monitoring of fish catches 
would have allowed the 
Commission services to 
consider taking preventative 
action to avoid making 
additional payments.

 
Observations

30

The Commission and the 
partner countries agreed 
on the relevant activities 
to be funded using sectoral 
support, but coordination 
with other partners in the 
sector was lacking

66 
According to the provisions of the 
FPAs, the Joint Committee should 
establish a multiannual sectoral pro-
gramme in the form of a matrix in line 
with the partner countries’ needs and 
priorities for the fisheries sector. The 
Commission’s guidelines for the man-
agement of sectoral support indicate 
that the actions included in this matrix 
should take account of the objective 
of improving governance through the 
development of an effective man-
agement and control system for the 
fisheries sector and of the sustainable 

exploitation of fisheries resources. 
The sectoral support matrix should 
be accompanied by clear objectives, 
criteria, procedures and indicators for 
evaluating the results of the agreed 
actions. The fisheries sectoral support 
should be coordinated with other fi-
nancial partners’ actions in the partner 
countries.

67 
In all four countries visited, the Court 
found that the actions proposed for 
sectoral support were in line with na-
tional strategies. Most planned actions 
related to governance and investments 
in the fisheries sector. This provided 
a good basis for the planned secto-
ral support, and was consistent with 
actions planned under the previous 
protocols. This is illustrated in Table 5.

Picture 1 — Fuelling station for the artisanal fishing fleet in the Seychelles.
Source: ECA.

Observations

31

5 Main actions financed and proportion of total sectoral support (SS)  
e
l
b
a
T

(2013 budgeted costs)

Main actions as planned for 2013

Madagascar1
% of SS

Monitoring, control and surveillance activi-
ties (patrols, inspections, VMS, ERS)

Monitoring, control and surveillance activi-
ties (observers)

Scientific research for stocks 

Laboratories, food safety (exports)

Capacity building and participation in 
meetings

Infrastructure directly linked to fisheries 
activities/sector

Infrastructure not linked to fisheries 
activities

Loan fund for the local fisheries sector

1  Calculation based on budgeted costs.

52 %

4 %

-

44 %

-

-

-3,4

-

Mauritania2
% of SS
(2012-2013)

38 %

-

3 % 

2 %

3 %

53 %

-

-

Mozambiqiue1,5
% of SS

Seychelles1
% of SS

7 %

4 %

63 %

Actions executed in 
the past

22 %

38 % of balance of 
previous protocol, spent 
in 20125

46 % of balance of 
previous protocol, spent 
in 20125

-

16 %

2 %

10 %

3 %

22 %

38 %

-

10 %

2  Calculation based on payments in the 2012-2013 period.

3  Actions were executed in the past.

4   The amount is not available.

5  The sum of the costs proposed by the PC does not match the total EU budget for the year.

Source: Matrices and activity reports.

68 
However, the protocols do not include 
formal eligibility conditions for actions 
to be funded by sectoral support. 
There is no evidence in the minutes 
of the Joint Committees of the Indian 
Ocean protocols audited that the 
criteria, procedures and indicators for 

evaluating the results of the secto-
ral support were discussed in detail. 
The positive example of the 2008-
2012 protocol with Mauritania, which 
established specific areas of activity 
and indicators, was not emulated by 
the Indian Ocean protocols which were 
approved at a later date.

 
Observations

32

Picture 2 — Fisheries school vessels financed by sectoral support in the Seychelles.
Source: ECA.

69 
The audit also found that, in the Indian 
Ocean countries visited, coordination 
among the development partners ac-
tive in the fisheries sector was weak. 
Sectoral support is not discussed at 
the regular coordination meetings 
between the representatives responsi-
ble for EDF support in the EU Delega-
tion and the other financial partners, 
and the fisheries attaché does not take 
part in these meetings. This is despite 
the fact that the Cotonou Agreement31 
identifies the sustainable development 
of the fisheries sector as being a prior-
ity for general economic development.

70 
In addition, in none of the countries 
visited was FPA sectoral support in-
cluded in a global matrix together with 
the other partners' funds intended for 
use in the fisheries sector. For exam-
ple in Mozambique, where different 
partners are funding similar actions, 
there is a risk of double financing, par-
ticularly with regard to participation 
in meetings and inspection activities. 
Although Mozambique does have 
a global matrix in place, it includes 
neither all the relevant partners nor 
sectoral support. This was also the 
case in Madagascar.

31  The Partnership Agreement 
between African, Pacific and 
Caribbean States and the 
European Union, 
Articles 23 and 23a, as revised 
on 11 March 2010.

Observations

33

The Commission’s control 
of sectoral support actions 
was limited and the actions 
actually implemented by 
the partner countries were 
in some cases different from 
those agreed

71 
For reassurance that the objectives 
of the sectoral support element of 
FPAs are being achieved and that EU 
funds are being used as intended, 
the Commission should monitor the 
effectiveness of the actions carried 
out and check whether they corre-
spond to those approved by the Joint 
Committee. This would also require 
the partner country to provide suf-
ficient information to enable the Joint 
Committee to assess the results and 
cost-effectiveness of the supported ac-
tions. The Commission has developed 
guidelines for the follow-up of sectoral 
support. These guidelines provide that 
the fisheries attaché is responsible for 
the on-the-spot checking of the imple-
mentation of actions, policy dialogue, 
monitoring other financial partner’s 
activities and maintaining a country 
file.

72 
In practical terms, the Commis-
sion monitors the implementation 
of agreed sectoral support actions 
through its participation in the annual 
Joint Committee. However, the audited 
protocols contained no requirements 
specifying which documentation the 
partner countries were to provide for 
monitoring purposes, nor did they 
establish procedures on how to deal 
with implementation problems within 
the Joint Committee. In the absence of 
specific monitoring rules and of con-
trol rights in the protocols, the task of 
monitoring sectoral support was com-
plicated. Furthermore, in practice, the 
fisheries attaché in the Indian Ocean 
does not have the necessary resources 
to carry out in-depth monitoring in 
five partner countries (i.e. on-the-spot 
visits to supported projects), particu-
larly in cases where cooperation with 
the authorities is complex.

73 
Apart from the difficulties caused by 
the lack of a comprehensive monitor-
ing framework, the Commission’s con-
trol of sectoral support expenditure 
was further hindered by the fact that 
the information provided by partner 
countries, aside from normally being 
limited to outputs, was not always 
verifiable. Indeed, most actions were 
not traceable in the budget, and the 
Commission had limited assurance 
that the claimed actions were actu-
ally undertaken and that the cost is 
reasonable.

Observations

34

75 
Furthermore, the audit found that the 
Commission paid insufficient atten-
tion to the partner countries difficul-
ties in absorbing the sectoral support 
funds, which affected three of the 
four audited protocols. Table 6 below 
shows the outstanding balance of the 
sectoral support budgets at the end 
of the four audited protocols. Despite 
the significance of the proportion 
of unspent funds, the Commission 
only became aware of the amount of 
funding left unused and of the ac-
tions to be implemented using these 
funds once the protocols were close 
to expiry. Such a scenario creates the 
risk that, especially towards the end of 
a protocol, the partner countries will 
spend the balance of the sectoral sup-
port on actions capable of absorbing 
a significant proportion of the unspent 
funds, but which are not in line with 
the FPA priorities of improving fisher-
ies governance, in order not to lose the 
available funds.

74 
The Court found that the Joint Com-
mittee did not systematically verify 
the cost-effectiveness of the sectoral 
support actions, as it did for the 2011-
2013 protocol with the Seychelles. In 
this particular case, a performance au-
dit was carried out to assess the secto-
ral support-funded actions implement-
ed in 2012, for which 8.45 million euro 
was budgeted. The audit concluded 
that only a few actions had been well 
executed (e.g. VMS), some were in 
progress (e.g. databases, studies, in-
frastructure projects for the industrial 
and semi-industrial fleet), and others 
had either an average completion rate 
of below 50 % (management plans, 
research studies) or had not been 
implemented at all (e.g. observers on 
board, sea communication equipment, 
artisanal infrastructures, etc.). The 
audit’s findings were discussed at the 
following Joint Committee meeting, 
together with the progress made in 
implementing the recommendations 
and further actions. In the case of Mo-
zambique, although a provision to as-
sess the value for money of EU-funded 
investments was introduced in the text 
of the 2012-2014 protocol, no evidence 
was found that this assessment had 
been carried out.

6 Outstanding balance of sectoral support at the end of the previous protocols, spent 
e
l
b
a
T

during the protocols in force at the time of the audit

Mauritania

Mozambique

Seychelles

Madagascar

Country

Outstanding balance at the end of the 
previous protocol (euro)

Proportion of balance corresponding 
to total sectoral support during the 
protocol

0

0 %

Source: Protocols, Joint Committees’ minutes and implementation report.

