Russia's armed forces : reforms and challenges : in-depth analysis.
Date: 2015-06-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: NATO, Russia, armed forces, foreign policy, military occupation, rearmament, territorial waters, volcanic eruption

Russia's
Reforms and challenges
armed forces

IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Author: Martin Russell
Members' Research Service
April 2015 — PE 554.213

EN

This paper describes the  current  state  of  the  Russian  armed  forces,  with  a  summary  of the  reforms
undertaken  to  make  them  more  effective  and  the remaining challenges. Data  comparing  Russia's
military capabilities with those of its international competitors are also included.

PE 554.213
ISBN 978-92-823-7027-8
doi: 10.2861/75411
QA-01-15-339-EN-N

Original manuscript, in English, completed in April 2015.

Disclaimer

The  content  of  this  document  is  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  author  and  any  opinions
expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction
is
and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.

© European Union, 2015.

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Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 1 of 24

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russia  is  flexing  its  military  muscles,  with  recent events putting the  spotlight  on  the
country's armed forces. However, the current military revival was preceded by a long
period of decline. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian armed forces
failed to adapt to the new realities of a post-Cold War world. Severe spending cuts left
them  under-equipped,  poorly  trained  and  ill-prepared  to  respond  to  new  challenges
such as the Chechen insurgencies and a 2008 conflict with Georgia.

Successive  military  reforms  to  transform  the  military  into  a  more  professional  and
mobile force ran into entrenched resistance from the military establishment and made
little  headway  until  the  appointment of  Anatoliy Serdyukov as  Defence  Minister in
2007. The 'New Look' reforms he undertook were intended to address the weaknesses
highlighted  in  the  2008  Georgian  war,  leading  to  a  substantially  restructured,
streamlined  and more combat-ready military.  For  the  most  part,  these  reforms  have
been kept in place by Serdyukov's successor Sergei Shoigu.

Despite  the  success  of  Serdyukov's  reforms,  many  modernisation  challenges  remain.
The armed forces are slowly reducing their reliance on compulsory military service by
recruiting more professional soldiers; however, demographic and financial constraints
mean  that  the  goal  of  a  fully  professional  military remains unrealistic. Even  with
continued conscription, the armed forces are still about one fifth understaffed. Quality
is  also  an  issue,  with  conscripts  in  particular  lacking  adequate  training  due  to  rapid
turnover in their ranks.

In  terms  of  military  hardware,  years  of  underspending  have  left  the  military  with
obsolete equipment, much of it dating from Soviet times. The armed forces are now in
the  middle  of  a  major  spending  programme  with  a  target to  have the  same  level  of
modern weapons as NATO countries by 2020. There have already been major deliveries
of new equipment to all the armed forces and these are set to continue over the next
few years. However, there is still a lot of catching up to do. Given that funding and the
defence  industry's  production  capacity are  limited,  it  is  unlikely  that the  rearmament
target will be met.

less  well  trained  and  have 

All of the above means that, despite recent improvements, Russian military personnel
are 
inferior  equipment  compared  to  their  NATO
counterparts. Russia  also  lags  behind  in  purely  numerical  terms,  with  for  example,
fewer tanks or battleships than the United States in particular; nuclear weapons are the
only area where parity has been preserved.

While Russia cannot match NATO quantitatively or qualitatively in conventional terms,
its adept use of hybrid warfare has enabled military successes in Ukraine; NATO, while
condemning  Russia for  its  alleged  involvement  in  Donbass,  has  yet  to  respond
effectively.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Historical background.................................................................................................... 3

2. Russian military reform, 2008-2012 .............................................................................. 4

2.1. Pre-reform: problems inherited from the Soviet armed forces............................. 4

2.1.1. Obsolete structures...................................................................................................... 4

2.1.2. Obsolete weaponry ...................................................................................................... 5

2.1.3. Hazing........................................................................................................................... 5

2.1.4. Inadequate human resources ...................................................................................... 6

2.2. The 2008 Georgian War highlights Russian military weakness.............................. 7

2.3. 'New Look' reforms................................................................................................. 8

2.3.1. Previous reform efforts ................................................................................................ 8

2.3.2. Anatoliy Serdyukov's reform drive............................................................................... 8

2.3.3. Anatoliy Serdyukov's legacy ......................................................................................... 9

3. Post-reform: continuing modernisation challenges.................................................... 10

3.1. Personnel challenges ............................................................................................ 10

3.1.1. Recruitment difficulties.............................................................................................. 11

3.1.2. Meanwhile, the number of conscripts is falling ......................................................... 12

3.1.3. Improved training....................................................................................................... 13

3.2. Equipment challenges .......................................................................................... 13

3.2.1. New weapons: already delivered or in the pipeline .................................................. 13

3.2.2. Can Russia meet its target for 70% of modern weapons by 2020? ........................... 15

3.2.3. Reasons for slow progress towards the 70% target................................................... 15

4. Military capability — comparison with other military powers ................................... 17

4.1. Conventional capability ........................................................................................ 18

4.2. Nuclear capability ................................................................................................. 18

5. Hybrid warfare............................................................................................................. 19

5.1. Russia's sophisticated use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine...................................... 19

5.2. Advantages of a hybrid approach to military conflict .......................................... 21

5.3. How is NATO responding to Russian hybrid warfare? ......................................... 22

5.4. Russia vs. NATO: how much of a threat are the Russian armed forces? ............. 22

6. Main references........................................................................................................... 24

Annex: Map of Russian armed forces in Eurasia and the world

between pp 12 & 13

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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IISS:

International Institute for Strategic Studies

List of main acronyms used

MoD: Ministry of Defence

GDP:

Gross domestic product

SAP:

US$:

State Armaments Programme

United States dollars

1. Historical background

1945-91: The  Soviet  Union  had  the  largest armed  forces  in  the  world,  with  some
five million  men  in service, according  to  CIA  estimates.1 However,  the  arms  race
crippled  the  Soviet  economy,  with  defence expenditure estimated  to have peaked at
30% of GDP in the late 1980s.2

Defence  expenditure  eventually  began  to  decline  from  this  peak, with  the easing  of
East-West  tensions. Under  Mikhail Gorbachev, armed  forces  personnel  were cut to
four million.3

1991: Gorbachev's successor Boris Yeltsin continued the downsizing process. However,
spending  and  staffing  cuts  were not  accompanied  by effective  modernisation,  leaving
the armed forces demoralised, underfunded and ineffective.4

1991-94: the first Chechen War, in which Russian soldiers failed to overcome insurgents
despite  overwhelming  numerical  superiority,  highlighted  the  weakness  of  the  armed
forces.

2000:  the  start  of  Vladimir Putin's  first  presidency  saw  a  reversal  of  the  Yeltsin-era
downwards  trend  in  expenditure,  against  a  background  of  renewed  conflict  in
Chechnya (second Chechen War: 1999-2009).

2008:  although  Russia  was  victorious  in  the  Georgian  war,  the conflict  highlighted
numerous weaknesses in its armed forces. Shortly afterwards, Anatoliy Serdyukov, who
was appointed Defence Minister in 2007, announced his 'New Look' reforms leading to
a radical overhaul of the Russian military.

2010:  hand-in-hand  with  the  New  Look  reforms,  a  new  State Armaments Programme
for 2011-2020 was launched, with the intention of modernising military equipment.

2014:  Russian  armed  forces  were  involved  in the annexation  of  Crimea.  Since  then,
they are also allegedly involved in separatist rebellions in Eastern Ukraine.

1

2

Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates 1950-1990, Firth N., Noren J., 1998.
The  Economic  Cost of  Soviet  Security  and  Empire,  Epstein  D.,  in The  Impoverished  Superpower:
Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden, Eds. Rowen H., Wolf C., 1990.

3 Military  Modernization  and  the  Russian  Ground  Forces,  Thornton,  R., in Russian  Military:  Ground

Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

4

ibid.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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Figure 1: Historical military expenditure trends

military spending in constant
(2011) US$ billion

military spending, %GDP

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Data: SIPRI.

Yeltsin slashed military spending and personnel. Under Vladimir Putin, military spending
has gradually increased both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, although
not to Soviet levels.

2. Russian military reform, 2008-2012

2.1. Pre-reform: problems inherited from the Soviet armed forces

2.1.1. Obsolete structures
During the Cold War, the Soviet military machine was commensurate in size with the
country's status as a superpower, potentially capable of defeating the United States. In
addition to five million men in active service, the armed forces had a further 20 million
reserves,5 which could be mobilised in the event of a global conflict. The military was
structured so as to be able to integrate large numbers of reserves: for example, in 1991
only 20 of the army's 132 divisions were 70% staffed, the remainder being kept either
at reduced  strength  (50%  staffed)  or  skeleton  strength  (10-20%  staffed),6 to  be
completed  with reserve staff should mass  mobilisation  become  necessary. The
disadvantage of this system was that only a small part of the armed forces was kept at
operational  strength  and  therefore  capable  of  rapid  deployment. The  apparent
assumption  was  that there  would  be  enough  time  to  integrate  and  prepare  reserves
during the slow build-up of tension preceding a global war.

