COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Better situational awareness by enhanced cooperation across maritime surveillance authorities: next steps within the Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime domain
Date: 2014-07-08
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: data collection, exchange of information, maritime safety, maritime surveillance, public authorities, shipping policy













EUR-Lex - 52014SC0225 - EN











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52014SC0225

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Better situational awareness by enhanced cooperation across maritime surveillance authorities: next steps within the Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime domain /* SWD/2014/0225 final */









COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION
FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
Better
situational awareness by enhanced cooperation across maritime surveillance
authorities: next steps within the Common Information Sharing Environment for
the EU maritime domain
Table
of contents
1.           Executive Summary
Sheet 6
2.           Introduction and scene setter 9
3.           Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties. 12
3.1.        Identification. 12
3.2.        Impact
assessment steering group. 12
3.3.        Consultation
and expertise. 12
3.3.1.     Public consultation. 12
3.3.2.     Other consultations. 13
3.3.3.     Dialogues and consultations
with other Institutions, other Services and Member States            13
3.3.4.     Consultancy studies. 15
4.           Problem definition. 17
4.1.        The
problem.. 17
4.2.        What
is causing this problem?. 20
4.3.        Who
is affected by the problems and what are the consequences for them?. 24
4.4.        The
baseline scenario. 25
4.4.1.     Evolution of the baseline
scenario. 27
4.5.        EU
right to act, added value, proportionality and subsidiarity. 29
4.5.1.     The right to act – treaty
basis. 29
4.5.2.     Added value of EU action. 29
4.5.3.     Subsidiarity and
Proportionality. 30
4.5.4.     Coherence with existing
policies and initiatives. 30
5.           Objectives. 32
5.1.        General
objectives. 32
5.2.        Specific
objectives. 34
6.           Policy options. 36
6.1.        Selecting
the policy options. 36
6.2.        Discarded
options. 36
6.3.        Retained
policy options. 37
6.3.1.     Option 1- No further EU action. 37
6.3.2.     Option 2 -Voluntary measures. 38
6.3.3.     Option 3 -Binding measures. 40
6.3.4.     Combination of policy
options. 41
7.           Assessment of options. 41
7.1.        Qualitative
assessment of options. 42
7.1.1.     Option 1 – No EU action
(baseline scenario) 42
7.1.2.     Option 2 – Voluntary
measures. 43
7.1.3.     Option 3 – Binding measures. 46
7.2.        Quantitative
assessment 47
7.2.1.     Economic, social and
environmental impacts of implementing the CISE project 47
7.2.2.     Economic, social and
environmental impacts of each Policy option. 49
7.3.        Assessment
of impacts on fundamental rights. 53
7.4.        Assessment
of Cost and administrative burden. 53
7.4.1.     Costs of the policy options. 53
7.4.2.     Cost at EU level versus
costs at Member States level 55
8.           comparing the options. 56
8.1.        Effectiveness
in obtaining the objectives. 56
8.2.        Benefits. 57
8.3.        Cost 58
8.4.        Conclusion. 58
9.           Monitoring and evaluation. 59
10.         Annex 1: Summary of public consultation. 61
11.         Annex 2: Summary of the Member States survey. 78
1.1         Cost
of current maritime surveillance. 78
1.2         Limitations
to information sharing. 79
1.3         Benefits
from CISE.. 80
1.4         Impacts. 81
12.         Annex
3: maritime surveillance authorities in EU Member States. 83
11.         Annex 4: Connection with other EU policies related to eGovernment 100
The
Malmö Declaration. 100
The
Granada Declaration. 100
Europe
2020. 100
Digital
Agenda for Europe. 101
European
eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015. 102
The
ISA programme. 103
Table of Figures and Tables
Table 1- Overview
of the quantitative assessment (source: COWI study) 50
Table 2 - Cost of the policy options
(source: Gartner study) 53
Table 3 - Comparison of the options  54
Figure 1- Limitations in access to information (source:
Member States survey) 17
Figure 2 - Overview of data gap assessment
(source: TAG work) 24
Figure 3 - European Interoperability
Framework (source: Commission) 30
Figure 4- Benefits in terms of surveillance
tasks (source: Member States survey) 32
Figure 5 - Central cost versus Member
States cost (source: Gartner study) 53
 1.                       Executive Summary Sheet 
 Impact assessment in support of a Communication on a Common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain 
 A. Need for action 
 Why? What is the problem being addressed? 
 The current information exchange between maritime surveillance authorities in the EU is suboptimal and leads to efficiency losses, duplication of data collection efforts and unnecessary operational costs. The link that would require further development, building on existing solutions and developments, relates to common standards which would allow for the interoperability of sectorial systems and machine readable information services. This would further enhance the possibilities for these authorities to have getting access to all the information necessary for their operative work. The main causes are real or perceived legal limitations, technical and cultural barriers which are preventing the desired information exchange. Under the baseline scenario, the situation is expected to improve also in the future due to enhanced co-operation between different maritime surveillance functions (maritime safety and security, border control, customs, general law enforcement, fisheries control, environmental control and defence) but is expected to remain suboptimal in the absence of an interoperability framework at EU level which would allow authorities to communicate and exchange information services more effectively. The relevant stakeholders are maritime surveillance authorities at national level (national coastguards etc.) and at EU level (FRONTEX, EMSA, EFCA, EDA, etc.). 
 What is this initiative expected to achieve? 
 The purpose of this initiative is to ensure that maritime surveillance information and services collected by one maritime sector and considered necessary/useful for the activities of other maritime sectors or functions can be efficiently shared with those sectors. Of particular importance is the objective to achieve enhanced exchange of information services between civilian and military authorities. This objective will have to be achieved through the removal of real or perceived legal and cultural limitations and through the use of an interoperability standard which would allow for this information exchange, based on existing models. Better exchange of information services are expected to lead to less duplication of data collection efforts, more cost efficient maritime surveillance operations and a better maritime surveillance awareness in EU waters. 
 What is the value added of action at the EU level? 
 Information exchange between maritime surveillance authorities/functions are of a transnational nature since it normally entails co-operation first and foremost at regional or sea basin level. Moreover, rules and conditions for transnational sharing of maritime surveillance information between authorities of a same sector are already regulated at EU level and involve EU agencies. 
 B. Solutions 
 What legislative and non-legislative policy options have been considered? Is there a preferred choice or not? Why? 
 The impact assessment considers 3 options with different sub-options. Several options (including one to review all existing information exchange systems) were discarded from the beginning as it would be counterproductive to the overall objectives of the initiative as making past work obsolete. The three options are 1) the baseline scenario (no further action at EU level) 2) voluntary measures,(including sub-options for a Communication by the Commission, the adoption of a handbook and best practices through a Recommendation and a joint undertaking) and 3) binding measures (including sub-options for revisions of existing sector legislation at EU level, an EU Regulation for a Common Information Sharing Environment, and a technical Regulation on interoperability standards). The preferred option is a mix of several sub-options, including the adoption of a Commission Communication, a handbook with best practices adopted through a Recommendation as well as revisions of sector legislation to remove unjustified legal limitations. 
 Who supports which option? 
 All input from the stakeholder consultation and a specific survey among the Member States as well as other preparatory actions (in particular pilot projects involving Member States representatives) demonstrate a firm support among stakeholders for EU action on this initiative. Stakeholders are however more divided as to the choice between binding versus non-binding options. The overall conclusion of stakeholders seem to be that binding measures are necessary but should be limited to the removal of any remaining unjustified legal limitations and technical barriers whereas non-binding measures through guidance should tackle cultural barriers at national level. This conclusion is in line with the conclusion of the impact assessment. 
 C. Impacts of the preferred option 
 What are the benefits of the preferred option? 
 The overall potential impact (benefit) of CISE is estimated to range between 1.6 billion € and 4.2 billion € over ten years as from the moment CISE is in place. These potential benefits of CISE as quantified in economic terms have social and environmental relevance as they stem from increased success in reducing goods being smuggled into the EU, oil polluting the sea, illegal unregulated and unreported fisheries, accidents at sea, irregular immigration, smuggling of small arms/light weapons, piracy and most importantly, succeeding in saving more lives at sea. The mix of preferred policy options mentioned in the preceding section is estimated to reap about 80% of the above mentioned overall economic impact (benefit). 
 What are the costs of the preferred option? 
 The total cost over 10 years for the preferred option is estimated at 133M€. EU central cost amounts to 26 M€ and Member States cost amounts to 107 M€ over 10 years. The cost of implementing CISE depends to a large extent on how each Member State may want to organise itself internally to connect to the environment, on the number of information services that will be provided in the environment and on the large variety of existing and planned IT systems. It is proposed not to impose any organisational structure to the Member States and let Member States connect to CISE their IT systems per sectorial functions. It is estimated that the above mentioned cost are necessary to reach the preferred policy mix reaping about 80% of the above mentioned overall economic impact (benefit). 
 How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected? 
 This initiative concerns only maritime surveillance authorities in the EU. Private companies such as SMEs and micro enterprises are not directly affected by this proposal. They will however benefit from a better business environment as enhanced maritime surveillance will ensure cleaner, safer and more secure seas as fundamental conditions to fostering blue growth, sustainable development and security of the EU maritime domain. Further, CISE provides business opportunities as new information services and technologies will be developed by businesses for the said public authorities. 
 Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations? 
 No. Cost per Member State amounts to between 2 M€ and 4 M€ for the ten year budgeting period, to adhere to a common information sharing environment. No other costs are envisaged. 
 Will there be other significant impacts? 
 The initiative will hopefully lead to a smarter use of existing resources and funds and simplify co-operation between maritime surveillance authorities in accordance with the refit initiative of the Commission. It is not expected to have any negative impacts on fundamental rights of citizens, competitiveness of private companies or international relations. It is expected that enhancing knowledge and improving maritime situational awareness could potentially lead to the reduction of threats and risks by 30% on average, while this effect will of course not be uniform over the type of risk and the different maritime areas of European interest. 
 D. Follow up 
 When will the policy be reviewed? 
 The development of this policy initiative will be reviewed after 4 years. Progress will be discussed regularly within the framework of a Member State expert group. 
2.                      
Introduction and scene setter
The
purpose of this impact assessment is to examine to what extent EU action is
necessary to enhance the exchange of maritime surveillance information services[1]
between the maritime surveillance authorities[2] in the EU.
The
creation of a Common Information Sharing Environment (hereinafter CISE) for the
EU maritime domain[3] has
been discussed in a EU context since 2007[4]
and has so far been the subject matter of two Communications of the Commission
in 2009 and 2010[5]. These
discussions have already produced some success stories and gradually lead to
enhanced information exchange, in particular between civilian surveillance
authorities.[6]
However, further improvements seem feasible to enhance exchange not only
between civilian maritime surveillance authorities, but in particular
information exchange between civilian and military authorities.
This work should
be seen against the background of an increasing number of situations and events
which can negatively affect the EU maritime domain today and within the next
15 years. In short, the EU maritime domain is exposed to various and
growing man-made, accidental and natural threats and risks[7].
These threats
and risks can partially be explained by the fact that trade with third
countries and movements of persons across borders have increased steadily in
recent years and we can expect that these movements will continue to increase
in the future.
A significant
proportion of entries to the EU are seaborne. For example, 74% of the EU's
external trade is carried by sea[8].
Increased number of threats therefore risks entering the EU by sea and may be
spread through Member States within a very short period of time.
Detecting,
checking and thwarting those threats - from post 9/11 terrorism, influx of
illegal drugs and arms, illegal immigration to customs fraud and environmental
damages or even from unintended accidents or natural events - are crucial to
ensure the fundamental conditions for the safety, the security and prosperity
of the EU and its population.
It falls under
the responsibility of the maritime surveillance authorities of the Member
States to face those threats. Their responsibility is not only to carry out
operations at sea, but also inter alia to ensure the effective understanding of
all activities carried out at sea and events occurred at sea that could impact
the security, safety, economy or environment of the European Union and its
Member States, this is commonly referred to as "maritime domain awareness"[9].
Seven different functions are relevant in this context: (1) maritime safety
(including search and rescue), maritime security and prevention of pollution
caused by ships, (2) fisheries control, (3) marine pollution preparedness and
response, marine environment protection (4) customs, (5) border control, (6)
general law enforcement and (7) defence.[10]
The increased
maritime surveillance and control needs which are required to face these
threats put an additional burden on the maritime surveillance authorities.
Increased control activities cost money however and putting additional funds
into maritime surveillance is not evident in times of financial crisis, when
many national and EU authorities are reducing their costs. This means that
maritime surveillance authorities of the EU Member States are obliged to become
more effective and cost efficient when carrying out their duties.
There is in
other words a need to enhance co-operation with other maritime surveillance
authorities of other functions at national level and/or of other Member States.
Such co-operation would inter alia strive for more effective and coordinated
actions at sea, create synergies, mutual knowledge and sharing of
experience/actions at sea. Information services are needed to foster such
co-operation. The subject matter for this impact assessment is to a large
extent about better regulations and making better use of existing solutions in
in the area of maritime surveillance along the spirit of the REFIT initiative
of the Commission[11]
rather than creating new rules.
Many Member
States have already or are in the process of setting up national initiatives to
this end and initiatives have been launched at EU level. One example of EU
level initiatives is the 2009 initiative for the coast guard functions
cooperation through the Forum of the Heads of the Coast Guard Functions of the
European Union and Schengen associated countries (so called "European
Coast Guard Functions Forum")[12].
A Commission study looking into the feasibility of improved co-ordination
between bodies carrying out coast guard functions at European level is
currently on-going. The very preliminary results of this study are that
suboptimal information sharing is a general obstacle to enhanced collaboration.
Suggestions for improvement include simplified procedures for the adoption of
analytical standards and procedures, the development of tools to report on the
information shared as well as the encouragement of automatic and cross sector
information sharing. Another example is the number of Service Level Agreements
on information exchange which has been concluded between various EU agencies[13].
These
initiatives for a more integrated and co-operative approach to the surveillance
of our seas, coasts and oceans have inter alia been inspired by the development
of the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) of the EU[14].
Its main aim is to increase co-ordination between various sectorial maritime
policies within the EU to enhance their effectiveness and cost efficiency. The
Blue book on the IMP[15]
has identified work towards more integrated maritime surveillance activities
supported inter alia by the creation of a Common Information Sharing
Environment (CISE) as an important step in this direction.
CISE is also a
part of wider Commission objectives expressed in its 'Europe 2020' strategy for
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. By helping to ensuring safe, secure
and clean seas, CISE can support the fundamental conditions for sustainable
(blue) growth. 
CISE also
contributes to the 'Digital Agenda for Europe' and to the ISA Programme, which
supports the delivery of European public services by fostering cross border and
cross sector interoperability, and thus contributes to the European single
digital market as well as to computer literacy.
CISE further
fosters the 'Innovation Union' both in the public and private sectors through
the development of new technologies and by engaging in new ways of cooperation
between about 400 relevant public authorities within the EU/EEA, saving time
and money.
As a tool
helping public authorities to optimise the deployment of their assets,
CISE could also contribute to the 'Resource-efficiency' flagship initiative
under the Europe 2020 strategy that supports the shift towards a
resource-efficient, low-carbon economy for sustainable growth. 
In particular to
achieve safe, secure and clean oceans through enhanced management and control.
It is targeting the control aspects of the management of the sea and should
therefore be seen as complementary to a number of existing measures within this
area, including the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the CFP Regulation,
the Reporting Formalities Directive, the EUROSUR Regulation, as well as other
non-legislative initiatives such as EMODNET, innovation in the blue economy,
and blue growth. The main idea of CISE is to ensure that the systems collecting
data under any such initiatives will become interoperable, thus allowing for
example data collected under EMODNET to be available to maritime surveillance
authorities of other sectors when needed.
Member States,
Council and other stakeholders have so far been very supportive of these
initiatives.[16]
3.                      
Procedural issues and consultation of interested
parties
3.1.                
Identification
The objective of
this impact assessment is to provide an analysis of the options for EU action
to implement CISE. The agenda planning reference is 2012/MARE/002.
This impact
assessment aims at:
•          Analysing
the need for EU action, and
•          Determining
the most suitable option and delivery instrument for this action.
3.2.                
Impact
assessment steering group
An impact
assessment steering group was created in June 2012 and met 9 times between 20th June
2012 and 24 October 2013. The Impact Assessment Steering Group was composed of
Legal Service (SJ), Secretariat-General (SG), Directorate-General for Mobility
and Transports (MOVE), Directorate-General for Home Affairs (HOME),
Directorate-General for Justice (JUST), Directorate-General for Taxation and
Customs Union (TAXUD), Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and civil
protection (ECHO), Directorate –General for Enterprise and Industry (ENTR),
Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT),
Directorate-General for Informatics (DIGIT), European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),
Joint Research Centre (JRC) and European External Action Service (EEAS).
3.3.                
Consultation
and expertise
Stakeholders'
consultations referred to in this document took place in several fora which are
listed below.
3.3.1.          
Public
consultation
On 14 June 2013,
a three-month public consultation was launched in support of the present impact
assessment. The consultation ended on 14 September 2013. A total of 33
responses were received, among which 24 responses were made on behalf of
organisations/administrations. The overall result of this consultation was as follows:
·                        
Overall
recognition that co-operation and information exchange between maritime
surveillance authorities of different sectors is unsatisfactory and could be
improved;
·                        
Overall
recognition that improved co-operation and information exchange could help
reduce cost and improve efficiency of surveillance activities;
·                        
Overall
belief that efforts need to be stepped up at EU level to address possible legal
limitations and, technical and cultural barriers and that these efforts have to
be achieved through binding measures where necessary to address certain
limitations or barriers.
Further details
regarding the results of this consultation can be found in Annex 1.
3.3.2.          
Other
consultations
In addition, a
specific survey targeting Member States experts on maritime surveillance took
place between May 2013 and June 2013. This survey was focusing on cost aspects,
possible limitations to information exchange and the potential benefits of
enhanced information exchange. The result of this Member State survey was as
follows:
·                        
Overall
difficulty for Member States to provide anything more than indicative
estimations of what the cost aspects of maritime surveillance activities could
be, but nevertheless an expectation that increased information exchange could
lead to less duplication of efforts and thus reduced cost;
·                        
Confirmation
that there are existing or perceived legal, technical and cultural limitations
which impede optimal information exchange between maritime surveillance
authorities. The perceived impact of these limitations varies to a large extent
from one Member State to the next.
·                        
Confirmation
that enhanced information could have moderate to significant benefits for
maritime surveillance activities. Potential benefits include better response
capability, better surveillance outcomes, cost savings for information
gathering and better use of assets.
Further details
regarding the results of this consultation can be found in Annex 2.
3.3.3.          
Dialogues
and consultations with other Institutions, other Services and Member States
The Council of
the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Economic and
Social Committee have provided support to the CISE project through inter alia
the following initiatives:
In 2012,
European Ministers called for the CISE project to be operational by 2020 in the
so called "Limassol declaration"[17].
Since 2008, the
Council have issued a number of Council conclusions in support of the CISE
project[18].
In 2010 and
2012, the European Parliament called on the European Union to create a common
information sharing environment in a Resolution on the Integrated Maritime
Policy of the EU[19]
and to invest meaningfully in further developing the CISE framework, in a
report on the maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy[20].
European
Economic and Social Committee issued a favourable Opinion[21]
on the 2010 Communication by the Commission on CISE referred to above.
The
European Data Protection Supervisor will be consulted on the CISE project
before the adoption of the policy package.
Maritime
surveillance authorities were closely involved in the process up to now:
·                        
A
specific Member State expert sub-group on integrated maritime surveillance was
established in September 2009 and has since then met 11 times. The purpose of
this expert group is to discuss and provide political guidance on maritime
surveillance in general and on the CISE project in particular. This group
involves representatives from all EU and EEA Member States. All relevant EU
Agencies are also invited to participate in this work: the European Maritime
Safety Agency (EMSA) (transport), the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU
(FRONTEX), the European Environmental Agency (EEA), European Police Office
(EUROPOL), the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), the European Satellite
Centre (EUSC) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).
·                        
A
specific Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on integrated of maritime surveillance
was established in November 2010 and has since then met 15 times. The purpose
of this group is to obtain technical guidance from the different functions on
the CISE project. TAG is composed of national or EU[22]
experts representing the seven sectorial functions, as well as representatives
from all the above mentioned European agencies. Each TAG member has been
nominated by its sectorial function and has the task to liaise with
counterparts from all involved countries inside his/her sector, to ensure as
wide representation as possible.
·                        
Further,
two large scale CISE pilot projects ('BLUEMASSMED'[23]
and 'MARSUNO'[24]) were
launched in 2010 and finalised in 2012. The final reports of these projects are
found on the indicated webpages. The purpose of these pilot projects was to
test the feasibility of CISE in practice, in two sea areas, the Northern Sea basins and the Mediterranean Sea including its Atlantic approaches. Together these
projects involved 14 EU Countries, Norway, and Russia as an observer, with 61
participating authorities representing all seven sectors. Both projects
provided encouraging final conclusions which have been taken into account in
this impact assessment.
·                        
These
pilot projects have been followed up by a new project, the on-going CISE
Cooperation Project Maritime surveillance[25], involving
43 public authorities from 12 Member States and Norway. Five EU Agencies
and other organisations are associated to this project. This project aims at
working on issues of relevance for the establishment of CISE based on selected
use cases such as information services identification, cost-benefit analysis,
definition of conditions for access and specifications of common data formats
and semantics. The stakeholder participation in this project continues to be
high.
·                        
Another
IMP sponsored project of relevance for this policy initiative is the on-going
project on the evolution of the SafeSeaNet which inter alia is assessing how
this system and platform could be further developed to enhance the needs of the
sectorial functions and support the National Single Window developments in a
CISE concept and the further exchange of data and enhanced interoperability
between relevant systems.
·                        
The
development of CISE has been discussed with stakeholders at numerous
Conferences and events since 2009, including the European Maritime Day where dedicated
workshops on CISE were held in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The interest and
support from stakeholders in these workshops have been high.
3.3.4.          
Consultancy
studies
The Commission
has commissioned several specific studies on specific issues related to CISE in
support of this impact assessment, inter alia a study on the IT cost of
implementing CISE and a study to assess its likely impact. In addition, the Commission carried out internally a
study on technical architectures and possible governance structures. These
studies will become available once the policy initiative supported by this
Impact Assessment becomes public[26].

