Annual report 2013 : synopsis of the work of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal.
Date: 2014-07-03
Institutions: Court of Justice of the European Union
Subjects: Civil Service Tribunal, Court of Justice of the European Union, General Court (EU), activity report

ISSN 1831-8444

COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Annual report
2013

3

1

0

2

T

R

O

P

E

R

L

A

U

N

N

A

N

O

I

N

U

N

A

E

P

O

R

U

E

E

H

T

F

O

E

C

I

T

S

U

J

F

O

T

R

U

O

C

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

ANNUAL REPORT 
2013

Synopsis of the work of the Court of Justice,  
the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal

Luxembourg, 2014

www.curia.europa.eu

Court of Justice
L-2925 Luxembourg
Tel. +352 4303-1

General Court
L-2925 Luxembourg
Tel. +352 4303-1

Civil Service Tribunal
L-2925 Luxembourg
Tel. +352 4303-1

The Court of Justice on the Internet: http://www.curia.europa.eu

Completed on: 1 January 2014

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. The photographs may be reproduced 
only in the context of this publication. For any other use, authorisation must be sought from the 
Publications Office of the European Union.

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

ISBN  978-92-829-1692-6  (Print) 
978-92-829-1669-8  (PDF)

ISSN  1831-8444  (Print) 
2315-2311  (PDF)

doi: 10.2862/5295 (Print) 
10.2862/4627 (PDF)

© European Union, 2014

Printed in Luxembourg

Printed on elemental chlorine-free bleached PaPer

Contents 

Contents

Court of Justice

Page

Foreword by the President 
of the Court of Justice, Vassilios Skouris ................................................................................................ 5

Chapter I

The Court of Justice

A — The Court of Justice in 2013: changes and activity   ................................................................ 9

B — Case-law of the Court of Justice in 2013  ..................................................................................  11

C — Composition of the Court of Justice  ..........................................................................................  55

1.  Members of the Court of Justice  .........................................................................................  57

2.  Change in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2013  .....................................  73

3.  Order of precedence  ...............................................................................................................  75

4.  Former members of the Court of Justice  .........................................................................  77

D — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice  ...................................  81

Chapter II

The General Court

A — Proceedings of the General Court in 2013  ............................................................................ 113

B — Composition of the General Court  ........................................................................................... 151

1.  Members of the General Court  .......................................................................................... 153

2.  Change in the composition of the General Court in 2013  ...................................... 165

3.  Order of precedence  ............................................................................................................. 167

4.  Former members of the General Court  .......................................................................... 171

C — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court  .................................... 173

Annual Report 2013 

3

Court of Justice 

Chapter III

The Civil Service Tribunal

Contents

A — Proceedings of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2013  ............................................................... 195

B — Composition of the Civil Service Tribunal  .............................................................................. 205

1.  Members of the Civil Service Tribunal  ............................................................................ 207

2.  Change in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2013  ......................... 211

3.  Order of precedence  ............................................................................................................. 213

4.  Former Members of the Civil Service Tribunal  ............................................................. 215

C —  Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Civil Service Tribunal  ....................... 217

4 

Annual Report 2013

Foreword 

Foreword

Court of Justice

In 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union experienced a striking increase in the pace of 
its judicial activity. First, the number of cases brought was the highest since the judicial system of 
the European Union was created. Second, with 1 587 cases being completed, the institution’s pro-
ductivity was at an unprecedented level. The Court of Justice can only be satisfied with this trend, 
which indicates the confidence of national courts and of litigants in the judicature of the European 
Union.

However, this intensification of judicial activity is liable, in the not necessarily distant future, to 
undermine  the  efficiency  of  the  European  Union’s  judicial  system  as  a  whole.  For  this  reason, 
there is a constant and continuous need to seek means, in the form of both legislation and working 
methods, of improving the efficiency of that judicial system.

2013 also witnessed the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union and the arrival 
of the two Croatian members at the Court of Justice and the General Court respectively, as well as 
the adoption of the decision increasing the number of Advocates General at the Court of Justice 
and, in this context, the arrival of the first Polish Advocate General.

Finally, the past year also saw the departure of six members of the General Court in the context of 
the partial renewal of its membership, two members of the Court of Justice and one member of 
the Civil Service Tribunal. 

This report provides a full record of changes concerning the institution and of its work in 2013. 
A substantial part of the report is devoted to succinct but exhaustive accounts of the main judicial 
activity of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, accompanied by 
statistics. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly thank my colleagues in the three courts 
and the entire staff of the Court of Justice for the outstanding work carried out by them during this 
exceptionally demanding year.

V. Skouris 
President of the Court of Justice

Annual Report 2013 

5

 
Chapter I

The Court of Justice

Changes and activity 

Court of Justice

A — The Court of Justice in 2013: changes and activity 

By Mr Vassilios Skouris, President of the Court of Justice

The first part of the Annual Report gives an overview of the activities of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in 2013. First, it describes how the institution evolved during the past year, with 
the emphasis on the institutional changes affecting the Court of Justice and developments relating 
to its internal organisation and its working methods (Section 1). Second, it includes an analysis of 
the statistics which shows both the evolution of the Court of Justice’s workload and the average 
duration of proceedings (Section 2). Third, it presents, as it does each year, the main developments 
in the case-law, arranged by subject matter (Section 3).

1. As regards the evolution of the Court of Justice of the European Union generally, the event of 
the past year which stands out is the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union. At 
a formal sitting on 4 July 2013, the first Croatian Judge of the Court of Justice and the first Croatian 
Judge of the General Court took the prescribed oath and they entered into office on the same day. 
Preparation for this seventh enlargement of the European Union was problem-free for the institu-
tion, and the two Judges, the members of their Chambers and all the staff of Croatian nationality 
who joined the institution were integrated smoothly. 

At the judicial level, it should be noted that, by Council Decision 2013/336/EU of 25 June 2013 in-
creasing the number of Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ 2013 
L 179, p. 92), the number of Advocates General was increased to nine with effect from 1 July 2013 
and will rise to eleven with effect from 7 October 2015. Following the adoption of that decision, the 
first Polish Advocate General took the oath on 23 October 2013. 

As regards procedural rules, following the entry into force of the new Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of Justice in 2012, the Court submitted to the Council a proposal for the adoption of new 
Supplementary  Rules  to  replace  the  Supplementary  Rules  of  4  December  1974  (OJ  1974  L  350, 
p. 29), as last amended on 21 February 2006 (OJ 2006 L 72, p. 1). This proposal was approved by 
the Council at the beginning of 2014 (OJ 2014 L 32, p. 37). In parallel the Court adopted practice 
directions to parties concerning cases brought before the Court (OJ 2014 L 31, p. 1), which replace, 
with effect from 1 February 2014, the practice directions relating to direct actions and appeals of 
15 October 2004 (OJ 2004 L 361, p. 15), as amended on 27 January 2009 (OJ 2009 L 29, p. 51). These 
two procedural instruments entered into force on 1 February 2014. 

2. The statistics concerning the Court’s activity in 2013 reveal unprecedented figures overall. The 
past year will be remembered for being, first, the most productive year in the Court’s history and, 
second, the year with the highest ever number of new cases.  

Thus, the Court completed 635 cases in 2013 (net figure, that is to say, taking account of the joinder 
of cases), a considerable increase compared with the previous year (527 cases completed in 2012). 
Of those cases, 434 were dealt with by judgments and 201 gave rise to orders.

The Court had 699 new cases brought before it (without account being taken of the joinder of 
cases on the ground of similarity), which amounts to an increase of approximately 10% compared 
with 2012 and constitutes the highest annual number of cases brought in the Court’s history. This 
increase in the total number of cases brought is attributable to the increase, compared with the 
previous year, in the number of appeals and references for a preliminary ruling. In 2013 the number 
of references for a preliminary ruling, which rose to 450, was the highest ever. 

Annual Report 2013 

9

Court of Justice 

Changes and activity

Concerning the duration of proceedings, the statistics are very positive. In the case of references 
for a preliminary ruling, the average duration amounted to 16.3 months. The slight increase com-
pared with 2012 (15.6 months) is not regarded as statistically significant. The average time taken to 
deal with direct actions and appeals was 24.3 months and 16.6 months respectively. It is true that, 
in the case of direct actions, the duration of proceedings increased significantly in 2013 compared 
with the previous year (19.7 months). The Court indeed remains vigilant in this regard, but initial 
statistical analyses show that the increase is, rather, attributable to short-term factors over which 
the Court has only very limited control. 

In addition to the reforms in its working methods that have been undertaken in recent years, the 
improvement of the Court’s efficiency in dealing with cases is also due to the increased use of the 
various procedural instruments at its disposal to expedite the handling of certain cases (the urgent 
preliminary ruling procedure, priority treatment, the expedited procedure, the simplified pro cedure 
and the possibility of giving judgment without an Opinion of the Advocate General). 

Use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure was requested in five cases and the designated 
chamber considered that the conditions under Article 107 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure were 
met in two of them. Those cases were completed in an average period of 2.2 months. 

Use of the expedited procedure was requested 14 times, but the conditions under the Rules of Pro-
cedure were met in none of those cases. Following a practice established in 2004, requests for the 
use of the expedited procedure are granted or refused by reasoned order of the President of the 
Court. In addition, priority treatment was granted in 5 cases.

Also, the Court utilised the simplified procedure laid down in Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure to 
answer certain questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling. A total of 33 cases were brought to 
a close by orders made on the basis of that provision.

Finally, the Court made fairly frequent use of the possibility offered by Article 20 of its Statute of 
determining cases without an Opinion of the Advocate General where they do not raise any new 
point of law. About 48% of the judgments delivered in 2013 were delivered without an Opinion. 

As regards the distribution of cases between the various formations of the Court, it is to be noted 
that the Grand Chamber dealt with roughly 8%, chambers of five Judges with 59%, and chambers 
of three Judges with approximately 32%, of the cases brought to a close by judgments or by orders 
involving a judicial determination in 2013. Compared with the previous year, the proportion of 
cases dealt with by the Grand Chamber remained stable (9% in 2012), while the proportion of cases 
dealt with by five-Judge chambers increased (54% in 2012). 

For more detailed information regarding the statistics for the past judicial year the section of this 
report specifically devoted to that topic should be consulted.

10 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

B — Case‑law of the Court of Justice in 2013

I. 

1. 

Constitutional or institutional issues

Proceedings of the European Union

As in previous years, the Court had the opportunity, by means of several decisions, to provide im-
portant clarification concerning the conditions in which it exercises its jurisdiction.

a) 

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations

In Case C-95/12 Commission v Germany (judgment of 22 October 2013), the Court determined an 
action brought by the Commission concerning the failure to comply with a previous judgment of 
the Court finding a failure to fulfil obligations.  (1)  In  the  previous  judgment,  the  Court  had  found 
that, by maintaining in force certain provisions of the ‘Volkswagen Law’, in particular those relat-
ing to the appointment by Germany and the Land of Lower Saxony of members of the supervisory 
board of the vehicle manufacturer Volkswagen and also the limitation of voting rights together 
with a blocking minority of 20% for the adoption of certain decisions by the shareholders of that 
vehicle manufacturer, Germany had infringed the principle of free movement of capital. Following 
the judgment of the Court, Germany had repealed the first two provisions, but it had maintained 
the provision on the blocking minority. Taking the view that it followed from the judgment finding 
a failure to fulfil obligations that each of the three provisions concerned constituted an independ-
ent infringement of the principle of free movement of capital and that, consequently, the provision 
on the blocking minority ought to have been repealed as well, the Commission had again brought 
an action before the Court and claimed that Germany should be ordered to pay a daily penalty 
payment and a lump sum.

In its judgment in this action, the Court found that it follows both from the operative part and from 
the grounds of its previous judgment that the Court did not find a failure to fulfil obligations result-
ing from the provision on the blocking minority considered in isolation, but solely a failure to do 
so resulting from the combination of that provision with the provision on the limitation of voting 
rights. In repealing, on the one hand, the provision of the ‘Volkswagen Law’ relating to the ap-
pointment by the State and the Land of Lower Saxony of members of the supervisory council and, 
on the other, the provision relating to the limitation of voting rights, thus putting an end to the 
combination of that latter provision and the provision concerning the blocking minority, Germany 
fulfilled, within the period prescribed, its obligations resulting from the judgment delivered against 
it. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Commission’s action.

b) 

Actions for annulment

As regards actions for annulment, mention should be made of two judgments of the Court relat-
ing to the new version of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, as introduced by the Treaty of 

(1)  Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-8995.

Annual Report 2013 

11

Court of Justice 

Case-law

Lisbon, which concern, respectively, the concept of ‘regulatory act’ and the concept of ‘implement-
ing measures’. (2)

In  Case  C-583/11  P  Inuit  Tapiriit  Kanatami  and  Others  v  Parliament  and  Council  (judgment  of 
3 October 2013), the Court upheld the order of the General Court (3) holding inadmissible an action 
for annulment of Regulation No 1007/2009 (4) brought by a number of natural and legal persons 
representing the interests of Canadian Inuits.

The Court observed that, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, certain acts of general 
application may be challenged before the Courts of the European Union by natural and legal per-
sons without their being required to meet the condition of individual concern. However, the Treaty 
states unequivocally that those less strict rules on admissibility apply to only a restricted category 
of such acts, namely the category of regulatory acts. In particular, as the General Court correctly 
observed, although legislative acts are also of general application, they are not regulatory acts and 
continue to be subject to stricter rules on admissibility. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires 
relating to Article III-365(4) of the proposed treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the con-
tent of which was reproduced in identical terms in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, that 
the amendment which that provision was to introduce to the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC 
was not intended to extend the conditions of admissibility of actions for annulment of legislative 
acts. Thus, for legislative acts, the admissibility of an action brought by a natural or legal person 
continues to be subject to the condition that the contested act must be of individual concern to 
the applicant.

In this instance, the Court held that the condition was not satisfied, since the prohibition on the 
placing of seal products on the market, set out in Regulation No 1007/2009, is worded in general 
terms and applies indiscriminately to any trader falling within its scope, without being specifically 
aimed at the applicants, who could not therefore be regarded as being individually concerned by 
that prohibition.

In addition, the Court stated that the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union does not require that an individual should have an uncon-
ditional entitlement to bring an action for annulment of European Union legislative acts directly 
before the Courts of the European Union. On the contrary, it is for the Member States to establish 
a system of legal remedies which ensure respect for the fundamental right to effective judicial 
protection. Nonetheless, neither that provision nor the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, 
which imposes such an obligation on the Member States, requires that an individual should be 
able to bring actions against such acts, as their primary subject matter, before the national courts 
or tribunals.