After the end of the Cold War, the risk of a global conflict receded and was replaced by
the  new  challenge  of smaller  scale, but  more  rapidly  unfolding, regional  conflicts,  for
example in Chechnya and Georgia. The mass mobilisation system inherited from Soviet
times was now not only redundant, but actually hindered an effective response. In the
first Chechen War, given the lack of battle-ready formations, many had to be cobbled
together using  troops  from  different  parts  of  the  country  who  had  not previously
trained together.7 Several years later, at the beginning of the second Chechen War in

5

Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates 1950-1990, Firth N., Noren J., 1998.
6 Reform of the Russian Army, Gayday A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.
7

Reform of the Russian Army, Gayday A., op. cit.

 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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1999, just  55 000  of  the armed  forces'  total  manpower  of  1.4 million  were  combat-
ready, as Vladimir Putin recalled in a 2006 address8 to the Russian Parliament.

The  mass  mobilisation  system meant  that  central  command  structures  were  much
larger  than  they  would  otherwise  have  needed  to  be,  with  entire  directorates
responsible  for  organising  a  potential  mobilisation. As  skeleton  units  were  staffed
in  2008 these  accounted  for 30%  of total  personnel9 — a
largely  by  officers,
disproportionately high number. On top of this, a cumbersome network of warehouses
was necessary, in order to store the equipment potentially needed by reserves.

In contrast to the disproportionately high number of senior officers, there was a severe
shortage  of  non-commissioned  officers,  making  it  difficult  to train  and  discipline
troops.10

Conscription was another relic of the Soviet period. At that time, it had been the only
realistic  option  to  provide  the  vast  manpower  required  by  the  active  forces and
generate the pool of former conscripts making up the reserve forces. However, in the
new  context, a  large  conscription-based  military  made  less  sense  than  a  smaller, but
better trained, professional one.

2.1.2. Obsolete weaponry
The above problems inherited from the Soviet past were compounded by chronic post-
Soviet  underspending  on  military  hardware,
leaving all  the  armed  forces severely
under-equipped. While the overall defence budget increased under Vladimir Putin, the
share of this allocated to new weapons, particularly conventional weapons, remained
low. For example, between 2000 and 2004 only 15 tanks out of a total 23 00011 were
replaced, while for its part the air force did not acquire any new aircraft between 1995
and 2008.12 Although the State  Armaments  Programme  for  2007-2015  set a  target  of
modernising  weapons  systems  by  2025,  only  2%13 of  equipment  was  replaced  under
this programme per year, meaning that weapons were becoming obsolete faster than
they  could be  replaced. According  to  a  2006  estimate,  only  20%  of  Russian  military
hardware was 'modern', compared to over 70% in NATO armed forces.14

Weapons were not only aged, but also poorly maintained — in 2008 the tail fins of two
MiG-29  fighters  were  so  corroded  that  they  disintegrated  in  mid-flight,  causing  the
planes to crash.15

2.1.3. Hazing
A  tradition  of  hazing  (abusive  and  sometimes  even  lethal16 initiation  practices)  goes
back  to  Tsarist  times,  but  was  first  reported  to  have  become  widespread  after  1967.
During that year, a change to the length of military service meant that two groups of

8 Annual address to the Federal Assembly, 10 May 2006.
9 Military  Modernization  and  the  Russian  Ground  Forces,  Thornton,  R.,  in Russian  Military:  Ground

Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

10 A 'new look' of the Russian armed forces? Klein M., in in The Russian Armed Forces in Transition, Eds.

McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

11 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, de Haas M., 2011.
12 Reform of the Russian Air Force, Lavrov A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.
13 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, op.cit.
14 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, op. cit.
15 Reform of the Russian Air Force, Lavrov A., op. cit.
16 For example, Hazing Trial Bares a Dark Side of Russia's Military, New York Times, 2006.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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conscripts  under  the  previous  three-year  term  and  the  new  two-year  term  were
temporarily  serving  at  the  same  time.  In  the  same  year,  conscripts  with  a  criminal
record were included in the draft for the first time to compensate for a demographic
dip.  These  two  changes,  together  with  a  lack of  junior  officers  who  could  impose
discipline, have  been  blamed17 for  the  spread  of  hazing,  typically  perpetrated  on
novices by conscripts in their second year of service. The scale of hazing was such that,
according  to  a  2010  survey18 by  government-funded pollsters  Russian  Public  Opinion
Research  Centre  (WCIOM),  it was  perceived  as  by  far  the  armed  forces'  biggest
problem.

2.1.4. Inadequate human resources
With military service such an unattractive option, large numbers of men — around half
of the potential intake, according to a 2010 estimate19 — chose to avoid conscription,
many of them paying bribes for exemption on the grounds of alleged health problems.
Conversely, with  the  armed  forces  keen  to  take  on  as  many  conscripts  as  possible,
those with genuine health problems, but unable to afford bribes, were pushed through
the medical — activists from Russian NGO Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of
Russia even joked that the only way for a man to be counted unfit would be to turn up
carrying  his  own  head.20 As a  result,  as  many  as  one-third  subsequently  had  to  be
released from  service for  health  reasons.21 Nor  was  a  criminal  record  or alcoholism a
bar  to conscription — one  2008  survey22 suggested  that over  10%  of  conscripts were
affected by one or both issues.

The quality  of  professional  soldiers  was  not  much  better.  Poor  pay and  conditions —
a starting  salary  less  than  half  the  national  average,23 senior  officers  often  paid  less
than  bus  drivers,24 inadequate  housing25 — made  it  difficult  to  attract  recruits.  Some
conscripts were allegedly bullied into staying on.26 Many of these new recruits were of
such  poor  quality  that  they  were  subsequently  dismissed,  while  of  those  who
completed  their 
just 30%  chose  to  renew their
engagement.27

initial  three-year  contract, 

Training  could  do  little  to  compensate  for  such  poor-quality  raw  material,  with  a
general  lack  of  funding  and  equipment for  this  purpose. Many  conscripts  had  to  be
trained by  other  conscripts,  given  the  lack  of  junior  officers.  Professionals  also  lacked
adequate training: in the air force, there were not enough operational aircraft for pilots

17 The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Odom W, Yale University Press, 1998.
18 Волнуют ли Вас проблемы нашей армии, и если да, то какие прежде всего? (Are you worried by
our  army's  problems,  and  if  so,  what  are  you  most  worried  about?),  WCIOM,  13 February 2010  (in
Russian only).

19 Cited in Russian Military Concerned With Evasion As Army Draft Begins, Radio Free Europe, 2010.
20 The Russian Soldier Today, Journal of International Affairs, 17 April 2010.
21 According  to  a  2012  Union  of  Committees  of  Soldiers'  Mothers  of  Russia report,  cited  by Jane's

Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Armed Forces, op. cit.

22 Cited in The Russian Soldier Today, op. cit.
23 Russia wants more contract soldiers on the ground, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 19 April 2013.
24 Resurgent Russia?  A  Still-Faltering  Military,  Zoltan  Barany,  Hoover  Institution  Policy  Review,

29 January 2008.

25 Civil-Military  Relations  and  Modernization,  Renz  B.,  in The  Russian  Armed  Forces  in  Transition,  Eds.

McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.
26 Resurgent Russia? A Still-Faltering Military, op. cit.
27

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Armed Forces, IHS Jane's, 2014.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

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to  clock  up  flying  time, or  to  participate  in  complex  military  drills  involving  large
numbers of aircraft.28 In the ground forces, Army Commander Alexei Maslov criticised
contract-service  soldiers,  who 'in  some  respects ... are  no  better  prepared  than  the
corresponding units of conscripts'.29

2.2. The 2008 Georgian War highlights Russian military weakness

Many of the above problems were highlighted by poor Russian military performance in
successive  conflicts — the  first  Chechen  War,  resulting  in  a  humiliating  defeat; the
second  Chechen  War,  in  which  Russian  troops  eventually  succeeded  in subduing the
region,  but  only  after  years  of  fighting  and  heavy  casualties;  and  then  the  2008
Georgian  War.  Although  Russia  was  victorious  in  the  latter  conflict  thanks  to
overwhelming numerical superiority, numerous problems suggested that it would have
had difficulties defeating a larger adversary.

The  Russian  military  was  hampered  in  Georgia  by  a  lack  of  modern equipment,  for
example:

Army:  in  Georgia,  Russian  armoured  vehicles  provided  inadequate  protection  from
enemy  fire.  Reliability  was  also  an  issue,  with  numerous  vehicles  breaking  down  and
blocking  troop  movements.  Troops  lacked  night  vision  capacity  and  even  adequate
individual  protective  equipment;  Russian  soldiers  are  reported  to  have looted body
armour and helmets from dead Georgians.30

Air  force: in  Georgia,  the  Russian  air  force lacked not  only modern  aircraft and
adequately  trained  pilots, but  also precision-guided  missiles,  making  it  difficult  to  hit
targets, including  Georgian  air  defences,  which  as  a  result  succeeded  in  downing  an
estimated seven  or  eight Russian  planes.31 This  problem  was  exacerbated  by  the
absence of satellite navigation support, with access to the United States' GPS blocked
and Russia's own GLONASS system not yet operational.

Moreover,  coordination  between  the  army  and  air  force  was  hampered  by  a  lack  of
interoperable  radio  equipment;  Russian  commanders  even  had  to  resort  to  mobile
phones for communication, incredibly using Georgian networks.

Navy: while the Russian navy was only involved in the Georgian war to a limited extent,
a lack  of  adequate  landing  platforms  caused  serious  problems in deploying troops on
the Georgian coast, despite meeting little resistance on this front.

Command structures also proved deficient, with a lengthy command chain preventing
orders  from  reaching  the  front  line  quickly  enough.32 A  lack  of  coordination  between
the  armed  forces — exacerbated by  the  above-mentioned  communication  difficulties
— resulted in the air force failing to provide adequate support for the ground forces.33

28 Reform of the Russian Air Force, Lavrov A., op. cit.
29 The  Army  Needs  Professionals,  Krasnaya  Zvezda 

11 September 2007 (in Russian).

(official Defence  Ministry newspaper),

30 The  Russian  Military  and  the  Georgian  War:  Lessons  and  Implications,  Cohen  A.,  Hamilton  R.,  in
Russian Military: Ground Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.
31 Military  Modernization  and  the  Russian  Ground  Forces,  Thornton,  R.,  in Russian  Military:  Ground

Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

32 Reform of the Russian Army, Gayday A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.
33 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, de Haas M., 2011.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 8 of 24

Meanwhile, due to a shortage of combat-ready professional troops, 30% of the soldiers
fighting  in  the  Georgian  War  were  relatively  inexperienced  conscripts,  in  violation  of
official Russian policy.34

2.3. 'New Look' reforms

2.3.1. Previous reform efforts
Over the years, several attempts were made to deal with these long-standing problems
and adapt the Russian military to post-Soviet realities. The first major round of reforms
was carried out in 1993, leading to significant downsizing. Three years later, President
Boris Yeltsin set a target to end conscription by 2000. Further reforms were adopted in
2003.  However,  none  of  these  reform efforts  achieved  more  than  partial  results,
leaving the obsolete mass mobilisation structures inherited from the Soviet Union more
or less intact.

One  major  change  was  that in  2006 the government  decided  to  halve  the length  of
compulsory military service to one year, with effect from 2008. However, conscription
could not be scrapped altogether for various reasons: entrenched resistance from the
military  establishment,  which  remained  attached  to  the  idea  of military  service as  a
cornerstone  of  the  Russian  armed  forces  since  Tsarist  times;35 demographic  and
financial constraints, making it impossible to attract sufficient numbers of professionals
to replace conscripts; the role of conscription in training the country's reserve forces.36

2.3.2. Anatoliy Serdyukov's reform drive
After years of only very limited modernisation, the reform process finally took off after
the appointment in 2007 of economist Anatoliy Serdyukov as Minister of Defence. Over
the next few years, Serdyukov succeeded in creating a 'New Look' military.

Compared  to  his  predecessors,  who  all  came  from  the  military  or  security forces,
Serdyukov's civilian background may paradoxically have been an advantage in pushing
through  the  reform  agenda, in  that  he  was  less  susceptible  to  military  establishment
influence.37 His  position  was  strengthened  by  a 2007  purge  of  military  leaders.38 This
was followed by the above-mentioned problems in Georgia, which were a wake-up call
for the armed forces, and which Serdyukov's reforms, announced shortly after the end
of the war, were designed to address.

Serdyukov's main reforms were as follows:

End of the Soviet-era mass mobilisation system: 'skeleton units' were disbanded and,
as part of a radical restructuring, their personnel transferred to fully staffed formations.
These were to be capable of rapid deployment in the event of conflict, in line with the
target, set  by then-President Dimitri Medvedev, of  all  formations  being  in  a  state  of
'permanent combat readiness' by 2020.39

34 The  Russian  Military  and  the  Georgian  War:  Lessons  and  Implications,  Cohen  A.,  Hamilton R.,  in
Russian Military: Ground Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

35 Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces, Thornton, R, op. cit.
36 Russia wants more contract soldiers on the ground, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 19 April 2013.
37 Civil-Military  Relations  and  Modernization,  Renz  B.,  in The  Russian  Armed  Forces  in  Transition,  Eds.

McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

38 Serdyukov Cleans Up the Arbat, Pukhov R., Moscow Defense Brief, 2008.
39 Medvedev's New Doctrine, Moscow Times, 2008.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 9 of 24

Smaller formations:  mirroring  post-Cold  War  military  reforms  in  Western  countries
enabling  a  faster  and  more  flexible  response  to  small-scale  regional  conflicts,  army
divisions  comprising  around  10 000  men  each were  split into  autonomous  brigades
about one-third the size. The air force was also restructured.

Streamlined command structures: now that these were no longer required to have the
capacity  to  organise  mass  mobilisation,  several  departments  in  the  General  Staff  and
the Main Commands of the individual armed forces were axed or downsized.40 Many of
the warehouses formerly needed to store equipment for the reserve forces were also
closed.

Fewer senior officers:  the  scrapping  of  skeleton  units  and  the  above-mentioned
warehouse facilities enabled a large number of officers to be laid off, from half a million
in 2008 to 220 000 in 2011 (Serdyukov's initial target was 150 000). At the same time as
slashing the number of senior officers, Serdyukov set a target at junior officer level of
200 000 non-commissioned officers, to improve discipline and training.41

A shorter  command  chain, more  effective coordination: the  six  Soviet-era  military
districts were replaced by four regional joint strategic commands (in December 2014 a
fifth  Arctic  Joint  Strategic  Command  was added).  Each  of  these  has  a  control  centre
directing ground, air and navy forces in their region, enabling closer coordination and a
shorter  command  chain,  in  which  orders  no  longer  have  to  pass  through  Moscow —
the  number  of  links  has  been  reduced  from  sixteen  to  a  theoretical  minimum  of
three.42

Substantially increased  procurement: a  new  State  Armaments  Programme  for  2011-
2020 was adopted in 2010, with substantially increased funding and a target of raising
the  percentage  of  modern  military  equipment  from  20%  to  70%, in  line  with  NATO
armed forces, by 2020. The previous programme for 2007-2015 had envisaged reaching
this target in 2025.

2.3.3. Anatoliy Serdyukov's legacy
Despite  his achievements as  a  military  reformer,  Serdyukov was forced  to  step  down
over a corruption scandal in 2012. Since then, a few of his reforms have been wholly or
partially reversed by successor Sergei Shoigu: a few divisions have been re-constituted
in the army alongside the new brigades, and the new air force structures ('air bases')
have been abandoned altogether, after proving ineffective.43

However, most of the 'New Look' agenda remains firmly in place under Shoigu. Despite
increasingly tense Russia-NATO relations over Ukraine, the armed forces remain geared
to  regional  rather  than  global  conflicts.  For  example, Russia's  Military Doctrine44
(a strategy  document  outlining  the  country's  overall  military  policy  and  situation,  last
updated in December 2014) foresees 'a diminishing probability of large-scale attacks on
Russia', and refers instead to 'unresolved regional conflicts'. In view of this, a return to
the Soviet-era mass mobilisation system scrapped by Serdyukov seems unlikely.

40 Reform of the Russian Army, Gayday A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.
41 A 'new look' of the Russian armed forces? Klein M., in in The Russian Armed Forces in Transition, Eds.

McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

42

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Armed Forces, IHS Jane's, 2014.

43 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015.
44 Military  Doctrine  of  the  Russian  Federation,  President  of  the  Russian  Federation,  2014  (in  Russian

only).

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 10 of 24

Serdyukov's emphasis on combat readiness continues under Shoigu, and has even been
stepped up. Since 2013, regular snap inspections have been held to test readiness, and
changes, such  as  improved  training, carried  out  based  on  the  results.45 A  recent
example was a large-scale drill involving 80 000 troops in March 2015.46

3. Post-reform: continuing modernisation challenges

Thanks to the reforms described in the preceding section, the Russian armed forces are
more  streamlined,  capable  of  a  rapid  response,  and  closely  coordinated  than
previously. Evidence for these improvements was the smooth action by Russian troops
in March 2014 to secure control of Crimea,47 despite the logistical challenge posed by
the absence of a land bridge. However, the significance of this achievement should not
be  exaggerated, given  that  Crimean  operations  involved  a  relatively  small  number  of
well-prepared  elite  troops  led  by Spetsnaz special  operations  groups, and  do  not
therefore necessarily reflect on the military as a whole.