The resulting
assumptions underpinning the quantitative assessment of CISE are summarised in
section 7.2.1 of the present report. 
3.3.5 Incorporating
comments from the Impact assessment board
A report was
sent to the Impact assessment board on 6 November 2013.
In its opinion
of 6 December 2013[27]
the Board rendered a positive overall opinion but recommended that the report
should be improved in order to 1) provide a clearer policy context and how this
initiative relates to other relevant EU policy initiatives and identify more
clearly technical and legal barriers to information exchange and the concrete
consequences for the relevant sectors 2) under the baseline scenario, present
more clearly the evolution of the data sharing situation across sectors and
further substantiate the administrative burden implications for national
authorities, 3) explain which EU sector rules which would be targeted for
legislative amendments and the views of stakeholders and 4) improve the
analysis of the impacts of the policy options by clarifying the assumptions
underpinning the quantitative assessment.
In a revised
version of this report submitted to Inter-service consultation, these comments
were addressed in the following way: 
-           a
more detailed description of how this policy initiative relates to other
relevant EU policies has been provided in the introduction.
-           further
details on maritime surveillance information systems have been provided in the
problem definition, with examples of data currently being collected. It should
be underlined however that the purpose of this policy initiative is not
to further regulate, create new legal obligations or determine at EU level in
detail which data sets that can be the subject matter of further information
exchange under CISE. The purpose is simply to provide the means for such
information exchange by ensuring the interoperability of existing information
exchange systems. It is therefore for the Member States to determine which
information they would like to exchange through CISE (if not already an
obligation under EU rules). The reason why further cooperation is needed to
develop technical interoperability solutions has been explained further. 
- further
concrete examples have also been added in the problem definition as well as a
further clarification of the relevant legal limitations and technical barriers.
- the baseline
scenario has been updated with further information on administrative burden and
on service level agreements between EU agencies. However it has not been
possible to make a further assessment of the evolution of the baseline scenario
other than the already existing preliminary assessment by the joint research
centre of the Commission since the effects can only be fully assessed once this
legislation referred to has entered into force. In addition, it is not possible
to make a further assessment of the evolution of data exchanges at national
level since many of these data exchanges fall outside the scope of EU level
intervention and since it is not intended that such data exchanges will be
subject to  EU level intervention other than to facilitate the means for such
information exchange by ensuring the interoperability of information systems.
- the content of
the policy options have been updated and are now more detailed. It has been
further clarified that the intention is not to create any new data collection
efforts. It is rather to reduce such efforts and data duplication by envisaging
multiuse of the data being collected. Further, it has been specified that any
legislative proposal to amend sector legislation or propose new legislation
would be accompanied with an impact assessment. The idea of adopting a handbook
as a recommendation has been abandoned for the reasons indicated by the board.
However, exact indications of sectorial legislation which needed is premature
and yet to be identified.
The impact of
each option has been assessed further, in particular for a handbook. The
administrative burden for national authorities has been reassessed. In
particular, more details have been provided on how to develop IT standards for
interoperability and on the involvement of Member States.
4.                      
Problem definition
4.1.                
The
problem
The increasing
challenges, threats risks and vulnerabilities[28] that the EU
maritime domain is exposed to is putting additional burdens on the up to 400
relevant maritime surveillance authorities of the EU Member States to ensure
the safety and security of the EU and its population. The additional workload
that these authorities are confronted with is not matched with additional
resources, which in turn forces them to become more resource and cost
efficient. 
The preparatory
actions referred to in section 3 have demonstrated that the current information
exchange between maritime surveillance authorities is suboptimal and can lead
to efficiency losses, duplication of data collection efforts and unnecessary
operational costs. In many cases, information exchange does not take place
because (1) maritime surveillance authorities do not know that the information
is available somewhere; (2) maritime surveillance authorities do not know that
they have information of interest for others (3) it is considered too complex
to do and (4), may be most fundamentally, there is no culture of doing so. 
The link that
would require further development, building on existing solutions and
developments, relates to common standards which would allow for the
interoperability[29]
of sectorial systems and machine readable information services. This would
further enhance the possibilities for these authorities to have access to all
the information necessary for their operative work, with the indirect effect
that these authorities would be able to increase their performance and
efficiency in carrying out their operative tasks.[30]
This goes beyond  exchange of raw data (e.g. ship positions) into the further
development of Information services (e.g. situational maritime picture,
intelligence reports, list of suspicious vessels, risk analysis, anomalies
detection, extended info on major accidents, response capacities, collaborative
tools) across sectors and borders easing the tasks of national surveillance
authorities in their daily duties.
The collection
and exchange of maritime surveillance information (such as marine environment
related information, maritime activity and event related information and
security related information) by maritime surveillance authorities have
historically been organised to take place within specific maritime
surveillance sectors referred to above[31], including
across borders. The information exchange within these sectors is in general
terms well developed and functions well, often supported by dedicated
information exchange systems at European level[32] or sometimes
at regional level.
Further
information on these information exchange systems are found in section 4.4. In
general terms, the information exchanged through these systems can vary from
one system to the next and depends on the specific control needs of each
sectorial function. Such information can for example refer to ship position,
composition of cargo, characteristics of vessels crew information, catch
composition, storage information, disaster alert information and many more.
Preparatory actions have indicated that maritime surveillance authorities
across Europe are currently collecting around 500 different data sets, of which
some follow from legal obligations and others are simply collected at national
level to cover their specific needs. 
These systems
were originally constructed to enable information exchange first and foremost
within single sectors, but did often not foresee information exchange with
other sectors.
This picture is
now gradually changing and more and more sectors are starting to share
information with each other. However, as of today and as confirmed by the
stakeholder consultation (see section 4.4), not all sectors involved in
maritime surveillance activities have provided for the sharing of such
information services to the other sectors/functions. A particular area
where information exchange remains suboptimal is the exchange between civilian
and military authorities. For example, Preparatory actions and interviews with
stakeholders have indicated that military authorities often detect
irregularities that concern civilian functions, but are often prevented from
transmitting that information. This is often because the data is
"over-classified" compared to how similar data is treated by civilian
authorities. 
In addition, the
current information exchange systems do not cover all information which could
be of interest to share. This means that national authorities need to find
alternative ways to exchange part of the information they need to exchange in
accordance with data protection requirements. Without adequate overarching IT
solutions in place to interconnect the various existing sectorial
interoperability solutions, like the requirement to submit defined information
through the national single windows, Eurosur’s National Competent Authorities,
Marsur, Flux, Siena, and other systems or platforms, authorities risk to
continuously be underperforming as still faced with an incoherent and
incompatible patchwork of solutions, preventing automatic sharing of
information services.
Member States
have through surveys expressed the view that limitations to information
exchange are experienced both from the perspective of the receiving and
providing end user. The following figures illustrate the extent to which the
different sectors are experiencing limitations in terms of exchange of
information from other sectors, within Member States. The black line in the
depicted bars is calculated as each sector’s average limitation value in terms
of access from all other sectors, across all Member States. The position of the
bar indicates the minimum and the maximum data limitation that the sector
experiences from another sector (in averages across Member States).
Note: 0: never; 1: rarely; 2: occasionally; 3: often
Figure 1- Limitations in access to information
(source: Member States survey)
The experienced
limitations are generally larger when looking at data exchange between Member
States.
The
problem statement can be illustrated by the following practical examples from
the preparatory actions and stakeholder consultations:
Maritime
surveillance authorities claim that they have suboptimal access to the maritime
surveillance information needed e.g. for the optimum planning of their routine
operations and for their various interventions at sea. Some of the information
relevant for this planning is not easily accessible or not accessible at all
due to real or perceived legal limitations or technical or cultural barriers,
depending on each Member State. Information needed for these tasks are
typically: (1) Internal surveillance capacities (patrol vessels, aircrafts,
including relevant capacities of other partner authorities within a given sea
area), (2) historical information about maritime activities in that particular
period of the year (organized by own entity or other entity), (3) respective
planning of partner authorities (e.g. navy, police), if available,
(4) programmed services offered by EU agencies (e.g. satellite images),
stand-by antipollution vessels or possible deployment of means at sea (either
directly or e.g. through the national maritime surveillance centres) (6) info
about tides and extreme weather forecasts, (7) navigational warnings,
military exercises, other restricted areas, (8) possible risk assessments
carried out by other national authorities or EU agencies, (9) list of
suspicious vessels.
In addition,
coordinated information services from neighbouring countries may be needed, in
order to avoid overlapping activities. Co-ordinated patrol activities near the
border and coordinated risk assessments which might affect the own area of
responsibility are of particular interest as well routine access to coastal
radar or visual imagery from those countries, and planned satellite image
service.
Another example
is a pleasure boat approaching the European continent from the Atlantic Ocean can potentially be smuggling drugs or arms or be in violation of any other
rules of the seven maritime surveillance sectors. It may enter the EU at any
place along its coastline from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. Customs
and other maritime control authorities along these coasts may be in a difficult
position to detect violations unless receiving appropriate information from
partner authorities in other sectors as to the suspicion of any nature of the
violation, the name of the ship, its destination and its time of arrival.
4.2.                
What
is causing this problem?
The problem is
driven by a number of specific causes. The most important specific causes are
the following:
Cause 1: Real or
perceived legal limitations and legal uncertainty to information exchange
between the relevant maritime surveillance sectors
As mentioned
above, the different sector policies dealing with maritime surveillance have
been developed relatively independently from each other in accordance with the
division of competence between authorities at national and EU level. The result
has been a lack of synergies between sectors/functions in general and in
particular, this approach has not allowed for or created channels for
information exchange between them. Instead, sector legislation at national and
EU level has often been drafted in such a way that information exchange with
other sectors either is not promoted or in some cases not even allowed.
Although the
picture is now gradually changing and more and more sectors are starting to
share their information collected with other sectors, the current EU regulatory
framework has still very variant approaches to information sharing from being
direct obligations to share certain data with other sectors to directed
prohibitions to do so. There are mainly four categories of real or perceived
limitations to information sharing between sectors: 1) direct legal limitations
for sharing of information with other sectors 2) provisions exempting specific
functions of data sets from any sharing arrangement, 3) legislative acts being
silent on the issue (interpreted as meaning that sharing with other sectors is
not possible), and 4) provisions which open for sharing with other sectors
but not in a mandatory form.
These categories
can be illustrated by the following example:
An article 12
was introduced in the fisheries control Regulation of 2009[33],
stipulating that certain defined control data (VMS, AIS and VDS data[34])
collected within the field of fisheries "may be transmitted to Community
agencies and competent authorities of the Member States engaged in surveillance
operations for the purpose of maritime safety and security, border control,
protection of the marine environment and general law enforcement".
On the one hand,
this Article ensures the sharing of the identified data to other functions and
provides for a legal basis of such sharing (to address categories 1 and 3), but
on the other hand limits the sharing to certain data and only on a voluntary
basis (which might not address categories 2 and 4).
It can be noted
at the same time that the conditions for exchanging data with other sectors
depend on the nature of the data. Non sensitive data can always be shared more
easily with other sectors than sensitive data (most often personal data or
commercial data), for which the conditions for access always have to be coupled
with the need to know principle referred to above. If the sharing of
information involves the processing of personal data, the EU law on protection
of personal data[35]
and the national legislation implementing this EU law are applicable. This
means in practice that perceived legal limitations (such as the limitation in
the above Article 12 to limit the distribution of data to certain data sets) in
fact are justified. Moreover it has to be noted that the exchange of personal
data has to comply with fundamental rights, including the protection of
personal data. This is of essential importance with regard to the necessity of
data processing in the light of data protection principles such as the 'purpose
limitation' for processing operations.
Another
challenge is to determine if the limitation is found at EU level or national
level. A limitation which is perceived as an EU level issue can in fact
primarily be a national matter. This can be illustrated by the following
example from preparatory actions:
A national
surveillance aircraft operating under the border control scheme of Frontex
detects and illegal transhipment activity between a fishing vessel and a cargo
vessel. In some cases, the national inspector operating under the Frontex
regime has considered that he/she is neither allowed to intervene nor report
this incident to fisheries authorities. If the fisheries authorities
nevertheless are alerted by phone, fisheries authorities will have to send out
a separate plane to record the incident and conduct an inspection, to an extra
flight cost of several thousands of euros per hour.
This problem can
be perceived as an EU level problem since the inspector is operating under the
Frontex regime, but is in fact likely to be a national problem since there are
no Frontex rules which prevent the national inspectors from intervening on
other matters than border control. The limitation lies instead with how the
mandate of the inspector has been formulated at national level.  In such a
case, the limitation is more of a cultural limitation and not an issue that can
be dealt with through legal action at EU level.
A screening of
EU legislation made under this impact assessment has shown that most or all
direct legal limitations to information exchange have already been removed or
are in the process of being removed and that a necessary legal basis for
information exchange is being put in place (such as Article 12 of the Fisheries
control Regulation). Legal limitations therefore mainly refer to national
legislation as shown in the above Frontex example.
Cause 2: absence
of an appropriate IT environment which ensures the interconnectivity of
existing and future systems.
The
seven sectoral functions carrying out maritime surveillance activities are
making extensive use of IT solutions to support their activities. 72 systems
have been identified through the Member States survey referred to in section 3.
These IT solutions have however been developed independently from each other,
with a data collection programme tailored only for each sectorial function. In
other words, these information systems lack interoperability and the missing
link is a common communication tool and a data model. If one compares with the
Internet, this tool is the Http protocol. The lack of homogeneity between the
IT systems means that information exchange between them becomes compromised,
with the effect that maritime surveillance activities become less efficient.
This was confirmed by both the Member States survey and the public
consultation. 
In
fact, the lack of a European wide infrastructure interconnecting maritime
surveillance authorities based on common standards led to the creation of
specific and different solutions ensuring the information exchange within each
sectorial function. This means that within most sectoral functions, EU-wide
systems are already in place, and are supporting day-to-day activities, as a
complement to national IT solutions.
For example, the
Maritime Safety and Security community facilitates cross-border exchange
between Member States with the "SafeSeaNet"[36]
solution and the "National Single Window"[37]
(the
maritime "National Single Window" is currently defining an
information exchange platform to facilitate port reporting formalities for
ships and information exchange between relevant authorities belonging to
maritime safety and security, customs, border control and health communities
within a Member State and between Member states); also a study
as regards the “SafeSeaNet evolution” including a “National Single Window
demonstrator” is ongoing by EMSA but preliminary and meant to be submitted to
TAG once sufficiently advanced; the Border Control community with the"
European border surveillance system" (EUROSUR)[38];
the Customs community with the "Common Communication Network and Common
System Interface" (CCN/CSI)[39];
the Defence community with the "Maritime Surveillance" network
(MARSUR); the Marine Environment community with the "Infrastructure for
Spatial Information in the European Community" (INSPIRE)[40]
and the "Shared Environmental Information System" (SEIS)[41];
the Law Enforcement community with the "Secure Information Exchange
Network Application" (SIENA); the Fisheries Control community with the
"Data Exchange Highway" and its "Fisheries Language for
Universal eXchange" (FLUX). Beside this variety of IT solutions at
national, regional or European level, the total number of stakeholders (more
than 400 public authorities across the EU/EEA, IT providers, shipping
industry…) makes the situation even more complex when it comes down to
exchanging information between their IT solutions. All the systems at national
level (72 reported from the survey – see above) have been designed without
ensuring their interoperability, i.e. there are 72 different ways of describing
and modelling similar information. At EU level, the interconnection solutions
described above have also to a great extent been put in place without ensuring
their interoperability. This means that different way of describing and
modelling similar information has been created in each system (e.g. a vessel is
described differently in each of these EU interconnection solutions). 
Until now,
interconnecting these IT solutions –whenever envisaged- has mainly been done by
establishing specific interfaces. But such way of “stitching it together” does
not work if cooperation is envisaged at a larger scale cross sector. It is to
be noted that the Port Reporting Formalities Directive introduces a better
interoperability approach and requires the development of "National Single
Window" in each Member State compliant with common specifications for
information exchange. However the "National Single Windows" do not
cover all the functions relevant for maritime surveillance. They will provide
Member States with maritime transport related information. They will not allow
for information exchange between for example a border control authority in one Member State and a navy or fisheries authority in another Member State. The problem at hand is
the "lack of semantic and technical interoperability between IT
solutions used to support maritime surveillance activities":
·                        
Semantic
interoperability is jeopardised by different interpretations of the information
exchanged between administrations, people, and applications. The lack of a
consistent format for the electronic exchanges increases the complexity of the
interconnection of the IT solutions (or analysis by humans).
·                        
Technical
interoperability is jeopardised by the variety of IT solutions and technologies
and the absence of agreement on how to automate information exchanges in a
uniform and consistent way.
Such
lack of interoperability is the result to sub-optimal cross-sector cooperation.
Further cooperation on the definition of common standards to improve
interoperability is therefore necessary.
A
practical real example of what the consequences of this lack of
interoperability could be is the following: A maritime surveillance authority
in Member State A would like to share information with an authority in Member
State B. It generates a document (e.g. a Word document) then sends the document
as an attachment to an email. The receiver then prints the document and
re-encodes it manually into its own maritime surveillance system. The result is
that the message is not being timely processed, that there could be encoding
errors and that this work would take time at the expense of the execution of
the core maritime surveillance activities. In a digital world, all these steps
can occur electronically and automatically.[42]
The
European Commission is currently implementing an overall strategy to
rationalise and streamline the IT systems it develops, maintains and operates,
including systems supporting EU policies and the information exchanges between
European Public Administrations (at European and national level)[43]. The
rationalisation initiative of the "trans-European systems between
administrations" might lead to the convergence of existing solutions (or
some of them) to a common architecture, to a common infrastructure and to
building blocks offered to interconnect public authorities. Given the fact that
the convergence of the solutions in place will take a long time, it is
imperative that the problem of interoperability in maritime surveillance gets
addressed today.
Cause 3: Cultural and administrative barriers
This
cause refers to the organisational structures of administrations and the
behaviours and mentality of individual officials. Discussions so far around the
CISE project have shown[44]
that there has been a tradition to keep surveillance information within
functions and that the willingness to exchange information (“dare to share
principle”) between functions has been relatively limited.  There are
substantial variances between Member States on the willingness to share
information, although more difficulties seem to occur in Member States with
high hierarchical organisational structures.
This lack of
willingness to exchange information with other functions is often the result of
a lack of trust and confidence and a lack of common cultural knowledge and
understanding of the operational aspects of other sectors. Another explanation
often referred to is that inspectors in some countries do not feel that they
can share the information in the absence of an explicit legal basis. Other
factors include different interpretations of terms and concepts used as well
ignorance of organisational structures, working methods and political cultures
of the partners. The fact that maritime surveillance activities have been
organised sector by sector in a rather isolated way has contributed to this
cultural distrust. 
4.3.                
Who
is affected by the problems and what are the consequences for them?
The number of
authorities dealing with maritime surveillance information in any form has been
estimated to be around 400 (see list of authorities in Annex 3). These are
essentially EU and EEA Member State authorities, but include also a number of EU
Agencies (concerning the relevant EU agencies, see further section 4.5.2
below). This does not include research bodies which might need maritime
surveillance data for scientific purposes, such as fish stock assessments or
assessments of the state of the marine environment.
Further, all
economic actors and citizens in the EU/EEA are indirectly affected by this
suboptimal situation as any threat to EU/EEA either at sea (in Member States'
waters or in any international waters of EU interest) or entering EU/EEA
territory by sea may affect these actors' security, economic, social and
environmental interests.
The direct
result of this suboptimal situation for these authorities is that they often
have an incomplete overview of the maritime awareness situation in the area in
or for the activities for which they are responsible.
Incomplete
maritime domain awareness can have, inter alia, the direct following
operational consequences:
1.           Authorities
remain unaware or incompletely aware of threats under their responsibility
despite that information that would be relevant for their operative activities
is available in other sectors. Their maritime domain awareness is sub-optimal.
2.           Threats
may not be detected, checked and thwarted in time despite that relevant
information is available in other sectors.
3.           Limited
response capabilities and cost-savings in the use of assets leading to
parallel, uncoordinated and less efficient deployment activities which can have
negative spill over effects for the surveillance of other sea areas or other
duties (e.g.: an hour flight of a surveillance aircraft costs several thousands
of euros). 
Concretely, the
negative consequences for these authorities are less efficient surveillance
outcomes i.e. less success rate in detecting, checking and thwarting on
risks/events such as: death toll at sea; illegal immigration; arms and drugs
smuggling; illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries; sea borne pollution;
piracy attacks, etc. In other words, it means that surveillance activities risk
being response oriented instead of being anticipative or predictive. A concrete
example where surveillance activities need to become more anticipative is the
influx of irregular immigrants through the Mediterranean. Early information
e.g. from navies or any other sector of the whereabouts of vessels carrying
irregular immigrants could for example have helped preventing tragic events
like the tragic events near the island of Lampedusa in late 2013 when many
hundred irregular immigrants lost their lives.
In addition,
suboptimal exchange of surveillance information between the relevant
authorities can have the following administrative consequences:
1.           Duplication
of work and costs: several authorities collect the same data as other services
in support of their activities.
2.           Excessive
administrative cost (e.g. manual encoding in systems) and reduced cost
efficiency leading to resource shortages on other tasks. This includes cost of
operating several different IT solutions for the different sectorial functions
for the same purpose of information sharing.
4.4.                
The
baseline scenario
The Technical
Advisory Group referred to in section 3 has in 2011 elaborated a gap analysis
covering about five hundred generic data elements relevant to maritime
surveillance[45].
The purpose of this
very extensive exercise was to make an inventory of the different data sets
which is being collected by the different sectorial functions at national level
in order to 1) identify duplication in data collection efforts, 2) to verify
which information is already being exchanged with other sectorial functions and
3) if there was a demand[46]
from the other 6 sectorial functions to receive such information which was not
yet exchanged. The inventory contained a list of the most relevant generic
maritime surveillance data sets which could be relevant for information
exchange across sectors and borders in the EU/EEA.
The result of
this gap analysis was that there is a potential gap of between 40% and 90%
between supply and demand for additional data exchange between the sectorial
functions depending on the area and that 45% of currently collected information
is collected by more than one sectorial function, and that about 80% of the
existing information is in national ownership. Moreover, almost half of the information
that is gathered is owned by two sectoral functions, namely defence and
maritime safety, security and prevention of pollution by ships.
The frequency of
these information supplies/demands varies as some information might not be
needed on a regular basis.
Bottom (dark
red): data presently owned by the sectoral function.
Lower centre
(light yellow): data presently received from other sectoral functions.
Upper centre
(yellow): data presented partially received from other sectoral functions; but
there is still a need to improve the completeness of the collection of this
data.
Top (blue): data not exchanged at present but
requested from other sectoral functions. 
Figure 2 - Overview of data gap assessment (source:
TAG work)
As
explained above, there have been some further developments since this gap
analysis was made in 2011. In particular, one can note the adoption of the ship
reporting formalities Directive (referred to above) for maritime transport -
which will put in place "National Single Windows" in Member States by
1 June 2015 - is expected to reduce the gap identified for this sector as well
for the maritime safety and security, customs, border control and health
sectors to some extent by introducing the sharing of all ship related
regulatory information for vessels above 300 gross tonnes between national
authorities and exchange between Member States. A very preliminary assessment
made by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission has concluded that
this new system will reduce the said gap from a range of 40%-90% range to a
range of 30%-85%[47].
Further, as regards the particular gap related to customs, the result remains
uncertain since the assessment of the data supply and the data demand was not
complete and made with different premises.[48]
There
are also other
sectorial EU-wide systems and platforms for information sharing that have been
put in place, and many are highly functional and successful. Some have started
to look at the opportunity for including other sectoral functions but there is
no EU wide approach to this.
4.4.1.          
Evolution
of the baseline scenario
Efforts to
ensure enhanced cross sector information exchange between maritime surveillance
authorities has already been going on for some time, but has accelerated with
the development of the Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU, where exchange of
maritime surveillance information was considered a priority issue. 
In fact, the
efforts to bring together technical maritime surveillance experts from
different sector policies, inter alia through the creation of a Member State
Expert sub-Group and a Technical Advisory Group[49],
pilot projects and the publication of two Communications from the Commission[50],
have increased interest in information exchange between sectors and helped
increase confidence building to work closer together.
Consultations
with Member States through focus groups have shown that individual Member
States have started to move away from the traditional silo thinking when
treating maritime surveillance information at national level. Many Member
States are instead taking steps to enhance information exchange between
sectors, and some have already put in place, or are planning to do so, national
coordination centres and common information sharing environments (e.g. Finland, United Kingdom and Portugal). The willingness to share information across sectors has been
increased, but some hurdles are still encountered. These particularly concern
unrecognised information needs of other sectoral functions; lack of common
definitions and standards as well as lack of trust between the sectoral
functions. 
At EU level,
pilot projects and requests from different entities such as EUNAVFOR, FRONTEX,
EFCA, EUROPOL or Bonn Agreement on pollution control in the North Sea[51]
as well development of other EU initiatives[52] has
contributed to increased co-operation.
Furthermore, two
directives the Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and
information system and the Directive 2010/65/EU on Reporting formalities for
ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States, are
particularly significant in the context of maritime awareness as those
facilitate the collection, sharing and exchange of information on all ships
above 300 gross tons[53]
(except military) on their identification, movement, status (crew and passenger
health, ship safety, ship security and environment related),cargo, crew and
passengers between authorities. Directive 2002/59/EC is currently under review
in order to assess the Union maritime information and exchange system
"SafeSeaNet" and how it can be enhanced and further used for the
intended purposes of safety, security, pollution prevention and maritime
transport as well as maritime traffic and trade, already involving various
sectorial functions depending on the national organisational structure. At the
same time, EMSA is developing the "Integrated Maritime Data
Environment"[54]
as a technical framework that collects and combines data from EMSA’s maritime
applications to provide integrated maritime services and a more complete
maritime awareness picture, tailormade in accordance with the demands of
various sectoral functions.
As required by
Directive 2010/65/EC, the Member States are currently implementing
"National Single Windows" for ship reporting formalities. Information
will be reported electronically and only once by the ships. These
"National Single Windows" will be linking "SafeSeaNet",
e-Customs and other electronic systems. Vessel related information will be made
available to relevant authorities (maritime security and safety, customs,
border control, and health) within a Member State and between Member States.
These "National Single Windows" will be fully operational from 1 June
2015.
Accordingly,
Service Level Agreements have been established between EMSA and FRONTEX, EMSA
and EFCA, and EFCA and FRONTEX to support them respectively in enhancing their
knowledge of the maritime domain awareness. These agreements cover a number of
areas for mutual cooperation, such as the integration of various control data
such as satellite AIS, radar images position reports from the VMS and AIS
systems. These data are combined through joint nautical charts[55].

