JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014
Date: 2015-03-25
Institutions: European Commission, High Representative of the Union
Subjects: Egypt, European neighbourhood policy, child labour, corruption, democratisation, economic reform, fight against unemployment, gender equality, human rights, innovation, public health, renewable energy, right of asylum, social change, teaching curriculum, terrorism, women's rights













EUR-Lex - 52015SC0065 - EN











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52015SC0065

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 /* SWD/2015/0065 final */









1.         OVERALL
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
This document reports on progress made
on the implementation of the EU-Egypt European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Action Plan between 1 January and 31 December 2014. Developments outside this
period are taken into consideration where relevant. This is not a general
assessment of the political and economic situation in Egypt. Information on
regional and multilateral sector processes is contained in the Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity progress report.
The formal EU-Egypt dialogue under the
ENP remained de facto suspended and the action plan was extended to
March 2015, pending negotiation of a new action plan. Consultations aiming to
revive the formal dialogue between the EU and Egypt took place in February and
December 2014. The EU and Egypt agreed to re-launch their cooperation within
the framework of the Association Agreement, beginning with arrangements for a
progressive resumption of Subcommittee meetings in 2015, including on democracy
and human rights.
  
The EU continued to carry out its
outreach activities. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission and the EU’s Special
Representative for Human Rights visited Egypt and reiterated the EU’s support
for reforms, urging counterparts to persist in implementing the transitional
roadmap adopted by the interim government in July 2013 and in promoting human
rights. The EU carried out an Expert Electoral Mission (EEM) for the constitutional
referendum in January 2014 and an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the
presidential elections in May 2014. These elections were deemed to have been
held in rather challenging circumstances.
2014 was marked by political, security
and economic challenges for Egypt. The political transition continued to unfold
as two important steps in the transitional roadmap were completed. In January
2014, a new Constitution was approved. In May 2014 the former Defence Minister
Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was elected President. Following his
swearing into office in June 2014 President El-Sisi installed a government to
replace the interim government in place since 2013. The roadmap was not
completed in 2014, pending parliamentary elections due to take place in March
and April 2015. The insurgency by militants in Northern Sinai involving
terrorist attacks there as well as in mainland Egypt continued throughout the
year. 2014 was also characterised by diminishing space for debate and dissent.
There was limited progress on Egypt’s
reforms in the areas of democratic governance and human rights. The new
Constitution, which includes certain provisions that are more liberal than the
preceding ones, entered into force with many areas to be governed in detail by
ordinary law. The President is subject to stronger controls by parliament and
his term is limited. The implementation of this new legal framework with
tangible results was pending at the end of the year. Egypt remained without a
parliament to enact legislation and to implement the Constitution throughout
the whole year, and the President continued to issue legislation by decree. A
discrepancy between existing (or amended) laws and the basic Constitutional
tenets was therefore noted.
The practice applied by the state
institutions with regard to law enforcement was contrary to the Constitution's
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the space for civil
society.
Freedom of association and assembly were
restricted. The freedom of the press was visibly reduced. There were no
tangible developments in the fight against corruption or in reforming the
judiciary. Many pro-Morsi protesters who had been arrested in 2013 remained in
detention throughout the year, while few were released. The jurisdiction of
military courts in civilian cases was expanded. Prisons remained in general
closed for inspections by independent bodies or experts.
There was less space for the activities
of civil society organisations (CSOs) due to stricter controls, which led a
number of CSOs to decide to close their offices in Egypt. Furthermore, draft
legislation envisages restrictions and detailed administrative controls of CSO
funding from abroad.
The economic situation remained
difficult, notably due to market distortions caused by a decades-long heavily
subsidised system (energy, fuel and water). Inflation continued to increase and
economic growth was sluggish. However, the budget for 2014-15 includes major
subsidy reforms in this area, and these are underway. Due to security threats, gas
exports to Israel and Jordan were disrupted. The security threats led to a drop
in tourism and investment, and threatened the stability of shipments coming
through the Suez Canal.