Despite  the  success  of  Serdyukov's  reforms,  further  modernisation  is  still  needed  in
many areas. The following sections explain the main issues in relation to personnel and
equipment.

3.1. Personnel challenges

Figure 2: Armed forces personnel

Armed Forces – active: 771 00048 (target: 921 50049); reserves: 2 million

Recruitment shortfall: 150 500 (16%)

Armed forces, by category/by service

Conscripts
300.000

Contract service
300.000

Professional
officers
220.000

Data: by category — IHS Jane's; by service — IISS

50

Command and
support
150.000

Army
230.000

Airborne
32.000

Strategic
missiles
80.000

Air
148.000

Navy
130.000

45 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
46 Arctic snap check involves 80,000 servicemen — Russia's General Staff, TASS, 19 March 2015.
47 Russia’s military delivers a striking lesson in Crimea, Washington Post, 18 March 2014.
48 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
49 2011  Defence  Ministry  figure,  cited  by Russia's  Military  Reforms:  Victory  after  Twenty  Years  of

Failure?, op. cit. No date has been mentioned for achieving this target.

50 While  these  two  sources  differ  substantially  as  to  the  total  numbers  and  must  be  seen  as  rough
estimates, the data for individual categories/armed forces gives an idea of the breakdown between
them.  Neither  source  mentions  a  date  for  these  figures,  which  are  presumably  the  most  recently
available in March 2015.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 11 of 24

3.1.1. Recruitment difficulties
There are two categories of professional soldiers: 1) officers and 2) ordinary contract-
service  personnel ('kontraktniki'),  including  non-commissioned  officers, on  three-year
renewable contracts. The officer corps is estimated at 220 000,51 while the number of
kontraktniki has reached 300 000.52 The two categories combined represent about two-
thirds of total personnel.

Efforts are  being  made to further increase  this proportion,  with  a  target  of  350 000
contract-service  soldiers  by  the  end  of  2015.53 In  2012, the  starting salary more  than
doubled to 20 000 roubles a month (US$350 at current exchange rates),54 with various
additional  allowances, as  well  as privileged  access  to  higher  education,  and  housing
subsidies in the form of contributions to rent or mortgage payments. In the same year,
foreign  nationals  became  eligible  to  serve55 (although  not  as  officers),  and  two-year
paid contracts are now being offered as an alternative to conscription.56 As a result, the
armed forces succeeded in recruiting 80-90 000 kontraktniki per year during the 2013-
2014  period57 (however,  it  is  not  known how  many  left the  military  during  these two
years).  In  2014, it  was  claimed58 that, for  the first  time, numbers in  this  category
exceeded those of conscripts.

Even  so, the  goal  of  a  fully  professional  military remains unrealistic. There  are
demographic constraints, due to shrinkage of the relevant age group (the result of the
birth rate halving in the early 1990s). Since they were raised in 2012, military salaries
have  been  eroded  by  inflation:59 the starting  salary is now just two-thirds  of  the
national  average,  and  may  not  be  sufficiently  competitive  to  attract educated
personnel in a labour market which remains tight, despite the economic downturn.

These problems are likely to continue for the foreseeable future; based on the current
age pyramid, the number of 18-year olds will only start to grow significantly in 2020.60
As for salaries, in the current difficult economic context substantial improvements are
unlikely; planned indexation of 5.5% for military salaries this year61 has been suspended
as part of a general pay freeze for government employees.62

51

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Armed Forces, IHS Jane's, 2014

Interfax: Defence  Ministry  announces 

52 According to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Armed Forces, op. cit., and
increased  number  of  contract-service  personnel,

to 
3 April 2015 (in Russian only).
53 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
54 Contract service, social guarantees, Russian Ministry of Defence (in Russian only).
55 Russian Army Attracts Tajikistan's Unemployed, Moscow Times, 17 March 2015.
56 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015.
57 Defence  Ministry  announces  increased  number  of  contract-service  personnel,  Interfax,  3 April 2015

(in Russian only).

58 Contract soldiers outnumber conscripts in Russian military – Defense Minister, RT, 29 October 2014.
59 Defence  Ministry  decides  not  to  cut  military  salaries, http://www.voen-pravo.ru (portal  on  legal

matters for Russian officers).

60 2010  Russian census,  cited  by  Demographics  Institute,  Higher  School  of  Economics — National

Research University, 2015 (in Russian only).

61 Salaries to rise, Rosiiskaya Gazeta, 23 November 2014 (in Russian only)
62 Benefits lagging behind inflation, Kommersant, 20 March 2015

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 12 of 24

3.1.2. Meanwhile, the number of conscripts is falling
In  the  absence  of  sufficient  professionals,  the  armed  forces  continue  to  rely  on
conscripts  to  make  up  the  numbers.  However,  here  too  there  are  difficulties  getting
enough manpower. Conscription  is  of  course  subject  to  the  same  demographic
constraints as recruitment. Moreover, now that military service lasts one year instead
of two, there are only half as many conscripts serving at a given moment. Draft dodging
remains  a  problem,  not  least due  to  the  persistent  problem  of  hazing,  mentioned
above.  Although shortening  the  length  of military  service  to  one  year  has helped  by
removing the main perpetrators, the second-year conscripts, there are still occasional
reports of incidents.63

It is true that strong public support for Russian intervention in Ukraine appears to have
made military service a more attractive option: a February 2015 survey by independent
pollsters  Levada Centre  shows  that the  percentage  of  respondents  who  would  be  in
favour  of  a  family  member  avoiding  conscription  (28%)  is  at  its  lowest  level
in  a
decade,64 correlating with a reported 20% drop of draft evasion in 2014, compared to
the previous year.65 However, this may be only a temporary phenomenon, as another
recent  Levada  poll66 shows  that, notwithstanding such support, the  number  opposing
or strongly opposing 'open war between Russia and Ukraine' has tripled over the last
12 months, from 13% to 39%.

The  shortage  of  conscripts,  combined  with  difficulties  in  recruiting  professionals,
translates  into  a  total  shortfall  of  over 150 500,  nearly  one-fifth of  the  2011  Defence
Ministry target of 921 00067 for the combined armed forces. In fact, the armed forces
are now the smallest they have been in living memory.

Given the long-term nature of the problems described above — demographic shrinkage
of  the  relevant  age  group, insufficiently  attractive pay  and  conditions,  and  endemic
corruption  enabling  widespread  draft  evasion,  the armed  forces  will almost  certainly
remain understaffed for the foreseeable future.

Figure 3: Armed forces total personnel, historical trend

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

Data: IISS

armed forces personnel, thousand

0
9
9
1

2
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

2
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

63 Russian family alleges 'suicide' conscript tortured to death, Telegraph, 21 September 2011
64 Military Service and Threats, Levada Centre, 21 February 2015 (in Russian only)
65 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
66 Ukrainian crisis: Russian involvement and expectations, Levada Centre, March 2015 (in Russian only)
67 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, de Haas M., 2011.

The Russian armed forces in Eurasia and the world

Central  and  Eastern  Europe:
In  1997,  NATO
pledged  not  to deploy  nuclear  weapons  in  the
new  Member  States  (NATO-Russia  Founding
Act).  However,  Russia  remains  nervous  about
NATO  activity.  The  Military  Doctrine1 mentions
infrastructure
‘NATO  member  state  military 
moving  closer  to  Russian  borders,  including
through further  expansion  of  the  block’  as  a
major military threat.

Kaliningrad  enclave: as  part
increased  activity  on
of
Russia's  western  borders,
nuclear-capable 
Iskander
missiles have recently moved
here. With a range of 500 km,
these  could  be  used  to  hit
targets 
several  NATO
in 
neighbours.7

Baltic/Scandinavia:  the  Russian  military  has  been
increasingly  active  on  the  country’s Western  borders:
in  2014,  three  times  as  many intrusions  into NATO
airspace compared  to  2013,  mostly  over  the  Baltic8;
recent  military  exercises  near  Estonian/Latvian
borders; Russian submarines have also been sighted off
Sweden. At a recent meeting, Nordic defence ministers
described Russia's conduct as 'the biggest challenge to
European security'.9

Arctic: Acknowledging the strategic importance of
the  Arctic  region  and  its  vast  natural  resources,
Russia’s  new  Military  Doctrine  mentions  the
region  for  the  first  time.  A  new  Joint  Strategic
Command  Centre  was  set  up 
in  2014 near
Murmansk,  and  the  number  of  airfields  in  the
region  is  being  trebled  from four to  14. A  new
Arctic Commission will coordinate Russian military
and other activities.10

East  Ukraine: Russian  troops
(12 000,  according 
to  US
military)  and  weapons  are
alleged to have been involved
in  Eastern
in  the 
Ukraine.  A 
further  50 000
Russian  troops  are  stationed
just over the border2.

fighting 

Transnistria:
Russian
'peacekeeping'
troops  have
been deployed in Transnistria
since 1992.3

Crimea annexed  by  Russia,
March  2014;  29 000  troops
stationed there.3

Russia’s 

Tartus naval  base  in  Syria  is
only
currently
military  base  outside  the
former 
the
USSR.

territory  of 

it 

tried 

re-occupy 

Georgia: attacked  by  Russia  in  2008
the
to 
after 
breakaway  regions  of  Abkhazia  and
South  Ossetia.  Since  then,  Russian
troops  are  stationed  in  both  regions,
which  have  also  signed  agreements
for  their  armed  forces  to  operate
under  a  joint  command  with  Russia.
Military  activity  has  been  stepped
up5.

Caucasus:  while 

insurgency  continues 

North 
the
situation  in  Chechnya  is  calmer
now, 
in
region,
other  parts  of 
especially Dagestan. In 2014, there
were  341  casualties  in  the  North
Caucasus, 
including 55 military
and security personnel6.

the

Russian Federation

NATO (1990)

Regional Command
Centres

Breakaway regions supported/
annexed by Russia
Ex-Warsaw Pact countries
which have joined NATO
Russian military bases abroad:

Military allies of Russia
(CSTO)
Former territory of USSR
(excluding Russia)

Navy

Air force

Army

1
2,4
3
5
6
7
8

Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,
Some 12,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine supporting rebels: U.S. commander, Reuters, 3 March 2015
Twenty Years of Russian “Peacekeeping” in Moldova, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 27 July 2012
Is Moscow Preparing for a New War Against Georgia? Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 March 2015
Chechnya only North Caucasian region with higher total casualties in 2014, Caucasian Knot, 1 January 2015 (in Russian)
Russia is putting state-of-the-art missiles in its westernmost Baltic exclave, Business Insider, 18 March 2015
Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West, European Leadership Network, 2014

9
10

11

12
13
14
15

Nordic nations agree on defense cooperation against Russia, Reuters, 9 April 2015
Jane's  Sentinel  Security  Assessment - Russian  Federation — Air  Force,  IHS  Jane's,  2014; Russia's  Arctic
policy up for remake, Barents Observer, 18 March 2015
Introduction, McDermott R. et al, in The Russian Armed Forces in Transition, Eds. McDermott R., Nygren
B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012
Big Shanghai Cooperation Organization Military Drills Held in China, Radio Free Europe, 25 August 2014
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL READY TO REACH OUT TO CSTO, Wikileaks, 10 September 2010
Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 11 April 2015
Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, United Nations, 2014

China: Russia  is  careful  to  avoid  identifying  China  as  a
potential adversary, describing it as a partner country in the
Military  Doctrine.  However,  the  relationship  between  the
two countries remains ambivalent; although China  was not
mentioned by name in Russia’s Vostok 2010 military drill in
the  Far  East,  the  purpose  of  this  large-scale  exercise
appeared to be preparation for a potential Chinese attack.11
Recently, in the context of Russian isolation from the West,
there has been a certain rapprochement,  with for example
Russia  participating  in  the  largest  ever  military  drill  staged
by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation10 (of which it is a
member,  together  with  China  and  four  Central  Asian
countries),  despite  previous Russian reticence  about  such
joint exercises with its larger neighbour.

The Collective  Security  Treaty  Organization  (CSTO): a
military alliance between Russia and five ex-Soviet republics.
The CSTO is not seen as a serious rival to NATO, which has
described it in leaked cables as a ‘waning organization’.13 It
has failed to develop an effective rapid reaction capacity or
to respond to regional instability (e.g. riots in Kyrgyzstan).
However, for Moscow the organisation is a useful means of
maintaining  its  own  military  presence  in  the  region  and
excluding potential rivals (China, US), thanks to a veto which
the alliance  gives  it  over  foreign  military  bases  in  CSTO
countries.

Tajikistan: citing  concerns  over  the  spread  of  Islamic
militancy from Afghanistan, Russia is planning to double the
number of troops stationed there (currently 5 900). Russian
military  specialists  may  also  be  involved  in  policing  the
border with Afghanistan.14

Rest of the world: nearly all of Russian military activities are
confined to the country's neighbourhood. Activities outside
this area are at a very modest level relative to Russia's size.
For  example,  it  is  only  the  72nd  largest  contributor  of
(83,  mostly  military  experts)15
to  UN
personnel 
peacekeeping  operations 
in  DR  Congo,
MINURSO  in  Western  Sahara,  etc.).  In  terms  of  unilateral
operations  abroad,  Russia 
is  hampered  by  its  lack  of
international  bases:  it  only  has Tartus in  Syria outside  the
ex-Soviet region, although Russia is currently in negotiations
with  several  countries  including  Cuba  and  Vietnam  to
establish bases further afield.

(MONUSCO 

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 13 of 24

3.1.3. Improved training
For  conscripts,  the  quality  of  training  has  not  been  helped  by cutting compulsory
military service to one year: in 2010 it was claimed that this did not leave enough time
for  them  to  learn  military  skills  such  as  how  to  use  weapons68. For  professionals, by
junior
contrast,  there  have  been considerable 
commander  training and combat  vehicle  driving  skills.69 Pilots  are  now  given
considerably more flying time,70 although they still lag behind their NATO counterparts
in this respect.71

improvements,  for  example 

in 

3.2. Equipment challenges

30%: percentage of modern military hardware in Russian armed forces (2015 target)

70%: percentage of modern military hardware in Russian armed forces (2020 target)

Over 70%: percentage of modern military hardware in NATO armed forces72

US$436.5  billion: funding  allocated  to Russia's 2011-2020  State Armaments
Programme73

3.2.1. New weapons: already delivered or in the pipeline
The current 2011-2020 State Armaments Programme (SAP-2020) sets a target for 30%
modern  equipment  by  2015,  and  a  more  ambitious  70%  by  2020,  in  line  with  NATO
In  2012, Vladimir Putin  claimed  that  that  the  share  of  modern
member  states.
equipment in Russia's conventional forces had already reached 28-30%,74 meaning that
the 2015 target will almost certainly be met. However, reaching the much higher target
of 70% set for 2020 will be more of a challenge.

Army

SAP 2020 target:

2 300 new tanks
30 000 assorted military vehicles75

The level of modern equipment in the ground forces is reported76 to have reached 32%
in 2015, with substantial deliveries of tanks (300) and military vehicles (5 000).

On top of these deliveries of existing models, a wide range of new designs are in the
pipeline, such as the Bumerang armoured personnel carriers and the Armata modular
platform,  which  will  serve  as  the basis  for  several  types  of  combat  vehicles  including
tanks. Prototypes  of  some  new  vehicles  will  probably  be  on  display  at  the  traditional
9 May  Victory  Day  parade  in  Moscow  this  year, although  it  could  be  a  year  or  two

68 The Country Needs a Safe Army, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 October 2010 (in Russian).
69 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
70

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Air Force, IHS Jane's, 2014.

71 Russia: Dangers of isolation, Financial Times, 8 January 2015.
72 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, op. cit.
73 The Military Balance 2015, op. cit.
74

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Procurement, IHS Jane's, 2014.

75 State  of  Play:  SAP  2020:  Russia's  State  Armaments  Programme  and  Implications  for  Future

Capabilities, IHS Jane's, 2015.

76 State  of  Play:  SAP  2020:  Russia's  State  Armaments  Programme  and  Implications  for  Future

Capabilities, op. cit.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 14 of 24

before mass  production  begins. Until  then,  new  deliveries  will  continue  to  use  older
designs,  but  with  upgraded  features (more  effective  armour  and  communications
systems, night vision).

Other  new  army  equipment  includes Iskander tactical  missiles,  with enhanced range
and  accuracy, and Ratnik kits  for  infantry  soldiers,  with  improved  body  armour,
navigation  and  communication  systems,  etc.,  addressing various weaknesses
highlighted in Georgia.

Navy

SAP 2020 target:

15 new nuclear submarines
50 battleships77

The navy remains under-equipped. For example, it is estimated that only 30-60% of the
Northern Fleet, the navy's largest fleet, is fully operational.78 'Blue-water' capability —
the ability to operate further afield, away from Russian coastal waters — is a particular
weakness, with few large ships currently operational.

To address these problems, it is planned to deliver 50 new large battleships (frigates,
corvettes) during the 2011-2020 period. There are no immediate plans for new aircraft
carriers, or even to refurbish the country's only currently operational carrier (compared
to the ten which the  United  States currently  operates);  experts estimate  that  the
earliest Russia could construct a new one is 2027.79

As mentioned above, Russia found it difficult to land assault troops from the sea during
the Georgian War — potentially a significant factor in the event of an all-out attack on
Ukraine.  It  was  precisely  to  remedy  this  problem  that  Russia  ordered  two  Mistral
helicopter carriers from France in 2010; however, delivery of these was suspended in
2014, following annexation of Crimea.

More progress has been made in upgrading the nuclear submarine fleet, with 15 Borey
and Yasen nuclear  submarines  planned  for  the  2011-2020  period; so  far,  three have
been delivered.80 The main weapon carried by Borey submarines is the Bulava ballistic
missile, which is capable of delivering nuclear warheads; however, this is not yet ready,
having repeatedly malfunctioned in tests.

Air force

SAP 2020 target:

850 new aeroplanes (of which 450 combat planes)
1 120 helicopters (of which 350 combat helicopters)81

Over  the  past  two  years,  the  air  force  has  received  substantial  amounts  of  new
equipment,  with  180  aircraft  and  helicopters  in  2013  and  around  200  planned  for
2014.82 Work  is  ongoing  to  develop Sukhoi T-50  state-of-the-art,  fifth-generation
stealth fighter planes, which are currently being tested; mass production is scheduled

77 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015.
78 Russian navy will become defensively focused, Oxford Analytica, 3 October 2014.
79

ibid.

80

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Procurement, IHS Jane's, 2014

81 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015
82

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Air Force, IHS Jane's, 2014

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 15 of 24

to  begin  at  the  end  of  2016.83 This  means  that  in  a  few  years  Russia  will  finally  have
fighter planes of a similar technological standard to the United States, whose own fifth-
generation Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors have already been in service for ten years.

Drones  are  another  area of  substantial  investment; in  2009  Russia  ordered  a  fleet  of
drones from Israel and since then has also developed domestic production. At present
Russia only has lightweight reconnaissance drones, but plans to start producing heavier
combat drones (up to 20 tonnes) in 2018.84

However, the  shortage  of precision-guided  missiles,  which  hampered  the  Russian  air
force in Georgia, appears to continue.85

3.2.2. Can Russia meet its target for 70% of modern weapons by 2020?
The Russian armed forces have a poor track record of meeting procurement targets (for
example,  the  1996-2005  State Armaments Programme  spent  only  20%  of its initially
envisaged budget),86 and it remains to be seen whether the current State Armaments
Programme will be different.

The above summary shows that all  Russian  armed  forces  are making  substantial
investments in new military hardware. However, at the current rate of progress, these
will not be enough to meet the 2020 target.

Figure 4: Military procurement targets and actual deliveries

s

m
e
t
i

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

s
M
B
C

I

y
r
a

t
i
l

i

M

s
e

t

i
l
l

t

e
a
s

l

s
e
n
a
p
o
r
e
A

ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile

Data: Military Balance 2015.

average  per
year  delivered
during 2011-
2013

average  per
year  needed t o
meet  S AP  2020
target s

r
a
e

l

c
u
N

s
e
n
i
r
a
m
b
u
s

i

s
p
h
s
e

l
t
t

a
B

t

s
r
e
p
o
c

i
l

e
H

Figure 4 shows  that  in  most  categories  of  equipment,  deliveries  lag  behind  targets.
Admittedly, these figures should be viewed with caution, as some are estimates, and in
any case the pace of delivery is likely to step up once new designs are ready.

3.2.3. Reasons for slow progress towards the 70% target
Financing: the  share  of  the  defence  budget  spent  on  new  equipment  has  increased,
from 37% in 2013 to over half this year;87 however, until the economy shows signs of

83

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Procurement, op. cit.

84 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies, op cit.
85
Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Air Force, op. cit.
86 Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, de Haas M., 2011
87 Russian military doctrine will not improve NATO ties, Oxford Analytica, 5 January 2015.

 
 
Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 16 of 24

recovery, any  further  increase, either  in  equipment  expenditure  or  overall  military
spending, seems unlikely.

Corruption: even when funding is available, a large part of it is lost to corruption — as
much as 40% of the procurement budget, according to a 2012 estimate.88 Corruption
pervades  all  levels  of  the  armed  forces  and  the  defence  industry — former Defence
Minister Serdyukov is himself facing corruption charges.

Limited production capacity: the defence industry has a poor track record in meeting
delivery deadlines — for example, the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, delivered to India
five years late in 2013. It may lack the capacity to produce the amount of equipment
envisaged by the 2011-2020 State Armaments Programme at the same time as meeting
heavy demand from foreign clients (US$15 billion in 2014).89

Quality is also an issue. For example Bulava submarine-launched missiles, which took
18 years  to  develop,  have repeatedly  failed tests — according  to the  submarine
designer,  due  to  'poor  quality  materials  ...  the  lack  of  necessary  equipment ... [and]
inefficient quality control'.90

Import restrictions: although most Russian weapons have traditionally come from the
domestic  defence  industry,  some  have  been  imported in  the  absence  of satisfactory
Russian-produced alternatives, as in the case of the Israeli drones mentioned above, or
Italian  armoured  vehicles  ordered  in  2010.91 In  both these cases, some  of  the
production  was  based  in  Russia,  enabling  acquisition  not  only  of  the  equipment  but
also of the underlying technology.

However,  arms  imports  are  controversial,  with  pressure from  the  domestic  arms
industry  to  prefer  Russian  products.  There  was  widespread  criticism  of  the  deal  with
France  to  acquire  Mistral  helicopter  carriers,92 and  now  that  their  delivery  has  been
suspended, the danger of reliance on foreign suppliers is all too apparent.

In any case, the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions have cut off many import options.
Ukraine  itself  was  a  major  supplier  of  the  Russian  defence  industry,  for  example of
helicopter  engines  and  gas-turbine  frigate  engines. It  is  true  that the  arms  embargo
adopted  by  the  EU,  United  States  and  other Western  countries in  July 2014 will have
little direct impact on arms imports, given the very limited extent of defence industry
cooperation between these countries and Russia. However, restrictive measures apply
not only to weapons as such, but also to dual-use goods used in arms production, such
as  electronic  components  and  precision  machine  tools,  which  Russia  is  unable  to
manufacture  domestically.  This  means  having  to  find  alternative  suppliers,  which  will
take time — two-and-a half years in the case of items formerly imported from Ukraine,
according to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin93 — thus slowing down the process
of acquiring new weapons.

88

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Procurement, IHS Jane's, 2014.

89 Russia Sold Arms Worth $15 Billion in 2014 – Putin, Moscow Times, 27 January 2015.
90 Bulava missile designer blames industry for test failures, News.Az, 14 April 2010.
91

Italian Rys: Russia Buys Western Lynx MRAPs, Defense Industry Daily, 27 January 2013.

92 Military  procurement  in  Russia,  Cooper  J.,
McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

in The  Russian  Armed  Forces  in  Transition,  Eds.

93 Russian military will suffer from Ukraine embargo, Oxford Analytica, 20 August 2014.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 17 of 24

4. Military capability — comparison with other military powers

Figure 5: Comparative defence statistics

Russia

USA

China

UK

Defence spending, US$ billion (%GDP)

$87 billion (4.1%)

$640billion (3.8%)

$188billion (2%)

$58billion (2.3%)

Active armed forces personnel

771 000

1 433 150

2 333 000

159 150

Main battle tanks

2 800

2 785

6 540

227

Battleships

34

Aircraft carriers

98

71

19

1

10

1

(UK: 0)

Nuclear warheads (including retired warheads)

7 500

7 100

250

215

Nuclear submarines capable of deploying strategic nuclear warheads

12

14

4

4

2014 figures
Data: IISS Military Balance 2015, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Federation of American Scientists.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 18 of 24

4.1. Conventional capability

Russia's armed  forces  are  larger  than  those  of  all  its  ex-Soviet  neighbours  combined.
However,  the  above  data  show  that  compared  to China  and  the  United  States  in
particular  (Russia's  largest  potential  adversary  if  a regional  conflict  were  to  escalate);
they come a distant third in most areas, with significantly fewer tanks, battleships and
bombers.  Clearly,  with  just one-eighth  of  the  United  States'  GDP  (one-quarter  of
China's), and half of its population (one-tenth of China's), Russia simply does not have
the economic and demographic resources to compete with either country in terms of
military spending or personnel.

Of  course, capability  is  not  just  about  numbers.  In modern  warfare (for  example,  the
2003  US  and  British  invasion  of  Iraq), a  smaller number of well trained and equipped
soldiers  can  easily  defeat  a  numerically  superior  adversary.  However,  in  this  respect
too, comparisons  are  not  in  Russia's  favour.  Although  substantial  efforts  are  being
made to recruit more professionals and upgrade equipment, the Russian armed forces
will lag behind in terms of training and equipment for many years to come.

4.2. Nuclear capability

Figure 6: Nuclear weapons: Russia and the world

Deployed strategic
Deployed non-strategic
Non-deployed
Retired

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

Russia

US

France China

UK

Israel Pakistan India

Data: Federation of American Scientists, 2015.

Nuclear  weapons  are  the  one  area  in  which  Russia,  which  inherited  the  entire  Soviet
nuclear  arsenal, has  maintained  parity  with  the  United  States. Russia's 7 500 nuclear
weapons fall into three categories:

 1 780 deployed strategic warheads, the  most  dangerous  category, available  for
immediate use. Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, 1991) and its
successor  (New  START,  2011), Russia  and  the  US  are  committed  to  reducing
stocks to under 1 550; both countries are slightly over this target;

 2 720 non-deployed  strategic/non-strategic warheads,  in  storage or  under
maintenance — not  limited  by  New  START (non-strategic  warheads are  slightly
smaller  than  strategic  warheads  and  designed  for  use  on  the  battlefield  rather
than  against  civilian  targets,  but are still  considerably  more  powerful  than  the
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki);

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 19 of 24

 3 000 retired, but largely intact warheads awaiting dismantlement.94

The United States has slightly more deployed strategic warheads (1 900), but its total
nuclear  arsenal  is  smaller  (7 100: 180  deployed  non-strategic;  2 680  non-deployed;
2 340 retired).95 Altogether, Russia has just under half of the world's nuclear weapons.

The United  States  has the  upper  hand in  terms  of launching capacity,  with  a  total
794 delivery  vehicles
(intercontinental  ballistic/submarine-launched missiles  and
strategic bombers) compared to Russia's 528.96 Russian delivery systems are also often
of  inferior  quality,  some  of  them  dating  back  to  Soviet  times. To  address  this
shortcoming,  the 2011-20  State Armaments Programme is  investing  heavily  in  new
nuclear-capable planes,  submarines  and missiles,  but  development  of  these  is  taking
time:  the  next  generation  of  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  launched  from  land-
based  silos  is  not  likely  to  be  ready  till  2020,97 while  the  new  submarine-launched
Bulava missile has repeatedly failed practice launches.
In  its  Military  Doctrine,98 Russia  'reserves  the  right  to  utilise  nuclear  weapons  ...
[including] in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use
of  conventional  weapons  when  the  very  existence  of  the  state  is  under  threat'.
However,  a recent  statement  by  Vladimir Putin  that a  nuclear  alert  had  been
considered  during  the  Crimean  crisis,99 suggests  that the  threshold  for  a  Russian
nuclear response could be lower. There have also been veiled threats in the context of
the current crisis — for example, if the United States decides to supply lethal arms to
Ukraine, for  use  against 'Russia  ...  a  country  which has  nuclear  weapons',  this  would
lead  to  'an  uncontrolled  and  extremely  dangerous  course  of  events',  according  to
parliamentary  Foreign  Affairs Committee Chair  Alexei Pushkov.100 Similarly, Russia's
ambassador  to  Denmark, Mikhail Vanin, has  warned  that  Danish  battleships  could
become  'targets  for  Russian  nuclear  missiles'  if  the  country  joins  NATO's  missile
defence system.101 While it is uncertain that Russia would ever follow through on such
threats,  they  are  a  useful  psychological  weapon  and  part  of  its  hybrid  approach  to
Ukraine and potential NATO allies (see following chapter).

5. Hybrid warfare

5.1. Russia's sophisticated use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine

Should  the  Ukraine  conflict  escalate  further  and  NATO  become  directly  involved,  the
Russian  armed  forces  would  find  themselves  by  far  the  weaker  party  in  terms  of
conventional  capability. Nor could  they count  on  any  outside  support,  now  that
countries  such  as  Belarus  and  Kazakhstan — Russia's  allies  in  the  Collective  Security
Treaty  Organisation  (CSTO) — have  distanced  themselves  from  Russia; for  example

94 Estimates; Status of World Nuclear Forces, Federation of American Scientists.
95

ibid.

96 Nuclear force remains central to Russia's defence, Oxford Analytica, 15 January 2015.
97 The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015.
98 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 2014 (in Russian only).
99 Ukraine conflict: Putin 'was ready for nuclear alert', BBC News, 15 March 2015.
100 Moscow will not stay indifferent to U.S. decision on lethal arms supplies to Kiev, Russia Beyond the

Headlines, 24 March 2015.

101 Russia warns Denmark its warships could become nuclear targets, Telegraph, 21 March 2015.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 20 of 24

Belarussian  President  Alexander Lukashenko has  criticised Russia's  annexation  of
Crimea  as  a  'bad  precedent'102 and  vetoed Russia's  proposal  for  Eurasian  Economic
Union countries to ban Ukrainian imports.

However,  Russian  military  operations are  only  part  of  an  increasingly  sophisticated
hybrid campaign, described in the Military Doctrine103 as 'a complex mixture of military
force  with  political,  economic,  information  and  other  non-military  means'.  The
importance  of  this hybrid  approach  has  been  acknowledged  by  Russian Chief  of Staff
General  Valery Gerasimov: 'in  many  cases,  [non-military  tools]  have  exceeded  the
power  of  force  of  weapons  in  their  effectiveness'.104 Accordingly,  the  recently
established  National  Command  and Control  Centre  for  State  Defence  brings  together
representatives  of  49  government  bodies,  enabling  coordinated  action  across  a  wide
range of fields, from food imports to media.105

In Ukraine,  conventional  military  operations — conducted  using  non-uniformed  'little
green men' in Crimea and Donbass — are combined with a wide range of instruments,
including:

Economic measures: Russia's refusal to renegotiate debts owed to it by Ukraine could
jeopardise an IMF bail-out for the country.106 Piling on the pressure, it has also banned
successive categories  of Ukrainian imports and raised gas  prices. For  the  time  being,
Russia's  ability  to  cut off  vital  gas  supplies  altogether  is  limited  by  its  dependence  on
Ukraine as a transit country for supplies to South-East Europe. That dependence would
have ended with the planned South Stream pipeline bypassing Ukraine. Now that this
project  has  been  abandoned, an  alternative  route  via  Turkey  is currently  under
negotiation.107 If  completed,  such  a  pipeline  would  give  Russia  even  greater  leverage
over Ukraine's fragile economy.

Cyber-attacks: US  intelligence  agencies  list cyber-aggression as  the  top  threat  to
national security, and Russia as the number one source of such threats.108 In Ukraine,
computers  in the Prime Minister's  office  and  several  of the  country's  embassies  have
been  hit  by the virulent 'Snake' malware,109 believed  to  have  originated  from  Russia,
which had already  proved  its capability in  this  field by  disabling  numerous  Estonian
websites in 2007.

Information war: Russia has launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign, both for
domestic and international consumption. The country's domestic media deftly combine
propaganda  with  entertainment,110 in  selling  a  narrative  according  to  which  patriotic
volunteers are protecting ethnic Russian minorities against a 'fratricidal war' waged by
a corrupt and aggressive Ukrainian regime.

Admittedly, such  propaganda  has  its  limitations. Russians  remain  reserved  about
stepping  up  the  country's  military  involvement  in Ukraine: as  mentioned  above, a

102 Belarus Says Russia's Annexation of Crimea Sets a 'Bad Precedent', Moscow Times, 24 March 2014.
103 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, op. cit.
104 Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for Ukraine, World Post, 11 February 2014.
105 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russian Federation — Armed Forces, IHS Jane's, 2014.
106 Ukraine's Russia debt threatens IMF rescue, Yahoo News, 26 March 2015.
107 Russia Presses Ahead With Plan for Gas Pipeline to Turkey, New York Times, 21 January 2015.
108 Russia expanding cyber arsenal, US assessment says, Boston Globe, 27 February 2015.
109 Ukraine PM's office hit by cyber attack linked to Russia, Financial Times, 7 August 2014.
110 Inside Putin’s Information War, Politico Magazine, 4 January 2015.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 21 of 24

recent  Levada Centre poll111 shows  strongly  increased  opposition  to  open  military
aggression in Ukraine, which could augment further if the reportedly large number of
Russian casualties in Ukraine continues to grow.112

Russia's propaganda machine has scored some successes in neighbouring countries —
for  example,  in  Latvia  where according  to  a Latvian government-commissioned  poll
more  than  twice  as  many  ethnic  Russians (who  are  able  to  watch  Russian  domestic
channels) support Russia as Ukraine in the conflict between the two countries.113

Meanwhile, the slick  Russia  Today news  channel reaches  out to  a  wider  international
audience,  with  broadcasts  in  English, Russian, Arabic  and  Spanish. During  just  one
month in 2015, its YouTube channel scored some 40 million views.114 Coverage will be
expanded  in  2015, thanks  to  a  40%  budget  increase  and  the  addition  of  French  and
German.  Russia has  also  successfully  harnessed  new  media,  with  an  army  of  pro-
Kremlin 'trolls' posting on news sites and social media.115

Psychological pressure: the  above-mentioned threats  referring to  Russia's  nuclear
arsenal, together with recent military drills held close to the Ukrainian, Georgian116 and
Estonian  borders, and frequent  incursions  into  the  airspace and  territorial  waters of
neighbouring countries, seem  designed  to  intimidate Ukraine  and  deter  its  potential
NATO  allies  from  becoming  involved. Terrorist  attacks  in  Kyiv,  Kharkiv  and  other
Ukrainian cities, allegedly coordinated by Russian special forces,117 could also be part of
this general strategy.

