REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2015-01-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, conflict of interest, cooperation policy, corruption, exchange of information, judicial reform, organised crime, prevention of delinquency













EUR-Lex - 52015DC0036 - EN











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52015DC0036

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism /* COM/2015/036 final */










1.      INTRODUCTION

The Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism (CVM) was set up at the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union
in 2007.[1] It
was agreed that further work was needed in key areas to address shortcomings in
judicial reform, the fight against corruption, and tackling organised crime.
Since then CVM reports have charted the progress made by Bulgaria and have sought to help focus the efforts of the Bulgarian authorities through specific
recommendations. 
The CVM has
played an important role in the consolidation of the rule of law in Bulgaria as a key facet of European integration. Monitoring by the Commission and
cooperating with the work of the Bulgarian authorities to promote reform has
had a concrete impact on the pace and scale of reform. The Commission's
conclusions and the methodology of the CVM have consistently enjoyed the strong
support of the Council,[2]
as well as benefiting from cooperation and input from many Member States.
This report summarises the steps taken
over the past year and provides recommendations for the next steps. It is the
result of a careful process of analysis by the Commission, drawing on inputs
from the Bulgarian authorities, civil society and other stakeholders. The
Commission was able to draw on the specific support of experts from the
magistracy in other Member States to offer a practitioner's point of view. 
The political uncertainties of the past
year in Bulgaria have not offered a stable platform for action. This report
will point to a number of areas where problems have been acknowledged and where
solutions are starting to be identified. These will need to take root for the
sustainability of change to be shown. Bulgaria can also do more to collect (and
publish) data on the judiciary and law enforcement.
The extent of
the challenge has been illustrated by opinion polling of Bulgarians themselves.
A Eurobarometer taken in the autumn of 2014 showed a strong consensus in
Bulgarian society that judicial reform, the fight against corruption and
tackling organised crime were important problems for Bulgaria. The results also
showed a concern amongst Bulgarians that the situation had deteriorated, though
with hope that this trend might reverse and with strong support for an EU role
in addressing these issues, and for EU action to continue until Bulgaria had reached a standard comparable to other Member States.[3] These
attitudes underline that continuation of the reforms is crucial for the quality
of life of citizens, both because of the impact of corruption and organised
crime on the Bulgarian economy and because of the importance of the rule of law
for a functioning and free society. 
The CVM is
designed to monitor longer-term trends rather than take a snapshot of the
situation at a particular moment. However, this report seeks to take into
account the perspectives put in place by the government which took office in
November 2014 and to identify some key landmarks which can illuminate the
progress of these policies in the future. In this way, the Commission hopes
this report will help in building a new consensus to accelerate reform in Bulgaria. The recommendations set out in this report, well-targeted EU funds and the
engagement of other Member States[4]
together show how the EU stands ready to support a renewed effort.
2.         STATE
OF THE REFORM PROCESS IN BULGARIA
2.1       Reform
of the judiciary
Independence,
accountability and integrity of the judiciary
The Supreme
Judicial Council (SJC) has wide-ranging powers to manage and organise the
Bulgarian judicial system. The 2014 CVM report noted that despite some
important steps in terms of managerial reform, the SJC was not widely regarded
as "an autonomous and independent authority able to effectively defend the
judiciary's independence vis-à-vis the executive and parliamentary branches of government".[5] The
work of the SJC in 2014 has continued to be subject to controversy, with
several incidents in relation to appointments, dismissals or the control of the
application by courts of the system of random allocation of cases. In addition
to this, tensions between the SJC and its Civic Council, set up to represent
civil society,
have developed over time, with claims on the part of civil society actors that
their views are not being adequately taken into account. Several organisations,
including the largest judges' association, have left the Civic Council as a
result. Perhaps partly in reaction, the SJC has developed its communication
strategy and has taken some further steps in terms of transparency.[6]
One issue
raised by stakeholders linked to independence is the management of the two
branches of the magistracy by their peers. Different Member States have
different degrees of autonomy for judges and prosecutors within judicial
councils. This has become an area of debate in Bulgaria, with several calls for
separate chambers within the SJC to determine career and disciplinary decisions
concerning judges and prosecutors, with more horizontal issues being dealt with
in plenary. The underlying reason for such calls is the different organisational
structures and roles of judges and prosecutors, but also the fact that decision
making on appointments and disciplinary matters could be used by one
constituency of the SJC to pressurise the other. 