Overall, Egypt made limited progress in
implementing the ENP Action Plan, especially on deep and sustainable democracy.
The continued use of the death sentence, including against 1200 persons in
March and April, was of particular concern. The restrictions on civil society
and peaceful demonstrations were also of concern. 
However, the above analysis needs to be
seen in a difficult regional and internal security context, with Egypt facing
challenges such as the ongoing insurgency of militant groups and the threat of
a possible impact of the effects of Da'esh (including allegiance pledged to
Da'esh by Sinai-based Ansar Beit al-Maqdis). These groups primarily target the
state security forces, causing significant loss of life including among
civilians, as well as key infrastructure. In addition, Egypt faced considerable
security challenges related to the situation in Libya and the flow of migrants
at its border with Libya, which is over 1 000 km long.
Egypt actively mediated between Hamas
and Fatah and between Palestine[1]
and Israel, working towards a permanent ceasefire and its implementation.
Based on the assessment of its progress
in 2014 on implementing the ENP and with the perspective of resuming the formal
dialogue under the ENP in 2015, Egypt should focus its work in the coming year
on:
·          
fully
enacting the 2014 Constitution and implementing it, in particular to ensure
rule of law and to improve human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
·          
completing
the 2013 transitional roadmap by organising genuine democratic parliamentary
elections, with a free and open campaign, so that parliament can enact and
ensure national legislation compliant with the Constitution and with
international standards, thereby ending legislation by decree;
·          
amending
the law on assembly in line with the Constitution and with international
standards;
·          
creating
conditions conducive to an active and independent civil society that can
contribute to the country’s political, social and economic development, through
appropriate legislation on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
clarification of provisions under Article 78 of the Penal Code concerning
funding provided to NGOs;
·          
re-applying
a moratorium on the death penalty;
·          
applying
due legal process and ensuring that prison conditions comply with international
standards and practices and allowing access to prisoners;
·          
ceasing
the practice of military courts judging civilians;
·          
ensuring
that investigations of cases of alleged violence, including sexual abuse, are
carried out and that the perpetrators are promptly brought to justice, and
ensuring the protection of women’s rights and gender equality;
·          
ensuring
that regulations on the right of asylum are in line with the Constitution and
international standards on the rights of migrants and refugees;
·          
ensuring
macroeconomic stability, strengthening public finance management and taking
action to implement necessary economic reforms, reducing barriers to trade and
ensuring correct implementation of the tariff dismantling process;
·          
ensuring
and further implementing social safety net systems to protect those who are
most vulnerable.
2.         POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND REFORM
Deep and sustainable democracy
A new Constitution was adopted in
January 2014, following its approval in a referendum in which 38.6 % of
voters participated. In general, the Constitution can be considered to be more
liberal than the previous constitutions, but remains conservative, in
particular on freedom of religion and belief. It limits the powers of the
President in a semi-presidential system, notably through term limits and
parliamentary checks, but it strengthens the autonomy of state institutions
such as the military, and especially the judiciary. Importantly, it includes an
unprecedented level of protection for human rights and individual freedoms, and
bolsters the rights of women and gender equality. However, these liberal
precepts have not yet been applied in the spirit of the constitution.
Despite the fact that around five
million women were not included on the voter list and were effectively
disenfranchised due to their lack of identification documents, women were the
largest group of voters who endorsed the constitution. The recourse to military
trials of civilians’ remained. The Constitution leaves many areas to be
determined by ordinary legislation.
In a departure from the constitutional
declaration of 8 July 2013 (roadmap), the Constitution allows for changes to
the electoral timetable, following which presidential elections can precede
parliamentary elections. Presidential elections were subsequently
announced in March 2014, in line with the 90-day timeline to begin electoral
procedures. General El-Sisi was promoted to Field Marshal by the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces and announced his candidacy for the Presidency. The
Presidential Elections Commission approved two candidates: El-Sisi and Hamdeen
Sabahi, a Nasserite politician who had come third in the 2012 presidential
elections that brought Mohamed Morsi to power. El-Sisi won the elections held
on 26-28 May 2014 with 97 % of the vote, with the turnout recorded at 47 %.