5.2. Advantages of a hybrid approach to military conflict

In Ukraine, coordinated actions in different fields have achieved a mutually reinforcing
destabilising  effect.  This  hybrid  approach also has the  advantage  of remaining  below
the threshold likely to trigger a military response by NATO, which despite not having a
Treaty  obligation  to  defend  Ukraine,  has  committed  itself  to  providing  support.118
Furthermore,  such  actions can  be  denied by  the  Russian  government: military
operations can  be  attributed  to volunteers  and  cyber-attacks to  'patriotic  hackers';
meanwhile, successive embargoes on  Ukrainian  food  imports  are  allegedly  motivated
by hygiene concerns.119

Such  denials  have  of  course  lost  credibility  with  NATO  intelligence, which suggests
there could be as many as 12 000 Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine.120 The claim that
cyber-attacks  come  from  private  hackers  is  equally  dubious, given  the  sophisticated

111 Ukrainian crisis: Russian involvement and expectations, Levada Centre, March 2015 (in Russian only).
112 Russian soldiers 'dying in large numbers' in Ukraine - Nato, BBC News, 5 March 2015.
113 Baltic  States  Compete  With  Russia 

in  TV  Battle  for  Hearts  and  Minds,  Moscow  Times,

13 February 2015.

114 The EU and NATO Are Gearing Up to Fight Russia — On the Internet, Vice News, 24 March 2015.
115 Pro-Russia trolling below the line on Ukraine stories, Guardian, 4 May 2014.
116 Is Moscow Preparing for a New War Against Georgia? Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 March 2015.
117 All  terrorist  attacks  in  Ukraine  coordinated  by  Russian  special  forces – Nalyvaichenko,  Interfax-

Ukraine, 1 April 2015.

118 NATO leaders pledge support to Ukraine at Wales Summit, NATO, 4 September 2014.
119 Russia Bans More Ukrainian Products, Moscow Times, 13 November 2014.
120 Some 12,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine supporting rebels: U.S. commander, Reuters, 3 March 2015.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 22 of 24

and coordinated nature of such attacks, or the fact that much of their activity is during
normal office hours in Russia's European time zones.121

And yet, Russia's persistent claims and counter-claims have played their part in slowing
down an effective response, by spreading doubts and undermining Western unity, with
for  example  the  German  government  apparently  distancing  itself  at  one  point  from
NATO claims of widespread Russian aggression.122

5.3. How is NATO responding to Russian hybrid warfare?

Compared  to  NATO,  Russia  has  inferior  conventional  capability,  but  its  sophisticated
hybrid campaign has given it the upper hand in Ukraine for the time being. What are
NATO and other Western actors, such as the EU, doing in response?

In  addition  to  conventional  responses, such  as  providing  the  Ukrainian  armed  forces
with  more  training  and  equipment,  NATO is  also  strengthening  its  cyber  defence
capability.  Cyber  defence  has  now  been  recognised  as  'part  of  NATO's  core  task  of
collective  defence',123 meaning  that  a  Russian  cyber attack  on  a  NATO  country  could
potentially  trigger  a  military  response.  To  test  capability  in  this  field,  NATO  recently
carried out its largest ever cyber defence exercise.124

In the information war, NATO's newly established Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence may  have  a  role  to  play  in  coordinating  the  response. The  EU  will  also  be
involved  in  this,  following  a  call125 by  the  March 2015  European  Council  to  'challenge
Russia's  ongoing  disinformation  campaigns',  requesting  EU  High  Representative
Federica Mogherini 'to prepare by June an action plan on strategic communication'.

To provide Russian speakers in the Baltic States and elsewhere with an alternative to
Kremlin  propaganda, Latvia  is  considering developing a  Russian-language  TV  channel,
possibly  in  cooperation  with  other  EU  countries.126 Meanwhile, on social  media,  the
United  States has  launched a UnitedForUkraine  campaign on  Facebook  and  Twitter
(hijacked at one point by Russian 'trolls');127 US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
is setting up a new Digital Media Department to produce Russian-language content.128
For  its  part,  the British  army  is setting  up  a  special  force  of  'Facebook  warriors'.129 It
remains  to  be  seen  how  effectively  these  and  other  initiatives  will  counter  Russian
hybrid warfare in Ukraine and elsewhere.

5.4. Russia  vs.  NATO:  how  much  of  a  threat  are  the  Russian  armed
forces?

Russia's armed  forces  are quantitatively  and  qualitatively inferior in conventional
capability to  those  of  the  United  States  and  NATO  as  a  whole.  It  is  true  that  recent
reforms  have  improved  their  effectiveness  and  that substantial  equipment  upgrades

121 Russian cyber espionage to become more aggressive, Oxford Analytica, 16 December 2014.
122 Breedlove's Bellicosity: Berlin Alarmed by Aggressive NATO Stance on Ukraine, Spiegel, 6 March 2015.
123 NATO Summit Declaration, 5 September 2014
124 Largest ever NATO cyber defence exercise gets underway, NATO, 18 November 2014.
125 European Council conclusions, 19-20 March 2015
126 Latvia proposes ‘alternative’ to Russian TV propaganda, EurActiv, 8 January 2015.
127 Hashtag  Hijacked:  Russia  Trolls  U.S.  Twitter  Campaign  In  Ukraine  Crisis,  Radio  Free  Europe/Radio

Liberty, 25 April 2014.

128 US unleashes cyber-troops on Russian social networks, Izvestia, 14 April 2015 (in Russian only).
129 British army creates team of Facebook warriors, Guardian, 31 January 2015.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 23 of 24

are ongoing. However, this will not fundamentally change the balance between the two
sides, meaning that Russia is unlikely to want to tackle NATO head-on.

On the other hand, Russia's military is more than adequate to present a serious threat
to  Ukraine, and  potentially  to  other non-NATO,  ex-Soviet  countries. Its  adept  use  of
hybrid  warfare  has  enabled  it  to  substantially  destabilise  Ukraine,
in  defiance  of
international condemnation. NATO, as an alliance conceived with conventional threats
in mind, is struggling to respond effectively.

Russia's armed forces — reforms and challenges

Page 24 of 24

6. Main references
Ukraine after Minsk II: the next level, Bentzen N., 2015.

The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and Implications, Cohen A., Hamilton R., in
Russian  Military:  Ground  Force  Modernization  and  Georgia  War  Lessons,  Ed.  Guardano A.,
2012.

Military  procurement  in  Russia,  Cooper  J.,  in The  Russian  Armed  Forces  in  Transition,  Eds.
McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

Russia's Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure?, de Haas M., 2011.

The Economic Cost of Soviet Security and Empire, Epstein D., in The Impoverished Superpower:
Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden, Eds. Rowen H., Wolf C., 1990.

Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates 1950-1990, Firth N., Noren J., 1998.

Reform of the Russian Army, Gayday A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Air Force, IHS Jane's, 2014.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Armed Forces, IHS Jane's, 2014.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russian Federation — Procurement, IHS Jane's, 2014.

State  of  Play:  SAP  2020:  Russia's  State  Armaments  Programme  and  Implications  for  Future
Capabilities, IHS Jane's, 2015.

The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015.

Reform of the Russian Air Force, Lavrov A., in Russia's New Army, Ed. Barabanov M., 2011.

Russia's Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War, McDermott R., 2009.

Military  Doctrine  of  the  Russian Federation, President  of  the  Russian  Federation, 2014 (in
Russian only).

Serdyukov Cleans Up the Arbat, Pukhov R., Moscow Defense Brief, 2008.

Civil-Military Relations and Modernization, Renz B., in The Russian Armed Forces in Transition,
Eds. McDermott R., Nygren B., Vendil Pallin C., 2012.

Economics of the Military-Industrial Complex, Rosefielde S, in Oxford Handbook of the Russian
Economy, Eds. Alexeev M. and Weber S., 2013.

Military  Modernization  and  the  Russian  Ground  Forces,  Thornton,  R.,  in Russian Military:
Ground Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

Q
A
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E
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-

After  a  long  period  of neglect  and  decline,  the  Russian
armed  forces  have  once  again  taken  centre  stage.  On
top of their alleged involvement in Ukraine, incursions
into the airspace and territorial waters of neighbouring
countries are becoming more frequent, and large-scale
military  drills  have been  held  throughout  the  country.
The traditional Victory Day parade through Moscow on
9 May celebrates Russian military prowess.

In  line  with  their  increasingly  active  role,  the  Russian
armed forces are undergoing a modernisation process
with  sweeping  reforms  and  a  major  rearmament
programme.  In  the  context  of  rising  tensions  with
NATO  and  a  potentially  escalating  conflict in  Ukraine,
the crucial question is whether the country now has a
modern fighting machine capable of taking on a more
substantial adversary.

This is a publication of the
Members' Research Service

Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services,
European Parliament

PE 554.213
ISBN 978-92-823-7027-8
doi: 10.2861/75411