The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, was also interpret-
ed in the judgment of 19 December 2013 Case C-274/12 P Telefónica v Commission, delivered in an 

(2) 

In relation to actions for annulment, mention should also be made of Joined Cases C-478/11 P to C 482/11 P 
Gbagbo  and  Others  v  Council  (judgment  of  23 April 2013)  and  Case  C-239/12  P  Abdulrahim  v  Council  and 
Commission (judgment of 28 May 2013). These judgments are presented under the heading ‘Common Foreign 
and Security Policy — Freezing of funds’.

(3)  Order of 6 September 2011 in Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council [2011] 

ECR II-5599.

(4)  Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in 

seal products (OJ 2009 L 286, p. 36).

12 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

appeal against an order of the General Court (5) holding inadmissible an action against a Commis-
sion decision declaring a provision of Spanish corporation tax law incompatible with the common 
market. Without ruling on the nature of that decision, the Court defined the tests for determining 
whether a regulatory act entails ‘implementing measures’ within the meaning of the final limb of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

As a preliminary point, the Court observed that, where regulatory acts entail implementing meas-
ures, judicial review of compliance with the European Union legal order is ensured either by the 
Courts of the European Union, if responsibility for the implementation of those acts lies with the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, or by the national courts and tribu-
nals, where that implementation is a matter for the Member States. Before the national courts and 
tribunals, natural and legal persons may thus plead the invalidity of the basic act and cause those 
courts and tribunals to make a reference to the Court under Article 267 TFEU.

As to whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures, the Court held that that question 
should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceed-
ings. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with re-
gard to other persons. Furthermore, reference should be made exclusively to the subject matter 
of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the partial annulment of an act, it is solely the 
implementing measures which that part of the act entails that must, as the case may be, be taken 
into consideration.

As regards the decision at issue in this case, the Court observed that it is concerned exclusively 
with declaring an aid scheme consisting of tax rules incompatible with the common market and 
that it does not define the specific consequences which that declaration has for each tax payer; 
those consequences are embodied solely in administrative documents, such as a tax notice, which 
constitute implementing measures within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU.

The Court therefore concluded that the General Court was correct to hold, in this instance, that the 
conditions governing admissibility laid down in the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU were not met.

c) 

References for a preliminary ruling

Case C-416/10 Križan and Others (judgment of 15 January 2013) (6) provided the Court with the op-
portunity to clarify both the extent of the discretion of national courts to make a reference to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling and the concept of court of last instance. The Court recalled that a national 
procedural rule pursuant to which legal rulings of a higher court bind the lower courts cannot call 
into question the discretion of the latter courts to request the Court for a preliminary ruling where 
they have doubts as to the interpretation of European Union law, and they must disregard the rul-
ings of the higher court if they consider, in the light of the interpretation given by the Court, that 
they are not consistent with European Union law. The Court held that those principles apply in the 
same way with regard to the legal position expressed by a constitutional court, since it follows 
from well-established case-law that rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be 
allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of European Union law.

(5)  Order of 21 March 2012 in Case T-228/10 Telefónica v Commission.

(6)  Another aspect of this judgment is presented under the heading ‘Environment’.

Annual Report 2013 

13

Court of Justice 

Case-law

In addition, the Court held that a national court is a court against whose decisions there is no judi-
cial remedy under national law, within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, and 
which is thus required to request a preliminary ruling from the Court, even where national law pro-
vides for the possibility of bringing before the constitutional court of the Member State concerned 
an action against its decisions limited to an examination of a potential infringement of the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitution or by an international agreement.

d) 

Actions for damages

In Case C-103/11 P Commission v Systran and Systran Luxembourg (judgment of 18 April 2013), the 
Court was required to adjudicate on the division of jurisdiction between the Courts of the European 
Union and the national courts as regards actions for damages seeking to establish the European Union’s 
non‑contractual liability. The case originated in an appeal brought by the Commission against the 
judgment of the General Court (7) in which that Court had held that the dispute relating to the alle-
gation of infringements of intellectual property law following the expiry of contracts between the 
Systran group and the Commission concerning an automatic translation system was of a non-con-
tractual nature and had ordered the Commission to pay the Systran group lump-sum damages for 
the harm sustained.

The Court held that the General Court had erred in law in its application of the principles govern-
ing the determination of jurisdiction in the context of actions for damages against the European 
Union and in the legal classification of the contractual relations between the Systran group and 
the Commission. The Court held that the Courts of the European Union must, before ruling on the 
substance of an action for damages, decide whether the liability invoked is contractual or non-con-
tractual and thus determine the very nature of the dispute. In doing that, they cannot base their 
reasoning simply on the rules alleged by the parties. They are required, on an analysis of the vari-
ous matters in the file, to verify whether the action has as its subject matter a claim for damages 
based objectively and overall on rights and obligations of a contractual nature or a non-contractual 
nature.

If, following that analysis, it is necessary to interpret the content of one or more contracts conclud-
ed between the parties in question, the Courts are required to declare that they have no jurisdic-
tion to rule thereon in the absence of an arbitration clause. Examination of the action for damages 
would in that case involve the assessment of rights and obligations of a contractual nature which 
fall within the jurisdiction of the national courts.

e) 

Length of proceedings

Three judgments delivered on 26 November 2013, in Case C-40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland 
(formerly Sachsa Verpackung) v Commission, (8) Case C-50/12 P Kendrion v Commission (9) and Case 
C-58/12  P  Groupe Gascogne v Commission,  (10)  enabled  the  Court  to  rule  on  the consequences of 

(7)  Case T-19/07 Systran and Systran Luxembourg v Commission [2010] ECR II-6083.

(8)  Judgment delivered on appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2011 in Case T-79/06 

Sachsa Verpackung v Commission.

(9)  Judgment delivered on appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2011 in Case T-54/06 

Kendrion v Commission.

(10)  Judgment delivered on appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2011 in Case T-72/06 

Groupe Gascogne v Commission. 

14 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

failure to deliver judgment within a reasonable time when examining an action for annulment of a Com‑
mission decision imposing a fine for infringement of the competition rules of European Union law.

The Court recalled that, where there are no indications that the excessive length of the proceed-
ings before the General Court has affected their outcome, the fact that a reasonable time has been 
exceeded in proceedings cannot lead to the judgment under appeal being set aside.

As regards the appropriate remedy to make good the financial consequences arising from the ex-
cessive duration of the proceedings before the General Court, the Court departed from the solu-
tion adopted in Baustahlgewebe v Commission (11) and rejected the claim seeking, for that purpose, 
in the context of an appeal a reduction in the amount of the fines imposed. The Court held, con-
firming the solution which it had adopted in Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland v Com‑
mission, (12) that the sanction for a breach, by a Court of the European Union, of its obligation under 
the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to adjudicate on the cases 
before it within a reasonable time must be an action for damages, since such an action constitutes 
an effective remedy of general application for asserting and penalising such a breach.

That action may not be brought directly before the Court but must be brought before the General 
Court, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. In that con-
text, the Court observed that the General Court must sit in a different composition from that which 
sat in the proceedings forming the subject matter of the action for annulment and the duration of 
which is contested.

Furthermore, in such an action for damages, the General Court must assess, in the light of the 
circumstances specific to each case, whether the ‘reasonable time’ principle was observed. The 
General Court must also assess whether the parties concerned really did sustain harm as a result 
of the breach of their right to effective judicial protection. It must take into consideration the gen-
eral principles applicable in the legal systems of the Member States for actions based on similar 
breaches. In particular, it must try to identify, in addition to any material loss, any other type of 
harm sustained by the parties affected by the excessive period, which should, where appropriate, 
be suitably compensated.

Dealing next with the length of the proceedings before the General Court in the cases at issue, 
which had amounted to approximately five years and nine months, the Court held that their length 
could not be justified by any circumstance connected with the cases. Neither the complexity of the 
disputes, nor the conduct of the parties, nor the particular features of the proceedings explained 
their excessive duration. In those circumstances, the Court concluded that the procedures before 
the General Court had failed to comply with the right which the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
confers on parties to have their case dealt with in a reasonable time and that that failure consti-
tuted a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that confers rights on individuals.

(11)  Case C-185/95 P [1998] ECR I-8417; this judgment was delivered on appeal against the judgment of the Court of 
First Instance (now ‘the General Court’) of 6 April 1995 in Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1995] 
ECR II-987.

(12)  Case C-385/07 P [2009] ECR I-6155; this judgment was delivered on appeal against the judgment of the General 

Court of 24 May 2007 in Case T-151/01 Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2007] ECR II-1607.

Annual Report 2013 

15

Court of Justice 

Case-law

2. 

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

In the area of protection of fundamental rights, the Court, in two judgments delivered on the same 
day, provided important clarification relating to Articles 51(1) and 53 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which concern, respectively, the field of application of the Charter and the level of protec-
tion which it ensures. (13)

a) 

Field of application of the Charter

In Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson (judgment of 26 February 2013), the Court observed, first of all, 
referring to its consistent case-law on the scope of fundamental rights in the European Union and 
to the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, that the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by that charter must be complied with where national legislation falls within 
the scope of European Union law. Situations which are covered in that way by European Union 
law cannot therefore exist without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of 
European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.

As regards the tax penalties and criminal proceedings for tax evasion — owing to false information 
concerning value added tax (VAT) being provided — which formed the subject matter of the main 
proceedings, the Court held that they constituted implementation of a number of provisions of 
European Union law on VAT and the protection of the financial interests of the European Union (14) 
and, accordingly, implementation of European Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of 
the  Charter.  The  fact  that  the  national  legislation  upon  which  those  tax  penalties  and  criminal 
proceedings were based was not adopted in order to transpose Directive 2006/112 (15) cannot call 
that conclusion into question, since the application of that legislation is designed to penalise an 
infringement of that directive and is therefore intended to implement the obligation imposed on 
the Member States to impose effective penalties for conduct prejudicial to the financial interests of 
the European Union.

(13)  This part of the Annual Report mentions only two fundamental judgments relating to the general provisions of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, a number of other decisions in which the Court adjudicated on the 
Charter  are  mentioned  under  other  headings  of  the  report.  In  that  regard,  mention  should  be  made  of  Case 
C-40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland (formerly Sachsa Verpackung) v Commission (judgment of 26 November 2013), 
Case C-50/12 P Kendrion v Commission (judgment of 26 November 2013) and Case C-58/12 P Groupe Gascogne 
v  Commission  (judgment  of  26 November 2013)  (see  the  heading ‘Proceedings  of  the  European  Union);  Case 
C-93/12 Agrokonsulting‑04 (judgment of 27 June 2013) and Case C-101/12 Schaible (judgment of 17 October 2013) 
(see the heading ‘Agriculture’); Case C-291/12 Schwarz (judgment of 17 October 2013) (see the heading ‘Movement 
across borders’); Case C-648/11 MA and Others (judgment of 6 June 2013) and Case C-349/12 Abdullahi (judgment 
of 10 December 2013) (see the heading ‘Asylum policy’); Case C-168/13 PPU F. (judgment of 30 May 2013) and 
Case C-396/11 Radu (judgment of 29 January 2013) (see the heading ‘European arrest warrant’); Case C-260/11 
Edwards and Pallikaropoulos (judgment of 11 April 2013) (see the heading ‘Environment’); and Case C-579/12 RX II 
Commission v Strack (judgment of 19 September 2013) (see the heading ‘European civil service’). 

(14)  See Article 325 TFEU and Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on 
the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), formerly Articles 2 and 22 of Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — 
Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(15)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.

16 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

Referring to its judgment in Melloni, (16) delivered on the same day, the Court also observed that, 
where a national court is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with 
by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not 
entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter, national courts and authorities 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights. However, the level of 
protection provided for by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by the Court, and the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law must not be thereby compromised.

Next, as regards the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the Court observed that that principle does not preclude a Member State from imposing 
successively, for the same fraudulent acts in connection with declaration obligations in the field of 
VAT, a tax penalty and a criminal penalty, in so far as the first penalty is not criminal in nature. The 
question of whether tax penalties are criminal in nature must be assessed on the basis of three 
criteria: the legal classification of the offence under national law, the very nature of the offence and 
the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur.

Last, the Court held that European Union law precludes a judicial practice which makes the obliga-
tion for a national court to disapply any provision contrary to a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights conditional on that infringement being clear from the text of 
that charter or from the relevant case-law, since that practice withholds from the national court the 
power to assess fully, with, as the case may be, the cooperation of the Court of Justice, whether that 
provision is compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

b) 

Level of protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter

In Case C-399/11 Melloni (judgment of 26 February 2013), (17) the Court had the opportunity, for the 
first time, to rule on the interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That provision 
states  that  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  is  not  to  have  an  adverse  effect  on  fundamental 
rights recognised by, inter alia, the Member States’ constitutions. In Melloni, in which the Court had 
received a request for a preliminary ruling from the Spanish Constitutional Court concerning the 
execution of a European arrest warrant pursuant to Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended, (18) 
the Court observed that Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not allow a Member 
State to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being 
open to review in the issuing Member State, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to 
a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the first Member State. 
It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where a European Union legal act calls for 
national implementing measures, national authorities and courts may apply national standards of 
protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not 
thereby compromised. However, the framework decision effects a harmonisation of the conditions 
of  execution  of  a  European  arrest  warrant  in  the  event  of  a  conviction  rendered  in  absentia. 

(16)  Case C-399/11 Melloni (judgment of 26 February 2013), see below.

(17)  Another aspect of this judgment is presented under the heading ‘Police and judicial cooperation in criminal 

matters’.

(18)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures  between  Member  States,  as  amended  by  Council  Framework  Decision  2009/299/JHA  of 
26 February 2009 enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2002 L 190, 
p. 1, and OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

Annual Report 2013 

17

Court of Justice 

Case-law

Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights  to  make  the  surrender  of  a  person  conditional  on  a  requirement  not  provided  for  in  the 
framework  decision  would,  by  casting  doubt  on  the  uniformity  of  the  standard  of  protection 
of fundamental rights as defined in that decision, undermine the principles of mutual trust and 
recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would therefore compromise its efficacy.

3. 

Citizenship of the Union

In Case C-300/11 ZZ (judgment of 4 June 2013), the Court ruled on the interpretation of Articles 30 
and 31 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States. (19) In this case, a judicial body of the United 
Kingdom, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), had dismissed an appeal by a Fran-
co-Algerian national, ZZ, against a decision refusing him admission to the United Kingdom, on 
grounds of public security. SIAC delivered a ‘closed’ judgment, with comprehensive reasons, and an 
‘open’ judgment, with summary reasons. ZZ was informed of only the latter judgment. On appeal 
against that judgment, the referring court raised the question as to the extent to which the compe-
tent national authority is required to inform the person concerned of the public security grounds 
which constitute the basis of the decision refusing entry.

