Hizbullah’s hybrid posture : three armies in one.
Date: 2015-03-05
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: Israel, Lebanon, Syria, armed forces, civil war, terrorism, war

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Hizbullah’s hybrid posture: three armies in one
by Florence Gaub

After Hizbullah ambushed an Israeli patrol in retalia-
tion for an airstrike which killed six of its command-
ers at end of January, its leader Hassan Nasrallah de-
clared “the resistance no longer cares about rules of 
engagement, and we […] have the right to confront 
the enemy at any time, place or manner.” This state-
ment  captures  the  hybrid  nature  of  the  Lebanese 
group’s military structure: it bears testament to the 
ease  and  agility  with  which  it  can  switch  between 
different  forms  of  irregular  warfare,  while  at  the 
same time maintaining the semblance of a conven-
tional military force. 

What is hybrid warfare?

Hybrid warfare, also referred to at times as complex 
operations, small wars, or irregular warfare, is a term 
which denotes the combined deployment of irregular 
and conventional force capabilities in an integrated 
and  coordinated  manner.  It  encompasses  elements 
ranging from regular tactics and formations, to ter-
rorist attacks, criminal activities, and more. In con-
trast to asymmetric or guerrilla warfare, hybrid war-
fare is operationally directed and coordinated within 
the  battle  space;  it  therefore  requires  a  centralised 
command and control structure (and therefore a de-
gree  of  organisation)  most  non-state  actors  do  not 
possess. In this framework, hybrid warfare uses all 
the  available  tricks  in  the  book  and  blends  tactics 
and technologies in new and unexpected ways. As a 
tactical choice, this type of war is not just limited to 
non-state or weak actors, and it is not new per se.

From civil warrior to resistance force

Although  Hizbullah  was  born  in  1985  as  a  typical 
militia engaged in asymmetric warfare, it has evolved 
over  time  into  an  organisation  capable  of  fighting 
several different types of war. During the Lebanese 
civil war, when it was but one of the country’s many 
militia  groups,  Hizbullah  mostly  launched  suicide 
bombings and frontal assaults on Western and Israeli 
forces – both methods which, militarily, are neither 
sophisticated nor efficient. 

Once Hizbullah became Lebanon’s official resistance 
against Israeli occupation in 1990, its tactics began 
to shift slightly. It relied on asymmetric methods of 
warfare, but it also displayed some conventional el-
ements  of  territoriality  within  its  theatre  of  opera-
tions.

The Shia group would attack Israeli positions within 
the security zone – a stretch of land within Lebanon 
held  by  Israel  as  a  buffer  against  infiltration  –  and 
then withdraw to nearby villages and melt away into 
the  civilian  population.  In  response  to  any  Israeli 
shelling beyond the buffer zone, Hizbullah launched 
Katyusha rockets into Israel as part of what Nasrallah 
described  as  its  ‘retribution  policy’.  Hizbullah  em-
ployed this tactic whenever it considered that Israel 
had broken the unwritten rule of using violence only 
within this specific area.  

That the group adhered to these geographic bound-
aries  shows  that,  in  its  second  life  as  a  resistance 

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February 2015

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force, Hizbullah had begun to adopt a more con-
ventional  posture.  It  also  rejected  certain  guer-
rilla tactics, refraining, for instance, from sending 
fighters into Israel to perpetrate terrorist attacks, 
as  the  Palestinian  Liberation  Organisation  had 
done. 

Three types of warfare 

Irregular (e.g. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)

Organisation:  little  training  or  discipline;  cellular 
and decentralised structure.

Weapons:  small  arms,  rocket-propelled  grenades 
(RPGs), mortars, short-range rockets.

Hybrid (e.g. Hizbullah)

Organisation:  moderately  trained  and  disciplined, 
units  up  to  battalion  size,  moderately  centralised 
command structure.