This
idea of a change of the SJC structure has been taken over in the new proposal
for a judicial reform strategy adopted by the Bulgarian government and the
Parliament.[7]
The SJC, without fully opposing the change, has raised feasibility concerns,
considering it would require a change of the Constitution, and could not be
enacted through a legislative amendment of the Judicial System Act. In
addition, the reform strategy touches upon wider issues such as the election of
SJC members. Previous CVM reports have already made recommendations which would
hold good for the SJC's next elections, to increase transparency and address
integrity in the selection procedure, including through "one judge one
vote" for the judicial quota of members of the Council.[8] The
new strategy also raises the issue of reducing the power of court presidents,
raised in the past as an important issue for the independence of individual
judges.
The
importance of more transparency and objectivity in judicial appointments has
been a consistent theme in CVM reports.[9]
Although some of the peaks of controversy seen in 2012-13 were avoided in 2014,
the question of high level appointments within the magistracy has remained
problematic. In particular, the election of the President of the Supreme Court
of Cassation (SCC) was postponed on several occasions, despite the fact that
candidates with good credentials had applied – with solid experience in the SCC
itself – and amidst controversy over the voting system. Nominations of
administrative heads of other courts raised concerns about the openness and
merit-based nature of the selection procedure. In addition to this, questions
submitted to the SJC by NGOs concerning integrity issues of certain candidates
do not always seem to have been addressed, even though the SJC carries out a
formal integrity check of all candidates – an important part of the procedure
since it can lead to a negative opinion. Some procedural improvements have
taken place which could lead to greater transparency in the procedures, such as
in particular the introduction of a possibility for the judges at the SCC to
organise a hearing of the candidates for President of the Court. Such new
procedural options can both enhance the credibility of appointments and improve
the ownership of rank and file judges in the process. 
A key
actor in promoting integrity and efficiency within the judiciary has always
been the Judicial Inspectorate. The election of its Chief Inspector, after a
long vacancy of the position, was considered as a test case by the January 2014
CVM Report.[10]
The election has so far not yet taken place. The procedure in Spring 2014
attracted candidates who seemed well qualified for the post, but a lengthy
process meant that Parliament did not reach the stage of a vote. As a result,
the Inspectorate has remained without the strong independent leadership foreseen
in the Constitution. This will remain an important test case in 2015 of the
ability of the Bulgarian institutions to carry out transparent and merit-based
appointments to high-level offices in the judiciary.[11] 
Another
recommendation of the 2014 Report[12]
was a thorough and independent analysis of the system of random allocation of
cases, to ensure it is secure, and that administrative heads of courts are made
to account in full for any decision not to use random allocation. The SJC has
taken some steps to analyse potential vulnerabilities and drew up plans to
modernise the system in the context of a longer term e-Justice project. The
allocations can now be collected centrally, facilitating checks. However, this
interim solution does not appear to have improved security. Specific
shortcomings identified in a March 2013 audit of the Supreme Administrative
  Court and the Sofia City Court were not followed up. As a result, a series of
scandals concerning case allocation in the Sofia City Court broke out in autumn
2014.[13]
These problems were not identified by the SJC – the issues had to be raised by
outside actors.
Whilst
delays in the preparations for a longer-term solution are unfortunate, the more
important issue is the reaction to evidence of transgressions. The reaction of
the SJC in autumn 2014 suggested that this is a low priority for the Council,
in spite of the potential for criminal as well as disciplinary offences. It
seems likely that the reputation of the judiciary in Bulgaria will continue to
be damaged until a fully secure system is in place. Using external IT security
expertise to test the new system would help to reassure that this is on the
right track.[14]

Reform strategies
for the judicial system
Steps
have been taken by the Ministry of Justice with first the roadmap for
addressing the 2014 CVM recommendations (although its current status and
deadlines are to be clarified) and then in the autumn with the presentation of
a long awaited judicial reform strategy.[15]
This comprehensive document would replace the 2010 strategy, which has been
only partially implemented. The Strategy was adopted by Decision of the Council
of Ministers on 17 December 2014 and broadly endorsed by Parliament on 21
January 2015.[16]
Consensus
and ownership has been pursued by encouraging a debate on the text.[17] The
Prosecutor-General and the SJC have reacted in detail. The text includes many
elements called for by civil society and professional organisations,[18] and
indeed points raised by previous CVM reports. Its goals are to ensure the good
governance of the judicial authorities and improve human resource aspects, but
also more broadly to modernise criminal policy and improve the protection of
fundamental rights. The strategy has introduced a degree of clarity and urgency
into the debate on judicial reform – this will now need to be carried through
into implementation. 
From
the side of the prosecution, there has been significant progress with the
implementation of the action plan put forward by the Prosecutor-General in 2013.
Partly sparked by the judicial reform strategy, the Prosecutor-General also
made new proposals in November 2014 for the decentralisation of the prosecution
and for providing additional guarantees of non-interference in the work of
prosecutors.[19]
Work
on a new criminal code has progressed, but still lacks a consensus. Experts and
practitioners have expressed divergent views about whether a complete rewrite
is needed, or just amendments – and about the overall rationale. The current
intention seems to be to follow a two track approach, with a first stage
consisting of swift amendment of parts of the criminal code (and possibly of
the criminal procedure code) on certain more urgent issues, including
provisions related to the fight against corruption and organised crime. In a
second stage and on the basis of thorough impact assessment and public
consultation, the need for a new criminal code would be determined. This could
be part of a broader reflection on future criminal policies, which needs time
in order to build consensus.[20]
Efficiency of
the judicial system
Work has
continued within the SJC on a methodology for the assessment of the workload of
magistrates and judicial bodies.[21]
One of the goals is to set up rules on how to measure and allocate workload,
taking into account the complexity as well as the scale of cases. Differences
in the workload today are seen as a significant cause of inefficiency in the
system. All regional courts will be reviewed, taking into account socio-economic
as well as demographic factors and the imperative of guaranteeing access to
justice, with a view to presenting a proposal for a new judicial map for the
regional courts before the end of 2015. There have already been concrete steps
taken in rationalising military courts. A solid methodology would offer the
right basis to assess whether it is justified to close down courts with very
little workload (or instituting a system of "mobile courts"), while redistributing
resources towards other overburdened courts. Work on a broader reform of the
judicial map is likely to take longer, notably as the SJC would need to
coordinate with a wider range of stakeholders,[22]
even if the final decision rests with the SJC. 
In
terms of broader human resource management, appraisal and promotion systems as
well as the quality of training are key factors. Here the Government's judicial
reform strategy sets out some elements for future improvements. The National
Institute of Justice continues to develop its repertoire of training for judges.[23] 
Disciplinary
action has been another area highlighted in CVM reports. Problems have included
a lack of consistency (and clear standards to deliver this), with a high
proportion of decisions being overturned in appeal. The SJC has recently
adopted some steps including general guidelines in this area, though this does
not appear to have been based on a clear analysis of shortcomings. It is too
early to say if the measures taken will be sufficient to avoid continued
controversy over disciplinary proceedings in the future.
Another
issue which CVM reports have urged to address is the effective implementation
of court judgements and notably the problem of convicted criminals having been
able to escape justice and abscond. Some work has been done, and some
managerial steps followed through an interagency action plan for 2014. However,
the response of the authorities continues to lack conviction. The issue has not
been looked at comprehensively, so it is difficult to assess the extent to
which one-off measures (such as the use of electronic monitoring) will fill the
gaps.[24]
2.2       Corruption
Corruption
remains a serious issue in Bulgaria. In the recent Eurobarometer survey, almost
all respondents identified corruption (97%) as an important problem.[25]
It
has been a long standing recommendation of the CVM that Bulgaria reviews and updates its national anti-corruption strategy.[26] The
first informal results of a recent evaluation of the impact over past years of
the Bulgarian anti-corruption strategy, carried out by the Bulgarian authorities,
appears to constitute an important contribution in terms of an honest
assessment of the shortcomings of the strategy. These include a piecemeal
approach, the insufficient use of risk assessments, and an absence of
monitoring and evaluation. Though ministerial inspectorates have developed a
culture of improved control, the absence of a centralised structure or common
benchmarks results in different ministerial inspectorates acting in an
uncoordinated way. Arrangements at local level seem to show major gaps. As for
the structure assigned by Bulgaria to perform risk analysis (BORKOR), this does
not seem to have delivered results in proportion to its costs, and in any event
can only be seen as providing analytical input. This body is not designed to
provide political direction.[27]

This assessment
of the shortcomings of the current anti-corruption system could be the starting
point of a long-awaited reform. A consultation of all stakeholders would allow
experience to be taken into account and build ownership for the exercise. Civil
society has developed useful experience in the field of anti-corruption, which
should be used to the full.
Preventive
measures seem in their infancy in most cases. Some lessons have been learned in
particular areas,[28]
but these reflect piecemeal efforts. There is no evidence of a structure to
exchange best practice or to give credit to successes. The public
administration does not have a comprehensive system of compulsory monitoring of
anti-corruption activities and reporting to a central point.
As
set out in successive CVM reports, public procurement is a high risk area in
terms of corruption. Systems to check the procedures can be strengthened, in
line with the recent strategy for the Bulgarian public procurement system which
has been developed in response to recommendations from the Commission services.

Regarding
conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment, the Commission on the Prevention
and the Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest (CPACI) has been awaiting
legislative changes as well as nominations at managerial level. Both are
important to the effective operation of the Commission,[29] and
the forced resignation of the former Chairman following evidence of trading in
influence[30]
would suggest there is a degree of urgency to put the Commission back on a
sound footing. However, these decisions have now been pending throughout 2014.
This is the responsibility of Parliament, and the delays run the risk of
increasing the impression that decisions where integrity concerns should predominate
are being taken on political grounds. In terms of corruption prevention, a
better use might be made of asset declarations submitted by public officials in
terms of identifying risk areas and possible cases of illicit enrichment.
Effective
prosecution and final convictions are central to the credibility of any
anti-corruption strategy. There are so far very few final convictions in cases involving
substantial corruption, despite the scale of the problem.[31] Positive
steps have been taken in the General Prosecution to prioritise corruption, and
there has been an increase in the number of cases initiated and the speed with
which they progress. A few of these cases concern individuals in high-level
positions. As in the case of organised crime, monitoring of the evolution of corruption
cases at court level is essential to identify aspects of court practice which
can be manipulated to delay the course of justice. Cases sometimes appear to
stall for a substantial amount of time at court level before being sent back to
the prosecution with a short deadline to perform supplementary tasks.
A
small specialised structure has been put in place by the Prosecution, staffed
by prosecutors and investigators from the State Agency for National Security
(SANS), to more effectively investigate corruption in the public administration.
The unit has so far mostly been targeting cases of local corruption, which
could not be handled at local level given local relationships and pressures. The
model of specialised structures to fight corruption appears to have seen some
early results, but the test will come with more high level cases and a
development of operational capacities. It will also be important that
structural changes to SANS do not undermine the effectiveness of this work.
Another
problem appears to lie with deficiencies in rules in the Criminal Code to fight
corruption, and in particular "high-level corruption", trading in
influence and the differentiation of active and passive corruption. There seems
to be an acute need to modernise the Code in this area, which could benefit
from rapid amendments, in parallel to a broader reflection on criminal policy
and a new code.
2.3       Organised
crime
Organised
crime remains a problem in Bulgaria. This is recognised in public attitudes,[32] and high-profile
recent cases of public shootings and the murder of a witness have provided a
clear reminder of the severity of the situation.  Whilst the number of cases
initiated by the prosecution seems to have increased substantially in 2014, the
number of cases that have reached final conclusion remains low.[33] Authorities
working in this area have reported to the Commission concerns over pressures at
local level hampering effective investigation of crime and corruption. The
intimidation of witnesses remains a serious problem, and there may be ways to
encourage witnesses to accept more readily witness protection programmes.[34] 
The specialised
prosecution and court put in place two years ago are slowly starting to yield some
results, with a few final convictions, and some evidence of swifter procedures.
But their action remains hindered by an unfocussed attribution of tasks and
very formalistic provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Prosecutor-General
made proposals in November to address some of these issues. 
Despite
substantial efforts, asset forfeiture and confiscation still do not seem sufficiently
targeted against organised crime groups. Interim freezing measures are ordered
by the Prosecution when urgent and passed on to the Assets Forfeiture Commission.
This Commission continues to achieve significant results, in spite of a burdensome
legal framework. The last CVM report noted question marks with regard to the
new legal framework for asset forfeiture[35]
– these issues remain outstanding.
The
Ministry of Interior has own capacities for forensic, DNA, ballistic and
graphology, but other fields of expertise require using experts accredited to
courts, raising questions of availability, competence, costs and – possibly –
impartiality. Bulgaria does not have a bureau of experts or similar mechanism.
Observers have raised this issue as one potential reason for the failure of
cases to progress in court.[36]

The
new Bulgarian government has announced its intention to remove the
investigation of organised crime from the mandate of the SANS, reversing the
controversial merger of the former police directorate on organised crime – GDBOP
– with SANS in 2013.[37]
The previous reform in this area resulted in several months of operational
disruption in organised crime cases, including in cooperation with other Member
States' security services. Concerns have been expressed that a new reorganisation
of the services responsible for investigating organised crime risks similar
disruption, but the government has made clear that it is conscious of this risk
and will take measures to facilitate the transition.
3.         CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since
the Commission's last report in January 2014, progress in terms of addressing
judicial reform and making concrete advances on corruption and organised crime has
been slow. The fact that the period covered by this report saw three different
governments and a deadlocked parliamentary situation has clearly contributed to
a lack of resolve to reform. However, the foundation stone for taking reform
forward is to acknowledge the problems and identify measures to remedy them.
The current government has taken an important step by adopting a judicial
reform strategy with an impressive level of precision. There are also
indications that the forthcoming analysis of the existing anti-corruption measures
will provide a helpful input to reflections on a future strategy. The next
phase would be to show that reform is genuinely a political priority by rapidly
taking these frameworks forward, building consensus and identifying precise
actions with specific milestones – and then to ensure their implementation. This
would require a further change in political culture, and a real sense that these
issues are at the top of the agenda.
Some
of the key institutions have continued to develop managerial changes which
should support the effort to carry reform through into change on the ground. In
addition to  accelerating reform in line with the strategy, more systematic and
professional gathering of data, and more transparency about putting information
in the public domain, would also help build confidence in the professionalism
and commitment of the authorities.
The
credibility of progress will also depend on the reaction to specific controversies
and on progress in respect of specific cases. Past CVM reports have noted how
public scepticism about reform has been fuelled by controversy in areas like
transparency and merit in judicial appointments, or the reaction to
transgressions like the absconding of convicted criminals or evident failures
in random case allocation. The Bulgarian authorities' reactions in such cases
continue to lack conviction, fuelling doubts about judicial independence. It
remains the case that the number of final court judgments on high-level corruption
and organised crime cases is very low. These shortcomings in terms of the key
measures of change also lie at the heart of Bulgarians' scepticism about reform
so far, as shown by opinion polling.[38]

The
Commission invites Bulgaria to take action in the following areas:
1. Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary
The
judicial reform strategy includes many proposals designed to address weaknesses
in this area. Such measures need to be backed up with an awareness that the
credibility of the system relies on the authorities showing a determination to
maximise objectivity and to ensure that transgressions are handled robustly.
·       
Pursue
reform of the organisation of the SJC, involving the professional associations
and other relevant stakeholders, including looking ahead to procedures for the
next elections to the SJC which will deliver an SJC which can command
confidence;
·       
Apply
objective standards of merit, integrity and transparency to appointments within
the judiciary, including for high level offices, and make these appointments in
a timely manner. Integrity issues are of particular importance and those
responsible for appointments have to show that any questions have been followed
up;
·       
Swiftly
resolve the impasse on the nomination for the post of Chief Inspector;
·        
Improve
rapidly the security of the system of random allocation of cases and accelerate
ongoing work on its modernisation; perform rigorous and impartial
investigations into all cases where suspicions of possible tampering with the
system are raised.
2.
Reform of the Judicial System
The
judicial reform strategy constitutes a solid basis for future action and the
debate it has sparked has shown bodies like the General Prosecution making a
constructive response.
·       
Implement
the new judicial strategy as adopted by the government, as well as the detailed
ideas proposed by the prosecution;
·       
Address
the critical areas in the criminal code which need urgent improvement to
improve the fight against corruption and organised crime;
·        
Agree
on a detailed timeframe for longer term reflection on the fundamental goals of
a new criminal code.
3.
Efficiency of the judicial system
The
Supreme Judicial Council has been taking some important managerial steps which
now need to be followed through. 
·        
Complete
the methodology for the assessment of workload of magistrates and courts and
consult all key stakeholders to offer an objective basis for the reform of the
judicial map (if necessary, disassociating the courts from other public service
maps);
·       
Enforce
clear procedures and standards for penalties to ensure consistent disciplinary
rulings;
·       
Implement
work to close loopholes in the effective implementation of court decisions,
such as absconding to evade prison sentences or failure to apply financial
sanctions defined in court.
·        
Make
concrete progress on e-justice as a mean to improve the judicial process.
4.
Corruption
The
forthcoming evaluation of Bulgaria's anti-corruption strategy should provide a
useful analysis of the challenges facing Bulgaria. It can help both in defining
a new strategy and in starting concrete steps to begin to tackle the problems,
both in terms of prevention and effective prosecution.
·       
Entrust
a single institution with the authority and autonomy needed to coordinate and control
the enforcement of the anti-corruption activities;  create a uniform set of
minimum standards for the public sector in terms of control bodies, risk
assessment and reporting obligations;
·       
Put
in place a solid national anti-corruption strategy, starting with publication of
the analysis of the shortcomings of the current strategy;
·       
Ensure
a determined follow-up to the public procurement strategy adopted in July 2014;
·       
Finalise
the nomination procedures for the remaining members of the CPACI and the
legislative changes to the conflicts of interest law; 
·       
Assess
how the system of assets declarations can be put to a better use (such as targeting
checks through risk assessment);
·       
Reinforce
the capacity of the prosecution to pursue high-level corruption cases;
·       
Monitor
the progress of high level corruption cases and define and take steps to avoid the
exploitation of procedural loopholes to delay the process of justice.
5.
Organised crime
It
remains the case that the large number of outstanding cases and the few
examples of progress cast a shadow over work to address organised crime and to
improve the professionalism of law enforcement in this area.
·        
Create
the necessary conditions for the Specialised Court for Organised Crime and the
attached Prosecutor's Office to be able to concentrate on high profile, complex
cases;
·        
Monitor
the progress of high level organised crime cases and define and take steps to
avoid the exploitation of procedural loopholes to delay the process of justice;
·        
Ensure
that necessary safeguards are taken to prevent high-level defendants absconding
from justice or managing to hide criminally acquired property before a final
court decision, with a clear assignment of the responsibility for any failings;
·        
Ensure
that any changes to the structures involved in the investigation of organised
crime are carried out in such a manner as to ensure operational continuity.
[1]               Conclusions
of the Council, 17 October 2006 (13339/06); Commission Decision establishing a
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address
specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against
corruption and organised crime, 13 December 2006 (C (2006) 6570 final)
[2]               Council
conclusions on previous reports: http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/key_documents_en.htm
[3]               Flash Eurobarometer
406
[4]               Some Member
States provide technical assistance to Bulgaria in CVM-relevant areas.
[5]               COM(2014)
36 final, p.3
[6]               Technical
report section 2.1
[7]               Reports
suggest however that this issue was questioned in Parliament on 21 January
2015.
[8]               COM
(2012) 411 final, p.11.
[9]               See for
example COM (2012) 411 final, p.6 and COM (2014) 36 final, p. 9.
[10]             COM
(2014) 36 final, p.4.
[11]             The
National Assembly has re-started the procedure with a deadline for nomination
of candidates on 30 January 2015.
[12]             See
Recommendation p. 9 of COM (2014) 36 final.
[13]             Notably
in relation to the allocation of bankruptcy procedures in two emblematic cases.
See technical report section 4.1.
[14]             This
could be expected to be a good area for the support of EU funds.
[15]             Available
on the website of the Ministry of Justice (in Bulgarian): http://mjs.bg/107/ 
[16]             It
appears that some elements of the strategy were questioned in Parliament.
[17]             Under the
interim government in October 2014, the text was put forward as a draft.
[18]             See most
notably the above-mentioned proposals for a division of the SJC into chambers
for decisions concerning appointments and disciplinary matters. 
[19]             The
concrete proposals presented by the Prosecutor-General, aiming at a more
decentralised, transparent and accountable prosecution office, could also be
considered in the context of broader changes to the Criminal Procedure Code and
the Judicial Systems Act.
[20]             The
preparations that have been ongoing since 2009 in this area should provide a
rich basis in terms of analytical input. 
[21]             Partly in
response to CVM recommendations (see for example COM(2014) 36 final, p.10), the
analytical work which is currently being carried out within the SJC could also
further improve the basis for assessments, for example by better accounting for
workload and developing a clearer basis for the regular appraisal of
magistrates.
[22]             There are
implications for the territorial organisation of other public services.
[23]             Technical
report, section 4.2.
[24]             See
technical report, section 6.2.
[25]             Flash
Eurobarometer 406 
[26]             Similarly,
the EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014 highlighted a number of challenges in Bulgaria (COM (2014) 38 final). Corruption (as well as judicial independence) are also
noted as challenges for Bulgaria in the 2014 country specific recommendations
in the context of the European Semester of economic policy coordination. (OJ
2014/C 247/02).
[27]             COM(2014)
36 final, p. 7; technical report section 5.4.
[28]             Such as
avoiding the handling of cash by customs officers and border guards, or
rotating staff.
[29]             Technical
report section 5.4. 
[30]             This has
been the subject of criminal proceedings.
[31]             SANS'
report on its activities for 2014 was able to point to much more activity on
organised crime than on anti-corruption.
[32]             It is
perceived as an important problem by 96% of Bulgarian citizen surveyed in the
recent Flash Eurobarometer 406. 
[33]             Technical
report section 6.1.    
[34]             In a
recent case of the murder of a witness in an emblematic case, the witness has
declined to participate in a witness protection programme.
[35]             COM
(2014) 35 final, p.8
[36]             Technical
report section 6.1.
[37]             COM (2014) 35 final,
p.8
[38]             Flash Eurobarometer
406.