Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 March 2015 on the independence of Banka Slovenije and of the members of its decision-making bodies (CON/2015/8)
Date: 2015-03-02
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Slovenia, auditing, central bank, competence of the institution, conduct of meetings, confidentiality, data protection, dismissal, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 2 March 2015  

on the independence of Banka Slovenije and of the members of its decision-making bodies 

(CON/2015/8) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  20  February  2015  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  President  of  the 

National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka 

Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 

the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules 

of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  draft  law,  which  was  submitted  to  the  legislative  procedure  of  the  National  Assembly  by  a 

group  of  its  deputies,  amends  the  legal  framework  of  Banka  Slovenije  by  amending  the  Law  on 
Banka Slovenije2 (hereinafter the ‘Law’) and the Law on the Court of Audit3. The draft law: 

(a) 

introduces changes to the procedure for removing a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing 
Board  from  office,  in  particular  in  cases  of  serious  misconduct4  and  incompatibility  of 
functions5; 

(b) 

provides that Banka Slovenije be audited by the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia6; 

(c) 

provides that, in addition to the representative of the committee of the National Assembly in 

charge  of 

finance  and  monetary  policy  and 

the  Minister 

for 

finance,  additional 

representatives of the National Assembly’s committees may participate in meetings of Banka 
Slovenije’s Governing Board7; 

(d) 

increases  Banka  Slovenije’s  reporting  requirements  to  the  National  Assembly,  in  particular 

with regard to banks that received State aid; 

1  

2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 72/2006 – official consolidated text, 59/11). 
Zakon o računskem sodišču (ZRacS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 11/01 and 109/12). 
See amendments to Article 39 of the Law. 

See amendments to Article 39 of the Law in connection with amendments to Article 38 and Article 32 of the Law. 
See amendments to Article 25 of the Law on Court of Audit. 

See amendments to Article 33 of the Law. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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(e) 

provides  for  an  exemption  whereby  the  duty  to  protect  confidential  information  does  not 

apply to information relating to banks receiving State aid, if such information is requested by 
the National Assembly, its working bodies or its Investigatory Committee8; 

(f) 

stipulates a larger voting  majority for the appointment of a governor and other members of 

the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije by the National Assembly and limits the number of 
their reappointments to two9;  

(g) 

provides for the possibility that Banka Slovenije’s Governor may dismiss directors or deputy 
directors of its departments without providing any grounds10. 

2. 

General observations 

The ECB notes that early in 2014 it was consulted by the Slovenian authorities on draft legislation 

amending  the  Law  on  Banka  Slovenije,  which  was  also  prepared  by  a  group  of  deputies  of  the 

National  Assembly  and  which  proposed  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Banka  Slovenije,  some  of 
which  are  identical  to  the  amendments  under  the  draft  law11.  The  ECB  issued  Opinion 
CON/2014/2512  on  the  previous  legislative  initiative  and  expressed  some  concerns.  The  previous 

legislative initiative was not endorsed in the deliberations in the Slovenian National Assembly, who 

took  into  consideration,  inter  alia,  the  concerns  raised  by  the  ECB  in  particular  as  regards  the 

protection of central bank independence. 

The ECB reiterates the views expressed in Opinion CON/2014/25 and has the following additional 

comments to make in relation to the draft law. 

3. 

Removal from office of a member of Banka Slovenije’s decision-making bodies 

3.1  Article 130 of the Treaty lays down the principle of personal independence, which is a key aspect of 

the  principle  of  central  bank  independence  for  the  members  of  the  European  System  of  Central 

Banks (ESCB). This principle is reflected in Article 7 and Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European 

System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). 

In particular, Article 14.2 provides, inter alia, that governors may only be relieved from office if they 

no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty 

of  serious  misconduct,  with  the  possibility  of  recourse  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 

Union. 

The purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent the authorities involved in the 

appointment  of  governors,  particularly  the  government  or  parliament,  from  exercising  their 

discretion  to  dismiss  a  governor.  Since  Article  14.2  is  directly  applicable,  national  central  bank 

8  
9  
10  
11  

12  

See amendments to Article 26 and Article 47 of the Law. 
See amendments to Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Law. 

See amendments to Article 40 of the draft law. 
In particular those described in points c) to f) above in paragraph 1 of this Opinion. The draft law now contains two 
different proposals in comparison to the previous legislative initiative and these two proposals relate to the grounds 
and  procedure  for  the  removal  from  office  of  members  of  Banka  Slovenije’s  Governing  Board  and  to  the  audit  of 
Banka Slovenije’s operations. 