However,
although improving the situation, it is not expected that these developments,
in the absence of an interoperability framework between existing systems with
common standards for machine readable exchange of information services, will be
capable to fully meet new challenges and address the problems identified in
this section effectively. The result would be that increased threats and risks
would not be dealt with in the most effective manner, that potential conflicts
between central EU policy objectives would persist and that duplication of data
collection efforts will continue to exist. These developments, already required
by EU law in some cases, do however constitute important building blocks and
will be the point of departure for the construction of such an interoperability
framework.
As regards the
evolution of IT technologies, there are two main drivers for the evolution of
IT systems[56]:
supply-side drivers (technology development or technology retirement) and
demand-side drivers (new business functionalities). Given the projections of
increased risks and threats in the coming years[57],
this suggests that there is a growing need for new business functionalities and
therefore a need to invest in IT systems to support better operations. The
initial investment cost in an IT system on average is 8% of the lifecycle cost
of that IT system and that the lifecycle of an IT system is typically 15 years[58].
The Member States survey shows that the average age of national IT systems
supporting maritime surveillance activities is 8.7 years, which also
suggests that several IT systems will have to be replaced in the future.
However, the
evolution of IT systems is impossible to foresee and the baseline assessment
shall only take into consideration current, planned or highly expected evolution
scenarios. One needs also to take into account that in a situation of financial
crisis, several Member States might not be in a position to make the necessary
investments to meet these new IT demands. If the IT requirements cannot be met,
the effectiveness and cost efficiency potential offered by CISE cannot be
reaped.
In addition, the
IT technologies and standards used in the Member States risk evolving in an
incoherent way. This suggests that the administrative burden of putting in
place additional information exchanges and building new IT functionalities will
be high and not cost-efficient. This has already happened in the recent past
with several interconnection solutions put in place by the EU (EUROSUR,
National Single Window), where the interoperability concerns have not been
addressed in a sufficient manner. The administrative burden imposed to the
Member States can be considered as unnecessarily high, since different IT
solutions are developed by different sectors.
4.5.                
EU
right to act, added value, proportionality and subsidiarity
4.5.1.          
The
right to act – treaty basis 
If the preferred
option of this impact assessment will be to exclude any legislative action as
defined in Article 288 of the TFEU and instead adopt a consultative initiative
such as a Commission Communication, it is not necessary to define any legal
basis for such a policy option.
If however
legislative action is considered as a preferred option in this impact
assessment, it will not be feasible to incorporate relevant legal provisions of
the CISE project into single instrument given that there is no basis in the
TFEU for all seven sectoral functions. The defence policy falls outside the
TFEU and falls only partially under the TEU while most of it falls under direct
national competence. Moreover, some Member States have an opt-out clause for
anything that falls under border control and justice co-operation[59].
In addition,
measures can only be included in the same instrument when the relevant process
for adoption of the legislative instruments at issue is the same, they have the
basis in the same Treaty and are of the same nature.
Therefore, the
most feasible approach for legislative action seems to be to elaborate a
legislative package containing instruments based on the respective Articles of
the Treaty the subject matter fall under and in accordance with the procedures
and under the conditions envisaged.
It is worth
noting also that the CISE project is developed under the Integrated Maritime
Policy of the EU. Legislative initiatives so far developed under this policy
have been proposed with a multiple legal basis, representing those sector
policies which affect our coasts, seas and oceans. It is settled case law that
when a measure simultaneously pursues a number of objectives or has several components
that are indissolubly linked, without one being secondary or indirect in
relation to the other, such an act will have to be founded on the various legal
basis.
A multiple legal
basis instrument can in this specific case come into play when measures
referring to 2 or several sectors "fall in the same basket" i.e.
refer to the same Treaty, are of the same nature (Regulation or Directive) and
follow the same legislative procedure for adoption.
4.5.2.          
Added
value of EU action
The added value
of EU action has been widely recognised already in stakeholder consultations in
other various events and consultations referred to in Section 3.
Information
exchange between maritime surveillance authorities are to a large extent of a
transnational nature since it normally entails co-operation first and foremost
at regional or sea basin level.
Moreover, rules
and conditions for transnational sharing maritime surveillance information
mainly between authorities of a same sector are already regulated at EU level;
which means that amendments of the regulatory framework and the possible
removal of legal limitations in accordance with data protection requirements
will have to take place at the same level.
In addition, a
number of EU Agencies are involved in maritime surveillance activities and are
therefore a part of the already existing information exchange at sector level.
Several EU agencies and similar bodies are directly relevant for the CISE
project, such as EMSA, EFCA, FRONTEX, EDA and EEA.
The process
therefore requires an overall EU and EEA wide direction, an overall management
of diversity in order to ensure that information exchanges are efficient and
beneficial for all maritime surveillance authorities across Europe,
independently where threats might occur.
Without targeted
action at EU-level it is not likely that transnational issues can be resolved
and co-operation ensured in an efficient manner.
4.5.3.          
Subsidiarity
and Proportionality
The principle of
subsidiarity is very relevant in this case. Prior consultations with Member States
have concluded that, although targeted EU action is necessary to ensure the
interoperability of the current system, the operational aspects of any future
common information sharing environment needs to be decentralised. This is due
to the fact that the operational information exchange most often takes place
between national authorities, although some interaction also occurs with EU
agencies when they handle maritime surveillance information based on EU
sectorial Regulations.
The role of the
EU should therefore essentially be to act as a facilitator, to ensure coherence
and common standards and to review and revise relevant EU level legislation
when necessary.
In conclusion,
it is not intended that the CISE project will interfere with the organisational
or operational aspects of maritime surveillance related information exchange
activities at national level to a larger extent than today. The focus of this
work on this policy initiative will be on the EU level. Member State authorities can however make use, as they see fit, of the solutions that can be achieved
at EU level.
As regards
proportionality, EU action to develop a common information sharing environment
will not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. Measures need
to be developed with the right level of detail without micromanaging the
process.
Measures should
not go into more detail than what is the case for the current information
sharing mechanisms within sectors.
4.5.4.          
Coherence
with existing policies and initiatives
The
CISE project is intended to be built on current achievements and the existing
mechanisms for information sharing which have already been developed at sector
level. The purpose will be to ensure the interoperability of sector systems
without reinventing any wheels but to streamline over time and reduce
administrative burden. This is to realise the full potential of existing
resources primarily in terms of sectorial policy achievements, but also better
cross sectorial knowledge of occurrences in particular sea basins and to create
new business opportunities.
Furthermore,
the project is fully in line with a number of other EU wide initiatives such
as, the Blue Growth initiative[60],
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive[61], the
proposal for a Directive on maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal
management[62],
the EU Maritime Transport Strategy 2018[63] including
the Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system Directive[64]
and the reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports
of the Member States Directive[65]
as well as the EUROSUR Regulation[66]
and customs legislation[67].
The CISE project
also operates within a larger framework of EU-level policies and strategies on
eGovernment that have been developed in recent years (see Annex 4):
·                        
The
Malmö and Granada Declarations[68]
on eGovernment, encouraging the development of more efficient interoperable
public services and the European eGovernment Action plan 2011-2015[69].
·                        
The
Digital Agenda for Europe (one of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy)
where seamless cross-domain and cross-border information exchanges are a
priority for the EU. The CISE initiative facilitates Pillar I - Digital
Single Market, Pillar II - improving standard-setting procedures and
increased interoperability and Pillar VII - IT-enabled benefits for EU
society.
·                        
The
strategy of the European Commission to rationalise and streamline the IT
systems it develops, maintains and operates.
·                        
The
ISA Programme[70] aiming at
fostering interoperability between public administrations. The CISE project has
been funded as relevant action in the Trusted Information Exchange area.
In addition it
is part of the recent Action Plan to increase the competitiveness of the EU
Security and Defence sector[71]+68.
It will be also part of cross-sectorial cooperation areas to implement the
future European Union Maritime Security Strategy[72].
Last but not
least, the CISE initiative is in line with the European Interoperability
Framework (EIF)[73],
which is promoting and supporting the delivery of European public services by
fostering cross-border and cross-sectorial interoperability. It defines four
levels of interoperability, which deserve special attention when a new European
public service is established. These levels are described as follows:
Figure 3 - European Interoperability Framework
(source: Commission)
5.                      
Objectives
5.1.                
General
objectives
The general objective of this policy
initiative is to ensure that maritime surveillance information and services
collected by one maritime sector and considered necessary useful for the
activities of other maritime sectors can be efficiently shared with those
sectors.
The point of departure should be the
current achievements and already existing standards for information exchange
and work should focus on ensuring the interoperability of information exchanges
regulated at EU level, with a particular view to provide Member States with
interoperability solutions that they may apply at national level. A particular
objective would be to enhance information exchange between civilian and
military authorities.
Enhanced information exchange between
sectors is expected to contribute to a better overview of the maritime domain
awareness for the maritime surveillance authorities at national and EU level
and enhanced consistency between sector policies in line with the Integrated
Maritime Policy of the EU and facilitate "smarter surveillance" by
more anticipative and predictive activities.
The foreseen
exchange of information between sectors will have to respect the same rules and
principles as for data exchanges within sectors, in particular the relevant
provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights[74],
the EU legal framework on the protection of personal data, and the national
legislation implementing this EU law, as well as the relevant provisions for
the protection of commercially sensitive data.
Personal data
can only be exchanged if the processing is legitimate[75]
and if certain principles relating to data quality are respected[76].
As the purpose of CISE would be to enhance the sharing of information between
maritime authorities, it is of particular importance to ensure that strict
safeguards are in place whenever personal data are transferred. Therefore,
information which contains personal data may only be exchanged for very
specific purposes. Also the principle of data minimisation[77]
has to be respected, which means that only that personal data will be exchanged
which will really need to be exchanged to achieve the defined objectives.
Commercially
sensitive data can only be exchanged if the processing does not undermine the
economic interest or competition position of the owner of the information.[78]
No
free flow of information between sectors is thus envisaged.
Within the field
of fisheries, personal data could for example be data on fishing vessels which
directly or indirectly identifies the characteristics about the crew.
Commercially sensitive data could for example be the exact position reports of
fishing vessels which identifies attractive fishing grounds.
Indirectly, a
Common Information Sharing Environment is very likely to trigger enhanced
cooperation[79]
between maritime surveillance authorities leading to increased operational
efficiency and cost effectiveness, for example by eliminating duplications of
data collection efforts or by coordinating deployments of assets such as ships,
aircrafts and satellites in a given sea area. 
Since the
objective of this initiative is limited to ensure the interoperability of
existing and future maritime surveillance systems, the intention is not to
develop any new maritime surveillance system. Nor is it intending to replace
existing or planned systems and or to duplicate existing or planned systems. It
is not intending either to gather more information through own sensors nor
permanently store maritime information. It is not intending either to take over
sectorial competences neither at EU nor at national level. It is aiming at
facilitating the interconnection of these systems, building on already existing
specifications and solutions.
While
information stems from mainly public but also private sources, such as in the
case of environmental data or weather forecasts, the exchange of information in
the context of CISE is essentially meant for public authorities.Aggregated data
such as future statistics on maritime occurrences potentially resulting from
CISE information may nevertheless become public if deemed appropriate. 
This is
confirmed by Member States in the surveys, indicating that they see moderate to
significant potentials for their surveillance tasks with better information
sharing across sectors and across countries, given that their current systems
will remain in place. 
Figure 4- Benefits in terms of surveillance tasks
(source: Member States survey)
5.2.                
Specific
objectives
The first
specific objective is to identify and address real or perceived legal
limitations between sectors to justified exchange of maritime surveillance
information and services Actions may include the development of a model Article
to provide for a legal basis to information sharing between sectors. When
personal data are exchanged, the requirements of the EU legal framework and
relevant national legislation on the protection of personal data have to be
respected. This means in practice that data can be exchanged inter alia if it
is necessary, proportionate and appropriate to achieve the defined objective.
The second
specific objective is to ensure interoperability between relevant
IT solutions used by maritime surveillance actors through the use of common
standards and specifications. This objective addresses the second cause of the
problem identified under section 4.2. It addresses any remaining semantic and
technical barriers to information exchange between sectoral functions, hence
enabling easier, increased and seamless information sharing among maritime
surveillance authorities. The objective will be to ensure that information can
be transferred and incorporated into existing IT solutions without any manual
data entry. The long term vision is that maritime surveillance IT providers one
day implement and test IT solutions EU wide based on commonly agreed
international standards[80].
It would mean allowing not only information exchange, but also exchanging
knowledge through high value services. The exchange of structured information
allows for automatic electronic information processing and data mining (e.g.
for automatic anomalies detection).
European
standards and standardisation are very effective policy tools for the EU. In particular
the Digital Agenda for Europe highlights the importance of IT standards in
delivering interoperability between devices, applications, data repositories,
services and networks. The common data model ensuring semantic interoperability
of information exchanges in maritime surveillance would be standardised with a
recognised standardisation body[81].
The public consultation confirms the interest of exploring standards-based
interoperability. The formalisation of such common data model for the IT
industry would mean a significant reduction in its solutions' development cost
in designing, production and sales phases, together with a consistent reduction
of the industrial risks of missing return on investments. Introducing such
standard would also lead to administrative simplification and reduction of
administrative burden throughout the EU/EEA. Moreover the compliance with a
unique and widely accepted set of standards at International or European level
would raise the probability of acceptance by third countries.
The
concrete result in the example referred to in section 4.2 would be that the
maritime surveillance authority in Member State A can transmit the relevant
information electronically and automatically between the IT systems of the two
authorities without any manual intervention. The information would be available
immediately for automatic processing or for human analysis by an operator and
without any possible encoding errors. In addition, the same information can
easily, if there is a justified need, be retransmitted to a connected maritime
surveillance authority in Member State C and at low cost.
Standards
needed in this respect would include the definition of a common data model
(specifying consistent and agreed formats for electronic information exchange)
and the definition of messaging protocols for trusted and secure information
exchange.
Supporting
tools to foster cooperation would also be needed: a register of maritime
surveillance authorities in EU/EEA with their contact details, tools for virtual
collaboration (e.g. videoconference), and a data dictionary to document and
disseminate the agreed common data model.
Special
software called 'reference implementation' would be put at the disposal of the
Member States authorities to facilitate the interconnections. The principle is
very similar to existing solutions, also working in decentralised environments[82]:
the MEXS component distributed by the MARSUR to the participating defence
authorities, the FLUX component distributed by the Commission to fisheries
authorities to exchange i.a. VMS data, the EUROSUR nodes which facilitate the
exchange of information between national border control authorities, the
National Single Windows making available port reporting formalities to national
maritime security and safety, customs, border control and health authorities or
the e-TrustEx platform[83]
which is available to any interested public authority in Europe for the secure
digital exchange of documents.
It
is unclear at this stage to what extent these solutions could be reused, as
this will depend on the results of the Cooperation Project[84]
from which more detailed requirements for CISE will be derived[85].
It is proposed to perform such detailed assessment when the results of the
Cooperation Project are available in view of minimising the cost of
implementing a reference implementation for CISE by reusing as much as possible
from these solutions.
The third
specific objective is to build confidence in order to bring maritime
surveillance authorities of different sectors together and seek for better
co-operation inter alia through joint missions, common operational procedures
and training, best practices sharing etc. Experiences of co-operation within
sectors and across sectors such as BLUEMASSMED and MARSUNO pilot projects[86]+83
have shown that authorities are more at ease to co-operate and exchange
information with each other when officials get to know each other through
regular cooperation, etc.
6.                      
Policy options 
6.1.                
Selecting
the policy options
A whole spectrum of possible options to
ensure an optimum exchange of maritime surveillance information within and
between sectors can be envisaged. Here, only those options that, prima facie,
a) contribute to the objectives laid out in section 5, b) are legally feasible
and c) do not entail disproportional costs for public administration,
businesses and citizens, are retained for further analysis in sections 7 and 8.
6.2.                
Discarded
options
- A first option
to consider would be to discontinue the current work at EU level, including
funding of various pilot and co-operation programmes. Any further action to
promote information exchange between different maritime surveillance sectors
would be left to national authorities or individual sectors.
This option is
immediately discarded as it would ignore the expectations of Member States and
stakeholders to pursue action within the field of integrating maritime
surveillance, as expressed in various council conclusions and ministerial
declarations, and would fall considerably short of achieving the objectives
identified in section 5.
- Should
regulatory actions be considered, different levels of actions are possible. The
most intrusive option would be to dismantle the existing sectorial information
exchange systems and build a new system covering all sectors from scratch.
This option is
immediately discarded as it would make no use of all efforts and investments
made by different sectors during a long period of time to create functioning
information exchange mechanism with their respective sectors. These systems
have developed through time and are in general carefully crafted to strike a
balance between different often conflicting interests. This option would also
lead to a disproportionate workload for legislators and involved stakeholders
compared to the expected benefits. In actual fact, it would delay the
development of a common information sharing environment since all structures
and organisational matters for existing structures would have to be
renegotiated between interested parties. Such action is therefore very
disproportionate compared to the defined objectives and would also disrespect
the subsidiarity principle.
Any option which
is not built on current achievements and existing sector systems is therefore
immediately discarded.
- Another option
would have been to seek amendments of horizontal EU legislation in force or in
coming which are imposing certain conditions for the transmission of certain
related information, such as rules on transparency and the protection of
personal or commercial data
Such an option
can also be immediately disregarded since the objective of this initiative by
no means is to review provisions of that nature. In other words, this
initiative should not lead to any amendments to the future personal data
protection package. For this reason, no option which would lead to free flow of
confidential (personal or commercially sensitive data) information can be
retained.
6.3.                
Retained
policy options
The policy
options retained for a more in depth analysis can broadly be divided into three
different categories:
·                        
No
further EU action;
·                        
Voluntary
measures; and
·                        
Legally
binding measures.
6.3.1.          
Option
1- No further EU action 
No policy Change
(baseline scenario)
Until now, no
specific legislative initiatives have been taken to implement the CISE project.
The Commission has so far issued two Communications to define the aim of the
CISE project, identify the guiding principles and steps towards its
establishment. Along with various EU funded pilot projects, these initiatives
have already contributed to raising the awareness among national maritime
surveillance authorities of the importance and necessity to share maritime
surveillance information and inspired some initiatives among certain sectors..
For example, as already highlighted above, the implementation of "national
single windows", as required by Directive 2010/65/EU, is envisaging
sharing of information to other sectors on national and EU level. This is also
the case for the fisheries control Regulation[87]+84.
This option
would mean that EU interventions continue as before and that no specific
instrument is developed at EU level. In substance, EU interventions would focus
on facilitating a dialogue between stakeholders through Member State Expert
Groups and other similar bodies created with the aim to enhance dialogue and
co-operation between sectors. 
Another
important aspect would be to provide continued funding to various projects.
Regulation (EU) n°1255/2011[88]+85
has already provided funding for CISE related projects during 2011-2013.
Funding for future projects for the 2014-2020 period are currently under
negotiation with the legislative bodies in the Regulation for the future
European maritime affaires and fisheries fund (EMFF).
Under this
option the future development of the CISE project would to a large extent
depend on Member States and sector initiatives to obtain interoperability of
the existing maritime surveillance information sharing systems. The role of the
EU would be limited to foster dialogue between different stakeholders. No EU
interoperability standard would be pursued. This policy option has received
very limited support from stakeholders.
6.3.2.          
Option
2 -Voluntary measures
This option
contains various sub-options with a higher ambition level and could provide a
more stringent framework compared to the previous option. It could also help
co-ordinating efforts between maritime surveillance authorities and sectors. 
This is the policy option which attracts the most support among stakeholders.
The success of
the voluntary measures would still depend on the willingness of the different
actors to participate, but may provide responsiveness and flexibility. 
This policy
option can be divided into the following sub-options:
6.3.2.1.    
Establishment
of a Communication 
In substance,
the purpose of This Communication would be to take stock of the current
situation, review the  the 2010 roadmap , assess the added value of enhanced
information exchange and the need for further EU action, further clarify the
respective roles of the EU and its Member States, identify priority areas for
further intervention at EU level and to propose and updated roadmap and provide
a roadmap for the next steps..
In particular,
the Communication should identify:
·                        
The
actions which the Commission considers should be taken to address any legal,
technical and cultural limitations to the exchange of information services
between maritime surveillance authorities. This with a view to promote a dare
to share culture and to provide Member States with the appropriate references
to take the necessary aciton at national level.
·                        
The
current interoperability solutions, the interoperability convergence to be
achieved in the medium term and the EU wide interoperability standards needed
in the long term. This with a view to allowing Member States, the European
Commission, and where necessary in cooperation with industrial players, to
elaborate the most appropriate long term interoperability framework for the EU
with the objective of ensuring the interoperability of maritime surveillance
systems.
·                        
By
which means co-operation between civilian and military authorities can be
enhanced.
·                        
Means
to strengthen the fundamental rights of citizens by bringing guidance on how
information exchange need to be arranged while respecting the EU charter on
fundamental rights and data protection rules at national and EU level.
The objective
would be to create an opportunity to have a more in depth discussion with the
co-legislators and stakeholders on how to implement the CISE project and to
have a common understanding on the next steps to take. The objective is not to
promote the creation of any new obligations to collect data, but rather to move
from a single purpose use to a multipurpose use of already collected data and
thus reduce duplication of data collection efforts. 
6.3.2.2.    
Establishment
of soft policy initiatives such as a guidance document and best practices
This sub-option
consists in developing a guidance document or a handbook for the further
development and functioning of CISE. This process should be steered by the
Commission and the document should be elaborated in close contact with Member
States experts. This document may provide recommendations, guidelines and best
practices on information sharing. The purpose would be encouraging increased
cooperation among EU Member State authorities on a voluntary basis to address
cultural barriers. This document should be developed outside any legislative
process in order to ensure the uptake of all relevant stakeholders and to be
able to address enhanced information exchange between civilian and military
authorities. 
In substance,
such a document may contain:
·                        
Key
definition of the most important concepts;
·                        
Key
guiding principles for information sharing including governance and
responsibility to share surveillance information with other sectors in line
with EU on the protection of personal data;
·                        
Key
recommendations on legal, technical and operational matters for information
sharing such as:
·                        
Suggestions
to Member States' maritime surveillance authorities as how they can go about to
exchange information across-borders and across-sectors, including using a
common data dictionary and common technical standards allowing for the
interoperability of the surveillance systems of different sectors; as well as
how to deal with perceived or real legal limitations at national level.
·                        
Administrative
practice in a coordinated manner by providing guidelines in order to help Member States and other stakeholders to interpret and apply specific provisions of EU
legislation. This may, in turn stimulate changes in national legislation in
situations, when it contains provisions which are more stringent in comparison
with the legislation on EU level;
·                        
A
description of core information services and standardised form for the
conclusion of agreements (Memorandums of Understanding and Service Level
Agreements) among the Member State maritime surveillance authorities and EU
agencies regarding the conditions for information sharing and the use of the
data shared; and
·                        
Available
or possible IT standards for interoperability, possibly elaborated through a
standardisation body as referred to in section 5.2. To do this, the Commission
will explore the feasibility of develop common standards through the
established processes at EU level, ensuring a strong involvement of Member States
through their national standardisation bodies.
6.3.2.3.    
Establishment
of a joint undertaking pursuant to Article 187 of the TFEU
The voluntary
approach may be formally founded on a joint undertaking. Such undertaking may
provide a framework for further activities, encourage and, when appropriate,
assist EU Member States to increase maritime surveillance information sharing
among sectoral functions and to achieve a more effective and coordinated
information sharing. A joint undertaking is typically established by a Council
Regulation. Such Regulation is adopted on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
relying on the legal basis in Article 187 TFEU. In the case of
CISE a joint undertaking may foster research on interoperability, on
new future-oriented maritime surveillance information services and on
civil-military cooperation.
In substance,
the objective of this sub-option would be to address the same issues as those
referred to in the previous sub-option.
This option
would be relevant when a temporary framework for the establishment of the CISE
project would be useful and can provide a flexible mechanism for further
cooperation.
6.3.3.          
Option
3 -Binding measures
This policy
option seeks to implement the objectives of the CISE project through a legally
binding approach. It thus constitutes a further upgrade of the ambition level
compared to the previous option. Any such legislative proposal would be
accompanied with an impact assessment, which would also identify the process
involved depending of the circumstances of each legislative instrument and to
what extent for example such changes would be the subject matter for delegated
or implementing acts. This policy option has received a mixed reaction from
stakeholders. While some are keen to see binding measures in place, the bigger
majority feels that binding measures are not necessary. It includes the
following sub-options:
6.3.3.1.    
Establishment
of a policy package within the existing legislative framework
The purpose of
this sub-option would be to envisage amendments, if necessary, of existing
sector EU rules regulating information exchange of maritime surveillance
related information. It does not envisage the adoption of a new instrument at
EU level, nor address legal limitations at national level. An inventory of the
existing legislative framework has shown that most if not all legal limitations
at EU level have already been removed or are in the process of being removed.
There can however be different interpretations to what extent a specific rule
constitutes a legal limitation or is justified and put in place for reasons of
data protection. 
In substance,
the main objective of this sub-option would be to address identified legal
limitations in sector legislation to cross-border and cross-sector information
sharing and to complement existing standards for information exchange with
interoperability standards between sector systems through delegated or
implementing acts.
The revision of
these provisions will also confirm the same level of conditions for access so
that all sectors which have a justified need to receive certain maritime
surveillance information indeed can do so. These revised provisions will have
to be accompanied by the same safeguards in accordance with the principles of
protection of the fundamental rights of an individual and confidentiality as is
already in place for the data exchanges within sectors.
It is envisaged
that the amending acts will rely on the existing sector mandates of the TFEU
and include an explicit delegation to the Commission (Art. 290 TFEU) to
supplement certain non-essential elements of the amended act to, in particular,
overcome technical barriers.
6.3.3.2.    
Establishment
of a cross sector legislative framework on CISE (Regulation)
The main
objective of this sub-option would be to put in place a legally binding
legislative framework which would not only seek to address the legal
limitations and introduce technical interoperability standards of the previous
sub-option, but also put in place other building blocks of the CISE in a
binding fashion.
In substance,
such a Regulation could contain for example:
·                        
Key
definition of the most important concepts;
·                        
Guiding
principles for the running of CISE for a multi sectorial functions;
·                        
Establishment
of key governance principles for the running of CISE;
·                        
Key
obligations on responsibility to share surveillance information to other
sectors;
·                        
Provisions
on reporting and monitoring; and
·                        
Provisions
for the adoption of delegated/implementing acts. The purpose of these acts
would mainly be to allow for the establishment of common technical standards
allowing for the interoperability of sector surveillance systems.
As noted above
(see section legal basis), such a framework would be split into several umbrella
packages depending on the legal basis, applicable legislative procedures, and
constitutional opt-in and opt-outs from the EU Treaties. In order to maintain a
cross sector approach, it would rely on a multiple legal basis. It would only
cover sectors covered by the EU Treaties and would therefore exclude the
defence sector.
6.3.3.3.    
Establishment
of a cross sector legislative framework for the technical aspects of CISE
This sub-option
can be described as a combination of the two sub-options for a binding
legislative framework described above. It would essentially be a technical
regulation which in substance would be putting in place the necessary
interoperability standards for EU wide exchange of information services. This
would be a European Standard for a common data model. This approach would be
relatively similar to the approach taken for the Inspire Directive40.
6.3.4.          
Combination
of policy options
A combination of
some of the different policy option outlined above is also possible. This is
likely to occur in this particular case since it is not likely that one option
or sub-option will prove successful to obtain all the objectives defined in
section 5.
7.                      
Assessment of options
The assessment of the different policy
options will be made in the following four steps:
·                        
A
qualitative assessment of each policy option. The purpose of this
assessment will be to examine the effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the
objectives defined in section 5 on the one hand, and the degree of coherence
with the objectives of existing EU policies, such as the Integrate maritime
policy of the EU and the sector policies of the seven sectoral functions
dealing with maritime surveillance, on the other, compared with the baseline
scenario.
·                        
A
quantitative assessment of the potential added value of each policy
option and of the development of the full potential of a Common Information
Sharing Environment as such. The purpose of this assessment will be to examine
the economic, social and environmental benefits compared to the baseline
scenario.
·                        
An
assessment of the impacts of these options on fundamental rights.
·                           
An
assessment of cost. The purpose of this assessment will be to examine
both the expected cost for each policy option and for the development of CISE
as such for putting in place an interoperability framework compared to the
baseline scenario.
There are two main reasons why this
methodology has been chosen:
First of all, the nature of the topic is
such that the conditions from making a quantitative assessment of each option
are quite different from making a qualitative assessment. While the qualitative
assessment can be relatively straightforward, the quantitative assessment is
quite a challenge.
The main reason for this is that the
main benefit for enhanced information sharing, namely better governance, is
very difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms. Attempts have been made to
evaluate such benefits both in the consultancy studies and preparatory actions
in support of this impact assessment, but those attempts, although involving
Member States as actors, can at the end of the day only consist of range
estimations of what such quantitative benefits could be. For some elements
however, such as reduction of duplication in data collection efforts and
reduced costs for patrol activities, a more precise estimation has been
possible.
Secondly, while the initiative is
expected to have benefits on the EU economy, society and environment, it has
not been possible to make a well-reasoned and convincing distinction between
the potential economic, social and environmental impacts of each policy option.
This is because this policy initiative essentially is about ensuring better
interoperability between the different information exchange systems of
different sectorial functions that together ensure economic, social and
environmental benefits. The initiative is in other words almost exclusively
about enhancing technologies and resource efficiency, which can lead to more
effective and cost efficient maritime surveillance activities. Thus, the
economic, social and environmental impact of such interoperability initiative
cannot be distinguished for each policy option. Therefore the quantitative
assessment will compare the combined economic, social and environmental benefits
of each policy option with the full CISE potential.
7.1.                
Qualitative
assessment of options
7.1.1.          
Option
1 – No EU action (baseline scenario)
Effectiveness
This option can contribute to achieving
some of the objectives in section 5 through the existing cross sector dialogue
and through the funding of projects via the EMFF Regulation. The launch of the
CISE initiative in 2007 has indeed, as highlighted above lead to some success
stories and fostered enhanced dialogue between different maritime surveillance
sectors and this positive progress can continue if this dialogue is pursued.
This option could also help removing some cultural barriers.
However, this option would not address
any legal limitations or technical barriers identified and would not lead to
any co-ordinated action at EU level. The 2010 CISE Roadmap would continue to be
implemented, but in a non-coherent manner. This option would also fall short of
the expectations of legislative bodies and stakeholders referred to in section
3, whereby it is requested that EU steps up its action on this initiative to
implement the objective defined in section 5. Some Member States are as well
presently waiting for EU common interoperability solutions to adapt their own
maritime surveillance systems. It is also unlikely that enhanced information
exchange between civilian and military authorities can be fostered specifically
further. 
The baseline (no specific EU action)
would mean that individual sectors at EU level carry out their current and
planned policies in such a way that it leads to a certain level of
cross-sectorial interoperability. However, such sectorial initiatives do not
tackle a number of essential CISE features:
i.)           the
various sectorial interoperability solutions, stand-alone those at EU level
related e.g. to the National Single Window, Eurosur, Flux, Marsur, Siena, e-Customs, SEIS and CECIS are not designed to be mutually interoperable;
ii.)          individual
sectors have so far shown little ability to seek for coherent overarching
cross-sectorial interoperability solutions that integrate into the EU's
overarching interoperability framework;
iii.)         sectorial
EU interoperability solutions do not provide for connections between national
authorities across sectors and borders: coast guards or national maritime surveillance
centres have the need to correlate data for building intelligence, awareness
and knowledge; if they receive various data in various formats and standards
from various surveillance functions in various Member States and from various
EU Agencies, correlation and intelligence building remains difficult and thus
ineffective. The reason for this being that without overarching coherent
interoperability, data can still not be integrated in an efficient, cost
effective and coherent manner into the operator’s own system and preferably on
a single screen, due to a lack of semantic, organisational, technical, legal
and political interoperability, and finally,
iv.)         sectorial
EU interoperability solutions will not allow for the sufficient ‘point to
point’ interoperability between relevant national authorities of any type to
develop and exchange new information services allowing e.g. various coast
guards functions to coordinate their operations and assets even if they are
distributed within various areas of competence.
Enhanced dialogue will continue to lead
to certain benefits, but there is a risk that with a low level of ambition that
this option represents, stakeholders will lose interest in the topic with the
result that no flexible, efficient, cost effective and coherent solution can be
found to satisfy Member States' needs.
Coherence
This option will contribute to better
coherence of sectorial policies provided that the progress towards better
information exchange that has been achieved between 2007 and 2013 continues in
the future in line with the objectives of the IMP. However, coherence between
policies is likely to be suboptimal in the absence of any structured regime.
Unless these issues are being discussed together by the different sector with a
view to achieve common solution, incoherencies between different sector
policies risk to persist.
7.1.2.          
Option
2 – Voluntary measures
7.1.2.1.    
Communication
Effectiveness
As such a Communication can contribute
to achieve some of the non-regulatory issues defined in the objectives through
enhanced dialogue with the relevant stakeholders, and would put the subject
matter higher on the political agenda. However, this option will not as such
address any legal limitations or technical barriers identified other than to
identify options for solving these issues at a later stage or through separate
measures.
A Communication could however be a very
useful tool to establish priorities, distinguish action at EU and national
level, set out short, mid and long term implementing roadmap towards
progressively building up overarching, effective, cost-efficient and fully
coherent interoperability solutions.
Finally, a Communication could inject
further ideas for enhanced information exchange between civilian and military
authorities and could in fact be one of the most effective means to foster a
dialogue in this respect. Provided that this instrument can provide for such a
roadmap, the effectiveness would be higher than the baseline scenario.
Coherence
This option can, through enhanced
dialogue, contribute to better coherence of data exchange systems within the
field of maritime surveillance in line with the Integrated Maritime Policy. The
effect is however uncertain since progress at the end of the day will depend on
the willingness of the stakeholders to take part in that dialogue. However, if
constructed as a roadmap from short to long terms, the results are likely to be
positive since the latter allows for a progressive process towards developing
and implementing the required interoperability solutions of the future while
departing from the on-going developments and allowing all stakeholders to take
active part in the process. A Communication taking account of short, mid and
long term opportunities will therefore provide a higher degree of coherence
compared to the baseline.
7.1.2.2.     Guidelines
and best practices
Effectiveness
Providing a guidance document with best
practices could be a very useful tool to achieve the objectives identified, in
particular the removal of cultural barriers. It is clear that many aspects of
the CISE project neither can nor should be the subject matter of any form of
legal or legislative act, among other reasons due to the decentralised
character of the operative data exchanges. An operative guideline which in very
concrete terms addresses some of the most common issues that maritime
surveillance authorities are confronted with at operative level and provides
for best practices should be drafted in close collaboration with the technical
experts at Member State level and could considerably help in obtaining a common
understanding on practical matters and the operational needs.
Such an approach will also partially
address the expectations of stakeholders. It will however not as such address
any remaining legal limitations or technical barriers, although it can help
dismantle and clarify certain issues which are wrongfully perceived as being
legal limitations or technical barriers (such as personal data protection
issues).
A biggest advantage of this option would
be that it would provide a clearer framework for the CISE initiative and would
provide a suitable degree of flexibility for the actors concerned as to the
practicalities. A clear advantage would be that such guidelines would be a
sufficiently flexible instrument to address the need for enhanced information
exchange between civilian and military authorities.
The effectiveness of this option is
therefore likely to be considerably higher compared to the baseline.
Coherence
This option will contribute in a better
way than previous options to a better coherence and integration of sector
policy work in line with the IMP. Working closer with officials of other
sectors and bringing in all the expertise at Member States level will also help
breaking down distrust and invisible barriers and contribute to a dare to share
environment.
Another positive aspect with this option
is it will institutionalise the objectives of more integrated information
exchange between sectors in a non-binding legal act. The effectiveness is
however uncertain due to the voluntary nature of the instrument.
7.1.2.3.    
Joint
undertaking
Effectiveness
The advantage of a joint undertaking is
the flexibility such arrangement offers; this includes the scope, governance,
funding (regarding both the Member States and EU’s contribution) and the
duration of the undertaking. It would also allow defining the individual
members’ roles in specific agreements, which may be for that purpose concluded
with the joint undertaking. This would allow taking into account specific
Member States national prerogatives or other interests both at the Member States and sectorial function level. The formal functioning of the undertaking would
be governed by the undertaking’s internal statutes, which could be amended
according to the procedure agreed between the undertaking’s members. A joint
undertaking could allow for a formal agreement between the signing parties to
proceed with sharing of information and collaboration in addition to what is
already foreseen at the present time. In any case, it would have the potential
of stimulating cross-sectorial and cross-border information sharing in the
areas where the sharing of information is not legally excluded.
This policy option may be perceived as a
step in the overall CISE development; contributing, on the one hand, to
overcoming cultural barriers and, on the other hand, providing a basis for
future legislative changes. It will however not address any legal limitations
and technical barriers as such, but can contribute considerably to enhance
information exchange between civilian and military authorities.
The main disadvantage of this option is
that it does not constitute a light approach. A joint undertaking requires that
a whole structure is put in place, including a secretariat. There is in other
words a risk that this option will make use of considerable resources in
putting the undertaking in place, which risk further delaying the
implementation of the objectives defined in section 5. It is also uncertain if
this instrument can be used at all to address legal limitations since joint
undertakings normally have a strong research and technical angle.
In conclusion, this option is likely to
be more effective in a medium term to implement the objectives compared to the
baseline scenario.
Coherence
This option is likely to contribute
significantly to the coherence of sector policies since it will ensure a formal
set up for the dialogue. It is however uncertain that this option will lead to
better coherence of sector policies further downstream compared to the baseline
if the joint undertaking is not supported by any concrete policy measures.
7.1.3.          
Option
3 – Binding measures
7.1.3.1.    
Amendments
of sector legislations
Effectiveness
This option is likely to address some of
the objectives in a much more efficient way than the baseline scenario. Only
binding options can address any the legal limitations and technical barriers
identified, since these are laid down in different legislative acts. A clear
advantage with this option is that it follows the legislative approach of the
TFEU which provides the legal basis sector by sector. A review and revision
process within the current legislative framework which could lead to a clear
mandate (legal basis) for cross sector information exchange will ensure
coherence with existing obligations within sectors and can also make use of
existing provisions of relevance such as provisions on access to data and
confidentiality. This option can also provide for common standards for
interoperability and thus solve technical barriers.
This option can however not address
cultural barriers and other non-legislative building blocks of CISE such as
operational and confidence building issues. Nor will it address the need for
better information exchange between civilian and military authorities.
Coherence
This option is likely to be effective in
ensuring coherence between sector policies since issues will be covered in a
regulatory framework. The need to co-operate between sectors will be fully
recognised in EU legislation to the gain for integration. This can be achieved
through a process whereby the amending rules are co-ordinated with each other
to be ensured that no incoherencies or inconsistencies are created.
7.1.3.2.    
A
cross sector Regulation
Effectiveness
This option could in normal cases be
considered as the best possible option since it basically could cover all the
fundamental aspects of the CISE project. Not only does it provide for a
solution to address legal limitations and technical barriers, but it could also
address certain cultural barriers through the adoption of guiding principles
etc.
However, this option could entail a high
level of complexity given the ambition to cover information exchange between
seven sectors, which do not have the same procedures for legislative action and
for some instances are not even covered in the same Treaty. This means that
several similar Regulations will have to be adopted. In order to achieve a
neutral balance between sector interests, such instrument would have to be
adopted with a multiple legal basis in line with current developments of the
IMP and be complemented by additional legislation covering the Title V of the
TFEU. It could be regarded as too intrusive by stakeholders and can only
address cultural barriers in a limited way due to subsidiarity issues.
EU legislative measures may not include
navies as they fall outside TFEU and are only subject to TEU to a limited
extent.  
Therefore, this option is not likely to
be in the short term more effective in implementing the objectives compared to
the baseline scenario. Nor will it address the need for better information
exchange between civilian and military authorities. However, if in the mid to
long term stakeholders develop a common understanding on which interoperability
solutions best suit them it might then be effective to implement such solutions
by means of a cross- sectorial Regulation in the long term. The legal
complexity of this option will however remain.
Coherence
In the short term it is perceived that
the existing maritime surveillance landscape is too complex for fully coherent
interoperability solutions to be implemented by a cross-sectorial Regulation.
In the long term however, if stakeholders may develop a common understanding of
what is needed, a cross-sectorial Regulation may indeed have the potential to
provide for the sought coherence.
7.1.3.3.    
Technical
Regulation
Effectiveness
This option is likely to be more
effective in implementing the objectives than both the baseline scenario and
the previous option for cross sector legislation. Although this option may
suffer from the same complexities as the previous option, it would constitute a
more smooth option that focuses on the topics where binding measures could have
considerable benefits. In conclusion, this option is likely to be more
effective in a long term to implement the objectives compared to the baseline
scenario.
Coherence
The same considerations on coherency
apply for this option as for the previous option.
7.2.                
Quantitative
assessment
7.2.1.          
Economic,
social and environmental impacts of implementing the CISE project 
The
overall impact (benefit) of CISE is estimated to range between 160 million €
per year and 420 million € per year over ten years as from the moment CISE is
in place[89].
This
calculation is based on estimates by national maritime surveillance experts
engaged in preparatory actions as well as studies referred to in Section 3.
The
overall methodology chosen was to compare the effectiveness and cost efficiency
of maritime surveillance today (without CISE) in accordance with the baseline
scenario with a scenario if CISE would be fully in place.
Three
different sources of economic data were used: First, the macro data collected
from Member States through the Member States expert group (MSEsG), second, the
detailed cost and benefit data collected from Member States active in
preparatory actions (TAG and the CISE Cooperation project) and third, economic
and impact statistics on maritime phenomena at European and international
level.  
This logic was deployed both through a bottom-up
and a top-down approach with a risk analysis.
The Bottom-up
approach consisted in selecting a representative sample of relevant maritime
surveillance ‘success’ indicators such as the reduction of goods being smuggled
into the EU (e.g. arms and light weapons), of oil pollutions at sea, of illegal
unregulated and unreported (IUU) fisheries, of accidents at sea, of human
trafficking, of piracy and most importantly, succeeding in saving more lives at
sea. Then a series of representative real life scenarios were drawn up of routine,
semi routine and exceptional maritime surveillance actions (use
cases) as typically carried out by Coast Guard functions representing all seven
functions involved in maritime surveillance. These use cases were then used to
compare the situation today (baseline) with a scenario if CISE would be fully
operational (CISE full potential). 
The resulting  added value of CISE
measured in terms of improved ‘success’ rate of the above indicators, was then
used to calculate the wider impacts corresponding to the individual ‘success
indicators’. This was done based on available statistics from e.g. Eurostat,
OECD and other recognised sources.
The Top-down approach
consisted in an estimate of overall maritime surveillance cost today for
certain Member States. These estimates were put in context of size and
importance of the countries selected and their spending on maritime
surveillance activities. The results of this top-down approach matched those of
the bottom-up approach.
The risk analysis consisted in an analysis
of challenges, risks, threats and vulnerabilities on the world wide maritime
areas of interest to Europe (including the Baltic, the North Celtic Sea, Biscay/Iberia, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Arctic Ocean, Oversees and High Seas).
This analysis concluded that enhancing knowledge and improving maritime
situational awareness could potentially lead to the reduction of threats and
risks by about 30% on average[90],
while this effect will of course not be uniform over the type of risk and the
different maritime areas of European interest.
The result of the above analysis was
then compared with the various policy options, with the view in particular to
determine the extent to which each individual option may reach the full CISE
potential.
7.2.2.          
Economic,
social and environmental impacts of each Policy option
7.2.2.1.    
Option
1 – No EU action (baseline scenario)
The 'baseline' is the reference
departure point for all other options.
As a consequence, being the reference
departure point for all other options its 'additional' value added has been
considered to be zero for normative reasons. This allows all other policy
options to be compared to the baseline.
7.2.2.2.    
Option
2 - Voluntary measures
Communication
The benefits of this option are likely
to be similar to the baseline scenario but will be higher if in very concrete
terms it identifies the necessary measures to be taken to achieve the defined
objectives. The benefits will stem from the concrete actions taken at a later
stage.
As a consequence, it is estimated that
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 20 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 60 M€ Total Ownership Cost
(TCO), realising 37 M€ cost savings, 114 M€ beneficial impact and may thus
realise at least a progressively cumulated[91] positive
impact of 151 M€ over the first ten years during which CISE is being
progressively set up.
Guidelines
and best practices through a Recommendation
The
benefits of this option are likely to be significant compared with the baseline
scenario because it can more effectively address the cultural barriers and
clarify misconceptions. It could thus directly promote and enable such
information exchanges which do not require the removal of technical barriers or
legal limitations and can therefore lead to quite quantifiable benefits
compared to the baseline. Better co-operation between stakeholders of different
sectors is likely to contribute to efficiency gains and reduced costs for
administration.
As a consequence, it is estimated that
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 40 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 75 M€ TCO, realising 75 M€
cost savings, 228 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a
progressively cumulated positive impact of 303 M€ over the first ten years
during which CISE is being progressively set up.
Joint
undertaking
The benefits of this option are likely
to be considerable compared with the previous option and high compared to the
baseline as the joint undertaking provides a forum in which all stakeholders at
EU and national level as well as industry may be represented to commonly
elaborate what they need. This option could thus provide an inclusive
approach towards maritime surveillance practitioners and is thus considered to
have a high uptake of the CISE full potential. There is however a risk that the
benefits would be reduced or occur more downstream if it turns out that the
administrative process for setting up the joint undertaking turns out to be
complex.
As a consequence, it is estimated that,
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 65 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 106 M€ TCO, realising 122
M€ cost savings, 373 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a
progressively cumulated positive impact of 495 M€ over the first ten years
during which CISE is being progressively set up.
7.2.2.3.    
Option
3 – Binding measures
Amendments
of sector legislations
The benefits are a priori likely to be
significant under this option compared to the baseline since it is meant to
address legal limitations and provide a solid mandate (legal basis) for
information exchange between sectors. The introduction of more automated
information exchanges will also lead to considerable cost savings with the
introduction of technical interoperability standards. A more coherent
information exchange system at EU level will also lead to efficiency gains
downstream through closer collaboration between maritime surveillance
authorities.
As a consequence, it is estimated that,
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 50 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 86 M€ TCO realising 94 M€
cost savings, 286 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a
progressively cumulated positive impact of 380 M€ over the first ten years
during which CISE is being progressively set up.
Cross
sector Regulation
While
this option would a priori allow for effective application of
interoperability solutions, it is however unlikely that in the short term a one
fits all solution can be found considering the complexity arising from the
diversity and the great number of stakeholders with many different systems
having miscellaneous needs and various organisational structures. In the short
term authorities at EU and national level:
i.)           Are
unlikely to adhere to an imposed solution likely to incur a high administrative
burden while they may not need or want this solution and
ii.)          Have
expressed their need for cheap, easy to implement and fully flexible
decentralised interoperability solution allowing them to doing what fits them
best.
As a consequence, it is estimated that,
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 50 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 86 M€ TCO realising 94 M€
cost savings, 286 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a
progressively cumulated positive impact of 380 M€ over the first ten years
during which CISE is being progressively set up. However, if in the mid to long
term stakeholders develop a common understanding on which interoperability
solutions best suit them it might then be effective to implement such solutions
by means of a cross- sectorial Regulation in the long term. The uptake might then
increase well beyond the indicated 50%.
Technical
Regulation
The benefits of this option are likely
to be equal to the previous option as such Regulation may allow to set an
overarching reference standard for maritime surveillance interoperability that
integrates with EU wide solutions. It can be expected that these benefits will
occur more upstream compared to the previous option since the legislative
process for putting such a Regulation will be less complicated, but will
nevertheless require some time and effort. The main benefit with this option is
that it will lead to more automatic information exchanges without human
intervention allowing increased and faster information services exchanges and
fostering data mining i.e. automatic or semi-automatic analysis of large
quantities of data to extract e.g. unknown and interesting patterns to detect
anomalies. While being more difficult to realise in the short term, this option
may however be effective and coherent in the mid to long term.
As a consequence, it is estimated that,
compared to the baseline, this sub-option (stand-alone) may realise 50 % of the
full potential of the CISE project, while incurring 86 M€ TCO realising 94 M€
cost savings, 286 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a progressively
cumulated positive impact of 380 M€ over the first ten years during which CISE
is being progressively set up.
The following table provides an overview
of the quantitative assessment the next ten years:
   || Option 1: No EU action || Option 2.1: Communication || Option 2.2: Guidance document and best practices || Option 2.3: Joint undertaking || Option 3.1: Policy package within existing legislative framework || Option 3.2: Cross sector legislative framework on CISE (Regulation) || Option 3.3: Cross sector legislative framework for the technical aspects || Policy mix 2.1 + 2.2 + 3.1 
 Assumed realisation potential of full CISE benefit || 0% || 20% || 40% || 65% || 50% || 50% || 50% || 80% 
 Key measures (MEUR) ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 TCO || 0 || 60 || 75 || 106 || 86 || 86 || 86 || 133 
 Cost Savings || 0 || 37 || 75 || 122 || 94 || 94 || 94 || 151 
 Impacts || 0 || 114 || 228 || 373 || 286 || 286 || 286 || 460 
 Total benefit[92] || 0 || 151 || 303 || 495 || 380 || 380 || 380 || 611 
 Performance ratios ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 Cost savings/TCO || 0 || 0.62 || 1.00 || 1.15 || 1.09 || 1.09 || 1.09 || 1.14 
 Impact /TCO || 0 || 1.88 || 3.05 || 3.51 || 3.34 || 3.34 || 3.34 || 3.47 
 Total benefit/TCO || 0 || 2.50 || 4.05 || 4.65 || 4.43 || 4.43 || 4.43 || 4.61 
Table 1-
Overview of the quantitative assessment (source: COWI study)
Option 2.3 is the most costly option but
it is also the option that delivers the highest expected benefits. The cost of
Option 2.1 and 2.2 are relatively low but their level of individually reaching
the CISE full potential is also relatively low. Option 3.1 aligns with Options
3.2 and 3.3 on cost and uptake of the CISE full potential, but are not
convincing in the short term. A policy mix of Options 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 is
however expected to have the highest uptake of the full CISE potential in the
short to mid-term while having an interesting benefit over cost ratio.
Indeed, elaborating a Communication and
combine it with a Guidance document in the short term (elaborated in close
co-operation with  stakeholders at Member State level) and envisage
reinforcements of sectorial legislation at EU level during the ordinary review
process, would be the most appropriate means to achieve the objectives defined
in section 5 in the short to medium term. This is the best solution, in
particular as it allows for civil/military cooperation as from the short term.
7.3.                
Assessment
of impacts on fundamental rights
This policy
initiative is relevant for the EU charter on Fundamental Rights, in essence its
Article 8 regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, it has to be checked
in detail whether additional processing operations (such as transfers of
personal data to other surveillance authorities) are in accordance with law,
pursues a legitimate purpose, is necessary in a democratic society, and in
particular if it's proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the
reasons are relevant and sufficient. The core principles of data protection
include the obligation of respecting purpose limitations with regard to new
processing operations.  These requirements are binding even though the
receivers of the relevant data is limited to maritime surveillance authorities
and is not intended for the wider public.
As noted above,
the creation of a Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime
domain (CISE) is an on-going process which has already lead to certain success
stories and lead to enhanced information exchange between maritime surveillance
authorities. This process has and will be coupled with a fundamental rights
assessment, in particular whenever legislative changes are made, to ensure that
these rights are respected and that strict safeguards are in place when
personal data is exchanged in accordance with EU and national law on the
protection of personal data.
In case binding measures will be needed
at a later stage, a further fundamental rights assessment will have to be
included in the impact assessment of the relevant legislative proposal.
7.4.                
Assessment
of Cost and administrative burden
7.4.1.          
Costs
of the policy options
The purpose of this assessment will be
to evaluate the direct investment cost of the Member States and at EU level to
put in place the Common Information Sharing Environment[93].
The cost of implementing CISE depends to
a large extent on how each Member State may want to organise itself internally
to connect to the environment and the number of information services that will
be provided in the environment. Another important element to take into consideration
is that existing and planned systems that a common information sharing
environment has to be built upon have developed at various speeds and reached
different levels of maturity.
Preparatory
actions have identified core IT components for facilitating information
exchanges based on pre-defined principles and requirements and have compared
different organisational approaches to the integration of information from
seven different sectoral functions in the 28 EU Member States[94].
The comparison shows that the total costs[95] of CISE on a
ten year period ranges from 83M€ to 142M€ for an arbitrary level of information
exchanges compared to the full data gap identified under the baseline scenario.
The cost analysis is based on a costing model which contains a set of
assumptions (mainly IT related). These assumptions related mainly to the
building blocks that are necessary to have an operational CISE. For example,
the number of participants has been estimated, the level of information
exchanges, the cost of software, the higher cost involved to connect older
technologies in the Member States and the potential of reusing generic building
blocks versus redevelopment by Member States. The complete set of assumptions
can be found in the supporting study[96].

An organisational structure where Member
States would set up central IT systems for information exchange related to
maritime surveillance shows the lowest cost of realisation of 83M€. It is
however more intrusive into the national structures and thus less recommendable
and does not take into account the very diverse situation and the investment
cycles in the Member States.
It
is therefore proposed not to impose any governance structure to the Member
States and let Member States connect their IT systems per sectoral functions to
CISE. The cost of such an organisational structure is estimated at 107 M€. As
said above, the number of information services that will be provided in the
environment influences the total cost, which might vary from that total of 107
M€. The expected level of information exchanges varies depending on the policy
option. The table below shows the cost of each policy option, with the
corresponding expected level of information exchange compared to the full gap
identified under the baseline scenario, and with the assumed realisation of
full CISE benefits.
   || Option 2.1: Communication || Option 2.2: Guidance document and best practices || Option 2.3: Joint undertaking || Option 3.1: Policy package within existing legislative framework || Option 3.2: Cross sector legislative framework on CISE (Regulation) || Option 3.3: Cross sector legislative framework for the technical aspects 
 % data sharing versus baseline || 4% || 16% || 42% || 28% || 28% || 28% 
 Assumed realisation potential of full CISE benefit || 20% || 40% || 65% || 50% || 50% || 50% 
 TCO – 10 years (M€) || 60 || 75 || 106 || 86 || 86 || 86 
 EC costs || 26 || 26 || 26 || 26 || 26 || 26 
 MS costs || 34 || 49 || 80 || 60 || 60 || 60 
Table 2 - Cost of the policy options (source:
Gartner study)
7.4.2.          
Cost
at EU level versus costs at Member States level
These costs can
be further divided into costs likely to occur at EU level and those likely to
occur at Member State level (which to a certain extent can be supported from
the EMFF Regulation).
The distribution
of cost over the 10 year budgeting period shows an initial investment needed at
EU-level for developing an Information Exchange Model, common IT components and
central support systems to CISE and a larger cost of the (gradual) connection
of country systems to CISE.
The initial
investments at EU-level are then followed by investments at the Member State level to offer and use new information services. The investments in the Member
States are assumed to follow a bell-curve where few will invest early, and the
peak of investments will be in year 5 and 6 of the budgeting period. This
implies that the adoption of CISE at the Member State level is modelled to
follow investment cycles in the Member States and not a centrally managed
rollout plan.
Figure 5 - Central cost versus Member States cost
(source: Gartner study)
EU-level cost
amounts to 26,1 M€. These include the set up and operation of the different
components envisaged at central level, i.e. CISE governance, a common data
model, a registry of services and authorities, a common collaborative platform,
common monitoring services, a reference implementation for the interface of
systems, and increased exchanges of information between EU systems[97].
Note that the
cost of implementing a reference implementation could be decreased by reusing
existing solutions as explained in section 5.2.
Depending on the
level of information exchange, the yearly Operating Expenditure (OpEx) for CISE
is expected to amount between 85.000 € and 200.000 € per Member State, thus between about 2,5 M€ and 5,5 M€ for all CISE participants (reference year 2023).
It is understood
that these are average figures. As results from the above, the burden may be
higher for certain Member States than for others depending on Member States'
existing situation and the resulting level of effort required to inter-connect
through CISE.
8.                      
comparing the options
An overall
assessment should now follow the qualitative and quantitative analysis.
   ||   || Short Term Effectiveness in achieving the objectives || Short Term Economic, social and environmental benefits* || Long Term Effectiveness in achieving the objectives || Long Term Economic, social and environmental benefits* || Cost 
 Option 1 || Baseline scenario (reference) || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || Communication || +++ || +++ || +++ || +++ || € 
 Guidance document through a recommendation || +++ || +++ || +++ || +++ || €€ 
 Joint undertaking || ++ || + || +++ || +++ || €€€ 
 Option 3 || Amendments of sector legislation || ++ || + || ++ || ++ || €€ 
 Cross sector Regulation || + || + || +++ || +++ || €€ 
   || Technical Regulation || ++ || ++ || ++ || ++ || €€ 
0: no
change compared to baseline scenario; +: limited increase compared to baseline
scenario; ++: moderate increase compared to the baseline scenario; +++: high
increase compared to the baseline scenario
Table 3 -
Comparison of the options
8.1.                
Effectiveness
in obtaining the objectives
The sub-option with the highest score
would be to develop a guidance document through a recommendation since this
option is the best suited in the short term to tackle the most fundamental
problems, namely cultural barriers. It can however not obtain the highest score
since it cannot tackle legal limitations and only to a certain extent technical
limitations.
The adoption of a Communication also
receives a relatively high score since it can constitute the necessary point of
departure for the implementation roadmap process, by raising the awareness, by
identifying the necessary steps needed towards implementation and by allowing
all stakeholders to commonly develop the solutions that best fit their needs in
a step by step approach.
Amendments of sector Regulation also
receives a relatively high score since this option can address legal
limitations and technical obstacles, but it does not receive a top score since
these limitations may not be as many as expected. The same caveat applies to
sub-option 3.3.
While a cross sector Regulation is
considered ambitious in the short terms, in particular if taking into account
the complexity and diversity of the current surveillance landscape and on-going
actions, this option nevertheless has a high potential for the longer term
future if in the meantime stakeholders can commonly develop the best fitting
interoperability solutions. The legal complexity of such measure will
nevertheless remain while in any case it won’t cover the defence community.
Due to its inclusiveness, a Joint
undertaking can be an effective means to implement the objectives, in
particular in the medium term.
8.2.                
Benefits
The sub-option which receives the
highest score is again the guidance document since this option constitutes an
efficient tool to promote the removal of cultural barriers in the short term.
This work can start more or less immediately and does not have to await the
outcome of a legislative process.
The option of a Communication also
receives a high score since it can establish the implementation roadmap process
and political support for the process. As stated above, it can however not as
such address limitations or implement any solution.
Amendments of sector legislations also
receive a relatively high score since this option can achieve benefits, but
those benefits will occur further downstream once the legislative process has
been finalised. The same reasoning applies for the technical Regulation
implementing EU standards for information exchange can lead to considerable
benefits, but since the elaboration of those standards are expected to take
some time; the benefits are further downstream.
The option that receives the lowest
short term score in terms of benefits is the cross sector legislation. This is
because the potential benefits are not expected until further downstream
compared to the other two binding sub-options (due to the complexity of the
matter) and will not be able to address the biggest hurdle, namely the cultural
barriers. However, in the longer term, once stakeholders agreed on best fit
legal, organisational, technical, semantic and policy aspects of
interoperability solutions, it may be of high value added to establish those
though a cross sectorial Regulation.
8.3.                
Cost
The non-binding options are the least
costly options for Member States since they will not be required to take any
measures to adhere to the common information sharing environment. At EU level
cost will only occur for the development of recommended IT solutions and at
Member States level they will only occur where solutions are implemented.
The most costly option for Member States and EU are the binding solutions for obvious reasons.
8.4.                
Conclusion
On the basis of the above, it seems that
it will not be possible to achieve the defined objective though one policy
option. Legally binding options can address legal and technical limitations but
not for all seven sectoral functions and can further not capture cultural
barriers. In particular, enhanced information exchanges between civilian and
military authorities cannot be addressed through this option. Non-binding
options are best suited to address cultural barriers (which seem to be the
biggest hurdle to information exchange at least in the short terms) and can be
considerably helpful in finding practical solutions which could involve all
seven functions and thus enhance information exchange between civilian and
military authorities. Those options do however fall short in addressing any legal
limitations and technical barriers.
The best solution therefore seems to be
to strive for a combination of several options in the short, medium and long
term.
It seems that the best way to implement
this work in the short term is to consider publishing a Communication which can
provide an implementation roadmap and identify in concrete terms the work
needed related to a corresponding timeframe.
Such action should be followed in the
short-term with a guidance document to address first and foremost the cultural
barriers and to establish best practices for information sharing. This document
would also be useful to raise the awareness of the fundamental rights regarding
the protection of personal data and ensure a common understanding of these
issues within the field of maritime surveillance.
While in the short term a joint
undertaking falls short in this perspective since the process for putting such
a mechanism in place is relatively heavy, it may however have a lot of
potential as a mid-term tool allowing for inclusive developments and research
by stakeholders to find the best fitting interoperability solutions. Such an
approach would however need further assessment as to its added value and
suitability.
The sub-option on addressing legal and
technical limitation through amendments of existing legislation over time seems
to be the most proportionate and acceptable to stakeholders in order to avoid
excessive EU action. This process can take place in conjunction with the
ordinary revision process of the sector legislation when undesired limitations
are identified, and also need to include a fundamental rights assessment in the
accompanying impact assessment. Such an approach would also be relatively light
compared to the option for a CISE Regulation and can therefore be smoother to
implement and would not risk creating any inconsistencies with provisions in
sector legislation. The developments of interoperability standards could be
developed in accordance with the digital agenda of the EU.
A technical regulation may be a solution
in the long term to deploy a standard in a coherent manner.
If needed, a cross sectorial Regulation
may be envisaged on the long term.
The preferred option would therefore be
a mix of options, 2.1, 2.2, possibly coupled with, 3.1, and 3.3 if such action
is deemed necessary.
As a consequence, it is estimated that,
compared to the baseline, this policy mix may realise 80 % of the full
potential of the CISE project, while incurring 133 M€ TCO realising 151 M€ cost
savings, 460 M€ beneficial impact and may thus realise at least a progressive
cumulated positive impact of 611 M€ over the first ten years during which CISE
is being progressively set up. 
Overall CISE is estimated to bring a
beneficial impact within a range of 160 million € per year and 420 million €
per year over the following ten years.
9.                      
Monitoring and evaluation
The European Commission will be monitoring
the further development of the CISE project action plan through regular
meetings with the Member State expert sub-group and the inter-service group on
maritime surveillance as well as the Technical Advisory Group (TAG).
These groups will also be heavily
involved in the drafting and the regular review of guidelines and handbooks
which would be put in place for this purpose, in particular to address the gap
between the demand and supply of maritime surveillance data identified in
section 4.4.
Monitoring and evaluation indicators
would be as follows:
 General objectives || Indicators 
 To maximise the information exchange among maritime surveillance authorities in the EU. || Relative increase of data flows of information services between authorities 
   || Efficiency increase in maritime surveillance Reduction of duplication in data collection efforts 
 To increase the automatic treatment of data flows. || Relative increase of automated data flows. 
 Specific objectives || Indicators 
 To address all remaining legal limitations to information exchange among maritime surveillance sectors. || No of legal limitations 
   || Number of service level agreements between EU agencies and Member States 
   || No of legal acts referring explicitly to CISE 
   || Number of CISE projects financed by EMFF 
 To address cultural barriers for information exchange. || Number of co-operation projects and pilot projects under EMFF which fosters enhanced collaboration on information exchange issues  
 To put in place interoperability standards for information exchange || Number of legislative acts or agreements on common interoperability standards referring to CISE 
   || Number of service level agreements on technical standards 
An evaluation of the implementation of
the work ahead and of the regulatory measures will be carried out before the
end of the period 2014-2020, with a view to assessing the need to define a new
set of actions beyond that period. The evaluation of the implementation of the
regulatory measures will continue at least for 2 years after they come into
effect.
10.                  
Annex 1: Summary of public consultation
The public
consultation summarised below was one element amongst many in terms of
stakeholder consultations. As mentioned in the above, The Member States Experts
subgroup and the Technical Advisory Group on CISE held numerous meetings to
steer the political and technical process towards CISE, three large scale pilot
projects each involving about fifty national authorities and EU level Agencies
explored the need and the expected feasibility of CISE from the viewpoint of
maritime surveillance practitioners and the Council supported the CISE process
in numerous conclusions.
Further to that,
a public consultation was conducted in the period 14 June – 14 September
2013 via the Commission’s Interactive-Policy Making (IPM) tool. The
consultation provided the possibility of EU citizens as well as non-EU citizens
to express their view on the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) – as
an input to the policy process of the European Commission. The below textbox provides
an overview of the content of the questionnaire used in the consultation
process.
Overview of
questionnaire content
 Introduction: Providing respondents with information about the background of the consultation process as well as presenting basic information on CISE Questions about the survey participant: Gathering information on the respondent, affiliate administration/organisation, and maritime community Questions about CISE themes: Gathering information about views on current status of information sharing, including legal framework, cultural  and technical barriers; as well as foreseen improvements with better information sharing Questions about implementation options: Gathering information about views on how best to implement CISE Questions about CISE benefits: Gathering information about views on the areas in which CISE can benefit, and by which magnitude Questions about CISE services: Gathering information about views on the development and supply of information services, standards, interoperability, public/private cooperation, and cost of provision. 
The consultation
process shows the attitudes of those who responded; and cannot necessarily be
regarded as being representative of the entire population. As such, the
consultation does not claim to provide a representative view of the general
public’s opinion of CISE; nor does it give a policy recommendation from the
general public. These factors must be taken into account when analysing and
using the results of the consultation process.
(a)          Questionnaire
results
33
responses
The European
Commission received a total of 33 responses to the public consultation on CISE.
This must be regarded as a rather low number, and naturally limits the validity
of the overview and analysis presented below. For the same reason, the analysis
below has been kept on an aggregated level, i.e. including all types of
respondents.
(b)          Respondents
Coverage
of types of respondents
The responses to
the public consultation have been somewhat uniformly distributed across (i)
national administration; (ii) a combination of other types of organisations,
including regional, European, international, non-governmental and professional
organisations; and (iii) responses received from private companies. A lower
number of responses have also been received from the scientific community and
the general public.
Coverage
of types of respondents
Source:
Public consultation
Coverage
of maritime functions
All maritime
functions, except Customs, are represented in the survey. However, there is an
overweight of responses from the maritime safety and security community, while
only one response has been received from both the fisheries and the law
enforcement community. Most of the private companies who responded  listed
themselves either as maritime surveillance systems and equipment
manufacturers/suppliers or in the fisheries and aquaculture business.
Coverage
of maritime functions
Source:
Public consultation
While most of
the responses have been received from national administrations, not all marine
functions are covered. Indeed, the coverage is scattered across all the
different types of respondents.
Types
of respondents and maritime function coverage
 Respondent || Safety and security || Border control || Defence || Fisheries control || Marine pollution || Law enforcement || Public maritime activities || Other || Total 
 National administration || 2 ||   || 1 ||   || 2 ||   || 3 ||   || 8 
 Regional administration ||   || 2 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 2 
 European organisation || 1 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 2 || 3 
 International organisation ||   || 1 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 1 || 2 
 Non-governmental organisation ||   ||   ||   ||   || 1 ||   ||   ||   || 1 
 Professional organisation/association || 1 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 2 || 3 
 Private company || 3 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 4 || 7 
 Expert/scientific ||   ||   || 1 ||   ||   || 1 ||   ||   || 2 
 General public || 2 ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   || 1 || 1 || 4 
 Other ||   ||   ||   || 1 ||   ||   ||   ||   || 1 
 All || 9 || 3 || 2 || 1 || 3 || 1 || 4 || 10 || 33 
Source:
Public consultation
(c)          Limitations
to current level of information sharing
The first part
of the questionnaire was designed to provide input about the current level of
information sharing in maritime surveillance, as well as the limitations that
currently exist as regards such sharing.
Current
sharing between sectors and across borders is limited
Among all the
respondents there was a clear sentiment that the public authorities, who are
responsible for maritime surveillance activities, do not cooperate or
share existing information between sectors and across borders in an optimal
manner.
Agreement
that public authorities do not cooperate or share information between sectors
and across borders in an optimal way
Source:
Public consultation
Regulatory
framework for information sharing
One of the
reasons for the respondents’ agreement on a sub-optimal level of information
sharing between sectors and across borders is the underlying regulatory
framework. In this regard, the degree to which the respondents agreed that the
current regulatory framework at the international, EU, and Member State level
limits such information sharing throughout the EU resembles, to some extent,
the above picture.
Agreement
that current international, EU, and Member State regulatory framework limits
information sharing between sectors and across borders
Source:
Public consultation
Cultural
barriers to information exchange
Historically,
policies that govern maritime surveillance information sharing have typically
been developed and organised with a particular maritime sector focus. From the
questionnaire there is a strong indication that this sectorial approach have
resulted in the built-up of cultural limitations to information exchange
between the sectors.
Agreement
that cultural barriers to cross-sectorial information exchange are the result
of sectorial policies and organisation at both Member States and EU level.
Source:
Public consultation
Technical
barriers to information exchange
There is less
agreement that the above mentioned sectorial policy focus also have resulted in
the built-up of technical barriers to exchanging maritime surveillance
information. However, the sectorial policy focus is still very much seen as an
important driver for today’s existence of technical limitations, such as
incompatibilities between systems, for information sharing.
Agreement
that technical barriers to cross-sectorial information exchange are the result
of sectorial policies and organisation at both Member States and EU level.
Source:
Public consultation
Maritime
situational awareness is not complete
One of the
possible effects from limited sharing of maritime surveillance information is
that relevant public authorities often do not have a complete understanding of
the situation at sea, or “maritime situational awareness”, which in turn may
prevent them in taking the right and timely actions. This is also the view from
the respondents where as many as 75% indicated their agreement (full or
mostly). 
Agreement
that relevant public authorities do not have complete ‘maritime situational
awareness’ often due to lack of information sharing between sectors.
Source:
Public consultation
Additional
items highlighted by respondents
Concerning all
of the items covered above, some 60% of the respondents have mentioned
additional problems and/or limitations which they feel should be highlighted,
based on their own experience. A categorisation and summary of these items is
listed in.
Additional
items highlighted by the respondents
 Issue || Description 
 Data access restrictions || Member States have different rules regarding access to information. Sharing of information requires the development of common principles of information security and certification systems. Issues pertaining to privacy rights also need to be dealt with 
 Cultural limitations || Authorities may not want to share their data due to confidentiality issues, lack of trust, competition. 
 Differing areas of competences || Authorities across Member States are not organized in the same way, and do not have the same tasks, rules, disciplines, etc. These differences can limit sharing and engagement in operations across borders. 
 Interoperability || Interoperability and harmonization of monitoring protocols for data sharing must be secured. Also, the interaction between final users, service suppliers and tools is currently fragmented across Member States and sectors; and has not been focused with a view to obtain a common and European-wide objective in the field. 
 Effective monitoring || Investment in human capital and technical resources and equipment is important to ensure a uniform and effective monitoring across the EU. 
 International cooperation || International cooperation on data sharing and common protocols should be promoted through the Neighbourhood Policy. 
 Collaboration between public authorities and private entities || Not well organised and could facilitate a potentially wider information sharing environment. Also, ship operators and shipping operations are perceived by some governmental agencies across the EU to be a part of the 'threat' not the 'solution'. As a result ship operators may therefore be unwilling to share data because the data invites unnecessary scrutiny and attention. 
Source:
Public consultation
One respondent
also mentioned that there is a need for changing the attitude towards data
sharing. For instance, as long as the data collector is an EU or Member State
authority, and as the policy makers have agreed to build an EU Integrated
Maritime Surveillance environment, then the data sharing shall be enforced
on the collectors—and not requested on voluntary basis. From this perspective,
a clear legal framework for IMO, IMS and CISE would be essential to ensure real
progress.
(d)          Expectations
from better information sharing
Improved
information sharing could lead to benefits
There is a clear
understanding among the respondents that current information sharing is
limited, and, as a partial result, that relevant public authorities often lack
full maritime situational awareness on which to base their action. In this
light, there is also a very strong agreement that better information sharing
between sectors and across borders could be expected to reduce the cost and
improve the efficiency of maritime surveillance activities. Better information
sharing is moreover expected to improve monitoring and surveillance, as well as
lead to better safety and security at sea.
Agreement that improved information sharing between
sectors and across borders could reduce cost and improve efficiency of maritime
surveillance activities.
Source:
Public consultation
Agreement
that improved information sharing between sectors and across borders could
improve monitoring, surveillance, safety and security at sea.
Source:
Public consultation
(e)          Implementation
of CISE
Action must be
taken
Regarding the
achievement of better information sharing in maritime surveillance almost all
respondents disagree with the option of taking “no further action”; that is,
things should involve as they are now.
Agreement on “no further action” to implement CISE.
Source:
Public consultation
CISE
should be implemented through binding measures
Generally
speaking, CISE could be implemented either though non-binding instruments, or
through binding measures while also removing existing limitations (legal or
other) where appropriate to ensure better information sharing. According to the
responses to the questionnaire, the respondents favour the option of
implementing CISE via binding measures. More specifically, 48% fully
agree with using binding measures while an additional 39% are in partial
agreement. For the non-binding option, on the other hand, only 21% are in full
agreement, and 21% are in partial agreement. Moreover, almost 50% disagree that
non-binding measures are the right option while only 9% disagree that binding
measures are the right option. 
Agreement
on using non-binding or binding instruments for implementing CISE
Source:
Public consultation
CISE
should be implemented step-wise
In connection
with the replies to how CISE should be implemented several comments were raised
by the respondents. While binding measures were the preferred option, several
respondents were of the opinion that the implementation should be done in a
step-wise manner; i.e. involving only a set of sectors and Member States with a
willingness to collaborate at first, and then later expand with additional
authorities. In this regard, it would be important to kick-off the process with
a few “basic” or “minimum condition” binding instruments that would be
supported financially by the EU to encourage cooperation. This should allow for
establishing a basic framework including common procedures, legal frameworks
and technical conditions. As a general rule, however, the introduction of
binding instruments should be shown to deliver “value for money” and be limited
to areas where non-binding instruments prove not to be efficient. 
Looking towards
the future, and particular as regards the expected rise in maritime traffic
over the coming 10-20 years, it was also mentioned that maritime and security
measures should be optimised and include all countries around the European seas
and straits, including non-Member States. 
CISE
should build on existing knowledge
Respondents also
mentioned that the implementation of CISE should build on the knowledge,
experience, and the demonstrated value added that are available from various
pilot projects and initiatives, such as , EU NAVFOR (defence), EFCA MarSurv
(fishery control), EUROSUR (border control). CISE should also take advantage of
the awareness of technical innovations proposed by pilot projects like
BluMassMed and MARSUNO and other initiatives launched in the context of the
European research and development framework (FP7).
CISE
should foster public/private partnerships
CISE should
moreover focus on fostering the collaboration between public authorities,
private suppliers and service providers, in order to implement and deploy an
effective service based system for the wider information sharing in the
maritime domain. Public-private collaboration in the implementation phase of
new information sharing systems could be fostered by initiatives like the Pre
Operational Validation (CLOSEYE) that benefits from FP 7 funding. In
H2020 further activity in other parts of the EU should be allowed inviting
administrations to get together and solicit industry involvement. New actors gaining
access to the available information could lead to the development of new
applications and services for the wider maritime community.
CISE
should build on a clear message
A few
respondents also highlighted a critique of the CISE process; i.e. mentioning
that the learning from pilot projects and initiatives had not been leveraged to
a satisfactory extent, and that the CISE initiative has been communicated in
contradictory and confusion tones by the different DGs involved in the process.
In this regard, the CISE TAG group should come up with a clear vision of what
CISE is, how it should be implemented, and establish an agreement on how it
should be supported and agreed upon at all political levels within the
commission. In this process, the different agencies involved with maritime
surveillance in the maritime domain should also take a more cooperative than
competing role.
(f)          Benefits
of implementing CISE
There is
generally agreement among the respondents that CISE will deliver benefits in a
number of different areas. The numbers of respondents who expect that CISE will
significantly enhance the effectiveness of maritime surveillance
activities as well as the response capabilities of operations are the most
noteworthy, i.e. numbering nearly 80% and 70%, respectively. The following
figure depicts the areas for which the respondents were asked to provide their
consideration as regards the magnitude of benefits. The areas have been sorted
according to the areas with the highest expected magnitudes of benefits (combining
significant and moderate benefits).
Expected magnitude of benefits of CISE in different
areas
Source: Public
consultation
CISE
will bring large cost saving effects
After enhancing
the effectiveness of maritime surveillance activities and response
capabilities, the respondents also consider that CISE will bring large benefits
in terms of cost savings. This includes cost savings from both information
gathering, sharing and better use of resources.
CISE
will support environmental protection and innovation
To a somewhat
lesser extent than cost savings, albeit with a few more respondents expecting
impacts with higher significance, the results show that 75% of the respondents
expect benefits from CISE in terms of support of both environmental protection
and innovation in the EU. 
Sustainable
economic growth and social improvement
About half of
the respondents consider that CISE will have significant to moderate benefits
in terms of supporting sustainable economic growth in the EU, while the
corresponding figure is about 40% for the support of social improvement in the
EU.
(g)          CISE
services
CISE
services could be developed through public private cooperation
Information
sharing in the CISE will take place through a number of information services
which can consist of predefined, regular, or ad hoc exchanges. These services
can be subscribed to, or developed and published by, the relevant authorities.
60% of the respondents, however, think that such information exchange services
also could be developed and published in cooperation between public and private
bodies. Some 25% think that this should not be the case, while 15% are of no
opinion about the matter.
Can information services be developed in
co-operation between public and private bodies?
Source:
Public consultation
Public-private
cooperation would require common standards
Several
respondents raised specific views on the public-private cooperative development
of information services in CISE. For example, the success of public-private
collaboration would depend on the development and application of common
standards for conducting information exchange among all stakeholders, and which
would also include appropriate confidentiality and security measures. Such
requirements and standards would nonetheless also need to take the technical
capabilities and standards of industry into account. 
Private
entities are involved in other areas
In initiatives
similar to CISE, such as EUROSUR and the Single Window reporting, private