25 000 000

788 555

5 568 928

38 %

63 %

63 %

 
Observations

35

76 
In fact the audit found that, despite 
the relatively sound selection of ac-
tions, the funds were not fully used as 
intended in all the partner countries 
visited during the audit (as illustrated 
in Box 2). Instead, in some cases, the 

funds were used for other projects, 
which were not as relevant to fisheries 
management as the planned actions 
and which differed from the indicative 
types of action presented in the Com-
mission’s guidelines for the implemen-
tation of sectoral support.

2
x
o
B

Examples of sectoral support funds not traceable in the national budget or not 
used as agreed between the Commission and the partner countries

Madagascar

The traceability of funds in the national budget was not ensured, despite repeated requests from the Delega-
tion to provide a specific budget line for sectoral support. The fact that the EU contribution and funding from 
other development partners were not earmarked and identifiable in the national budget made the transfers 
difficult to monitor. This lack of traceability may also hinder the detection of funding overlaps with the re-
gional inspection programme.

The Commission suspended payments for 1 year (2011) due to implementation issues.

Mauritania

The country benefited from 65 million euro of sectoral support under the 2008-2012 protocol. From 2011 up 
until the end of the protocol in July 2012, the authorities failed to sufficiently inform the Commission on how 
they were using the sectoral support funds. Only in August 2012, after several requests from the Commis-
sion, did the partner country reveal that the unspent sectoral support allocations at the end of the protocol 
amounted to 25 million euro. Approximately 90 % of this balance was earmarked for infrastructure items such 
as port infrastructure, and a patrol vessel. Of this amount, approximately 50 % had been spent by the partner 
country without the ex ante agreement of the Commission.

Mozambique

The authorities assign project codes in the budget. However, these alone are not sufficient to mitigate the risk 
of funding overlap by the various financial partners for actions such as observers, inspection days, mission 
days for international meetings, etc.

The balance of sectoral support from a previous protocol (2007-2011) financed actions that were not included 
in the multiannual (2012-2014) or annual (2012) matrices and therefore not approved ex ante by the Joint Com-
mittee. The Commission did not suspend payments in this case. Infrastructure accounted for 84 % of the funds 
spent in 2012. The Commission was only informed once that the actions had been implemented. Expenditure 
was not always directly linked to the development of the Mozambican fisheries sector or to improvements in 
fisheries governance (ministry building accounting for 46 % of the balance for 2012 and fencing of the fisher-
ies school accounting for 38 %).

 
36

32  Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1380/2013 provides that 
sectoral support is conditional 
upon the achievement of 
specific results, and 
complementary to and 
consistent with the 
development projects and 
programmes implemented in 
the third country in question. 
Sectoral support should be 
decoupled from payments for 
access to fisheries resources. 
The Union requires the 
achievement of specific results 
as a condition for payments 
under the financial assistance, 
and closely monitors progress.

Observations

Payments made by the 
Commission for sectoral 
support were not linked 
to progress achieved by 
the partner countries in 
implementing agreed actions

77 
In order to ensure the application of 
the conditionality principle, the proto-
col should provide for the possibility of 
adjusting payments to reflect progress 
on actions or when there is no sound 
financial management in the partner 
country, rather than just suspending 
them.

78 
The audit found that the protocols 
did not provide for a reduction in the 
sectoral support component on the 
basis of the actual progress achieved 
by partner countries when implement-
ing the agreed actions.

79 
The Indian Ocean protocols audited 
provide that the sectoral support 
component can be suspended, after 
consultation in the Joint Committee, 
where the actions implemented are 
inconsistent with the budgeted pro-
gramme (actions and financial execu-
tion). This definition of conditionality 
makes it difficult for the Commission 
to appropriately apply the suspension 
of the sectoral support component. In 
fact, there has only been one actual 
case of suspension, in Madagascar in 
2011, and this was not linked to the 
country’s progress in implementing 
sectoral support.

80 
In Mauritania, the Commission im-
proved the conditionality of sectoral 
support for the 2013-2014 protocol by 
introducing more explicit conditions. 
In particular, the first payment under 
the protocol was made conditional on 
the absorption of the balance from the 
previous protocol, and the disburse-
ment of the sectoral support compo-
nent was linked to the implementation 
of the agreed actions. The Commission 
applied these provisions and did not 
pay the sectoral support component 
as the existing balance had not been 
fully spent. However, as for the Indian 
Ocean protocols, no partial disburse-
ments were possible.

81 
The new common fisheries policy has 
introduced the principle of decoupling 
access rights and sectoral support pay-
ments32. This means that the sectoral 
support component no longer has 
a fixed payment date as is the case 
with the access rights component, 
but should be paid once the partner 
countries are able to demonstrate the 
results achieved. The Court deems this 
to be an improvement on the earlier 
focus on actions. However, the appli-
cation of this principle is hindered by 
the fact that the protocols currently 
in force still do not provide for the 
possibility of partial reductions of pay-
ments when results are only partially 
achieved, but only for the possibility of 
the Commission suspending payments 
where the results are not satisfactory.

Observations

82 
The audit also found there to be a lack 
of consistency between the handling 
of FPA sectoral support (by the Com-
mission’s DG Maritime Affairs and Fish-
eries) and payments under the EDF for 
budget support (by DG International 
Cooperation and Development). Secto-
ral support (FPA) and budget support 
(EDF) share the same concept, since 
payments are disbursed directly to 
public authorities in the partner coun-
tries based on the progress achieved in 
a number of previously defined areas. 
In some cases, EDF payments were 
delayed by the Commission due to 
various problems linked to either the 
political situation or the management 
of public finances. A similar approach 
was not taken for sectoral support 
payments by DG Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries. Box 3 illustrates this incon-
sistency in the cases of Madagascar 
and Mozambique.

83 
The protocols do not include rules 
relating to budgetary transparency 
in the partner country, in contrast to 
the EU Budget Support Guidelines33. 
While Mozambique had laudably taken 
the initiative of identifying actions by 
project code in the budget, there was 
little traceability of funds in the other 
three countries visited, which affected 
the visibility of the support and the 
potential for subsequent monitor-
ing of the use of EU sectoral support 
funds. The fact that the protocols do 
not require the partner countries to 
ensure the traceability and transparen-
cy of funds is not consistent with the 
requirements for budget support for 
sectoral reforms under the Cotonou 
Agreement.

37

33  Budget support is subject to 
eligibility criteria (Section 5.1 
of Budget Support Guidelines, 
2012). Two of these are: 
—  good public financial 
management or a credible 
and relevant programme to 
improve it; 
—  transparency and 
oversight of the budget. 
Moreover, Article 61(2) of the 
Cotonou Agreement provides 
that: ‘Direct budgetary 
assistance in support of 
macroeconomic or sectoral 
reforms shall be granted 
where: […](c) public financial 
management is sufficiently 
transparent, accountable and 
effective.’

3
x
o
B

Inconsistencies between EU payments in partner countries

In Madagascar, almost all EU financial assistance was suspended from 2010 until May 2014, by virtue of Ar-
ticle 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, or pending appropriate measures as regards human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law. Payments under the FPA were, however, continued.

In Mozambique, one budget support payment was delayed by 7 months until the Government solved an issue 
affecting the transparency of national public finances, as requested by the International Monetary Fund/Gen-
eral Budget Support donors. However, FPA sectoral support payments were made during this period.

Source: ECA, based on information from DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and DG International Cooperation and Development.

 
Conclusions and 
recommendations

38

concerned for fishing authorisa-
tions while awaiting the signature of 
a renewed protocol. This regulatory 
possibility is, however, not consistent 
with another regulatory requirement, 
namely ‘the exclusivity clause’ and its 
application led to misunderstandings 
between a partner country and the 
Commission (paragraphs 22 and 23).

87 
The Commission’s strategy of enlarg-
ing the network of FPAs is relevant to 
the needs and priorities of the EU fleet. 
However, there is still room to improve 
the complementarity and consistency 
among the FPAs negotiated within 
the same region, so as to maximise 
the potential of FPAs to improve 
fisheries governance at regional level 
(paragraphs 26 to 28).

88 
One of the main objectives of the FPAs 
is to only fish surplus stocks. How-
ever, this has proven very difficult to 
implement in practice due to a lack 
of reliable information on fish stocks 
and on the fishing effort of domes-
tic fishing fleets, or of other foreign 
fleets which have also been granted 
access by the partner countries 
(paragraphs 29 to 32).

84 
Fisheries Partnership Agreements 
(FPAs) between the EU and its partner 
countries allow EU fishing fleets to 
fish in the partner countries’ waters, 
and support the sustainable develop-
ment of their national fisheries sector. 
The Court’s audit examined whether 
FPAs are well managed by the Com-
mission, looking into the negotia-
tion of FPAs and their protocols, the 
exercise of fishing access rights, and 
the implementation of support to 
the national fishing sector. The audit 
concluded that FPAs are generally 
well managed by the Commission, but 
that there are still several areas for 
improvement, particularly as regards 
implementation.

85 
Negotiating an FPA and its associated 
protocols is a long and complicated 
process, yet the Commission handled 
these difficulties well and, with few 
exceptions, managed to avoid inter-
rupting the EU fleet’s fishing activi-
ties. Nevertheless, the audit identified 
a number of weaknesses in the way 
the Commission handled the negotia-
tion process (paragraphs 17 to 25).

