Corridor report on Poland : the case of Ukrainian and Russian immigrants.
Date: 2015-02-05
Institutions: Migration Policy Centre, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Subjects: Poland, Russia, Ukraine, immigration, integration of migrants, labour market, migrant, migrant worker, migration policy

INTERACT
January 2015 
2015/02

Corridor Report on Poland: the 
case of Ukrainian and Russian 
immigrants
Author: Magdalena Lesińska, Centre of Migration 
Research, University of Warsaw

Editor: Cameron Thibos, Lecturer, Council On 
International Educational Exchange

Summary of migration profile of Poland

Although  Poland  has  been  and  still  remains  a  net  emigration 
country,  its  migration  status  is  changing,  and  the  transformation 
process  into  an  emigration-immigration  country  is  (slowly  but 
steadily) becoming noticeable. The size of the foreign population in 
Poland is still relatively small in comparison with other countries in 
Europe, constituting less than two percent of the resident popula-
tion.  Moreover,  immigration  has  had  a  predominantly  temporary 
and circular character – as opposed to settlement migration – with 
most migrants coming from eastern neighbouring countries. Among 
these, Ukrainians dominate in all statistics related to entry, stay and 
work  of  foreigners  in  Poland. They  represent  an  immigrant  group 
that is perceived to be the closest to Polish society due to geographic, 
cultural and linguistic proximity; past and present ties between the 

interact-project.eu

KEYFINDINGStwo nations; common history; and last but not least, 
well  developed  migration  networks.  Poland  is  also 
home to a smaller, less well-understood population 
of  Russian  nationals.1  In  contrast  with  Ukrainian 
migrants, who have been intensively investigated by 
researchers over the last two decades, the migration 
strategies and structural features of Russian nationals 
in Poland are far less recognized and studied.

Ukrainian  nationals  in  Poland  represent  first  and 
foremost  a  short-term  type  of  labour  migration. 
The  majority  of  Ukrainian  migrants  who  reside  in 
Poland  come  from  Western  Ukraine,  which  has 
historic connections with the Polish state as well as 
a  large,  long-standing  Polish  minority.  As  a  result, 
widespread  cross-border  contacts  and  mobility 
have existed across the Polish-Ukrainian border for 
decades.  Most  of  them  circulate  between  the  two 
countries  without  any  intent  to  settle  in  Poland. 
However  taking  into  account  the  recent  conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia, this trend could change 
in the very near future.

Legal and political framework related to 
immigration in Poland

In  recent  years,  several  important  developments 
related  to  immigration  policy  have  been  notice-
able. They all follow a trend which can be summa-
rized as an evolution towards a slow and controlled 
opening-up  of  Poland  to  foreigner  inflows.  These 
developments,  however,  have  some  serious  limita-
tions. They  promote  circular  (as  opposed  to  settle-

1.  For example, on 31 December 2013, the difference in the 
number  of  valid  residence  permits  issued  for  citizens  of 
Ukraine was 37.6 thousand versus 12.6 thousand for Rus-
sians. However, it must be noted that Russians are among 
the top nationalities registered in asylum seeker statistics 
(comprising  approximately  90%  of  total  asylum  seekers 
every year). Also, in 2012, 24% of all persons obtaining a 
right to stay on the basis of supplementary protection had 
Russian citizenship. The vast majority of asylum seekers 
from Russia declare Chechen ethnicity.

2 ■  Migration Policy Centre - INTERACT ■ January 2015

ment)  labour  migration.  Poland’s  migration  policy 
has  shifted  from  protection  against  inflows  to 
facilitation for desirable groups of migrants. Direct 
incentives  are  addressed  primarily  to  EU  citizens 
and nationals from eastern neighbouring-countries, 
and are focused on the legal and economic spheres 
(not socio-cultural or political). The most important 
legal and political provisions that could be perceived 
as drivers of migration are related to the liberaliza-
tion  of  labour-market  entry  rules  for  foreigners  (a 
far-reaching simplification of legislation concerning 
work permits and the introduction of the employers’ 
declaration system). 

In  general,  there  is  no  complex,  long-term  and 
systematic state strategy concerning the integration 
of  foreigners  in  Poland.  The  legal  and  institutional 
framework  created  to  address  this  issue  has  been 
developed  mostly  in  response  to  EU  requirements 
and  under  EU  guidance  to  align  Polish  migration 
laws  with  relevant  EU  legislation.  Therefore,  the 
development of integration policy in Poland can be 
portrayed  as  a  reactive,  centralized  and  top-down 
process.