entities  are to a certain extent also involved; i.e. shipping agents, ships
and their managing companies, etc. This could serve as a point of reference for
CISE. 
Private
entities could contribute to rich development environment
Opening the
development of information services to also include private entities based on a
common standards approach could also ensure competition in the market for
developing and supporting information services. In turn, this could create a
vigorous services development environment, not unlike the one which has been
established in the mobile communications industry, and thus bring a long range
of additional benefits to the different maritime stakeholders through the more
effective use of available information resources. In the longer run, CISE could
grow to become a platform for private entities to develop and offer new smart
surveillance tools.
Relevance
of including private entities
The following
table summarises the different perspectives that respondents have on the
relevance of involving private entities in the development of information
services
Views on the relevance of involving private entities
in the development of information services
 Relevance area || Description 
 Private industry is an important player in the maritime domain || Private industry plays essential role in maritime domain. Ships are private assets operated under private agreements; off-shore activities are privately driven, including many safety and security requirements under industry responsibility. Leaving industry outside of a cooperative data-sharing environment could therefore be a strategic mistake 
 Local interest and coverage of services || The involvement of private (local) stakeholders can secure a high degree of local awareness and participation. Especially in strait areas this can promote better security readiness in case of maritime accidents. 
 Leveraging knowledge and technical knowhow || The participation of the private sector can provide both the knowledge and the technological knowhow that is needed to develop useful and effective information sharing services in CISE across a number of areas. 
 Innovation driver || Including private entities can provide different perspectives, mutualisation and cost effectiveness in the development of services, and thus drive innovation. It can also contribute by including relevant research programmes. 
 Intellectual property issues || There may be a need for protecting industrial intellectual property. 
 Incentive and security issues || As private entities are driven by commercial interests and financial gain this could create a potential incentive conflict with public stakeholders driven by improving surveillance effectiveness and efficiency. Commercial interests may also conflict with the protection and/or sharing of information obtained under CISE, which could be an issue. 
 Cultural issues || Authorities may expect that communication is one-way; i.e. from industry to authorities, which could affect collaboration and involvement of private entities. This is for instance seen in supply chain security where certain authorities want to separate channels/views/systems from logistics industries as a condition for cooperation. 
Source:
Public consultation
Feasibility
of integrating existing systems into CISE
There is
generally agreement among the respondents that it not only would be feasible to
integrate existing or developing products, technologies, systems and services
for surveillance and intelligent data sharing at sea into the CISE by 2020; it
would also be necessary. The following table provides a summary of respondents’
perspectives in this regard.
Summary
of perspectives on the feasibility of integrating existing and developing
products, services, systems, and technologies into the CISE by 2020.
 Is it feasible? || Summary of perspectives 
 Yes || It is consistently feasible, although it depends on the specific product, technology, system, service maturity and impact on existing platforms. Some of them have high readiness and imply relatively low effort to be integrated. Some technologies have already reached the level of sufficient maturity to be used in the CISE within 2020. However specific improvements in the technical field could provide a significant improvement in the overall quality of CISE, and at the same time the development of CISE might stimulate the appeal for a standardisation of maritime technology across Member States, thus extending the use of proven existing systems and best practices. Full interoperability and reliability of existing maritime surveillance technologies within the wider framework of information sharing between actors in the EU should be pursued. Efforts should also focus on creating the right, modular, easily accessible business ecosystem for information services. Using an open architecture could ease the process. And knowhow and experiences from the collaboration between public bodies and private companies in other areas should be exploited. 
 Yes, but || With a positive political will the integration is highly likely to be possible. However, national and sectoral commitment is also essential. Hence, a political consensus and agreement must be reached at the EU level, including all involved DGs and their agencies. The integration would moreover require financial support to relevant EU institutions/agencies. Some technologies are already ready to be used in CISE. Other ones will be ready in horizon 2020. However, the necessary technological conditions will not be in place in all cases, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to interlink systems across all EU members by 2020. The point is for the EU to find a suitable normalisation of the products, to help Members States share maritime information in a proper way. This will make it easier to reach a good level of interoperability between the existing maritime surveillance systems and services. Integration could also be widened by using a step-wise approach, i.e. using a roadmap for entry with feedback loops to amend gaps and shortcomings. Regional integration could be achieved faster. 
 No || The timeframe is too short 
Source:
Public consultation
A common
data model for exchange should be based on standards
In order to
improve interoperability, the CISE will make use of a common data model for
data exchanges between systems and sectors. More than half (52%) of the
respondents agree that such a data model standard should be endorsed by a
recognised standards body. Only 9% did not see such an endorsement as
necessary, while 36% had no opinion of the matter.
Should
the standards for CISE’s common data model be endorsed by a recognised
standards body?
Source:
Public consultation
The table below
summarises additional remarks made by the respondents.
Summary of perspectives on whether the common data
model standards should be endorsed by recognised standards body
 Endorsement || Summary of perspectives 
 Yes || Technical commonality would seem to be a vital aspect of any EU wide system and therefore clear and precise technical standards would need to be identified and implemented. Also, common data formats and data models are essential for the effective sharing and correlation of data. They moreover facilitate access to the data, allow the creation of consistent procedures for data acquisition, reduce response time, and make it easier to include more participants. Suggested standards bodies include: ISO, CEN, EU-COM Remarks were also made that the standards body should be European. Also, the creation of an "EU Advisory Board" could coordinate and facilitate the process. 
 Yes, but || Interoperability could benefit from an official standardisation process although this could introduce a considerable delay, hindering the 2020 target. On this basis a two-step approach could be used. First, design good foundations for the reference data model and pushing to extensively adopt it. Second, once the data model is consolidated, start the formal standardisation process. A different perspective is that CISE should not define one common model, but a library of models based on existing standards and let the communities to decide which one fits best their existing set-up. Interoperability is well defined and standardised already and technically there are solutions to fit any existing architectures. 
 No || Technology is running ahead of standards bodies which are slow to follow. The best standards are therefore de facto. No need for standards. Just an open standard architecture. The development of common data model will involve a large number of institutions and businesses who will approve of the model. 
Source:
Public consultation
Most
respondents are already exchanging data
Some 58% of the respondents
are currently already exchanging data with other organisations that is relevant
for maritime surveillance. 15% are not engaged in such activities. The
remaining 27% have not indicated if they are currently sharing or not.
Do
you already exchanging data with other organisations that is relevant for
maritime surveillance?
Source: Public consultation
In connection
with the above there is no clear cut picture whether the respondents use
specific standards in their information exchange. Some base their data exchange
on standards; others only use standards for some exchanges but not all; while
others again do not use standards. Also, standards have not been developed or
applied in all areas of the respondents’ information exchange, which naturally impede
its usage. In some cases, standards are required for information cases, while
in others they are used on a voluntary basis. 
CISE would
benefit from agreed technology and open source
Most of the
respondents (52%) think that CISE would benefit from agreeing on a technology
stack and from using an open source software development platform. The
remaining 48% of the respondents have either not answered the question or given
no opinion. As such no respondents disagree that an agreed technology stack and
an open source platform would be beneficial. 
Would
CISE benefit from an agreed technology stack and an open source software
development platform?
Source:
Public consultation
Even if there is
broad agreement on the benefits of agreeing on a technology stack and using an
open source platform for CISE, there are only scattered views on what such a
stack should include, and why. The main view appears to be to base CISE on a
service oriented architecture based on an existing library of standards in
order to enable the possibility for continuous and cost-effective updates and
maintenance. 
Cost of
supplying information services
Respondents were
also asked to provide information on their expected cost for making data
available through CISE, and if they are in a position to cover these cost. 
Several of the
private organisations indicated that the question was either not applicable to
them, or too complex to answer. Views from national administrations differed.
For some, the cost would amount to between EUR 1-2 million and thus impede the
administrations from covering the cost. Others could not say and referred to
the issue being a matter of political decision. A European organisation put the
cost much lower, i.e. between EUR 100,000‑200,000, and thus within budgetary
limits.
Several
respondents mentioned that the cost would depend on the chosen degree of
interoperability and available APIs for CISE. For some respondents, budgets
could probably still cover the cost, while for others it is not possible to say
at this point.
Return
from CISE is expected to be higher than its cost
Some 30% of the
respondents expect return from CISE to be higher than its cost. This is
significantly higher to the 6% who do not expect the return to be higher.
However, with 45% of the respondents having given no answer to the question,
and 6% being of no opinion on the matter, it appears that there is a great deal
of uncertainty about the capability of CISE to deliver returns that are higher
than its cost.
Do
you expect the return from CISE to be higher than its cost?
Source:
Public consultation
(h)          Concluding
remarks
The low number
of responses to the public consultation makes it difficult to make sound
analysis on the provided answers. However, that being said, it appears that
there is wide agreement that the EU economy and society will benefit from CISE,
and that the platform can enable new innovative solutions for a more efficient
and cost-effective use of available maritime surveillance information
solutions.
Current
situation is inadequate
There is broad
agreement that the public authorities involved with maritime surveillance do
not cooperate or share existing information between sectors and across borders
in an optimal manner. This is mostly perceived as being due the underlying
legal framework and a historical sectorial focus; which in turn prevents public
authorities in gaining an adequate maritime situational awareness in support of
their activities. Technical limitations to information sharing are seen as less
of an issue.
CISE
will improve maritime surveillance 
The large
majority of respondents agree that CISE will improve maritime surveillance;
particularly with respect to enhancing the effectiveness of surveillance and
the response capabilities of operations. Cost savings in terms of information
gathering and use of resources are also highlighted as outcomes of CISE.
CISE
should be implemented through binding measures
Almost all
respondents disagree that no further action should be taken in the area of
improving information sharing. Moreover, a majority of respondents agree that
CISE should be implemented using binding measures. The development of CISE
services would furthermore benefit from cooperation between public and private
entities. There could however be a need for establishing a clearer view of
CISE.
CISE
could benefit from standards and open source
CISE could
benefit from building upon existing standards, an agreed technology stack, and
an open source platform. It would furthermore be preferable if the
implementation of CISE would use a step-wise approach, perhaps through the
support from a well-defined roadmap.
11.                  
Annex 2: Summary of the Member States survey
1.1         Cost of current maritime surveillance
Introduction
The results of
the MS survey regarding cost of maritime surveillance are presented below.
Since the figures provided by the Member States are very incomplete, it is
difficult to draw general conclusions and to get a good estimate of the
surveillance cost baseline.
Results
The results are
presented in the tables below:
Table 11-1 Operation and investment cost
Forecast code:
0: reduction, 1: stable, 2: increase up to 20%, 3: increase above 20%.
Table 11-2: Number of people employed (annual full
time equivalents)
Forecast code:
0: reduction, 1: stable, 2: increase up to 20%, 3: increase above 20%.
1.2         Limitations to information sharing
Introduction
In the second
part of the survey Member States were asked to provide answers about the extent
of limitations to information sharing; including the extent to which the limitations
arise from (1) technical limitations; (2) cultural and/or administrative
differences; and (3) legal limitations. 
A total of 13
Member States provided answers to experienced limitations. However, some only
provided answers for certain user communities. In general, the received data
should be interpreted carefully as
·                        
the
low and high scores could be expressions of low need for exchange between user
communities;
·                        
limitations
are mostly expressions of "targeted actions";
·                        
less
focus is put on routine exchange and thus the unknown.
Results
On average
across all user communities there are about 25% cases of occasional and often
experienced limitations to data access in the responding Member States. There
are, however, most cases registered within the General Law Enforcement,
Defence, Border Control and Maritime Safety user communities. As regards
limitations seen from the providing part, only few communities experience
limitations to obtaining access from the Maritime Safety and Marine Pollution
communities, while data access from General Law Enforcement, Defence, and
particularly customs are experienced as more restrictive and limited. Overall, 
·                        
limitations
are larger between Member States compared to within Member States;
·                        
but
experience of limitations also differs depending on whether the user community
is receiving or providing information.
In terms of the
types and overall significance of limitations to data sharing with respect to
the different user communities, the results are the following:
Figure 11-1: Overall
significance of barriers within MS
Explanation:
0:none, 1:minor, 2:moderate, 3:significant.
Figure 11-2: Overall
significance of barriers across MS
Explanation:
0:none, 1:minor, 2:moderate, 3:significant.
1.3         Benefits
from CISE
Introduction
The third part
of the survey addressed both potentials regarding surveillance tasks, i.e.
routine tasks, targeted operations and response operations, as well as the
types of benefits that Member States would regard as most likely to be
realised.
Results
In terms of
surveillance tasks, Member States generally see moderate to significant
benefits across the board, albeit with targeted operations showing the largest
potential
Figure 11-3: Overall benefits per Member State
Explanation:
0:none, 1: small, 2:moderate, 3: significant.
Figure 11-4: Overall benefits per Member States
(number of answers)
1.4         Impacts
Introduction
Examples of
economic impacts:
·                        
support
a safe and competitive maritime space; 
·                        
reduction
in foregone tax/import duties;
·                        
fairer
competition.
Examples of
social impacts:
·                        
improved
sense of security:
·                        
reduction
in organised crime, particularly from better control of weapons and drugs
smuggling
·                        
examples
of environmental impacts:
·                        
better
preventive monitoring
·                        
faster
response to environmental damages/disasters
Results
The results are
presented in the figures below:
Figure 11-5: Overall impacts per Member State
Explanation:
0:none, 1: small, 2:moderate, 3: significant.
Figure 11-6: Overall impacts per Member State
(number of answers)
12.                  
Annex 3: maritime surveillance authorities in EU
Member States
 BELGIUM 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 The Belgian Coastguard (1) MRCC Ostend (safety)(2) Maritime Security Center Belgium MSC(B)(3) Shipping Assistance Division (of the Agency for Maritime Services & Coast) responsible for VTS and SAR || Department of Agriculture and Fisheries(4) Ministry of Defence (MOD) Federal Public Service interior (Martime& river Police) Federal Public Service Finance( Customs) || Federal public service Health Food chain safety and environment. Management (MUMM) (5) MOD - Belgian Navy (6) || Federal Public Service Finance (Customs) || Federal Public Service interior (Martime & river Police) Federal Public Service  Finance (Customs) || Federal Public Service interior (Belgian police) (7) || MoD - Ministry of Defence- (Belgian Navy) 
 (1)The Belgian Coastguard is responsible for the cooperation between the partners authorised for the Belgian part of the North Sea, 17 governmental institutions (both regional and federal). 
 (2) MRCC is a division of shipping Assistance Division which is part of the internal independent Agency for Maritime Services and Coast, an agency of the Flemish Authorities.  The MRCC together with the MSC(B) form the Belgian coastguard center. 
 (3) MSC (B) together with the MRCC form the Belgian coastguard center.  3 departments work close together: Ministry of defence (MOD), Federal Public Service interior ( Martime & River Police) , Federal Public Service Finance ( Customs). 
 (4) An agency of the Flemish Authorities. 
 (5) The Management Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models (a federal scientific establishment that comes under the Federal Science Policy).  Main role of MUMM in this context is to provide scientific advice on all environmental issues. 
 (6) In case of severe pollution incident (activation of the North Sea contingency Plan) the Belgian Navy is the overall coordinator of the activated Pollution Response Cel. 
 (7) Law enforcement in Belgium is conducted by an integrated police service structured on the federal and local levels. 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 BULGARIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communications - Bulgarian Maritime Administration/ Ministry of Interior/ Ministry of Defence || National Agency of Fisheries and Aquaculture || Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communications -Bulgarian Maritime Administration/ Ministry of Interior || Ministry of Finance - Customs Agency || Ministry of Interior - Police/ Ministry of Defence - Bulgarian Navy || Ministry of Interior - Police/ Ministry of Defence - Navy || MoD - Bulgarian Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 CROATIA ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 CYPRUS 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Dpt. Of Merchant Shipping/ Marine Police/ Cyprus Ports Authority/ Civil Defence Service/ Ministry of Defence || Dpt. For Fisheries and Marine Research || Dpt. For Fisheries and Marine Research/ Dpt. Of Merchant Shipping || Dpt. Of Customs || Marine Police || Ministry of Justice & Public Order (Police)/ Dpt. of Merchant Shipping || Cypriot National Guard - Naval command 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 DENMARK 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Danish Maritime Authority/ MoD- Royal Danish Navy- Admiral Danish Fleet/ Danish Coastal Authority/ Ministry of Transport and Energy (ports)/ Emergency Response Committee(1) || Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries - the Danish Directorate of Fisheries/ Ministry of Defense || Danish Environmental Protection Agency (law)/ The Admiral Danish Fleet is responsible for the maritime/ anti-pollution response/ Local municipalities when pollution reaches the shore || Ministry of Justice/ Customs Authority/ Admiral Danish Fleet and Naval Home Guard may be used to embark Customs officers at sea || Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs/ Local Police districts/ Admiral Danish Fleet will provide maritime surveillance and enforce national sovereignty at sea || Ministry of Justice and local police districts/ Danish Authority for Enterprise and Construction (rules on dual use products)/ Admiral Danish Fleet/ Customs Authority and Danish Maritime Authority may provide the legal basis for law enforcement || MoD - Royal Danish Navy 
 (1) The Emergency Response Committee consists of the Danish Energy Authority (chair), the police in Esbjerg, the Admiral Danish Fleet, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency and the Danish Maritime Authority. It supervises all measures taken by the op 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 ESTONIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Maritime Administration/ Governmental crisis commission/ Ministry of Interior/ Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre || -Ministry of Environment - Environmental Inspectorate/ Estonian Border Guard -Ministry of Agriculture || -Ministry of Interior -Border Guard || Estonian Tax and Customs Board || Border Guard || Police || MoD - Estonian Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 FINLAND 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Policy: Ministry of Transport and communications, Ministry of the Interior (SAR), Operational aspects: Finnish Maritime Administration (1)/ The Border Guard of Finland (at sea)(2), Rescue departments (harbours), the Finnish Environment Institure, Finnish Navy (3) || Policy matters: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry-Department of Fisheries and Game Operational aspects/controlling: Regional Centers for Economic Development, Transport and Environment (ELY), police, Finnish border guard, the Finnish customs || Policy: Ministry of the Environment Operational aspects: Finnish Environmental Institute (in cooperation with the Navy, The Border Guard of Finland, Finstaship (=state-owned shipping company), and the local rescue authorities) Pollution prevention: Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Transport and Communication, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry || Policy: ministry of finance Operational aspects: Customs Authorities (=The Finnish Customs)/ The Border Guard of Finland (immigration) || Policy: Ministry of the Interior Operational aspects: Border Guard (with coast guard districts) Policy related to maritime surveillance: Ministry of Defence Operational aspects: Navy || Police/ The Border Guard of Finland/ Finnish Customs || Policy: MoD Operational: Navy with Border Guard (Coast Guard)  in the times of war 
 (1)the ministry of social affairs and health is responsible for the working conditions onboard the ships and respective inspections carried out by industrial safety administration 
 (2) Border Guard is responsible of SAR and SSAS-alarms, the Finnish Navy conducts maritime SAR operations with and under the Border Guard 
 (3) in case of military crisis or war, Finnish Navy protects maritime traffic and transport with Border Guard (CG) 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 FRANCE 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 -Ministry of Transport (Admin. Of Mar. Affairs) -Ministry of Justice -Ministry of budget (Customs) -Ministry of Interior (home office-civil protection, gendarmerie) - MoD (navy - gendarmerie maritime) || - Ministry of Transport (Admin. of Mar. Affairs) -MoD (Navy - gendarmerie maritime) -Ministry of Budget (Customs) - Ministry of Interior (gendarmerie) || -Ministry of Transport (Admin. Of Mar. Affairs) -Ministry of Justice -Ministry of budget (Customs) -Ministry of Interior (home office-civil protection) - MoD (navy - gendarmerie maritime) || Ministry of Budget (customs) || -Ministry of budget (Customs) -Ministry of Interior (home office-civil protection) - MoD (navy - gendarmerie maritime) -Ministry of Transport ( Admin. Of Mar. Affairs) || -Ministry of budget (Customs) -Ministry of Interior (gendarmerie) - MoD (navy - gendarmerie maritime) -Ministry of Transport ( Admin. Of Mar. Affairs) || MoD - French Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 GERMANY 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs/ Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration(2)/ Federal Ministry of Interior and Coastal States/ Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs/ Federal Ministry of Defense(3), German Navy/ Federal Police and Water Police/ German Lifeboat Association In case of a complex emergency situation: CCME || Within Territorial Waters: Ministries of the Coastal States/ Fishery Control Agencies of the Coastal States, partially Water Police (Schleswig-Holstein) Outside Territorial Waters: Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection/ Federal Agency for Agriculture and Food || Within Territorial Waters and Shore Areas: Ministries of Environment of the Coastal States Outside Territorial Waters: Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs/ Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration and CCME/ Environmental Authorities of the Coastal States || Federal Ministry of Finance/ Federal Customs Administration/ Water Customs Service || Federal Ministry of Interior/ Federal Police || by each responsible Ministry/ by each responsible Authority - mainly Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration in close co-operation with Water Police of Coastal States || MoD - German Navy(3) 
 (1) Network German Coastguard: The command centres of the Federation and the Coastal States including the Maritime Emergencies Reporting and Assessment Centre of the Central Command for Maritime Emergency (CCME) are operating together in the Joint Emergency Reporting and Assessment Centre under the roof of the German Maritime Safety and Security Centre in Cuxhaven. Each agency retains the same responsibility in terms of geographical area and tasks as before, but information exchange, co-operation, co-ordination of operational means and support are optimized. In case of emergency situations the authority competent in the case will lead operations. 
 (2) also the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency and See-Berufsgenossenschaft 
 (3) The German Armed Forces have the task to provide national security and defense against any threat from outside enemies. In accordance with a recent Supreme Court ruling concerning the Aviation Security Act, protection against imminent terrorist attacks may be considered as grave threats to security and the Armed Forces may act to prevent such threats in accordance with the German Constitution (Art. 35). In particular it is the task of the German Armed Forces to monitor all German Air and Water Space and to support other agencies in exercising sovereign rights. Rescue operations, evacuation operations and surveillance missions are also within the scope of tasks of the German Armed Forces 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 GREECE 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Shipping, Maritime Affairs & The Aegean - Hellenic Coast Guard/ Ministry of Citizen's Protection-Civil Emergency/ Planning and Defence Directorate/ Ministry of Defence - Hellenic Navy and Air Force (when needed) || Ministry of Shipping, Maritime Affairs & The Aegean - Hellenic Coast Guard || Ministry of Shipping, Maririme Affairs & The Aegean - Hellenic Coast Guard || Ministry of Finance - Customs || Ministry of Sipping, Maririme Affairs & The Aegean  - Hellenic Coast Guard (maritime borders) - Hellenic Police (land - air borders + reception and asylum processing)/ Ministry of Defence - Hellenic Navy (when needed) || Ministry of Shipping, Maririme Affairs & The Aegean - Hellenic Coast Guard || Policy: MoD Operational: Hellenic Navy 
 (1) on matters relating to the reception of migrants and granting of asylum ||   ||   ||   ||   
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 ICELAND 
 Maritime safety || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of the Interior, Icelandic Maritime Administration, Maritime Traffic Center, The Icelandic Coast Guard. || Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, Directorate of Fisheries, The Icelandic Coast Guard. || Ministry for the Environment, The Environment Agency of Iceland, The Icelandic Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration. || Ministry of Finance, Directorate of Customs, The Icelandic Coast Guard, The Icelandic Police and The National Commissioner of Police. || Ministry of the Interior, The National Commissioner of Police, The Icelandic Police and The Icelandic Coast Guard. || Ministry of the Interior, The National Commissioner of Police and the Icelandic Coast Guard. || Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Icelandic Coast Guard and The National Commissioner of Police. 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 IRELAND 
 Maritime safety || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Policy Dept. of Transport Operational Irish Maritime Administration/ Irish Coast Guard/ National port Authorities/ Irish Defence Forces/ Voluntary SAR services || Policy Dept. of Agriculture, Food and The Marine Operational Sea Fisheries Protection Authority/ Irish Defence Forces || Policy Dept of Transport/ Dept of Environment Operational Irish Coast Guard/ Environmental Protection Agency || Policy Revenue Commissioners/ Dept of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Operational Irish Police || Policy Dept of Defence/ Dept of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Operational Irish Defence Forces/ Irish Police || Policy Dept of Justice, Equality and Law Reform/ Dept of Defence Operational Irish Police/ Irish Defence Forces || Policy: Dept.of Defence Operational: Navy 
 (1) Elements of Maritime Safety Policy function may be shared with the Department of Agriculture, Marine & Food if the Irish Coast Guard transfers from the Department of Transport Tourism and Sport. 
 (2) Policy function of Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport will move to the Department of Agriculture, Marine & Food if the Irish Coast Guard transfers 
 (3) The Irish Police are called An Garda Siochana 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 ITALY 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport - Coast Guard/ State Civil Defence Department/ Sea Emergency Operations Centre(1) || Ministry of Agricultural Policies/ Coast Guard (National Fishing Control Centre)/ Navy || Ministry of Environment, Territory and Sea/ Ministry of Transport - Coast Guard || Ministry of Economy and Finance - Customs || (3) Ministry of Interiors - Police Forces/ Ministry of Transport - Italian Coast Guard(2)/ Ministry of Defence - Navy/ Ministry of Economy and Finance - Customs || (4) Ministry of Transport - Coast Guard/ Ministry of Interiors - Police Forces/ Ministry of Defence - Navy || Policy: MoD Operational: Navy 
 (1) manned with personnel of the Coast Guard 
 (2) when a SAR operation is also needed 
 (3) Italian Institutions who work in the field of Border Control operate under coordination of the Ministry of the Interior. 
 (4) if “Law Enforcements” has to be considered  in a broader way ( since authorities different from real Police Forces have been included, e.g. Coast Guard and Navy), other authorities like Ministry of Economy and Finance shall be added. In any case, the 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 LATVIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport - Maritime Administration/ Ministry of Defence - Coast Guard/ Harbour Master Offices/ Ministry of Environment || Ministry of Agriculture - National Board of Fisheries/ Marine and Inland Waters Administration || Ministry of Environment - Marine and Inland Waters Administration/ Ministry of Defence - Coast Guard/ Port Authorities || Ministry of Finance - Customs || Ministry of Interior/ State Border Guard || -Security Police -State Police -Municipal Police || Policy: MoD Operational: Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 LITHUANIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport and Communications/ Lithuanian Maritime Safety Authority/ Klaipeda State Seaport Authority/ Maritime and Aviation Rescue Centres(1) || -Ministry of Agriculture - Fisheries Service -Navy/Joint Military Commite || Ministry of Transport and Communications/ Ministry of Environment/ Lithuanian Maritime Safety Administration/ Klaipeda Regional Environmental Protection Department/ Maritime Rescue Centre (Naval Force (Ministry of National Defence)) || Ministry of Finance - Customs Department || Ministry of the Interior/ State Border Guard Service || Ministry of the Interior - Police Department/ Ministry of the Interior - State Border Guard Service || Ministry of National Defence - Naval Force 
 (1) composed by the Naval Force (Ministry of National Defence) and the Civil Aviation Administration 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 MALTA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Malta Maritime Authority/ Ministry of Transport and Communications/ Armed Forces of Malta/ Civil Protection Department || Ministry of Rural Affairs and Environment - Fisheries Conservation & Control Division || Malta Maritime Authority/ Ministry of Rural Affairs and Environment (1)/ Oil Pollution Response Module (OPRM)/ Civil Protection Department || Ministry of Finance/ Customs Dept || Armed Forces of Malta/ Police || Police || Armed Forces of Malta 
 (1) Malta Environment & Planning Authority has a monitoring role 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 NORWAY 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Policy: Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs/ Ministry of Defence/ Ministry of Justice and the Police/ Ministry of Trade and Industry Operational: Coastal Administration/ Coast Guard/ Armed Forces/ Police/ JRCC/ Norwegian Maritime Directorate/ Customs || Policy: Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs Operational: Directorate of Fisheries/Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs/ Ministry of the Environment Operational: Norwegian Coastal Administration/ Coast Guard/ Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority/ Climate and Pollution Agency || Policy: Ministry of Finance Operational: Customs/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Justice and the Police Operational: Police/ Customs/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Justice and the Police Operational: Police/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Defence Operational: Armed Forces/ Coast Guard 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 NETHERLANDS (1) 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (2) - North sea Dept/ Coastguard(3)/ Regional Authorities(4)/ Port Authorities/ Shipping Inspectorate(5)/ MoD - Royal NL Navy/ Royal Netherlands Lifeboat Institution/ Ministry of Economic Affairs(6) || -Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality General Inspection Administration (nVWA)  -Coastguard/ Maritime Police || Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management(2) - North sea Dept/ Coastguard || Ministry of Finance - Customs/ Coastguard || Justice - Public Prosecutor + Royal Military Constabulary/ Coastguard(7) || Ministry of Justice - Public Prosecutor/ enforcement services/ Coastguard(7)/ National Police Service Agency || MoD(8) - Royal Netherlands Navy 
 (1) Policy cooperation and integration through the Coordinating Minister for North Sea Affairs (= Minister of Transport etc.) and the Inter-ministerial Board of North Sea Directors. Integrated North Sea policy established in the General Policy Paper on Sp 
 (2) In case of a substantive accident/disaster a representative of the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management chairs an inter-ministerial policy-team in order to ste team at the Coastguard Centre 
 (3) The Netherlands’ Coastguard is a cooperative framework under the operational coordination and command of the Royal Netherlands Navy, bundling the majority of governmental operational services and (civil and military) resources into one functional orga 
 (4) Regional authorities are responsible for vessel traffic management in the approaches and entrances to the Netherlands’ seaports, including the provision of pilotage and vessel traffic services 
 (5) The Shipping Inspectorate is part of the Transport and Water Management Inspectorate of the ministry of Transport, Public works and Water Management 
 (6) The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for offshore exploration of oil and gas, wind-farming, cables and pipes, (coastal) tourism 
 (7) Operational cooperation and integration through the Netherlands Coastguard, under the operational coordination and command of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Integrated operational framework established in annual Coastguard plans and programmes 
 (8) The ministry of Defence is responsible for military uses of the sea, including military exercising, and is operationally responsible for the Netherlands Coastguard and the Hydrographical Service 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 POLAND 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Maritime Security (1): Ministries of: Infrastructure, Interior and Administration, National Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs. Maritime Offices, SAR Service (2), Border Guard, Police, State Fire Brigades (3) and Customs Service (4) and Navy (5) Maritime Safety: Ministry of Infrastructure, Maritime Offices, SAR Service and  Border Guard || Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Regional Sea Fishery Inspectorates, Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection, Veterinary Inspection (6) in cooperation with Border Guard, Police and Customs Service || Maritime Offices  in cooperation with SAR Service and Border Guard Marine environment protection: Chief Inspectorate for Environmental Protection (7) || Ministry of Finance in cooperation with Customs Service and Border Guard || Border Guard || by each responsible Ministry or Authority, in particular: Maritime Offices and Ministry of Infrastructure in cooperation with Border Guard, Police, Customs Service || Navy 
 Ministry of Infrastructure (and supervised authorities) and Polish Border Guard are the most important institutions responsible for matters of maritime surveillance in Poland. 1. In principle the relevant Ministries are dealing with issues related to maritime surveillance on policy level, supervised authorities or services on operational level; 2. Maritime Offices (Gdynia, Słupsk, Szczecin), SAP. Service (Maritime Search and Rescue Service) are under supervision of Ministry of Infrastructure, which is responsible for coordination of the maritime policy in Poland, including integration of maritime surveillance; 3. Border Guard, Police and State Fire Brigades Services are under supervision of Ministry of the Interior and Administration; 4. Customs Service is under supervision of Ministry of Finance (relevant Customs Chambers: Gdynia, Olsztyn, Szczecin); 5. Navy (Navy Command, Maritime Operations Centre, Hydrographic office of the Polish Navy) is under supervision of Ministry of National Defense, 6. Regional Sea Fishery Inspectorates, Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection and Veterinary Inspection are under supervision of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Polish Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC) is a unit within this Ministry; 7. Chief Inspectorate for Environmental Protection is under supervision of Ministry of the Environment. 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 PORTUGAL 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of National Defence/ National Maritime Authority/ Portuguese Navy+Air Force/ Ministry of Public Works, Transports and Communications || Ministry of Agriculture - Rural Development and Fisheries/ System of Supervision and Fishing Activity Control (SIFICAP)/ Ministry of National Defence - Portuguese Navy+Air Force/ National Maritime Authority/ Ministry of Home Affairs/ National Republican Gu || Ministry of National Defence -Portuguese Navy+Air Force/ National Maritime Authority || Ministry of Justice -Judiciary Police/ Ministry of Finance- Customs and Special Duties General Administration/ Ministry of Home Affairs/ Fiscal Brigades || Ministry of National Defence - Portuguese Navy/Air Force/ National Maritime Authority/ Ministry of Home Affairs - Aliens and Border Service || Ministry of National Defence- Portuguese Navy+Air Force/ National Maritime Authority/ Ministry of Home Affairs/ National Republican Guard/ Aliens and Border Service || Ministry of National Defence -Portuguese Navy/ Air Force 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 ROMANIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure trough Romanian Naval Authority(1), Maritime Ports Administrations of Costanta and Galati (ports security)/ Ministry of Administration and Interior - Romanian Border Police General Inspectorate(2) || Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - National Agency for Fishery and Aquaculture/ Ministry of Administration and Interior - Romanian Border Police General Inspectorate(2) || For pollution response: Ministry of Environment and Forests (land-based pollution) - Water Resources Management Department/ Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure - Romanian Naval Authority (ships' pollution)/ Ministry of Administration and Interior - General Inspectorate for Emergency Situation(3) For Marine env.: Ministry of Environment and Forests - Water Resources Management Department(4)/ Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports(5) || Ministry of Public Finance, National Customs Authority (6) || Ministry of Administration and Interior - Romanian Border Police General Inspectorate(2) || Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure - Romanian Naval Authority(1)/ Ministry of Administration and Interior - Romanian Border Police General Inspectorate (2), General Inspectorate of Romanian Police - Naval Transport Police Department (7) || Ministry of National Defence -Romanian Naval Forces 
 (1) under the coordination of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
 (2) trough Border Police County Inspectorate of Constanţa 
 (3) trough Emergency Situation County Inspectorate of Constanţa  
 (4) trough Water Resources Management Department, National Institute for Marine Research and Development “Grigore Antipa” 
 (5) trough National Authority For Scientific Research, The National Institute for Research and Development of Marine Geology and Geoecology – GeoEcoMar and Romanian Space Agency 
 (6) through Customs offices and county directions for tolls and customs operations (Constanţa and Galaţi) 
 (7) trough Maritime Transport Police Department of Constanţa 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 SLOVENIA 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Transport - Slovenian Maritime Administration/ Port State Control/ Ministry of Interior - Police/ Ministry of Defence/ Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief/ Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning/ Environmental Age || Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food/ Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Agriculture, Forestry and Food/ Ministry of the Interior - Police/ Ministry of Transport - Slovenian Maritime Administration || Ministry of Transport - Slovenian Maritime Administration/ Ministry of Defence/ Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief/ Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning - Environmental Agency || Ministry of Finance - Customs Administration || Ministry of Interior - Police || Police/ Customs/ Navy/ Slovenian Maritime Administration || Policy: MoD Operational: Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 SPAIN 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ministry of Public Works and Transport (SASEMAR), Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil), Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs - protection of the marine env., Ministry of Economy and Finance (Customs), Coastal Autonomous Communities. || Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs - fisheries, Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil), Ministry of Defence (Navy), Coastal Autonomous Communities. || Ministry of Public Works and Transport (1), Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs - protection of the marine env., Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil), Ministry of Defence (Navy), Coastal Autonomous Communities. || Ministry of Economy and Finance (Customs), Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil), Ministry of Defence (Navy). || Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil) || Ministry of Interior (Guardia Civil) Ministry of Defence (Navy), Minstry of Economy and Finance (Customs), Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Merchant Marine). || Policy: Ministry of Defence Operational: Navy, Guardia Civil 
 (1) Together with the Coastal Regions, competent for Spatial Planning. Maritime Directorate (Harbour Masters and SASEMAR) competent for marine pollution response. 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 SWEDEN 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Policy: Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications/ Ministry of Defence Operational: Maritime Administration/ Coast Guard/ Police/ Armed Forces || Policy: Ministry of Agriculture Operational: Board of Fisheries/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications/ Ministry of Defence Operational: Environmental Protection Agency/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Finance Operational: Customs/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Justice Operational: Police/ Customs/ Coast Guard || Policy: Ministry of Justice Operational: Police/ Customs/ Coast Guard || Policy: MoD Operational: Swedish Navy 
   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 UNITED KINGDOM 
 Maritime safety, security etc. || Fisheries control || Pollution response & Marine env. || Customs || Border control || Law Enforcement || Defence 
 Policy: Department for Transport (DfT) Operational: Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  (1) || Fisheries is a devolved matter in the UK. England: Policy (and lead for UK) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Operational The MMO is the 'sole' Copmpetent Authority' for the UK where required under the legislation. Marine Management Organisation (MMO) and the Royal Navy (indirect but through MMO) Scotland: Marine Scotland Northern Ireland: DARD and Sea Fisheries Inspectorate Wales; Welsh Assembly Government || Policy Department for Transport (DfT), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Operational Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (1) Marine Management Organisation (MMO) || Policy Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Operational Border Force (Home Office) || Policy/Operational Border Force (Home Office) || Law enforcement (policing) is a devolved matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland England & Wales: Policy Home Office Operational National Crime Agency, Police Scotland & Northern Ireland: policing is a devolved matter || Policy Ministry of Defence (MoD) Operational Royal Navy 
 (1) in conjunction with government emergency planning 
 Note (February 2014): The information contained in this spreadsheet regarding responsibilities of UK Government Departments and Agencies and their data systems is based on an informal survey of contacts and may not be comprehensive. The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) acts as a data sharing hub for most of these Government Departments and Agencies. 
11.                  
Annex 4: Connection with other EU policies related to
eGovernment
The
CISE initiative operates within a larger framework of EU-level policies and
strategies on eGovernment that have been developed in recent years. It is
influenced by a number of EU policies and initiatives that need to be taken
into consideration:
The Malmö
Declaration[98]
The
Malmö Declaration (Nov 2009) responds to the
citizens’ need for more open, flexible and user centric public services. The
declaration points out that, in order to move towards a globally leading
knowledge economy, a true Single Market with seamless eGovernment services and
efficient and effective public administrations are key. Therefore remaining
barriers to cross-border activity should be addressed and technical and legal
pre-conditions and key enablers should be put in place. Furthermore, public
administrations should re-design their administrative processes to reduce
administrative burden. Member States (through the ministers in charge of
eGovernment policy) committed to improve the conditions for interoperability of
public administrations, to increase the positive effect of electronic
collaboration on the delivery of public services. 
The Granada
Declaration[99]
The Granada
Declaration complements the Malmö Declaration on eGovernment by
encouraging the development of more efficient interoperable public services
that promotes the re-use of public sector information, increase the efficiency
of government and lead to a measurable reduction in administrative burdens on
citizens and businesses as well as contribute to a low-carbon economy.
Europe 2020[100]
The Europe 2020 agenda proposes an
ambitious strategy for Europe to exit from the economic crisis. Looking beyond
the short term it aims for a smart, sustainable and inclusive future economy,
realised by a collective European approach focusing on five key areas:
Employment:
Modernising labour markets and empowering people by lifelong skills
improvement.
Innovation:
Improving framework conditions and access to finance for research and
innovation.
Education:
Enhancing the performance of education and reducing early school-leaving.
Social
Inclusion:
Ensuring social and territorial cohesion for every citizen to benefit from
growth and jobs.
Climate/Energy:
Shiftingll towards a low carbon economy by increasing resource efficiency and
modernising the transport sector.
These
five key areas are defining concrete targets and are in turn broken down into
seven flagship initiatives:
Innovation Union
Youth on the
move
A digital agenda for Europe
Resource efficient Europe
An industrial
policy for the globalisation era
An agenda for
new skills and jobs
European
platform against poverty
Efficient
and effective public services, which the CISE initiative contributes to,
contribute to the competitiveness of the EU economy.
Digital Agenda
for Europe[101]
The
Digital Agenda for Europe is one of the seven flagship initiatives of the
Europe 2020 Strategy. It defines how wider deployment and more effective use of
digital technologies will enable the delivery of the social and economic
benefits Europe 2020 aims for. It follows the i2010, eEurope 2005,
eEurope 2002 and eEurope initiatives. The
Digital Agenda contains 101 actions and addresses seven main topics of
improvement (called Pillars), one of them being Interoperability: 
Pillar
I - Digital Single Market: Regulatory limitations should be
eliminated to facilitate cross-border use of commercial and cultural digital
content and services and to enable citizens and businesses to fully benefit
from the European Single Market.
Pillar
II – Interoperability & Standards:
Standardisation, public procurement and coordination between public authorities
will improve the interoperability of digital services and devices.
Pillar
III - Trust and Security: Responsive mechanisms and cooperation
networks should be developed to address cyber-crime and to protect citizens’
personal data and privacy.
Pillar
IV - Very Fast Internet: To ensure the roll-out and take-up of
broadband throughout Europe, investments in fast internet should be stimulated.
Pillar
V - Research and Innovation: Research and Innovation efforts should
be stimulated by leveraging more private investment, improving coordination and
increasing the opportunities for SMEs.
Pillar
VI - Enhancing e-Skills: To decrease the professional IT skills
shortage and to increase Europe’s productivity, all European citizens should
have a minimum level of digital literacy and skills. 
Pillar
VII - IT for Societal challenges: By smart use of IT societal
challenges such as climate change, the ageing society, energy consumption and
social exclusion can be addressed more effectively.
The
Digital Agenda states that interoperability has the potential to contribute to
the European economy’s smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This requires
public services to flow across borders and across sectors, with electronic
services and devices working together efficiently, based on common standards
and open platforms.  
The
CISE initiative contributes to the realisation of the Digital Agenda for Europe. Seamless cross-domain and cross-border information exchanges are a priority for the
EU, as is clearly indicated by the actions in the Pillar VII (IT-enabled
benefits for EU society) and others of the Digital Agenda. The CISE
initiative facilitates 
Pillar
I - Digital Single Market, e.g. action 3 on opening up public data for
re-use by other public authorities).
Pillar
II - improving standard-setting procedures and increased interoperability, namely
action 27 under which Member States should implement commitments on
interoperability and standards in the Malmö and Granada Declarations by 2013.
Action 23 is the "umbrella" action for the Interoperability and
Standards Pillar of the Digital Agenda. 
Pillar
VII for IT-enabled benefits for EU society. CISE contributes to action
84 ('Support seamless cross-border eGovernment services in the single market
through the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) and Interoperability
Solutions for European Public Administrations (ISA) Programme') through its
contribution to the ISA programme and action 89 ('Member States should make
eGovernment services fully interoperable overcoming organisational, technical
or semantic barriers and supporting IPv6').
European
eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015[102]
The
European eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015, launched in December 2010, is the
second eGovernment Action Plan commissioned by the European Commission and aims
to realise the four goals set in the Malmö declaration (Empowerment of citizens
and businesses; Mobility in the Single market; Efficiency and Effectiveness;
Legal and technical pre-conditions). The plan is focused on using public
resources more efficiently, reducing public expenditure and at the same time
providing seamless eGovernment services that answer to the user’s needs. In
other words: Better public services with fewer resources. 
The
eGovernment Action Plan sets three main targets (also based on the Digital
Agenda):
By
2015, a number of key cross-border services will be available online 
By
2015, 50% of EU citizens will have used eGovernment services
By
2015, 80% of enterprises will have used eGovernment services
The
above three targets are to be achieved by stimulating joint action on
eGovernment within Europe and by establishing the pre-conditions for eGovernment
services development, such as interoperability, e-Signature and
e-Identification.
Eventually
the eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015 should lead to more open, innovative and
responsive public services, engaging, enabling and empowering citizens to use digital
services. It will smoothen access to public services across the EU.
The ISA
programme[103]
The
Interoperability Solutions for European Public Administrations Programme (ISA)
aims to foster interoperability between public administrations by helping to establish
common approaches that will make collaboration a lot easier. Sharing and
reusing tools such as common platforms and common components, along with the
sharing of services like common infrastructures, will also play a part by
keeping costs down and reducing time to market.
The
ISA programme is a key actor for the delivery of cross-sector and cross-border
electronic collaboration as it consists of actions that contribute to the
cross-border and cross-sector interoperability, sharing and reuse of common
specifications, tools and services.
Focus
on semantics ensures that the precise meaning of the information remains when
exchanged across borders in different languages. The ISA programme supports
development and sharing of assets and methodologies in the semantics domain via
its SEMIC action Activities in the area of semantic interoperability provide
the means for public administrations to work together on common vocabularies,
definitions and classifications of information in the domains of justice, social
affairs, research, economy, health and many others. The CISE initiative is
benefiting from work done under this action, e.g. by applying the methodologies
it developed.
The
ministers emphasised respect for privacy and data protection, as trust and
security are integral when creating services that rely on the electronic
exchange of information. In this area called Trusted Information Exchange,
ISA supports a variety of actions, one of them being the Trusted Exchange
Platform that supports the secure exchange of documents between local
governments, national parliaments, EU institutions, citizens and businesses.
The CISE initiative has also been funded by the ISA programme as relevant
action in this Trusted Information Exchange area.
The
European Interoperability Strategy
(EIS)[104]
and the European Interoperability Framework (EIF)[105]
are defined as annexes of the Commission Communication on interoperability for
European public services[106],
where it is stated that
"For
public administrations, interoperability brings benefits such as cooperation.
It facilitates the exchange, sharing and reuse of information, thus improving
the delivery of European public services to citizens and business, reducing
costs and preventing duplication of efforts".
The
European Interoperability Framework (EIF) promotes and supports the delivery of
European public services by fostering cross-border and cross-sectoral interoperability.
The Commission Communication stipulates that the EIF should be taken into
account when making decisions on European public services that support the
implementation of EU policy initiatives. The work done so far under the
CISE initiative has been based on the EIF.
The
EIF is maintained under the ISA programme, in close cooperation between the Member States and the Commission. They work together in the spirit of Article 170 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under this Article, to help
achieve the objectives referred to in Article 26 concerning the internal
market, the European Union should help establish and develop trans-European
networks and promote the interconnection and interoperability of national
networks as well as access to such networks.
The
EIF contributes to the better functioning of the internal market by increasing
interoperability. The same applies for the CISE initiative.
[1]               For the purpose of this impact assessment the use of
the term "data" usually refers to raw or unprocessed data which are
formatted in a special way. The term "information" is usually used
when data has been treated and taken a certain meaning.
[2]               Maritime surveillance authorities are those civilian
and military authorities who in one way or the other are involved in or have
the responsibility to carry out surveillance activities not only in waters
under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of EU Member States but also in any
international waters of interest to the EU, such as in the Gulf of Aden where
the Operation Atalanta has been carried out. These authorities can be either
national authorities (such as the national coastguard) or EU level authorities
(such as EFCA, FRONTEX, EMSA).
[3]               There is not yet an agreed definition of this term,
but the EU Maritime domain is commonly referred to as the waters under the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the EU Member States (in most cases up until a
200 nautical miles Exclusive economic Zone) under the Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS). The concept also include maritime surveillance activities carried out
in other maritime areas where the EU has a security interest (such as the gulf
of Aden outside the horn of Africa to protect our merchant vessels from piracy
attacks) and all the maritime-related activities carried out by EU bodies or
Member States under civil and military authority in accordance with our
obligations under international and EU law (such as search and rescue
operations or fisheries control operations).
[4]               Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions - An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union
{COM(2007) 574 final)} - 10 Oct 2007
[5]               Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European economic and social Committee and the
Committee of the regions: "Towards the integration of maritime
surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime
domain" COM(2009)538 final – 15.10.2009, and the Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European economic and
social Committee and the Committee of the regions, on a draft roadmap towards
establishing the Common Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of
the EU maritime domain COM (2010)584 final – 20.10.2010.
[6]               For example, the Directive 2010/65/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on reporting
formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member
States and repealing Directive 2002/6/EC envisages sharing of data collected
through a single point of contact ("single window") to several
functions (maritime safety and security, border control, customs and health)
based on their legal requirements.
[7]               See inter alia risk assessment study in the
consultancy report in support of this impact assessment.
[8]               Communication from the Commission: Ports, an engine
for growth – COM(2013) 295 final - 23.05.2013
[9]               As referred to the equivalent definition of
"maritime situational awareness" in the Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European economic and
social Committee and the Committee of the regions: "Towards the
integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment
for the EU maritime domain" COM(2009)538 final – 15.10.2009 and to the
definition of "Maritime Domain Awareness" by the International Maritime Organization in Amendments to the
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual
(24.05.2010).
[10]             This is a relatively simplified picture for
illustration purposes. The definition of the tasks attached to these functions
is independent from how maritime surveillance functions are organised at
national level which can vary to a great extent from one Member State to the next.  
[11]             See communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the
regions – Strengthening the foundations of smart Regulation – Improving
evaluation - COM (2013) 686 final) of 2 October 2013.
[12]             http://www.ecgff.eu/
[13]             E.g. Service Level Agreements concluded between EMSA
and FRONTEX, EMSA and EFCA, and EFCA and FRONTEX (see section 4.4.1)
[14]             See footnote 4
[15]             See footnote 4
[16]             Declaration of the European Ministers responsible for
the Integrated Maritime Policy and the European Commission, on a Marine and
Maritime Agenda for growth and jobs "The Limassol Declaration" –
07.10.2012- para 22 - http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/documents/limassol_en.pdf;
GAERC Conclusions on Integrated Maritime Policy and Maritime Surveillance
(25.06.2013, para 6), GAERC conclusions on the Marine and Maritime Agenda for
Growth and jobs (11.12.2012, para 9), ENVC Conclusions on the Integrated
Maritime Policy (19.11.2011, para 14), GAERC Conclusions on Integration of
Maritime Surveillance (17.11.2009) and GAERC Conclusions on Integrated Maritime
policy and Maritime Surveillance (8.12.2008, p 45 para 5); European Parliament
resolution of 21 October 2010 on Integrated Maritime Policy - Evaluation
of progress made and new challenges (2010/2040(INI) (para 36) - http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0386&language=EN
[17]             Declaration of the European Ministers responsible for
the Integrated Maritime Policy and the European Commission, on a Marine and
Maritime Agenda for growth and jobs "The Limassol Declaration" –
07.10.2012, see para 21: "We reaffirm that growth can be boosted by
coherent and effective public policy that sets out the conditions necessary for
the full development of the blue economy. It should reduce administrative and
regulatory burdens and remove bottlenecks for innovation and investment. We
therefore call for involved parties to: (…) Support the integration of maritime
surveillance towards an active operational Common Information Sharing
Environment for the EU maritime domain by 2020,
as an effective and cost-efficient way of safeguarding EU interests"
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/documents/limassol_en.pdf.
[18]             See inter alia GAERC Conclusions on Integrated Maritime
Policy and Maritime Surveillance (25.06.2013, para 6), GAERC conclusions on the
Marine and Maritime Agenda for Growth and jobs (11.12.2012, para 8), ENVC
Conclusions on the Integrated Maritime Policy (19.11.2011, para 13), GAERC
Conclusions on Integration of Maritime Surveillance: "towards the
integration of Maritime Surveillance: a Common Information and Sharing
Environment for the EU maritime domain (23.05.2011), GAERC Conclusions on
Integrated Maritime Policy (14.06.2010, para 11), GAERC Conclusions on
Integration of Maritime Surveillance (17.11.2009) and GAERC Conclusions on
Integrated Maritime policy and Maritime Surveillance (8.12.2008, p 45 para 5
and 6) 
[19]             European Parliament resolution of 21 October 2010 on
Integrated Maritime Policy - Evaluation of
progress made and new challenges (2010/2040(INI) (para 31-36)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0386&language=EN
[20]             Parliament report on the maritime dimension of the
Common Security and Defence Policy
(2012/2318(INI)) - Committee on Foreign Affairs http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/2318%28INI%29&l=en

[21]             Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions - Towards the integration of maritime surveillance: a common
information
sharing environment for the EU maritime domain (14.07.2010)
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.ten-opinions.16088
[22]             6 of 7 Sectoral functions were represented by national
experts. Customs was represented by DG TAXUD.
[23]             http://www.bluemassmed.net/
[24]             http://www.marsuno.eu/
[25]             http://coopp.eu/the-project
[26]             http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm
[27]             Ares (2013)3659551 of 6 December 2013
[28]             These can take many forms, such as natural catastrophes
- storm floodings or tsunamis; security of supply related to minerals,
foodstuff, seafood and energy; risks to underwater pipelines and cables through
anchors, fishing gear or others; poor safety regulation of wind, wave and tidal
energy farms; unintended accidents; illegal discharge of oil at sea; piracy;
terrorism; local wars; illegal immigration; safety of life at sea; narcotics
and arms trafficking; smuggling of (counterfeit) goods - considering that 70%
of the EU’s external trade is carried by sea and that stand alone cigarette
smuggling constitutes a loss of public income of about € 10 billion each year;
importation of alien species in (polluted) ballast waters, plundering of
natural resources such as overfishing; plundering of archaeological artefacts
and treasures on the seabed and others. These challenges, threats, risk and
vulnerabilities have been occuring on the world wide maritime areas of interest
to Europe (including the Baltic, the North Celtic Sea, Biscay/Iberia, Black
Sea, Mediterranean, Arctic Ocean, Oversees and High Seas) with a varying degree
of frequency depending on the sea basins and the type of occurrence. More
details can be extracted from expert work in the supporting consultant’s study
report (COWI/Wise Pen International).
[29]             The term interoperability is defined in in Article 2 of
Decision  No 922/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 16
September 2009 on interoperability solutions for European public
administrations (ISA) (OJ L260 3.10.2009) as meaning the "ability of
disparate and diverse organisations to interact towards mutually beneficial and
agreed common goals, involving the sharing of information and knowledge between
the organisations, through the business processes they support, by means of the
exchange of data between their respective IT systems".
[30]             The consequences for the maritime surveillance
authorities of this suboptimal situation is highlighted in section 4.4.
[31]             See introduction, in other words general law
enforcement, border control, maritime safety/maritime security and prevention
of pollution caused by ships, marine pollution preparedness and response/marine
environment protection, fisheries control, customs and defence.
[32]             See section 4.4.
[33]             Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November
2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the
rules of the common fisheries policy
[34]             Vessel Monitoring System, Automatic Identification
System and Vessel Detection System data
[35]             Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union;  Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data: the national legislations which implemented Directive 95/46/EC; 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of  personal data processed
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
Regulation 45/2001/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the
free movement of such data.
[36]             Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring
and information system and repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC.
[37]             Directive 2010/65/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 20 October 2010 on reporting formalities for ships arriving in
and/or departing from ports of the Member States and repealing Directive
2002/6/EC. The national single windows will be fully functional in Member
States by 1 June 2015. 
[38]             Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System
(EUROSUR).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011PC0873:EN:NOT