In its judgment, the Court ruled that the abovementioned provisions of Directive 2004/38, read in 
the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, relating to effective judicial review, re-
quire the national court with jurisdiction to ensure that failure by the competent national authority 
to disclose to the person concerned, precisely and in full, the grounds on which the decision refus-
ing entry is based, and to disclose the related evidence to him, is limited to that which is strictly 
necessary. The national court must ensure that the person concerned is informed, in any event, of 
the essence of those grounds in a manner which takes due account of the necessary confidentiality 
of the evidence. Thus, the Court made clear that there is no presumption that the reasons invoked 
by a national authority for refusing to disclose those grounds exist and are valid. The national court 
must thus carry out an independent examination of all the matters of law and fact relied on by the 
national authority and it must determine whether State security stands in the way of disclosure to 
the person concerned, precisely and in full, of the grounds on which the decision refusing entry is 
based.

Where State security does stand in the way of such disclosure, judicial review of the legality of the 
decision must be carried out in a procedure which strikes a balance between the requirements 
flowing from State security and the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection, while 
limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to that which is strictly necessary. However, 
that balancing exercise is not applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the grounds 
that is adduced before the national court with jurisdiction, since disclosure of that evidence is liable 
to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner. (20)

(19)  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of 
the  Union  and  their  family  members  to  move  and  reside  freely  within  the  territory  of  the  Member  States 
amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1612/68  and  repealing  Directives  64/221/EEC,  68/360/EEC,  72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda 
at OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34).

(20)  For the application of the principles established in ZZ in the area of the common foreign and security policy, see, 
below,  Joined  Cases  C-584/10  P,  C-593/10  P  and  C-595/10  P  Commission  v  Kadi  (judgment  of  18 July 2013), 
under the heading ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy — Freezing of funds’.

18 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

4. 

Enhanced cooperation

In Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council (judgment of 16 April 2013), the 
Court  was  called  upon,  for  the  first  time  since  the  enhanced  cooperation  mechanism  was  in-
troduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, to examine the lawfulness of the authorisation for such 
cooperation.  Two  Member  States  brought  an  action for annulment of Council Decision 2011/167 
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection between 
25 Member States, (21) Spain and Italy having refused to take part owing to the proposed language 
arrangements.

The Court first examined the applicants’ argument that the Council had no competence to au-
thorise such enhanced cooperation, on the ground that Article 20(1) TFEU excludes any enhanced 
cooperation within the ambit of the European Union’s exclusive competences and that the cre-
ation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights falls not within the ambit of one of the competences shared by the Member States and the 
European Union, but within that of the exclusive competence of the European Union as provided 
for in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, concerning the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market. The Court did not follow that reasoning. It held that the com-
petence to create European intellectual property rights and the competence to set up, as regards 
those rights, Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements fall within the 
ambit of the functioning of the internal market. They thus fall within an area of shared compe-
tences and are, in consequence, non-exclusive.

In addition, according to the Court, provided that it is compatible with the conditions laid down in 
Article 20 TEU and in Article 326 et seq. TFEU, the contested decision does not amount to misuse 
of powers, but rather, having regard to its being impossible to reach common arrangements for 
the whole European Union within a reasonable period, contributes to the process of integration. 
The Court emphasised, moreover, that it is inherent in the fact that the competence conferred by 
Article 118 TFEU to create European intellectual property rights is exercised within the ambit of en-
hanced cooperation that the European intellectual property right so created, the uniform protec-
tion given by it and the arrangements attaching to it will be in force, not in the European Union in 
its entirety, but only in the territory of the participating Member States. Far from amounting to in-
fringement of Article 118 TFEU, that consequence necessarily follows from Article 20(4) TEU, which 
states that acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation are to bind only participating 
Member States.

Last, the Court held that the contested decision complies with the condition relating to the adop-
tion of a decision authorising enhanced cooperation as a last resort, since the Council took account 
of the fact that the legislative process undertaken with a view to establishing the European patent 
had begun during the year 2000, that a considerable number of different language arrangements 
for the unitary patent were discussed by all Member States and that none of those arrangements 
found support capable of leading to the adoption at European Union level of a full ‘legislative pack-
age’ relating to the unitary patent.

(21)  Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 

of unitary patent protection (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 53).

Annual Report 2013 

19

Court of Justice 

Case-law

5. 

Division of competences and legal basis

As regards the division of competences, mention should be made of three judgments. The first two 
relate to the common commercial policy and the third to social policy.

In Case C-137/12 Commission v Council (judgment of 22 October 2013), the Commission had sought 
annulment of Decision 2011/853 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the European Convention 
on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access. (22) The Commission 
claimed, in particular, that the decision came under the common commercial policy and should 
have been adopted on the basis of Article 207(4) TFEU and not of Article 114 TFEU, concerning the 
approximation of laws. In that regard, the Court observed that Decision 2011/853 primarily pursues 
an objective that has a specific connection to the common commercial policy, which means that, 
for the purposes of the adoption of that decision, Article 207(4) TFEU, together with Article 218(5) 
TFEU, had to be cited as the legal basis and which also means that the signing of the European Con-
vention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access (23) on be-
half of the European Union falls, pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, within the exclusive competence 
of the European Union. The improvement of the conditions for the functioning of the internal mar-
ket, on the other hand, is an ancillary objective of that decision that provides no justification for its 
adoption on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.

Pointing out that only acts of the European Union with a specific link to international trade are 
capable of falling within the field of the common commercial policy, the Court observed that, unlike 
Directive 98/84 (24) on the legal protection of the same services based on conditional access within 
the European Union, the legal basis of which is Article 100a EC, Decision 2011/853, by authorising 
the signing of the abovementioned convention on behalf of the European Union, is intended to 
introduce protection similar to that provided by the directive in the territory of European States 
which are not members of the European Union, in order to promote in those States the supply 
of such services by European Union service providers. The objective thus pursued, which, in the 
light of the recitals to that decision, read in conjunction with the convention, can be seen to be the 
primary objective of the decision, therefore has a specific connection with international trade in 
those services, by dint of which the decision can legitimately be linked to the common commercial 
policy. The Court therefore upheld the Commission’s action and annulled the contested decision.

The division of competences between the European Union and the Member States was also cen-
tral to Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi‑Aventis Deutschland (judgment of 18 July 2013), con-
cerning the Agreement on Trade‑related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). (25) The Court, 
which was requested to rule, in particular, on the question whether Article 27 of that agreement, 
concerns  patentable  subject  matter,  falls  within  a  field  for  which  Member  States  have  primary 

(22)  Council Decision 2011/853/EU of 29 November 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the European 
Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access (OJ 2011 L 336, 
p. 1).

(23)  European  Convention  on  the  legal  protection  of  services  based  on,  or  consisting  of,  conditional  access 

(OJ 2011 L 336, p. 2).

(24)  Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection 

of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access (OJ 1998 L 320, p. 54).

(25)  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, constituting Annex 1C to the Agreement 
establishing  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  signed  in  Marrakesh  on  15 April 1994  and  approved  by 
Council  Decision  94/800/EC  of  22 December 1994  concerning  the  conclusion  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community,  as  regards  matters  within  its  competence,  of  the  agreements  reached  in  the  Uruguay  Round 
multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1).

20 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

competence, stated that, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the common commercial 
policy — which falls within the context of the European Union’s external action and concerns trade 
with non-member States — also relates to the commercial aspects of intellectual property. (26) If an 
act of the European Union is intended to promote, facilitate or govern international trade, it comes 
within the common commercial policy. The Court considered that the rules in the agreement at  
issue have a specific link to international trade. The agreement itself comes within the context of 
the liberalisation of international trade and its objective is to strengthen and harmonise the protec-
tion of intellectual property on a worldwide scale and to reduce distortions of international trade 
on the territory of the States that are members of the World Trade Organisation. Consequently, the 
Court held that the agreement, and more particularly Article 27 thereof, now falls within the field 
of the common commercial policy and within the exclusive competence of the European Union.

In Case C-431/11 United Kingdom v Council (judgment of 26 September 2013), an action was brought 
before  the  Court  for  annulment of Council Decision 2011/407  on  the  position  to  be  taken  by  the 
European Union within the EEA Joint Committee concerning an amendment to Annex VI (Social 
Security) and Protocol 37 to the EEA Agreement. (27) In support of its action, the United Kingdom 
submitted that the contested decision was incorrectly based on Article 48 TFEU, relating to measures 
in the field of social security, whereas the appropriate basis was Article 79(2) TFEU on immigration 
policy.

The Court held that Decision 2011/407 was properly adopted on the basis of Article 48 TFEU. The 
objective  of  that  decision  is  to  allow  the  European  Union  acquis  on  the  coordination  of  social 
security systems, amended by Regulations No 883/2004 (28) and No 987/2009, (29) to be applicable 
also  to  European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA)  States  which  are  Contracting  Parties  to  the 
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. That decision does not seek only to regulate the social 
rights of nationals of the three EFTA States concerned, but also, and in the same manner, to regulate 
the social rights of citizens of the European Union in those EFTA States. Thus, Decision 2011/407 is 
precisely one of the measures by which the law governing the internal market of the European 
Union is to be extended as far as possible to the EEA, with the result that nationals of the EEA States 
benefit from the free movement of persons under the same social conditions as citizens of the 
Union. It follows that it is necessary to replicate the modernisation and simplification of the rules 
on the coordination of social security systems which apply within the European Union, by replacing 
Regulation No 1408/71 (30) with Regulation No 883/2004, also at the level of the EEA.

Furthermore, according to the Court, Article 79(2) TFEU cannot serve as the basis for the adoption 
of a measure such as Decision 2011/407, since, regard being had to the context of the development 
of the association with EFTA States of which it forms part and, inter alia, to the objectives pursued 
by that association, such a measure is manifestly irreconcilable with the purposes of Article 79(2) 

(26)  See Article 207(1) TFEU.

(27)  Council Decision 2011/407/EU of 6 June 2011 on the position to be taken by the European Union within the EEA 
Joint Committee concerning an amendment to Annex VI (Social Security) and Protocol 37 to the EEA Agreement 
(OJ 2011 L 182, p. 12).

(28)  Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination 
of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 988/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 (OJ 2009 L 284, p. 43).

(29)  Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down 

the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (OJ 2009 L 284, p. 1).

(30)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 

persons and their families moving within the Community (OJ English Special Edition 1971(II), p. 416).

Annual Report 2013 

21

Court of Justice 

Case-law

TFEU, which comes under Chapter 2, entitled ‘Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration’, 
of Title V of the FEU Treaty. The Court therefore dismissed the United Kingdom’s action.

II.  Agriculture

In relation to agriculture, two decisions concerning the principles of European Union law and the 
protection of fundamental rights should be mentioned.

First, in Case C-93/12 Agrokonsulting‑04 (judgment of 27 June 2013), the Court was called upon to 
rule on the permissibility of a jurisdiction rule of a Member State conferring on a single court all dis-
putes relating to decisions of a national authority responsible for the payment of agricultural aid, 
in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. At issue was a provision of the Bulgarian Code of Administrative Procedure, the 
effect of which was that the referring court was required to rule on all actions directed against acts 
of the national authority responsible for payment of agricultural aid under the common agricul-
tural policy.

The Court held that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights do not preclude such a rule, provided that actions intended to ensure the 
safeguarding of the rights which individuals derive from European Union law are not conducted 
in less advantageous conditions than those provided for in respect of actions intended to protect 
the rights derived from any aid schemes for farmers established under national law and that the 
national rule at issue does not cause individuals procedural problems in terms, inter alia, of the 
duration of the proceedings, such as to render the exercise of the rights derived from European 
Union law excessively difficult.

Second, in Case C-101/12 Schaible (judgment of 17 October 2013), the Court was required to exam-
ine the validity of certain provisions of Regulation No 21/2004. (31) It was necessary to ascertain, in 
essence, whether the obligations imposed on keepers of sheep and goats by those provisions, which 
concern the individual identification of animals, their individual electronic identification and the keeping 
of an up‑to‑date register, can be considered to be consistent with Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamen‑
tal Rights, which establishes the freedom to conduct a business, and with the principle of equal 
treatment.

In its judgment, the Court ruled that there is no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of 
the provisions at issue in the light of that freedom and that principle. As regards, first of all, their 
compatibility with the freedom to conduct a business, the Court found that, while the provisions 
of Regulation No 21/2004 which impose on keepers of sheep and goats obligations regarding an 
individual electronic identification of the animals and the keeping of a holding register may limit 
the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business, that freedom is not absolute. It may be subject 
to a broad range of interventions on the part of the public authorities which may limit the exer-
cise of economic activity in the public interest, subject to the principle of proportionality. In this 
instance, the Court considered that, although the obligations at issue in the main proceedings may 
limit the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business, they are nonetheless justified by legitimate 

(31)  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  21/2004  of  17 December 2003  establishing  a  system  for  the  identification  and 
registration  of  ovine  and  caprine  animals  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  1782/2003  and  Directives 
92/102/EEC and 64/32/EEC (OJ 2004 L 5, p. 8). The request for a preliminary ruling concerned Articles 3(1), 4(2), 
5(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 9(3) of, and point B.2 of the annex to, Regulation No 21/2004.

22 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

objectives pursued in the public interest. In facilitating the traceability of each animal and thus, in 
a case of epizootic disease, enabling the competent authorities to take the necessary measures to 
prevent the spread of contagious diseases in sheep and goats, the obligations are appropriate and 
necessary in order to attain those objectives, namely health protection, the control of epizootic 
diseases and the welfare of animals, as well as the completion of the agricultural internal market in 
the sector concerned.

III.  Freedoms of movement

1. 

Freedom of movement for workers and social security

As regards freedom of movement for workers and social security, three judgments deserve special 
attention.

First, in Case C-202/11 Las (judgment of 16 April 2013), the Court adjudicated on the rules of a Mem‑
ber State requiring the use of an official language in contracts of employment. In this case, a Neth-
erlands  national,  residing  in  the  Netherlands,  had  been  engaged  by  a  company  established  in 
Antwerp  (Belgium).  The  cross-border  employment  contract,  drafted  in  English,  stated  that  the 
employee carried out his work in Belgium. Subsequently, by letter also drafted in English, he was 
dismissed by that company. The employee brought an action before the Arbeidsrechtbank (Labour 
Court), claiming that the provisions of the contract of employment were null and void because they 
infringed the provisions of the decree of the Flemish community on the use of languages, which 
imposes an obligation on any undertaking established in the Dutch-speaking region, when hir-
ing a worker in the context of employment relations with a cross-border character, to draft all the 
documents relating to the employment relationship in Dutch, failing which the contracts are to be 
declared null and void by the courts of their own motion. In its decision, the Court held that such 
legislation, which could have a dissuasive effect on non-Dutch-speaking employees and employ-
ers, constitutes a restriction on freedom of movement for workers. The Court also stated that, in 
the particular context of a cross-border contract, such a linguistic obligation is disproportionate 
by reference to the objectives invoked by Belgium in this case, namely the protection of an official 
language, the protection of workers and the facilitation of the related administrative controls.