Integration policy in Poland is a set of ad hoc meas-
ures  dedicated  to  particular  groups.  There  is  no 
coherent  integration  doctrine,  and  any  legal  provi-
sions  and  integration  programmes  until  now  have 
been addressed only to two incoming groups, namely 
recognized refugees and repatriates and their fami-
lies.  This  can  be  explained  first  of  all  by  Poland’s 
immigrants 
limited  experience  with 
requiring integration programmes, and secondly by 
policy makers’ lack of interest in encouraging settle-
ment migration.

long-term 

Despite  the  state’s  generally  passive  attitude  to  the 
integration  of  foreigners,  a  more  active  approach 
is noticeable in the NGO sector. The interest in the 
implementation  of  projects  aimed  at  migrants  and 
support  for  their  integration  is  strictly  related  to 

Political and institutional framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Ukraine v. Russia

Legal framework for 
emigrants/diaspora

Approach towards 
emigrants

Ukraine 

Russia 

Formal and organized structure

Formal and organized structure

•	 To protect the social and economic rights 

•	 To protect of the rights of labour migrants in 

and interests of Ukrainian workers abroad; 

destination countries;

•	 To encourage emigrants to send remittances; 

•	 To develop strong relations with the mother 

•	 To engage Ukrainians residing abroad in 

country;

development activities

•	 To implement projects that strengthen inter-

Main state-actors

•	 Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 

•	 Ministry of Labour and Social Policy

•	 Ministry of the Interior

Main official documents  The State Programme for Cooperation with 

Socio-economic rights

Political rights

Language and cultural 
rights

Dual citizenship 

Ukrainians Living Abroad up to 2015 
(adopted in 2012)

Bilateral agreement on social security (signed 
2012)

Right to vote in parliamentary  elections

Provision of financial and organisational 
support to Ukrainian nationals residing abroad 
for their cultural and educational networks

Accepted 

national ties;

•	 To cooperate closely with Russians living 

abroad and to promote a positive image of 
Russia abroad

•	 Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Compatriots Living 
Abroad and International Humanitarian 
Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo);

•	 President and Government of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Federal Migration Service

Programme of Work with Compatriots 
Residing Abroad in 2013-2014

Bilateral agreement on the avoidance of double 
taxation of income and property (signed in 
1992)

Right to vote in presidential and parliamentary 
elections 

Promotion of Russian culture and Russian 
language abroad, including teaching Russian 
via courses provided by the Russian Centres for 
Science and Culture

Accepted when Russian citizen obtains second 
citizenship, but when a foreigner applies for 
Russian citizenship - he/she is obliged to 
renounce the previous one

opportunities to apply for financial support from the 
EU  (particularly  from  the  European  Fund  for  the 
Integration of Third-Country Nationals, EIF Fund). 
Since 2007, diverse  integration activities  have been 
implemented by non-governmental and local insti-
tutions  following  best  practices  adopted  in  other 
EU  countries  (language  and  adaptation  courses, 
information  campaigns,  inter-cultural  education 

programmes and training courses) using the support 
of  the  EIF  fund.  This  means  that  in  practice,  the 
NGOs sector is a partial substitute for state adminis-
tration when it comes to the implementation of inte-
gration policy.

3 ■  Corridor Report on Poland: the case of Ukrainian and Russian immigrants

Main reasons for migration to Poland in cases of Ukrainian and Russian migrants 
(averages for 2010-2012)

Country of 
origin

Family 

Education 

Remunerated 
activities 

Refugee 
status

Subsidiary 
protection

Russia

Ukraine

19.20%

12.97%

2.19%

4.17%

21.05%

63.67%

3.76%

0.00%

19.91%

0.01%

Other 
reasons

33.89%

19.19%

Total migrants 
surveyed

17,020

90,385

Source: INTERACT survey

Emigration / diaspora policies of Ukraine 
and Russia

The  available  analyses  of  emigration  /  diaspora 
policies  in  Ukraine  and  Russia  underline  that  the 
primary focus of decision makers is linked to labour 
migration (specifically to nationals working abroad 
as a part of the international labour market) and to 
its  negative  consequences  to  the  country,  such  as 
brain-drain. Also, the return migration of nationals 
from abroad has become an attractive issue recently 
in the media and political campaigns in these coun-
tries. Although it is difficult to say that there are sepa-
rate diaspora policies adopted by the authorities of 
Russia and Ukraine, the emigration issue is included 
in various legislative acts and in bilateral agreements 
that  regulate  various  aspects  of  the  movement  of 
people and the employment of nationals abroad. The 
legal framework is focused mostly on the protection 
of  the  rights  of  labour  migrants  abroad  as  guaran-
teed by bi- and multilateral agreements. 