All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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(NCB) statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal in line with Article 14.2, or should omit 

any mention of such grounds.  

Personal  independence  would  be  jeopardised  if  the  same  rules  did  not  also  apply  to  other 

members  of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  NCBs  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-related 

tasks. Various provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB require comparable security of 

tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB does not restrict the security of tenure of office to 

governors, while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute refer to ‘members of 

the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs rather than to governors specifically. This applies in particular 

where a governor is ‘first among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where such 
other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks13. 

3.2  Article 39(1) point 4, as proposed under the draft law, provides that a member of Banka Slovenije’s 

Governing  Board  may  be  removed  from  office  if  they  have  committed  serious  misconduct.  The 

subsequent  paragraphs  of  Article  39,  as  proposed  under  the  draft  law,  set  out  a  procedure  for 

bringing this ground for dismissal, by reference to the evidence of a breach of law or constitution, 

and  provide  for  the  assessment  of  the  initiative  and  any  subsequent  proposal  to  the  National 

Assembly to dismiss a member of the Governing Board on the basis of a found  breach of law  or 

constitution.  The  ECB  notes  that  not  just  any  breach  of  law  or  of  the  constitution  is  inherently 

tantamount  to  or  analogous  with  serious  misconduct,  and  as  such  this  provision  broadens  the 

scope of the Union law concept of ‘serious misconduct’ to such breaches. Accordingly, the national 
legislator should not specify what amounts to serious misconduct14.  

Furthermore,  the  ECB  has  previously  commented  favourably  on  dismissal  procedures  where  the 
finding  of  a  breach  of  law  had  been  the  remit  of  the  judicial  system15.  However,  the  draft  law 

entrusts a working body of the National Assembly, and not an independent judicial body, with the 

competence to establish breaches of law or of the constitution. Thus, the dismissal of a member of 

the  Governing  Board  may  be  based  on  a  discretionary  assessment  by  a  working  body  of  the 

National  Assembly  whereas  the  purpose  of  Article  14.2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  is  to  prevent 

competent  authorities,  typically  the  government  or  parliament,  from  exercising  discretion  on  the 

grounds to dismiss a governor. Article 39, as proposed under the draft law, should be fully aligned 

with  Article  14.2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  or  omit  any  mention  of  grounds  of  dismissal,  as 

Article 14.2 is directly applicable.  

3.3  The incompatibility of functions referred to in point 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law only addresses the 

situations defined in Article 38 of the Law. In this respect, the ECB reiterates the view expressed in 
its  Convergence  Report  of  May  2006  and  in  Opinion  CON/2014/2516  that  inserting  a  cross-

reference to Article 38 in point 2 of Article 39(1) would be welcome for legal certainty reasons. In 

addition, it should be clarified that point 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law is a condition required for the 

13  

14  
15  
16  

See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, p. 24. All ECB Convergence Reports are available on the 
ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.   

See Opinion CON/2012/73. 
See Opinion CON/2012/73 and CON/2012/49. 
Paragraph 2.4 of the Opinion CON/2014/25. 

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performance  of  duties  and  not  a  ground  for  dismissal  in  addition  to  the  two  grounds  provided  by 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.4  According  to  Article  38(4), as proposed under the draft law, the  existence of an incompatibility of 

functions  of  a  member  of  the  Governing  Board  is  established  by  the  National  Assembly.  As 

provided  for  in  Article  38(2)  point  5  of  the  Law  ‘other  work  or  activities  that  might  affect  their 

independence or could conflict with Banka Slovenije’s interests’ may constitute a function which is 

incompatible  with  the  position  of  a  member  of  the  Governing  Board.  These  provisions  involve  a 

discretionary  assessment  by  the  National  Assembly  on  what  impacts  the  independence  or 

constitutes  a  conflict  of  interest  of  the  members  of  the  Governing  Board.  Given  that 

incompatibilities  may  lead  to  the  dismissal  of  members  of  the  Governing  Board  and  that  their 

dismissal  should  not  be  discretionary  in  nature,  the  mentioned  provisions  raise  concerns  as 

regards the personal independence of the members of the board. Therefore, the ECB recommends 

that  Banka  Slovenije’s  Governing  Board  retain  its  current  powers  to  determine  the  existence  of 

incompatibilities  of  the  members  of  the  Governing  Board  at  least  with  regard  to  incompatibilities 

which may arise under Article 38(2) point 5 of the Law. 

4. 