86 
For continuity of the European fleet’s 
activities, the Commission can make 
use of the possibility offered by Arti-
cle 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 
to allow vessels to apply through 
the Commission to the third country 

Conclusions and recommendations

39

89 
The actual unit cost paid for a tonne 
of fish was frequently higher than the 
unit price negotiated. While the nego-
tiations considered catches reported 
from previous protocols, the reference 
tonnage agreed in the most recent 
protocols often remained higher, lead-
ing to their regular underutilisation. 
However, the EU financial contribu-
tion must be paid in full regardless 
of the fishing opportunities used. 
The underuse of the protocols and 
resulting high costs were sometimes 
attributable to clauses negotiated with 
the partner countries to comply with 
their national legislation or to ensure 
the sustainability of fishing activities 
(paragraphs 33 to 46).

90 
The usefulness of independent ex post 
evaluations as an aid to decision-mak-
ing in the negotiation process is 
hindered by incomplete information 
being provided on the utilisation rates 
of the protocols, their lack of compa-
rability and the absence of a critical 
analysis of the effectiveness of FPAs 
(paragraphs 48 to 53).

Recommendation 1 
Negotiation of FPAs

For future protocols and agreements, 
the Commission should:

(a)  review dormant agreements 

and consider how to address the 
interruption of fishing activities 
imposed by the exclusivity clause 
while respecting the principles of 
the common fisheries policy. Fur-
thermore, the Commission should 
clarify and include in the protocols 
appropriate provisions to ensure 
the continuity of fishing opera-
tions between two protocols;

(b)  define regional strategies for the 
development of fisheries govern-
ance and ensure that protocols 
negotiated within the same region 
are consistent with the relevant 
regional strategy and with other 
EU funds;

(c)  when negotiating the fishing pos-

sibilities of new protocols, consider 
the utilisation rates of previous 
protocols, and endeavour to better 
link payments for access rights 
to actual catches, while ensuring 
that the fishing activities are not 
adversely affected;

(d)  better analyse the potential impact 
of SFPA clauses on the use of the 
protocol, while safeguarding the 
mutual benefits for the EU and 
the partner countries concerned, 
perhaps by consulting the relevant 
stakeholders to identify where 
more detailed assessments of criti-
cal clauses are necessary;

(e)  better focus ex post evaluations to 
obtain a consistent and compara-
ble analysis of the return on public 
money spent under the protocols 
as well as a comprehensive and 
critical analysis of their effective-
ness for the EU and the partner 
country concerned.

Conclusions and recommendations

40

91 
The audit also concluded that the 
management of the implementation of 
the access conditions and the sectoral 
support components was not suffi-
ciently robust.

92 
The licensing process is lengthy and 
cumbersome, and delays can compli-
cate or reduce the fleet’s fishing activi-
ties. However, the Commission does 
not have an information system to 
help it keep track of the various stages 
of the licence application process, 
which makes it more difficult to iden-
tify the reasons for delays and areas for 
improvement (paragraphs 55 to 60).

93 
Despite recent initiatives by the 
Commission, there were shortcom-
ings in the management of data on 
fish catches, with a lack of reliable, 
consistent and complete information 
(paragraphs 61 to 65).

Recommendation 2 
Management of access 
conditions to fisheries

The Commission should, without 
delay:

(a)  establish procedures to monitor 
each of the steps in the licensing 
process, including time taken by 
Member States, partner countries, 
and the Commission services, in 
order to identify and follow up on 
weaknesses in the procedure;

(b)  promote the acceptance of elec-

tronic licences or of a list of author-
ised vessels for the whole period 
of validity of the licences;

(c)  ensure that the new catch data-

base is fully used by flag Member 
States and provides reliable catch 
data which can be consolidated, 
monitored and kept up to date.

94 
The planning of actions funded by 
sectoral support has gradually im-
proved. However, the Commission’s 
role in monitoring the implementation 
of this component is still limited. There 
was a lack of a clear framework, with 
no eligibility and traceability rules or 
reporting requirements for the actions 
funded. As a result, cases were identi-
fied where partner countries imple-
mented different actions than those 
jointly planned with the Commission, 
which implied a subsequent risk for 
the effectiveness of the sectoral sup-
port component (paragraphs 66 to 76).

Conclusions and recommendations

41

95 
Finally, the protocols allow for the sus-
pension of sectoral support payments, 
but not for a reduction in payments on 
the basis of actual implementation of 
agreed actions or the results achieved. 
Moreover, the conditions for payment 
of sectoral support are different from 
those for EDF budget support, which 
can sometimes lead to inconsistencies 
(paragraphs 78 to 83).

Recommendation 3 
Management of sectoral 
support

The Commission should, without 
delay:

(a)  for new protocols, propose the 

introduction of eligibility require-
ments to assess actions being 
considered for sectoral support 
funding (other requirements could 
relate to traceability, selection, 
reporting and performance meas-
urement, and control rights for the 
Commission);

(b)  ensure effective coordination on 

the subject of FPA sectoral support 
with other development partners 
active in the fisheries sector;

(c)  ensure that sectoral support 

disbursements are consistent with 
other budget support payments 
and based on the results achieved 
by the partner countries in the 
implementation of the matrix of 
commonly agreed actions.

This report was adopted by Chamber I, headed by Mr Augustyn KUBIK, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 15 July 2015.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

 
 
 
Annexes

42

I
x
e
n
n
A

Fisheries Partnership Agreements: further information on their negotiation and 
implementation

1 

The flag state is the state 
where the vessel is registered.

Introduction

01 
In drawing up an FPA, the EU and its partner countries negotiate an agree-
ment and its implementing protocols. This agreement provides a framework 
for long-term cooperation in fisheries, including the general principles and 
standards governing access for EU vessels to fish in waters under the jurisdic-
tion of the partner countries. The protocols set out detailed terms and condi-
tions regarding, for example, fishing opportunities and species, the financial 
contribution (for both access and sectoral support), the level of fees to be 
paid by shipowners, the number and size of vessels authorised for fishing, 
and the specific areas in which they are allowed to fish.

Responsibilities

02 
FPAs are managed centrally by the Commission under direct management ar-
rangements. The Council delivers a mandate to the Commission, represented 
by DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, to open negotiations on behalf of the 
EU for each new agreement or protocol renewal. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the agreement and the protocol have to be concluded by the Council with 
the consent of the European Parliament. Once an agreement is in force, pro-
tocols are generally negotiated every 3 to 6 years, as agreed with the partner 
country.

03 
Responsibility for the day-to-day management of FPAs lies with the central 
offices of DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and the six fisheries attachés 
responsible for follow-up and regular communication with the partner 
countries.

04 
The partner countries are responsible for observing and enforcing conserva-
tion and management measures and for establishing effective mechanisms 
with which to monitor and check the activities of fishing vessels. The EU and 
Flag Member States1 are, however, responsible for exercising effective control 
over their vessels and ensuring that they fulfil all their obligations, particu-
larly in terms of collecting catch and VMS data.

 
Annexes

43

I
x
e
n
n
A

Negotiation of FPAs

05 
The negotiation process consists of various phases, but in order to ensure 
the continuity of fleet activities, the Commission has to start the process 
of negotiating a new protocol at the latest approximately 1 year before the 
expiry of the current one. Following a Commission initiative, a mandate is 
received from the Council, and one or more rounds of negotiations then take 
place between the Commission and the partner country. At the end of these 
negotiations, the agreement is initialled by the Commission and the partner 
country concerned, then approved and signed by the Council and the partner 
country. The protocol can then be applied provisionally, if the parties agree, 
before its formal ratification. The protocol is ratified by the partner country, 
and the European Parliament gives its consent to the conclusion of the proto-
col, which then enters into force.

Fishing authorisations

06 
Fishing Authorisation Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 requires the Commis-
sion to keep a licence database in which data is updated on a regular basis 
by the Member States, which are responsible for checking the eligibility of 
the licence applications submitted by the operators. These applications are 
subsequently forwarded to the Commission for verification. The Commission 
forwards the applications to the partner countries, via the Delegation. Once 
the partner country has issued the authorisation, the original document is 
sent back to the operator via the Delegation, the Commission and the Mem-
ber States.

The Joint Committees

07 
The agreements provide for the establishment of a Joint Committee to 
monitor the application of each FPA. Each Joint Committee is made up of 
representatives from the Commission and from the partner country con-
cerned, and is responsible for monitoring FPA performance, interpretation 
and application, establishing the annual and multiannual programmes for the 
sectoral support component and evaluating their implementation, liaising 
over matters of mutual interest in relation to fisheries, acting as a forum for 
the amicable settlement of any disputes regarding FPA interpretation or ap-
plication, and reassessing, where necessary, the level of fishing opportunities 
and, consequently, that of the financial contribution.