Second, reference should be made to Case C-20/12 Giersch and Others (judgment of 20 June 2013), 
relating to equal treatment with respect to social advantages for frontier workers and members of their 
families. In this judgment, the Court ruled that Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 (32) must be 
interpreted as precluding, in principle, legislation of a Member State which makes the grant of fi‑
nancial aid for higher education studies conditional upon residence by the student in that Member State 
and thereby gives rise to a difference in treatment, amounting to indirect discrimination, between 
persons who reside in the Member State concerned and those who, not being residents of that 
Member State, are the children of frontier workers carrying out an activity in that Member State.

In addition, the Court considered that, while the objective of increasing the proportion of residents 
with  a  higher  education  degree  in  order  to  promote  the  development  of  the  economy  of  that 
Member State is a legitimate objective which can justify such a difference in treatment, and while 

(32)  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1612/68  of  15 October 1968  on  freedom  of  movement  for  workers  within  the 
Community (OJ English Special Edition 1968(II), p. 475), as amended by Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda at OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and 
OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34. 

Annual Report 2013 

23

Court of Justice 

Case-law

a condition of residence is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of that objective, a condition 
such as that at issue nevertheless goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective 
pursued. Such a residence condition precludes the taking into account of other elements poten-
tially representative of the actual degree of attachment of the applicant for financial aid with the 
society or with the labour market of the Member State concerned, such as the fact that one of the 
parents, who continues to support the student, is a frontier worker who has stable employment in 
that Member State and has worked there for a significant period of time.

Third, Case C-282/11 Salgado González (judgment of 21 February 2013) concerned the method for 
calculating the pensions of self‑employed workers, in the light of the European Union legislation on so‑
cial security for migrant workers. (33)

The Court recalled, first of all, that in the absence of harmonisation at European Union level, it is 
for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for entitlement to benefits 
but that, in exercising those powers, Member States must comply with the law of the European 
Union and, in particular, with the provisions of the FEU Treaty on freedom of movement. Regula-
tion No 1408/71 provides that, where the legislation of a Member State makes the acquisition of 
the right to benefits subject to the completion of periods of insurance, as in the case of a retire-
ment pension, the competent institution of that Member State is to take account, where necessary, 
of the periods of insurance completed under the legislation of any other Member State. (34) For 
that purpose, it must take account of those periods as if they had been completed under its own 
legislation.

Thus,  national  legislation  under  which  the  theoretical  amount  of  the  retirement  pension  of 
a self-employed worker, migrant or non-migrant, is invariably calculated on contribution bases 
paid by that worker over a fixed reference period preceding the payment of his last contribution is 
contrary to the requirements set out in Regulation No 1408/71 (35) where that theoretical amount 
is calculated as if the person concerned worked exclusively in the Member State concerned. The 
situation  would  be  different  if  the  national  legislation  set  out  adjustment  mechanisms  for  the 
method of calculation of the theoretical amount of the retirement pension in order to take into ac-
count the fact that the worker exercised his right to freedom of movement by working in another 
Member State.

2. 

Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services

In Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11 Libert and Others (judgment of 8 May 2013), the Court had the 
opportunity to rule on the question whether European Union law precludes national legislation 
which, first, makes the transfer of immovable property in certain communities subject to verification, 
by an assessment committee, that there exists a ‘sufficient connection’ between the buyer and the 
communes concerned and, second, requires subdividers and developers to provide social housing, 
while providing for tax incentives and subsidy mechanisms.

The  Court  observed  that  legislation  imposing  such  transfer  conditions  constitutes  a  restric-
tion of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by European Union law. It further observed that 

(33)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons and their families moving within the Community, as amended on a number of occasions (OJ English 
Special Edition 1971(II), p. 416).

(34)  See Article 45 of Regulation No 1408/71.

(35)  See, in particular, Article 46(a) of Regulation No 1408/71.

24 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

requirements  relating  to  social  housing  policy,  such  as  the  requirement  to  satisfy  the  housing 
needs of the less affluent local population, can constitute overriding reasons in the public interest 
that justify such a restriction. However, those measures go beyond what is necessary to attain the 
objective pursued where the conditions laid down for the transfer of immovable property do not 
directly reflect the socio-economic aspects relating to the objective of exclusively protecting the 
less affluent local population on the property market. In such a case, those conditions are liable to 
favour not only the less affluent population but also other persons with sufficient resources who, 
consequently, have no specific need for social protection on the property market.

On the other hand, the Court held that Article 63 TFEU does not preclude a ‘social obligation’ from 
being imposed on some economic operators, such as subdividers and developers, when they are 
granted a building or land subdivision authorisation, in so far as it is intended to guarantee suf-
ficient housing for the low-income or otherwise disadvantaged sections of the local population.

In Case C-85/12 LBI (formerly Landsbanki Islands) (judgment of 24 October 2013), the Court ruled on 
the interpretation of Directive 2001/24 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, (36) 
which has been incorporated into the Agreement on the European Economic Area. That directive pro-
vides that, in the event of the insolvency of a credit institution with branches established in other 
Member States, the reorganisation measures and winding-up proceedings are to form part of a sin-
gle insolvency procedure in the Member State in which the institution has its base (the home State) 
and are to be effective in accordance with the law of the home State throughout the European 
Union, without any further formalities.

In this case, it was necessary to establish whether reorganisation measures adopted by Iceland fol-
lowing the banking and financial crisis which had affected it were covered by the directive. These 
measures, adopted in the form of a moratorium, protected the financial institutions from any legal 
proceedings and ordered the suspension of pending legal proceedings throughout the period of 
the moratorium. LBI, an Icelandic credit institution, which benefited from a moratorium in Iceland, 
was the subject of attachment orders in France and challenged them before the French courts, 
maintaining that the directive rendered the reorganisation measures adopted in Iceland directly 
enforceable against its French creditor and that the attachment orders were therefore void.

First of all, the Court observed that Directive 2001/24 seeks to establish mutual recognition by the 
Member States of the measures taken by each of them to restore the viability of the credit institu-
tions which it has authorised. The Court stated, next, that in accordance with Directive 2001/24, (37) 
the administrative and judicial authorities of the home Member State are alone empowered to 
decide on the implementation of reorganisation measures for a financial institution and on the 
opening of winding-up proceedings against such an institution. Those measures have, in all the 
other Member States, the effects which the law of the home Member State confers on them. It fol-
lows that the reorganisation and winding-up measures decided by the administrative and judicial 
authorities of the home Member State are the subject of recognition under Directive 2001/24, with 
the effects which the law of that Member State confers on them. However, the legislation of that 
Member State can, in principle, take effect in the other Member States only where measures have 
been taken by the administrative and judicial authorities of that Member State against a specific 
credit institution.

(36)  Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and 

winding up of credit institutions (OJ 2001 L 125, p. 15).

(37)  Articles 3(1) and 9(1).

Annual Report 2013 

25

Court of Justice 

Case-law

Case C-221/11 Demirkan (judgment of 24 September 2013) concerned the question whether the 
freedom to provide services which is referred to in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol (38) to the Asso‑
ciation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Turkey (39) includes what is referred 
to as ‘passive’ freedom to provide services, namely the freedom for the recipients of services to travel 
to a Member State in order to take advantage of a service.

The  Court  held  that,  while  the  principles  enshrined  in  the  articles  of  the  FEU  Treaty  relating  to 
freedom to provide services must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals in order to 
eliminate restrictions as between the Contracting Parties on the freedom to provide services, the 
interpretation given to the provisions of European Union law, including Treaty provisions, concern-
ing the internal market cannot be automatically applied by analogy to an agreement concluded 
by the European Union with a non-Member State, unless there are express provisions to that effect 
laid down by the agreement itself. In order to determine whether such application is possible, it 
is necessary to compare the aim and the context of the agreement, on the one hand, and those 
of the Treaty, on the other. There are fundamental differences between the Association Agree-
ment and its Additional Protocol, on the one hand, and the Treaty, on the other, connected with 
the fact that the EEC-Turkey Association pursues a solely economic purpose, intended essentially 
to promote the economic development of Turkey. Thus, the development of economic freedoms 
for the purpose of bringing about freedom of movement for persons of a general nature which 
may be compared to that afforded to European Union citizens is not the object of the Association 
Agreement. In addition, from a temporal viewpoint, the Court emphasised that there is nothing 
to indicate that the Contracting Parties to the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol 
envisaged, when signing those documents, freedom to provide services as including the ‘passive’ 
freedom to provide services. Accordingly, the freedom to provide services within the meaning of 
Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol does not encompass freedom for Turkish nationals who are 
the recipients of services to visit a Member State in order to obtain services.

3. 

Free movement of capital

In Joined Cases C-105/12 to C-107/12 Essent and Others (judgment of 22 October 2013), the Court was 
called upon to rule on the question whether Article 345 TFEU and the rules on free movement of capital 
preclude national rules governing the ownership of electricity or gas distribution system operators which 
lay down an absolute prohibition of privatisation of such operators.

The Court observed, first, that Article 345 TFEU is an expression of the principle of the neutrality of 
the Treaties in relation to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. 
In particular, the Treaties do not preclude, as a general rule, either the nationalisation of undertak-
ings or their privatisation, so that Member States may legitimately pursue an objective of establish-
ing or maintaining a body of rules relating to the public ownership of certain undertakings. How-
ever, according to the Court, Article 345 TFEU does not mean that rules governing the system of 
property ownership current in the Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the 
FEU Treaty, which include, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of capital.

(38)  Pursuant  to  Article  62  thereof,  this  protocol  is  to  form  an  integral  part  of  the  Association  Agreement.  The 
protocol was signed on 23 November 1970 at Brussels and was concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf 
of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972.

(39)  Signed at Ankara on 12 September 1963. 

26 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

In the case in point, the Court held that, owing to its effects, the prohibition of privatisation con-
stitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital. It added that the objectives of achieving 
transparency in the electricity and gas markets and preventing distortions of competition, which 
underlie the choice of the ownership system adopted in the national legislation, may be taken 
into consideration as overriding reasons in the public interest to justify the restriction on the free 
movement of capital. Likewise, as regards the group prohibition and the prohibition of activity 
which may adversely affect the operation of the system, the Court held that the abovementioned 
ob jectives may also, as overriding reasons in the public interest, justify the restrictions on funda-
mental freedoms found to exist. However, the restrictions must be appropriate to the objectives 
pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain those objectives.

IV.  Border controls, asylum and immigration

1.  Movement across borders

As regards the common rules on standards and procedure for external border controls, a German 
court wished to know whether Regulation No 2252/2004, (40) in so far as it requires an applicant for 
a passport to provide his digital fingerprints and lays down that they are to be stored in the passport, is 
valid, notably in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In Case C-291/12 Schwarz (judgment 
of 17 October 2013), the Court answered that question in the affirmative. Whilst taking such digital 
fingerprints and storing them in passports constitute a breach of the rights to respect for private 
life and to the protection of personal data laid down, respectively, in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, those measures are nonetheless justified as a means of preventing any 
fraudulent use of passports.

In Case C-84/12 Koushkaki (judgment of 19 December 2013), the Court clarified its case-law on visa 
policy, more particularly on the procedure and conditions governing the issue of uniform visas, and ex-
plained the Member States’ discretion in that context. First of all, the Court held that Articles 23(4), 
32(1) and 35(6) of the Visa Code (41) must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authorities 
of a Member State can refuse, after examining an application for a uniform visa, to issue such a visa 
to an applicant only if the grounds for refusal of a visa listed in those provisions can be applied 
to that applicant. Those authorities have a wide discretion when examining that application with 
respect  to  the  conditions  for  the  application  of  those  provisions  and  to  the  assessment  of  the 
relevant facts, with a view to ascertaining whether one of those grounds for refusal can be applied 
to the applicant.

As regards, in particular, the ground for refusal relating to a possible lack of intention to leave the 
territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa, the Court held (42) that the competent 
authorities of a Member State are not required to be certain as to the applicant’s intention, but 
may merely establish that there is a reasonable doubt, in the light of the general situation in the 

(40)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics 
in passports and travel documents issued by Member States (OJ 2004 L 385, p. 1), as amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 (OJ L 142, p. 1, and corrigendum 
at OJ 2009 L 188, p. 127). 

(41)  Regulation  (EC)  No  810/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13 July 2009  establishing 

a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1).

(42)  The Court ruled in the light of Article 32(1) of the Visa Code, read in conjunction with Article 21(1) of that code.

Annual Report 2013 

27

Court of Justice 

Case-law

applicant’s country of residence and the applicant’s individual characteristics, determined in the 
light of information provided by the applicant.

Last, the Court held that the Visa Code does not preclude national legislation which provides that, 
where the conditions for issue of a visa provided for by that code are satisfied, the competent au-
thorities have the power to issue a uniform visa to the applicant, but does not state that they are 
obliged to issue that visa, in so far as such a national provision can be interpreted in a way that is 
in conformity with that code. The competent national authorities cannot therefore refuse to issue 
a uniform visa to an applicant unless one of the grounds for refusal of a visa provided for in the 
aforementioned articles can be applied to that applicant.

2. 

Asylum policy

Two  judgments  that  concern  the  right  to  asylum  and  relate  to  Regulation  No  343/2003 
(‘Dublin II’) (43) merit attention.

First, the Court was requested, in Case C-648/11 MA and Others (judgment of 6 June 2013), to rule 
on the determination of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application where the 
applicant for asylum is an unaccompanied minor with no member of his family present in the ter-
ritory of the European Union and has lodged applications in more than one Member State. To that 
end, the Court interpreted the second paragraph of Article 6 of Regulation No 343/2003 as mean-
ing that the Member State responsible for examining the application will be the one in which the 
minor is present after having lodged an application there. In this connection, the Court held that 
the words ‘the Member State … where the minor has lodged his or her application for asylum’ 
in that provision cannot be construed as meaning the first Member State where the minor has 
lodged his or her application for asylum. Since unaccompanied minors form a category of particu-
larly vulnerable persons, it is important not to prolong the procedure for determining the Member 
State responsible more than is strictly necessary, but to ensure that they have prompt access to 
the procedures for determining refugee status. Therefore, although express mention of the best 
interest of the minor is made only in the first paragraph of Article 6 of that regulation, the effect 
of Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, is 
that the child’s best interest must also be a primary consideration in all decisions adopted by the 
Member States on the designation of the Member State responsible for examining the application 
for asylum. It follows that unaccompanied minors who have lodged an asylum application in one 
Member State must not, as a rule, be transferred to another Member State within which the minor 
lodged a first application for asylum.

Second,  in  Case  C-394/12  Abdullahi  (judgment  of  10 December 2013),  the  Court  ruled  that  Art-
icle 19(2) of Regulation No 343/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where 
a Member State has agreed to take charge of an applicant for asylum as the Member State of the first 
entry of the applicant for asylum into the European Union, the only way in which the applicant for 
asylum can call into question the competence of that Member State based on the criteria set out 
in Article 10(1) of that regulation to examine the application is by pleading systemic deficiencies in 
the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that Mem-
ber State. Reiterating the interpretation set out in N.S., (44) the Court observed that those systemic 

(43)  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  343/2003  of  18 February 2003  establishing  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1).

