BRICS bloc(k) rising?.
Date: 2015-07-07
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, foreign policy, governance, the EU's international role, world economy

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BRICS bloc(k) rising?
by Balazs Ujvari 

The  past  decade  has  seen  the  emergence  of  a 
variety of alliances both inside and outside the 
post-Second World War global governance sys-
tem, often resulting in new plurilateral organisa-
tions and structures, not least in the Asia-Pacific 
and  the  ‘Global  South’.  These  initiatives  have 
mostly  been  driven  by  one  purpose:  balancing 
out  the  perceived  domination  of  international 
institutions and organisations by Western pow-
ers – namely the US, the EU and Japan. Those 
countries that have been most successful in stir-
ring  the  waters  of  global  governance  and  ad-
vancing a distinct set of interests in key interna-
tional  issues  through  collective  action  are  now 
commonly  referred  to  as  the  BRICS.  The  term 
was  originally  coined  by  Goldman  Sachs  chief 
economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 as BRIC, before 
South Africa was added to Brazil, Russia, India 
and  China  some  ten  years  later.    With  the  7th 
BRICS summit set to take place in the Russian 
city of Ufa this July, the oft-repeated objective of 
the five partners to shape future global govern-
ance through joint action has, once again, come 
to the fore.

In  general  terms,  the  formulation  of  common 
positions  by  the  BRICS  is  guided  by  ‘relation-
al  multilateralism’,  a  concept  which  includes 
a  preference  for  consensual  decision-making, 

voluntary engagement, a strictly realist perspec-
tive on national sovereignty, and the absence of 
legally  binding  clauses.    The  group  also  tends 
to prioritise economic growth and development: 
environmental  or  human  rights  concerns,  for 
example,  are  almost  always  secondary  to  eco-
nomic  performance.  Furthermore,  they  often 
advocate  agreements  tailored  to  the  needs  of  a 
limited number of state parties, instead of seek-
ing a universal membership through a one-size-
fits-all approach. Finally, the BRICS’ attitude is 
largely shaped by their frustration at their lim-
ited overall influence in the institutions of global 
governance,  which  is  only  partly  assuaged  by 
the veto right of China and Russia on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).  

The  BRICS  now  regularly  engage  in  coordina-
tion  meetings  on  the  margins  of  major  United 
Nations and G20 conferences, as well as in sep-
arate ministerial and expert-level deliberations. 
In addition, their leaders also regularly convene 
BRICS summits, the first of which took place in 
the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in June 2009. 
As  a  political  bloc,  the  BRICS  first  caught  the 
attention  of  European  observers  at  the  2009 
Copenhagen climate conference, in which they 
managed  to  water  down  the  EU’s  ambitious 
agenda  by  winning  the  support  of  the  US  and 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

June 2015

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 ‘...the more successful the group has 
been in opposing or blocking the EU’s 
stance by forming a bloc in a given policy 
area, the more likely it is that collective 
references – and approaches – to these 
emerging countries can be found.’ 

Australia for their joint position on the content 
of the final accord. 

In return for their contribution to the manage-
ment of the financial crisis, the BRICS were able 
to  successfully  initiate  a  long-awaited  reform 
of  the  quota  system  within  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank. 
Subsequently, the voting share of emerging and 
developing  countries  has  risen  from  39.4%  to 
44.7% and from 44.6% 
to 47.19%, respective-
ly. 

Besides broadly shared 
views 
climate 
on 
change and global eco-
nomic governance, the 
BRICS  have  also  dis-
played the tendency to 
agree on security mat-
ters. In 2011, when all 
the BRICS where present on the UNSC as either 
permanent  or  non-permanent  members,  four 
of  them  abstained  on  UNSC  Resolution  1973, 
which established a no-fly zone over Libya. All 
five then went on to form a united front on reso-
lutions dealing with the crisis in Syria.

Building blocks

Over the past five years, the BRICS have contin-
ued to solidify and even extend their already ex-
isting network of coordination meetings. Their 
foreign  ministers  met  on  the  sidelines  of  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  (UNGA)  in 
New York in September 2014 to discuss intra-
BRICS economic, trade and investment coopera-
tion, a comprehensive reform of the UN, as well 
as the crisis in Gaza. The BRICS leaders also met 
ahead  of  the  2014  G20  summit  in  Brisbane  in 
order to eke out a cooperation strategy, a gath-
ering which was followed by a meeting of their 
finance ministers ahead of the World Economic 
Forum summit in Davos in early 2015. 

Some  consultations  have  gone  beyond  mere 
joint declarations, leading to more concrete out-
comes. In December 2014, BRICS health minis-
ters agreed on a joint strategy to fight tuberculosis 
and the creation of a working group to prevent 
the spread of the Ebola virus. And in early 2015, 
the BRICS adopted a five-year agenda to address 
demographic  issues,  including  women’s  rights, 
aging populations and migration.

cooperation  through  increased  institutionali-
sation.  On  the  first  day  of  the  previous  BRICS 
summit in Fortaleza last July, the group members 
agreed on the long-anticipated plan to create the 
New  Development  Bank  (NDB)  and  a  reserve 
currency pool worth in excess of $100 billion. 
The  NDB,  with  its  headquarters  in  Shanghai 
and a regional centre in Johannesburg, will be-
come operational under India’s presidency and 
be open to new applicants as long as the share of 
the original five mem-
bers constitutes at least 
55% of the overall cap-
ital  stock.  However, 
whilst  the  new  insti-
tution  is  scheduled  to 
start  lending  in  2016, 
only two BRICS parlia-
ments – those of Russia 
and India – have so far 
ratified 
founding 
its 
agreement.  Moreover, 
consensus is yet to be reached on the currency 
in which the capital will be held.

In October last year, a group of 21 Asian coun-
tries, led by China and India, signed up to the 
newly-created  Asian  Infrastructure  Investment 
Bank  (AIIB).  With  Russia  officially  singing  up 
to  the  AIIB  in  April  this  year,  the  $50  billion, 
China-led institution counts all members of the 
BRICS  bloc  as  founding  members.  The  AIIB, 
which  has  a  capital  target  of  more  than  $100 
billion, represents yet another attempt to com-
pensate for emerging powers’ limited voice and 
influence within other multilateral development 
institutions,  including  the  Asian  Development 
Bank  (ADB),  where  China’s  5.5%  voting  share 
is dwarfed by that of the US (15.7%) or Japan 
(15.6%). The rules guiding the AIIB’s activities 
are  likely  to  differ  somewhat  from  those  of  es-
tablished multilateral organisations, in particu-
lar  with  regard  to  the  environmental  and  gov-
ernance standards to be met by debtors.

Last  but  not  least,  the  symbolic  impact  of  the 
bids of individual BRICS to host major interna-
tional  sporting  events  –  be  it  the  summer  and 
winter  Olympics  (Beijing,  Sochi,  Rio)  or  the 
FIFA World Cup (South Africa, Brazil, Russia) – 
should not be underestimated. Not only do they 
add visibility, but they can be seen as evidence 
of the global nature of their ambitions.

Losing pace?

In addition to seeking joint positions and strate-
gies, the BRICS have also sought to consolidate 

Despite  their  shared  ambitions,  it  is  still  far 
from  clear  whether  the  BRICS  will  succeed  in 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

June 2015

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BRICSonomics

Data source: OECD – *Data for 2015 is based on estimates

overcoming  the  demographic,  economic,  soci-
etal and political differences which continue to 
divide them. Despite the recent progress in forg-
ing  fresh  institutions,  cracks  have  already  sur-
faced  within  the  group  over  key  issues.  India, 
for instance, alone blocked the implementation 
of  the  Bali  deal  reached  under  the  aegis  of  the 
WTO  in  2013,  fearing  that  rules  limiting  farm 
subsidies could undermine its policies on food 
stockpiling.  Then,  China’s  abstention  on  the 
Western-backed  resolution  condemning  the 
March 2014 referendum in Crimea at the UNSC 
left  Moscow  completely  isolated  over  Ukraine. 
Similarly,  when  the  annexation  of  Crimea  was 
debated at the UNGA, Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa all abstained on the resolution con-
demning Russia’s actions in the peninsula.

Russia’s  economy  is  contracting,  the  Chinese 
economy is facing a slowdown. After registering 
the weakest expansion (7.4%) in more than two 
decades  in  2014,  Chinese  economic  growth  is 
projected to drop further to 6.8% this year. 

Following  a  decade-long  boom,  the  Brazilian 
economy  has  also  seen  a  dramatic  downturn. 
The  economy  grew  by  a  mere  0.2%  in  2014, 
with the corruption scandal engulfing the state-
run Petrobas oil company significantly contrib-
uting to a loss in investors’ confidence. Although 
President  Dilma  Rousseff  is  preparing  to  cut 
public  spending  in  order  to  tackle  this  crisis, 
the country’s economy is expected to shrink by 
about  1%  this  year  –  the  lowest  growth  for  a 
generation. 

Additionally, the recent economic woes experi-
enced  by  some  of  the  BRICS  cannot  but  raise 
doubts about the future cohesion and collective 
political influence of the bloc. The Russian econ-
omy, for example, is expected to shrink by 3.1% 
in 2015 – largely due to the effects of Western 
sanctions and a sharp decline in oil prices. While 

South Africa’s economic performance in the past 
two years has been marred by power shortages, 
service  delivery  protests,  endemic  labour  un-
rest and corruption allegations against President 
Jacob Zuma. As a result, Pretoria registered the 
slowest economic expansion last year since 2009, 
with its growth rate dropping to just 1.5%. 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

June 2015

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Against this background, India stands out with 
growth  averaging  over  6.5%  between  2011 
and  2014.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  ‘big  bang’ 
economic  reform  process  pursued  by  Prime 
Minister  Narendra  Modi,  India  is  predicted  to 
dethrone  China  as  the  world’s  fastest  growing 
large economy this year.  

Between EU and them

Since  2003,  when  the  European  Security 
Strategy (ESS) was adopted, the EU has entered 
into ‘strategic partnerships’ with all the BRICS, 
starting with China and Russia in 2003, followed 
by India in 2004 and, finally, Brazil and South 
Africa in 2007. In doing so, the Union displayed 
its desire to further cooperation with individual 
BRICS  countries  on  key  global  challenges.  But 
should the BRICS be treated individually or as a 
group? And how can the EU take into account 
their collective views while formulating its own 
position?

The EU’s response to the emergence of the BRICS 
as a potentially unified force on the global stage 
varies.  Interestingly,  the  more  successful  the 
group has been in opposing or blocking the EU’s 
stance by forming a bloc in a given policy area, 
the more likely it is that collective references – 
and  approaches  –  to  these  emerging  countries 
can be found. 

Having drawn lessons from the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate  change  conference,  it  is  in  the  domain 
of  climate  change  where  Brussels  has  demon-
strated  the  greatest  awareness  of  the  BRICS’s 
rising influence. In 2011, a joint reflection pa-
per  ‘Towards  a  strengthened  and  renewed  EU 
climate diplomacy’, prepared by the EEAS and 
the Commission, was the first official document 
to  draw  attention  to  the  bargaining  power  of 
the BRICS bloc in this field. Then, in February 
2012, the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) of 
the  European  Parliament  (EP)  adopted  a  land-
mark  resolution  on  the  ‘EU  foreign  policy  to-
wards  the  BRICS  and  other  emerging  powers: 
objectives and strategies’. 

In addition to making the case for the develop-
ment of a broader EU-BRICS policy, this docu-
ment  singled  out  climate  change  as  an  area  in 
which sustained coordination with the group is 
necessary in order to reach a global agreement. 
In  order  to  put  this  in  practice,  the  so-called 
’Green  Diplomacy  Network’  (GDN),  created 
originally in 2002, now serves as a network of 
environment  and  climate  change  experts  at-
tached to the diplomatic representations of the 

EU and its member states in key third countries. 
These GDN officials are tasked with evaluating 
the climate policy of their host countries, iden-
tify levers of influence and recommend ways to 
strengthen the EU’s position – at both a govern-
mental and societal level.

To a lesser extent, similar examples can also be 
found in the field of international trade, where 
the  BRICS  have  proved  somewhat  less  cohe-
sive. This was, for example, demonstrated most 
recently  by  India’s  isolation  at  the  9th  WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013. Yet, the 
Commission’s DG Trade regularly publishes sta-
tistics on the exchange of goods between the EU 
and the BRICS as a whole.  The EP Committee 
on  International  Trade,  for  its  part,  pointed  in 
a  resolution  adopted  in  April  2013  to  the  im-
portance of linking the BRICS’s rising economic 
clout  to  the  respect  for  democratic  principles 
and good governance.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, a bilateral 
approach  appears  to  remain  the  main  modus 
operandi for EU-BRICS relations. Testimony to 
this is the speech delivered in February 2012 by 
then  HR/VP  Catherine  Ashton  on  ’EU  Foreign 
Policy  towards  the  BRICS’,  which  sent  a  very 
clear message: the EU must treat the BRICS as 
individual countries through the respective stra-
tegic  partnerships.  Nonetheless,  here  too,  the 
EP  has  acknowledged  the  collective  actions  of 
the  BRICS,  noting  in  a  resolution  dating  from 
February 2012 that they are increasingly prone 
to act as a group in foreign policy terms. In an-
other  resolution  adopted  in  the  same  year,  the 
BRICS were identified by the AFET committee 
as a cohesive bloc in the domain of cybersecuri-
ty: one which must be taken into account when 
the EU defines its own responses.    

Against  this  backdrop,  the  BRICS  seem  now 
to have ceased to be seen by EU policymakers 
as  a  loose  constellation  of  emerging  countries 
which  occasionally  defines  common  responses 
to global challenges. However, they are certainly 
not  yet  regarded  as  a  cohesive  alternative  bloc 
on the international scene. Their unity and co-
herence  will  continue  to  vary  according  to  the 
policy  area  in  question.  Yet,  there  is  no  doubt 
that the BRICS will seek to speak with one voice 
on multiple topics in the years to come, possibly 
even extending their cooperation into uncharted 
waters.  

Balazs Ujvari is a Junior Analyst at the EUISS.

European Union Institute for Security Studies

June 2015

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© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. | QN-AK-15-017-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-273-8 | ISSN 2315-1110 | DOI 10.2815/831727