 
Annexes

44

I
x
e
n
n
A

The fisheries attaché

08 
The fisheries attaché represents DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in the 
partner countries and plays a direct role in monitoring the implementation of 
the protocols. The fisheries attaché contributes to the preparation of nego-
tiations and Joint Committee meetings, maintains contact with the national 
authorities, checks that the provisions of the protocols and sectoral support 
are properly implemented, reports to DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries on 
a regular basis, analyses documents and takes part in the RFMO’s scientific 
meetings, monitors the development of issues relating to DG Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries policy at international level, monitors the activities of other 
partners in the fisheries sector and prepares updated project files for all 
EU-funded projects.

2 

This fisheries attaché works at 
the Delegation in Mauritius 
and is responsible for the five 
agreements in the Indian 
Ocean (Comoros, 
Mozambique, Mauritius, 
Madagascar and Seychelles).

3  One is responsible for Cape 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal 
and Guinea-Bissau, another 
for Sao Tome and Principe and 
Gabon, another for Mauritania 
and the fourth for Morocco.

09 
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries currently has six fisheries attachés, one in 
the Indian Ocean region2, four in the West Africa (Central Atlantic) region3, 
and another with responsibility for the Pacific Ocean region and for Kiribati in 
particular.

Monitoring by the Member States

10 
The Member States monitor the activities of their fleets and the legality of 
such activities through their fisheries monitoring centres. They also follow 
up on their fleets’ catches through the ERS. The Member States send this 
catch data to the Commission together with the fishing area information 
provided by the VMS. In the case of the tuna protocols, the Member States’ 
scientific institutes validate the annual catches after the year-end in accord-
ance with their own scientific procedures. The annual consolidated catches 
are used for the final statement of fees discussed with the partner countries, 
for discussions on the utilisation of the FPA with the partner countries and for 
payments where the reference tonnage is exceeded, in accordance with the 
conditions of the protocol. The validated annual catches are also sent to the 
relevant RFMO, to fulfil the EU reporting requirements.

 
Annexes

45

I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Fisheries Partnership Agreements in force for 2015

0
0
4
3
t
s
e
W

-
p
m

i
r
h
S
5
1
3
4
t
s
a
E
-

t
u
b

i
l
a
H
d
n
a
l
n
e
e
r
G
0
0
5
2
t
s
e
W

-

t
u
b

i
l
a
H

d
n
a
l
n
e
e
r
G
0
0
0
2
h
s
fi
d
e
R

l
a
s
r
e
m
e
D
0
0
0
3
h
s
fi
d
e
R
c
i
g
a
l
e
P
0
0
2
2
d
o
C

t
s
a
E
-

t
u
b

i
l
a
h
c
i
t
n
a
l
t
A
0
0
2
t
s
e
W

-

t
u
b

i
l
a
h
c
i
t
n
a
l
t
A
0
0
5
7
t
s
a
E
-
p
m

i
r
h
S

3
0
2
4
0
1
5
1

1
4
0
3
4
7
2

4
4
2
7
4
8
7
1

5
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
1
3
-
3
1
0
2
.
1
.
1

r
e
i
d
a
n
e
r
G
0
0
1
t
s
e
W

-

.

p
p
s

r
e
i
d
a
n
e
r
G
0
5
2
b
a
r
c
w
o
n
S
0
0
0
0
6
n

i
l
e
p
a
C
0
0
2

0
0
1
t
s
a
E
-

.

p
p
s

y
l

n
o
y
t
i
c
a
p
a
c

l
a
b
o

l

i

g
g
n
h
s
fi
d
n
a
s
l
e
s
s
e
v
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

.
e
g
a
n
n
o
t
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
r
o
N

a
n
u
t
d
n
a
s
d
o
p
o

l
a
h
p
e
c

,
l
a
s
r
e
m
e
d

,

p
m

i
r
h
S

0
0
0
0
0
2
6

0
0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
0
2
9

7
1
0
2
.
1
1
.
3
2
-
4
1
0
2
.
1
1
.
4
2

e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
r
o
N

:
s
r
e
h
t
o
e
h
t

r
o
F
.
s
c
i
g
a
l
e
p
0
0
0
0
8
a
n
u
t
d
n
a
l
a
s
r
e
m
e
d

,
c
i
g
a
l
e
P

y
l

n
o
y
t
i
c
a
p
a
c
g
n
h
s
fi

i

l
l
a
r
e
v
o
d
n
a
s
l
e
s
s
e
v
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

.
e
g
a
n
n
o
t

0
0
0
0
0
0
6
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
4
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

8
1
0
2
.
7
.
4
1
-
4
1
0
2
.
7
.
5
1

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
5
7
9

0
5
7
.
5
1

0
5
2
6
6
8

0
0
5
5

0
0
5
7
5
3

0
0
0
0
5
3

0
0
0
0
0
7

0
0
5
2
0
3

0
0
0
5
2
3
1

0
5
2
6
6
5
1

0
0
0
0
6
6

5
1
0
2
.
9
.
5
1
-
2
1
0
2
.
9
.
6
1

8
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
1
3
-
5
1
0
2
.
1
.
1

7
1
0
2
.
1
.
7
2
-
4
1
0
2
.
1
.
8
2

s
l
e
s
s
e
v
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N
d
n
a
0
0
0
5

0
0
5
2
6
2

0
0
5
2
6
2

0
0
0
5
2
5

0
0
0
6

0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
5
6

0
0
5
2
2
4

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
0
9

0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
5
7
5
2

0
0
0
0
5
4

0
0
0
0
0
6

0
0
0
0
8
6

0
0
0
0
5
3
1

m
o
r
f
n
o

i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
a
l
a
n
o

i
s
i
v
o
r
P

4
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
3
2

8
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
2
2
-
4
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
3
2

7
1
0
2
.
1
.
1
-
4
1
0
2
.
1
.
1

8
1
0
2
.
6
.
0
3
-
3
1
0
2
.
7
.
1

6
1
0
2
.
7
.
3
2
-
3
1
0
2
.
7
.
4
2

0
0
0
8

0
0
0
0
2
5

0
0
0
7

0
0
0
5
8
3

0
0
0
4
1

0
0
0
8
8
9

0
0
0
0
6
4

0
0
0
5
2
3

0
0
0
0
5
7

0
0
0
0
5

3
3
3
3
8
5
2

3
3
3
3
3
5
2

0
0
0
0
8
9

0
0
0
0
1
7

0
0
0
8
3
7
1

6
6
6
6
1
1
5

6
8
2
4
6
8
5
4

4
7
8
3
3
4
6
2

0
6
1
8
9
2
2
7

5
1
0
2
.
1
.
1
3
-
2
1
0
2
.
2
.
1

8
1
0
2
.
5
.
2
2
-
4
1
0
2
.
5
.
3
2

9
1
0
2
.
1
1
.
9
1
-
4
1
0
2
.
1
1
.
0
2

0
2
0
2
.
1
.
7
1
-
4
1
0
2
.
1
.
8
1

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

t
n
e
m
e
e
r
g
a

d
e
x
i
M

t
n
e
m
e
e
r
g
a

d
e
x
i
M

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

t
n
e
m
e
e
r
g
a

d
e
x
i
M

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

a
n
u
T

1
e
d
r
e
V
e
p
a
C

e
r
i

o
v
I
’

d
e
t
ô
C

s
o
r
o
m
o
C

n
o
b
a
G

d
n
a
l
n
e
e
r
G

u
a
s
s
i
B
-
a
e
n
u
G

i

r
a
c
s
a
g
a
d
a
M

s
u

i
t
i
r
u
a
M

i
t
a
b

i
r
i

K

o
c
c
o
r
o
M

e
u
q

i

b
m
a
z
o
M

e
p

i
c
n

i
r
P
d
n
a
é
m
o
T
o
ã
S

1
s
e
l
l
e
h
c
y
e
S

1
l
a
g
e
n
e
S

s
t
n
e
m
y
a
p
l
a
u
n
n
a
l
a
t
o
T

i

)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
2
g
n
h
s
fi
b
a
r
C
)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
0
5
8
2
s
r
e
l
w
a
r
t

r
e
z
e
e
r
f

c
i
g
a
l
e
P

)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
0
5
1
s
l
e
s
s
e
v
c
i
g
a
l
e
p
r
e
z
e
e
r
f
-
n
o
N

r
e
z
e
e
r
F
)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
5
2
s
l
w
a
r
t
n
a
h
t

r
e
h
t
o
r
a
e
g
h
t
i

w
e
k
a
h
k
c
a
l

b
n
a
h
t

r
e
h
t
o

s
e
i
c
e
p
s

l
a
s
r
e
m
e
D
)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
0
4
e
k
a
h
k
c
a
l
B
)
a
t
o
u
q
(
0
0
0
5
s
n
a
e
c
a
t
s
u
r
C

0
0
0
0
1
s
r
e
n

i
l

g
n
o

l
e
c
a
f
r
u
s
d
n
a
s
l
e
s
s
e
v
a
n
u
t
e
n

i
l
-
d
n
a
-
e
l

o
P
0
0
0
5
a
n
u
t

0
0
0
0
0
0
7
6

0
0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7

4
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
5
1
-
2
1
0
2
.
2
1
.
6
1

t
n
e
m
e
e
r
g
a

d
e
x
i
M

2
a
i
n
a
t
i
r
u
a
M

r
a
e
y
-
4
s
i
h
T

.

5
1
0
2
y
l
u
J
0
1
n
o
d
e
d
u
l
c
n
o
c
y
l
l

u
f
s
s
e
c
c
u
s
e
r
e
w

l

o
c
o
t
o
r
p
w
e
n
a
f
o
t
n
e
m
h
s
i
l

b
a
t
s
e
e
h
t

f
o
w
e

i

v
n

i

i

a
n
a
t
i
r
u
a
M
d
n
a
n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C
n
a
e
p
o
r
u
E
e
h
t
n
e
e
w

t
e
b
s
n
o
i
t
a

i
t
o
g
e
N

0
0
0
8

0
0
0
0
2
5

0
0
0
0
6
4

0
0
0
0
8
9

5
1
0
2
.
1
.
1
3
-
2
1
0
2
.
2
.
1

a
n
u
T

e
u
q

i

b
m
a
z
o
M

.
s
t
n
e
m
y
a
p

l

a
u
n
n
a
e
h
t

f
o
e
g
a
r
e
v
a
n
a
s
a
d
e
t
a
u
c
l

l

a
c
n
e
e
b
s
a
h
s
t
h
g
i
r

s
s
e
c
c
a
e
h
t

r
o
f
n
o
i
t
u
b
i
r
t
n
o
c
l

a

i
c
n
a
n
fi
e
h
T

1

2

.
t
n
e
m
a

i
l
r
a
P
n
a
e
p
o
r
u
E
e
h
t

f
o
t
n
e
s
n
o
c
e
h
t
d
n
a

l
i
c
n
u
o
C
f
o

l

a
v
o
r
p
p
a
e
h
t

s
d
e
e
n

l
l
i
t
s

t
i

,
r
a
e
y
r
e
p
o
r
u
e
n
o

i
l
l
i

m
5
2
1
9
5
o
t

.

s
t
n
u
o
m
a

l

o
c
o
t
o
r
p

.

l

n
o
i
t
a
u
g
e
R
d
n
a
s
e

i
r
e
h
s
i
F
d
n
a
s
r
i

a
ff
A
e
m

i
t
i
r
a
M
G
D
e
t
i
s
b
e
W
e
c
r
u
o
S

:

d
e
y
a
l
e
d
e
r
e
w
s
n
o
i
t
a
i
t
o
g
e
n
h
c
i

h
w
h
t
i
w
s
e
i
r
t
n
u
o
c
h
t
i
w
s
l
o
c
o
t
o
r
p
t
s
a
L

)
n
T
(
e
g
a
n
n
o
t
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
R

s
s
e
c
c
A

t
h
g

i
r

)
o
r
u
e
(

l
a
r
o
t
c
e
S

t
r
o
p
p
u
s

)
o
r
u
e
(

U
E
l
a
t
o
T

n
o
i
t
u
b
i
r
t
n
o
c

)
o
r
u
e
(

d
o
i
r
e
P

s
e
i
c
e
p
S

y
r
t
n
u
o
C

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes

46

I
I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Fisheries Partnership Agreements

Greenland
18

Comoros
0.6

Seychelles
5

Micronesia
-

Solomon Islands

Kiribati

-

1.3

Morocco
30

Mauritania
-

Cape Verde
0.5

Senegal
1.8

Gambia
-

Guinea-Bissau

9

Côte d’Ivoire
0.7

São Tomé
and Principe
0.7

Equatorial
Guinea
-

Gabon

Mozambique

1.4

-

Madagascar
1.5

Mauritius
0.7

Mixed Agreement
Fisheries Partnership Agreement in force 
for 2015: 
Greenland, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco.

Tuna Agreement
Fisheries Partnership Agreement in force 
for 2015:
Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles.

and

Countries with agreements but no 
protocols in force:
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Mauritania1, 
Micronesia, Mozambique, Solomon 
Islands.

EU waters

Northern Agreements

Country

Type of
agreement

EU contribution for 
2015 in million euro

Country (dormant agreement)
Type of
agreement

-

1 Negotiations between the European 
Commission and Mauritania in view of the 
establishment of a new protocol were
successfully concluded on 10 July 2015. This 
four-year protocol amounts to 59.125 million 
euro per year, it still needs the approval of
Council and the consent of the European 
Parliament.

Source: Map based on Flanders Marine Institute, 2015. MarineRegions.org. Accessed at http://www.marineregions.org on 2015-04-20.

 
Reply of the  
Commission

47

Executive summary

I
Under the recent CFP Reform, Sustainable Fisher-
ies Partnership Agreements are primarily a tool 
for improving fisheries governance in the EEZ of 
coastal state partner countries based on the same 
principles as those applied in the EU. This is aimed 
to ensure the sustainable exploitation of resources, 
whilst at the same time supporting our partners’ 
capacity to develop its fishing sector.

The agreements are based on the best available 
scientific advice, are fully transparent and non-dis-
criminatory. These principles are embedded in the 
FPA protocols that have been recently negotiated. 
The protocols have been negotiated with the aim 
of maximising the value for money which is paid for 
access to the partners fishing areas and the provi-
sion of sectoral support.

Reply to paragraphs III and IV 
The negotiation of FPA protocols depends on 
a series of factors, many of which are outside the 
control of the Commission. There are rules to be fol-
lowed that involve other EU institutions, i.e. Council 
and Parliament. The overall time of the negotiation 
process is also highly dependent on the internal 
adoption procedures of the partner third country.

When interruptions occurred, they were generally 
of a short duration and did not impact on the fish-
ing activities of the EU fleet operations.

V
This transitional regime is based on Article 9 of 
the FAR Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 which 
would ensure continuity of fishing operations for 
a limited time period of 6 months, in a situation 
where a protocol has been agreed between the 
EU and its partner country, but the protocol is not 
yet being provisionally applied. Such transitional 
licences granted on a strictly voluntary basis by the 
partner country upon request from the Commis-
sion should still be considered as licences granted 
under the main agreement (albeit in the absence of 
a protocol) and thus not contrary to the exclusivity 
clause (unlike purely ‘private licences’ would be as 
explained by the Court in case C-565/13).

VI
Where applicable, this concept implies that man-
agement objectives, management measures and 
sharing keys established by the coastal State among 
the different stakeholders are clearly specified 
and well known, as is the case in the mixed Agree-
ments with Greenland, Morocco, Mauritania and 
Guinea-Bissau.

Regarding the Tuna Agreements the fishing 
opportunities are established on the basis of the 
management objectives and measures adopted 
by the appropriate regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs) mandated to carry out these 
tasks on a regional basis, and supported by RFMOs 
scientific work and advice.

VII
The Commission takes into account the level of 
utilisation of fishing opportunities in the past, the 
external factors that may have an impact on the 
uptake of the fishing opportunities depending on 
the availability and variability of catches. 

Catch reference levels fixed in ‘tuna FPAs proto-
cols’ — which are not catch limits — are based on 
previous reported catches of the EU fishing fleets. 
The reference tonnage agreed in the respective 
protocols, an essential prerequisite for our partners, 
provides the legal basis for the payment of the EU 
contribution for access. However such catch refer-
ence levels need also to take into account the high 
inter-annual variability of catches in the different 
areas, due to the variability of distribution and 
abundance of highly migratory species on a yearly 
basis. 

Concerning the link between a possible underutili-
sation of fishing possibilities and the implementa-
tion of more constraining technical conservation 
measures (TCMs), it has to be recalled that such 
TCMs are agreed between both parties to ensure 
a sustainable exploitation of the different stocks, 
to reduce the impact of fishing activities on marine 
ecosystems and to avoid conflicts between offshore 
foreign industrial fleets and coastal state inshore 
artisanal fishermen.

Reply of the Commission 

48

Technical conservation measures are in many cases, 
enshrined in the national legislation of the partner 
countries and are therefore non-negotiable. They 
have to be incorporated into the SFPA.

The principle of a payment in advance from the EU 
of the access contribution provides a stable income 
to the partner country, thus making SFPAs attractive 
governance tools.

VIII
The Commission was aware of the problems of 
comparability in the methodology applied by 
the independent consultants in undertaking the 
evaluations. Following an internal audit and on the 
basis of the guidelines resulting from this audit, the 
Commission has established a common template 
for the Terms of Reference for evaluations to be 
undertaken in the context of the SFPAs. A single 
and common methodology relating with the assess-
ment of economic impacts of FPAs has been agreed 
and implemented from early 2015. 

IX
The Commission has during the last years engaged 
in a process of redesigning its IT tools and has 
launched the so-called ‘IT Licence Project’ in early 
2013 that will record both the transmission and 
follow-up of authorisations, in a digital manner. 
The existing IT tools allow the Commission to 
better manage the procedures relating to fishing 
authorisation applications and deliveries, from the 
introduction of a complete demand by the Mem-
ber State till the delivery of an authorisation by the 
third country. 