Weapons: same as irregular groups but with stand-
off capabilities (longer-range rockets, anti-tank mis-
siles, man-portable air-defence systems).

Conventional (e.g. Syrian Armed Forces)

forma-
Organisation:  hierarchical, 
tions, generally centralised, highly disciplined and 
trained.

larger-sized 

Weapons:  all  means  –  sophisticated  air  defences, 
ballistic missiles, conventional ground forces, spe-
cial forces, air forces, navies.

The hybrid surprise of 2006

Hizbullah’s silent evolution from a guerrilla force 
into a more conventional player went unnoticed 
and only became apparent during its 34-day war 
with  Israel  in  2006.  The  organisation  displayed 
tactics  and  capabilities  well  beyond  what  was 
expected,  and  subsequently  became  the  poster 
child for hybrid warfare. Following the Israeli in-
vasion, Hizbullah fully exploited Lebanon’s rocky 
terrain, which is ideal for dismounted movement 
but nightmarish for armoured manoeuvre. It also 
made  use  of  easily  defendable  hilltop  villages, 
which  offer  excellent  fields  of  fire  and  are  in-
habited by populations sympathetic to its cause. 
The  group  blended  advanced  battlefield  tactics 
with heavy weaponry – such as rockets, mortars, 
surface-to-air  and  surface-to-ship  missiles  –  and 
mined the roads used by Israeli tanks. 

Although numerically inferior, its units were co-
hesive,  well-trained,  disciplined  and  versed  in 
how  to  hold  territory.  Able  to  maintain  contact 
with the chain of command thanks to a complex 
communication  system,  Hizbullah  successfully 
employed  hedgehog  defence  tactics,  i.e.  taking 
up defensive positions in fortified bunkers like a 
regular force. Throughout the conflict, it contin-
ued to launch rockets into Israel using concealed 
launchers (even behind enemy lines) as part of its 
strategic messaging. 

None  of  these  tactics  are  characteristic  of  guer-
rilla  forces,  which  usually  rely  on  population-
centric  methods  in  order  to  conceal  themselves. 
Essentially,  Hizbullah  caught  Israel  by  surprise 
because it acted in a manner which was not con-
ducive to either an irregular or a state actor.

The syrian chapter

With its involvement in the Syrian civil war, how-
ever, Hizbullah has entered a new military phase: 
now,  it  is  fighting  rebel  groups  alongside  the 
Assad regime’s regular forces. Hizbullah’s hybrid 
capacities  come  into  play  here,  too,  with  its  in-
fantry and reconnaissance units, as well as sniper 
teams, complementing the Syrian military. 

It is also said to be training and assisting Syrian 
government  forces  to  hold  conquered  territory, 
especially  in  built-up  areas.  This  urban  compo-
nent is once again a sign of evolution for a force 
accustomed  to  battle  in  the  hilly,  rural  areas  of 
southern Lebanon. 

Its newly acquired skills were particularly visible 
during the offensive on al-Qusayr, a town not far 
from  the  Lebanese-Syrian  border.  Hizbullah  not 
only planned and conducted the offensive, but it 
did so in a conventional military manner: the city 
was  first  cordoned  off,  and  then  hit  with  Syrian 
artillery  and  airstrikes.  Only  afterwards  did 
Hizbullah ground forces, operating in company-
size units of 100 men, enter the town to clear it 
of enemy combatants block by block. During the 
attack,  it  assigned  code  names  to  locations  and 
objectives, allowing for rapid,  unencrypted com-
munication. 

In Syria, therefore, Hizbullah has morphed from 
an asymmetric mountain force into a convention-
al  urban  one  –  proving  once  again  its  that  it  is 
extraordinary adaptable in operational terms.

Florence Gaub is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS.

european union institute for security studies

February 2015

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© eu institute for security studies, 2015. | Qn-al-15-007-2a-n | isBn 978-92-9198-302-5 | issn 2315-1129 | DOi 10.2815/764067