Case C-270/15 P: Appeal lodged on 8 June 2015 by the Kingdom of Belgium against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 25 March 2015 in Case T-538/11 Belgium v Commission
Date: 2015-06-08
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: State aid, aid to agriculture, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, cattle, control of State aid, livestock farming








C_2015254EN.01001401.xml










3.8.2015   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 254/14





Appeal lodged on 8 June 2015 by the Kingdom of Belgium against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 25 March 2015 in Case T-538/11 Belgium v Commission
(Case C-270/15 P)
(2015/C 254/18)
Language of the case: Dutch

Parties


Appellant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: C. Pochet and J.-C. Halleux, acting as Agents, L. Van Den Hende, advocaat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Kingdom of Belgium claims that the Court of Justice of the European Union should:






—


set aside the judgment of the General Court of 25 March 2015;










—


annul the decision of the European Commission of 27 July 2011 concerning the State aid for financing screening of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in bovine animals implemented by Belgium (State aid C 44/08 (ex NN 45/04)); and










—


order the Commission to pay the costs.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments


First ground: The General Court errs in its legal reasoning and disregards the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it in respect of the existence of an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.






(a)



First part: The General Court errs in its legal reasoning and disregards the obligation to state reasons, particularly inasmuch as it proceeds on the assumption that, whenever the public authorities impose on specific undertakings a legislative or administrative obligation, the costs pertaining to that obligation must automatically be imposed also on the undertakings in question, without the public authorities being able to intervene in any way and regardless of the purpose of the measure and the link with the exercise of public powers. Given that that assumption has to be rejected, the General Court fails in any way to explain why the costs of the TSE tests would constitute a charge ‘normally’ included in the budget of an undertaking. The General Court also disregards the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in conjunction with Article 53 thereof, in particular in that it does not examine a number of arguments and precedents put forward by the appellant or fails to appreciate the relevance thereof.










(b)



Second part: The General Court errs in its legal reasoning in so far as it regards the presence or absence of harmonisation legislation as wholly irrelevant for State-aid purposes. The General Court thus also disregards its obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in conjunction with Article 53 thereof, in not responding to the arguments raised by the Kingdom of Belgium.










(c)



Third part: The General Court errs in its legal reasoning when, in the judgment under appeal, it appears to suggest that the Kingdom of Belgium fails to state why the presence or absence of overcompensation would be of legal relevance to the existence of an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. The judgment under appeal also displays erroneous legal reasoning in so far as it appears to insinuate that the argument lacks an adequate factual basis.





Second ground: The General Court errs in its legal reasoning and disregards the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it in respect of the application of the selectivity requirement within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The General Court errs in its legal reasoning in so far as it asserts in a generalised manner that all undertakings that must have mandatory inspections carried out in order for them to be able to place their goods on the market or to sell them are, by definition, in a ‘comparable factual and legal situation’. At the very least, the General Court disregards the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it by failing entirely to explain why all of those undertakings would be in a ‘comparable factual and legal situation’ from a State-aid perspective, and by leaving unanswered the reservations expressed by the Kingdom of Belgium.