Sabahi won 3% of the valid votes, with 4.91 % spoiled ballots. El-Sisi was
inaugurated on 8 June 2014, and was sworn in before the Supreme Constitutional
Court.
The EU carried out an Expert
Electoral Mission (EEM) for the constitutional referendum in
January
2014
and an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the
presidential elections led by Mario David, Member of European Parliament. The
EOM concluded that the elections were held in a challenging political context,
despite broad public support for the roadmap. Although the overall electoral
process was judged to be satisfactory on polling day itself, the EOM was
critical of partial media coverage, very limited space for dissent, and the
political/legal context the elections were held in.
The roadmap was not completed in the
course of the year, pending parliamentary elections. In the absence of a
parliament, legislation continued to be issued by decree. Preparations for the
parliamentary elections started in 2014.
The Muslim-Brotherhood-affiliated
political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, was banned by Court order in
August 2014 on the grounds of being associated with a terrorist organisation.
Cases were filed to also ban the Salafist Building and Development and Al-Nour
parties. However, an Urgent Matters Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction
over a lawsuit filed against political parties founded on a religious basis.
In July the Ministry of Social
Solidarity re-launched a consultation process on a controversial piece of NGO
legislation currently under preparation, after the process had stalled in
December 2013. The Ministry later announced the establishment of a committee to
review the draft law to ensure that it would be in line with the constitution.
New government proposals presented were widely seen as restricting the freedom
of association and strengthening controls on civil society.
Several NGOs closed their offices and
left Egypt when their applications for registration were rejected.
There has been serious concern after the
Ministry announced that all entities involved in NGO activities had to register
as NGOs by 10 November 2014, not as other legal entities, thus obliging them to
conform to the stringent rules under NGO legislation. In addition, the
President approved an amendment to the Penal Code in September 2014, which
envisaged harsh
punishment for anyone receiving foreign funding for activities that intended to
harm national interest or unity. This aimed to contain terrorist
activities but its vague legal formulation permits a broad interpretation, causing
concerns that NGOs critical of the government might be targeted.
EU cooperation with civil society
suffered due to the difficult process of CSO registration and the lengthy and
complicated process for authorising project funding. This resulted in the
suspension of a substantial number of projects.
The uncertainty about the revision of
the law of association further hampered the work of civil society, including
those delivering critical basic public services. The EU continued to support
national entities and CSOs in addressing children’s and women’s rights, and
human rights in general.
The freedom of assembly remained
seriously restricted by the controversial 'protest law, which governs the right
to public assembly and peaceful protests, passed by the interim President
Mansour in November 2013. Anti-government protests continued in 2013-14, in
particular in universities. A very high number of people continued to be
arrested since former President Morsi’s ouster for violating the ‘protest law’,
and there were recurrent calls to amend it to bring it into line with the
Constitution. Trials against activists and political detainees were often based
on violations of this restrictive law. The Supreme Constitutional Court was
expected to start examining the constitutionality of the law in 2015.
The freedom of the press was
reduced significantly: Many journalists, including foreign correspondents, were
harassed by security agents and pro-regime mobs. Al Jazeera, perceived by the
authorities as friendly to the Muslim Brotherhood, was specifically targeted,
with several of their journalists (including non-Egyptians and some Europeans)
sentenced in June to seven to ten years of imprisonment for joining or
assisting a terrorist group and spreading misinformation harmful to Egypt’s
national security. On 1 January 2015 the Court of Cassation ordered a re-trial
of three Al-Jazeera journalists, due to a flawed original trial, while
journalist Peter Greste was released and deported to his country of origin.
Self-censorship vis-à-vis the authorities prevailed, exemplified by a statement
by main chief editors that they would stop publishing content which could
undermine state institutions in the wake of the attacks on security forces in
Sinai in October.
As regards transitional justice,
the Fact-Finding Committee set up in November 2013 by then-interim President
Mansour to look into the violent incidents following former President Morsi’s
ousting, presented its findings and recommendations to the President in
November 2014, and he agreed that the report could be published. The report
largely attributes responsibility for the violence to the Muslim
Brotherhood/Islamists
and exculpates security forces. In March 2014, the National Council for Human
Rights released a separate report, which concluded that, on the contrary,
security forces used excessive force in these events, namely in dispersing the
Rab’a sit-in in August 2013. There were no judicial investigations or
prosecutions of state security personnel in 2014 in relation to the dispersal.
