Case T-669/14: Action brought on 15 September 2014 — Trioplast Industrier v Commission
Date: 2014-09-15
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: credit guarantee, damages, deadline for payment, fine, indemnification, industrial product, packaging product, principle of legal certainty, principle of proportionality








C_2014409EN.01005002.xml










17.11.2014   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 409/50





Action brought on 15 September 2014 — Trioplast Industrier v Commission
(Case T-669/14)
2014/C 409/72
Language of the case: English

Parties


Applicant: Trioplast Industrier AB (Smålandsstenar, Sweden) (represented by: T. Pettersson, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant seeks from the General Court the following relief:






1)


Annulment:






a)


the annulment of the European Commission’s letter of 3 July 2014 in Case COMP/38354 — Industrial Bags — Trioplast Industrier AB;










b)


the cancellation of, or a reduction in the amount of, the late-payment interest of EUR 6 74  033,32 imposed on the Applicant under the Commission’s letter;










c)


an order that the Commission reimburse the Applicant for the expenses of EUR 4  686,64 incurred in providing security for payment of the late-payment interest.














2)


In the alternative, damages pursuant to Article 340(2) TFEU as a result of the breaches of EU law set out in the application, for:






a)


the amount of the late-payment interest, or part thereof; and










b)


the expenses of EUR 4  686,64 incurred in providing security for the late-payment interest.














3)


Damages pursuant to Article 340(2) TFEU as a result of the breaches of EU law related to the period when the Commission did not release or reduce the bank guarantee amount following the General Court’s judgment in case T-40/06, for the expenses incurred in providing security, to an amount of EUR 22  783,90, or part thereof.










4)


Interest on such sums as are found to be due.










5)


An order that the Commission pay the costs of the proceedings.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.






1.


First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s letter lacks legal basis:






—


the Commission’s decision of 30 November 2005 as amended by Commission decision of 7 December 2005 in Case COMP/38354 — Industrial Bags — Trioplast Industrier AB (‘the 2005 Decision’) never constituted a valid basis for a claim against the applicant with regard to the order for late-payment interest, since it did not specify an exact and unconditional amount of the fine for which the applicant was liable. Moreover, the decision was annulled by the General Court in its judgment of 13 September 2010 in case T-40/06 Trioplast Industrier AB v Commission (‘the 2010 judgment’), as far as it related to setting out a fine for the applicant.














2.


Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of an essential procedural requirement and lack of competence:






—


the Commission’s letter constitutes a decision unlawfully taken by a member of DG Budget who lacked competence to engage the Commission in the taking of such a decision. The Commission’s letter cannot be considered to merely give effect to a previous decision and, as such, be considered as an accessory measure of management. Instead, as neither the 2005 decision nor the 2010 judgment set the amount to be paid by the applicant, the Commission’s letter is the decision that sets the actual amount of the fine. Such a decision cannot be taken by anyone else than the College of Commissioners to bring about binding legal effects.














3.


Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of legal certainty and the principle that penalties should be specific to the offender and to the offence:






—


in requiring the applicant to pay the contested interest amount, the Commission is in effect sanctioning the applicant for a situation created by the former's breach of the principle of legal certainty and the principle that penalties should be specific to the offender and to the offence. The Commission has not yet remedied that breach.














4.


Fourth plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 266 TFEU:






—


the Commission has infringed Article 266 TFEU by not acting in accordance with the 2010 judgment. The Commission’s letter demonstrates the Commission’s final decision not to adopt a new formal decision specifying the exact amount that the applicant needs to pay, despite its obligation to do so after the 2010 judgment. The letter is therefore a definite and final statement that shows that the Commission will not fulfil its obligations under Article 266 TFEU.














5.


Fifth plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of proportionality:






—


the Commission did not respect the principle of proportionality when ordering the applicant to pay late-payment interest on a fine, the sum of which has never been clear and which had been annulled in its totality, without the Commission taking a new final decision as to the amount of fine to be paid by the applicant. The purposes of the rules that give the Commission the right to claim late payment interest in other cases are not fulfilled in the present case. In the alternative, it is at least disproportionate to impose an interest rate of a punitive character, since the applicant has been prevented from avoiding that cost as a result of the Commission’s own conduct.














6.


Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law when it refused to release the applicant’s bank guarantee subsequent to the 2010 judgment:






—


in the said judgment, the General Court annulled the 2005 decision, originally ordering the payment of fines, leaving the Commission without any legal claim against the applicant until the adoption of a new decision. In refusing to release the bank guarantee after the 2010 judgment, the Commission acted contrary to the ruling. This error in law directly caused the applicant further costs for continuing to provide the bank guarantee. In the alternative, the Commission should at least have reduced the amount of the bank guarantee immediately after the judgment to the maximum amount established by the General Court.