Main conclusions from INTERACT 
project

According  to  survey  results,  immigration  from 
Russia and Ukraine to Poland is structurally different 
(see table below).2

2.  An important remark must be made concerning the pro-
file of Russian and Ukrainian migrants who benefit from 
the assistance of the organizations that were surveyed in 
Poland.  The  organizations  that  work  with  the  Russian 
migrant population in Poland deal with refugees and/or 
asylum seekers who have Russian nationality (and Chech-

4 ■  Migration Policy Centre - INTERACT ■ January 2015

An overwhelming majority of Ukrainian migrants to 
Poland constitute labour migrants (this is supported 
by  other  data  sources  as  well).  The  second  most 
important category (family reunification) is of much 
lesser importance. In the case of Russian citizens, the 
structure  of  incoming  migrants  is  far  more  diverse 
with  approximately  20%  of  persons  coming  to 
Poland for family reasons, over 21% for work-related 
reasons  and  over  20%  for  humanitarian  reasons 
(the  majority  of  those  people  are  Chechen  asylum 
seekers). 

Note,  however,  that  the  table  presents  averages  for 
2010-2012, and this data has changed very recently. 
Due  to  recent  political  events  in  Eastern  Ukraine, 
the  scale  of  Ukrainian  immigration  to  Poland  has 
increased  significantly  and  in  addition,  the  impor-
tance  of  humanitarian  immigration  has  grown 
immensely.  In  2013  the  number  of  asylum  claims 
by  Ukrainian  citizens  was  as  high  as  46.  In  2014, 
(until  the  end  of  October)  it  amounted  to  1,876, 
i.e.  over  40  times  higher  (data  from  the  Office  for 
Foreigners).  Similarly,  by  the  end  of  October  2014 
a total of 707,166 visas had been issued to Ukrain-
ians,  as  compared  to  720,125  for  the  entire  year 

en  ethnicity),  but  this  group  is  not  representative  of  the 
population  of  Russian  migrants  residing  in  Poland.  On 
the other hand, the Ukrainian migrants who have contact 
with organizations in Poland are usually labour migrants 
pursuing  employment  and  temporary  stays  in  Poland. 
Taking  this  into  account,  the  evidence  from  the  survey 
conducted in Poland must be interpreted with some res-
ervations, and should not interpreted as referring to the 
general population of Ukrainian and Russian migrants in 
Poland.

of  2013  (data  of  the  Polish  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs). The number of seasonal migrants increased 
as well – 183,000 declarations to employ a foreigner 
were issued in the first half of 2014, as compared to 
137,000 in the first half of 2013 (data from the Polish 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy).

Some selected outcomes of the online survey are also 
worth  pointing  out  here.  In  Poland  24  representa-
tives from organizations working with migrants took 
part in the survey. The main findings are as follows:

 • Russian  and  Ukrainian  migrant  organisations 
focus  on  providing  up-to-date, 
reliable 
information on legal and institutional frameworks, 
labour-market  conditions,  and  available  jobs. 
Other possible areas of service, such as lobbying 
for  the  recognition  of  qualifications  or  training 
programmes,  are  of  secondary 
importance. 
That  said,  organizations  catering  to  Ukrainian 
migrants  appear  to  offer  a  much  more  diverse 
range of services in comparison to those focusing 
on the needs of Russian migrants. 

 • Organizational  representatives  tend  to  believe 
that  associations  in  the  country  of  origin  are 
more  important  when  searching  for  a  job 
in  the  destination  country  than  any  official 
instrument  implemented  by  the  country  of 
origin,  such  as  governmental 
initiatives  to 
support  the  employability  of  migrants  abroad 
and  official  pre-departure  programmes.  In  the 
case  of  organizations  working  with  Russian 
migrants,  there  was  significantly  less  belief  in 
the  importance  of  measures  provided  by  either 
associations or the government in the country of 
origin. 