The case against Hosni Mubarak who was
charged with responsibility for the killing of protesters during the 25 January
2011 revolution was dismissed in November 2014 on procedural grounds. Former
Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly and six of his aides were acquitted in the same
case. The Prosecutor General launched an appeal. In January 2015, it was
decided that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his two sons would be
retried on charges of corruption.
The prosecution of opponents and
dissenters – many arrested for violating the contentious ‘protest law’– in many
cases showed
due process and procedural deficiencies, including mass sentences, harsh
rulings based on insufficient evidence or failure to allow lawyers to cross-examine
witnesses. Lengthy pre-trial detention with no formal charges was also
prevalent. The mass sentencing to death of some 1200 Muslim
Brotherhood/Morsi
supporters in March and in April 2014 in Minya received broad international
attention. 220 of the sentences were later confirmed, after consultation with
the Grand Mufti. They are under appeal. 183 people were sentenced to death in
February 2015. In addition, Egypt resumed executions in June 2014, after a de
facto moratorium since 2011. 
The security sector remained
unreformed. Following the election of El-Sisi as President, the military
consolidated its influence over key political decisions in Egypt. The new
Constitution gives the Supreme Court of the Armed Forces (SCAF) the final say
on appointments to the position of Minister of Defence. According to the new
Constitution, the military budget continues to go before parliament as a single
budget item. Military trials of civilians continued throughout the year. A new
presidential decree issued in October following terrorist attacks in Sinai
broadened the scope for the military trial of civilians.
Other human rights and fundamental
freedoms
Throughout the year, reports emerged of
arbitrary arrests by security forces and inhumane conditions in prisons. Other
reports referred to forced disappearances and torture in facilities
outside judicial oversight.
The National Council for Human Rights
and the Fact Finding Committee were granted access to prisons only in
some cases. Prisons remained in general closed for inspection by local or
international organisations.  
As regards the freedom of religion or
belief, the Egyptian authorities obliged mosques to lay down a theme for
their weekly Friday sermons in a move to curb Islamist dissent and extremism.
The Minister for Religious Endowments banned all NGOs from collecting donations
inside mosques and instructed imams not to let anyone speak from the pulpit or
give religious lessons without prior written ministerial permission. On
the other hand, there was a noticeably positive approach towards Coptic
Christians, including through symbolic gestures and through easing of
restrictions on church construction and restoration.
There was progress on investigations
into cases of targeted sexual violence against women, recurrent in
crowded squares during demonstrations and holiday celebrations. A number of
defendants received sentences up to life imprisonment for sexual assault.
Reports emerged that female protesters were subject to abuse
and rape by the police while in detention and that these incidents were not
subject to any form of investigation.
Child labour persisted and
street children remained subject to exploitation and sex trafficking. The new
Constitution plans for the establishment of the child protection committees
envisaged under the Child Law of 2007. These have only been set up in two
governorates, but were not operational yet at the end of 2014. A number of underage
protesters were detained in adult facilities instead of being treated by
the youth justice system.
An increasing number of arrests of
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI)
community took place under accusations of debauchery. The defendants were
referred to trial where they were given harsh sentences after very short
proceedings. LGBTI people continued to face harsh treatment in police custody,
physically and mentally, and were often subjected to non-consensual medical
examinations.
Other governance-related issues
Corruption and lack of transparency
remained issues of concern in 2014. In the Global Competitiveness Index
released in August 2014, Egypt ranked 118th. In the 2014 Constitution, Egypt’s
highest audit institution (the Central Audit Office) retained the relative
increase in independence it gained under the 2012 Constitution, but the related
laws were not put in place.
There was significant corruption in
dealings related to land properties and in the security administration. The
mandate of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) was extended to cover
strategy development, prevention and investigation; the ACA’s role in fighting
corruption and organised crime was thus strengthened. The role of the National
Coordinating Committee for Combating Corruption was also strengthened given
that it was placed under the ACA’s leadership and transferred from the Ministry
of Justice and placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. Support for
finalising the implementation of the national strategy to combat corruption
remained the main way in which the EU continued to support Egypt.
The functions of planning,
administrative reform and monitoring were merged under a ministry specifically
designed for these purposes as the single competent authority on them. A
strategy for administrative reform was launched in July. The EU continued to
support improvements in Egypt’s national training capacity and simplifying
procedures by supporting the Central Agency for Organisation and
Administration. Provisions that foster administrative, financial, and economic
decentralisation are included in the new Constitution. Egypt updated and
implemented its decentralisation strategy.
Following the decision to revive EU
support for reforming the justice administration, taken in April, a consortium
of EU Member States including France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom was
set up to: assist Egypt’s government in strengthening administrative processes;
improve the efficiency of the justice system; support the institutional
capacity of the main training institution for the judiciary and justice
administrators (National Centre for Judicial Studies); and support
child-friendly courts.
Cooperation on foreign and security
policy, regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis
management
After the ouster of former President
Morsi and the election of President El-Sisi, Egypt experienced a revival of
foreign policy driven by the country’s ambition to regain leadership in the
Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Thanks to its intensive ‘Africa
campaign’, Egypt was reintegrated into the African Union in July 2014. As a
result of renewed regional turmoil, Egypt emerged as an important
foreign-policy partner.
The EU consulted with Egypt on
cooperation on foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on the Gaza
Strip and to a lesser degree on North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt played a
pivotal role in brokering a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in August 2014 and
hosted a successful Reconstruction Conference in October. Its constructive
influence over the Palestinian Authority and Hamas (despite Egyptian mistrust
of the latter given its affiliation to the Muslim
Brotherhood)
and regained levels of ‘practical’ mutual trust of Egypt with Israel offered a
springboard for
the EU and broader international efforts to seek the return of the Palestinian
Authority to the Gaza Strip and instigate momentum to the peace process.
3.         ECONOMIC REFORM AND SOCIAL
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT
Egypt’s social instability and security
threats continued to undermine the economy. The macroeconomic situation
remained weak and fragile, with persistent external and internal imbalances.
However, these were largely kept in check thanks to financial support provided
by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Real GDP growth
remained subdued but stable at 2.2 %[2] for the
fiscal year 2013-14, driven by private consumption, but was held back by weaker
exports, tourism and investment. On the upside, quarterly GDP growth data show
an upward trend. Inflation remained persistently high at more than 10 % on
average. Monetary policy was tightened in July, when the Central Bank
increased the benchmark interest rates by 100 basis points, in response to
inflationary pressures and in support of the Egyptian pound. The fiscal
deficit remained unsustainably high, reaching 13.6 % of GDP reflecting
two stimulus packages and various spending pledges. Without grants from
the Gulf countries, the deficit for the 2013-14 fiscal year would have reached
17.4 % of GDP.   
Bold reform efforts were launched in the
budget for 2014-15 to reduce expenditure, and in particular to begin reducing
energy subsidies, which represented almost 7 % of GDP, as part of a 5-year
macroeconomic plan focused on fiscal consolidation and inclusive
growth. The balance of payments remained of concern, despite a decrease in
the current account deficit to an estimated 0.8% of GDP, but which was
mainly due to a large increase in inflows of foreign assistance from the Gulf
countries, while key sectors like tourism fell by almost 50% in the 2013-14
fiscal year. An Article IV Consultation of the International Monetary Fund took
place in November, for the first time since 2010.
The unemployment rate rose to
13.4 % in 2014, with youth unemployment reaching 22.1 % for 25-29
year olds and 46.4 % for 20-24 year olds. The latest household survey
showed an increase in poverty, with 25.2 % of Egyptians living below the
national poverty line, and 23.7 % just above it. On the positive side,
extreme poverty fell to 4.8 %.
Prominent trade unionists were appointed
as ministers in the interim government, a move widely seen as an expression of
commitment to reforms in the social sector, and a draft law on
minimum/maximum wages was prepared.