[39]             Convention
drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the
use of information technology for customs purposes.
[40]             Directive
2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2007
establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community
(INSPIRE)
[41]             Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European economic and social Committee the Committee
of the regions: Towards a Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS)
COM(2008) 46 final – 01.02.2008.
[42]             Some encouraging developments can however be noted
which permits automatic transmission of information, inter alia through the use
of National Single Windows, Eurosur, Marsur, Flux, Siena, as well as other
systems and platforms  referred to in this text.
[43]             Assessment of Trans-European networks supporting EU
policies, under the Interoperability Solutions for European Public
Administrations programme (ISA): http://ec.europa.eu/isa/actions/02-interoperability-architecture/2-14action_en.htm
[44]             See in particular MARSUNO pilot project final report - http://www.marsuno.eu/
[45]             It is available at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum.
[46]             When requested to identify the relevant demand, TAG
participants were requested to limit themselves to information for which it
could be considered that the sharing of information could correspond to a
justified operational need in accordance with the need to know principle
referred to above. It is to be noted that this assessment is indicative only
since the expected demand might not fully correspond to the actual right of the
owner to share this information due to confidentiality requirements. It was not
considered possible to make a full assessment if the owner of the information
had to share the relevant information since that assessment has to be made by
him of the data on the basis of a case by case analysis of the relevant data.
Therefore, it will ultimately be for the demand side and for the owner to
determine which information can be shared by the owner and whether the receiver
has a justified need to receive it.
[47]             This estimation is made with the assumption that the
single window will in the future be able to share information with all the 6
other functions. The current directive provides for sharing with the customs
and border control communities only.
[48]             Whereas the supply side has been defined as the data
required by the Community Customs Code and its implementing provisions for the
declaration of goods, the demand side has been identified from the perspective
of what could be needed from a more operational point of view by national
customs authorities engaged in preventive activitites in case of an event, in
addition to those already accessible in accordance to EU law.
[49]             Referred to in section 3 of this report.
[50]             See footnotes
[51]             See further http://www.bonnagreement.org/
[52]             Such as project MARSURV-1: anti-piracy monitoring
service off the coast of Somalia for Atalanta operation with EUNAVFOR (EU Naval
Forces); project MARSURV-2: EU maritime borders surveillance service in the
Mediterranean for INDALO operation with FRONTEX and project MARSURV-3:
fisheries control service with EFCA in the Mediterranean during the bluefin
tuna surveillance campaign; project BE-AWARE: risk assessment of marine
pollution in the North Sea and its approaches .
[53]             While such big ships have a primary economic
importance, it has to be noted that the majority of ships subject to maritime
surveillance are smaller than 300 gross tons. These include small fishing
vessel, pleasure craft and too often small boats carrying illegal immigrants
over sea.
[54]             http://www.emsa.europa.eu/integrated-maritime-data-environment-imdate.html
[55]             Further information on the content of these agreement
can be found in the study in support of this Impact assessment.
[56]             "The Four Laws of Application Total Cost of
Ownership”, Gartner, Andy Kyte, 3 April 2012 (reference ID G00230382)
[57]             See risk assessment study referred to in footnote 26.
[58]             See Gartner study on the "Sustainability and
Efficiency of Visions for CISE" for more information, available on http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm
[59]             Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
[60]             See for example the Ministerial Limassol Declaration
referred in footnote n°17 and Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European economic and
social Committee and the Committee of the regions: "Blue Growth:
opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth" COM(2013) 510
final – 08.07.2013
[61]             Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in
the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) 
[62]             Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and
integrated coastal management COM(2013) 133 final – 12.03.2013
[63]             Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Strategic
goals and recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018 -
/* COM/2009/0008 final */ 21.01.2009
[64]             See footnote n°36
[65]             See footnote n°37
[66]             See footnote n°38
[67]             See Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.101992, p. 1).
This Customs Code will soon be superseded by the recently adopted Union Customs
Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p.1) which will come into force on 1 June 2013.
[68]             Malmö Declaration: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/ministerial-declaration-on-egovernment-malmo.pdf
Granada Declaration: http://ec.europa.eu/ceskarepublika/pdf/press/ks7rada.pdf
[69]             http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0743:FIN:EN:PDF
[70]             Decision No 922/2009/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 September 2009 on establishing a programme on
interoperability solutions for European public administrations (ISA) — OJ L
260, 03.10.2009, p. 11.
[71]             Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European economic and social Committee and the
Committee of the regions: "Towards a more competitive and efficient
defence and security sector" /* COM/2013/0542 final */ 24.07.2013
[72]             Joint Communication from the Commission and the High
Representative of the Union for the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the
European Parliament and Council: Elements for a European Union Maritime
Security Strategy: For an open, safe and secure global maritime domain –
planned to be adopted early 2014.
[73]             The European Interoperability Framework 2.0
(http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/isa_annex_ii_eif_en.pdf),
as an annex to the Commission Communication on Interoperability for European
public services, defines semantic interoperability as the precise meaning of
exchanged information which is preserved and understood by all parties and
technical interoperability as the planning of technical issues involved in
linking computer systems and services.
[74]             http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/
[75]             Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. This means that
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority
[76]             Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC. This means that data
must be processed fairly and lawfully, collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those
purposes; the personal data must be adequate in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and kept no longer than is necessary for those
purposes
[77]             Which follows from Article 6 of the Directive 95/46/EC.
[78]             Commercially sensitive data is commonly referred to as
any information which is not in the public domain or publically available and
where disclosed may undermine the economic interest or competition position of
the owner of the information. See for example the guidance document by the
European Medicines Agency on the identification of confidential information and
protection of personal data www.ema.europa.eu.
[79]             As elaborated in the Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: "Towards interoperability for
European public services" (COM(2010) 744 final) – 16.12.2010:
"For
public administrations, interoperability brings benefits such as cooperation.
It facilitates the exchange, sharing and reuse of information, thus improving
the delivery of European public services to citizens and business, reducing
costs and preventing duplication of efforts".
[80]             Similarly to what is happening in the eHealth sector
with the IHE initiative (www.ihe.net) or in
the eProcurement sector with the OpenPEPPOL Association (www.peppol.eu).
[81]             In Europe, standards are developed and agreed by the
three officially recognized European Standardization Organisations: the
European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI)
[82]             See study on Architecture Visions and existing systems
at EU level for more information
[83]             The platform has been developed with the support of the
ISA programme and is currently being tested in a pilot phase with several
national authorities, the European Parliament, the Council and the Publication
Office
[84]             The Cooperation Project Maritime Surveillance is a
project run by 11 Member States and Norway, aiming at defining a set of useful
cross-sector and cross-border information services, and at defining the needed
supporting common data model
[85]             Several scenarios can be envisaged:
- Leverage
the solution: the solution is performing well operationally, and is reported as
compliant with CISE (as it is) and therefore it is ready to be reused.
- Convert the
solution: The solution is performing operationally well, but additional
investment is required to make it CISE compliant and then reuse it across the
board.
- Reuse parts
of the solution: The solution can provide input to CISE reference
implementation which will in any case be something new.
[86]             See footnotes n°23 and n°24
[87]             Directive and Regulations referred to above.
[88]             Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 30 November 2011 establishing a Programme to support the
further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy.
[89]             CISE in place: All limitations to information sharing
(legal, technical and cultural limitations and barriers) have been addressed
and a significant part of the information gap identified by TAG is closed.
[90]             To be more precise, ‘risks’ as referred to above are
understood as being a combination of ‘risks’ and their ‘impacts’. Depending on
the sea basin and the situation one may encounter a combination of ‘high risk’
with ‘low impact’ or vice versa. The resulting combination of risks and their
impacts may be referred to as level of ‘danger’. It is such level of danger
that is being reduced by 30% in average. For simplicity however the present
text only refers to (threats and) risks being reduced by 30% through enhanced
knowledge and improved maritime situational awareness.
[91]             It is understood that CISE will be established step by
step and that the benefit would thus increase proportionally over the first ten
years.
[92]             As the implementation of CISE is an ongoing process and
is intended to be implemented gradually, the 80% uptake of the full potential
is meant to be reached after a progressive uptake over the next ten years. The
gradually cumulated total benefit over the next ten years is thus less than 80%
of the full potential (that may be assumed for the second ten year period).
[93]             None of the policy options impose information reporting
obligations. The impact of increased operational information exchanges on
resources at Member States level has been included in the costing estimates.
[94]             See Commission study on CISE Architecture Visions and
existing systems at EU level for more information, available on http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm

[95]             The total cost combines one-off capital investment
expenditures (CapEx) as well as annual operational expenditures (OpEx) over the
10 year period, both at EU level and at Member States level.
[96]             See Gartner study on the "Sustainability and
Efficiency of Visions for CISE" for more information, available on http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm

[97]             See Gartner study on the "Sustainability and
Efficiency of Visions for CISE" for more information, available on
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm
[98]             http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/ministerial-declaration-on-egovernment-malmo.pdf

[99]             http://ec.europa.eu/ceskarepublika/pdf/press/ks7rada.pdf

[100]            http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm

[101]            Digital Agenda for Europe. http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/ 
and Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European economic and social Committee the Committee of the regions:
"A Digital Agenda for Europe" COM(2010) 245 final/2 – 26.08.2010
[102]            http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0743:FIN:EN:PDF

[103]            Decision No 922/2009/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 September 2009 on
establishing a
programme on interoperability solutions for European public administrations
(ISA) — OJ
L 260,
03.10.2009, p. 11.
[104]            http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/isa_annex_i_eis_en.pdf

[105]            http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/isa_annex_ii_eif_en.pdf

[106]            Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions: "Towards interoperability for European public
services" (COM(2010) 744 final) – 16.12.2010