(44)  Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 [2011] ECR I-13905.

28 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

deficiencies and the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum must provide substantial 
grounds for believing that the applicants for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.

3. 

Immigration policy

The Court was called upon in Case C-383/13 PPU G. and R. (judgment of 10 September 2013) to 
interpret Article 15(2) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 (‘the return directive’), (45) which lays down the 
procedural guarantees relating to decisions to remove illegally staying third country nationals. In that 
context,  Directive  2008/115  requires  Member  States  to  put  in  place  effective  remedies  against 
those decisions and, furthermore, provides that the third-country national is to be released imme-
diately if his detention is not lawful.

In its judgment, delivered under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, the Court ruled that fail-
ure to observe the rights of the defence when adopting a decision extending the detention of 
an illegally-staying national with a view to his removal does not automatically entail the lifting of 
his detention. However, the national court must, according to the Court, ascertain whether such 
a breach actually deprived the party relying thereon of the possibility of arguing his defence bet-
ter, to the extent that the outcome of the administrative procedure leading to the maintenance of 
his detention could have been different.

Case C-297/12 Filev and Osmani (judgment of 19 September 2013) also concerns the interpretation 
of Directive 2008/115 (‘the return directive’). The Court held, in particular, that that directive pre‑
cludes a provision of national law which makes the limitation of the length of an entry ban subject to 
the making by the third‑country national concerned of an application seeking the benefit of such a limit. 
It follows from the wording of Article 11(2) of that directive that Member States must limit the dur-
ation of any entry ban, independently of an application made for that purpose.

The Court also held that that provision precludes breach of an entry and residence ban in the terri-
tory of a Member State, which was handed down more than five years before the date either of the 
re-entry into that territory of the third-country national concerned or of the entry into force of the 
national legislation implementing that directive, from giving rise to a criminal sanction, unless that 
national constitutes a serious threat to public order, public security or national security.

Last, the Court emphasised that a Member State which has chosen, on the basis of Article 2(2)(b) of 
the ‘return directive’, not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who have been subject 
to a criminal law sanction cannot apply those national rules to a national who was the subject of 
a criminal law sanction before the directive was transposed into national law and who could al-
ready have relied directly on it.

(45)  Directive  2008/115/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 December 2008  on  common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, 
p. 98).

Annual Report 2013 

29

Court of Justice 

Case-law

V.  Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

1. 

European arrest warrant

As regards the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, mention should be made of three 
judgments concerning Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the sur-
render procedures between Member States. (46) Two of them, moreover, originate in questions re-
ferred by the Spanish Constitutional Court and the French Constitutional Council.

In the first case, namely Melloni, cited above, the Spanish Constitutional Court asked the Court 
whether the framework decision allows the national courts — as is required by the case-law of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court — to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia subject to the 
possibility that his conviction is open to review in the issuing Member State. The Court, after observ-
ing that the executing judicial authority can make execution of an arrest warrant subject only to 
the conditions defined in the framework decision, held that Article 4a(1) of the framework deci-
sion, which does not provide for that condition, precludes the judicial authorities from refusing to 
execute an arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a sentence in a situation where the 
person concerned did not appear in person at the trial and, being aware of the scheduled trial, he 
instructed a legal counsellor to defend him and he was in fact defended by that counsel. In add-
ition, the Court held that that provision of the framework decision, which, in certain circumstances, 
allows the execution of a European arrest warrant where the person concerned did not appear 
at the trial, is compatible with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and also with the 
rights of the defence as recognised in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Although the right of the accused to appear in person at his trial is an essential component of the 
right to a fair trial, that right is not absolute, as the accused may waive that right where certain 
safeguards are ensured.

Nor, the Court observed last, does Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights allow a Member 
State to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia subject to the condition, not provid-
ed for in the framework decision, that the conviction is open to review in the issuing Member State, 
in order to avoid a breach of the rights guaranteed by its constitution. The Court also observed that 
a different interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights would undermine the 
principle of the primacy of European Union law and would compromise the efficacy of Framework 
Decision 2002/584. (47)

In Case C-168/13 PPU F. (judgment of 30 May 2013), concerning a priority question of constitution-
ality submitted to the French Constitutional Council, the Court examined the possibility of lodging 
an appeal with suspensive effect against a decision extending the effects of a European arrest warrant. 
After observing that Framework Decision 2002/584 provides in itself for a procedure that complies 
with the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court observed that the fact that 
it makes no express provision for a right of appeal with suspensive effect against decisions relating 
to European arrest warrants does not prevent the Member States from providing for such a right 

(46)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures  between  Member  States,  as  amended  by  Council  Framework  Decision  2009/299/JHA  of 
26 February 2009 enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2002 L 190, 
p. 1, and OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

(47)  See, in that regard, the presentation of the judgment under the heading ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 

European Union’.

30 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

or require them to do so. In that regard, the Court held that, provided that the application of the 
framework decision is not frustrated, a Member State is not prevented from applying its constitu-
tional rules relating inter alia to respect for the right to a fair trial.

However, the Court made clear that certain limits must be set as regards the margin of discretion 
enjoyed by Member States in this respect. It follows that, in light of the importance of the time 
limits, a final decision on the execution of the warrant must be taken, in principle, either with-
in 10 days from consent being given to the surrender of the requested person or, in other cases, 
within 60 days from his arrest. The Court also observed that, in accordance with the framework 
decision, (48) the decision to extend the warrant or to authorise onward surrender must be taken, 
in principle, within 30 days of receipt of the request. Consequently, where national legislation pro-
vides for an appeal with suspensive effect against that decision, that appeal must comply with the 
abovementioned time-limits for making a final decision on the execution of the warrant.

In a third case relating to the European arrest warrant, the Court held, in Case C-396/11 Radu (judg-
ment of 29 January 2013), that the executing judicial authorities cannot refuse to execute a European 
arrest warrant issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution on the ground that the re‑
quested person was not heard in the issuing Member State before that arrest warrant was issued. In the 
first place, that ground does not feature among the grounds for non-execution of such a warrant, 
as provided for in Framework Decision 2002/584. In the second place, the Court held that the right 
to be heard, laid down in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not require 
that a judicial authority of a Member State should be able to refuse to execute a European arrest 
warrant issued for the purposes of a criminal prosecution on that ground, since such an obligation 
would inevitably lead to the failure of the very system of surrender provided for in the framework 
decision. Such an arrest warrant must have an element of surprise in order to stop the person con-
cerned from taking flight. In any event, the Court observed, relying on a number of provisions of 
the framework decision, that the European legislature has ensured that the right to be heard will 
be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to compromise the effectiveness 
of the European arrest warrant mechanism. (49)

2.  Mutual recognition of financial penalties

In Case C-60/12 Baláž (judgment of 14 November 2013), the Court interpreted the concept of ‘court 
having  jurisdiction  in  particular  in  criminal  matters’  within  the  meaning  of  Framework  Decision 
2005/214 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties. (50) The 
Court made it clear, first of all, that that concept is an autonomous concept of European Union law. 
In view of the fact that the scope of the framework decision includes offences involving ‘conduct 
which infringes road traffic regulations’ and that those offences are not subject to homogeneous 
treatment in the various Member States, and in order to ensure that the framework decision is ef-
fective, the Court held that that concept covers any court or tribunal which applies a procedure 
that satisfies the essential characteristics of criminal procedure, without it being necessary for that 
court or tribunal to have jurisdiction in criminal matters alone. Next, the Court stated that, since 
the framework decision also applies to financial penalties imposed by administrative authorities, 
a prior administrative phase may be required, depending on the particular features of the judicial 

(48)  Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c) of Framework Decision 2002/584.

(49)  See, in particular, Articles 8, 13 to 15 and 19 of Framework Decision 2002/584.

(50)  Article  1(a)(iii)  of  Council  Framework  Decision  2005/214/JHA  of  24 February 2005  on  the  application  of  the 
principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16), as amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

Annual Report 2013 

31

Court of Justice 

Case-law

systems of the Member States. Consequently, a person must be regarded as having had the op-
portunity to have a case tried before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters, 
within the meaning of the framework decision, where, prior to bringing his appeal, that person 
was required to comply with a pre-litigation administrative procedure. However, access to a court 
having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters must not be made subject to conditions which 
make such access impossible or excessively difficult. Thus, such a court must have full jurisdiction 
to examine the case as regards both the legal assessment and the factual circumstances.

VI.  Judicial cooperation in civil matters

1. 

Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments

In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, most of the decisions delivered in the past year 
concerned the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 (Brussels I). (51)

Among these, Case C-49/12 Sunico and Others (judgment of 12 September 2013) merits special at-
tention. The question concerned the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning 
of Article 1(1) of that regulation and whether that concept must be interpreted as including an 
action whereby a public authority of one Member State claims, from natural and legal persons resi-
dent in another Member State, damages in respect of loss caused by a conspiracy to commit VAT 
fraud in the first Member State.

According to the Court, although certain actions between a public authority and a person gov-
erned by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, the situation is other-
wise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers. Since, in the present 
case, the action brought by the public authority is based not on national VAT legislation but on 
the alleged participation by the person governed by private law in a conspiracy to defraud, which 
comes under the national law of tort, the legal relationship between the two parties is not a legal 
relationship based on public law involving the exercise of powers of a public authority. Accordingly, 
such an action is included within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning 
of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001. The Court held, however, that it is for the national court 
to ascertain whether the public authority has made use of evidence obtained in the exercise of its 
powers as a public authority and, if appropriate, whether it was in the same situation as a person 
governed by private law in its action.

2. 

Law applicable to contractual obligations

Although  litigation  relating  to  the  conflict  of  laws  was  rare  in  2013,  the  Court  nonetheless  ad-
dressed an important issue in Case C-184/12 Unamar (judgment of 17 October 2013). Asked to inter-
pret Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Rome Convention, (52) the Court had the opportunity, in this case, to 
determine whether the court before which the dispute has been brought may disregard the law chosen 
by the parties to a commercial agency contract in favour of the law of the forum, owing to the manda‑
tory nature, in the legal order of the latter Member State, of the rules governing the situation of 
self-employed commercial agents.

(51)  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 

of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

(52)  Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 

(OJ 1980 L 266, p. 1).

32 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

The  Court  held  that  the  choice  of  applicable  law  made  by  the  parties,  in  accordance  with  Art‑
icle 3(1) of the Rome Convention, must be respected, so that the exception relating to the existence 
of a ‘mandatory rule’ within the meaning of the legislation of the Member State concerned, as 
referred to in Article 7(2) of that convention, must be interpreted strictly. Provisions compliance 
with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic 
order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present 
on the national territory are to be regarded as public order legislation of that kind. Consequently, 
the law of a Member State which has been chosen by the parties to a commercial agency contract 
and which meets the minimum protection requirements laid down by Directive 86/653 (53) may be 
rejected by the court before which the case has been brought only if that court finds, on the basis 
of a detailed assessment, that the legislature of the State of the forum held it to be crucial to grant 
the commercial agent protection going beyond that provided for by the directive, taking account 
in that regard of the nature and the objective of such mandatory provisions.

VII.  Transport

Two important judgments were delivered in this field in 2013. First, in Case C-11/11 Folkerts (judg-
ment of 26 February 2013), the rules on compensation to air passengers in the event of cancellation 
of a flight were explained further. The Court held that in the case of directly connecting flights the 
fixed compensation must be assessed by reference to the delay beyond the scheduled time of 
arrival at the final destination, understood as being the destination of the last flight taken by the 
passenger concerned. Thus, a passenger on a connecting flight must receive compensation where 
he has been delayed at the departure of his first flight for a period below the limits specified in 
Regulation No 261/2004 (54) but, owing to that delay, arrived at his final destination at least three 
hours later than the scheduled arrival time.

Second, in Case C-547/10 P Switzerland v Commission (judgment of 7 March 2013), the Court heard 
an appeal against the judgment of the General Court (55) dismissing the action for annulment of 
Decision 2004/12, (56) whereby the Commission had approved the restrictions adopted by the Ger‑
man authorities on overflight during the night of certain areas of German territory near Zurich airport.

The Court upheld in its entirety the General Court’s analysis of the action. It observed that, under 
Article 8(2) of Regulation No 2408/92, (57) a Member State may make the exercise of air traffic rights 
subject to national, regional or local operational rules relating, in particular, to the protection of 
the environment. The adoption of such rules is not equivalent to the imposition of a condition, 
within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 2408/92, consisting in the limitation or refusal 
of the exercise of traffic rights. An interpretation to the contrary would render Article 8(2) of that 

(53)  Council  Directive  86/653/EC  of  18 September 1986  on  the  coordination  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States 

relating to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17).

(54)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common  rules  on  compensation  and  assistance  to  passengers  in  the  event  of  denied  boarding  and  of 
cancellation or long delay of flights (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

(55)  Case T-319/05 Switzerland v Commission [2010] ECR II-4265.

(56)  Commission Decision 2004/12/EC of 5 December 2003 relating to the application of Article 18(2), first sentence, 
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on air transport and Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 (OJ 2004 L 4, p. 13).

(57)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra Community 

air routes (OJ 1992 L 240, p. 8). 

Annual Report 2013 

33

Court of Justice 

Case-law

regulation meaningless. In the case in point, since the measures at issue do not involve, during 
their period of application, any prohibition, whether conditional or partial, of passage through Ger-
man airspace for flights leaving or arriving at Zurich airport, but a mere change in the flight path of 
the flights concerned after take-off from or prior to landing at that airport, the General Court was 
correct to consider that they do not fall within the scope of Article 9(1) of the regulation.

Furthermore, since the Swiss Confederation did not join the internal market of the European Union 
and  the  EC-Switzerland  Air  Transport  Agreement  (58)  contains  no  specific  provisions  such  as  to 
enable the air carriers concerned to benefit from the provisions of European Union law on the 
freedom to provide services, the interpretation given to the latter provisions in the context of the 
internal market cannot be transposed to that agreement.