4.         TRADE-RELATED ISSUES, MARKET
AND REGULATORY REFORM
The EU-28 continued to be Egypt’s main trading
partner, with total trade in goods amounting to EUR 25.5 billion in 2014.
Trade and investment continued to be affected by a number of trade irritants,
regulatory barriers and restrictions on investment.
Egypt continued to make regular use of export
taxes and bans. Export taxes were imposed on rice, marble and granite,
metal scraps and sand, and there were bans on the export of solvents
(essential in paint manufacturing and comprised mainly of diesel fuel), and mineral
raw materials: quartz, talc, manganese and feldspar.
In January 2014 Egypt implemented an
autonomous one-year suspension of the Association Agreement tariff dismantling
schedule on passenger cars. In February 2014 it suspended the import of
motorcycles and three-wheeled vehicles (tuk-tuks) for one year, and the import
of their components for three months. In May, it re-allowed their import for
private or personal use and the import of components used for producing the
vehicles (engines, chassis). The import of tuk-tuks and motorcycles for trading
purposes remained suspended.
In view of possible future negotiations
for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), an external
contractor carried out a sustainability impact assessment on the potential
implications. This included a stakeholder consultation exercise in Egypt.
However, no preparatory official discussions for a DCFTA took place.
As regards technical regulations,
a decree issued in June introduced ten new standard specifications on imported
cars and spare parts. These standards had already been applied to
locally-assembled cars and aimed to prevent the import of sub-standard vehicles
and spare parts, or those not conforming to international standards. A twinning
operation in support of metrology and standards was signed in November (with a
UK-led consortium). A twinning operation in conformity assessment and
accreditation was signed in December with a consortium led by Germany.
In the area of customs, in April
2014 Egypt ratified the regional convention on Euro-Mediterranean preferential
rules of origin. The convention entered into force on 1 June 2014.
On sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues,
Egypt took part in an EU programme managed by the European Food Safety Agency
to promote the participation of neighbouring countries in the agency’s work.
Egypt showed interest in the EU’s
integrated maritime policy/blue growth concepts and acknowledged the
importance of addressing maritime issues in a more coordinated way.
A new twinning project in support of the
development of an improved certification system for the accountancy and audit
profession was signed with the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies in late
2014.
There were improvements in the investment
climate. In April 2014 a presidential decree regulating challenges to state
contracts was adopted and aimed to address the myriad of lawsuits put forward
since January 2011 over the legality of past privatisation contracts.
This decree was welcomed by investors as likely to bring more legal certainty. 
As regards the movement of capital
and current payments, a number of restrictions were imposed through
administrative measures taken by the Central Bank, in response to foreign
exchange shortages. Some limitations were still in place for individuals,
whereas for companies the Central Bank guaranteed that profits and dividends
could be expatriated without restrictions.
a 10 % tax
on capital gains and stock dividends and a temporary 5% wealth tax on
annual company profits and personal income over and above EGP 1 million were
introduced in June.
In July, excise duties on alcohol
and cigarettes were increased, and the President issued a decree on
implementing the real estate tax (envisaged to focus mainly on high-end private
housing and corporate real estate). Preparations for the replacement of the
sales tax by VAT were ongoing, but implementation is only expected in
2015.
A twinning project carried out with the
Egyptian Competition Authority was signed at the end of 2014 with a
consortium led by the German Federal Cartel Office.
The legislation on public procurement
was amended to increase the thresholds under which direct awarding of contracts
is allowed in emergency situations. 
New statistical surveys carried
out in 2014 covered topics such as housing rents, violence against women,
disability and migration. Results of the innovative survey on the determinants
and consequences of international migration are expected in 2015.
The transitional cabinet formed by
President El-Sisi created a specific ministerial portfolio to coordinate SME
policy. Proactive steps were taken to formulate a national SME strategy.
The joint 2014 evaluation of SME policy[3]
highlighted challenges including the improvement
of the regulatory framework governing microfinance institutions, tailored
training schemes for SMEs, and the definition of a comprehensive policy
framework promoting
entrepreneurial learning at all levels of the education and
training system.  
5.         COOPERATION ON JUSTICE,
FREEDOM AND SECURITY
Concerning asylum, the UN High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 139 501 Syrian nationals
were registered in Egypt as of 10 September 2014. According to
estimates, the total population of Syrian refugees in Egypt reached two to
three times this figure. The influx was significantly reduced after June 2013
when the suspension of the “visa-free” system considerably changed entry and
residency conditions for Syrians. Most Syrian refugees in Egypt were not in
camps but stayed in urban neighbourhoods, renting and sharing accommodation.
They faced economic and social hardship and became more and more vulnerable.
Cases of harassment and violence were recorded, as well as cases of denial of
public services, and an increase in arrests and deportation. Some 300 000 registered
Syrian refugees had access to health services, while Syrian children were
granted access to schools regardless of their registration status.  
The human trafficking problem in Sinai
subsided, as a result of closing the border with Israel, the toughening of
immigration laws and an increased army presence in Sinai. Migration flows
shifted westwards towards Libya. In line with the government’s efforts to
finalise and implement the National Strategy to combat trafficking in human
beings, the EU prepared further specific support jointly with the Ministry of
Justice and the International Organisation for Migration.
Irregular migration by sea
departing from Egypt increased significantly in 2014. Figures indicate that
from 1 January to 31 August 2014, nearly half of the 3 026 Egyptians arriving
in Italy were unaccompanied minors. UNHCR Egypt was aware of the
arrest during 2014 of more than 3 000 individuals. Exit from detention was
often premised on departure from Egypt and conditions of asylum were believed
to be an important push factor for refugees to attempt migration by sea. 
There were no developments regarding
Egypt’s accession to the Hague Conventions on judicial cooperation.
Cooperation with Egypt on the fight
against terrorism was stepped up, driven partly by regional
developments. Egypt participated in a practitioners’ seminar organised by the
EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator on foreign fighters in Syria in February and
possible other forms of cooperation were discussed during a visit of the Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator in December, with a particular focus on foreign fighters,
de-radicalisation and counter-narratives. In that respect, a strengthened
judicial cooperation with Eurojust, including the nomination of a Eurojust
contact point, would be helpful in fostering closer coordination with the EU in
the fight against terrorism. 
6.         TRANSPORT, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE
CHANGE, INFORMATION SOCIETY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION
No major policy reforms took place in
the transport sector in 2014. However, a number of steps were taken to
develop the country’s transport infrastructure. Projects
announced during the year included major rehabilitation and construction of
roads (484 km at a cost of EGP 984 million or around EUR 110 million), as well
as railway and maritime port infrastructure.
In the field of energy, Egypt’s
oil and gas production continued to be hampered as a result of the government
accumulating debts to foreign investors. About USD 2 million in arrears that
the General Petroleum Corporation owed to foreign operators were settled, while
USD 3 million remained to be paid. Several energy-intensive industries had
their supply of energy curtailed by the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company.
The government’s main efforts were directed at reforming the petrol and
electricity subsidies, while improving electricity generation, import and
connection. In March 2014, the Ministers of Petroleum and Electricity agreed to
form a joint technical group to follow up on operations of the electricity and
natural gas networks. Negotiations were reportedly conducted with a number of
companies and states to import gas for the re-export through Egypt’s LNG
(liquefied natural gas) plants.
In June, the Prime Minister issued a
decree increasing the price of electricity gradually for five years to reduce
the need for subsidies. Following the approval of the 2014-15 state budget, the
government agreed to cut fuel subsidies by EGP 44 billion, to reduce the
budget deficit to 10 % of GDP. This affected the price of oil products,
with average increases of 40% in July 2014 on different types of fuel. The
government decided to allow the use of coal in the energy sector, as
well as by industries such as cement, subject to environmental controls.
As regards developing renewable
energy sources and promoting energy efficiency, the EU-Egypt energy
sector policy support programme was on hold as the budget support general
conditions for disbursement were not met. However, a number of objectives were
achieved through technical assistance, including related draft legislation. The
electricity regulator also issued a decree to incentivise the installation of
photovoltaic panels. The government took first steps towards realising its
objective to achieve 20 % of renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020.