 • Organizational  representatives  generally  claim 
that  their  impact  on  migrants’  positions  in  the 
Polish  labour  market  (including  impacts  on 
wages  levels  or  occupational  skills-matching)  is 
very limited in practice.

 • Organizational  representatives  generally  believe 
that  country-of-origin  policies  pertaining  to 
migrants’  social  relations  positively 
impact 
migrants’ integration in the destination country. 
All representatives stated that the governments of 
the countries of origin do not offer any support 
for establishing organizations, including schools, 
religious institutions, and cultural centers in the 
destination country. 

 • One of the most striking outcomes of the survey 
is related to the civic and political participation 
of migrants. Very few organizations engage with 
this area, and respondents claim that the civic and 
political participation of migrants in the country 
of origin had no effect on any area of their lives 
in  the  country  of  destination.  In  other  words, 
migrants’ participation (or non-participation) in 
the political and public spheres of their country 
of  origin  does  not  influence  social  relations, 
school  performance,  religious  practices  or  the 
residential  integration  of  migrants  in  their 
country of residence. 

 • According 

to  respondents,  migrants  most 
commonly  decide  to  keep  the  passport  of  their 
country of origin because it is seen as an asset in 
the country of destination, in case of Ukrainian 
migrants,  and  for  reasons  of  sentimentality,  in 
the case of Russian migrants.

To conclude, the survey demonstrates the following: 

1.  destination-country organizations working with 
migrants have an insignificant role in Ukrainian 
and Russian migrants’ integration processes; 
2.  there is no clear evidence of any organized sup-
port  from  the  country  of  origin  for  migrants’ 
integration  process  in  the  country  of  destina-
tion. In other words, there is a gap between the 
legal and institutional frameworks that officially 
exist within Russian and Ukrainian state systems 
addressing  nationals  living  abroad  and  their 
implementation in practice; and 

5 ■  Corridor Report on Poland: the case of Ukrainian and Russian immigrants

3.  the  activities  of  organizations  working  with 
migrants are focused on assisting them with their 
adaptation to the labour market in the country of 
destination. Their role in other areas, such as edu-
cation or social integration, remains marginal.

References

Duszczyk M., Góra M., Kaczmarczyk P. 2013. Costs 
and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and 
the  Eastern  Partnership  Countries  –  case  of  Poland. 
IZA  Paper  No.  7664.  Online:  http://ftp.iza.org/
dp7664.pdf

Lesińska M. 2010. Integration policy, in: A. Górny, I. 
Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska, M. Okólski (ed.). 
Immigration to Poland: policy, employment, integra-
tion. Scholar Publishing House, Warszawa. 

Makaryan S. 2013. Emigration-Diaspora Policy Nexus 
in  Migration  Policies  of  the  EU  Eastern  Partnership 
Countries and in Russia. CARIM-East Analytic and 
Synthetic  Notes  no  3.  Online:  http://www.carim-
east.eu/media/CARIM-East%20AN-2013-03.pdf

Migration  Policy  Team.  2013.  Ukraine.  The  Demo-
graphic-Economic Framework of Migration, the Legal 
Framework  of  Migration,  the  Socio-Political  Frame-
work of Migration. Online: http://www.migrationpol-
icycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Ukraine.pdf

INTERACT
Researching  Third  Country  Nationals’  Integration  as  a  Three-way  Process  -  Immigrants,  Countries  of 
Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

The INTERACT project studies the impact of sending countries on migrant integration. It looks at 
the ways in which institutions and organisations in origin countries thicken transnational bonds by 
developing tools to boost financial transfers, maintain cultural heritages, enhance migrant political 
participation, and protect migrants’ rights. It seeks to understand how these efforts impact migrant 
integration, as well as how origin country policies complement or contradict the integration measures 
of receiving country governments.

Tel: (+39) 055 4685 817/892
Fax: (+39) 055 4685 – 755
mpc@eui.eu

The INTERACT project is co-financed by the European Union.
Complete information can be found online at: interact-project.eu

6 ■  Migration Policy Centre - INTERACT ■ January 2015

Content © Authors, 2015© European University Institute, 2015QM-02-15-059-EN-NISBN  978-92-9084-260-6DOI 10.2870/108220