VIII.  Competition

1. 

a) 

Agreements, decisions and concerted practices

Infringements of the competition rules

So far as concerns interpretation of the provisions on agreements, decisions and concerted prac-
tices, mention should be made of two judgments. (59) First, in Case C-681/11 Schenker & Co and Others 
(judgment of 18 June 2013), the Court ruled that an undertaking which has infringed Article 101 TFEU 
cannot rely on a breach of the principle of legitimate expectations and thus escape imposition of a fine 
by claiming that it erred as to the lawfulness of its conduct on account of the terms of legal ad-
vice given by a lawyer or of the terms of a decision of a national competition authority. The Court 
held that the fact that an undertaking has characterised its conduct wrongly in law cannot have 
the effect of exempting it from imposition of a fine other than in exceptional cases, for example 
where a general principle of European Union law, such as the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations, precludes imposition of such a fine. However, a person may not plead breach of that 
principle unless he has been given precise assurances by the competent authority. Thus, legal ad-
vice given by a lawyer cannot form the basis of a legitimate expectation for an undertaking; nor, 
likewise, can the national competition authorities cause undertakings to entertain such a legiti-
mate expectation, since they do not have the power to adopt a decision concluding that there is no 
infringement of European Union law, but are empowered to examine the conduct of undertakings 
on the basis of national competition law.

The Court also adjudicated on the power of the national authorities not to impose a fine notwith-
standing the finding of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The Court held that, while Article 5 of 
Regulation No 1/2003 (60) does not expressly confer such power on them, it does not exclude that 

(58)  Agreement  between  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  Air  Transport,  signed  on 
21 June 1999 in Luxembourg, approved on behalf of the Community by Decision 2002/309/EC, Euratom of the 
Council  and  of  the  Commission  as  regards  the  Agreement  on  Scientific  and  Technological  Cooperation  of 
4 April 2002 on the conclusion of seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation (OJ 2002 L 114, p. 1). 

(59)  As  regards  judicial  proceedings  relating  to  infringements  of  the  competition  rules,  mention  should  also  be 
made of Case C-40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland (formerly Sachsa Verpackung) v Commission, Case C-50/12 P 
Kendrion v Commission and C-58/12 P Groupe Gascogne v Commission (judgments of 26 November 2013). These 
judgments are presented under the heading ‘Proceedings of the European Union’.

(60)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 

laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).

34 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

power either. However, in order to ensure that Article 101 TFEU is applied effectively in the general 
interest, the national competition authority may decide not to impose a fine only exceptionally 
where an undertaking has infringed that provision intentionally or negligently and such a deci-
sion not to impose a fine can be made under a national leniency programme only in so far as the 
programme is implemented in such a way as not to undermine the requirement of effective and 
uniform application of Article 101 TFEU.

Second, in Case C-287/11 P Commission v Aalberts Industries and Others (judgment of 4 July 2013), 
the Court determined an appeal against a judgment of the General Court (61) annulling a decision 
in which the Commission had imputed to a parent company liability for the infringement of the com‑
petition rules by its subsidiaries.

In that regard, the Court restated the principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to 
the parent company where, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not 
decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, 
the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, 
organisational and legal links between those two legal entities. The Court held that the General 
Court had erred in law in examining only whether the subsidiaries could, on the basis of evidence 
specific to each of the subsidiaries, be regarded as having participated separately in the infringe-
ment and not examining the plea disputing the classification of the parent company and its sub-
sidiaries as a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 EC. However, the Court held that, 
in this instance, that error of law could not lead to the judgment under appeal being set aside, 
given that the action for annulment was in any event well founded, as the Commission’s findings 
as to the participation of the subsidiaries in the cartel had not been proved to the requisite legal 
standard.

In addition, the Court held the General Court had been correct, even though it found that one of 
the undertakings concerned had participated in meetings organised within the cartel, not to annul 
the Commission’s decision in part, since the Commission regarded the cartel in question as a single, 
complex and continuous infringement. According to the Court, partial annulment is possible only 
if the conduct that is a constituent element of the infringement can be severed from the remainder 
of the infringement.

b) 

Access to the file in cartel cases

In Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie and Others (judgment of 6 June 2013), the Court was required to ad-
judicate on the principles applicable to access by a person injured by a cartel, and seeking damages, 
to the documents in the file relating to national court proceedings concerning the application of 
Article 101 TFEU. In its decision, the Court held that European Union law, in particular the principle 
of effectiveness, precludes a provision of national law under which such access is made subject to 
the consent of all the parties to the proceedings and which leaves no possibility for the national 
courts to weigh up the interests involved. That also applies to documents disclosed in the context 
of a leniency programme. The national courts must be able to weigh up, on a case-by-case basis, 
the interest of the applicant in obtaining access to those documents in order to prepare his action 
for damages, in particular in the light of other possibilities he may have, and the actual harmful 
consequences  which  may  result  from  such  access  having  regard  to  the  public  interests  or  the 
legitimate interests of other parties, including the public interest in the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes.

(61)  Case T-385/06 Aalberts Industries and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II-1223.

Annual Report 2013 

35

Court of Justice 

2. 

a) 

State aid

Concept of State aid

Case-law

In Joined Cases C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others 
(judgment  of  19 March 2013),  the  Court  held,  on  appeal,  that  the  General  Court  (62)  had  been 
wrong to annul the decision whereby the Commission had classified as State aid the shareholder loan 
granted by France to France Télécom SA (FT) in the form of a credit line and announced, in particular, in 
a press release from the French Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry. In its judgment, 
the General Court had considered that the financial advantage conferred on FT had not entailed 
a corresponding reduction of the State budget, so that the condition that the measure be financed 
through State resources, necessary for it to be classified as aid, was not satisfied.

The Court set aside the judgment of the General Court, observing that while it is the case that, 
for the purposes of establishing the existence of State aid, the Commission must establish a suf-
ficiently direct link between, on the one hand, the advantage given to the beneficiary and, on the 
other, a reduction of the State budget or even a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on 
that budget, it is not necessary that such a reduction, or even such a risk, should correspond or be 
equivalent to that advantage, or that the advantage should have as its counterpart such a reduc-
tion or such a risk, or that the advantage should be of the same nature as the commitment of State 
resources from which it derives.

In adjudicating on the substance of the action before the General Court, the Court held, moreover, 
that the Commission had been correct to consider that the announcement of that measure in the 
press release must be regarded as forming part of the aid measure which subsequently took con-
crete form in the offer of the shareholder loan. Several consecutive measures of State intervention 
must be regarded as a single intervention, especially where they are so closely linked to each other 
that they are inseparable from one another.

In Case C-677/11 Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL‑ARREE (judgment of 30 May 2013), the 
Court held that a decision by a national authority extending to all traders in the agricultural industry, 
on a compulsory basis, an inter‑trade agreement introducing the levying of a contribution, in order 
to make it possible to implement publicity activities, promotional activities, external relations ac-
tivities, quality assurance activities, research activities and activities in the defence of the sector’s 
interests, does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

The Court held, in this instance, that, first, that contribution mechanism does not involve any direct 
or indirect transfer of State resources. The funds provided by the payment of those contributions 
do not go through the State budget or through another public body and the State does not re-
linquish any resources, in whatever form (such as taxes, duties, charges and so on). Second, the 
inter-trade organisations are private-law associations and form no part of the State administration. 
Third, the public authorities cannot use the resources resulting from such contributions to sup-
port certain undertakings, since it is the inter-trade organisation that decides how to use those re-
sources, which are entirely dedicated to pursuing objectives determined by that organisation. Last, 
the Court added that such private funds used by inter-trade organisations do not become State re-
sources simply because they are used alongside sums which may originate from the State budget.

(62)  Joined Cases T-425/04, T-444/04, T-450/04 and T-456/04 France v Commission [2010] ECR II-2099.

36 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

b) 

Powers of the Council and of the Commission in regard to State aid

During 2013, the Court delivered a number of important judgments which defined the respective 
powers of the Council and the Commission in State aid matters.

A first series of judgments concerned aid in the agricultural sector. In the Community guidelines 
for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to 2013, (63) the Commission proposed that 
Member States should amend the existing aid schemes for the purchase of agricultural land so as 
to conform to those guidelines by 31 December 2009. In 2007, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Hun-
gary accepted the measures proposed by the Commission. In 2009 those four States requested 
the Council to declare their aid schemes, permitting the purchase of agricultural land, compat-
ible with the internal market from 1 January 2010. The Council agreed to those requests. The Com-
mission brought actions challenging the Council’s decisions. The Court dismissed those actions 
by four judgments of 4 December 2013, in Case C-111/10 Commission v Council, concerning Lithu-
ania, Case C-117/10 Commission v Council, concerning Poland, Case C-118/10 Commission v Council, 
concerning Latvia, and Case C-121/10 Commission v Council, concerning Hungary. In those judg-
ments, the Court defined the extent of the power conferred on the Council by the third subparagraph 
of  Article  108(2)  TFEU  to  declare  State  aid  compatible  with  the  common  market  in  exceptional 
circumstances.

The Court pointed out that the Commission plays a central role in monitoring State aid and that 
the power of the Council under that provision is clearly exceptional in character. The Court further 
emphasised that, in order to maintain the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action 
and the principle of legal certainty, when one of those institutions has adopted a final ruling on 
the compatibility of the aid in question, the other one may no longer adopt a contrary decision. 
As regards the contested decisions, the Court observed that the national measures adopted by 
the States in order to make their aid schemes conform to the Commission’s guidelines related to 
the period before 1 January 2010 and that, accordingly, the Council’s decisions related to new aid 
schemes.

However,  the  Court  emphasised  that  the  Council  does  not  have  power  to  authorise  a  new  aid 
scheme indissolubly linked to an existing aid scheme that a Member State has undertaken to mod-
ify or abolish by accepting appropriate measures proposed by the Commission. Nevertheless, in 
this instance, the Court stated that, owing to the substantial change in circumstances, to which the 
Council refers in the reasons stated for the contested decisions, the Commission’s assessment in 
the guidelines cannot be regarded as prejudicing the assessment which was made by the Council 
and which related to economic circumstances radically different from those which the Commis-
sion had taken into account in its assessment. Examining the relevant economic circumstances, 
the Court concluded that, in the light of the unusual and unforeseeable character of the economic 
and financial crisis and the extent of its effects on agriculture in the Member States concerned, the 
Council could not be considered to have made a manifest error of assessment.

Another judgment concerning the allocation of powers between the Council and the Commis-
sion  was  delivered  on  10 December 2013  in  Case  C-272/12  P  Commission  v  Ireland  and  Others, 
which concerned national rules on excise duties. The Court set aside the judgment of the General 
Court, (64) which had upheld the action for annulment of a Commission decision classifying ex-

(63)  Community guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sector 2007 to 2013 (OJ 2006 C 319, p. 1).

(64)  Joined  Cases T-50/06  RENV, T-56/06  RENV, T-60/06  RENV, T-62/06  RENV  and T-69/06  RENV  Ireland and Others 

v Commission, judgment of 21 March 2012, not yet published in the ECR.

Annual Report 2013 

37

Court of Justice 

Case-law

emptions from excise duties on heavy mineral oil used in the production of alumina as State aid. 
Those exemptions had been introduced by certain Member States on the basis of authorisation 
decisions adopted by the Council pursuant to Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81 on the harmonisation 
of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils. (65) The General Court had held, inter alia, that the 
authorisations granted by the Council precluded the Commission from being able to classify the 
exemptions at issue as State aid.

The Court held, conversely, that the purpose and the scope of the procedure laid down in Art-
icle 8(4) of Directive 92/81 differ from those of the rules established in Article 108 TFEU. Accordingly, 
a Council decision authorising a Member State, in accordance with Directive 92/81, to introduce 
an exemption from excise duties cannot have the effect of preventing the Commission from im-
plementing the procedure provided for in Article 108 TFEU in order to examine whether such an 
exemption constitutes State aid and, on completion of that procedure, if appropriate, to adopt 
a negative final decision against those exemptions.

Last, the Court stated that, although the authorisation decisions had been adopted on a proposal 
by the Commission, which had considered that those exemptions did not give rise to distortions of 
competition, that fact could not preclude those exemptions from being classified as State aid, since 
the concept of State aid corresponds to an objective situation and cannot depend on the conduct 
or statements of the institutions. However, that fact must be taken into consideration in relation to 
the obligation to recover the incompatible aid, in the light of the principles of protection of legiti-
mate expectations and legal certainty.

IX.  Fiscal provisions

In Joined Cases C-249/12 and C-250/12 Tulică (judgment of 7 November 2013), the Court was re-
quested  to  rule  on  the  method  of  calculating  the  taxable  amount  of  VAT  where,  following  the 
non-payment of that tax, the national tax authorities must recover the tax payable in respect of 
transactions in which the price set by the parties makes no reference to VAT. The Court held that 
Directive 2006/112 on the common system of valued added tax, (66) in particular Articles 73 and 78 
thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that, when the price of goods has been established by the 
parties without any reference to VAT and the supplier of those goods is the taxable person for the 
VAT owing on the taxed transaction, the price agreed must be regarded as already including the 
VAT if the supplier is not able to recover from the purchaser the VAT claimed by the tax authorities.

Taking the full price into account as the taxable amount would have the consequence, in a situation 
where the supplier has no means of recovering from the purchaser the VAT claimed subsequently 
by the tax authorities, that the supplier would bear the VAT burden. Such a method of calculating 
the taxable amount would conflict with the principle that VAT is a tax on consumption to be borne 
by the end consumer and also with the rule that the tax authorities may not charge an amount of 
VAT exceeding the tax charged by the taxable person.

(65)  Council  Directive  92/81/EEC  of  19 October 1992  on  the  harmonisation  of  the  structures  of  excise  duties  on 

mineral oils (OJ 1992 L 316, p. 12).

(66)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, 

p. 1).

38 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

X.  Approximation of laws

1. 

Intellectual property

In regard to the approximation of laws in the field of intellectual property, two judgments in par‑
ticular  are  noteworthy  in  2013.  The  first,  presented  under  the  heading  ‘Enhanced  cooperation’, 
deals  with  the  proposed  unitary  patent;  the  second,  presented  under  this  heading,  provides 
explanation in the field of copyright and related rights.

In Case C-521/11 Amazon.com International Sales and Others (judgment of 11 July 2013), the Court 
expanded on its case-law concerning the financing of fair compensation for a private copy, within 
the  meaning  of  Article  5(2)(a)  of  Directive  2001/29.  (67)  That  case  concerned  national  legislation 
under which fair compensation takes the form of a private copying levy chargeable to those who 
make  available,  for  commercial  purposes  and  for  consideration,  recording  media  suitable  for 
reproduction.

Referring to Padawan, (68) the Court observed, first of all, that European Union law does not pre-
clude a system of a general levy, indiscriminately applying a private copying levy on the first pla-
cing on the market of those media, where it is accompanied by the possibility of obtaining reim-
bursement of the levies paid if the media are not used to make private copies. However, it is for 
the national court to verify, having regard to the particular circumstances of each national system 
and to the limits imposed by Directive 2001/29, that practical difficulties justify such a system of 
financing fair compensation and that the right to reimbursement is effective and does not make 
repayment of the levies paid excessively difficult. According to the Court, the practical difficulties of 
determining whether the purpose of the use of the media is private may justify the establishment 
of a rebuttable presumption of private use of such media when they are made available to natural 
persons, provided that the presumption established does not result in the private copying levy 
being imposed where the media are clearly used for non-private purposes.

The Court made it clear, next, that a private copying levy cannot be ruled out by reason of the fact 
that half of the funds received under that arrangement is paid, not directly to those entitled to such 
compensation, but to social and cultural institutions set up for the benefit of those entitled, pro-
vided that those social and cultural establishments actually benefit those entitled and the detailed 
arrangements for the operation of such establishments are not discriminatory. Nor can the obliga-
tion to pay that levy be excluded by reason of the fact that a comparable levy has already been 
paid in another Member State. However, a person who has previously paid that levy in a Member 
State which does not have territorial competence may request its repayment.

2.  Money laundering

The prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing was at the centre of Case C-212/11 Jyske Bank Gibraltar (judgment of 25 April 2013). In that 
case, the Court was required to rule on the compatibility with Article 22(2) of Directive 2005/60 (69) 

(67)  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 

certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).

(68)  Case C-467/08 [2010] ECR I-10055. 
(69)  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (OJ 2005 L 309, 
p. 15).

Annual Report 2013 

39

Court of Justice 

Case-law

of the legislation of a Member State requiring credit institutions active on national territory under 
the rules on the freedom to provide services to provide the information requested in the interest of 
combating money laundering directly to the financial intelligence unit of that State.

According to the Court, that provision must be interpreted as meaning that the entities referred 
to by the directive must forward the requested information to the financial intelligence unit of 
the Member State in whose territory they are situated, that is to say, in the case of operations per-
formed under the rules on the freedom to provide services, to the financial intelligence unit of the 
Member State of origin. However, that provision does not preclude the host Member State from 
requiring a credit institution carrying out activities on its territory under the rules on the freedom 
to provide services to forward the information directly to its own financial intelligence unit, on 
condition that such legislation seeks to strengthen, in compliance with European Union law, the 
effectiveness of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

While such national legislation constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, in so far 
as it gives rise to difficulties and additional costs for activities carried out under the rules governing 
the freedom to provide services and is liable to be additional to the controls already conducted in 
the Member State of origin, that does not mean that it must be incompatible with Article 56 TFEU. 
That is not the case if it may be considered to be justified by an overriding reason in the public 
interest. In that regard, first, such legislation may be considered to be appropriate for ensuring 
attainment of the objective of preventing money laundering and terrorist financing and, second, 
it may constitute a proportionate measure in pursuit of that aim in the absence of any effective 
mechanism guaranteeing full and complete cooperation between financial intelligence units.

3. 

Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles

Among the decisions delivered during the year concerning insurance against civil liability in re-
spect  of  the  use  of  motor  vehicles,  mention  should  be  made  of  Case  C-306/12 Spedition  Welter 
(judgment of 10 October 2013). In that case, a reference was made to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of Article 21(5) of Directive 2009/103 (70) concerning the powers that the 
claims representative must have.

The Court observed, first of all, that Directive 2009/103 is intended to guarantee motor vehicle 
accident  victims  comparable  treatment  irrespective  of  where  in  the  European  Union  accidents 
occur. To that end, such victims must be entitled to claim in their Member State of residence against 
a claims representative appointed there by the insurance undertaking of the responsible party. 
Furthermore, according to recital 37 in the preamble to that directive, Member States must require 
those claims representatives to have sufficient powers to represent the insurance undertaking in 
relation to victims, and also to represent it before national authorities including, where necessary, 
before the courts, in so far as that is compatible with the rules on the conferring of jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the claim representative’s powers must include the authority to accept service of 
judicial documents. Excluding that authority would deprive Directive 2009/13 of its purpose, which 
is to guarantee victims comparable treatment throughout the territory of the European Union.

(70)  Directive  2009/103/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 September 2009  relating  to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to 
insure against such liability (OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11).

40 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

4.  Misleading advertising and comparative advertising

In relation to misleading advertising and comparative advertising, mention should be made of 
Case C-657/11 Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology (judgment of 11 July 2013). Called upon to clar-
ify the scope of the concept of advertising, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 84/450, (71) 
as amended by Directive 2005/29, and of Article 2(a) of Directive 2006/114, (72) the Court stated that 
it cannot be interpreted and applied in such a way that steps taken by a trader to promote the sales 
of its products or services that are capable of influencing the economic behaviour of consumers 
and, therefore, of affecting the trader’s competitors, are not subject to the rules of fair competition 
imposed by those directives. It follows that the concept covers the use of a domain name and also 
the use of metatags in a website’s metadata where the domain name or the metatags consisting 
of keywords (keyword metatags) make reference to certain goods or services or to the trade name 
of a company and constitute a form of representation that is made to potential consumers and 
suggests to them that they will find a website relating to those goods or services or relating to 
that company. By contrast, the registration of a domain name, as such, is not encompassed by that 
term, since such registration constitutes a purely formal act which, in itself, does not necessarily 
imply that potential consumers can become aware of the domain name and which is therefore not 
capable of influencing the choice of those potential consumers.

XI.  Social policy

1. 

Equal treatment in employment and occupation

Case C-81/12 Asociaţia ACCEPT (judgment of 25 April 2013) concerned homophobic statements relat‑
ing to the recruitment policy of a professional football club. The particular feature of the case was that 
the public statement ruling out the recruitment of a footballer presented as being homosexual had 
been made by a person who presented himself and was publicly perceived as playing a leading 
role in that club but did not have legal capacity to bind the club in recruitment matters. The Court 
ruled that such statements are capable of amounting, for the purpose of Directive 2000/78 (73) es-
tablishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, to facts from 
which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination based on sexual orientation on the 
part of the club.

The Court observed that an employer cannot deny the existence of facts from which it may be 
inferred that the employer has a discriminatory recruitment policy merely by asserting that the 
homophobic statements suggestive of the existence of such a policy come from a person who, 
while claiming and appearing to play an important role in the management of that employer, is not 
legally capable of binding it in recruitment matters. Such an inference may, on the other hand, be 
rebutted by a body of consistent evidence, such as the fact that the club has clearly distanced itself 
from the homophobic statements. However, the burden of proof, as adapted by Directive 2000/78, 

(71)  Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17), as 
amended by Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 (OJ 2005 L 149, 
p. 22).

(72)  Directive  2006/114/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 December 2006  concerning 

misleading and comparative advertising (codified version) (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 21).

(73)  Articles 2(2) and 10(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 

for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).

Annual Report 2013 

41

Court of Justice 

Case-law

would not require evidence that would be impossible to adduce without interfering with the right 
to privacy. It is therefore unnecessary for the defendant employer to prove that persons of a par-
ticular sexual orientation have been recruited in the past.

In Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 Ring (judgment of 11 April 2013), the Court ruled, again in re-
spect of Directive 2000/78, on the question whether the dismissal of a worker with a shortened period 
of notice on grounds of illness can entail discrimination against workers with disabilities.

In that regard, the Court pointed out, in particular, that Directive 2000/78 (74) requires employers to 
take appropriate and reasonable accommodation measures in order, in particular, to enable a per-
son with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment. ‘Reasonable ac-
commodation’ within the meaning of that directive refers to measures aimed at eliminating the 
various barriers that hinder the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in profes-
sional life on an equal basis with other workers. Thus, the Court held that a reduction in working 
hours,  even  if  it  does  not  come  within  the  concept  of  the  ‘patterns  of  working  time’,  to  which 
Directive 200/78 makes explicit reference, may be considered to be an appropriate accommodation 
where reduced hours make it possible for the worker to continue employment, provided that it 
does not constitute a disproportionate burden on the employer. Indeed, the list of such measures 
set out in the preamble to Directive 2000/78 is not exhaustive.

As regards a national provision permitting dismissal with a shortened period of notice on grounds 
of illness, the Court considered that such a provision is liable to produce a difference of treatment 
indirectly based on disability, in so far as a worker with a disability is more exposed to the risk of ap-
plication of the shortened notice period than a worker without a disability. Referring to the broad 
discretion which the Member States enjoy in relation to social policy, the Court held that it was for 
the referring court to examine whether the national legislature, in pursuing the legitimate aims 
of, first, promoting the recruitment of persons with illnesses and, second, striking a reason able 
balance between the opposing interests of employees and employers with respect to absences 
because of illness, omitted to take account of relevant factors relating in particular to workers with 
disabilities and to the specific needs connected with the protection that their condition requires.

2. 

Protection of workers in the event of the insolvency of the employer

In  Case  C-398/11  Hogan  and  Others  (judgment  of  25 April 2013),  the  Court  held  that  Dir-
ective 2008/94 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (75) 
applies to the entitlement of former employees to old‑age benefits under a supplementary pension 
scheme set up by their employer.

Article 8 of that directive provides that Member States are to ensure that the necessary measures 
are taken to protect the interests of employees as regards their entitlement to those benefits. Ac-
cording to the Court, in order for that article to apply, it is sufficient that the supplementary pen-
sion scheme is underfunded as of the date of the employer’s insolvency and that, on account of 
his insolvency, the employer does not have the necessary resources to contribute sufficient money 
to the pension scheme to enable the pension benefits owed to be satisfied in full. State pension 
benefits, which are not covered by Article 8 of Directive 2008/94, may not be taken into account in 
assessing whether a Member State has discharged the obligation laid down in that article.

(74)  Article 5 of Directive 2000/78.

(75)  Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of 

employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (Codified version) (OJ 2008 L 283, p. 36).

42 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

The Irish legislation at issue in Hogan had been enacted by Ireland following an earlier judgment of 
the Court in Robins and Others. (76) As soon as the latter judgment was delivered, the Member States 
were informed that the correct transposition of Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 requires an employee 
to  receive,  in  the  event  of  the  insolvency  of  his  employer,  at  least  half  of  the  old-age  benefits 
concerned. However, the Irish legislation limited the extent of the protection of the plaintiffs in 
the main proceedings to less than half the value of their old-age benefits. The Court held that such 
legislation not only does not fulfil the obligations imposed on Member States by that directive but 
also constitutes a serious breach of that Member State’s obligations, such as to render it liable. In 
that regard, the Court added that the economic situation of the Member State concerned does 
not constitute an exceptional situation capable of justifying a lower level of protection of workers’ 
entitlement to old-age benefits.

3. 

Right to maternity leave

In  Case  C-5/12  Betriu  Montull  (judgment  of  19 September 2013),  the  Court  ruled  that  Directives 
92/85 (77) and 76/207 (78) concerning, respectively, the protection of pregnant workers and workers 
who have recently given birth and equal treatment for men and women at work do not preclude 
national legislation which limits the benefit of maternity leave provided for in the former directive, 
in  respect  of  the  period  after  the  compulsory  leave  of  six  weeks  which  the  mother  must  take 
after childbirth, solely to parents who are both employed persons and therefore excludes from 
the benefit of that right the father of a child whose mother is not an employed person and is not 
covered by a State social security scheme.

First,  according  to  the  Court,  the  situation  of  such  a  self-employed  person  does  not  fall  within 
the scope of Directive 92/85, which covers only pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding. Second, although such legislation establishes a difference in treat-
ment on the grounds of sex, that difference in treatment is justified under Directive 76/207, (79) 
which recognises the legitimacy of protecting a woman’s biological condition during and after 
pregnancy. (80)

XII.  Consumer protection

Mention should be made, in the field of consumer protection, of Case C-415/11 Aziz (judgment of 
14 March 2013), concerning the interpretation of Directive 93/13 (81) on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts. The case originated in a reference for a preliminary ruling from a Spanish court in an ac-
tion by a consumer for a declaration that a loan agreement secured by a mortgage was unfair and for 
annulment of the enforcement proceedings against the consumer.

(76)  Case C-278/05 Robins and Others [2007] ECR I-1053.

(77)  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in  the  safety  and  health  at  work  of  pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are 
breastfeeding (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1).

(78)  Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
(OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40).

(79)  Article 2(1) of Directive 76/207.

(80)  Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207.

(81)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

Annual Report 2013 

43

Court of Justice 

Case-law

The Court held that, if the national procedural rules render it impossible for the court hearing the 
declaratory proceedings — before which consumer has brought proceedings claiming that the 
contractual term on which the right to seek enforcement is based is unfair — to grant interim re-
lief capable of staying or terminating the mortgage enforcement proceedings where such relief is 
necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of its final decision, those rules impair the effectiveness 
of the protection sought by the directive. Without that possibility, where enforcement in respect 
of the mortgaged immovable property took place before the judgment of the court in the de-
claratory proceedings declaring the contractual term on which the mortgage is based to be unfair 
and annulling the enforcement proceedings, that judgment would enable the consumer to obtain 
only protection of a purely compensatory nature, which would be incomplete and insufficient and 
would not constitute either an adequate or an effective means of preventing the continued use of 
that term, contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13.

Next, the Court stated that the concept of ‘significant imbalance’ to the detriment of the consumer, 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the directive, must be assessed in the light of an analysis of the 
rules of national law applicable in the absence of any agreement between the parties, in order to 
determine whether, and if so to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a less favourable 
legal situation than that provided for by the national law in force. To that end, an assessment of the 
legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at his disposal, under national law, to 
prevent continued use of unfair terms should also be carried out.

XIII.  Environment

1. 

Right to information and access to decisions in environmental matters

In Križan and Others, (82) the Court ruled on the right of public access to an urban planning decision re-
lating to the location of a landfill site. The Court held that the decision at issue in the main proceed-
ings, first, constituted one of the measures on the basis of which the final decision whether or not 
to authorise that installation would be taken and, second, included information relevant to the au-
thorisation procedure. The Court therefore observed that, under the provisions of the Aarhus Con-
vention, (83) and Directive 96/61 on the prevention and control of pollution (84) reproducing those 
provisions, the public concerned were entitled to have access to that decision. In that context, the 
Court explained that the refusal to make the urban planning decision available to the public could 
not be justified by a reference to the protection of the confidentiality of commercial or industrial 
information. Nonetheless, it accepted the possibility of rectifying an unjustified refusal to make an 
urban planning decision available to the public concerned, provided that all options and solutions 
remain possible and that such rectification enables the public to have an effective influence on the 
outcome of the decision-making process.

Furthermore,  the  Court  held  that  the  purpose  of  the  directive,  which  is  to  prevent  and  control 
pollution, could not be achieved if it were impossible to prevent an installation which may have 

(82)  Another aspect of this judgment is presented under the heading ‘Proceedings of the European Union’.

(83)  Convention  on  access  to  information,  public  participation  in  decision-making  and  access  to  justice  in 
environmental  matters,  signed  at  Aarhus  on  25 June 1998. This  convention  was  approved  on  behalf  of  the 
European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1).

(84)  Council  Directive  96/61/EC  of  24 September 1996  concerning  integrated  pollution  prevention  and  control 
(OJ  1996  L  257,  p.  26),  as  amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  166/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 18 January 2006 (OJ 2006 L 33, p. 1).