It approved new feed-in tariffs for renewable energy in September. Work
continued on wind energy projects, including construction of the 200 MW wind
farm at Gab El Zeyt and preparations for a new wind farm at Gulf El Suez.
Egypt began preparations for the third
national communication under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
This included mainstreaming the low-emission development strategy into national
planning, mapping the nationally-appropriate mitigation actions and development
of national monitoring, reporting and verification systems. The CLIMA South
project took its first steps in view of establishing a national climate change
centre.
  
A solid waste management sector was set
up under the authority of the Ministry for Environment, and a draft
national solid waste management policy document was prepared. With the support
of the EU, Egypt also launched further reforms in the water sector. The
‘integrated Lake Burullus’ project, which includes the construction of a waste
water treatment plant in Kafr El Sheikh and which was supported by the EU
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), was one of the four leading projects
selected by the Mediterranean Hot-Spot Identification Programme’s Project
Preparation Implementation Facility under the 'Horizon 2020' Initiative for a
cleaner Mediterranean Sea. 
As regards information society policy,
the government worked on a proposal to amend the telecommunications system,
which would include provisions to avoid the disconnection of internet services,
as well as addressing the regulator’s competences and competition policy
provisions for the sector. A review of the telecoms licensing system was
proposed in April 2014, and recommended introducing more competition into the
fixed and mobile markets.
The EU launched its new Framework
Programme for Science, Research, Innovation and Technology, called 'Horizon
2020', for the South Med region in Cairo in February 2014. The
ShERACA+ project, aiming to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation between the EU
and Egypt in science, research, innovation and technology, was launched
in January 2014. The RDI-II programme approved financing for 26 research and
innovation projects. 
During 2014 Egypt continued to prepare
for its participation in the "Global Monitoring for Environment and
Security (GMES) and Africa programme".
7.         PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS,
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
The government introduced a new
strategic framework, the ‘national strategic plan for education reform 2014-30,
and a short-term plan covering 2014-17. The EU supports the priorities set out
in the strategic plan. The new Egyptian constitution, which was
approved in January, stipulated that government spending in the field of
education should reach at least 4 % of GDP.
As regards technical and vocational
education and training (TVET), the government created a National Human
Resources Development Council (chaired by the Prime Minister) with two
Executive Councils (for TVET and for skills development). The position of a
Deputy Minister of Education in charge of Technical Education was created in
spring.
Egypt participated in the Tempus programme
with 34 on-going projects out of which 7 are coordinated by an Egyptian higher
education institution. 453 students and staff were selected in 2014 within
partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus. Eight master students and five
doctoral candidates received scholarships to participate in joint masters and
doctoral programmes. Three organisations were selected for funding
under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. Youth and
youth organisations benefited from Erasmus+, with 346 participants in
mobility projects and 41 in the action for young people and decision-makers in
the field of youth.
Access to culture remained a
challenge. EU cooperation with Egyptian authorities and cultural operators
helped to address this issue. The lag in implementing Egypt’s international
commitments to protect cultural heritage was due to a lack of capacity in the
relevant departments within Egyptian ministries. The EU initiated discussions
with the authorities and stakeholders to identify new programmes that would
respond to the needs of the sector. Cooperation on MedCulture and
Euromed Audiovisual programmes continued.
The new constitution also confirmed the
importance of public health for Egypt’s development and set a public
spending target for related expenditure to at least 3 % of GDP. In
consultation with the stakeholders (including donors), the new Health Minister
drafted a white paper entitled ‘Framing National Health Policy’, which
reiterated the emphasis put on modernising and standardising public primary
healthcare. The EU budget support for this sector, the health sector policy
support programme II, could not disburse any funds in 2014 due to
non-compliance with general conditions placed on budget support operations.
_________________________
[1] This
designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and
is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this
issue.
[2]
For
sources and detailed figures, see Statistical Annex accompanying the reports.
Figures without sources are forecasts by Commission services.
[3] "SME
Policy Index The Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa 2014 Implementation
of the Small Business Act for Europe" (SBA)".