Auditing  of  regularity  of  business  operation  of  Banka  Slovenije  by  the  national  Court  of 

Audit 

4.1  The draft law amends Article 25 of the Law on Court of Audit, pursuant to which the operations of 

Banka Slovenije should be audited yearly by the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia.  

4.2  According to Article 1 of the Law on the Court of Audit, the Court is the supreme audit institution for 

the supervision of state accounts, the state budget and all public spending in Slovenia. In relation 

to  other  state  authorities,  the  Court  of  Audit  is  an  autonomous  and  independent  authority.  In 

relation  to  its  auditing  powers  Article  20  of  the  Law  on  the  Court  of  Audit  states  that  the  Court 

should audit the business operation of users of public funds, and more concretely (a) it may carry 

out regularity and performance audits; and (b) it may audit any act on past operations as well as 

any  act  on  planned  business  operation,  including  acts  prescribed  by  law  or  any  special  financial 

statement or report which the users of public funds is obliged to prepare at the request of the Court.  

4.3  Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB requires the accounts of the ECB and NCBs to be audited 

by independent external auditors recommended by the ECB’s Governing Council and approved by 

the Council of the European Union and this is duly reflected in Articles 52 and 65 of the Law. The 

established procedure as approved by the ECB’s Governing Council in the ʼGood Practices for the 
selection  and  mandate  of  external  auditorsʻ,  and  as  currently  followed  by  Banka  Slovenije17  is  to 

appoint  independent  auditors  or  firms  of  auditors  as  external  auditors  with  a  specific  audit  multi-

year mandate.  

4.4  The  ECB  notes  that  whereas  a  state  auditor  may  not  be  charged  with  the  audit  of  the  financial 

accounts of an NCB, it would be in principle possible to give competences to a state audit ofﬁce or 

similar  body  charged  with  controlling  the  use  of  public  ﬁnances,  such  as  the  Court  of  Audit,  in 

17  

Council Decision 2012/444/EU of 24 July 2012 amending Decision 1999/70/EC concerning the external auditors of 
the  national  central  banks,  as  regards  the  external  auditors  of  Banka  Slovenije  (OJ  L  202,  28.7.2012,  p.  21), 
approving the external auditors of Banka Slovenije for the period 2012-2014.  

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respect  of  NCB  activities  and  use  of  public  finances.  However,  such  competence  of  the  Court  of 

Audit should be subject to a number of safeguards of central bank independence: (a) the scope of 

the  control  should  be  clearly  deﬁned  by  the  legal  framework;  (b)  the  activities  of  the  NCB’s 

independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; (c) in line with the principle of institutional 

independence, as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, 

the audit should: (a) comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to an NCB and its decision-

making  bodies,  (b)  not  interfere  with  the  NCB’s  ESCB-related  tasks,  and  (c)  be  carried  out  on  a 

non-political, independent and purely professional basis.   

4.5  The  ECB  considers  that  the  broad  scope  of  the  mandate  that  the  proposed  amendment  gives  to 

the Court of Audit in respect of Banka Slovenije is not compatible with Article 27 of the Statute of 

the ESCB and with the principle of independence. 

4.6 

In  addition,  and  without  prejudice  to  the  above,  the  ECB  notes  an  inconsistency  in  the  Law 

resulting from the proposed deletion of point 1 of Article 32(1) of the Law. Point 1 of Article 32(1) 

provides that the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall be competent to propose the external 

auditor.  Deleting  the  competence  of  the  Governing  Board  to  propose  the  external  auditors  from 

Article 32(1) is not consistent with its role established in Article 52(2). According to Article 52(2) of 

the Law, the auditor is selected by the Governing Board on the basis of a preliminary call for bids 

and is then, in accordance with Article 52(1) and 65 of the Law proposed in line with the rules of 

Article  27.1  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  The  ECB  understands  that  this  inconsistency  may  have 

been  caused  in  light  of  the  fact  that  the  draft  law  is  largely  based  on  the  text  of  the  previous 

legislative initiative from 2014. The deletion of point 1 of Article 32(1) should be removed. 

5. 

Other amendments 

5.1  Previous legislative initiative of 2014 to change the Law on Banka Slovenije 

The ECB reiterates its views expressed in Opinion CON/2014/25 where applicable to the draft law, 

and complements them, as follows. 

5.2  Participation by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meetings 

The principle of central bank institutional independence, enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and 

Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, renders the participation by representatives of third parties in 

an NCB’s decision-making body with a right to vote on matters concerning the performance by the 

NCB of ESCB-related tasks incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, even if such 
a vote is not decisive18. Furthermore, the principle of central bank institutional independence also 

renders the participation of third party representatives, without a right to vote in the meetings of an 

NCB’s decision-making body entrusted with the performance of ESCB-related tasks, incompatible 

with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, if such participation interferes with the performance of 
ESCB-related  tasks19  by  that  decision-making  body  or  endangers  compliance  with  the  ESCB’s 

confidentiality regime. 

18  
19  

See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 22. 
Pursuant  to  Article  2  of  the  Law,  the  principle  of  central  bank  independence  should  be  respected  not  only  when 
Banka Slovenije performs ESCB-related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks. 

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5.3  Reporting by Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and confidentiality of information20 

5.3.1  The ECB notes that the proposed amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporting of Banka 

Slovenije to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Law on the 

protection of confidential data should be assessed with regard to the relevant Union law. 

5.3.2  First, the proposed new Article 26(3) of the Law provides that the report addressed to the National 

Assembly should contain a report on the work and on the performance of tasks of the members of 

the  Governing  Board  of  Banka  Slovenije.  However,  the  Governing  Board  is  a  collegial  body 

accountable to the National Assembly as a whole. Depending on the level of detail of this report, 

this provision raises concerns regarding the institutional independence of Banka Slovenije and the 

personal independence of the members of the Governing Board. The Law should contain adequate 

safeguards in order to ensure that: (a) the reporting obligations do not result in an interference with 

the independence of the members of Governing Board as provided for in Article 130 of the Treaty 

and  Article  7  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB;  (b)  the  special  status  of  governors  in  their  capacity  as 

members  of  the  ECB’s  decision-making  bodies  is  fully  respected;  and  (c)  confidentiality 
requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB are observed21. 

5.3.3  Second,  as  pointed  out  by  the  ECB  in  its  Convergence  Reports22,  the  obligation  of  professional 

secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB may give rise to similar 

provisions in NCBs’ statutes or in Member States’ legislation. The primacy of Union law and rules 

adopted  thereunder  also  means  that  national  laws  on  third  party  access  to  documents  may  not 

result  in  infringements  of  the  ESCB’s  confidentiality  regime.  Access to  an  NCB’s  information  and 

documents must be without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime, to which the members 

of  NCBs’  decision-making  bodies  and  staff  are  subject.  Where  access  to  NCB’s  information  and 

documents  is  allowed  under  Union  law,  the  NCBs  should  ensure  that  such  bodies  protect  the 

confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied by 

the  NCBs  themselves.  Therefore,  any  provision  of  information  permitted  by  the  proposed 

amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporting of Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly 

and  the  proposed  amendment  to  Article  47  of  the  Law  on  protection  of  confidential  data  should 

comply  with  the  relevant  Union  laws,  including  those  governing  the  exchange  of  statistical  and 

supervisory information, as well as the obligation of professional secrecy. Therefore, Article 26 of 

the  Law  should  refer  not  only  to  national  laws  in  this  respect  but  also  to  Union  law  including 

Article 37  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  Furthermore,  without  prejudice  to  the  ECB’s  observations 

regarding the specific protection of statistical or supervisory  information laid down in Union law and 

referred  to  in  the  next  paragraphs,  the  ECB  emphasises  that  confidential  information  may  be 

exchanged  only  if  necessary  for  the  performance  of  the  tasks  of  the  body  that  receives  the 

information.  In  this  context,  the  ECB  notes  that  a  representative  of  the  National  Assembly’s 

Committee  for  finance  and  monetary  policy  may  participate,  subject  to  compliance  with  the 

conditions  set  out  in  paragraph  5.2  above  regarding  the  participation  by  representatives  of  third 

parties  in  Banka  Slovenije’s  Governing  Board  meetings,  in  meetings  of  the  Governing  Board  of 

20  
21  

22  

See paragraph 5.1 and 5.2 of the Opinion CON/2014/25. 
See, for example, p. 22 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013. 

See, for example, p. 27 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013. 

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Banka Slovenije23 where they can become acquainted with any confidential information, including 

the details relating to granting State aid to credit institutions.  

5.3.4  Third, with respect to the exchange of confidential statistical information, according to Article 8(3) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/9824, the ESCB members shall take all the necessary regulatory, 

administrative, technical and organisational measures to ensure the physical and logical protection 

of  confidential  statistical  information.  The  ECB  recalls  that  confidential  statistical  information  may 

only  be  used  for  the  exercise  of  the  tasks  of  the  ESCB  and,  as  regards  NCBs,  in  the  field  of 

prudential supervision or for other statutory NCB tasks. 

5.3.5  Fourth,  with  respect  to  supervisory  information,  Union  law  provides  a  framework  for  cooperation 

and collaboration with relevant authorities and other entities. These arrangements reflect the need 

to  protect  confidential  information  and  also  the  need  to  allow  cooperation.  Any  exchange  of 

information may only be performed under those arrangements. Against this background, the ECB 

further notes that Article 47(2) as proposed under the draft law – suspending the duty to safeguard 

confidential information relating to banks and savings banks that received State aid or were subject 

to measures under the Law on measures for strengthening bank stability, if such information was 

requested by the National Assembly, a working body of the National Assembly, or the Investigation 

Committee of the National Assembly – raises concerns with regard to a number of provisions from 

Union law.  

In  particular,  Article  47(2)  as  proposed  under  the  draft  law  is  not  compatible  with  Article  59  of 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council25. Pursuant to Article 59(2) of 

Directive 2013/36/EU, Member States may authorise disclosures of certain information relating to 

the  prudential  supervision  of  institutions  to  parliamentary  inquiry  committees  subject  to  specific 

conditions  which  apply  when  disclosing  such  information  to  parliamentary  enquiry  committees  in 

the relevant Member State: (a) the parliamentary enquiry committee must have a ‘precise mandate’ 

under  national  law;  (b)  the  information  must  be  ‘strictly  necessary’  for  fulfilling  that  mandate; 

(c) persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under 

national  law  at  least  equivalent  to  those  referred  to  in  Article  53(1)  of  Directive  2013/36/EU; 

(d) where  the  information  originates  in  another  Member  State,  that  it  is  not  disclosed  without  the 

express  agreement  of  the  competent  authorities  which  have  disclosed  it  and,  solely  for  the 

purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement; and (e) to the extent that the disclosure 

of  information  relating  to  prudential  supervision  involves  processing  of  personal  data,  any 

processing  by  the  parliamentary  enquiry  committee  must  comply  with  national  law  transposing 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council26. These conditions have to be 

respected  and  implemented  when  disclosing  confidential  information  to  an  enquiry  committee  of 

23  
24  

25  

26  

See Article 33(1) of the Law. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information   by the 
European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). 

Directive 2013/36/EU of  the  European  Parliament and of the Council of 26  June 2013 on access  to the activity  of 
credit  institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
Directive  95/46/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  October  1995  on  the  protection  of 
individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data  (OJ  L  281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31). 

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the  National  Assembly27.  The  ECB  notes  that  the  provisions  in  Directive  2013/36/EU  on  the 

exchange of information and professional secrecy do not provide a legal basis for the disclosure of 

confidential information to the National Assembly  per se. Similar concerns may also be raised as 

regards Article 26(4), as proposed under the draft law. Accordingly, Article 26 should clearly state 

that  the  laws  governing  the  protection  of  confidential  information  apply  to  any  report  that  Banka 

Slovenije submits to the National Assembly. Second, under Directive 2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council28 the sharing of confidential information on resolution (actions, tools, 

plans  etc.)  with  parliamentary  enquiry  committees  is  not  wholly  unrestricted.  Article  84(5)  of 

Directive 2014/59/EU provides that Member States may authorise the exchange of information with 

parliamentary  enquiry  committees  in  their  Member  State  ‘under  appropriate  conditions’.  Member 

States should take into account the general purpose behind professional secrecy in this context as 

expressed, for example, in recital 86 of Directive 2014/59/EU which states that ‘… therefore [it is] 

necessary  to  ensure  that  there  are  appropriate  mechanisms  for  maintaining  the  confidentiality  of 

such information, such as the content and details of recovery and resolution plans and the result of 
any assessment carried out in that context’29.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 March 2015. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

27  

28  

29  

See  ECB  Opinion  on  the  disclosure  of  confidential  information  to  a  national  parliamentary  inquiry  (CON/2014/89), 
Ireland, 19.12.2014, p. 2. 
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework  for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC,  2007/36/EC,  2011/35/EU,  2012/30/EU  and 
2013/36/EU,  and  Regulations  (EU)  No  1093/2010  and  (EU)  No  648/2012,  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 
See  ECB  Opinion  on  the  disclosure  of  confidential  information  to  a  national  parliamentary  inquiry  (CON/2014/89), 
Ireland, 19.12.2014, p. 3. 

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