COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on the findings of the South-East-European Focus Group Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the short term resilience of the European gas system Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015
Date: 2014-10-16
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, cross-border cooperation, electricity supply, energy cooperation, energy grid, energy supply, gas, security of supply













EUR-Lex - 52014SC0326 - EN











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52014SC0326

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on the findings of the South-East-European Focus Group Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the short term resilience of the European gas system Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015 /* SWD/2014/0326 final */









1. Work of the South-East European Focus
Group
The South-East-European (SEE) focus group was
defined, for the purposes of this stress test exercise, as consisting of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Croatia. These Member States were selected particularly for
their mutual dependency and subsequent reliance on one or few Member States for
deliveries of gas in case of a disruption either of the Ukrainian route or of
Russian supplies in general. The definition of this particular group served
primarily the purpose of carrying out the stress test exercise in an efficient
and coordinated manner, the key objective being that Member States sharing a
common border (and interconnection) have regard to each-others' plans and adopt
as cooperative an approach as possible. Logically, given the interdependencies
in the broader Central and Eastern European region, the grouping of Member
States may be manifold, both ad hoc and more sustained. Constructive and open
coordination as part of alternative groupings, such as the Visegrad 4 (V4),
TEN-E regional group in Central and South Eastern Europe or the broader Gas
Regional Initiative South-South-East, may all contribute to the broader supply
security of the region.
The Commission has organized several dedicated
meetings and telephone conferences for the Member States of this focus group in
the course of the summer to discuss the preparation of the national reports
with the particular aim of ensuring coordination amongst them throughout the
process. Overall, there was a good level of engagement and several national
reports have been shared among Member States. Nevertheless, a joint report or
more collaborative effort, such as the one carried out in the Baltic Member States and Finland, was not considered. The most intensive coordination has taken
place between Greece and Bulgaria. Consequently, having regard to the latter,
this analysis will focus on the respective national reports, pointing to any
coordination undertaken or lack thereof.
2. Description of the system 
Natural gas plays a key role in the energy mix of
all the Member States in the focus group.
 
Table 1 –
Natural gas consumption and share of energy consumption per Member State
Source: Eurogas, European
Commission EU energy in figures statistical pocketbook 2014
In addition to exploiting domestic production[1]
natural gas networks in the SEE Focus Group have been, with the exception of Croatia, designed largely with a view to receiving supplies from Russia via Ukraine. There have in the past years been some important additions to these networks such
as the interconnector between Hungary and Austria, the Greek LNG terminal and
some interconnections and reverse-flow projects between these Member States[2].
However, overall there is still a lack of robust bi-directional interconnection
– including due to internal network-related constraints – between the networks
overall and with other Member States. Therefore scope for gas flow optimization
in the case of a supply cut through Ukraine is still restricted within this
region. In addition, as mentioned in the Communication, several such connecting
infrastructure projects launched after the 2009 gas supply crisis, including
with EU funding from the European Energy Program for Recovery, have still not
been commissioned which contributes to the sustained high exposure of these
systems to a supply shock from the East.
Storage capacity varies in the focus group Member
States with Hungary having the largest at over 6 bcm, Romania at nearly 3 bcm and smaller storages in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are also significantly
smaller markets. There is no underground gas storage in Greece. As of early October, storage filling levels in Bulgaria and Croatia were above 80% and in Hungary above 65%[3].
Nevertheless, Hungary has one of the highest storage fill to demand ratios
among Member States. No data is being published by Romanian storage operator Romgaz
on the storage transparency platform.
In case of a 6-month Russian gas supply disruption
modelled by ENTSOG, missing gas (before measures) by February in the 5 Member
States would be as shown in Table
1. In relative terms Bulgaria is most exposed
although total shortfalls are higher in Hungary and Romania due to larger markets.
 Croatia and Greece experience smaller shortfalls with the latter being the
only Member State in the focus group whose position deteriorates in the
"cooperative" scenario due to a relative burden sharing with Bulgaria whose position would otherwise be more precarious.
Table 2
– Missing gas (%) in February (6th month) according to ENTSOG
modelling of a
6-month Russian gas flow disruption in an average February and cold spell
February

Source: ENTSOG
3. Assessment of the reports
3.1. Cross-border measures
The analysis of the national reports has shown
important elements which can be used to improve the supply situation in the
short term as well. As a general note, these Member States are significantly
less vulnerable if there is cooperation among themselves as well as with other
– particularly neighbouring – Member States. This holds true particularly as
all these Member States have limited direct import infrastructure for other
gas than that coming from Russia (via Ukraine)[4]
and all consider themselves as net "receivers" of gas volumes. It is
therefore crucial that all measures are taken domestically to buffer the
effects of a supply cut and that all measures are taken across borders to
ensure that maximum gas quantities can enter from Member States with access to
alternative supplies and correspondingly those supplies can reach customers in
the entire region.
In its report Greece is only relying on deliveries
from Turkey to a very limited extent which is prudent though the potential for
or conditions of continued deliveries could be explored. It does however set
out a vital role for (spot) LNG under any supply disruption scenario. On the
basis of analysis of LNG market dynamics provided by the International Energy
Agency to the Commission as well as discussions with market experts there
appears to be sufficient flexibility in the market to procure such cargoes. It
is clear however that if such purchases are not linked to an option or a term
contract, the price can be expected to be very high, possibly even double the
market price of gas today. In addition, it also needs to be taken into account
that once such a transaction is made, it can take up to a week for a cargo to
arrive.
The reverse flows at the interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria remain quite restricted but could in principle be used to a level of 3 mcm/day[5] which
would allow LNG to flow into Bulgaria.[6]
To this end, in coordination with Bulgaria, which is in general long on
electricity, a scheme has been discussed by which Greece could effectively
exchange around 3 mcm/day of gas for its equivalent in electricity produced,
thus helping to keep both sectors stable in the two Member States. This example
underlines the strong connection between the two sectors and that the most
effective solution to respond to a possible gas supply disruption is to
maximize cross-border capacities both in electricity and gas. In addition, as Bulgaria points out in its report, the existence of a regional intraday electricity market can
also help alleviate the effects of such a disruption. All efforts should
therefore be made by in particular the national regulator and ministry for the
establishment of such an arrangement.
Bulgaria also sets out
in its report that for such an exchange-based scheme to function effectively in
the coming winter, it needs the additional electricity generation capacity of
the Varna power plant which is to be closed down on 31 December 2014 in line
with EU environmental rules[7].
While the Commission understands the position of Bulgaria in the matter,
granting such temporary derogations may have far-reaching implications in
clashing environmental and energy legislation. Nevertheless, as a last resort
the Commission will consider granting a temporary exemption to alleviate a
possible supply crisis.
The situation of the interconnector between Bulgaria and Romania has also been assessed. This infrastructure that receives EU financial support
under the European Energy Program for Recovery was initially foreseen to be
operational by the end of 2013 but has not been finalized yet. Information
received from both Member States certainly makes it clear that urgent action is
required in order to ensure that the outstanding issues of this project are
resolved. However, given the apparent complications of the project, it is
unlikely to be finalized for the coming winter. Nevertheless, clear political
commitment from both Member States is necessary to overcome technical and
organizational challenges and finalize the project in the shortest timeframe.
In addition, the low pressure in the Romanian system remains problematic with
respect to enabling more substantial cross-border flows to Bulgaria once the
pipeline is in place but also to and from Hungary. This strongly underlines the
need for all regional strategic infrastructure (domestic and cross-border) to
be put in place expediently.
In spite of or perhaps as a result of either missing
infrastructure or specific difficulties Member States see as regards gas flows
within the region in case of a disruption, only the above-mentioned
Bulgarian-Greek exchange scheme was set out in the report. No other assumptions
on flows between Member States or towards Energy Community Contracting Parties
were made in the national reports of Member States within the region. While it
may be due to shortages materializing in these Member States it is certainly a
clear signal that Member States currently consider only national approaches to
solving a serious supply disruption. This however is also due to a lack of
coordination, and while no specific mention was made of export restrictions, no
other scheme of mutual optimization was considered or discussed either.
While not mentioned specifically in the report of Bulgaria, the demand in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is so small[8] that
sending minimal necessary volumes to that country from Bulgaria will likely be possible even if Bulgaria experiences a shortfall. This would be an
important signal of cooperation that would need to be prepared in advance by
way of an agreement between the two countries. Similarly – though no mention
was made of this possibility either –, facilitating supplies from Romania to
Moldova, which are also low compared to the Romanian consumption, would be
equally important from a solidarity point of view, given the lack of
alternatives for that country to source its gas. 
Looking at further supply possibilities for the
region – mentioned tangentially in the Romanian national reports – in a worst
case scenario a substantially more complex supply scheme could involve an
agreement with Ukraine by which the latter allows flows from e.g. Slovakia to
be directed to Romania and possibly Bulgaria through its system.
The role of Hungary in the SEE focus group of Member
States is crucial given its interconnections with neighbouring Member States –
both those having access to non-Russian gas and those that do not. Currently –
in case of a disruption of flows from Ukraine – the supplies to Hungary (and connecting Member States) depend on the availability of flows from the West, through
the Hungary-Austria Gas (HAG) pipeline from Austria. According to the information from Austria,
the HAG pipeline can flow at maximum capacity[9]
as long as there are also flows entering into Austria, allowing that Member
State to act as a bridge towards the east. In case flows into Austria would also be reduced as a result of a disruption of all Russian gas flows, it is crucial
that proportionate amounts of gas can still be sent across the interconnector
into Hungary. In addition, the planned 1 January 2015 commissioning of the
Slovak-Hungarian interconnector, co-financed through the European Energy
Program for Recovery, will be a crucial milestone in terms of security of
supply for the broader region as the large Slovak system allows potentially
very substantial deliveries of gas from a westerly direction[10].
Recent reports in Hungary of a delay in the testing phase are cause for some
concern[11].
In terms of onwards connections towards the east, Hungary's connection to Romania is about 4 mcm/day. This figure is however further constrained by
internal bottlenecks in the Romanian system highlighting the aforementioned
general lack of solid gas supply possibilities within these Member States.[12] The
Hungarian interconnection to Croatia could also play a role but Croatia can also be supplied through Austria and Slovenia[13].
At the same time, to date neither the Romanian nor the Croatian interconnector
with Hungary is bidirectional allowing flows into Hungary.
Hungary's role is also
key as it is the sole connection to Serbia (and onwards to Bosnia and Herzegovina). Serbia was receiving gas through this interconnection during the
2009 crisis as well and this would be again crucial in case a supply disruption
were to take place. Finally, Hungary has also been supplying gas in physical
reverse flow to Ukraine until recently.
3.2. National measures
In spite of the comparatively significant
curtailments of non-protected customers that may possibly occur particularly in
the event of a full disruption of Russian gas supplies, protected customers in
the SEE focus group would – in all likelihood – not need to be curtailed if –
alongside effective further national measures – a cooperative approach is
adopted by all concerned Member States, within the SEE focus group and those
that would be able to supply gas into those Member States, i.e. Austria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Germany.
Measures being considered by Member States in the
focus group relate to increasing flexibility in production (where applicable)
and increasing withdrawal rates from the underground storages, but neither
measure is considered sufficient to resolve a deeper supply cut. In any event,
a faster usage of storages will also have repercussions both on future
availability in case of a prolonged crisis as well as physical characteristics
as storage withdrawal rates drop as storage volumes decrease.
Other than preliminary projections from a demand
response project Greece is putting in place, no Member State has provided an
assessment on the amount of price-elastic demand (industrial or power sector)
that may be removed from the market as a result of the likely price increases
in the case of a serious disruption scenario either through voluntary switching
measures or production stoppages. In any event it is unlikely that demand
response is higher than 10% in any Member State which however is in any event
significant. 
This consequently leaves compulsory fuel switching
as a key measure. All 5 Member States have plans in place for such fuel
switches to be carried out and combined heat and power plants and heating units
are obliged to keep liquid fuel reserves anywhere from around 5 to 15 days.
Some Member States point out in their report that the implementation of these
measures – especially on the long term – may require further review in view of
e.g. the associated logistics. In any event fuel switching for the district
heating sector in particular remains relatively low in at least Romania while it is around half in Hungary.
Consequently, in case of a longer-term disruption,
especially of all Russian gas, Member States will have to resort to curtailing
non-protected consumers. One way of limiting this is however to implement the
cooperative approach flagged earlier and explained in the Communication. To
this end all Member States have confirmed in their national reports the
specific measures developed in their Emergency Plans[14] as
regards the hierarchy of customers and the specific steps to be taken and
decision powers to be exercised.
4. Recommendations
Member States of the SEE Focus Group remain very
exposed to either a Ukrainian transit or a full Russian supply disruption and
therefore it is in their interest to take measures to prepare for such an
event, irrespective of the likelihood of it materialising. The general
recommendations made in the Communication naturally also hold true for the
Member States of the SEE Focus Group. In addition the Commission considers that
the following specific recommendations are particularly relevant for the Member
States in this Group to ensure that ultimately less demand is curtailed in the
case of a supply disruption.
Common recommendations to all Member States of the Focus
Group
1.      Need
for more transparency. TSOs and national regulatory authorities
but also Member States should strive for the highest level of transparency in
their actions vis-à-vis stakeholders and the general public. In a situation of
heightened political tensions such as the one we are experiencing currently all
actions may be interpreted in a political light. It is therefore crucial that
such actions are explained to allay concerns and build trust.
Similarly,
Member States should be clear as to the measures they will implement in a
situation of disruption allowing other Member States and all stakeholders to
prepare.
2.      Need
to increase bilateral and regional perspective. Member States in
the SEE Focus Group (and beyond in the broader CEE region) need to build trust
towards each other to enable them to benefit from cooperation in the energy
sector both in times of crisis and under normal circumstances. Such cooperation
should also involve Contracting Parties to the Energy Community. Regional
formats may be manifold, can be linked to larger political initiatives and may
have as their remit anything from simple exchanges of information to broader
joint initiatives. It is crucial that bilateral or broader regional work is
structured in a way as to consider the position of the neighbouring Member
States when developing e.g. crisis mechanisms but also beyond. 
When
developing more far-reaching modes of cooperation, such as e.g.
inter-governmental agreements setting out cooperation in the sector, it is
essential that the political framework is swiftly followed by specific
operational elements allowing the agreement to take hold and deliver benefits
to both sides.
Specifically
in relation to the upcoming winter the early warning team East established
recently by ENTSOG, should play a key role both in ascertaining whether a
supply crisis is developing and examining the options for TSOs in the region to
ensure that system usage is optimal, including from a regional perspective.
3.      Need
to apply EU market rules in consistent and proportionate manner.
National – as opposed to broader regional – security of supply objectives are
clearly at the forefront of considerations in Member States in the SEE Focus
Group. This may indeed not be much different from those of many other Member
States. It is crucial that Member States do not interpret EU rules in a narrow
sense in implementing public service obligations e.g. as regards capacity
reservations at interconnectors. Furthermore, the consistent application of
network codes and guidelines such as those related to congestion management, capacity
allocation and balancing are essential to allow the efficient functioning of
cross-border trading by market players.
4.      Need
to finish projects on time. Unfortunately too
many projects and initiatives have been left suspended or bogged down by problems
in the SEE region leading to an overall level of strategic preparedness for a
possible shortfall in the Ukrainian transit or Russian supplies of natural gas
that would need to be improved. Specifically Member States should take
necessary measures to assess the points of contention in joint projects and, if
deemed appropriate, invite an independent third party to resolve differences. 
5.      Need
to ensure that fuel switching can be carried out.
Fuel switching, which has been assessed by Member States mostly in the context
of obligatory measures as opposed to price-driven ones, is very important to
further reduce exposure to natural gas in most Member States. At the same time,
measures in place foresee relatively short liquid fuel stocking obligations.
While this may be in accordance with the plans developed under Regulation
994/2010, consideration should be given to the impacts of a more prolonged
supply shock, including logistics and commercial implications.
Greece
1.     
Electricity-gas exchange Memorandum of
Understanding with Bulgaria. Greece should launch
expedited discussions with Bulgaria (starting with political level followed by
operational level of 4 (electricity and gas) TSOs) to develop a Memorandum of
Understanding by 31 December 2014 ensuring unhindered electricity supplies to
Greece and in return reverse flow gas supplies to Bulgaria in case of a serious
gas supply disruption. Key to this plan is a balance of interests in
that electricity volumes to Greece should be roughly equivalent to gas
necessary to produce that electricity in the gas-fired power plants which in
turn is sent to Bulgaria.
2.     
Contingency plan with industry, CHPs and
heating on switching: Statutory stock
obligations for alternative fuel of light or heavy fuel oil amount to 1 to 10
days. A plan should be developed as soon as possible with industry players to
ensure logistical, commercial and regulatory arrangements are in place to
ensure fuel oil deliveries to plants under normal market conditions and
alternatively define the circumstances pursuant to which strategic oil stocks
may be tapped for the purposes of replacement fuel for power/heat generation.
3.     
Evaluate the economics of additional LNG
purchases, replacement fuel oil, extra electricity imports and the demand
response plan just enacted and on that basis develop the most economic
security of supply contingency plan.
Bulgaria
1.     
Electricity-gas exchange emergency
Memorandum of Understanding with Greece.
Bulgaria should launch expedited discussions with Greece (starting with
political level followed by operational level of 4 (electricity and gas) TSOs)
to develop a Memorandum of Understanding by 31 December 2014 ensuring
unhindered electricity supplies to Greece and in return unhindered gas supplies
to Bulgaria in case of a serious gas supply disruption. Key to this plan is a balance
of interests in that electricity volumes to Greece is roughly equivalent to
gas necessary to produce that electricity in the gas-fired power plants.
2.     
Contingency plan with industry, CHPs and
heating on switching: Statutory stock
obligations for alternative fuel oil amount to 5 days. A plan should be
developed as soon as possible with industry players to ensure logistical,
commercial and regulatory arrangements are in place to ensure fuel oil
deliveries to plants under normal market conditions and alternatively define
the circumstances pursuant to which strategic oil stocks may be tapped for the
purposes of replacement fuel for power/heat generation. 
3.     
Take all necessary measures to
overcome challenges of finalizing the Romania-Bulgaria interconnector in the
next months. It is the understanding of the Commission that delays of this
project have been two-fold: technical issues related to the construction of the
 Danube crossing and problems concerning the pressure difference between the
Romanian and Bulgarian systems.
4.     
Consider
similar electricity-gas exchange emergency agreement with Turkey. Curtailing electricity exports to non-EU partners such as Turkey – even in a security of supply emergency – would send a bad political signal. At the
same time it could be investigated whether a commitment to continue exports
even under emergency conditions could not be replicated on the Turkish side by
reverse flow of gas, the technical possibilities of which appear to be possible
and are being investigated.
5.     
Commitment to continue to allow for the
operation of the interconnector towards the former Yugoslav Republic of
  Macedonia even in the case of a supply shortfall.
 Bulgaria should make a clear commitment – on the basis of solidarity – not to
cut off very minor volumes to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It has
not done so in its national report, so it is important that this is made clear
in bilateral discussions.
6.     
Need for
more transparency and implementation of internal market rules. Bulgaria should work together with its regional partners in both electricity and gas to
start developing transparent, integrated/regional market places based on EU
internal market rules. As it set out in its national report specifically on the
need for intraday regional electricity markets, efforts should be made in an
expedited manner to promote such markets developing. The logic and merits of
such regional/liquid markets are the same for electricity and gas.
Correspondingly, it must be in Bulgaria's interest to also promote liquid
regional gas markets.
7.     
As a last resort, the Commission to
consider short term derogation from the Large Combustion Plant Directive[15]
to Varna coal-fired power plant (unit 6) allowing it and units 1,2,3 to
stay online at least as cold reserve during the coming winter.
Romania
1.     
Take all necessary
measures to overcome challenges of finalizing the Romania-Bulgaria
interconnector in the coming months. It is the understanding of the
Commission that delays of this project have been two-fold: technical issues
related to the construction of the Danube crossing and problems concerning the
pressure difference between the Romanian and Bulgarian systems. As has also
become clear from the Romanian national report, which builds on an autarchic
perspective but experiences significant shortfalls, interconnections are
crucial in increasing security of supply.
2.     
Romania should by 31 December 2014
work out a clear definition of protected customers in line with provisions
of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation. It is important to delineate this
group both from the point of view of Romania's obligations under the Security
of Gas Supply Regulation as well as to allow less sensitive groups of customers
to react to price signals in case of serious shortages. In view of the
significant potential shortfall during the winter months it is crucial to
delineate precisely which – limited – customer groups the Romanian authorities
want to protect in a particular manner.
3.     
Investigate (as starters) short-term feasibility
of making full use of Hungarian-Romanian interconnector,
potentially bridging apparent limitations within the Romanian system to allow
flows reaching capacity of the interconnector. At the same time take necessary
measures to allow higher flows towards Hungary.
4.     
Investigate possibility of supplying
Moldova via existing pipeline network in case of lack of flows from Ukraine.
 Romania should undertake to ensure supplies reach Moldova in the case of a gas
supply emergency– on the basis of solidarity –. It has not done so in its
national report so it important that this is made clear in bilateral
discussions.
5.     
Urgent publication of storage level data
by Romgaz. EU-level transparency data on storages
has proven a very valuable tool to monitor and debate EU security of supply
policy. So far the Romanian storage system operator in not a member of Gas
Storage Europe (GSE) nor is it providing data on gas storage volumes to GSE. Romania is thus the only Member State with underground storage capacity which is not reporting any
data for which there appear to be no reasonable explanation.
Hungary
1.     
Commitment
to resolve outstanding testing-related issues on Slovak-Hungarian
interconnector ensuring its commissioning by 1 January 2015. The
Slovak-Hungarian interconnector is in the interest of Hungary as well as the Member States and Energy Community Contracting Parties linked to Hungary (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Transparency surrounding the commissioning of this
pipeline needs to increase greatly for the benefit of the Hungarian gas sector
and the credibility of Hungarian energy policy.
2.     
Hungary,
as a result of its relatively well-connected gas network, has an important role
to play in terms of receiving gas from or via Central European Member States
and in supplying Member States and Energy Community Contracting Parties to the
south and east. On that basis it should sign agreements with bordering
countries related to security of supply emergencies, in order to maximise the
amounts of gas it can receive from well supplied neighbours on the one hand,
and ship onwards to neighbours facing shortfalls, on the other.
­   Need
to implement and operationalize Hungarian-Croatian Intergovernmental Agreement
on security of supply. While the initiative
is a commendable one, it appears that the parties are have yet to take specific
action to ensure material mutual benefits from such an agreement. Specifically
apparently even without compression Croatia would be able to supply 1 mcm/day
using the Hungarian compressor station and therefore an agreement should be
found to implement this scheme and with it allow reverse flows.
­   Continue
discussions with Austria to agree on the specific circumstances of using the
Hungary-Austria interconnector to its full capacity.
3.     
Increase transparency (TSO, NRA and
Ministry). Recent interruption of supplies to Ukraine raised questions and complaints relative to its sudden and perceived
disproportionate nature. In addition, the role of Gazprom filling the Hungarian
storage under special licence-free regime should be clarified. 
Croatia
1.     
Need to implement and operationalize
Hungarian-Croatian Intergovernmental Agreement on security of supply.
While the initiative is a commendable one, it appears that the parties are have
yet to take specific action to ensure material mutual benefits from such an
agreement. Specifically apparently even without compression Croatia would be able to supply 1 mcm/day using the Hungarian compressor station and
therefore an agreement should be found to implement this scheme and with it
allow reverse flows.
2.      Consider
reassessing very high share of protected customers to allow for more level
playing field with neighbouring Member States.
[1] Domestic production
is significant in Romania and has a smaller share in Croatia and Hungary. There is no appreciable domestic production in Bulgaria or Greece.
[2] These are the
interconnectors between Hungary and Croatia as well as the one between Hungary and Romania and the reverse flow towards Austria in Hungary. The latter two projects have
been co-financed through the European Energy Program for Recovery (Regulation
1233/2010).
[3] Source: Gas Storage
Europe AGSI transparency platform.
[4] Meaning that only Greece has direct access to an import gas source via its LNG terminal.
[5] 3 mcm/day is
according to ENTSOG data, of which 1 mcm/day is firm capacity while another 2
mcm/day is interruptible capacity. Bulgaria sets out in its national report
that the capacity could even be 4.2-6 mcm/day depending on pressure conditions.
[6] The Interconnector
Greece-Bulgaria also receives EU financial support under the European Energy
Program for Recovery. The
Interconnector Greece Bulgaria was initially planned for 2014 but is now more
likely to be completed by 2016.
[7]
Unit 6 of
the Varna power plant is to be shut down end 2014 on the basis of EU
environmental rules. However, although units 1, 2 and 3 have a derogation to
continue production until end 2015, due to running hour limitations of
700h/year for each, the plant owner (CEZ Group) is planning to shut down the entire
plant by end 2014.
[8] It is around 1
mcm/day in February which is 10% of Bulgarian consumption in February.
[9] This is equal to 14.4
mcm/day
[10] Capacities from the Czech Republic at Lanzhot are at 24 mcm/day and they are at 17 mcm/day from Austria at Baumgarten.
[11] Magyar Gáz Tranzit,
the operator of the Hungarian side of the interconnector has however stated
that said delays will not affect the timely commissioning of the pipeline on 1
January 2015. 
[12] This means that
apparently only about 1 mcm/day can reach e.g. the main demand centre Bucharest.
[13] Capacities from Slovenia to Croatia at Rogatec are at 5 mcm/day which can largely complement the national production
and storage withdrawal capacity as also modelled by ENTSOG.
[14] Developed pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 994/2010
[15] Directive 2001/80/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 23 October 2001 on the limitation of emissions of certain
pollutants into the air from large combustion plants.