X
The Commission has since 2011 been developing 
new data submission procedures and new data-
bases, particularly the so-called ‘DataWareHouse’, to 
allow a better and proper monitoring of all catches 
made by EU fishing vessels. This was available at the 
end of 2013 and became progressively operational 
through 2014 depending on the Member States’ 
capacity to implement the system. When specific 
issues are identified these are discussed with Mem-
ber States.

XI
The guidelines established by the Commission ser-
vices in 2013 and updated in 2014 for the monitor-
ing of the implementation of the sectoral support 
lay out the principles to be followed for the defini-
tion and monitoring of the sectoral support and 
specific rules regarding reporting requirements. 
This enables adjustments to the programme to be 
agreed by the Joint Committee.

These guidelines have been complemented in 
recent protocols through the introduction of spe-
cific provisions relating to the implementation and 
monitoring of the sector support.

They, inter alia, require the development and agree-
ment of a matrix of activities to be funded by the 
sectoral support which clearly identify the actions 
to be supported, targets and the results achieved.

The matrix is examined regularly by the Joint Com-
mittee and monitored by the fisheries attaché to 
ensure that matrix programme is being respected. 

XII
Following the new CFP adopted in 2013, including 
the decoupling of sectoral support payments from 
those relating to access rights, and the conditional-
ity relating to them, sector support payments are 
now directly linked to the performance and utilisa-
tion of the sectoral support. 

Sectoral support provided under the SFPAs is pro-
vided on the basis of a limited number of specific 
actions proposed by the partner country and not 
on a systemic approach as the EDF, which inter alia 
provides budgetary support. Furthermore, sectoral 
support is generally much lower than that provided 
under the EDF.

Provisions are foreseen for the revision of sectoral 
support in the Joint Committee for cases where the 
partner country requests the reallocation of funds 
within the programme with an appropriate justifi-
cation, or, if necessary, the suspension of sectoral 
payments until such time as satisfactory implemen-
tation of the sectoral support is achieved.

Reply of the Commission 

49

XIII (a)
The Commission accepts this recommendation. 

During the negotiations for the renewal of proto-
cols, the Commission actively promotes the use of 
electronic licences for EU vessels. 

XIII (b)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
has begun with its implementation.

XIII (c)
The Commission can accept this recommendation, 
the implementation of which is subject to negotia-
tions and agreement of both the EU and the third 
country concerned;

XIII (d)
The Commission can accept the recommendation, 
it has already commenced the consultation process 
with stakeholders.

XIII (e)
The Commission accepts this recommendation. 

A new methodology was presented to the Com-
mission in December 2014 and accepted in January 
2015. It will provide a common basis for the under-
taking of assessments of the economic impacts of 
the protocols, which will be undertaken in advance 
of future negotiations. Once this methodology has 
been systematically applied it will respond fully to 
the Court’s recommendations.

XIII (h)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation.

The Commission is in constant contact with Mem-
ber States in order to solve all technical issues.

XIII (i)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it has been partially implemented as 
it has established specific guidelines for the man-
agement and monitoring of sectoral support and 
subject to negotiations with the partner countries 
the Commission will take the necessary steps for 
the full implementation.

XIII (j)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it has been partially implemented.

The new CFP has made ‘consistency with other 
Union policies’ one of its principles of good govern-
ance (Article 3(h) of EU Regulation No 1380/2013. On 
that basis, fisheries aspects are increasingly main-
streamed into development policy.

XIII (f)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation.

The Commission has during the last years engaged 
in a process of redesigning its IT tools and has 
launched the so called ‘IT Licence Project’ to record 
both the transmission and follow-up of authorisa-
tions, in a digital manner. 

XIII (k)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is being partially implemented.

Disbursements are considered in the context of the 
Joint Committee of each FPA on an annual basis. If it 
has been seen and agreed by the Joint Committee 
that there has not been adequate utilisation of the 
funding provided, payment for the following years’ 
sectoral support contribution may be suspended.

XIII (g)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation. 

Reply of the Commission 

50

Observations

21
In the case of Mauritania, there has been no inter-
ruption of fishing activities between the 2008-
2012 and 2013-2014 protocols. 

22
In conformity with Article 9 of the FAR, the Mauri-
tanian authorities accepted to issue licences for the 
applications that were sent to them. Had EU ship-
owners requested licences to be issued for other 
fishing categories these may have been issued 
for these other fishing categories. However, no 
requests were received from the shipowners at that 
time. 

23
The solution negotiated with Mauritania in July 
2014 is a compromise to the issue of the expiration 
date and it has been accepted by the Commission 
with the consent of Member States concerned. 

24
The possibility of providing compensation for the 
interruption of fishing activities stems from the EFF 
(European Fisheries Fund) regulation. These com-
pensatory amounts are already budgeted for in the 
EU budget, therefore there would be no additional 
expenditure for the EU.

28
The new CFP has made ‘consistency with other 
Union policies’ one of its principles of good govern-
ance (Article 3(h) of EU Regulation No 1380/2013. 

Enhanced cooperation with DG DEVCO, both at 
senior management and desk level, will ensure that 
there is efficient use of the financial support pro-
vided by the EU, either through SFPAs or EDF, and 
by other donors. 

The EU sectoral support is provided inter alia 
to assist in improving governance at a national 
level, whereas the funding provided to the IOC at 
a regional level from the EDF is aimed at further 
developing regional cooperation. The fisheries 
attaché in the EU Delegation in situ, in his regular 
contacts with the IOC, also contributes to ensuring 
complementarity of actions financed.

31
Through FPAs and more particularly through sec-
toral support, the EU also seeks to enhance a col-
laborative scientific process on stocks, fisheries and 
management measures assessments between EU 
and partner countries’ scientists through Joint Sci-
entific Committees in mixed SFPAs and also support 
the participation of partner countries’ scientists and 
managers to RFMO meetings in the context of tuna 
SFPAs.

For tuna agreements, the protocols should grant 
access rights only if they are in line with manage-
ment principles expressed in Unclos. The Com-
mission should therefore ensure that the FPAs 
reflect the resolutions and recommendations of 
the regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs) on the state of fish stocks.

For mixed agreements, the Joint Scientific Commit-
tee reviews regularly all relevant and available infor-
mation on catches, effort and stock status of the 
fisheries relating to the respective SFPA protocols.

According to Article 61 of Unclos, even if a coastal 
state determines the surplus, the EU and the flag 
state also bear responsibility that there is no over-
fishing. For this reason, the EU aims at obtaining full 
transparency on fishing opportunities and man-
agement objectives. The concept of surplus does 
not however mean that a management framework 
based on catch limits has to be adopted. Fishing 
mortality rates may be indeed constrained through 
other types of measures, such as capacity limits, 
effort limits, etc. 

Reply of the Commission 

51

32
Fishing mortality is limited by the capacity limits 
that have been set on the basis of the fleet develop-
ment plans of the parties to IOTC and the capac-
ity levels relating to the EU are respected in the 
protocols. 

Reply to paragraphs 33‑34
In all recent negotiations, the issues of sound 
financial management and value for money played 
a major part in the development of the negotia-
tions. This is reflected in the restructuring of the 
financial component which now sees the industry 
taking a greater share of the financial burden of 
access payments away from the EU.

39
Information provided in the evaluation also shows 
that the direct added value for all the beneficiaries 
has only slightly decreased in the 2013-2014 proto-
col compared to the previous protocol (from 0,86 to 
0,8) with a rebalancing of the benefit of the added 
value in favour of Mauritania.

This should also be conditioned by the fact that the 
evaluation covered a period of only 11 months out 
of the protocol duration of 2 years, which coincided 
with period of low utilisation. In addition the high 
volatility in the market prices for small pelagics 
should also be noted, which clearly has an influence 
on the value added estimates. For these reasons, 
the conclusions of the evaluation should be treated 
with caution.

40
Negotiations with Mauritania for a successor proto-
col have been suspended for that reason. 

41
During the negotiations with Mozambique for the 
new protocol, these technical conditions were 
accepted by the Member States considering the 
fact that the Commission even obtained a deroga-
tion from national legislation (1/3 of the fleet to 
be inspected instead of the totality) with a view to 
maximise the utilisation of the protocol. 

46
SFPAs and EDF budget support are different by 
nature and are negotiated separately. The calendar 
for negotiations of EDF and SFPA support indeed 
rarely coincide. EDF programming is discussed 
every 7 years while SFPAs had an average duration 
of 3-4 years. 

Therefore, the Commission considers that this does 
not affect the Commission’s position during SFPA 
negotiation. 

Overall, there is coherence and consistency in 
the approaches taken in respect of our partner 
countries. 

49
The Commission relies on data provided by Member 
States as required by EU legislation. Discrepancies 
which may occur will be resolved through the new 
centralised catch reporting system which allows 
for continuous follow-up. Data availability will be 
improved comparing the reported catches with the 
set reference tonnage from the protocol on a con-
stant basis. 

50
The short duration of the protocol prior to the 
reform of the CFP was to allow for the transition to 
the implementation of the new CFP. Now this has 
entered into force, protocols with a longer duration, 
on average for 4 to 5 years, will be sought. 

Reply of the Commission 

52

52
Given that the objectives of the CFP as regards the 
FPAs do not envisage their impact on EU regions 
nor the supply of fish to the EU market, it would not 
be expected to have an evaluation of these aspects.

In early 2015 the consultants engaged by the Com-
mission to undertake SFPA evaluations have devel-
oped and agreed with the Commission services 
a common, homogenous method for the assess-
ment of economic impacts in the context of the 
SFPAs.

57
The verification procedure by the Commission fully 
respects the provision of the applicable protocol. 

The Commission is currently creating a new sys-
tem which will record both the transmission and 
follow-up of authorisations, all in a digital manner 
(LICENCE project) and allow the Commission to 
better manage parts of the procedures relating with 
fishing authorisation applications and deliveries, 
from the introduction of a complete demand by the 
Member States till the delivery of an authorisation 
by the third country.

58
The form of transmission of authorisations requests 
is highly dependent on the specific provisions in 
the national legislation of the partner country as 
well as their respective human and administrative 
capacity. 

59
For Mauritania, the EU Delegation is closely moni-
toring the licencing procedure and is in constant 
contact with the competent services of Mauritania 
to ensure that delays are minimised. Moreover, the 
process is facilitated by the existence of agents that 
represent ship owners with local authorities. 

60
The current IT system only allows the Commission 
to track a fishing authorisation application once 
sent complete by the relevant flag state. The goal 
of the project initiated in early 2013 to improve the 
process, called ‘IT Licence Project’ will enable better 
monitoring of the procedures associated to fishing 
authorisations applications and deliveries. In the 
meantime, the Commission is currently reviewing all 
its internal procedures.

62
The reporting provisions in the relevant EU legisla-
tion are respected and the Commission maintains 
appropriate records. Moreover, it is in the process of 
developing the necessary IT tools for the creation of 
the catch database.

63
The Commission has since 2011 been developing 
new data submission procedures and new data-
bases, particularly the so-called ‘DataWareHouse’, to 
allow a better and proper monitoring of all catches 
made by EU fishing vessels. This was available at the 
end of 2013 and became progressively operational 
through 2014 depending on the Member States 
capacity to implement the system. When specific 
issues are identified these are discussed with Mem-
ber States.

65
The Commission has already identified this issue 
and is currently working with Member States, EU 
fisheries research institutes and third countries to 
agree on common and shared methodologies to 
assess catches made in waters covered by FPAs.

Although there may have been a potential risk in 
incurring additional expenditure for the EU, how-
ever, this was not the case for the Indian Ocean 
where the catches did not exceed the reference 
tonnage in any of the agreements under review by 
the Court except for MDG in 2005 and 2007. 

Reply of the Commission 

53

68
Please see the reply to Point XI of the Executive 
Summary.

69
When possible in countries where several donors 
are active, the EU has set up coordination meet-
ings with other development players (cf. Mauritania 
and more recently in Mozambique). The fisheries 
attaché participates in the coordination meet-
ings. There is active liaison between the different 
sections of the Delegation involved in cooperation 
development. 

The choice of EU priorities is reflected in the coordi-
nation meetings with other donors. 

70
The Delegation in Mozambique participates in 
sector donor coordination meetings organised by 
the Ministry and the Delegation is represented as 
a major donor in the sector. Moreover, the fisheries 
authorities prepare a plan of activities in accord-
ance with national rules and relating to the trans-
parency of activities funded by different donors and 
the EU. The Commission considers that there is no 
risk of double funding.

72
Please also refer to the reply to the Executive Sum-
mary Point XI. 

73
The Commission aims to have the sectoral sup-
port contribution clearly referred to in the national 
budget, but this depends on the national financial 
legislation of the partner country.

It is the view of the Commission that the sectoral 
support provided is traceable in the respective 
matrices of the partner countries. 

The Commission has also to rely on the fact that 
the actions undertaken by the partner country to 
implement the respective matrix regarding the 
sectoral support implementation is usually subject 
to the relevant national rules relating to tendering 
and procurement.

74
The Joint Committees under the protocols monitor 
the implementation of the sectoral support includ-
ing where available the cost-effectiveness.

As regards Mozambique, in addition to the regular 
monitoring in the Joint Committee, the final assess-
ment of the implementation of the sectoral support 
provided under the 2012-2014 protocol has yet to be 
undertaken. Mozambique is currently in the process 
of preparing the documentation for this assessment 
and a Joint Committee is to be organised to review 
progress. 

75
Please see the reply to Point XII of the Executive 
Summary.

For Mauritania, the level of utilisation was affected 
by the difficult political context at the beginning 
of the period 2008-2012. Furthermore, sectorial 
support in the 2013-2014 protocol was reduced to 
3 M€/year at the explicit request of the Mauritanian 
authorities: this was not the Commission’s initial 
objective and not a direct response to the lack of 
transparency from the Mauritanian partner. 

Reply of the Commission 

54

The absorption capacity is closely monitored in 
each Joint Committee meeting systematically 
assessing and commenting on the utilisation rate of 
the funds with significant improvements in the case 
of the Seychelles and Mozambique compared with 
the previous protocols.

76
The utilisation of the sectoral support provided to 
partner countries is determined on a case-by-case 
approach, on the basis of how the partner country 
wishes to use this support in relation to its national 
fisheries policy development.

Box 2 — Madagascar
The EU funds are fungible at the level of the pub-
lic treasury like any other government source of 
income. 

Box 2 — Mauritania 
The amount of 25 M€ of unspent sectoral support 
allocations is the result of a joint review. In March 
2013, Mauritania sent a report to the EU where it 
indicated that the remaining funds amounted 13 M€ 
at this date. But this figure was not jointly acknowl-
edged since Mauritania did not fully justify the basis 
for its calculation.

Box 2 — Mozambique
In its meeting in June 2012 the Joint Committee 
agreed to amend the programme ex post as noted 
in the attached annexes to the report and that addi-
tional infrastructure projects which were foreseen 
in the overall framework of actions agreed and had 
been included in the national budgetary exercise. 

78
Please see the reply to Point XII of the Executive 
Summary.

Governance of the sectoral support has been 
improved following the reformed CFP which decou-
ples sectoral support financing from access pay-
ments, and increased monitoring and application of 
conditionality in the Joint Committee process.

Please see the reply to Point XII of the Executive 
Summary.

80
Disbursements are considered and reviewed 
regularly in the context of the Joint Committee of 
each FPA on an annual basis. If it has been seen 
and agreed by the Joint Committee that there 
has not been adequate utilisation of the funding 
provided, payment for the following years’ sectoral 
support contribution may be suspended pending 
improvement in the utilisation of the funds. This 
was particularly the case regarding the Seychelles, 
Mozambique and the Comoros.

81
If there have been no or limited results achieved on 
a priority action/projects payment of the sectoral 
support in the following year will be suspended 
until the targets have been met.

This has to be seen in the context that actions are 
in the main not limited in duration to the finan-
cial year in question, but may be of a multiannual 
nature. 

82
Although the concepts are the same, the objectives 
significantly differ due to the different scope and 
scale of the support and its management.

Reply of the Commission 

55

However, there is improved coherence and con-
sistency in the implementation of these policies 
between the services of the Commission relating 
to the use of and disbursement of sectoral support. 
This is applied on the basis of targeted, identifiable 
actions with clear achievement indicators against 
which performance can be measured. 

Sectoral support programmes are developed and 
based on the needs of the partner country and are 
discussed in the Joint Committee by both parties 
and the final programme of activities is a result of 
this consultative process.

Box 3 — Madagascar
In Madagascar, payments under the SFPA continued 
after the decision that Madagascar would not be 
eligible any more to budget support. This decision 
was taken in full coordination between the relevant 
services of the EU institutions as payments were 
clearly targeted to fisheries administration and were 
contributing to safeguard employment and growth 
in the fisheries sector, as well as food security in the 
country, in the context of the political crisis. 

Box 3 — Mozambique
Although budget support was delayed, this had no 
link to the payment of sectoral support as there was 
no direct implication on the implementation of the 
agreed specific sectoral support work programme. 
This, therefore, recognises the distinct nature of the 
two support regimes.

The Commission believes that greater coherence 
between the development and fisheries policies 
does not necessarily mean an identical approach 
as regards payments of funds under the respective 
policies, as they are each governed by specific legal 
instruments, with the respective conditions to be 
respected.

83
Please refer to the reply to Point XI of the Executive 
Summary.

The Commission endeavours to have sectoral sup-
port contributions included in the Loi de Finance of 
the partner countries in order to ensure transpar-
ency of the funds. 

Conclusions and recommendations

85
The negotiation of FPA protocols depends on 
a series of factors, many of which are outside the 
control of the Commission. There are rules to be fol-
lowed that involve other EU institutions, i.e. Council 
and Parliament. The overall time of the negotiation 
process is also highly dependent on the internal 
adoption procedures of the partner third country.

86
This transitional regime is based on Article 9 of 
the FAR Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 which 
would ensure continuity of fishing operations for 
a limited time period of 6 months, in a situation 
where a protocol has been agreed between the 
EU and its partner country, but the protocol is not 
yet being provisionally applied. Such transitional 
licences granted on a strictly voluntary basis by the 
partner country upon request from the Commis-
sion should still be considered as licences granted 
under the main agreement (albeit in the absence of 
a protocol) and thus not contrary to the exclusivity 
clause (unlike purely ‘private licences’ would be as 
explained by the Court in case C-565/13).

87
As far as the ‘tuna’ agreements are concerned, 
this approach is already followed, especially in the 
Indian Ocean where the fisheries exist with partner 
countries that mirror the migratory route of the 
tuna. As regards the ‘mixed’ agreements, this would 
be more difficult to achieve given the different 
fisheries concerned.

Reply of the Commission 

56

88
Where applicable, this concept implies that man-
agement objectives, management measures and 
sharing keys established by the coastal state among 
the different stakeholders are clearly specified 
and well known, as is the case in the mixed Agree-
ments with Greenland, Morocco, Mauritania and 
Guinea-Bissau.

Regarding the tuna agreements the fishing oppor-
tunities are established on the basis of the man-
agement objectives and measures adopted by 
the appropriate regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs) mandated to carry out these 
tasks on a regional basis, and supported by RFMOs 
scientific work and advice.

89
The Commission takes into account the level of 
utilisation of fishing opportunities in the past, the 
external factors that may have an impact on the 
uptake of the fishing opportunities depending on 
the availability and variability of catches. 

Catch reference levels fixed in ‘tuna FPAs proto-
cols’ — which are not catch limits — are based on 
previous reported catches of the EU fishing fleets. 
The reference tonnage agreed in the respective 
protocols, an essential prerequisite for our partners, 
provides the legal basis for the payment of the EU 
contribution for access. However such catch refer-
ence levels need also to take into account the high 
inter-annual variability of catches in the different 
areas, due to the variability of distribution and 
abundance of highly migratory species on a yearly 
basis. 

Concerning the link between a possible underutili-
sation of fishing possibilities and the implementa-
tion of more constraining technical conservation 
measures (TCMs), it has to be recalled that such 
TCMs are agreed between both parties to ensure 
a sustainable exploitation of the different stocks, 
to reduce the impact of fishing activities on marine 
ecosystems and to avoid conflicts between offshore 
foreign industrial fleets and coastal state inshore 
artisanal fishermen.

Technical conservation measures are in many cases, 
enshrined in the national legislation of the partner 
countries and are therefore non-negotiable. They 
have to be incorporated into the SFPA.

The principle of a payment in advance from the EU 
of the access contribution provides a stable income 
to the partner country, thus making SFPAs attractive 
governance tools.

90
The Commission was aware of the problems of 
comparability in the methodology applied by 
the independent consultants in undertaking the 
evaluations. Following an internal audit and on the 
basis of the guidelines resulting from this audit, the 
Commission has established a common template 
for the Terms of Reference for evaluations to be 
undertaken in the context of the SFPAs. A single 
and common methodology relating with the assess-
ment of economic impacts of FPAs has been agreed 
and implemented from early 2015. 

Recommendation 1 (a)
The Commission accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 1 (b)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
has begun with its implementation. 

Recommendation 1 (c)
The Commission accepts this recommendation, the 
implementation of which is subject to negotiations 
and agreement of both the EU and the third country 
concerned.

Recommendation 1 (d)
The Commission accepts this recommendation, it 
has already commenced the consultation process 
with stakeholders.

Reply of the Commission 

57

Recommendation 1 (e)
The Commission accepts this recommendation.

A new methodology was presented to the Com-
mission in December 2014 and accepted in January 
2015. It will provide a common basis for the under-
taking of assessments of the economic impacts of 
the protocols, which will be undertaken in advance 
of future negotiations. Once this methodology has 
been systematically applied it will respond fully to 
the Court’s recommendations. 

92
The Commission has during the last years engaged 
in a process of redesigning its IT tools and has 
launched the so called ‘IT Licence Project’ in early 
2013 that will record both the transmission and 
follow-up of authorisations, in a digital manner. 
The existing IT tools allow the Commission to 
better manage the procedures relating to fishing 
authorisation applications and deliveries, from the 
introduction of a complete demand by the Mem-
ber State till the delivery of an authorisation by the 
third country. 

93
The Commission has since 2011 been developing 
new data submission procedures and new data-
bases, particularly the so-called ‘DataWareHouse’, to 
allow a better and proper monitoring of all catches 
made by EU fishing vessels. This was available at the 
end of 2013 and became progressively operational 
through 2014 depending on the Member States 
capacity to implement the system. When specific 
issues are identified these are discussed with Mem-
ber States.

Recommendation 2 (a)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation.

The Commission has during the last years engaged 
in a process of redesigning its IT tools and has 
launched the so called ‘IT Licence Project’ to record 
both the transmission and follow-up of authorisa-
tions, in a digital manner. 

Recommendation 2 (b)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation. 

During the negotiations for the renewal of proto-
cols, the Commission actively promotes the use of 
electronic licences for EU vessels. 

Recommendation 2 (c)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is already taking the necessary 
steps to rectify this situation.

The Commission is in constant contact with Mem-
ber States in order to solve all technical issues.

94
The guidelines established by the Commission ser-
vices in 2013 and updated in 2014 for the monitor-
ing of the implementation of the sectoral support 
lay out the principles to be followed for the defini-
tion and monitoring of the sectoral support and 
specific rules regarding reporting requirements. 
This enables adjustments to the programme to be 
agreed by the Joint Committee.

These guidelines have been complemented in 
recent protocols through the introduction of spe-
cific provisions relating to the implementation and 
monitoring of the sector support.

They, inter alia require the development and agree-
ment of a matrix of activities to be funded by the 
sectoral support which clearly identify the actions 
to be supported, targets and the results achieved.

Reply of the Commission 

58

The matrix is examined regularly by the Joint Com-
mittee and monitored by the fisheries attaché to 
ensure that matrix programme is being respected.

Recommendation 3 (c)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it is being partially implemented.

Disbursements are considered in the context of the 
Joint Committee of each FPA on an annual basis. If it 
has been seen and agreed by the Joint Committee 
that there has not been adequate utilisation of the 
funding provided, payment for the following years’ 
sectoral support contribution may be suspended.

Reply to table 4
For Mozambique subsequent verification by the 
Commission led to a correction of the figures. 
The current information held by the Commission 
indicates that the catches were 2330t, which closely 
reflects the quantity reported by Spain and France 
for the same year (2326t).

95
Following the new CFP adopted in 2013, including 
the decoupling of sectoral support payments from 
those relating to access rights, and the condition-
ality relating to these payments, are now directly 
linked to the performance and utilisation of the 
sectoral support. 

Sectoral support provided under the SFPAs is pro-
vided on the basis of a limited number of specific 
actions proposed by the partner country and not 
on a systemic approach as the EDF, which inter alia 
provides budgetary support. Furthermore, sectoral 
support is generally much lower than that provided 
under the EDF.

Provisions are foreseen for the revision of sectoral 
support in the Joint Committee for cases where the 
partner country requests the reallocation of funds 
within the programme with an appropriate justifi-
cation, or, if necessary, the suspension of sectoral 
payments until such time as satisfactory implemen-
tation of the sectoral support is achieved.

Recommendation 3 (a)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it has been partially implemented as 
it has established specific guidelines for the man-
agement and monitoring of sectoral support and 
subject to negotiations with the partner countries 
the Commission will take the necessary steps for 
the full implementation. 

Recommendation 3 (b)
The Commission accepts this recommendation and 
considers that it has been partially implemented.

The new CFP has made ‘consistency with other 
Union policies’ one of its principles of good govern-
ance (Article 3(h) of EU Regulation No 1380/2013. On 
that basis, fisheries aspects are increasingly main-
streamed into development policy. 

HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

Free publications:

• 

• 

one copy: 
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);

 more than one copy or posters/maps: 
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or 
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).

(*) 

The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

Priced publications:

• 

via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).

 
The European Union (EU) negotiates agreements with 
coastal countries to obtain fishing rights for EU vessels and 
to support the governance and sustainable development of 
the local fishing sector. The Court found that these 
agreements were generally well managed by the European 
Commission, but that some improvements were needed. 
The quantities of fish negotiated with the coastal countries 
regularly exceeded the actual use made by the EU fleet, 
making the agreements relatively more costly than 
expected for the EU. The monitoring of catch data and the 
licencing process was not sufficiently robust, and the 
support provided for the sustainable development of the 
local fisheries sectors needed clearer eligibility conditions, 
and better coordination and consistency with other EU 
development support.

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS