COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)
Date: 2014-08-08
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU office or agency, Economic and Monetary Union, economic recession, financial control, financial market, management audit

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 8.8.2014  
SWD(2014) 261 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the document 

REPORT FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL 

on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) 

{COM(2014) 509 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

Introduction 

Purpose of the staff working document and underlying sources 

The ESAs founding Regulations1 require the Commission to publish a general report by 
early  2014  on  the  experience  acquired  as  a  result  of  the  operations  of  the  Authorities  and 
procedures  laid  down  in  these  Regulations.  This  report  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  European 
Parliament  and  to  the  Council  together  with  any  accompanying  proposals,  as  appropriate. 
Article 81 of the ESAs Regulations sets out a non-exhaustive list of indicators against which 
the performance of the ESAs shall be assessed. The present staff working document contains 
details to support the assessment in the Commission report on the ESAs. It takes the above-
mentioned indicators thoroughly into account while extending the analysis  to further issues, 
including the process of delivering draft technical standards, the application of the supervisory 
powers  contained  in  Articles  17  and  18  of  the  ESAs  Regulations,  the  functioning  and 
composition  of  the  Joint  Committee,  the  Board  of  Appeal  and  the  stakeholder  groups,  the 
financing and budgetary process, the direct supervision of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) by 
ESMA, and the potential impact of the establishment of Banking Union on the overall ESFS 
and the EBA in particular. 

The present document is underpinned by various sources: 

First,  Commission  representatives  are  participating  as  a  non-voting  member  in  the 
meetings of the ESAs' Boards of Supervisors (BoS) and as an observer in the meetings of 
the Management Boards (MB) and the Joint Committee (JC). The Commission  services 
are  also  taking  part  as  an  observer  in  the  work  of  many  of  the  various  technical  working 
groups, standing committees and task forces of the ESAs.   

Second,  on  24  May  2013  the  Commission  services  organised  a  Public  Hearing  on  the 
ESFS review which attracted more than 400 participants from all sectors concerned.  

Third,  the  Commission  services  consulted  on  the  issue  between  26  April  and  31  July 
2013  to  inform  its  review  of  the  ESFS.  The  process  comprised  a  public  consultation  and  a 
'targeted' consultation, including more detailed and technical questions directed at the ESAs 
and  ESRB,  national  authorities,  relevant  institutions  and  agencies,  and  key  external 
stakeholders.  The  Commission  services  received  137  responses  in  total  (94  to  the  public 
consultation and 43 to the targeted consultation). 

Moreover, throughout 2012 and 2013 the Commission services maintained a dedicated 
dialogue  with  the  ESAs  in  the  framework  of  an  ESAs  review  contact  group  and  in  this 

1

 See Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, 1094/2010, and 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 

Council of 24 November 2010; OJ of 15 December 2010, L 331, pp. 12-119. 

2 

 
 
 
                                                      
 
context  received  several  sets  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  input  on  the  performance  and 
deliverables of the ESAs since their inception. 

into  account  that  the  relevant 

Finally, the present document also takes into account the self-assessment provided by the 
ESAs,  as  well  as  studies  undertaken  by  the  IMF2  and  the  European  Parliament34.The 
analysis  takes 
is  under  continuous 
development.  Therefore  it  is  without  prejudice  to  on-going  work  on  various  legislative 
proposals put forward by the Commission which are currently under negotiation (e.g. proposal 
on  the  anti-money  laundering  Directive;  financial  benchmarks  etc.)  in  the  European 
Parliament and the Council.  

legislation 

This  staff  working  document  also  reflects  the  principles  set  out  in  the  Common 
Approach  of  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  of  the  EU  and  the  European 
Commission  on  decentralised  agencies  of  July  20125,  which  aims  at  making  existing  EU 
agencies more coherent by improving their governance, efficiency and accountability. 

The analysis builds on data spanning the period from January 2011 to end 2013. 

Background on the ESFS 

The  financial  crisis  exposed  important  failures  in  financial  supervision,  both  in  particular 
cases and in relation to the financial system as a whole. President Barroso therefore requested 
a group of high level experts in 2008, chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière, to make proposals 
to  strengthen  European  supervisory  arrangements,  with  the  objective  of  establishing  a  more 
efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of supervision. The Group presented its 
report  on  25  February  2009.  Building  on  its  recommendations,  the  Commission  set  out 
proposals  to  strengthen  financial  supervision  in  October  2009,  which  were  adopted  by  co-
legislators  in  November  2010.  The  ESAs  started  their  operations  in  January  2011.  The 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) consists of: 

−  Three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), namely a European Banking Authority 
(EBA),  a  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA),  and  a 
European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA),  working  within  a  network  of 
national competent authorities (NCAs), and the Joint Committee ensuring cross-sectorial 
cooperation and consistency; and  

− 

2 

3 

the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) monitoring and assessing potential threats 
that  arise  from  macro-economic  developments  and  from 
to  financial  stability 
developments  within  the financial system as a  whole.  To  this  end,  the  ESRB  is  charged 

 International Monetary Fund – Financial Sector Assessment Program at EU level, March 2013.  

 See PE 507.490 (on the ESRB) and PE 507.446 (on the ESAs) both of October 2013. 

4 
December 2012 (not public). 

 Joint Committee (JC 2012 100), Self-Assessment Report of the European Supervisory Authorities, 21 

5 

 See: http://europa.eu/agencies/documents/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf.  

3 

 
                                                      
with providing an early warning of system-wide risks that may be building up and, where 
necessary, issue recommendations for action to deal with these risks. 

The  ESAs  are  cornerstones  of  the  comprehensive  reforms  that  have  been  initiated  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  financial  crisis  with  a  view  to  creating  a  new  supervisory  architecture  for 
European financial markets. The underlying rationale for setting up the ESAs was to ensure 
closer  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  among  national  supervisors,  facilitate  the 
adoption  of  EU  solutions  to  cross-border  problems,  and  advance  coherent  application  and 
interpretation of rules. In particular by preparing uniform standards and ensuring supervisory 
convergence they actively shape the creation of a Single Rule Book applicable to all 28 EU 
Member  States  and  thus  contribute  to  the  functioning  of  the  Single  Market.  The  overall 
objective  of  the  ESAs  is  to  sustainably  reinforce  the  stability  and  effectiveness  of  the 
financial  system  throughout  the  EU.  To  this  end  they  have  been  assigned  regulatory, 
supervisory, financial stability and consumer protection roles. 

The powers assigned to the Authorities include the following: 

−  Developing  draft  technical  standards  as  well  as  guidelines  and  recommendations, 

respecting better regulation principles; 

−  Resolving cases of disagreement between national supervisors, where legislation requires 

them to co-operate or to agree ; 

−  Contributing  to  ensuring  consistent  application  of  technical  rules  of  EU  law  (including 

through peer reviews); 

−  A coordination and enforcement role in emergency situations; 

−  ESMA exercises direct supervisory powers for  Credit Rating Agencies. 

Challenge ahead: establishment of Banking Union 

The  establishment  of  a  Banking  Union  and  notably  of  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism 
(SSM)  and  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  (SRM)  as  key  components  will  impact  the 
functioning of the ESFS, but does not call into question its existence and necessity. The EBA 
will continue to be responsible for contributing to the single rulebook applicable to the EU-28 
and  ensuring  supervisory  convergence.  Given  the  role  attributed  to  the  ECB  in  the  field  of 
banking  supervision  and  to  the  Single  Resolution  Board  (SRB)  for  resolving  credit 
institutions, close cooperation between the EBA and the ECB and the SRB will be crucial to 
avoid duplications, e.g. in terms of reporting requirements. 

4 

 
 
Work  on  the  Banking  union  is  still  on-going.  While  the  SSM  Regulation6  and  the  changes 
agreed to the EBA Regulation7 already entered into force, the Regulation establishing a SRM 
still needs to be formally adopted8. Therefore, at the current stage, any assessment of potential 
interactions  with  the  ESFS  remains  necessarily  of  a  rather  theoretical  nature.  There  is 
however  broad  agreement  among  stakeholders  that  any  future  legislative  proposals  for 
amending the system cannot ignore the expected impact of Banking Union. 

2. 

Experience acquired from the operation and impact of the ESAs  

a.  Overall effectiveness and efficiency  

The  ESAs  are  seen  to  have  quickly  established  well-functioning  organisations  and  to 
have  performed  well  overall,  even  though  some  shortcomings  have  been  identified  by 
stakeholders.  

While  the  ESAs  have  been  only  operational  for  three  years,  they  are  widely  perceived  as 
having  performed  well  and  to  have  contributed  to  re-establish  confidence  in  the  financial 
system.  They  are  seen  as  having  played  a  particularly  important  role  in  preparing  draft 
technical standards and in contributing to foster supervisory convergence and culture through 
their participation in colleges, identifying and assessing systemic risks as well as by means of 
the stress tests and, in particular, the recapitalization exercise of EBA in 2011/12. However, 
whilst  most  directly  affected  stakeholders  show  a  good  understanding  of  the  ESAs' 
functioning,  uncertainty  seems  to  prevail  among  others  about  both  the  actual  powers  and 
competencies of the ESAs as well as about the possibility for stakeholders to approach them.  

Despite identical powers  assigned  to  each Authority in the founding Regulations,  they  have 
developed  differently  since  their  establishment,  for  example  with  ESMA  also  being 
empowered  with  the  direct  and  exclusive  supervisory  responsibility  for  Credit  Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) established in the EU and, recently, for Trade Repositories (TR).  

6 
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central  Bank  concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  OJ  L  287  of 
29.10.2013, pp. 63-89. 

7 
 Regulation  (EU)  No  1022/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October  2013 
amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010  establishing  a  European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Banking 
Authority)  as  regards  the  conferral  of  specific  tasks  on  the  European  Central  Bank  pursuant  to  Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, OJ L287 of 29.10.2013, pp. 5-14. 

8 
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform  procedure  for  the  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  certain  investment  firms  in  the  framework  of  a 
Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2013) 520. On 20 March 2014 a political agreement on the 
SRM  has  been  reached  which  was  confirmed  in    the  Plenary  of  the  European  Parliament  on  15  April.  Final 
confirmation by the Council and the European Parliament is expected in July 2014... 

5 

 
  
                                                      
The scope of the mandate of the ESAs is considered by stakeholders sufficiently broad with 
some room for targeted extensions, such as in the fields of consumer/investor protection9, the 
enforcement of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as well as in the area of 
shadow banking.10 

b.  Cross-cutting issues 

i.  Regulatory scope and activities 

The  work  undertaken  by  the  ESAs  on  the  development  of  the  single  rulebook 
contributed  significantly  to  regulatory  harmonisation  and  coherence  and  to  mutual 
understanding  between  supervisors.  Transparent  and  efficient  processes  are  seen  as 
crucial in this area. 

The  Authorities  may,  in  areas  specified  in  the  relevant  sectorial  legislation,  develop  draft 
technical  standards  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  set  out  in  Articles  10-15  of  the 
founding  Regulations.  In  order  to  give  the  draft  technical  standards  legal  effect  the 
Commission needs to subsequently adopt them by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 
290  TFEU  (regulatory  technical  standards)  or  by  means  of  implementing  acts  pursuant  to 
Article  291  TFEU  (implementing  technical  standards).  Technical  standards  are  of  technical 
nature  and  must  not  imply  strategic  decisions  or  policy  choices  and  their  content  should  be 
delimited  by  the  legislative  act  on  which  they are  based.  Technical  standards  are  ultimately 
adopted by the Commission. An amendment to the draft text submitted to it by the relevant 
authority requires prior coordination with that Authority, in accordance with Article 10 of the 
ESAs Regulations.  

Moreover, the ESAs contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory and 
supervisory  standards  and  practices  and  ensure  the  common,  uniform  and  consistent 
application of Union law, in particular by providing opinions to the Union institutions and by 
developing  guidelines  and  recommendations  pursuant  to  Article  16  of  the  founding 
Regulations. 

Consistent  procedures  (manuals,  codes  of  conduct  etc.)  have  been  established  by  all  ESAs 
which  facilitate  appropriate  action  in  the  area  of  governance,  consultation  and  impact 
assessment. Since their inception all three ESAs have deployed a considerable amount of their 
human  resources  in  preparing  and  delivering  a  number  of  draft  technical  standards  to  the 
Commission.  

Overall, the new instrument of technical standards and the central role of the ESAs in 
their development are considered by stakeholders as a success. It allows the EU to equip 

9 
(2004/25/EC) into the scope of ESMA pursuant to Article 1(2) of the ESMA Regulation. 

 E.g. include the Shareholders Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) and the Takeover Bids Directive 

10 
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Shadow 
Banking – Addressing New Sources of Risk in the Financial Sector, COM(2013)614 of 4 September 2013. 

6 

 
                                                      
itself  with  a  significant  amount  of  high  quality  rules  within  a  very  short  timeframe. 
Guidelines  and  recommendations  developed  under  Art.  16  of  the  ESAs  Regulation 
proved to be a flexible instrument for convergence, although uncertainties remain with 
regard to their nature and scope.  

ESMA submitted during the period under review more than 55 draft technical standards to the 
Commission. Subsequent to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the CRDIV/CRR 
framework  in  spring  2013,  EBA  submitted  a  first  set  of  27  draft  technical  standards,  while 
EIOPA has been confined to extensive preparatory work given the pending negotiations on 
the Solvency II / Omnibus II framework. One joint regulatory draft technical standard on the 
Financial  Conglomerates  Directives  was  submitted  by  all  three  ESAs  in  2013.  During  the 
period under review the Commission has approved more than 45 technical standards in total 
of which three were sent back to the ESAs for further amendments.  

The following areas were identified by stakeholders to require further consideration in order 
to make the process for adoption of technical standards more efficient and transparent.  

−  Deadlines  /  pending  legal  texts:  working  under  short  deadlines  for  submission  of 
draft  technical  standards  has  been  challenging  for  the  ESAs.  Frequently,  preparatory 
work for draft technical standards had to start whilst the legislative process concerning 
the basic act was still taking place. Stakeholders were particularly concerned that this 
resulted in shorter deadlines for public consultation than initially estimated. Recently 
proposed  pieces  of  legislation,  such  as  the  4th  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive,  or 
the Mortgage Credit Directive, seek to address this concern by providing for flexible 
deadlines that are dependent upon final agreement of the level 1 text. The requirement 
for  the  Commission  to  endorse  draft  technical  standards  within  three  months  after 
submission by the relevant ESA as well as the objection period by the co-legislators of 
1+1 months for regulatory technical standards which were adopted by the Commission 
without  amendment  is  a  new  process  for  all  involved  actors  and  has,  at  times,  been 
challenging.  Despite  the  Commission's  preference  for  a  more  horizontal  approach  in 
the  framework  of  the  ESAs'  review,  co-legislators  agreed  in  the  context  of  the 
Mortgage  Credit  and  Omnibus  II  Directives  to  provide  for  the  possibility  to  further 
extend  the  objection  period  by  one  additional  month  by  way  of  amendments  to  the 
ESAs Regulation.11 Moreover, many stakeholders and the ESAs themselves requested 
to  make  better  use  of  the  technical  expertise  of  the  ESAs  in  the  preparation  of 
legislation,  in  particular  as  regards  the  timeline  and  scope  of  empowerments  for 
technical standards. 

−  Human Resources: Regulatory workload for the ESAs has been constantly growing 
since  their  establishment.  Anyway,  the  increase  in  terms  of  human  resources  and 
corresponding  budget  has  been  limited  in  light  of  the  general  reduction  of  staff 
applicable  to  all  institutions,  bodies  and  agencies  foreseen  by  the  Inter-institutional 
Agreement on budgetary discipline, which has to be effected between 2013 and 2017.  

11 
 Directive 2014/17/EU, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34; Directive 2014/51/EU, OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, P.1 see 
also Article 149 CRDIV [Directive 2013/36/EU, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338] and Article 463 CRR [Regulation 
No. 575/2013, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1] 

7 

 
                                                      
−  Nature  and  scope  of  non-binding  measures:  Article  16  of  the  ESAs  Regulations 
provides for guidelines and recommendations in the areas not covered by regulatory or 
implementing  technical  standards,12  however  without  further  defining  them.  In 
addition,  the  preconditions  for  the  adoption  of  guidelines  and  recommendation,  in 
particular the need to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices 
so as to ensure common uniform and consistent application of Union law are viewed 
by  many  stakeholders  as  creating  uncertainty  as  to  the  concrete  scope  of  these 
measures. While guidelines and recommendations are legally non-binding, they have a 
certain  harmonising  impact  through  the  comply-or-explain  mechanism  to  which  the 
addressees are subject. This is however framed by the explicit conditions required to 
take action under Article 16 as well as the objectives pursued by it. Notably the need 
of  establishing  consistent,  efficient  and  effective  supervisory  practices  as  well  as  to 
ensure  common,  uniform  and  consistent  application  of  Union  law  constitute 
preconditions for the adoption of guidelines and recommendations which cumulatively 
have  to  be  met  in  order  to  ensure  their  legality.  There  also  seems  to  be  uncertainty 
among  market  participants  as  to  the  possibility  for  national  competent  authorities  or 
financial institutions to review guidelines under Article 60 of the ESAs Regulations. 

−  Ensure  a  transparent  and  inclusive  process:  While  stakeholders  appreciated  the 
public consultations carried  out by  the ESAs some criticism was  expressed  about (i) 
restricted  timeframes,  (ii)  the  publication  of  consultation  papers  in  English  only  (iii) 
the  lack  of  detailed  feedback  on  consultations,  and  (iv)  frequently  the  lack  of  high 
quality impact assessments. 

ii.  Convergence in supervisory practices and common supervisory 

culture 

The creation of a common Union supervisory culture and the promotion of convergent 
supervisory practices is necessarily a long term objective. The ESAs' focus on the regulatory 
agenda  and  shortcomings  in  the  governance  structure  of  the  ESAs13  as  well  as  the  ESAs' 
limited  human  resources  have  made  it  difficult  to  advance  work  in  this  regard.  The  tools  at 
their  disposal  include,  in  particular,  peer  reviews  (Article  30),  the  participation  in  colleges 
(Article  21),  the  organisation  of  training  and  staff  exchange  programmes  (Article  29), 
supported  by  improved  access  to  all  relevant  information  from  national  authorities  (Article 
35). The ESAs are also active at promoting convergent supervisory practices at international 
level. 

Peer reviews 

Peer  reviews  aim  at  assessing  and  comparing  the  effectiveness  of  national  competent 
activities.  As  a  follow-up,  the  ESAs  may  issue  guidelines  or  recommendations  pursuant  to 
Article 16 of the Regulations. 

12 

13 

 See also recital 26 of the ESAs Regulations. 

 See section vi. 

8 

 
 
                                                      
The  ESAs  have  started  to  conduct  peer  reviews,  and  stakeholders  suggested  to  make 
greater  use  of  this  tools  in  future.  ESMA  and  EIOPA  have  conducted  thematic  peer 
reviews,  both  via  the  use  of  questionnaires  and  self-assessments  as  well  as  on-site  visits. 
EIOPA has conducted four peer reviews in total, on the pre-application of internal models by 
NCAs,  the  pre-application  of  internal  model  for  colleges  of  supervisors,  the  supervision  of 
branches  of  EEA  undertakings  and  supervisory  practices  in  relation  to  IORPs.  ESMA  has 
completed six peer reviews addressing the Prospectus Directive, the Transparency Directive, 
the  use  of  sanctions  under  MAD,  supervisory  practices  in  relation  to  Money  Market  Funds 
and the conduct of business rules under MiFID. The EBA set up in May 2012 an independent 
Review  panel  followed  by  a  dedicated  methodology  in  June  2012,  in  order  to  organise  and 
conduct peer reviews on some or all of the activities of the NCAs. So far no peer reviews have 
been finalised, but a peer review concerning stress testing is under way.  

Many stakeholders agree that more and better use could be made of the tool of peer reviews 
by the ESAs. According to stakeholders, peer reviews could focus more on outcomes, make 
more  systematically  use  of  on-site  visits  and  rely  more  on  ESAs  staff  to  ensure  an 
independent  and  objective  assessment.  Furthermore,  stakeholders  suggested  a  more 
systematic follow up where deficiencies have been detected to allow making best use of this 
instrument. 

Colleges of supervisors 

The  ESAs  are  empowered  to  promote  and  monitor  the  efficient,  effective  and  consistent 
functioning  of  colleges  of  supervisors  and  foster  the  coherence  of  the  application  of  Union 
law  among  colleges  (Article  21).  Colleges  are  permanent  coordination  structures  for  the 
exchange  of  information  between  home  and  host  authorities,  for  the  planning  and 
performance of key supervisory tasks in a coordinated manner or jointly, including all aspects 
of on-going supervision, and also for the preparation and handling of emergency situations.  

The ESAs, and in particular EBA and EIOPA, have been actively involved in all aspects 
of  the  work  of  colleges  of  supervisors  and  have,  as  stressed  by  stakeholders,  improved 
their  functioning  through  the  provision  of  guidance  and  the  oversight  of  agendas  and 
annual  action  plans.  Since  September  2013, with  the  establishment  of  colleges  for  CCPs, 
ESMA has also been involved in colleges work under EMIR.14 

The establishment of the ESAs has encouraged more active college engagement and sharing 
of information between college members. By being present in most colleges, the ESAs gain a 
broad  overview  of  the  functioning  of  colleges  and  of  the  relevant  banking  groups  and  can 
enhance  their  efficiency  by  sharing  best  practices.  However,  it  is  considered  that  since  the 
ESAs do not have a voting right in colleges, their impact is somewhat limited.15  

14 
 A  further  potential  role  for  ESMA  in  the  supervision  of  critical  benchmarks  is  foreseen  under  the 
Commission  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  indices  used  as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts, COM(2013) 641 of 18 September 2013. 

15 With the exception of colleges for CCPs where ESMA does have a voting right in certain instances. 

9 

 
                                                      
With the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the banking sector, colleges 
of supervisors will continue to play an important role for banks with a presence in non-SSM 
countries. However, if a bank operates only within the SSM countries, it will fall under the 
full responsibility of the SSM authorities and no college is required.  

Access to data 

The ESAs contributed to enhance supervisory reporting and disclosure but were faced 
with difficulties accessing data from competent authorities and financial institutions in 
practice.  Important  progress  has  been  made  in  the  area,  notably  by  agreeing  on  a  common 
supervisory  reporting  framework  (EBA).  However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  founding 
Regulations confer the right to the ESA to request competent authorities to provide them will 
all the necessary information for the fulfilment of their tasks, including at recurring intervals 
and in specified formats, the ESAs have experienced difficulties in obtaining information in 
practice  due  to  resistance  of  the  members  at  the  Board  of  Supervisors  to  agree  on  relevant 
demands and the legal conditions attached to the use of such powers. In addition, the different 
practices  and  approaches  across  the  Union  in  the  collection  of  data  have  hampered 
comparability and the exchange of data or their reliable presentation in an aggregated format. 
Some  stakeholders  as  well  as  the  study  undertaken  by  the  European  Parliament  suggested 
exploring the merits of giving a stronger role to the ESA Chairs by enabling them to directly 
request relevant information from national supervisors.16 

International dimension 

The international work of the ESAs is twofold, encompassing (i) technical assistance to the 
Commission in preparing equivalence decisions on third country regulatory and supervisory 
regimes, (ii) the development of contracts and the conclusion of administrative arrangements 
with supervisory authorities, international organisations and third countries pursuant to Article 
33 of the ESAs Regulations,  e.g. the participation in international standard setting groups. 

In the preparation of equivalence assessments and related advice to the Commission the ESAs 
have established regulatory dialogues to complement the technical assessment with  countries 
including  the  US,  Switzerland  and  China  as  well  as  Japan,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Korea, 
Australia, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Canada, Israel and Bermuda. 
The ESAs also participate in the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogues established between 
the Commission and in particular the United States, Russia, Japan, Switzerland and Brazil.  

Examples of the conclusion of administrative arrangements include the approval by ESMA on 
behalf  of  national  competent  authorities  under  the  AIFMD  of  38  Memoranda  of 
Understanding  with  42  non-EU  authorities  and  the  cooperation  agreement  between  EIOPA 
and the World Bank on fostering risk-based supervision in the insurance sector. 

16 Article 41(1) of the ESAs regulation already provides for the possibility to delegate specific tasks to the ESAs' 
chairpersons but so far only very limited use has been made of this article. 

10 

 
                                                      
The ESAs are also involved in the work of international standard setting bodies: EIOPA has 
become a member of the IAIS in its own right; ESMA is an associate member of IOSCO and 
EBA is an observer in the BCBS.  

The  ESAs'  activities  as  regards  international  matters  are  framed  by  their  underlying 
mandates.  The  participation  of  the  ESAs  in  relevant  international  organisations  is  perceived 
by  stakeholders  as  contributing  to  ensure  consistency  with  global  benchmarking  and  is 
expected  to  further  strengthen  and  complement  the  European  voice,  alongside  the 
Commission, in international fora. The specific requirements regarding international work of 
decentralised agencies set out in the Common approach to these agencies are intended to help 
agencies to operate within their mandate and the existing institutional framework. 

Other aspects 

The  ESAs  provided  sectorial  and  cross-sectorial  training  to  share  sound  supervisory 
standards and practices across the European Union. Stakeholders praise the beneficial effects 
of the ESAs' work in organising trainings and workshops as well as promoting secondments. 
In total 130 training events were organised, out of which 56 by EIOPA, 34 by ESMA and 40 
by EBA. Related activities by the ESAs also aimed at facilitating personnel exchange and thus 
encouraging  competent  authorities  to  intensify  the  use  of  secondments  schemes  and  other 
tools. 

ESMA  has  been  particularly  active  in  the  coordination  of  activities  of  national  IFRS 
enforcers in Europe. In November 2012 ESMA issued for the first time common European 
IFRS enforcement priorities, highlighting the areas on which all EU enforcers have to focus 
when reviewing 2012's financial statements.17 ESMA's powers in the accounting field could 
be  further  enhanced  by  clarifying  its  mandate  through  a  clear  reference  to  the  IAS 
Regulation18 in the ESMA Regulation.  

iii.  Direct decision making powers: consistent application of EU law and 

emergency situations 

The  founding  Regulations  confer  a  limited  set  of  binding  decision  making  powers  on  the 
ESAs, in particular in the case of national authorities incorrectly applying EU law (breach of 
law,  Article  17),  in  emergency  situations  declared  by  the  Council  (Article  18),  and  in  the 
event of disagreement between national authorities (binding mediation, Articles 19 and 20). In 

17 

 http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-725.pdf.  

18 
application of international accounting standards. 

 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
addition,  where  provided  in  Union  law  the  ESAs  may  also  take  temporary  action  under 
Article 9(5) of the ESAs Regulations.19 

Breach of law 

The  ESAs  have  not  issued  recommendations  or  decisions  with  respect  to  alleged 
breaches of EU law but have made use non-binding mediation and moral suasion.  

The founding Regulations entitle the ESAs to address recommendations to national authorities 
when a national authority appears to be in breach of Union law and, following a pre-defined 
procedure and as a last resort, to directly address decisions to financial institutions to ensure 
respect  of  directly  applicable  EU  law.  The  ESAs  assessed  a  number  of  alleged  breaches  of 
Union law for admissibility, including on the necessity for national competent authorities to 
cooperate  and  the  prohibition  of  taking  unilateral  measures,  in  particular  disproportionate 
measures  having  ring-fencing  effects  such  as  disproportionate  limitations  to  intra-group 
capital flows.  

These  assessments  did  not  lead  to  any  action,  which  might  be  partly  explained  by  the 
reluctance  of  the  relevant  BoS  to  agree  to  address  any  recommendations  to  national 
authorities  or  to  addressing  individual  decisions  to  financial  institutions.  So-far  the  ESAs' 
investigatory powers have only resulted in "soft" informal measures, such as persuasion and 
informal ad-hoc meetings to bring about conformity of EU law.  

The period of two months granted to the relevant ESA between initiating an investigation and 
addressing  a  recommendation  to  the  competent  authority  is  perceived  by  stakeholders  too 
short and could be extended.   

Emergency situations 

To date no emergency situations has been declared.  

The  founding  Regulations  set  out  that  the  ESAs  shall  fulfil  an  active  coordination  role 
between national supervisory authorities, in particular, in case of adverse developments which 
potentially jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability 
of the financial EU financial system. Following the determination of an emergency situation 
by the Council the ESAs may, as a last resort, adopt individual decisions directly to financial 
institutions/insurers requiring the necessary action including the cessation of any practice.  

So  far,  no  emergency  situation  has  been  declared  by  the  Council,  nor  has  the  Council  ever 
been  called  upon  to  do  such  a  declaration.  However,  the  ESAs  have  undertaken  significant 
preparative work to ensure their capability to act efficiently in case an emergency action was 
declared, such as adopting a Crisis Management Manual/Framework and the setting up of a 

19 

 See also section (v) on consumer protection. 

12 

 
 
                                                      
specific internal decision making and monitoring framework. Pursuant to Article 9(5) of the 
ESMA Regulation ESMA has been entrusted with direct intervention powers under the Short-
Selling Directive, subject to a number of conditions.20  

Binding mediation 

So far the instrument of binding mediation has not been used.  

The founding Regulations enable the ESAs to assist national authorities at the request of one 
or  more  authorities  in  reaching  a  common  approach  or  settling  the  matter,  including  direct 
decision making powers requiring financial institutions to comply with the obligations under 
Union  law.  The  ESAs  have  been  occasionally  approached  by  NCAs  complaining  about 
disagreements but no binding decisions have been taken by the ESAs on the matter.   

As  possible  reasons  for  the  lack  of  use  of  these  powers  stakeholders  point  to  the  current 
governance  structure  of  the  ESAs  which  does  not  favour  decisions  or  proceeding  against 
individual members of the BoS. Further explanations put forward by stakeholders may be the 
dissuasive  effect  of  the  relevant  powers  as  well  as  the  lack  of  clarity  of  the  founding 
Regulations  as  to  the  scope  of  and  triggers  for  binding  mediation.  Stakeholders  suggested 
clarifying in the founding Regulations that the material scope is not limited to breaches of EU 
law  but  extends  to  supervisory  judgement,  at  least  in  those  cases  where  the  judgement  is 
sufficiently framed by legal conditions. Distinct investigatory powers, such as direct access to 
relevant  information  or  the  possibility  to  carry  out  on-site  inspections,  to  facilitate  the 
detection of breaches of EU law, were also suggested as additional assets. 

Article  38  of  the  founding  Regulations  which  provides  safeguards  to  Member  States  in 
order  to  ensure  that  no  decisions  taken  under  Article  18  and  19  impinge  in  any  way  on  the 
fiscal responsibilities of Member States has not been invoked during the period under review. 

The limited use made by the ESAs of their direct decision making powers does not lead 
to the conclusion that these powers are not useful. According to stakeholders, there is a 
need to preserve these powers, and to examine further the conditions for their use to ensure 
that there are no undue obstacles preventing the ESAs from having recourse to these powers.   

iv.  Coordination function  

The ESAs have taken various measures to promote coordinated action and to facilitate 
exchange of information. Beyond their coordination role in emergency situations the ESAs 
are  required  to  promote  a  coordinated  Union  response,    particularly  in  adverse  market 
conditions,  by  facilitating  information  exchange  between  authorities,  determining  the 
scope/reliability of information to be made available by national authorities and centralising 

20 
short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, Article 28.  

 Regulation  (EU)  No  236/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  March  2012  on 

13 

 
 
                                                      
information  received,  carrying  out  non-binding  mediation,  notifying  to  the  ESRB  potential 
emergency  situations,  and  by  taking  all  appropriate  action  to  facilitate  action  by  national 
authorities (Article 31 ESAs Regulations). 

Stakeholders welcomed the various actions taken by the ESAs throughout the reporting period 
and encourage them to remain ambitious in this respect. EBA devoted a large proportion of its 
resources to ensuring a coordinated supervisory response to the banking crisis in 2011-2012, 
most  notably  by  means  of  the  2011/12  recapitalisation  exercise  as  well  as  by  addressing  a 
variety of different topics such as capital, liquidity and governance. EBA is the only authority 
that reported increasing requests from national supervisors for non-binding mediation.  

All  ESAs  actively  contributed  to  facilitate  exchange  of  information.  The  ESMA  BoS,  in 
addition to its regular meetings, holds occasional conference calls to discuss adverse market 
developments  and  to  exchange  information.  EIOPA  has  in  particular  coordinated  the 
collection of information on exposures of insurance companies to sovereign debt and banking 
in  accordance  with  an  agreed  common  approach  to  such  vulnerabilities.  Further  important 
examples for coordinated action have been delivered by the JC in its report on cross-sectorial 
risks21,  the  ESMA  coordination  of  measures  adopted  by  competent  authorities  on  short 
selling22, and the EIOPA opinion on the low interest environment.23  

v.  Consumer protection 

The  ESAs  have  established  internal  structures  on  consumer  protection  issues  within 
their  organisations.  Work  on  consumer  protection  is  taking  up  speed  but  stakeholders 
consider that the ESAs could be more proactive.  

Consumer and investor protection is one of the statutory tasks assigned to the ESAs, which 
so-far  is  perceived  as  not  being  given  sufficient  priority  in  the  work  of  the  authorities.  The 
horizontal  nature  of  the  issue  allows  for  its  implementation  through  various  aspects  of  the 
ESAs' work, which however seem to lack ambition in this respect. In addition, the ESAs have 
experienced difficulties to divide relevant tasks among themselves. There is still limited scope 
for  the  authorities  in  taking  legally  binding  decisions  pursuant  to  Article  9(5)  of  the  ESAs 
Regulations and no emergency situation has so far been declared, but the relevant scope for 
action is not limited to these direct decision making powers and stakeholders consider that the 
ESAs  could  take  a  more  proactive  approach  (e.g.  issuing  guidance  on  consumer  protection 

21 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/43119/ESAs_joint_risk_report_autumn_2013_final.pdf. 

 For the August 2013 report, see:  

22 

23 

 http://www.esma.europa.eu/content/Update-measures-adopted-competent-authorities-short-selling-0. 

 See: https://eiopa.europa.eu/en/publications/eiopa-opinions/index.html. 

14 

 
                                                      
issues).  Furthermore,  the  scope  of  action  is  constantly  increasing  not  at  least  due  to  the 
dynamic provision included in Article 1(2) of the ESAs Regulation.24  

EIOPA was the first authority to put forward specific guidelines on complaints handling by 
insurance  undertakings  in  June  2012,  after  having  published  a  Report  on  Financial  Literacy 
and Education Initiatives by Competent Authorities in December 2011. This was followed in 
February  2012  by  an  Initial  Overview  of  consumer  trends  in  the  European  insurance  and 
occupational  pensions  sectors.  In  July  2012  ESMA  published  several  sets  of  guidelines  on 
issues related to MiFID and UCITS followed by consultations on guidelines on remuneration 
under  the  AIFMD  and  the  MiFID.  EBA  published  in  March  2013  a  Report  on  Consumer 
Trends,  Supervisory  Concerns  Regarding  Consumer  Protection  Issues.  In  June  2013  two 
opinions  were  adopted  and  published  on  responsible  lending  and  on  the  treatment  of 
borrowers in payment difficulties. 

Several Consumer/Investor days have already been organised by EIOPA (November 2011, 
December  2012)  ESMA  (October  2012)  and  EBA  (October  2012).  As  of  2013,  Consumer 
Days  are  organised  by  the  JC  of  the  ESAs  building  on  the  experience  gathered  from  the 
previous organisation of sectorial events. The first joint Consumer Day was held on 25 June 
2013. 

So far, the ESAs have issued four warnings, notably on investments in Foreign Exchange 
(Forex)  (December  2011),  on  the  pitfalls  of  online  investments  (September  2012),  on 
Contracts  for  Differences  (CfD)  (April  2013)  and  on  virtual  currencies  (December  2013), 
which were published on the relevant websites.25  

Several  national  authorities  represented  in  the  respective  BoS  do  not  hold  consumer 
protection  mandates  at  national  level  and  thus  lack  the  necessary  expertise  and  tend  to 
prioritise  other  issues  of  more  direct  concern  to  them.  To  remedy  this  fact  stakeholders 
consider  that  the  ESAs  could  introduce  a  mechanism  to  ensure  close  co-operation  and  the 
involvement of the relevant national authorities in order to bring in the expertise and ensure a 
comprehensive approach to consumer protection at ESAs level.  

Further  suggestions  to  strengthen  the  role  of  the  ESAs  in  this  field  include  calls  from 
stakeholders for a more proactive approach by the authorities towards consumer and investor 
protection.  Moreover,  stakeholders  stressed  the  need  to  ensure  that  the  ESAs  can  make  full 
use of the powers laid down in Article 9 either by adopting enabling legislation on the basis of 
Article  9(5)  of  the  ESAs  Regulations  or  by  directly  amending  Article  9(5)  to  broaden  the 

24 
 The power to restrict certain activities can only be exercised if an emergency situation in accordance 
with the conditions of Article 18 has been declared or when the power is laid down in the specific legislative acts 
laid down in Article 1(2). On the execution of its powers in general – including those on consumer and investor 
protection -  Article 1(2) provides that the ESAs may act based on "any further legally binding Union act which 
confers tasks on the Authority". This includes future legislation in the field of consumer protections such as on 
Mortgage Credit, MiFIDII/MiFIR, Payment Accounts, PRIPS, IMD, etc. 

25 

 See: http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/News-investors. 

15 

 
                                                      
scope  for  ESAs'  action.  Furthermore,  to  ensure  a  framework  consistent  across  sectors  and 
appropriate  coordination  of  the  ESAs'  activities,  some  stakeholders  consider  that  more  use 
could be made of the JC. According to those stakeholders, this could be achieved for instance, 
by exchange of best practices between authorities which would allow for better definition and 
clarification of their relevant competences in line with the legal basis.26  

A number of stakeholders also suggested, at least for the mid-term, to further explore the idea 
of  establishing  a  distinct  market  conduct  authority  mandated  with  consumer  and  investor 
protection  next  to  an  integrated  authority  responsible  for  prudential  supervision,  generally 
referred to as a twin-peaks approach.27 

vi.  Governance and decision making  

The  ESAs  are  composed  of  a  Board  of  Supervisors  (BoS),  a  Management  Board  (MB),  a 
Chairperson,  and  an  Executive  Director.  The  structure  of  the  decision  making  bodies  is 
broadly in line with the common approach on decentralised agencies, with all Member States 
being present at the BoS28and a small-sized MB29.    

Chairpersons and Executive Directors 

It is widely recognized that the Chairpersons and Executive Directors have fulfilled their 
mission in an effective way and have, in general, given a high profile to their authorities. 
Nevertheless  there  seems  to  be  room  to  strengthen  their  role  and  authority.  This 
assessment is broadly shared by NCAs participating directly in the activities of the ESAs as 
well  as  external  stakeholders.  The  chairpersons  clearly  add  value  by  preparing  and  chairing 
the meetings of the ESAs decision making bodies (BoS and MB) and increase the visibility 
and  efficiency  of  the  ESAs.  The  Executive  Directors,  who  are  in  charge  of  the  operational 
management of the authority, equally fulfilled their mandate in an independent and objective 
manner.  

However, stakeholders stressed that the current situation where the Chairpersons do not have 
a  voting  right  in  the  BoS  undermines  their  authority  and  limits  their  role  as  strong  and 
independent representatives of the European interest. According to them, consideration should 
therefore be given to strengthen the standing and authority of the Chairpersons. Possible ways 
to achieve this, suggested by several stakeholders in the course of the review as well as in the 
IMF  assessment,  could  be  by  providing  the  chairpersons  with  a  voting  right  in  the  BoS  to 

26 
 A  good  example  for  this  heightened  cooperation  can  be  found  in  the  complaint  handling  area  where 
both  EBA  and  ESMA  sought  inspiration  from  EIOPA’s  groundwork  and  plan  to  develop  identical  complaint 
handling procedures for the banking and securities field. 

27 

28 

29 

 See section 4. 

 The BoS is comparable to the composition of the Management Board in the common approach. 

 Comparable to the Executive Board in the common approach. 

16 

 
                                                      
strengthen  the  European  dimension  in  the  ESA  decision  making  process  or  by  delegating 
more tasks to the Chairperson such as in the field of access to data.30  

Board of Supervisors 

The  shift  away  from  a  decision-making  process  based  on  consensus  to  actual  voting31, 
either by simple majority (which is the rule) or by qualified majority (regulatory issues, 
budgetary  matters)  is  considered  by  stakeholders  as  a  step  forward  but  there  remain 
concerns  about  the  role  of  NCAs  in  the  decision  making  process.  The  BoS  is  the  main 
decision-making  body  and,  in  particular,  responsible  for  the  adoption  of  draft  technical 
standards,  opinions,  recommendations,  and  decisions.  The  BoS  is  composed  of  the 
Chairperson,  the  heads  of  NCAs  which  are  voting  members,  and  representatives  of  the 
Commission, the ECB, the ESRB and the two other ESAs (non-voting members).  

The  membership  structure  of  the  BoS  ensures  buy-in  of  NCAs  and  voting  by  simple  or 
qualified majority is now a routine task at the BoS. Nevertheless, some concerns remain that 
the  key  role  of  the  NCAs  in  the  BoS  as  their  only  voting  members  might  hamper  the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the BoS. Members of the BoS as well as other stakeholders in 
their  responses  to  the  public  consultation  stressed  that  since  NCAs  are  accountable  to  their 
national parliaments, the current membership structure and voting arrangements could lead to 
a system representing the majority of national views which might not necessarily favour the 
European interest. While the ESAs regulations require the voting members of the BoS to act 
independently and in the sole interest of the European Union, BoS members tend, at times, to 
rather defend purely national interests and to take the wider European interest not sufficiently 
into account. This important weakness has been raised both by members of the BoS as well as 
other stakeholders in their responses to the public consultation. Similar observations have also 
been highlighted by the IMF in its recent reports on the ESAs32 as well as by the Parliament.33 

Management Board 

Overall, the MBs of the three ESAs is considered by stakeholders to work satisfactorily 
while some divergences between the MB of the three ESAs can be observed. The MB is 
composed  of  the  Chairperson  plus  six  members  of  the  BoS.  The  Executive  Director  and  a 
representative  of  the  Commission  participate  as  observers  in  the  meeting.  The  Commission 
representative  has  a  right  to  vote  on  budgetary  matters.  The  MB  is  mainly  in  charge  of  the 
authority's work programme and plays a central role in the adoption of the budget. 

Most  stakeholders  consider  the  MBs  of  the  three  ESAs  to  work  effectively.  It  can  be  noted 
that  the  MBs  of  the  three  ESAs  diverge  to  a  certain  extent.  For  instance,  the  EBA  and  the 

30 
Chairperson but so far no use has been made of this possibility.  

 Article  41(1)  of  the  ESAs  regulation  already  provides  for  the  possibility  to  delegate  tasks  to  the 

31 

32 

 The amended EBA Regulation introduces the principle of double majority voting at EBA. 

 See IMF: Financial Sector Assessment Program – The EBA / The ESMA / The EIOPA, 2013. 

33 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) Review, para AU. 

 European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2014 with recommendations to the Commission on the 

17 

 
                                                      
EIOPA  MB  appear  to  play  a  bigger  role  in  preparing  discussions  and  priorities  of  the  BoS, 
similar  to  the  role  of  a  steering  committee,  whereas  the  role  of  the  MB  of  ESMA  is  more 
limited  to  budgetary  and  organisational  tasks.  A  stronger  role  for  the  MB  could  have  the 
advantage  of  creating  more  room  for  the  BoS  to  focus  on  policy  issues  and  substantive 
discussions,  a  shortcoming  of  the  BoS  that  was  raised  by  several  BoS  members.  Some 
stakeholders take a critical view, however. According to them, in the current composition of 
the MB, such a role risks not representing the European interest due to the lack of independent 
European representatives.  

One  possible  way  brought  forward  by  different  stakeholders  with  different  backgrounds 
(supervisors, industry representatives, academics, IMF) to strengthen the role of the MB and 
ensure  that  it  acts  in  the  European  interest  could  be  to  transform  it  into  a  more  permanent 
"Executive Board" inspired by the governance structure of the Executive Board at the ECB, 
but  of  a  smaller  size.  In  line  with  the  common  approach  on  decentralised  agencies  such  a 
strengthened MB would have a stronger operational role compared to today's situation, with 
the  BoS  giving  the  general  orientation  for  the  ESAs'  activities,  thereby  contributing  to 
enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness. 

Preparatory bodies 

The role of the staff of the ESAs in preparatory bodies could be enhanced. Preparatory 
bodies  (standing  committee,  working  groups,  task  forces)  play  an  important  role  for  the 
development  of  draft  regulatory  and  implement  technical  standards,  guidelines  and 
recommendations.  The  ESAs'  staff  always  participate  in  the  activities  of  the  preparatory 
bodies,  but  their  role  diverges  to  a  large  extent.  Whereas  in  some  areas  working  group/ 
standing committees are chaired or co-chaired by the ESAs, in most cases representatives of 
NCAs chair these bodies and the role of the ESAs' staff is limited to a secretarial role, even if 
it can be observed that the role of the ESAs staff is growing in importance.  

Many  responses  to  the  consultation  from  NCAs  but  also  from  market  participants  to  the 
consultation stress the advantages of the current structure which in their view ensures a high 
quality  and  practicality  of  the  technical  work  and  paves  the  way  to  swift  agreement  at  the 
BoS.  On  the  other  hand,  several  responses  to  the  consultation  underscore  the  idea  that  a 
stronger role of the ESAs and their staff would allow for developing a more European stance 
already at technical level and contribute to addressing the current imbalance of contributions 
to the work of preparatory bodies. Some responses to the public  consultation pointed  to  the 
relative overrepresentation of NCAs from some Member States in these bodies to the expense 
of  NCAs  from  other  Member  States  that  may  have  more  limited  resources.  A  way  forward 
suggested  by  some  stakeholders  could  be  that  ESA  staff  systematically  chairs  preparatory 
bodies, while maintaining the strong involvement of NCAs to ensure buy-in and making best 
use of their technical expertise.  

vii. Accountability  

The  accountability  arrangements  are  considered  by  stakeholders  to  be  sufficiently 
strong  and  to  work  satisfactorily.  The  chairpersons  of  the  ESAs  are  accountable  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council.  They  are  regularly  invited  to  hearings  of  the  ECON 

18 

 
committee, which exercises the accountability role on behalf of the Parliament, and report in 
writing  on  the  main  activities  of  the  respective  ESA.  With  regard  to  the  Council,  the  ESAs 
regularly attend meetings of the FSC and the EFC and, occasionally, of the ECOFIN. 

This  assessment  is  shared  by  a  huge  majority  of  stakeholders,  with  a  few  responses  to  the 
public consultation seeing the need for stronger accountability requirements, in particular with 
regard  to  scrutiny  role  of  the  EP  for  guidelines  developed  by  the  ESAs,  and  for  a  more 
transparent discharge process in general.  

Responses to the public consulation exposed some need for clarification of the concept of 
independence  of  the  ESAs.  The  ESAs  are  set-up  as  decentralised  agencies  and  thus 
contribute  to  the  implementation  of  Union  policies.  Amongst  other  things  the  ESAs  pool 
technical expertise available at European and national level. The ESAs are independent legal 
entities  under  European  public  law,  distinct  from  the  EU  institutions.  While  there  is  broad 
consensus  among  stakeholders  that  the  ESAs  should  be  independent,  the  concrete  meaning 
and implication of the concept of independence are less clear. Different views were expressed, 
calling either for a stronger independence of the ESAs from NCAs and/or the Commission. 

Regarding  the  independence  from  NCAs,  concerns,  as  mentioned  above,  referred  mainly  to 
the role of NCAs in the BoS and the preparatory bodies where some stakeholders felt that the 
ESAs should be less dependent on financial resources and technical input of NCAs and that 
the European dimension in decision making should be strengthened.34  

With  regard  to  strengthening  independence  vis-à-vis  the  Commission,  responses  to  the 
consultation  raised  concerns  in  the  context  of  funding  and  compliance  with  administrative 
procedures  and  the  involvement  of  the  Commission  in  the  work  of  the  ESAs.  Some 
stakeholders considered that the Commission could undermine the authority of the ESAs, in 
particular  due  to  the  perception  that  the  Commission  has  too  much  influence  on  the  work 
programme of the ESAs and overburdens the ESAs with regulatory tasks.  

viii. Financing and human resources  

The staff recruited by the ESAs is seen to be experienced in regulatory and supervisory 
matters  and  to  be  composed  in  a  way  that  respects  broadly  the  principles  of 
geographical  balance  and  gender  balance.  However,  stakeholders  are  of  the  view  that 
the  ESAs  are  understaffed.  At  the  end  of  2013  the  ESAs  employed  a  total  of  384  staff 
(EBA:  124,  ESMA:  150,  EIOPA:  110).  Interest  for  positions  has  been  high,  which  is 
demonstrated  by  an  average  of  47  applications  per  vacancy  notice  in  the  first  half  of  2013 
with however some divergence between the ESAs (ESMA 73, EIOPA 43, EBA 26).  

Stakeholders consider the ESAs to offer an attractive and challenging work environment and 
value the use of both temporary agents and seconded national experts.    

From  stakeholders'  point  of  view  the  ESAs  are  understaffed  and  more  human  resources  are 
needed  in  order  to  carry  out  their  mandate  satisfactorily.  Furthermore,  some  concerns  were 
expressed  with  regard  to  the  perceived  inflexibility  of  the  EU  administrative  framework 

34 

 See for more details sections vi and viii.  

19 

 
                                                      
which the ESAs have to apply, the perceived lack of seniority of ESAs' staff as well as the 
possible competition with the SSM in terms of recruitment of highly qualified staff. 

Stakeholders considered that the diversity of staff among the ESFS, including the ESAs and 
NCAs, could be further increased by simplifying exchanges of staff.  

In a similar vein current resources are considered insufficient and the funding situation 
needs  to  be  addressed,  both  in  the  short  and  long-term.  Funding  and  resources  of  the 
ESAs  should  be  commensurate  to  their  increasing  tasks  and  responsibilities.  There  is  broad 
consensus among stakeholders that the current allocation of funding (60% by NCA, 40% by 
the  EU,  and  fees  raised  by  ESMA  for  the  supervision  of  credit  rating  agencies  and  trade 
repositories) is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons.  

First, it raises the question of the independence of the ESAs which could be at least perceived 
as being undermined by the role of NCAs and the Commission in financing them. Second, the 
current  scheme,  and  the  need  to  increase  staffing,  is  not  sustainable  for  many  NCAs,  in 
particular in the current strained economic environment. This risks leading to a situation were 
increasing  funding  at  European  level  is  financed  at  the  expense  of  weaker  funding  for 
supervision  at  national  level.  Furthermore,  resources  at  the  EU  level  are  tight  under  the 
multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF)  2014-2020  and  flexibility  within  the  MFF  is  very 
limited.    

Different options for improving the resources situation, both in the short and in the long-term, 
have  been  brought  forward  by  stakeholders  (e.g.  concerning  the  funding  mix,  introducing  a 
separate  budget  line  for  the  ESAs;  increasing  the  level  of  funding  by  raising  fees  and/or 
levies),  and  will  need  to  be  analysed.  Two  essential  conditions  emerge  from  the  views 
expressed: i) Ensuring sufficient resources at EU and national level, while (ii) respecting the 
current strained economic environment and the MFF.   

Stakeholders  consider  that  any  amendment  to  the  financing  of  the  ESAs  should  be 
accompanied by further streamlining expenses of the ESAs, where necessary. They consider 
this could be achieved e.g. by reducing administrative costs of the ESAs and making more use 
of  harmonized  practices  across  the  ESAs  (e.g.  IT  infrastructures,  reporting  formats, 
administrative procedures).  

ix.  Involvement and role of stakeholders 

The Stakeholder groups (SGs) were quickly set up and are valued by the ESAs and most 
stakeholders even if stakeholders consider that their impact could be strengthened and 
the resource requirements for setting up and running the SGs are extensive.  

To  ensure  a  structured  liaison  with  stakeholders  the  ESAs  regulations  establish  specialised 
separate  SGs  for  each  ESA35.  Each  SG  is  composed  of  experts  on  the  sector  in  question, 
representing  a  broad  scope  of  stakeholders  reaching  from  financial  institutions,  employees' 
representations,  consumers  and  users  of  financial  services,  representatives  of  SMEs  to 

35 

 Two for EIOPA representing respectively stakeholders of the insurance and pensions sector. 

20 

 
                                                      
academics.36 SG members are appointed by the BoS. The SGs are consulted when developing 
draft technical standards, guidelines and recommendations and may also submit opinions and 
advice on their own initiative.  

The  general  role  and  mandate  of  the  SGs  is  laid  down  in  the  ESAs  regulations  and  is 
complemented by rules of procedures developed by the ESAs providing further guidance on 
the selection and appointment procedure and for other aspects, e.g. compensation and secrecy 
requirements.  

The  ESAs  quickly  set  up  the  SGs  groups  which  were  operational  as  of  the  second  half  of 
2011. The SGs meet on average in a bimonthly rhythm and have been consulted on various 
occasions. In the first half of 2013 36 draft technical standards or guidelines were submitted 
to the SGs (EBA 24, ESMA 6, EIOPA 6).  

The impact of the SGs is considered by stakeholders to be limited for various reasons:   

−  The  procedure  for  setting  up  the  SGs  and  ensuring  adequate  representation  of  the 
different categories while respecting geographical and gender balance is very resource 
intensive  and  appears  disproportionate  to  some  stakeholders.  According  to  them, 
longer  mandates  for  SG  members,  currently  mandates  are  only  2.5  years,  and 
staggered  appointments  could  lighten  the  recruitment  process  and  ensure  more 
continuity.  

−  The requirement that SG members "shall serve in a personal capacity", restrictive rules 
on sharing documents, the lack of access to data and insufficient compensation of SG 
members representing non-profit organizations limit the quality of the contributions of 
the SG37 and might prevent experts from providing their expertise to the SGs. These 
aspects are particularly relevant for representatives of consumer interests and smaller 
institutions.    

−  Many stakeholders complained about the unbalanced composition of the SGs, which 
are  in  particular  deemed  to  insufficiently  represent  consumers,  users  of  financial 
services, employee representatives and SMEs. The appointment process for members 
of the SGs is perceived by many stakeholders as lacking transparency.  

−  Too  short  deadlines  for  the  consultation  of  SGs  and  lack  of  explicit  and  detailed 

feedback from the ESAs.  

36 
 The European Ombudsman issued on 07 November 2013 an opinion on the composition of the EBA 
banking stakeholder group following a complaint from Uni Europa in September 2011. The opinion confirmed a 
number  of  deficiencies  regarding  the  selection  process carried out  by  EBA  for  the  composition  of  the  various 
stakeholder  categories  and  called  for  a  more  balanced  representation  of  the  stakeholders  of  the  different 
categories, in terms of geographical balance and gender balance. With regard to the category of "users", these 
should be representatives of entities clearly related to retail users of the services provided by the banking sector. 
See for more detailed information on the ombudsman's decision: Decision of the European Ombudsman closing 
her inquiry into complaint 1966/2011/(EIS)LP against the European Banking Authority.  

37 
amendments could be envisaged for the ESMA and the EIOPA regulation. 

 However, it has to be noted that the modifications to the EBA regulation addressed this issue. Similar 

21 

 
                                                      
Several  respondents  to  the  consultation  suggested  limiting  the  number  of  SGs  of  EIOPA  to 
one with alternating members depending on the subject under discussion.  

The  ESAs  themselves  appear  to  be  broadly  accessible  but  some  stakeholders  point  out  that 
they could be more transparent by publishing the agenda and minutes of Board meetings in 
time,  improving  the  readability  of  the  ESAs'  websites,  including  facilitating  access  to 
information and publishing more detailed organization charts.   

x.  Joint bodies – JC and BoA 

The ESAs share two joint bodies: The Board of Appeal (BoA) and the Joint Committee (JC).  

Since  the  BoA  so  far  only  decided  on  one  appeal38,  it  would  be  premature  to  form  a 
judgment  on  its  structure.  The  BoA  ensures  the  right  to  appeal,  in  first  instance,  against 
decisions adopted by the ESAs. For reasons of efficiency and consistency the ESAs founding 
regulations set up a joint body dealing with issues related to banking, insurance and securities. 
The  BoA  has  six  members  and  six  alternates  and  is  independent  from  the  ESAs.  It  was 
appointed at the end of 2011 and has so far heard and decided on one appeal. Several further 
appeals are under consideration by the BoA. The current structure of the BoA is considered 
by  stakeholders  to  ensure  a  strong  degree  of  homogeneity  and  works,  as  far  as  this  can  be 
assessed  at  this  early  stage,  satisfactorily.  At  this  stage,  only  few  calls  in  favour  of  sector-
specific specialisation were made.  

The  JC  has  an  important  and  increasing  role  but  stakeholders  called  for  improved 
visibility, transparency and governance. The JC aims to ensure cross-sectorial cooperation 
and  consistent  supervisory  approaches  between  the  three  ESAs.  The  JC  has  no  legal 
personality and any decisions are to be taken by the individual ESAs, which implies that the 
three BoS of the ESAs have to endorse proposals of the JC in parallel. The JC is composed of 
the Chairpersons of the ESAs and the chairpersons of the Sub-Committees.39 Furthermore, the 
Executive  Directors  of  the  ESAs,  a  representative  of  the  Commission  and  the  ESRB 
participate as observers. The Chairperson and the secretarial support for the JC rotate on an 
annual  basis  among  the  ESAs  (2011  EBA,  2012  ESMA,  2013  EIOPA).  Physical  meetings 
take  place  bimonthly  and  are  complemented  with  monthly  teleconferences  of  the  ESAs 
management staff and ad hoc discussions.  

Due to the parallel establishment of the ESAs the work of the JC has taken up slowly in 2011 
but  reached  regular  speed  in  2012. Overall,  the  JC  has  an  important  and  increasing  role  for 
cross-sectorial  issues  (e.g.  financial  conglomerates,  PRIPs,  consumer  protection  in  general, 
work  on  the  benchmark  setting  process)  but  there  are  calls  to  improve  its  visibility  and 
transparency  as  well  as  governance  arrangements.  Identified  shortcomings,  raised  by 
stakeholders and/or highlighted by the IMF are: (i) lack of transparency on and visibility of 
the activities of the JC and its sub-committees; (ii) lack of dedicated staff; (iii) complex and 

38 https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/abouteiopa/Organisation/BoA/Decisions/BoA_2013-
008_Board_of_Appeal_SV_Capital_OUE_vs_EBA__Decision_24_June_2013.pdf 

39 
and vulnerabilities; anti-money laundering and consumer protection and financial innovation. 

 So far, Sub-Committees are in place for: financial conglomerates; cross sectoral developments, risks 

22 

 
                                                      
time-consuming  decision  making-process;  and  (iv)  uneven  representation  of  the  different 
sectors in the sub-committees. 

A  way  forward  to  improve  these  deficiencies  in  the  short-term  suggested  by  many 
stakeholders is the development of a dedicated website informing about the activities of the 
JC  and  making  non-confidential  documents  easily  available  to  interested  stakeholders. 
Furthermore, close dynamic cooperation among the ESAs, increased visibility in the area of 
consumer  protection  and  financial  conglomerates,  clearer  prioritisation  of  strategic  cross-
sectorial  topics  and  making  better  use  of  the  JC  for  matters  of  internal  organizational  and 
process-oriented  harmonisation  (e.g.  general  procedures,  training  and  IT)  is  considered  to 
strengthen the added value of the JC.[policy orientations] 

3. 

Assessment  of 

the 

individual  performance  of 

the  ESAs  –  main 

achievements/developments 

i.  EBA  

The EBA‘s mission is to improve the functioning of the EU Single Market, in particular by 
ensuring  a  high  quality,  effective  and  consistent  level  of  regulation  and  supervision  in  the 
domain of banking, e-money and payments as well as relating areas of corporate governance, 
auditing and financial reporting. EBA's challenge was to establish itself as a new organization 
in the midst of an unprecedented crisis of the European banking system.  

EBA‘s  regulatory  activity  aimed  at  establishing  a  single  rulebook  is  at  present 
dominated  by  its  focus  on  the  implementation  of  the  CRDIV  /CRR  legislative 
framework which was adopted in June 2013.40 Until end 2013 the EBA BoS adopted 58 draft 
technical standards.  

A  key  component  of  EBA's  oversight  activities  during  the  first  three  years  was  the 
initiation  and  coordination  of  an  EU  wide  stress  test  exercise  in  2011  and  the  2012 
recapitalisation exercise. While the outcome of the stress test exercise did not fully meet the 
expectations, the EBA's recapitalisation exercise which raised banks' capital ratio (core tier 1) 
to  9%  by  end  June  2012  and  built  up  capital  buffers  to  address  market  concerns  over 
sovereign  risks  was  positively  received  by  market  participants  and  analysts  and  constituted 
one  of  the  most  important  contributions  to  convergence  in  supervisory  practices  in  the 
banking sector. 

EBA is the authority most affected by the recent establishment of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Stakeholders stressed the need to preserve 
the role of EBA if not to strengthen it in order to ensure the integrity of the Single Market and 

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 

40 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [CRDIV]; and Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [CRR]. 

23 

 
 
                                                      
to  provide  a  platform  to  participating  and  non-participating  Member  States  for  regular 
exchange  of  views  and  best  practices  and  common  decision  making  on  the  further 
development  of  the  single  rulebook.  The  legislative  amendments  to  the  EBA  Regulation 
adopted  under  the  SSM  package  are  seen  as  providing  for  balanced  voting  arrangements 
between  the  participating  and  non-participating  Member  States  once  the  SSM  gets 
operational.  Views  expressed  highlighted  that  close  cooperation  and  regular  communication 
with the ECB will be crucial notably in the fields of convergence of supervisory practices and 
the conduct of supervisory tasks, such as stress tests. In order to ensure that EBA can carry 
out  credible  stress  tests,  the  amended  EBA  regulation  strengthened  EBA  powers  for  stress 
testing and for requesting access to data.  

ii.  EIOPA  

EIOPA's  mission  consists  in  promoting  a  sound  regulatory  framework  and  consistent 
supervisory practices in order to protect the rights of policy holders, pension scheme members 
and beneficiaries and contribute to the public confidence in the European Union's insurance 
and occupational pension sectors.  

EIOPA's regulatory output was affected by the fact of the pending negotiations on the 
Omnibus II Directive amending the Solvency II Directive. EIOPA however prepared and 
partly pre-consulted around sixty technical standards and guidelines on Solvency II in parallel 
to  the  on-going  negotiations  on  Omnibus  II.  In  addition,  one  technical  standard  has  been 
adopted in the field of occupational pensions. Two sets of guidelines on consumer protection 
issues have been publicly consulted and one has been published so-far.  

EIOPA  received  several  ad-hoc  requests  for  advice  and  opinions  from  the  EU 
institutions,  such  as  the  technical  assessment  on  insurance  products  with  long-term 
guarantees  which  was  submitted  in  June  2013.41  In  response  to  a  Commission's  request 
EIOPA  delivered  advice  to  the  Commission  in  February  2012  on  the  EU-wide  legislative 
framework  for  IORPs  and  performed  a  quantitative  impact  study  (QIS)  on  the  quantitative 
aspects of its study.42 

EIOPA has been the first authority publishing a set of guidelines on consumer protection 
issues in June 2012, more specifically on complaints handling by insurance undertakings and 
was the frontrunner among the ESAs in the organisation of consumer days. 

41 
assessment/index.html. 

 See: https://eiopa.europa.eu/en/consultations/qis/insurance/long-term-guarantees-

 See: 

42 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/en/consultations/qis/occupational-pensions/quantitative-impact-
study/index.html.  Furthermore,  EIOPA  invested  significant  resources  in  2013  following  the  request  of  the 
Commission  for  advice  on  the  calibration  of  investments  in  infrastructure  securities  and  Venture  Capital 
expected to be delivered early 2014. 

24 

 
 
                                                      
iii.  ESMA  

ESMA's  mission  is  to  enhance  the  protection  of  investors  and  reinforce  stable  and  well-
functioning  financial  markets  in  the  European  Union  as  well  as  direct  supervision  of  CRAs 
and recently trade repositories. ESMA‘s scope of action encompasses securities and markets 
activities,  trading  venues,  the  disclosure  and  content  of  financial  information,  investment, 
market integrity and CRAs. 

ESMA has been particularly active in contributing to the single rulebook by submitting 
more than 90 draft technical standards to the Commission for the implementation of the 
European Market and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), for the new Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRA) supervisory regime, on the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
and on the short-selling and credit default swaps Regulation. It provided ample advice on the 
legislation  currently  being  negotiated  by  the  co-legislators,  including  MiFID2,  MIFIR,  the 
Transparency  Directive  the  Market  Abuse  Directive  (MAD)  and  Market  Abuse  Regulation 
(MAR),  the  revised  Credit  Rating  Agency  Regulation  (CRA3)  and  the  Central  Securities 
Depositaries Directive (CSD).  

ESMA  actively  contributed  to  promoting  supervisory  convergence  by  e.g.  issuing 
opinions  on  the  treatment  of  sovereign  debt  under  IFRS  and  -  for  the  first  time  - 
common European IFRS enforcement priorities. It assessed and issued opinions on a large 
number  of  proposals  for  pre-trade  transparency  waivers  for  trading  systems.  ESMA 
completed  6  thematic  peer  reviews  and  assessed  numerous  requests  regarding  alleged 
breaches of Union law which in one case was resolved by adoption of an opinion by ESMA to 
safeguard uniform interpretation and supervisory convergence. 

ESMA  adopted  a  series  of  concrete  initiatives  in  the  area  of  investor  protection,  for 
instance two sets of Guidelines in July 2012 on MiFID provisions relating to suitability and 
the compliance function and one set of Guidelines on exchange-traded funds and other UCITS 
issues. Further Guidelines on remuneration of alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) 
followed in February 2012. ESMA was also active in issuing three investor warnings in total, 
in the event that a financial activity poses a serious threat to investors. 

With  the  entry  into  force  of  CRA2  in  July  2011,  ESMA  assumed  responsibility  for 
supervising CRAs registered in the EU. So far 22 CRAs are supervised by ESMA and the 
authority  recently  began  to  supervise  Trade  Repositories  and  to  coordinate  supervisory 
colleges for Central  Counterparties. As the number  of  registered CRAs  gradually increased, 
the  role  of  ESMA  progressively  moved  from  ensuring  consistency  across  the  assessment  of 
the  application  for  registration  being  undertaken  by  national  authorities  to  a  more  central 
supervisory  enforcement  role  in  line  with  the  regulatory  framework  and  delegated  powers. 
The CRA Technical Committee of ESMA also acted as a forum for NCAs to exchange their 
views on the application of the Regulation.  

25 

 
 
 
4. 

The structure of the ESAs   

Most  stakeholders  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  structure  of  the  ESAs  and  were  in 
favour  of  giving  the  new  supervisory  system  more  time  to  settle,  also  in  light  of  the 
establishment of the Banking Union. It is widely accepted that the current structure of the 
ESFS  ensures  that  all  elements  of  the  financial  sector  are  taken  into  account  and  close 
cooperation  between  the  micro-  (ESAs)  and  the  macro-prudential  (ESRB)  dimension.  Most 
stakeholders are satisfied with the current structure of the ESFS and plead for evolution rather 
than revolution. They stress in particular that more radical changes would be premature at this 
early stage and suggest giving the current structure and the Banking Union some time to settle 
before  considering  amendments  to  the  structure.  However,  some  stakeholders,  from  various 
backgrounds, expressed a preference for more radical changes, like merging the ESAs into a 
single authority, introducing a twin peaks approach, moving the ESAs to a single seat or, at 
least, consider more efficient arrangements in some areas.  

The interaction between the establishment of the Banking Union and the ESFS and EBA 
in particular will have to consolidate in practice. Many stakeholders are concerned about 
the  interaction  between  the  SSM  and  the  EBA  and  a  division  between  the  regulation  and 
supervision  of  banks  in  Member  States  participating  in  the  Banking  Union  and  those  of 
Member States not participating in the Banking Union. Overlaps between the systems (such 
as  double  standards,  double  reporting,  double  stress  testing  etc.)  should  be  avoided  and 
responsibilities  balanced.  The  EBA  will  maintain  its  prerogatives,  and  contribute  to 
developing the single rulebook and in particular the single supervisory handbook, whereas the 
focus  of  the  ECB  will  be  on  the  supervision  of  institutions.  With  respect  to  the  ESRB, 
stakeholders point out that organisational and operational changes might be necessary in light 
of the SSM to allow for an effective ESRB and avoid possible conflicts of interest. Sufficient 
time  should  be  allowed  for  the  parallel  functioning  of  the  ESFS  and  the  Banking  Union, 
covering not only the EBA and the ESRB but also the interaction with ESMA and EIOPA, to 
fully assess the actual relationships and possibly identify and address shortcomings.   

Several  responses  from  stakeholders  from  the  3  EEA  states  requested  to  rapidly  agree  on 
suitable  means  in  order  to  fully  integrate  the  EEA/EFTA  States  in  the  ESFS.  Important  to 
note, however, that relevant difficulties mainly stem from the fact that these States have raised 
political and constitutional issues in regard to the exact ways of such integration. 

There is broad consensus on the effectiveness and efficiency of direct supervision of CRAs by 
ESMA  and  for  its  mandate  for  supervising  trade  repositories.  Most  stakeholders  expressed 
however  a  more  cautious  position  on  the  further  extension  of  direct  supervisory  powers,  at 
least  in  the  short  term.  Possible  areas  for  direct  supervision  by  the  ESAs  highlighted  by 
stakeholders include market/post-trade infrastructures (e.g. benchmarks, CCPs, CSDs) where 
the  degree  of  concentration  of  actors  at  EU  level  is  considered  as  possibly  justifying  a 
European approach to supervision.  

*** 

26 

 
 
 
ESAs' Headcount

t
n
u
o
c
d
a
e
H

180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40

2011

2012

2013

2014*

Year

EBA
ESMA
EIOPA

27 

 
 
Regulatory activities  

Year 

2011 

2012 

Regulatory activity 

EBA 

EIOPA 

ESMA  

EBA  

EIOPA 

ESMA 

Draft regulatory 

technical standards** 

Draft implementing 

technical standards** 

Joint Draft Technical 

Standards*** 

Guidelines and 

Recommendations 

Technical advice 

requested from COM 

Other**** 

Of which opinions 

0 

0 

4 

0 

17 

1 

0* 

0* 

0 

3 

42 

0 

4 

0 

2 

5 

4 

3 

1 

0 

0* 

0* 

39 

10 

1 Joint RTS for all three ESAs in 2013 

6  

0 

25 

6 

1  

3 

29    

2 

8 

6 

11 

4 

2013  

EIOPA 

ESMA 

0* 

1* 

6  

13 

10 

2 

36 

3 

10 

18 

29 

8 

EBA 

36 

21 

6 

1 

45 

6 

Joint opinions***** 

1 Joint Opinion for all three ESAs in 2013 

* Pending the final adoption of Omnibus II and Solvency II EIOPA had no legal powers to adopt technical standards 
** As submitted to the European Commission 
*** Joint RTS on FICOD submitted to the European Commission in July 2013, and published in the OJ in March 2014 
**** The category "other" includes opinions, best practices reports, surveys, final reports and other advice of the ESAs but excludes technical advice requested 
from the Commission 

28 

 
 
 
 
***** Joint Opinion of the ESAs on the review of the European Systemic Risk Board in December 2013 

Common supervisory culture 

Year 

2011 

2012 

Activities 

EBA 

EIOPA 

ESMA 

EBA  

EIOPA 

ESMA 

Colleges established 

82 

Colleges visited in % of 

68% 

invitations 

Training sessions  

Peer reviews 

completed 

16 

0 

Governance of the ESAs 

89 

87% 

18 

0 

0 

- 

9 

2 

87 

82% 

13 

0 

91 

82% 

21 

0 

0 

- 

11 

2 

2013  

EIOPA 

ESMA 

92 

89% 

17 

4 

6 

100% 

28 

2 

EBA 

135 

93% 

20 

1 

Year 

2011 

2012 

2013  

Measures 

EBA 

EIOPA 

ESMA 

EBA  

EIOPA 

ESMA 

EBA 

EIOPA 

ESMA 

Meetings of the Board 

6/ 

of Supervisors* 

Meetings of the 

Management Board* 

Meetings of the SG** 

No. of documents 

submitted to SG 

6 

4 

8 

6 

7 

13 

1 

7 

8 

3 

8 

7 

6 

7 

12 

6 

6 

12 

9 

8 

6 

7 

7 

6 

5 

7 

56 

6 

7 

10 

19 

8 

6 

5 

22 

* Only physical meetings, teleconferences and away day are not included 

29 

 
 
 
 
*** SG stands for stakeholder group. EIOPA has two SGs 

Joint Committee 

Year 

No. of meetings 

No. of common acts 

and joint positions 

No. of discussion 

notes* 

Dedicated staff ** 

2011 

5 

1 

39 

3.5 

2012 

6 

4 

81 

8 

2013  

6 

19 

90 

12   

*This figure includes the persons providing the JC with secretariat, as well as the staff supporting the work of the Sub-Committees of the JC and legal and 
coordination aspects of the JC support  

30