Special Report No 13 // 2014#EU support for rehabilitation following the earthquake in Haiti #(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Date: 2014-09-25
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU aid, EU financing, Haiti, aid to disaster victims, development aid, earthquake, economic reconstruction, emergency aid

EN 

2014 

NO 13

Special Report  EU support for 

rehabilitation following 
the earthquake in Haiti

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

 
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LUXEMBOURG

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

ISBN 978-92-872-0816-3
doi:10.2865/58214

© European Union, 2014
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Luxembourg

EN 

2014 

NO 13

Special Report EU support for 

rehabilitation following 
the earthquake in Haiti

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Contents

02

Paragraph

Glossary and acronyms

I – VII 

Executive summary

1 – 11 

Introduction

1 – 3 

Haiti is a fragile state

4 – 5 

The 2010 earthquake dramatically exacerbated the situation

6 – 7 

The EU delegation was likewise severely affected

8 – 11 

Despite the international response, rehabilitation was a challenge

12 – 17  Audit scope and approach

18 – 63  Observations

18 – 27  The Commission addressed priority rehabilitation needs

19 – 21  Rehabilitation needs were well identified

22 – 24  EU support for rehabilitation was set within a sound strategy

25 – 27  The division of labour between the Commission and other main donors  

was appropriate but coordination during implementation was difficult

28 – 40  Despite some Commission efforts, relief, rehabilitation and  

development were not sufficiently linked

30 – 32  The Commission used different instruments in a flexible manner

33 – 35  Coordination within the Commission was not optimal

36 – 40  LRRD was well thought-out with regard to the design of individual  

rehabilitation programmes but sometimes difficult to ensure in practice

 
Contents

03

41 – 63  The Commission did not sufficiently ensure effective implementation  

of EU support for rehabilitation

42 – 54  Most programmes encountered delays and some achieved limited progress

55 – 58  Some significant risks were not sufficiently managed 

59 – 63  Monitoring was based on an appropriate framework but was allocated  

insufficient resources

64 – 68  Conclusions and recommendations

Annex I  —  List of programmes examined

Annex II  —  Scoring methodology

Annex III  —  Scoring of programmes

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

 
 
 
 
Glossary  
and acronyms

04

CAED: Cadre de Coordination de l’Aide Externe au Développement d’Haïti (Framework for the Coordination of 
External Assistance in Support of Haiti’s Development)

DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument 
Launched in January 2007, the Development Cooperation Instrument provides aid notably through (i) geographic 
programmes with partner countries in Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and South Africa to support 
actions in a wide range of areas (e.g. education, health, social cohesion and employment, governance, democracy, 
human rights, assistance in post-crisis situations and fragile states); and (ii) five thematic programmes concerning 
investing in people, the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources, non-state actors and 
local authorities, the improvement of food security, and cooperation in the area of migration and asylum. 
Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing 
a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

Dipecho: Disaster Preparedness ECHO 
ECHO launched its disaster preparedness programme, Dipecho, in 1996. It targets vulnerable communities 
living in the main disaster-prone regions of the world. Typically, Dipecho-funded programmes cover training, 
capacity-building, awareness-raising, early warning, and planning and forecasting measures, with the funds being 
channelled through aid agencies and NGOs working in the regions concerned.

DRR: disaster risk reduction 
DRR is a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing the risks of disaster. It aims to reduce 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities to disaster as well as to deal with the environmental and other hazards that trigger 
them.

ECHO: Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Its mandate includes saving and preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and safeguarding the 
integrity and human dignity of populations affected by natural or man-made disasters. It provides humanitarian aid, 
short-term rehabilitation support and disaster prevention and preparedness support.

EDF: European Development Funds 
The EDFs are the main instrument for providing European Union aid for development cooperation to the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The partnership agreement 
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 for a period of 20 years (the Cotonou Agreement) is the current framework for 
the EU’s relations with ACP countries and OCTs. Its main focus is on reducing and eventually eradicating poverty.

EEAS: European External Action Service 
The EEAS was launched on 1 December 2010. The EEAS prepares the Commission decisions for country allocations, 
country and regional strategy papers and national and regional indicative programmes jointly with relevant 
Commission departments, as part of the programming cycle for most external action instruments.

Glossary and acronyms 

05

EuropeAid: Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid implements a wide range of the 
Commission’s external assistance instruments financed by the EDFs and the general budget (including the DCI). 
Almost all the EDF interventions are managed by EuropeAid.

FPI: Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
The FPI is a Commission department established on 1 January 2011, reporting directly to the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Expenditure managed by the FPI mainly relates to actions 
implemented under: (a) the common foreign and security policy; (b) the Instrument for Stability (IfS); (c) the election 
observation missions; (d) the Industrialised Countries Instrument.

G12: Group of 12 Donors 
The Group of 12 Donors (G12) includes Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, Spain, the United States, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the UN and the European 
Commission. It is chaired by the deputy head of Minustah in his/her capacity as humanitarian coordinator. The EU 
delegation assumed the chairmanship ad interim in 2013.

GBS: general budget support 
GBS programmes typically consist of a support package involving the transfer of funds, capacity-building measures, 
dialogue with the partner country and the establishment of conditions for disbursement.

GDP: gross domestic product

GNI: gross national income

IAS: Internal Audit Service 
The IAS is a directorate-general of the Commission. It is headed by the Commission’s internal auditor and reports 
to its Audit Progress Committee. Its task is to provide independent assurance on the effectiveness of the internal 
control systems and to help the Commission by means of opinions, advice and recommendations.

IDB: Inter-American Development Bank

IfS: Instrument for Stability 
Established in 2007, the Instrument for Stability is meant to be a rapid and flexible mechanism to prevent conflict, 
support post-conflict political stabilisation and ensure early recovery after a natural disaster. Regulation (EC) 
No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for 
Stability, (OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, p. 1.)

IHRC: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission

IMF: International Monetary Fund

Glossary and acronyms 

06

LRRD: linking of relief, rehabilitation and development

Minustah: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

NGO: non-governmental organisation

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PDNA: post-disaster needs assessment

PFM: public finance management

ROM: result- oriented monitoring 
The ROM system was established by EuropeAid in 2000 to strengthen the monitoring, evaluation and transparency 
of development aid. It is based on short, focused, on-site assessments by external experts. It uses a structured 
and consistent methodology against five criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, potential impact and likely 
sustainability.

WB: World Bank

07

V
Despite some Commission efforts, relief, rehabilitation 
and development were not sufficiently linked. The 
Commission used a range of complementary instru-
ments flexibly and designed individual rehabilitation 
programmes to ensure the linkage between relief, 
rehabilitation and development. However, ECHO and 
EuropeAid had no clear common country strategy to 
optimise the synergies and smooth transition between 
their respective activities. The weak national admin-
istration and insufficient government commitment to 
reform were significant challenges to effective rehabi-
litation and the creation of conditions for sustainable 
development.

VI
The Commission did not sufficiently ensure effective 
implementation of EU support for rehabilitation. Ten 
out of the 13 programmes examined by the Court 
delivered, or were likely to deliver, their planned 
outputs, although almost all with delays. Three 
programmes achieved limited progress, including 
the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) general 
budget support programme. While the Commission 
was well aware of the difficult context, it did not suf-
ficiently manage some significant risks to the imple-
mentation and achievement of its programme objec-
tives. The monitoring of programmes was based on an 
appropriate framework but the Commission and the 
EEAS did not take timely measures to strengthen the 
resources of the EU delegation, which had insufficient 
capacity to perform on-the-spot visits. This would 
have been particularly useful in a rapidly evolving 
situation.

Executive  
summary

I
Haiti is one of the most fragile states in the world and 
the earthquake which hit the country on 12 Janu-
ary 2010 dramatically exacerbated the situation. It 
claimed a heavy toll in human lives, caused mas-
sive destruction, had a grave impact on the national 
economy and severely reduced the already weak 
administration’s capacity to provide basic services to 
the population.

II
The Court examined whether the EU support for reha-
bilitation in Haiti following the earthquake was well 
designed and implemented.

III
The Court concludes that EU support for rehabilitation 
after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was well designed 
overall but the programmes were not implemented 
sufficiently effectively. In common with other donors, 
the European Commission faced serious obstacles in 
its efforts to support rehabilitation. It was confronted 
by the difficult challenge of having to manage its aid 
in partnership with weak national authorities — so as 
to encourage ownership and contribute to the emer-
gence of a functioning government — while seeking 
to ensure rapid aid. However, the Commission could 
have improved its management of some factors under 
its control.

IV
The Commission addressed priority rehabilitation 
needs. Together with other major donors, the Commis-
sion identified major rehabilitation needs in Haiti after 
the 2010 earthquake correctly and adopted a sound 
cooperation strategy which addressed the new chal-
lenges faced by the country while continuing its sup-
port for long-term socioeconomic development. The 
division of labour between donors was appropriate 
but coordination during implementation was difficult.

Executive summary 

08

VII
The Court recommends that during operations in the 
context of a post-disaster or fragile situation the Com-
mission should:

 — improve risk management;

 — adopt a common strategy to ensure the linkage 
and synergy between emergency aid, rehabilita-
tion and development;

 — when providing budget support, focus on key 

public finance management (PFM) functions and 
reforms and, where appropriate, set out shorter-
term measures for safeguarding EU funds against 
waste, leakage and inefficiency;

 — develop business continuity procedures in-

cluding provisions for emergency personnel 
redeployment.

Introduction

09

03 
Haiti remains one of the poorest 
countries in the world4. More than 
half of the population5 live in extreme 
poverty on less than 1,25 USD per day. 
Life expectancy is 62 years, 12 years 
less than the Latin American average. 
About half of the population is illiter-
ate; 20 % of children are malnourished 
and 30 % do not have access to clean 
water sources6. Haiti has the high-
est prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Latin 
America7.

Haiti is a fragile state

01 
In the 18th century Haiti was a leading 
sugarcane producer and one of the 
wealthiest regions in the world. How-
ever, the country has been plagued by 
ethnic conflicts, long-lasting periods of 
anarchy and political instability since 
its independence in 18041. The succes-
sive dictatorships in the second half 
of the 20th century2 were tainted with 
crimes of repression and a plundering 
of the country’s wealth. Today Haiti is 
a fragile state (see Box 1).

02 
The unstable political and security 
situation in the country led to the 
deployment of the United Nations Sta-
bilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah) at 
the end of 20043. Following riots over 
food prices in 2008, the country did 
not have a stable government until 
Laurent Lamothe became prime minis-
ter in March 2012. The security situa-
tion improved, but criminality still has 
a negative impact on development.

1 

2 

In 1791 the slave population of 
the French colony launched an 
insurrection, which led to 
independence in 1804 and to 
the foundation of the world’s 
first independent black 
republic 2 years later. In 1844 
the island split into two 
countries, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic.

Since 1949 Haiti has been 
ruled by several dictators: 
General Paul Magloire, 
succeeded by François 
Duvalier (Papa Doc) and his 
son, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc).

3  Minustah is not scheduled to 
depart until 2016, when a 
reconfiguration and 
consolidation of the mission is 
to take place.

4 

The GNI per capita in Haiti in 
2012 (Atlas method, WB) is 
760 USD compared to the 
Latin American and Caribbean 
average of 8 981 USD.

5  Haiti has nearly 10 million 

inhabitants.

6 

7 

Sources: ‘World DataBank —
World development indicators 
2011 and 2012’, ‘United 
Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) human 
development report’, ‘CIA 
– The world factbook’.

The prevalence of HIV in the 
population aged 15–49 stands 
at 2,2 % (‘Ministère de la Santé 
Publique et de la Population, 
Déclaration d’Engagement sur 
le VIH/SIDA: Rapport de 
Situation Nationale’, 
March 2012).

1
x
o
B

Definition of state fragility

The Commission defines ‘fragility’ as meaning weak or failing structures and situations where the social 
contract is broken due to the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions and to meet 
its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable 
access to power, the security and safety of the population and the protection and promotion of citizens’ rights 
and freedoms.

Source: COM(2007) 643 final of 25 October 2007 ‘Towards an EU response to situations of fragility — engaging in difficult environments for 
sustainable development, stability and peace’.

 
10

8 

9 

The earthquake on 
12 January 2010 affected the 
cities of Port-au-Prince, 
Léogâne and Jacmel, 
damaging the port, airport 
and main roads.

Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee ‘Real-time 
evaluation in Haiti: 3 months 
after the earthquake’; 
31 August 2010.

10  Post-disaster needs 

assessment (March 2010).

11  According to the 

government’s estimates 
105 000 houses were 
destroyed, 208 000 houses 
were damaged, 60 % of 
hospitals in and around 
Port-au-Prince and 
5 000 schools were ruined. 
Around 3 million people were 
affected by the earthquake. 
The total cost estimate of the 
impact is 7,8 billion USD, which 
equals the total GDP of Haiti 
in 2009.

12  After a period of relatively 
constant growth between 
2005 and 2009, GDP fell by 
5,4 % as a consequence of the 
earthquake.

Introduction

The 2010 earthquake 
dramatically exacerbated 
the situation

The EU delegation was 
likewise severely affected

06 
The EU delegation was severely af-
fected by the earthquake: one staff 
member died, the head of delega-
tion needed hospitalisation and the 
majority of staff suffered from trauma 
or other psychological problems. 
Within 48 hours of the disaster, 30 offi-
cials were evacuated to Brussels or the 
Dominican Republic. The EU delega-
tion’s building was unusable and com-
munication with Brussels was barely 
possible. Many files were damaged or 
lost.

07 
Some of the officials returned to Haiti 
after a few weeks but due to many 
changes in the management posts and 
long periods without a head of delega-
tion, the EU delegation’s operational 
capacity was seriously affected for 
a considerable period of time.

04 
At a time when Haiti was still recover-
ing from the 2008 storms, an earth-
quake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter 
scale, which hit the capital and its 
surroundings on 12 January 2010 (see 
the Map), claimed a heavy toll in 
 human lives and caused massive 
destruction8. Around 230 000  people 
were killed, making this disaster as 
deadly as the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, but concentrated in a sin-
gle country9. Some 300 000 people 
were injured, half of them children. 
Around 1,3 million  people were ren-
dered homeless in Port-au-Prince and 
over 500 000 people  left the disaster 
area to seek refuge in the rest of the 
country10. Poor sanitary conditions, 
which worsened dramatically after the 
earthquake, facilitated the outbreak of 
a cholera epidemic.

05 
Many public administration buildings, 
including the national palace, hospi-
tals, schools and other public estab-
lishments, were destroyed and a large 
number of their employees died11. The 
capacity of the Government of Haiti in 
terms of service delivery was thus se-
verely affected. As the earthquake hit 
the region with the highest economic 
activity in the country, it had a grave 
impact upon gross domestic product 
(GDP) development12 and tax collec-
tion. The treasury lacked the budg-
etary resources to restore national 
administration operations and to pay 
civil servants.

Introduction

11

p The area hit by the earthquake on 12 January 2010
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Introduction

12

Despite the international 
response, rehabilitation 
was a challenge

08 
In the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, several hundred international 
organisations, countries and individu-
als from around the world responded 
to the urgent humanitarian needs13. 
The United Nations (UN) Office for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) launched a ‘flash ap-
peal’ which gathered 575 million USD 
in 72 hours. By the end of 2012, public 
sector donors had disbursed 2,23 bil-
lion USD as humanitarian aid and an 
additional 192 million USD to fight the 
cholera outbreak (see Figure below). 
Furthermore, an estimated 3 billion 
USD was contributed to UN agencies 
and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) by private donors14.

13 

International organisations 
long established in Haiti (the 
Red Cross movement and 
major NGOs) were able to 
provide an immediate 
response and by May 2010 
over 1 000 international 
organisations had provided 
humanitarian aid.

14  Office of the Special Envoy for 

Haiti —Key Facts as of 
December 2012.

e Funds raised and disbursed in support of Haiti as of December 2012
r
u
g
i
F

13,34 USD billion planned 
2010-2020 
PUBLIC FUNDING 
Recovery and humanitarian funding (excluding debt relief, totaling 1,0 USD billion)

10,77 USD billion planned 
2010-2020 
RECOVERY FUNDING

2,57 USD billion planned 
2010-2012 
HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

8,34 USD billion
pledged
2010-2020

2,43 USD billion 
planned 
2010-2012

2,37 USD billion
planned 
2010-2012 

204 USD million 
planned 
2010-2012 

New York PLEDGES

OTHER FUNDING

EARTHQUAKE

CHOLERA

3,06 USD billion raised
(estimated) 
2010-2012

PRIVATE FUNDING 
(Donors: 
foundations, 
companies and 
individuals)

2010-2012: 5,37 USD billion 
2013-2020: 2,96 USD billion

3,01 USD billion 
DISBURSED 
2010-2012

1,01 USD billion 
DISBURSED 
2010-2012

2,23 USD billion 
DISBURSED 
2010-2012

191,9 USD million 
DISBURSED 
2010-2012

Source: Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, based on donor reporting and publicly available data.

 
Introduction

09 
In order to mobilise international sup-
port for the reconstruction and further 
development of the country, the UN 
hosted the international donor confer-
ence ‘Towards a new future for Haiti’ 
in New York on 31 March 2010. Donors 
agreed to support the government’s 
‘Plan d’Action pour le Relèvement et 
le Développement National d’Haïti’15 
(PARDH) and provide assistance for 
medium- and long-term recovery in or-
der to ‘build back better’16. At the con-
ference, 55 donors pledged 5,37 billion 
USD for the 2010–12 period and a fur-
ther 2,96 billion for the year 2013 and 
beyond. In addition, several countries 
cancelled a combined total of 1 bil-
lion USD of Haiti’s debt17.

10 
The European Union (EU) was a main 
donor. It made a single pledge 
amounting to 1,23 billion euro. This 
included pledges for rehabilitation 
and development of the country from 
the Commission (460 million euro)18, 
18 Member States and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank19. The Com-
mission also provided humanitarian 
aid through Directorate-General for 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(ECHO). Over the period 2010–13 ECHO 
allocated in total 232 million euro20.

11 
Despite the immense financial aid 
and international effort, the country 
is still facing big challenges. It took 
far too long to clear the rubble which, 
among other issues, affected the pace 
of reconstruction21. An estimated 
210 000 people were still living in tent-
ed camps at the end of 2013 and none 
of the ministerial buildings destroyed 
have yet been fully reconstructed. 
The recovery is hindered by structural 
problems that beset the country even 
before 2010. Barely operational, public 
administration is still a major obstacle 
for the delivery of services in sectors 
such as health, education and water 
and sanitation. Weak public finance 
management makes it difficult to 
optimise the use of resources and to 
prevent fraud and corruption. Lack of 
a land register, resulting in associated 
land disputes, hampers the reconstruc-
tion process. The extreme vulnerability 
of the agriculture sector to frequent 
natural hazards and lack of investment 
undermines food production22.

13

15  Action plan for national 

Recovery and Development 
of Haiti.

16  The underlying principle of 

the PARDH was not to simply 
re-establish the situation 
prevailing before the 
earthquake but to take the 
opportunity of reconstruction 
to address the main causes of 
vulnerability in the past and 
present.

17  These countries include, 
among others, Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Finland and 
Sweden.

18  This pledge, which consists 

mainly of EDF funds, was later 
increased to 522 million euro.

19  For the breakdown of pledges 
by country/institution see 
http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.
org/download/International_
Assistance/5-ny-pledge-total.
pdf

20  European Commission’s 

humanitarian aid and civil 
protection response in 
Haiti -— Two years after the 
earthquake (2012); ECHO 
Factsheet Haiti — April 2013.

21  See for example ‘From relief to 
recovery: Supporting good 
governance in post-
earthquake Haiti’, Oxfam ,2011. 
One of the main critical issues 
was the slowness of the rubble 
removal process.

22  Due to several disasters that 

faced Haiti between 1996 and 
2010 the country was in a 
protracted crisis even before 
the earthquake, with 57 % of 
the population 
under     nourished.

14

23 

In the period February 2010 –  
December 2012, the 
Commission committed 
202 million euro in the areas of 
rehabilitation and DRR. The 
programmes sampled had a 
total value of 141 million euro. 
Out of this sum, 81,1 million 
euro had been paid at 
31 December 2013 (see 
Annex III).

24  When programmes are 
mentioned in the 
observations, reference is 
made to their numbering in 
Annexes I and III.

Audit scope  
and approach

12 
The Court examined whether the EU 
support for rehabilitation in Haiti was 
well designed and implemented. The 
audit focused on three main questions:

(a)  Did the Commission address prior-

ity rehabilitation needs?

(b)  Did the Commission ensure link-

age between relief, rehabilitation 
and development?

(c)  Did the Commission ensure effec-

tive implementation of EU support 
for rehabilitation?

13 
The audit covered the support pro-
vided to Haiti in 2010–13 by ECHO, the 
Directorate-General for Development 
and Cooperation (EuropeAid) and the 
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
(FPI).

14 
The audit was carried out between 
May and November 2013 and included:

(a)  a review of the 10th EDF country 

cooperation strategy and other key 
policy documents;

(b)  interviews with Commission and 
European External Action Service 
(EEAS) officials in Brussels;

(c)  a visit to Haiti from 26 August 
to 6 September 2013 involving 
interviews with EU delegation staff 
and representatives of the Haitian 
authorities, the main international 
development partners, NGOs and 
civil society organisations, as well 
as visits to projects.

15 
The audit included a review of 13 EU-
funded programmes aimed to provide 
support for rehabilitation and dis-
aster risk reduction (see Annex I). In 
financial terms the sample represents 
about two thirds of the commitments 
made by the Commission for those 
two areas23. The seven programmes 
funded by ECHO were implemented 
in the domains of housing (shelters), 
water, sanitation, disaster prepared-
ness and food in Port-au-Prince, Petit-
Goâve, Léogâne and Jacmel. The three 
programmes funded by EuropeAid 
concerned general budget support 
(GBS), the reconstruction of residential 
areas and improving food security in 
the region of Artibonite. The three 
FPI programmes aimed at restoring 
the crisis preparedness of the Haitian 
administration.

16 
The review focused on assessing the 
relevance, design and outputs of these 
programmes, which were scored using 
relevant criteria from the Commission’s 
results-oriented monitoring (ROM) 
methodology (see Annexes II and III)24.

Audit scope and approach 

15

17 
In the course of preparing the audit, 
the auditors considered the standards, 
guidelines and good practices that 
were being developed by the INTOSAI 
Working Group on Accountability 
for and Audit of disaster-related Aid 
(AADA)25. They considered in particular 
ISSAI 5510 — The audit of disaster risk 
reduction — and ISSAI 5520 — Audit 
of disaster-related aid — in order to 
obtain an adequate knowledge of the 
disaster management cycle, identify 
risks in the management of disaster-
related aid and design the audit 
programme.

25  The 5500 series of ISSAIs 
concerning the audit of 
disaster-related aid were 
published in October 2013 
(see http://www.issai.org).

Observations

16

The Commission 
addressed priority 
rehabilitation needs

18 
The Court examined whether the 
Commission clearly identified the re-
habilitation needs, set out a sound co-
operation strategy and ensured proper 
coordination of efforts and division of 
labour with other main actors.

Rehabilitation needs were 
well identified

19 
The EU support for rehabilitation after 
the earthquake was based on an ap-
propriate assessment of needs agreed 
between experts, the main donors and 
the government of Haiti. Immediately 
after the earthquake, ECHO experts 
performed a preliminary, multi-sector 
needs assessment. At the end of Janu-
ary 2010 a joint team of experts from 
the Commission, Belgium, France and 
Spain assessed needs in the areas of 
infrastructure, PFM, governance, jus-
tice and security and social services (in 
particular education).

20 
The Commission also supported 
the post-disaster needs assessment 
(PDNA)26, which aimed at setting up 
a framework for development and 
growth27. It was the basis of the action 
plan for national recovery and devel-
opment presented by the Haitian gov-
ernment at the New York international 
conference of 31 March 2010.

21 
The main rehabilitation needs con-
cerned housing and urban rehabilita-
tion, water, sanitation and hygiene, 
health, food security and education. 
Support was also needed for govern-
ance, PFM and reinforcement of the 
administration to develop systems 
and policies that would ensure ap-
propriate and sustainable delivery of 
basic services. Due to scarce public 
resources, budget support was con-
sidered crucial to fuel the restart and 
recovery of essential state functions in 
the very fragile context prevailing in 
the post-disaster era. The diagnosis of 
PFM weaknesses and an action plan28 
of priority measures were agreed be-
tween the government and the  donors 
involved in supporting economic 
governance.

EU support for rehabilita-
tion was set within a sound 
strategy

22 
The Commission revised the 10th 
EDF cooperation strategy with Haiti 
on the basis of the abovementioned 
assessments and the government’s 
requests29. The revised cooperation 
strategy aimed to continue supporting 
long-term socioeconomic develop-
ment to eradicate poverty while also 
responding to post-earthquake reha-
bilitation needs. It retained the sectors 
initially targeted (infrastructure, gov-
ernance and budget support), but the 
financial allocation was significantly 
increased. The allocation for program-
mable aid (A envelope) was topped up 
by 100 million euro to reach 391 mil-
lion euro and the allocation to cover 
unforeseen events such as emergency 
assistance (B envelope) was increased 
from 13,6 million to 73,6 million euro. 
The sector allocations under program-
mable aid were revised as indicated in 
the Table.

26  The PDNA was funded by the 
Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery 
(GFDRR) with financial support 
from the Commission and 
Australia, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Around 
250 national and international 
experts and representatives of 
NGOs and Haitian civil society 
participated in the 
assessment. It covered eight 
areas: governance, 
production, social sectors, 
infrastructure, regional 
development, environment 
and disaster risk management, 
as well as cross-cutting 
themes including gender, 
youth and vulnerable 
populations.

27  The experts considered that 
11,5 billion USD was required 
over 3 years: 50 % for the 
social sectors; 17 % for 
infrastructure; 15 % for the 
environment and risk and 
disaster management; and the 
rest for the production 
sectors, governance and 
cross-cutting aspects (gender, 
young people, vulnerable 
populations).

28  Within the coordination group 
(‘Cadre de Partenariat pour 
l’Appui Budgétaire’, 
established on 27.2.2009), in 
May 2010 budget support 
donors agreed on a priority 
action plan to improve 
financial controls and 
introduce reforms, and a 
common matrix of indicators 
to assess progress in those 
areas.

29  The government wished to 

maintain the overall direction 
of the initial 10th EDF 
cooperation strategy, which 
remained relevant to support 
long-term development. 
Besides, while the majority of 
donors concentrated on the 
area directly hit by the 
earthquake, it was considered 
crucial to continue supporting 
the remaining part of the 
country.

Observations

17

l

e Revised sector allocations under the 10th EDF  
b
programmable aid after the earthquake
a
T

Sector

Initial allocations

Revised allocations

(million euro)

Focal sectors

Infrastructure

Governance

General budget support (GBS)

Other

Reserve

TOTAL

259

175

36

48

32

0

291

349

245

27

77

35

7

391

Sources: CSP/NIP 2008–13 and revised CSP/NIP 2011–13.

24 
The programmes examined by the 
Court generally reflected the strat-
egy adopted by the Commission. The 
specific needs in the areas supported 
by the Commission were assessed 
correctly during the design of indi-
vidual programmes (see Annex III, 
Relevance).

30 

In agriculture, significant 
funding was made available 
between 2011 and 2012 
through the food security 
thematic programmes and the 
food facility (in total 
23,6 million euro), and the 
millennium development goal 
initiative (20 million euro to 
improve food security). 
Disaster preparedness was 
supported by Dipecho 
programmes, IfS and the EU 
Member States.

23 
As regards infrastructure, roads re-
mained the main area of EU support 
but urban reconstruction (including 
housing) was added in line with the 
PARDH. In the governance sector, 
support for decentralisation and the 
strengthening of state capacity was 
maintained but the development of 
a land register system and DRR were 
additional priority areas. The increased 
allocation for GBS was aimed at help-
ing to restore public services, launch 
the reconstruction programme and 
support the development and growth 
strategies through reforms of eco-
nomic governance. Significant funding 
(43,6 million euro) was also made avail-
able under the EU general budget for 
food and agriculture and disaster risk 
reduction30.

Observations

The division of labour 
between the Commission 
and other main donors was 
appropriate but coordination 
during implementation was 
difficult

25 
Haiti was chosen as a pilot country for 
joint EU programming (see Box 2) un-
der the 10th EDF. As indicated above, 
the revision of the 10th EDF coopera-
tion strategy was also prepared by the 
Commission in coordination with EU 
Member States active in Haiti (Germa-
ny, France and Spain) and other main 
donors. This allowed for an effective 
division of labour. While France and 
Spain were mostly active in the south 
of the country and the United States in 
the north, the EU support was focused 
on the central region of Artibonite. 
In addition Port-au-Prince and other 
cities affected by the earthquake were 
divided into zones in which individual 
donors and their implementing part-
ners were active.

26 
However, day-to-day coordination 
between the Commission and other 
donors during the implementation of 
programmes was difficult:

(a)  The effectiveness of the coordina-
tion mechanism for humanitarian 
assistance run by OCHA31, in which 
ECHO actively participated, was 
limited. The main reasons were its 
complexity, the very high number 
of humanitarian actors with di-
verging operational methods, the 
reluctance of some donor coun-
tries to work together, linguistic 
problems32 and the fact that the 
meetings were organised in the 
UN military base33. In addition 
inter-sector coordination between 
working groups remained weak 
due to the lack of skilled coordina-
tors with strategic thinking and 
facilitation skills34.

18

31  This coordination mechanism 
was based on sector working 
groups called ‘clusters’. 
Clusters are partnerships 
between international actors, 
national and local authorities 
and civil society. They were 
created when clear human-
itarian needs existed within a 
sector, there were numerous 
actors within sectors and 
national authorities needed 
coordination support. Until 
2012 there were 11 functional 
clusters. Since then, seven of 
them have been phased out 
partly due to the transition to 
development, but also due to 
a sharp decrease in financial 
resources for humanitarian 
action in the country.

32  Many meetings were held, and 
the documentation was 
prepared, in English. This 
limited the participation of 
local NGOs.

33  Some organisations did not 

enter the military premises for 
ideological reasons; other, 
mainly smaller, local NGOs 
were not allowed in. The 
rooms were overcrowded and 
it was difficult to find common 
positions on certain issues.

34 

‘Evaluation of OCHA response 
to the Haiti earthquake’, 2011, 
pp. 10–11 (http://hhi.harvard.
edu/sites/default/files/In%20
Line%20Images/
programs%20-%20hum%20
effectiveness%20-%20
earthquake%20-%20
evaluation.pdf).

2
x
o
B

Joint EU programming

Joint EU programming aims to coordinate donors’ in-country work under a common framework of support, 
with each specialising in their particular strengths. This has the potential to decrease the fragmentation of 
aid and increase ownership, alignment and harmonisation while also raising the profile of the EU’s work and 
allowing European donors to speak with one voice.

Source: EU Commission, ‘Joint multi-annual programming, Final report’ (2010).

 
Observations

(b)  The coordination mechanisms for 

development aid, which were in 
place before the earthquake, are 
also complex and involve many 
stakeholders (government, donors, 
international NGOs, UN agencies, 
etc.) with different mandates35. 
The main international donors are 
gathered in the ‘Group of 12 do-
nors’ (G12). At sector level, coor-
dination mechanisms were useful 
for the division of labour and 
exchange of information, but did 
not lead to coordinated actions or 
the setting up of sector policies36.

(c)  Due to the collapsed institutional 
capacity of the national adminis-
tration, slow decision-making by 
the government, inadequate com-
munication, the limited involve-
ment of civil society and a lack of 
leadership skills, the Interim Haiti 
Recovery Commission (IHRC) (see 
Box 3) was unable to coordinate37 
the significantly increased donor 
support after the earthquake ef-
fectively. In November 2012, a new 
coordination system was launched 
by the government, the UN and 

the G12 to transfer the leader-
ship of aid coordination to the 
Haitian authorities: the ‘Cadre de 
Coordination de l’Aide Externe au 
Développement d’Haïti’38 (CAED). 
However, the CAED was not yet 
able to provide strategic guidance 
on international support for recon-
struction efforts39.

27 
Concerning budget support, in 
May 2010, in the framework of the es-
tablished coordination group40, donors 
agreed on a priority action plan41 to 
improve financial controls and intro-
duce reforms, and on a common ma-
trix of indicators to assess progress42. 
This joint assessment also made it 
possible to adapt the technical sup-
port components of their respective 
programmes to ensure complementa-
rity. Nonetheless, these encouraging 
prospects for coordinated monitor-
ing and policy dialogue with national 
authorities faded progressively during 
implementation (see paragraph 63).

19

35 

‘Inter-agency real-time 
evaluation in Haiti: 3 months 
after the earthquake’ (2010).

36  Office of the Special Envoy for 
Haiti, ‘Has aid changed? 
Channelling assistance to Haiti 
before and after the 
earthquake’, June 2011, p. 8 
(http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/
has_aid_changed_en.pdf).

37  See for example ‘L’aide 

française à Haïti après le 
séisme du 12 janvier 2010’, 
Cour des comptes (January 
2013) and ‘From relief to 
recovery: Supporting good 
governance in post-
earthquake Haiti’, Oxfam, 2011.

38  Framework for the 

Coordination of External 
Assistance in Support of Haiti’s 
Development.

39  Meetings of the CAED were 
infrequent and the terms of 
reference of the sector 
working groups were still 
being drafted at the time of 
the Court’s visit.

40 

‘Cadre de Partenariat pour 
l’Appui Budgétaire’ (CPAB) 
formally established on 
27 February 2009 and chaired 
by the minister of finance.

41  Notably based on IMF 

recommendations from the 
2009 revision of the WB public 
expenditure and financial 
accountability review 
prepared in 2007.

42  Essentially concerning the 

general conditions of the GBS, 
i.e. satisfactory progress 
(i) towards an enhanced 
macroeconomic stability 
framework; (ii) on reform to 
improve public finance 
manage PFM; and (iii) on the 
implementation of recovery 
and development strategies.

3
x
o
B

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission

The creation of the IHRC was announced at the international donor conference ‘Towards a new future for 
Haiti’ in New York and was formally established in April 2010 for a period of 18 months. The IHRC’s role was to 
oversee the implementation of the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (APNRD) and manage 
the funds pooled by the government and the international community in the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. The 
IHRC was co-chaired by the Prime Minister of Haiti and Bill Clinton, the former US president.

 
Observations

20

The Commission used differ-
ent instruments in a flexible 
manner

43  The revised country strategy 

paper was signed in 
March 2012.

30 
EuropeAid programming and pro-
gramme preparation involve discus-
sion with national authorities and 
coordination with other donors. Given 
the significant preparatory work which 
has to be done by the Commission and 
the EEAS, this process is not designed 
to address the rapidly changing needs 
faced in a crisis situation. However, 
while the formal adoption of the 
revised 10th EDF cooperation strategy 
after the earthquake took 2 years43, 
its overall direction was set reason-
ably quickly, which made it possible to 
reduce delays for launching rehabilita-
tion programmes.

Despite some Commission 
efforts, relief, rehabilita-
tion and development 
were not sufficiently 
linked

28 
The Court examined whether the Com-
mission: (i) used different instruments 
in a flexible manner; (ii) coordinated 
ECHO and EuropeAid activities well; 
and (iii) addressed linking relief, reha-
bilitation and development (LRRD) in 
the design and implementation of EU 
rehabilitation programmes.

29 
The main objectives for EU support in 
Haiti following the earthquake con-
cerned the provision of relief assis-
tance, the rehabilitation of damaged 
infrastructure and essential public 
service functions, and the creation of 
conditions for sustainable develop-
ment. LRRD was therefore a strategic 
issue for EU cooperation with Haiti 
in the post-2010 disaster period (see 
Box 4).

4
x
o
B

Linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development

The role of relief assistance is to provide urgent short-term humanitarian aid to save and preserve the lives of 
people facing serious difficulties resulting from natural disasters or violent conflicts. Rehabilitation operations 
are processes designed to progressively take over from relief assistance and stabilise the economic and social 
situation by helping those affected to reconstruct infrastructure, improve services and reinforce institutions 
which will permit a decent transition towards development cooperation. LRRD covers the measures and inter-
ventions designed to fill the gaps and/or strengthen synergies between short-term and long-term assistance.

Sources: COM(96) 153 final of 30 April 1996 on ‘Linking relief, rehabilitation and development’, COM(2001) 153 final of 23 April 2001 on ‘LRRD —  
An assessment’ and COM(2012) 586 final of 30 October 2012 on ‘The EU approach to resilience: Learning from food security crises’.

 
Observations

31 
Alongside EuropeAid, ECHO was also 
involved in rehabilitation activities. 
Whereas in 2010 the humanitarian 
aid provided by ECHO was directed 
towards emergency needs (including 
rubble removal, settlement of plastic 
sheeting camps, water trucking, sani-
tation and food distribution to inter-
nally displaced persons), its assistance 
in 2011 and 2012 continued beyond 
the emergency phase. It included 
disaster risk reduction44 and addressed 
displacement45, mainly in the form of 
constructing temporary shelters, build-
ing toilets and sanitation systems and 
organising cash-for-work programmes. 
These activities were undertaken by 
ECHO as short-term rehabilitation 
support until long-term rehabilitation 
projects by development partners 
were ready46.

32 
The Commission also deployed the 
more flexible Instrument for Stability 
(IfS) managed by FPI, to follow on from 
the ‘Disaster preparedness ECHO’  
(Dipecho) programme. This was 
intended to facilitate the transition 
to rehabilitation and development 
by helping increase people’s capacity 
to cope with disasters through large-
scale public and school awareness 
campaigns, small-scale mitigation 
activities and civil protection training 
of volunteers47.

21

In total 5,5 million euro: 
3 million euro from the 
Humanitarian Implementation 
Plan Haiti 2011 and 
2,5 million euro from the 
Dipecho programme in the 
Caribbean region which was 
independent of the response 
to the earthquake.

45  ECHO’s assistance focused 
in 2012 on addressing 
displacement 
(20,25 million euro), response 
to cholera (3 million euro), 
responding to disasters such 
as tropical storm Isaac and 
Hurricane Sandy 
(9 million euro) and reducing 
the risk of disasters 
(2 million euro).

46  This is in line with 

recommendation 1 made by 
the Court in its Special Report 
No 6/2008 concerning 
European Commission 
rehabilitation aid following 
the tsunami and Hurricane 
Mitch with respect to the rapid 
design of rehabilitation 
programmes  
(http://eca.europa.eu).

‘Dipecho study: Lessons 
learned for an improved 
strategy and approach’, Inspire 
Consortium, March 2013, 
pp. 11 and 19 (http://
ec.europa.eu/echo/files/
policies/dipecho/reports/
LL_improved_strategy_
approach_March2013.pdf).

47 

48  One of the outcomes was the 

decision to set up 
reconstruction programmes in 
the neighbourhood of the 
affected areas.

49  For example, the NGO 
Concern Worldwide 
implemented a peace-
building project funded by the 
IfS aiming at reducing armed 
gang fighting in the Grand 
Ravine slum. The project was 
followed by humanitarian 
interventions with ECHO and 
then rehabilitation and 
improvement of the same 
neighbourhood with 
EuropeAid.

Coordination within the 
Commission was not optimal

44 

33 
The Commission set up a crisis plat-
form, consisting of regular coordina-
tion meetings between EuropeAid, 
ECHO, the Secretariat-General of the 
Commission and the EU Member 
States, to coordinate the EU response 
in the first few weeks after the earth-
quake. ECHO and the EU delegation 
also shared information regularly 
(e.g. on the needs of internally dis-
placed people in camps and tem-
porary shelters) and communicated 
with FPI on the Dipecho programme 
to ensure good links with other DRR 
activities. Country team meetings 
were organised regularly between the 
Commission’s departments48. These 
coordination mechanisms made it 
easier to assess needs and set priorities 
properly.

34 
The EuropeAid neighbourhood 
reconstruction and development 
programme (programme 9) was 
enlarged to include additional areas 
in Port-au-Prince. In order to ensure 
continuity with previous ECHO pro-
jects, EuropeAid followed the concept 
‘same partner in the same area’, which 
involved hiring ECHO implementing 
partners who had been present in 
a given district during the humanitar-
ian aid phase, thus taking advantage 
of their valuable know-how in a given 
context49.

22

50  CONT delegation visit, 

22–26 February 2012, Haiti, 
Feedback note (http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2009_2014/
documents/cont/dv/
draftfeedbackreport_/
draftfeedbackreport_en.pdf).

Observations

35 
However, as was stressed in 2011 by 
the Commission’s Internal Audit 
Service (IAS), ECHO and EuropeAid 
had no clear common country strat-
egy on LRRD to optimise the synergy 
and smooth transition between their 
respective activities. During its visit to 
Haiti in February 2012, a delegation of 
the Committee on Budgetary Control 
of the European Parliament found 
an insufficient level of coordination 
between ECHO and the EU delega-
tion50. The weaknesses found by the 
Court mainly concerned the following 
aspects:

(a)  ECHO programmes are short-term 
whereas EuropeAid programming 
and programme preparation take 
time. Although both adopted 
a flexible approach (see para-
graphs 30 and 31), several months 
elapsed between the end of ECHO 
support and the availability of 
EuropeAid’s funding for recon-
struction and neighbourhood 

development. Smooth bridging of 
field operations was only possible 
by means of self-financing and mo-
tivation of implementing partners.

(b)  There were differing views be-

tween humanitarian and develop-
ment partners, including ECHO 
and the EU delegation, on the 
most appropriate approach for 
addressing housing needs. Ac-
cording to the EU delegation and 
many other development partners 
interviewed by the Court, the 
construction of temporary shel-
ters instead of permanent houses 
3 years after the earthquake is not 
the most efficient solution taking 
into account the lack of space and 
involves a high risk of shelter areas 
turning into slums.

(c)  ECHO’s exit strategy and hand-

over to the EU delegation were not 
formalised and documented. This 
did not ensure a proper follow up.

rehabilitation in Haiti

1 Lack of space is a major constraint for urban  
o
t
o
h
P

Source: European Court of Auditors.

 
Observations

23

37 
Almost all ECHO rehabilitation pro-
grammes facilitated a smooth transi-
tion towards development. They were 
often part of integrated approaches 
for a given neighbourhood area. In ad-
dition to the construction of shelters, 
such approaches included livelihood 
support, training and supporting local 
authorities (see Box 5). However delays 
in the implementation of programmes 
(see paragraph 43) slowed down the 
creation of conditions for sustainable 
development in the areas concerned.

LRRD was well thought-out 
with regard to the design 
of individual rehabilitation 
programmes but sometimes 
difficult to ensure in practice

36 
The programmes examined by the 
Court were appropriately designed to 
link humanitarian and rehabilitation 
phases or to lead to the creation of 
conditions for sustainable develop-
ment. The activities aimed to restore 
the essential functions of public 
services and to create the condi-
tions for sustainable development. 
However, the prospects of achieving 
this were not promising for four out 
of the 13 programmes examined by 
the Court due to lack of appropriate 
reforms, the authorities’ failure to take 
ownership and the absence of a prop-
erly functioning administration (see 
Annex III, Design).

5
x
o
B

Integrated solutions

The HELP programme (programme 2) funded by ECHO in the peripheral areas of Petit-Goâve and Léogâne 
aimed to repair houses and construct semi-permanent shelters. It was part of an integrated approach in-
tended to rebuild the community. Other programmes in this area involved constructing a vocational training 
centre, planting community gardens, setting up a market, paving streets and improving public transport. In 
this way, the rehabilitation efforts made it possible for people to not only return to their houses but also to 
start income-generating activities.

 
24

51  Land title issues were also an 
important factor contributing 
to delays in other donors’ 
programmes. See for example 
‘Haiti reconstruction — USAID 
infrastructure projects have 
had mixed results and face 
sustainability challenges’, US 
Government Accountability 
Office (June 2013).

40 
Immediately after the earthquake, 
the GBS programme (programme 10) 
helped the government to overcome 
the lack of treasury resources, which 
could have generated wide instabil-
ity. The support for the government’s 
recovery, development and growth 
strategies and for improving economic 
governance was a relevant lever to-
wards a better situation. However, the 
slow progress made in this area by the 
government hindered the smooth im-
plementation of the GBS programme 
and its potential contribution to the 
institutional and physical reconstruc-
tion efforts (see paragraphs 53 and 54).

Observations

38 
In the area of urban development, 
the elaboration and dissemination of 
anti-seismic construction standards 
and good practices were planned in 
disaster-risk reduction schemes which 
were part of government and institu-
tional support programmes, such as 
the reconstruction and neighbour-
hood development programme (see 
programme 9). This was an appropriate 
approach with a view to ‘build back 
better’. Nevertheless, despite aware-
ness campaigns, these standards were 
rarely followed for private houses 
in vulnerable areas because of the 
increased construction cost and the 
absence of effective controls by the 
administration. The progress of the 
reconstruction programmes was also 
hampered by property rights issues, 
due to the embryonic state of the land 
registry service51. Pilot projects aimed 
at developing the land register were 
ongoing in two districts of Port-au-
Prince, but coverage of the entire 
country was likely to be a long process.

39 
The DCI food programme examined 
by the Court (programme 8) followed 
humanitarian assistance and aimed to 
form a bridge towards the resumption 
of sustainable development, notably 
by setting up a continuous supply of 
good quality seeds for agricultural 
production. However, the weak ad-
ministration in place offered limited 
prospects for sustaining the pro-
gramme’s results and the hoped-for 
development.

Observations

The Commission did not 
sufficiently ensure effec-
tive implementation of EU 
support for rehabilitation

41 
The Court examined whether: (i) the 
planned outputs were delivered in 
a timely manner; (ii) the Commission 
assessed the main risks in the post- 
disaster context and adopted meas-
ures to address them; and (iii) monitor-
ing was adequate.

Most programmes encoun-
tered delays and some 
achieved limited progress

42 
Eleven out of the 13 programmes 
examined by the Court were not 
implemented within the initial time-
table. The delays ranged from 1 to 12 
months, which is a matter of particular 
concern with regard to programmes 
which were initially intended to 
be short-term. Three programmes 
delivered a limited proportion of 
their planned outputs (see Annex III, 
Outputs). Two of these were large pro-
grammes in financial terms52.

ECHO projects

43 
The planned outputs of the seven 
programmes examined by the Court 
included the removal of rubble, the 
construction of 1 500 temporary shel-
ters, the renovation of 800 damaged 
houses, the construction of sanitation 
and water supply systems, the provi-
sion of civil protection equipment and 
training, the creation of a geographic 
information centre, the provision of 
microcredits and various income-
generating activities. One programme 
(programme 6) was implemented 
within the planned timetable. The 
others were delayed due to a difficult 
post-earthquake context53, but also 
deficiencies in their design or imple-
mentation. The implementing partners 
did not sufficiently consider local 
constraints (e.g. cumbersome national 
administrative procedures) or technical 
difficulties (e.g. size of temporary shel-
ters unsuitable for the available space).

44 
Almost all the programmes eventually 
delivered the planned outputs. How-
ever in one case54, the planned return 
of approximately 2 000 families to 
their houses was not achieved during 
programme implementation because 
the Ministry of Public Works did not 
deliver reliable data on the state of 
houses55.

25

52 

‘Programme d’appui 
budgétaire général au Plan 
d’action pour la 
Reconstruction et le 
Développement d‘Haïti et à la 
Stratégie Nationale de 
Croissance et de Réduction de 
la Pauvreté’ (programme 10) 
with an EU contribution of 
47 million euro; and 
‘Strengthening of the Haitian 
emergency preparedness’ 
with an EU contribution of 
14,5 million euro 
(programme 13).

53  Deteriorating conditions for 

implementing the 
programmes due to a cholera 
outbreak, hurricanes or 
precarious security conditions.

54  Construction of safe and 

sustainable shelter solutions 
(programme 1).

55  The Ministry of Public Works 
had to assess whether the 
buildings:
–  were not damaged by the 
earthquake and could be 
occupied immediately; or
–  were dangerous buildings 
to which entrance should 
be limited and where 
occupancy is possible only 
after some repairs are 
carried out; or

–  were dangerous buildings 

to which entrance is 
forbidden and where 
occupancy is envisaged 
only if significant repairs are 
carried out, or require 
demolition.

Observations

26

shelters and toilets’ (Léogâne) and ‘Construction of safe and sustainable shelter  
solutions’ (Delmas, Port-au-Prince)

3 Temporary shelters built under the programmes ‘Construction of safe transitional 
d
n
a
2
s
o
t
o
h
P

Source: European Court of Auditors.

Instrument for Stability

45 
The IfS-funded programme to help 
restore the Haitian government’s 
crisis preparedness capacity had three 
components: (i) removing rubble while 
providing cash-for-work for vulnerable 
populations; (ii) organising a series of 
high-level political meetings on recon-
struction issues, aid delivery strategies, 
constitutional reform and restoring 
the functioning of government; and 
(iii) increasing the resilience of the 
population through the provision of 
equipment to be used in the event of 
an emergency, and the installation of 
a crisis room in Port-au-Prince.

46 
The first two components (pro-
grammes 11 and 12) were imple-
mented as planned. The main causes 
of delays in implementing the third 
component were logistical constraints, 
the lack of suitable country experi-
ence and linguistic skills on the part 
of implementing partners and overly 
ambitious programme objectives. Fur-
thermore, the training provided was 
insufficient and not fully adapted to 
local conditions. The emergency kits 
were of inadequate quality and not 
always placed in suitable locations.

 
 
 
27

56  Support programme for 

neighbourhood 
reconstruction and 
development to facilitate the 
return of affected populations 
(programme 9).

57  Baillargeau, Martissan, 
Delmas 9, Christ-Roi, 
Grand-Ravine and Carrefour.

58  Part of the programme is 

implemented through the 
‘Unité de Construction de 
Logements et de Bâtiments 
Publics’, which has been 
operational since August 2012 
and is attached to the Prime 
Minister’s Office.

59  Setting up local committees, 
participatory consultation, 
social and technical studies 
and land ownership research.

60  An NGO had not the financial 

engineering expertise 
required to set up a loan 
scheme.

Observations

Neighbourhood reconstruction 
and development

47 
The return of displaced people to 
their home neighbourhoods was a key 
priority for the government in order 
to remedy the tenuous social cohe-
sion caused by population movements 
and many casualties. The EDF-funded 
‘Programme d’appui à la reconstruc-
tion et à l’aménagement de quartiers 
pour faciliter le retour des popula-
tions sinistrées’56 supported the 
reconstruction of six highly populated 
neighbourhoods57 of Port-au-Prince 
and one in the town of Petit-Goâve. In 
addition to improving urban planning 
and public infrastructure, support was 
provided to households to reconstruct 
their houses themselves. Various other 
activities were promoted through 
training and micro-finance at com-
munity level to encourage economic 
autonomy.

48 
Part of the programme was imple-
mented through the national admin-
istration58. Although it was relevant 
in view of the ‘building-back-better’ 
and ownership principles, such an 
approach did not make it possible 
to deliver physical outputs at a pace 
that was fully compatible with LRRD. 
At the time of the Court’s visit, the 
general concept for the rehabilitation 
had been agreed and master plans 
for access roads and public infrastruc-
ture had been drafted for all projects 
examined but construction work had 
not yet started.

49 
Nevertheless, significant progress 
was made in the rehabilitation of the 
public administration’s capacities for 
urban development. Good progress 
was also being made on the activities 
implemented by the NGO partners. 
Their field experience, continuous 
presence from the beginning of the 
humanitarian action and pragmatic 
approach allowed preparatory work 
to be carried out quickly59. In addition, 
their interactions with the authorities 
benefited from the improvement in 
context following the establishment of 
institutional support components.

Food security

50 
The DCI-funded programme examined 
by the Court (programme 8) aimed to 
improve food security for the most vul-
nerable households and agricultural 
producers in the region of Artibonite, 
through the sustainable management 
of natural resources, income-generat-
ing activities and reinforcing the ca-
pacities of the regional administration.

51 
At the time of the Court’s visit, the 
programme was still at an early stage 
of implementation but was already 
delayed by 4 months due to shortcom-
ings in the design of the programme 
(insufficient analysis of the administra-
tive and organisational environment) 
and inadequate expertise on the part 
of an implementing partner60.

28

61  The IMF, World Bank, IDB, 

France and Spain. Canada and 
the United States assist 
economic governance but do 
not provide direct budget 
support.

62  The GBS programme 

examined (programme 10) 
was the second under the 
10th EDF for Haiti. The first 
programme, signed in 2009, 
amounted initially to 
27 million euro and was 
increased to 61 million euro 
from the B envelope and 
VFLEX funds.

63  PARDH, adopted in 2010.

64 

‘Document de Stratégie 
Nationale de Croissance et de 
Réduction de la Pauvreté’ 
(2008–10); ‘Plan Stratégique de 
Développement d’Haïti, Cadre 
de Croissance Triennal’ 
(2012–15).

65  Only 375 000 euro (out of 

3 million euro) was disbursed 
due to the non-achievement 
of eight indicators (out of nine) 
in the area of PFM.

Observations

Budget support

52 
In a joint effort with other donors61, 
the 10th EDF-funded GBS pro-
gramme62 aimed to support the imple-
mentation of the government’s action 
plan for post-disaster reconstruction63 
and its growth and poverty reduction 
strategy64. The programme included 
44 million euro as budget support and 
a further 3 million euro for comple-
mentary actions, such as technical as-
sistance or support for the production 
of national statistics.

Some significant risks were 
not sufficiently managed

55 
The Commission analysed the post- 
disaster context effectively and 
identified the main risk factors. These 
concerned political instability, secur-
ity, land ownership rights, shortage 
of land and urban complexity, poor 
administrative capacity, low levels 
of participation at community level, 
inadequate coordination and natural 
hazards.

56 
However, the Commission did not 
manage the resulting risks to the im-
plementation of EU programmes and 
the achievement of their objectives 
well. It did not assess the likelihood 
and potential impact of these risks, 
and did not plan appropriate measures 
to prevent or mitigate some significant 
risks. For example:

(a)  long customs delays at Haiti’s ports 
and airport were a well-known 
problem, which significantly hin-
dered the implementation of the 
ECHO-funded programme for the 
construction of temporary shelters 
(programme 1);

(b)  the Ministry of Agriculture’s limited 
capacity and lack of institutional 
set-up for the provision of breeder 
seeds was identified during the 
preparation of the DCI food pro-
gramme (programme 8). However, 
no proper measures were planned 
and the prospects for sustaining 
the programme’s results were low;

53 
The programme provided much- 
needed treasury resources to help 
rehabilitate essential state functions in 
the aftermath of the earthquake. The 
first fixed tranche of 26 million euro 
was disbursed in 2011 according to 
the planned schedule, i.e. immediately 
after the finance agreement had been 
signed. Mainly due to slow progress 
in economic governance, the second 
fixed tranche of 7 million euro and 
only part of the first variable tranche65 
were disbursed in December 2012, that 
is, after the end of fiscal year 2011–12, 
for which they were initially scheduled. 
Due to unsatisfactory progress in PFM 
reform, no further disbursements were 
made by the Commission and other 
budget support donors in 2013.

54 
Some progress was under way on 
PFM, such as the creation of a unique 
treasury account or the establishment 
of 10 public accountant posts. Never-
theless, more than 2 years after the 
start of this second 10th EDF-funded 
GBS programme, there was not yet an 
appropriate and realistic PFM reform 
programme with well-defined and ac-
cepted priority actions and milestones.

Observations

29

(c)  due to its overly complex and am-
bitious design, the IfS programme 
to support the restoration of the 
Haitian government’s crisis prepar-
edness capacity (programme 13) 
did not achieve its planned objec-
tives in a satisfactory manner (see 
Box 6). The implementing part-
ner’s country-relevant experience 
was an important factor that was 
not sufficiently taken into account.

57 
In a situation where the essential func-
tioning of the state was significantly 
weakened, the provision of budget 
support involved high fiduciary risk66. 
The Commission carried out a reason-
able assessment of the prevailing 
level of fiduciary risks. However, in 
the light of the limited level of sup-
port from other donors67, the com-
plementary assistance package was 
insufficient and not properly focused 
on key functions to enable significant 
and prioritised improvements to be 
made to safeguard public resources 
(see Box 7). During its visit to Haiti 
in February 2012, a delegation of the 
Committee on Budgetary Control of 
the European Parliament found inad-
equate national control and account-
ing systems50.

66  One likely consequence of 
weak PFM systems is 
widespread fraud and 
corruption. Transparency 
International’s Corruption 
Perception Index 2013 ranks 
Haiti in 163th place out of the 
177 countries covered. An 
example of large-scale fraud 
and corruption is the case of 
41 contracts totalling more 
than 500 million USD awarded 
irregularly during the period 
November 2010–October 2011.

67  During the Court’s visit, no 

other donors were 
implementing significant 
institutional support in the 
PFM area. In 2010, IMF experts 
helped to control public 
resources, but no adequate 
follow-up was ensured by the 
donor community.

6
x
o
B

Difficulties in the implementation of the IfS funded ‘Programme to support the res-
toration of the Haitian government’s crisis preparedness capacity’ (programme 13)

This programme aimed to help restore the Haitian government’s crisis preparedness capacity. The objective 
of delivering 300 containers of emergency equipment to 140 locations all around the country turned out to 
be too ambitious to be achieved within the planned deadline. The implementing partner had difficulties in 
identifying suitable locations and ensuring sufficient quality of the material and its accessibility. Impassable 
roads, limited capacity at the harbour and airport, the unavailability of fuel and customs delays proved to be 
underestimated challenges for a partner without any previous local experience.

 
Observations

30

7
x
o
B

Measures to protect EU funds

In its Special Report No 11/2010 on the Commission’s management of general budget support in ACP, Latin 
American and Asian countries, the Court recommended that the Commission should strengthen its risk man-
agement. This should include shorter-term measures where PFM systems are particularly weak, which is the 
case in Haiti, as confirmed by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 2011 assessment. 
Shorter-term measures to better protect EU funds against waste, leakage and inefficiency could include the 
audit of the civil servant payroll (about 50 % of the current budget), reinforcement of revenue departments  
(customs, tax), specific support to accounting functions and institutional support to the inoperative  
‘Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif’.

58 
Political risks were identified by the 
Commission when preparing the 
programme68 and monitored during 
implementation but no clear meas-
ures were planned to address them, 
should they occur. Political instability 
and volatility have regularly interfered 
with the development and consolida-
tion of political and policy dialogue 
between the government and GBS 
donors. Insufficient political will, 
slow legislative processes and limited 
administration capacity have subse-
quently proved to be major constraints 
to adopting and implementing crucial 
reforms effectively and implement-
ing the programme as planned (see 
paragraphs 52 to 54).

Monitoring was based on an 
appropriate framework but 
was allocated insufficient 
resources

59 
As mentioned above in paragraphs 6 
and 7, the EU delegation was itself 
severely affected by the earthquake. 
The Commission and the EEAS did not 
take timely measures to send suffi-
cient staff with the relevant skills and 
experience within the critical phase. 
The EU delegation’s staff resources 
have only recently been increased69. 
Given these circumstances, the EU 
delegation made remarkable monitor-
ing efforts but had little capacity to 
perform on-the-spot visits70, which 
would have been useful in a rapidly 
evolving situation.

68  E.g. change of government, 

insufficient political will to 
reform, social instability.

69  The EU delegation was 

reinforced with 11 additional 
posts at the end of 2013.

70  The EU delegation in 

Port-au-Prince has the second 
highest workload amongst all 
the EU representations 
according to EuropeAid 
workload assessment.

 
31

71  On the basis of the agreed 

indicators.

Observations

60 
The monitoring system used by ECHO 
was based on a mandatory stand-
ardised reporting framework which 
provides appropriate information and 
compares it against a set of agreed 
indicators. Where there were delays 
or unexpected difficulties, ECHO took 
timely corrective action. In the case 
of the programme ‘Construction of 
safe and sustainable shelter solutions’ 
which was not being implemented 
satisfactorily (see paragraph 44), ECHO 
ceased cooperation with the imple-
menting partner after the programme 
had ended.

62 
The EuropeAid urban reconstruction 
programme (programme 9) has a re-
sult-oriented set-up. The monitoring 
of progress against clearly defined in-
dicators was ensured through financial 
and narrative reporting from partners, 
project visits by programme manag-
ers and results oriented monitoring 
(ROM) visits. However, despite the 
limited number of field visits by the EU 
delegation due to its heavy workload 
(see paragraph 59), no independent 
technical supervision was planned to 
check the quality of construction work, 
which was particularly important for 
this programme.

61 
For the IfS programmes, monitoring 
by the EU delegation was based on 
programme reports and field visits, as 
well as interim and final evaluations by 
external experts. Several weaknesses 
found during the interim evaluation 
were quickly addressed by replacing 
the local project manager, setting up 
closer monitoring and improving co-
ordination between partners.

63 
During the implementation of the 
GBS programme examined (pro-
gramme 10), the group of donors 
concerned, led by the World Bank, did 
not consistently carry out the intended 
joint monitoring of progress in eco-
nomic governance71, which was to be 
the basis for coordinated disburse-
ment decisions. This situation also 
reduced the opportunities for political 
and policy dialogue with the govern-
ment. In the same way as other donors, 
the EU delegation had to make its own 
assessments. However, the EU delega-
tion did not have enough specific 
competence in the PFM area and the 
reinforcement of the EU delegation’s 
human resources was far too slow.

Conclusions and 
recommendations

32

64 
The Court concludes that EU support 
for rehabilitation after the 2010 earth-
quake in Haiti was well designed 
overall but the programmes were not 
implemented sufficiently effectively. In 
common with other donors, the Com-
mission faced serious obstacles in its 
efforts to support rehabilitation. It was 
confronted by the difficult challenge 
of having to manage its aid in part-
nership with weak national authori-
ties — so as to encourage ownership 
and contribute to the emergence of 
functioning government — while 
seeking to ensure rapid aid. However, 
the Commission could have improved 
its management of some factors under 
its control.

66 
Despite some Commission efforts, 
relief, rehabilitation and development 
were not sufficiently linked. The Com-
mission used a range of complemen-
tary instruments flexibly and designed 
individual rehabilitation programmes 
to ensure the linkage between relief, 
rehabilitation and development. How-
ever, ECHO and EuropeAid had no clear 
common country strategy to optimise 
the synergies and smooth transition 
between their respective activities. 
The weak national administration and 
insufficient government commitment 
to reform were significant challenges 
to effective rehabilitation and the crea-
tion of conditions for sustainable de-
velopment (see paragraphs 28 to 40).

65 
The Commission addressed priority 
rehabilitation needs. Together with 
other major donors, the Commission 
identified major rehabilitation needs 
in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake cor-
rectly and adopted a sound coopera-
tion strategy which addressed the new 
challenges faced by the country while 
continuing its support for long-term 
socioeconomic development. The 
division of labour between donors was 
appropriate but coordination dur-
ing implementation was difficult (see 
paragraphs 18 to 27).

67 
The Commission did not sufficiently 
ensure effective implementation of 
EU support for rehabilitation. Ten out 
of the 13 programmes examined by 
the Court delivered, or were likely to 
deliver, their planned outputs, al-
though almost all with delays. Three 
programmes achieved limited pro-
gress, including the 10th EDF general 
budget support programme. While 
the Commission was well aware of the 
difficult context, it did not sufficiently 
manage some significant risks to the 
implementation and achievement of 
its programme objectives. The moni-
toring of programmes was based on 
an appropriate framework but the 
Commission and the EEAS did not take 
timely measures to strengthen the 
EU delegation’s resources, and it had 
insufficient capacity to perform on-
the-spot visits, which would have been 
particularly useful in a rapidly evolving 
situation (see paragraphs 41 to 63).

Conclusions and recommendations

33

68 
Based on this audit the Court makes 
the following recommendations to im-
prove the effectiveness of Commission 
operations in the context of a post-
disaster or fragile situation:

Recommendation 1 
Risk management

The Commission should, at the outset 
of programmes and, where appropri-
ate, during implementation, assess the 
likelihood and potential impact of the 
main risks to the achievement of pro-
gramme objectives and take measures 
to prevent or mitigate these risks.

Recommendation 2 
Linking relief, 
rehabilitation and 
development

EuropeAid and ECHO should adopt 
a common strategy on LRRD to ensure 
effective linkage and synergy between 
their respective activities. The strategy 
should set:

—  the objectives and mandates of 
the respective departments;

—  the procedures to prepare coordi-

nated country action plans;

—  exit strategies and handover 

procedures.

Recommendation 3 
Budget support

When providing budget support, the 
Commission should, in coordination 
with other donors:

—  provide adequate capacity- 

building support and focus on 
key PFM functions, including ac-
countability and anti-corruption 
mechanisms;

—  support the timely preparation 

of an appropriate PFM reform 
programme;

—  where appropriate, set out shorter-
term measures for safeguarding EU 
funds against waste, leakage and 
inefficiency.

Recommendation 4 
Emergency provisions for 
EU delegations

In cases involving natural disasters or 
other similar events, and particularly 
those affecting the functioning of 
the EU delegation, the Commission 
and the EEAS should develop busi-
ness continuity procedures, including 
provisions for emergency personnel 
redeployment.

Conclusions and recommendations

34

This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 17 June 2014.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

 
 
 
Annexes

35

I
x
e
n
n
A

List of programmes examined

Partner and project title

Total costs (EU contribution)

Implementing period

ECHO

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

UNOPS Shelter (Rehabilitation) — Construction of safe and  
sustainable shelter solutions

4,2 million euro 
(EU: 4,1 million euro; 96,5 % share)

1 October 2010–4 August 2011  
(2,5 month extension)

HELP (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.) Water and sanitation (Shelter) — 
Construction of safe transitional shelters and toilets

2,7 million euro  
(EU: 2,2 million euro; 82,51 % share)

1 July 2012–31 December 2013  
(8 month extension)

WHH (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe eV); German Agro Action)
Disaster preparedness — Enhancing disaster preparedness and 
awareness capacities

COOPI (Cooperazione Internazionale Fondazione Italy)
Disaster preparedness (Coordination) — Strengthening the 
capacities of the disaster and risk management (DRM)

887 479 euro;  
EU: 650 000 euro; 73,24 % share

1 July 2011–31 October 2012  
(1 month extension) — Dipecho 
project

648 235 euro 
(EU: 550 000 euro;  84,85 % share)

13 August 2012–31 December 2013  
(4,5 month extension)

Concern Worldwide Shelter (Water sanitation) — Construction of 
improved T shelter (long term).

5,8 million euro
(EU: 5,2 million euro; 90 % of total 
eligible costs)

1 April 2010–30 June 2011  
(3 month extension)

SI (Solidarités internationales; France) Coordination (Shelter) — 
Cash-for-work activities , installation of community committees 
and disaster preparedness 

SI (Solidarités internationales; France) — FOOD — Improving 
living conditions, giving access to employment and community 
services (e.g. income-generating activities are permanently 
installed), helping to strengthen food security

2,9 million euro  
(EU: 99 % contribution)

1 October 2010–31 August 2011

1 million euro 
(EU : 100 %)

1 September 2011– 31 December 2012 
(4 month extension)

EuropeAid

8

9

10

FAO (Organisation des Nations Unies pour l‘Alimentation et 
l’Agriculture); Améliorer la situation de sécurité alimentaire et 
nutritionnelle des ménages vulnérables dans le département de 
l’Artibonite

Ordonnateur National d’Haïti, AFD, UN-Habitat, Croix-Rouge 
France, Solidarités International, Concern Worldwide, Care 
France, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe EV. Programme d’appui à la 
reconstruction et à l’aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter le 
retour des populations sinistrées; Programme d’’appui à la recon-
struction et à l’aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter le retour 
des populations sinistrées

Ordonnateur National d’Haïti, and other public and private 
contracting entities. Programme d’appui budgétaire général au 
Plan d’action pour la Reconstruction et le Développement d‘Haïti 
(PARDH) et à la Stratégie Nationale de Croissance et de Réduction 
de la Pauvreté (SNCRP) 

1,5 million euro
(EU: 80 % share)

I November 2012–31 October 2014 
(24 months)

74,5 million euro  
(EU: 55,8 million euro;  
France: 10,5 million euro;  
NGOs: 8 million euro;  
UN Habitat: 200 000 euro)

7 December 2011–7 December 2016 (60 
months, including one extension)

47 million euro 
(EU: 100 %)

2 May 2011–2 May 2015 (48 months)

 
Annexes

36

I
x
e
n
n
A

Partner and project title

Total costs (EU contribution)

Implementing period

Instrument for Stability (IfS)
Programme to support the restoration of Haitian government capacities for crisis preparedness; Decision 2010/022-598 — 20 million euro

11 UNDP — Cash-for-work for early recovery and stabilisation

Multi-donor action totalling  
40,9 million USD 
(EU: 5 million euro; 16 % of total 
project costs)

13 January 2010–31 December 2012 
(IfS contribution between  
1 September 2010 and 31 August 2012)

12

13

Club de Madrid — Strengthening Haiti’s institutional base and 
increasing the Haitian leadership’s ownership of the recovery process

500 000 euro
(EU: 100 % contribution)

1 July 2010–29 February 2012

International Management Group (IMG), Belgrade and  
Joint Research Centre (JRC)— Strengthening of Haitian  
emergency preparedness

13,25 million euro for IMG group 
(lead coordinator) and  
1,25 million euro (Joint Research 
Centre) 
( EU: 100 % contribution)

14 October 2010–31 May 2012 (IMG),
20 December 2010–19 December 2012 
(JRC)

An additional sum of 7 million euro is covered in a second decision to strengthen the institutional capacity and funding is planned from the end of 20131 .

1   Decision C(2012) 7698 final; (CRIS decision 2012/024530); no contribution agreement signed. The project is still at a draft stage and was not 

examined.

 
Annexes

37

I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Scoring methodology

For the purpose of the audit, the scoring of the relevance, design and outputs was determined on the basis of 
the Commission’s results-oriented monitoring (ROM) methodology. The criteria used are listed below.

Relevance

A

B

C

D

Design

A

B

C

D

Project is clearly embedded in national policies and EC strategy, is highly relevant to the identified priority needs and targets the vulnerable 
groups.

Fits well in national policies and EC strategy (without always being explicit), is relevant to identified needs and vulnerable groups.

There are some issues/problems regarding consistency with national and EC policies, or relevance to targeting.

Contradictions with national policies or EC strategy; relevance of needs is questionable. Major adjustments needed.

Clear and well-structured logical framework; feasible and consistent vertical logic of objectives; adequate SMART OVIs (objectively verifiable 
indicators); risks and local constraints clearly identified and managed; project's objectives form a bridge between humanitarian phase and 
development, project is intended to lead to a resumption of sustainable development, capacity building is included to ensure the partner takes 
full responsibility after the project end, exit strategy in place.

Adequate intervention logic, although it might need some improvement regarding hierarchy of objectives, OVIs, risks and constraints, LRRD 
mostly assured, provisions for full takeover of responsibility have been made, improvements regarding ownership however advised.

Problems with intervention logic may affect performance of project and capacity to monitor and evaluate progress; improvements necessary to 
ensure ownership and sustainability.

Intervention logic is faulty and requires major revision for the project to have a chance of success.

Outputs 

A

B

C

D

All outputs have been, or most likely will be, delivered with good quality contributing to outcomes as planned, activities are implemented on 
schedule and regularly monitored.

Output delivery is, and will most likely be, according to plan, but there is room for improvement in terms of quality, coverage and timing. Delays 
do not harm delivery of outputs.

Some outputs are/will be not delivered on time or with good quality. Adjustments are necessary. Activities are delayed and somewhat 
disconnected from the intervention logic and plans.

Quality and delivery of outputs has, and most likely will have, serious deficiencies. Major adjustments are needed to ensure that at least the key 
outputs are delivered. Serious delays and fundamental disconnect of activities from intervention logic and plans.

 
Annexes

I
I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Scoring of programmes1

Programmes and partners

Instru-
ment

EC 
contribution

Paid as at 
31.12.2013

Relevance

Design

Outputs

2

1

UNOPS — ECHO/-CR/BUD/2010/02028 
Shelter (Rehabilitation) - Construction of 
safe and sustainable shelter solutions
HELP (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.) —  
ECHO/HTI/BUD/2012/91008 
Water sanitation (Shelter) — Construction 
of safe transitional shelters and toilets  
3 WHH (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe eV); 

4

5

6

7

8

German Agro Action) —  
ECHO/DIP/BUD/2011/92002 
Disaster preparedness — Enhancing disas-
ter preparedness and awareness capacities
COOPI (Cooperazione Internazion-
ale Fondazione Italy) — ECHO/HTI/
BUD/2012/91016 
Disaster preparedness (Coordination) — 
ECHO/HTI/BUD/2012/91016 — Strengthen 
the capacities of the Disaster and Risk 
Management (DRM)
Concern Worldwide —  
ECHO/-CR/BUD/2010/02010 
Shelter (Water sanitation) — Construction 
of improved T shelter (long term)
SI (Solidarités internationales; France) — 
ECHO/-CR/BUD/2010/02045  
Coordination (Shelter) — Cash for work  
activities, instalment of community  
comitees and disaster preparedness
SI (Solidarités internationales; France) — 
FOOD — Improve the living conditions, 
give access to employment and community 
services (e.g. income generating activi-
ties are permanently installed), help to 
strengthen food security
FAO (Organisation des Nations Unies pour 
l‘Alimentation et l’Agriculture) (FAO) —  
DCI-FOOD.2012/299-441; Améliorer la situa-
tion de sécurité alimentaire et nutrition-
nelle des ménages vulnérables dans le 
département de l’Artibonite

1  See Annex II for methodology.

O
H
C
E

d
o
o
f

—

I
C
D

4,1

2,2

0,7

3,6

1,8

0,6

0,6

0,4

5,2

2,9

5,2

2,9

1,0

1,0

1,5

1,1

B

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

C

A

A

A

B

A

B

C

38

(million euro)

Implementation 
period

10.2010–8.2011

7.2010–12.2013

7.2010–10.2012

8.2012–1.2013

4.2010–6.2011

10.2010–8.2011

9.2011–12.2012

C

A

B

A

B

A

A

too early 
to assess

11.2012–10.2014

 
 
 
Annexes

39

I
I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Programmes and partners

Instru-
ment

EC 
contribution

Paid as at 
31.12.2013

Relevance

Design

Outputs

(million euro)

Implementation 
period

9

Programme d’appui à la reconstruction et 
à l’aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter 
le retour des populations sinistrées  
(CRIS Nr 2011/023-144); Ordonnateur 
National d’Haïti, AFD, UN-Habitat, Croix-
Rouge France, Solidarités International, 
Concern Worldwide, Care France, Deutsche 
Welthungerhilfe EV.
Programme d’appui budgétaire générale 
pour la Reconstruction et le Développement 
d‘Haïti (PARDH) et à la Stratégie Nationale 
de Croissance et de Réduction de la 
Pauvreté (SNCRP) (CRIS Nr2010/022-435); 
Ordonnateur National d’Haïti, and other 
public and private contracting entities
11 UNDP – Cash for work for early recovery  

10

12

13

and stabilisation
Club de Madrid — Strengthening Haiti’s 
institutional base and increasing the Hai-
tian leadership’s ownership of the recovery 
process
International Management Group (IMG), 
Belgrade and  Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
— Strengthening of the Haitian emergency 
preparedness

TOTAL

F
D
E

S
F
I

55,8

11,0

47,0

34,9

5,0

0,5

5,0

0,5

14,5

13,1

141,0

81,1

A

A

A

A

A

A

C

A

A

C

B

12.2011–12.2016

C

A

A

C

5.2011–5.2015

9.2010–8.2012

7.2010–2.2012

10.2010–5.2012 
(IMG), 
12.2010–12.2012 
(JRC)

 
Replies of the Commission 
and the EEAS

40

Executive summary

III
The Commission and the EEAS would like to under-
line that most projects achieved their objectives, 
despite the difficult context in which they were 
implemented.

The Commission managed to mitigate the impact of 
some external factors that caused delays.

V
While a formal joint country strategy for LRRD in 
Haiti was not required, the Commission services 
coordinated their approaches and ensured the link 
between relief and development on a sectorial 
basis. Full and systematic integration of the LRRD 
approach has been included in the funding cycle 
covering 2014–20.

VI
The Commission and the EEAS emphasise that most 
projects have achieved their intended results.

As regards the risks, the Commission and the EEAS 
would like to recall that working in a fragile country 
inevitably entails risks. While these risks were iden-
tified, and possible mitigation measures were put 
in place, the Commission and the EEAS decided, in 
some cases, to implement the programmes despite 
the risks involved in order to contribute to the 
 benefits of the population.

The delegation’s capacity was strengthened to 
the extent that budgetary and human resources 
constraints and standing administrative procedures 
allowed.

Learning from the experience of the earthquake in 
Haiti and crises in other countries, the Commission 
and the EEAS have introduced a number of rapid 
response measures.

VII First indent
The Commission accepts this recommendation.

(i)  Since the adoption of the new budget support 
guidelines in January 2013, the recommendation is 
already in place for budget support programmes.

(ii)  Adequate risk management is important for all 
programmes. Detailed procedures are in place to 
ensure assessment of likelihood, potential impact 
and mitigation measures in the design of the pro-
gramme. During the implementation, risk manage-
ment will be considered in the framework of the 
already existing procedures.

VII Second indent
The Commission accepts this recommendation. The 
Commission is already implementing an LRRD strat-
egy and will continue to do so in the framework of 
the resilience agenda.

 — The Commission accepts this part of the rec-

ommendation; the objectives of the common 
strategy are defined (context specific) as part of 
the preparation of the country plans. Mandates 
of the departments are defined in their mission 
statements.

 — The Commission accepts this part of the rec-
ommendation (cf. guidance on LRRD and 
workshops).

 — The Commission accepts this recommendation 

as part of the country action plans.

VII Third indent
The Commission accepts the Court’s 
rec  ommendation.

The Commission underlines that for countries in 
situations of fragility and crisis/post-crisis, assis-
tance has to be adapted to the situation in order 
to achieve a measure of success. To this effect, the 
Commission has developed a specific instrument of 
intervention known as the ‘state building contract’ 
containing provisions for such situations.

The Commission wishes to highlight that Recom-
mendation 3 of the Court is included in the guide-
lines of budget support.

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

41

VII Fourth indent
The Commission and the EEAS accept this recom-
mendation but would like to point out that busi-
ness continuity procedures, established under 
the responsibility of the EEAS, and provisions for 
emergency personnel redeployment have been 
established for all delegations in the meantime. In 
addition, it would like to point out that the safety 
and security of EU personnel is the first priority in 
situations of crisis or disasters in a country in which 
EU staff are present.

Observations

The Commission considers that relief, reha-
bilitation and development were sufficiently 
linked, given the difficult circumstances.

35
Although no common strategy was formally estab-
lished, in practise numerous meetings were held 
between the partners and information was shared 
between ECHO and EuropeAid. This ensured com-
plementarity and linkage between Humanitarian 
and Development funded activities.

Since the European Parliament Committee on Budg-
etary Control’s visit to Haiti, the Commission has 
made significant efforts to address the situation.

At field level, coordination between ECHO field 
officers and the EU delegation is ensured through 
regular meetings so that they can inform and con-
sult each other on the design of programmes and 
progress achieved. Both offices are currently draft-
ing a joint humanitarian and development frame-
work. In addition, the head of delegation represents 
humanitarian concerns on behalf of the EU.

Furthermore, at HQ level, coordination has been 
greatly enhanced by a number of activities and 
procedures, including:

 — a resilience action-plan;

 — a joint EU–Member State instruction letter on 
the implementation of the EU approach to 
resilience, so as to encourage effective EU–
Member State collaborative action, bringing 
together humanitarian assistance, long-term 
development cooperation and ongoing political 
engagement at both EU and national levels;

 — an interservice group on transition;

 — LRRD operation guidelines;

 — formal and informal consultation processes on 

programmes.

35 (b)
In the Commission’s view, there are different man-
dates and procedures between the services, but no 
difference in views. ECHO is not mandated to imple-
ment long-term development investments, and 
therefore cannot finance permanent houses.

It must be noted that, as from 2013, the Commission 
stopped funding temporary shelters in Port-au-
Prince, where an effective synergy was developed 
between the experience acquired by ECHO’s part-
ners and the neighbourhood reconstruction and 
development programme funded by DG Develop-
ment and Cooperation — EuropeAid . ECHO funded 
some temporary shelters, in the form of traditional 
Creole houses, in the Palmes region, the epicentre 
of the earthquake, where undisputed land was 
available and where there was no risk of contribut-
ing to multiplication of slums. In many if not most of 
the cases, getting a temporary shelter represented 
an improvement for the beneficiary compared to 
what they lived in before the earthquake.

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

42

43
Relief interventions prompted by sudden onset 
crises usually entail a level of risk, which may either 
cause delays or, in some cases, require mitigating 
measures in order to ensure a positive outcome of 
the projects.

In this light, it was primarily external factors in 
a complex humanitarian environment which made 
the collaboration more and more difficult, lead-
ing to a change in area of intervention. Despite 
ob stacles, partners were able to meet the objec-
tives set out in the actions. Changes that occurred 
in the implementation of the projects were duly 
discussed between ECHO and partners before deci-
sions were taken.

It is difficult to anticipate these types of complica-
tions when planning negotiations with municipali-
ties or national authorities.

44
Implementation of the rehabilitation project was 
affected by two issues.

1)  There was social unrest in the area of Bristou-Bobin 
where the ECHO-funded project has been imple-
mented. Repeated violent incidents relating to the 
electoral context or community issues blocked ac-
tivities for security reasons.

2)  The partner also found out during the course of the 
project that 30 % of the buildings in Bristou-Bobin 
were not assessed by the Ministry of Public Works 
(MTPTC).  An  unexpected  building  assessment 
needed to be done, which further jeopardised the 
delivery of the planned outputs.

35 (c)
EU-funded humanitarian actions are needs-based. 
An ECHO exit strategy for Haiti has not been formal-
ised as such. However, the conditions for a phasing 
out of the humanitarian instrument were system-
atically indicated in all relevant ECHO funding 
decisions.

37
Delays were mostly caused by external factors 
determined by the rapidly evolving context which 
were out of control of ECHO’s partners.

40
The philosophy of budget support prescribes 
that payment is made upon results achieved. This 
requires that a delicate balance needs to be ensured 
between predictability and conditionality.

The withholding by the EU and other donors of 
payments in summer 2012 was due to national 
audit reports that indicated deficiencies in public 
procurement procedures during the state of emer-
gency in 2011. The donor community pressure trig-
gered the creation of a special audit commission to 
assess 41 contracts passed through the emergency 
law procedures. Following the recommendations of 
the audit commission and the subsequent cancel-
lation of six of these contracts by the government, 
donors resumed payments. This exemplifies the 
leverage capacity for improved economic govern-
ance that budget support operations can have and 
the contribution to reform that the programme has 
achieved.

The Commission and the EEAS consider 
that the implementation of EU support for 
rehabilitation was largely effective.

42
Despite the difficult circumstances which were the 
main reason for delays, most programmes achieved 
the intended results.

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

43

forward-looking approach of the Commission’s 
budget support, the adoption of a comprehensive 
and realistic PFM strategy was included as a pre- 
condition for the first payment in the new budget 
support programme to Haiti, adopted in Novem-
ber 2013. This precondition has now been fulfilled 
through the recent adoption of this strategy

56
The Commission considers that it adequately man-
aged the risks to the implementation of EU pro-
grammes. Working in a fragile country inevitably 
entails risks.

56 (a)
Customs problems were exacerbated by the post-
earthquake chaos. A risk analysis was conducted 
systematically by all implementing partners, and 
potential delays due to, among other things, cus-
toms delays had been factored in and recorded in 
the proposals’ log frames. It was evidently impos-
sible to anticipate exactly the duration of such 
delays. Considering the fact that there was no 
alternative to fulfil population housing needs other 
than importing shelters, the benefits of such an 
operation outweighed the identified risks related to 
customs delays.

56 (b)
Complementary to other donors’ institutional sup-
port to the Ministry of Agriculture for reinvigorating 
the seed production industry and strengthening 
its quality control capacities, the EU programme 
supported local farmer groups engaging in artisanal 
seed production.

46
Further to the final evaluation report, the Commis-
sion decided to address the mentioned issues of 
insufficient and not fully adapted training, inad-
equate quality of materials in the emergency kits 
and other challenges through a follow-up interim 
response programme over 3 years with a different 
implementing partner with more local experience.

48
The Commission aims to achieve a balance 
between, on the one hand, programmes that are 
fully owned by the beneficiary and implemented 
through the beneficiary so as to build capacity 
of the latter and, on the other hand, delivering 
programme outputs rapidly. By working with differ-
ent partners, the Commission aimed to strike this 
balance.

51
Measures to rectify the design shortcomings have 
already been implemented.

53
The Commission agrees that disbursements did not 
follow the indicative timetable strictly, but concurs 
that it was necessary to withhold the payment in 
order to respect the terms of the financing agree-
ment and exert the necessary leverage to encour-
age reform advancements.

54
The guidelines on budget support do not request 
the existence of an appropriate PFM strategy as 
an eligibility condition for budget support but 
require the existence of reform efforts which can 
be translated in the existence of ‘sub-sectorial’ 
PFM strategies. In Haiti, while the government only 
recently adopted a comprehensive PFM strategy 
in May 2014, it has been, for a long time, imple-
menting a number of reform strategies touching 
on different aspects of PFM. In addition, in the 

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

44

56 (c)
This project had as planned objectives to get an 
immediate impact at the operational level by put-
ting in place 300 containers with first aid equip-
ment and by training volunteers at the local level to 
handle this equipment in case of natural disasters. 
While the project indeed managed to place 302 con-
tainers in the country with only a 2-month extension 
of the implementation period and to administer 
basic training for 3 041 local volunteers, it was also 
designed as a pilot project that could be brought 
forward under the cooperation envelopes (European 
Development Fund) for Haiti.

As regards the choice of the implementing partner, 
the Commission would like to mention that none of 
the partners with longstanding relevant experience 
in Haiti was available to undertake this action.

Box 6
The location for the containers was assigned by the 
Haitian authorities (DPC — Direction de la Protec-
tion Civile) and mayors of villages concerned. The 
DPC only reported 10 cases (out of 302) where 
relocation was needed.

The follow-up interim response programme will 
address the insufficient training of the volunteers. 
In addition, it will also further the sustainability of 
the volunteer network through integration of the 
structure in the regional and local authorities (col-
lectivités territoriales), and restore where necessary 
the equipment of the emergency kits.

57
The budget support programme was formulated 
in the aftermath of the earthquake in coordination 
with other budget support donors. The priority was 
to provide much-needed treasury resources to the 
government and accompanying measures to take 
account of planned technical assistance by other 
donors.

Under the new budget support programme (the 
state building contract) adopted in 2013, the techni-
cal assistance envelope was increased to  
12 million euro to cover the government’s needs for 
capacity building.

Box 7
The new budget support programme for Haiti, 
adopted in November 2013, is based on a spe-
cific modality for fragile countries. Among other 
measures, an audit of the civil servant payroll, the 
reinforcement of revenue departments and specific 
support to the supreme audit institution  
(Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux 
administratif) are included in this operation.

58
The Commission and the EEAS had thoroughly 
considered the political risks in Haiti, but decided 
nevertheless to intervene as the potential benefits, 
including the possibility of exerting political lever-
age in support of reforms, outweighed the risks.

Mitigating measures were consequently adopted to 
the extent possible, taking into account the limited 
capacity of Haitian institutions and the need to 
respect Haiti’s sovereignty. The EU has increased 
the depth and intensity of its political dialogue with 
Haiti, as witnessed by numerous high-level contacts 
in the past 2 years and the launching of a structured 
and regular political dialogue in December 2013. 
Specific supporting measures, aimed at contribut-
ing to political stability, are being implemented. 
The Commission and the EEAS also would like to 
stress that consolidation of democracy and the sta-
bilisation of the political context in Haiti can only be 
achieved in the long term and through an endog-
enous process, as the recent advancements of the 
‘inter-Haitian dialogue’ demonstrate.

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

45

59
The Commission and the EEAS would like to 
underline that they did strengthen capacity to the 
degree that the budgetary and human resources 
constraints and standing administrative procedures 
allowed. The delegation, like all other national and 
international partners, had to work in very difficult 
conditions: the delegation building was considered 
unsafe and the temporary office space was set up 
in a safe delegation residence. In the aftermath of 
the earthquake, staff of the delegation were evacu-
ated to the Dominican Republic, while the head of 
delegation stayed behind with core security and 
administrative staff.

Backstop support was provided by the delegation 
in the Dominican Republic and by headquarters.

63
Throughout 2010 and 2011, limited resources in 
the delegation were complemented by increased 
support from headquarters. For example, for 
budget support, experts from headquarters regu-
larly undertook missions to Haiti and represented 
the EU in the donor coordination meetings with 
Government.

Conclusions and recommendations

64
The Commission and the EEAS welcome the positive 
elements of the Court’s conclusion Most projects 
achieved their objectives, despite the difficult con-
text in which they were implemented.

66
While a formal joint country strategy for LRRD in 
Haiti was not required, the Commission services 
coordinated their approaches and ensured the link 
between relief and development on a sectorial 
basis. Full and systematic integration of the LRRD 
approach has been included in the funding cycle 
covering 2014–20.

67
The Commission and the EEAS emphasise that most 
projects have achieved their intended results.

As regards the risks, the Commission and the EEAS 
would like to recall that working in a fragile coun-
try inevitably entails risks. While these risks were 
identified, and possible mitigation measures were 
put in place, the Commission decided, in some 
cases, to implement the programmes despite the 
risks involved in order to contribute to the benefits 
of the population.

The delegation’s capacity was strengthened to the 
extent that budgetary and human resources con-
straints, and standing administrative procedures, 
allowed.

Learning from the experience of the earthquake in 
Haiti and crisis events in other countries, the Com-
mission and the EEAS have introduced a number of 
rapid response measures.

Recommendation 1
The Commission accepts this recommendation.

(i)  Since the adoption of the new budget support 
guidelines in January 2013, the recommendation is 
already in place for budget support programmes.

(ii)  Adequate risk management is important for all 
programmes. Detailed procedures are in place to 
ensure assessment of likelihood, potential impact 
and mitigation measures in the design of the pro-
gramme. During the implementation, risk manage-
ment will be considered in the framework of the 
already existing procedures.

Recommendation 2
The Commission accepts this recommendation. The 
Commission is already implementing an LRRD strat-
egy and will continue to do so in the framework of 
the resilience agenda.

Replies of the Commission and the EEAS

46

Recommendation 2 — First indent
The Commission accepts this part of the recommen-
dation; the objectives of the common strategy are 
defined (context specific) as part of the preparation 
of the country plans. Mandates of the departments 
are defined in their mission statements.

Recommendation 2 —Second indent
The Commission accepts this part of the recommen-
dation (cf. guidance on LRRD and workshops).

Recommendation 2 — Third indent
The Commission accepts this recommendation as 
part of the country action plans.

Recommendation 3
The Commission accepts the Court’s 
recommendation.

The Commission underlines that for countries in 
situations of fragility and crisis/post-crisis, assis-
tance has to be adapted to the situation in order 
to achieve a measure of success. To this effect, the 
Commission has developed a specific instrument of 
intervention known as the ‘state building contract’ 
containing provisions for such situations.

The Commission wishes to highlight that Recom-
mendation 3 of the Court is included in the guide-
lines for budget support.

Recommendation 4
The Commission and the EEAS accept this recom-
mendation but would like to point out that busi-
ness continuity procedures, established under 
the responsibility of the EEAS, and provisions for 
emergency personnel redeployment have been 
established for all delegations in the meantime. In 
addition, it would like to point out that the safety 
and security of EU personnel is the first priority in 
situations of crisis or disasters in a country in which 
EU staff are present.

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Q
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A
B
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1
4
-
0
1
3
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N
1
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The earthquake which hit Haiti on 
12 January 2010 claimed a heavy toll in human 
lives and caused massive destruction in and 
around the capital. In this report the European 
Court of Auditors examines whether the EU 
support for rehabilitation of the country 
was well designed and implemented and 
whether the Commission properly linked the 
provision of relief with rehabilitation efforts 
and development aid. The Court concludes 
that the support for rehabilitation was overall 
well designed, addressing the major needs of 
the country. However, the programmes were 
not implemented sufficiently effectively and 
relief, rehabilitation and development were not 
sufficiently linked. This was partly due to the 
difficult context and the weaknesses of national 
authorities, but also due to shortcomings in 
the management of some factors under the 
Commission’s control. 

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS