COP21 en route to Paris : the state of play.
Date: 2015-07-08
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: adaptation to climate change, climate change, climate change policy, environmental policy, international agreement

34

2 0 1 5

I
S
A
H
A
R
S
I
N
/
S
I

P
A

COP21 en route to Paris: the state of play
by Balazs Ujvari 

The  21st  Conference  of  Parties  (COP21)  for 
the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) – to be held in Paris 
at the end of this year – is widely hoped to bring 
about a new long-term global regime on climate 
change. While climate negotiations are still about 
preserving the environment and minimising eco-
nomic losses while doing so, their modus operandi 
has  changed  over  the  years.  Long  gone  are  the 
days  of  Kyoto-style  agreements  seeking  to  bring 
all UNFCCC parties under a set of legally bind-
ing national targets. Since COP15 in Copenhagen 
(2009), where efforts to extend the Kyoto Protocol 
beyond 2012 resulted in definitive failure, the tone 
of climate negotiations has profoundly changed. 

Although the Copenhagen Accord proved short-
lived,  COP15  did  serve  as  a  stepping  stone  to 
an  overhaul  of  the  UNFCCC  process  launched 
at COP17 in Durban (2011). At this conference, 
parties  converged  on  three  key  points.  First,  it 
was decided that a new set of negotiations would 
be  launched  in  order  to  develop  a  new  regime 
with legal force by autumn 2015 in Paris; to that 
end, an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform  for  Enhanced  Action  (ADP)  was  estab-
lished  and  mandated  to  produce  this  new  con-
vention. 

Second, largely due to the insistence of develop-
ing countries, parties were called to make nation-
al voluntary ‘contributions’, rather than ‘commit-
ments’, to the fight against climate change. 

Third,  a  two-step  process  was  agreed  upon,  ac-
cording to which nations were to reveal their in-
tended contributions by 31 March 2015, leaving 
time for a scientific assessment of whether such ef-
forts would suffice to realise the overarching goal: 
holding global temperature rise ‘below 2°C or 1.5 
°C above pre-industrial levels’.

Climate diplomacy 

The rules of the game have therefore changed. But 
how  are  the  negotiations  unfolding  in  practical 
terms? And are the parties still on track to clinch a 
deal this December in Paris?

The  17th  meeting  of  the  ADP,  the  latest  staging 
post  on  the  way  to  COP21,  concluded  last  June 
in Bonn by adopting a last-minute deal on a pain-
fully negotiated 83-page draft text for COP21. As 
drafting by 195 national authors proved virtually 
unmanageable,  delegates  authorised  the  two  co-
chairs (Algeria and the US) to make their own al-
terations  to  the  text  with  a  view  to  meeting  the 
deadline  of  24  July  set  for  submitting  a  stream-
lined draft of the Paris convention to the UNFCCC 
secretariat. 

Yet unresolved issues abound: most notably, a key 
disagreement remains between China and the US 
over whether developing countries should benefit 
from differentiated treatment. The informal min-
isterial  meeting  to  be  hosted  by  French  Foreign 
Minister  Laurent  Fabius  on  21  July  in  Paris  will 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

July 2015

1

 
 
thus be an opportunity to gather key emitters and 
address  sticking  points  so  that  delegates  can  en-
gage in concrete bargaining during the next ADP 
session at the end of August. 

Despite the progress made in the negotiations, only 
44  countries  –  34  of  which  ahead  of  the  March 
31  target  –  have  hitherto  filed  greenhouse-gas 
pledges.  As  the  overwhelming  majority  of  these 
submissions  stem  from  developed  nations,  their 
aggregated emissions account for merely 54.7% of 
that of the entire globe – a figure that will drasti-
cally increase this coming autumn when other de-
veloping countries with the largest emission rates 
are due to reveal their contributions.     

Back to BASICs?

If the tone and language of UNFCCC negotiations 
has  considerably  changed  since  the  first  COP  in 
Berlin in 1995, one thing has remained the same: 
the  central  importance  of  negotiating  blocs.  The 
first bloc to determine its contribution to COP21 
was the EU: a binding, economy-wide, domestic 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  reduction  target  of  at 
least 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. 

Another major bloc in the process is the BASICs, 
formed  at  the  2009  Copenhagen  conference,  in-
cluding the world’s first- and third-largest green-
house  gas  emitters  –  China  and  India  –  togeth-
er  with  Brazil  and  South  Africa.  In  spite  of  their 
widely  differing  interests,  the  members  of  the 
group have successfully prolonged their coopera-
tion  on  climate  change.  As  a  result,  the  Chinese 
delegate, for example, acted as a spokesperson for 
the  BASICs  when  opening  speeches  were  deliv-
ered in Durban (COP17). 

Although their submissions – due by this autumn 
– will likely differ, it is expected that the BASICs 
will again present a united front during the sum-
mit in an attempt to ensure that the final outcome 
fits their own vision of multilateralism. The only 
BASIC country to have made a carbon pledge thus 
far is China, which is aiming to lower carbon di-
oxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% 
from the 2005 level. It remains to be seen wheth-
er  the  BASICs  can  turn  into  BRICS  by  bringing 
Russia  on  board.  Moscow,  however,  has  taken  a 
major step backwards with regard to its previous 
commitments,  offering  to  cut  emissions  to  just 
75% of 1990 levels by 2030. 

By contrast, the US, the second-biggest carbon di-
oxide  emitting  nation,  has  committed  to  reduce 
CO2 emissions by 26%-28% by 2025 – the most 
ambitious  pledge  that  can  be  met  without  new 

climate  laws  being  passed  by  Congress.  Canada 
has recently followed suit by setting a 30% reduc-
tion target below 2005 levels by 2030. For their 
part, Japan (whose contribution will largely hinge 
on its success in reintegrating nuclear power into 
its energy mix) and Australia (where emission cuts 
are  complicated  by  the  abundance  of  natural  re-
sources) are yet to declare their contributions. 

Outstanding issues

In order for COP21 to culminate in a robust global 
climate deal, at least three conditions will have to 
be met. First and foremost, it will be necessary for 
the parties to eventually converge on the form and 
content of their contributions: this promises to be 
a  rather  daunting  task  in  the  light  of  the  broad 
variety of proposals circulating thus far, involving 
quantitative  reductions,  mitigation  actions,  ad-
aptation  efforts,  financial  aid,  capacity  building, 
technology  transfer  and  research  and  develop-
ment (R&D) efforts. 

Second,  and  closely  related,  is  the  need  to  agree 
on  an  accounting  period,  as  well  as  a  base  year 
against  which  to  measure  the  implementation  of 
the  contributions  made.  Lastly,  once  the  above 
conditions  are  fulfilled,  a  compromise  will  have 
to  be  found  on  the  potentially  most  contentious 
issue, and not only between developed and devel-
oping countries: the legal form of the agreement, 
including provisions for its entry into force and a 
procedure for its review and extension. 

Owing to the early declaration of its contribution(s), 
the  EU  is  well  positioned  to  set  an  example  in 
the  run-up  to  the  Paris  conference.  And  domes-
tic  public  opinion  is  rallying  behind  it,  as  most 
recently  indicated  by  Dutch  citizens  successfully 
suing  their  government  over  inaction  on  cli-
mate  change.  Furthermore,  through  the  ’Green 
Diplomacy Network’, European environment and 
climate  change  experts  are  already  actively  en-
gaged climate diplomacy in third countries, seek-
ing to foresee, leverage or accommodate other ma-
jor players’ stances on the matter.

The lessons of the Copenhagen setback seem in-
deed to have been learnt, including the opportu-
nity to convene world leaders at the beginning of 
the conference rather than at the very end. In this 
regard, France’s efforts to set the tone for COP21 
by steering the parties towards the ‘Paris Alliance 
for Climate’ may eventually prove crucial.

Balazs Ujvari is a Junior Analyst at the EUISS.

European Union Institute for Security Studies

July 2015

2

© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. | QN-AL-15-034-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-329-2 | ISSN 2315-1129 | DOI 10.2815/492207