44 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

benefited from a permit awarded in breach of the directive from continuing to function pending 
a definitive decision on the lawfulness of that permit. Consequently, the directive requires that the 
members of the public concerned should have the right to apply for interim measures capable of 
preventing that pollution, such as the temporary suspension of the disputed permit.

Under  Directive  2003/4,  (85)  Member  States  are  to  ensure  that  public  authorities  are  required 
to make the environmental information held by or for them available to any applicant. In Case 
C-279/12 Fish Legal and Shirley (judgment of 19 December 2013), the Court was required to clarify 
the concept of public authority within the meaning of that directive.

The Court held that entities such as water supply and sewage treatment undertakings can be clas-
sified as legal persons which perform ‘public administration functions’, and for that reason consti-
tute ‘public authorities’ within the meaning of the directive, (86) if, under national law, they are re-
sponsible for performing services of public interest and, for that purpose, are vested under national 
law with special powers going beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in rela-
tions between persons governed by private law. Furthermore, these undertakings which provide 
public services relating to the environment must also be classified as ‘public authorities’ within the 
meaning of the directive (87) if they provide those services under the control of a body or person 
falling within Article 2(2)(a) or (b) of Directive 2003/4 and do not determine in a genuinely autono-
mous manner the way in which they provide those services since such a body or such a person is 
in a position to exert decisive influence on those undertakings’ action in the environmental field.

The Court further observed that such a person performing ‘public administrative functions’ within 
the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2003 which constitutes a public authority is required to 
give access to all the environmental information which it holds. Conversely, commercial companies 
which are capable of constituting a public authority by virtue of Article 2(2)(c) of that directive only 
in so far as, when they provide public services in the environmental field, they are under the con-
trol of a public authority, are required to supply environmental information only if it relates to the 
provision of such services.

2. 

Right to an effective remedy in environmental matters

In Case C-260/11 Edwards (judgment of 11 April 2013), the Court was called upon to rule on the 
question of the cost of judicial proceedings that could undermine the right to an effective remedy in 
environmental matters. The Court held that the requirement, laid down in European Union law, (88) 
that the judicial proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive means that the persons con-
cerned should not be prevented from seeking, or pursuing a claim for, a review by the courts that 
falls within the scope of the relevant provisions of European Union law by reason of the financial 
burden that might arise as a result, taking into account all the costs that must be borne. The Court 

(85)  Directive  2003/4/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28 January 2003  on  public  access  to 

environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ 2003 L 41, p. 26).

(86)  Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2003/4.

(87)  Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2003/4.

(88)  The fifth paragraph of Article 10a of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40) and the fifth paragraph 
of Article 15a of Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention 
and control (OJ 1996 L 257, p. 26), both as amended by Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes  relating  to  the  environment  and  amending  with  regard  to  public  participation  and  access  to 
justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 156, p 17).

Annual Report 2013 

45

Court of Justice 

Case-law

stated that the requirement pertains, in environmental matters, to the observance of the right to 
an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and also to the 
principle of effectiveness.

Thus, where a national court is called upon to make an order for costs against a member of the 
public who is an unsuccessful claimant in an environmental dispute, it must satisfy itself that the 
proceedings are not prohibitively expensive, taking into account both the interest of the person 
wising to defend his rights and the public interest in the protection of the environment.

In carrying out that assessment, the national court cannot base its decision solely on the economic 
situation of the person concerned, but must also undertake an objective analysis of the amount of 
the costs. Thus, the cost of proceedings must neither exceed the financial resources of the person 
concerned nor appear, in any event, to be objectively unreasonable.

XIV.  Telecommunications

In the case-law of the past year the Court concerned itself with the regulatory framework applica-
ble to electronic communication services.

In Case C-375/11 Belgacom and Others (judgment of 21 March 2013), the Court was requested to 
give a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the fees applied to mobile telephone operators in 
Belgium with Directive 2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services. (89)

First, the Court stated that the procedure for the renewal of rights of use for radio frequencies must 
be regarded as a granting of new rights and therefore the award procedure must be subject to the 
directive. Second, the Court held that Articles 12 and 13 of the directive do not preclude a Member 
State from charging mobile telephone operators a one-off fee payable both for a new acquisi-
tion of rights of use for radio frequencies and for renewal of those rights, in addition to an annual 
fee for making those frequencies available, intended to encourage optimal use of the resources, 
and to a fee to cover the cost of managing the authorisation, provided that those fees are genu-
inely intended to ensure optimal use of the radio frequencies, are objectively justified, transparent, 
non-discriminatory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose and take into account 
the objectives set out in Article 8 of the directive.

Last, the Court observed that the charging of a one-off fee is an amendment to the conditions ap-
plicable to operators holding rights of use for radio frequencies. Accordingly, Article 14(1) of the 
directive does not preclude a Member State from charging such a fee, provided that that amend-
ment is consistent with the conditions set out in that provision, namely that the amendment is 
objectively justified and effected in a proportionate manner and notice has been given to all inter-
ested parties in order to enable them to express their views.

(89)  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 

electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21). 

46 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

In  Case  C-518/11  UPC Nederland  (judgment  of  7 November 2013),  the  Court  was  called  upon  to 
clarify the scope ratione materiae of the directives forming the new regulatory framework governing 
electronic communication networks and systems in European Union law. (90)

The Court held that a service consisting in the supply of a basic package of radio and television 
programmes via cable, the charge for which includes transmission costs as well as payments to 
broadcasters and royalties paid to copyright collecting societies in connection with the transmis-
sion of programme content, falls within the definition of an electronic communications service 
and, consequently, within the substantive scope of the legislation governing electronic communi-
cations in European Union law.

As regards, next, the powers of the national authorities in the context of the application of that 
legislation,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  directives  concerned  must  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that 
they preclude an entity such as a local entity not being a national regulatory authority within the 
meaning of Directive 2002/20 from intervening directly in retail tariffs in respect of the supply of 
a basic package of radio and television programmes via cable. Nor, having regard to the principle 
of sincere cooperation, can such an entity rely, as against a supplier of basic packages of radio and 
television programmes via cable, on a clause stipulated in an agreement concluded prior to the 
adoption of the new regulatory framework which restricts that supplier’s freedom to set tariffs.

In  addition,  Directive  2010/13,  on  audiovisual  media,  (91)  formed  the  subject  matter  of  two  im-
portant judgments of the Court.

In the first place, in Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (judgment of 22 January 2013), the Court was re-
quired to determine the validity of Article 15(6) of Directive 2010/13 in the light of the right to private 
property and the freedom to conduct a business. Under that provision of the directive, the right-hold-
er is required to authorise any other broadcaster established in the European Union to make short 
news reports, without being able to seek compensation exceeding the additional costs directly 
incurred in providing access to the signal.

As regards the allegation of an infringement of Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which enshrines the right to private property, the Court observed that a holder of exclusive broad-
casting rights relating to events of high interest to the public cannot rely on the protection afford-
ed by that provision, since it cannot properly rely on an acquired legal position in order to demand 
compensation exceeding the additional costs incurred in providing access to the signal.

Next, as regards the compatibility of Article 15(6) of Directive 2010/13 with the freedom to conduct 
a business provided for in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court emphasised 

(90)  The  measures  concerned  were  Directive  97/66/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
15 December 1997  concerning  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  the  protection  of  privacy  in  the 
telecommunications  sector  (OJ  1998  L  24,  p.  1),  Directive  2002/19/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and associated 
facilities  (Access  Directive)  (OJ  2002  L  108,  p.  7),  Directive  2002/20,  Directive  2002/21/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33) and, last, Directive 2002/22/EC of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  7 March 2002  on  universal  service  and  users’  rights  relating  to  electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Services Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51).

(91)  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of 
certain  provisions  laid  down  by  law,  regulation  or  administrative  action  in  Member  States  concerning  the 
provision of audiovisual media services (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

47

Court of Justice 

Case-law

that, for holders of exclusive broadcasting rights, that freedom is not absolute, but must be viewed 
in relation to its social function. Thus, in the light, first, of the importance of safeguarding the fun-
damental freedom to receive information and the importance of freedom and pluralism of the 
media and, second, of the protection of the freedom to conduct a business, the Court held that 
the European Union legislature was entitled to adopt rules such as those laid down in Article 15 of 
Directive 2010/13, which limit the freedom to conduct a business, and to give priority, in the neces-
sary balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access over contractual freedom.

In the second place, Case C-234/12 Sky Italia (judgment of 18 July 2013) provided the Court with the 
opportunity to adjudicate on national legislation laying down, for pay television broadcasters, a max‑
imum percentage of broadcasting time that can be devoted to advertising that is lower than that laid 
down for free-to-air broadcasters.

In its judgment, the Court held that a Member State may, without infringing the principle of equal 
treatment,  set  different  hourly  broadcasting  limits  on  television  advertising  for  pay-television 
broadcasters and free-to-air broadcasters. In that regard, the Court stated that the principles and 
objectives of the rules relating to television advertising broadcasting, laid down, in particular, in 
Directive 2010/13, are intended to establish a balanced protection, on the one hand, of the financial 
interests of television broadcasters and advertisers and, on the other, of the interests of rights hold-
ers, namely writers and producers, in addition to consumers as television viewers. The balanced 
protection of those interests differs according to whether or not the broadcasters transmit their 
programmes for payment, since the situation both of those broadcasters and of their viewers is 
objectively different.

Furthermore, the Court observed that while it is true that the national legislation at issue is capable 
of constituting a restriction of freedom to provide services, laid down in Article 56 TFEU, the pro-
tection of consumers against abuses of advertising constitutes an overriding reason in the public 
interest which may justify that restriction provided that application of the restriction is an appropri-
ate means of ensuring achievement of the aim pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary 
for that purpose.

XV.  Common foreign and security policy — Freezing of funds

In common foreign and security policy (CFSP) matters, the Court delivered a number of judgments 
relating to fund-freezing measures which deserve mention on account of their contribution to the 
case law concerning the substantive conditions that must be satisfied by such measures, the extent 
of judicial review of such measures or the procedural rules applicable to judicial actions brought 
against them.

1. 

Review of legality by the Courts of the European Union

In Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and Others v Kadi (‘Kadi II’) (judg-
ment of 18 July 2013), the Court adjudicated, in particular, on the extent of the review of legality of 
fund freezing measures by the Courts of the European Union.

In the proceedings giving rise to the judgment of the General Court under appeal, Mr Kadi had 
sought  annulment  of  the  decision  adopted  by  the  Commission  following  the  judgment  of  the 

48 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

Court of 3 September 2008 in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commis‑
sion. (92) He had relied, in particular, on breach of the obligation to state reasons and of his rights 
of defence. The General Court held the action well founded and annulled the contested decision. 
Although the Court found a number of errors of law in the judgment of the General Court, (93) it 
nonetheless upheld that judgment, stating, after carrying out an evaluation, that in spite of those 
errors the operative part of the judgment of the General Court was well founded.

The Court recalled that the Courts of the European Union must ensure that a decision imposing 
restrictive measures is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That examination entails a verifica-
tion of the factual allegations underpinning the decision, with the consequence that judicial review 
cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but 
must concern whether those reasons are substantiated.

In  order  to  permit  such  an  assessment,  there  is  no  requirement  that  the  competent  European 
Union authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence 
underlying the reasons alleged in the summary provided by the United Nations Sanctions Commit-
tee. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons 
relied on against the person concerned. Nevertheless, if the competent European Union authority 
finds itself unable to provide information to the Courts of the European Union, it is the duty of 
those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them. If that 
material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European 
Union must disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain 
a listing.

In that regard, the Court pointed out, referring to the judgment in ZZ, (94) that overriding consider-
ations relating to the security of the European Union or of its Member States or to the conduct of 
their international relations may preclude the disclosure of some information or some evidence to 
the person concerned. In such circumstances, it is the task of the Courts of the European Union to 
accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate security considerations about the nature and sources 
of information taken into account in the adoption of the act and, on the other, the need to guaran-
tee to an individual respect for his procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and the require-
ment for an adversarial process. If the Courts of the European Union conclude that those over-
riding reasons relating to security do not preclude disclosure of the information concerned, they 
must give the competent European Union authority the opportunity to disclose it to the person 
concerned. If that authority does not disclose that information or that evidence, the Courts of the 
European Union will then undertake an examination of the lawfulness of the contested measure 
solely on the basis of the material which has been disclosed to that person.

If it turns out that the reasons relied on by the competent European Union authority do indeed 
preclude the disclosure to the person concerned of information or evidence produced before the 
Courts of the European Union, it is necessary to strike an appropriate balance between the require-
ments attached to the right to effective judicial protection, in particular respect for the principle of 
an adversarial process, and those flowing from the security of the European Union or its Member 
States or the conduct of their international relations. To that end, it is necessary to assess whether 
the failure to disclose confidential evidence to the person concerned is such as to affect the proba-
tive value of the confidential evidence.

(92)  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/04 P [2008] ECR I-6351. 

(93)  Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission [2010] ECR II-5177.

(94)  This judgment is presented under the heading ‘Citizenship of the Union’.

Annual Report 2013 

49

Court of Justice 

Case-law

In the case in point, the Court observed that, contrary to the decision of the General Court, most 
of the reasons relied on against Mr Kadi are sufficiently detailed and specific to enable the proper 
exercise of the rights of the defence and judicial review of the lawfulness of the contested measure. 
However, as no information or evidence was adduced to substantiate the allegations of Mr Kadi’s 
involvement in activities connected to international terrorism, those allegations are not such as to 
justify the adoption, at European Union level, of restrictive measures against him.

Similarly, and relying on that interpretation of the provisions of European Union law in the area of 
the CFSP, in Case C-280/12 P Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian (judgment of 28 November 2013) 
the Court dismissed the Council’s appeal against the judgment of the General Court (95) in which 
that Court had annulled at first instance the restrictive measures imposed on the applicants, which 
were intended to implement the measures adopted against Iran with the aim of preventing nuclear 
proliferation. (96) The Court held that as the Council had not produced any evidence or a summary 
of the confidential evidence before the Courts of the European Union, it was for those Courts to 
rely on the only evidence available before them, namely the claim made in the statement of rea-
sons for the acts concerned. The Court therefore held that the General Court had not erred in find-
ing that the Council had not shown that Mr Fulmen and Mr Mahmoudian were involved in nuclear 
proliferation.

Next,  in  Joined  Cases  C-478/11  P  to  C-482/11  P  Gbagbo  and  Others  v  Council  (judgment  of 
23 April 2013), the Court adjudicated on the starting point of the period prescribed for initiating an 
action for annulment in the field of the CFSP. Appeals had been lodged before the Court against the 
orders of the General Court (97) dismissing as out of time the applicants’ actions for annulment of 
Council decisions and regulations imposing restrictive measure on them, which were among the 
restrictive measures adopted against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Before the General Court, the applicants had maintained that the period of two months 
prescribed for bringing their actions could not operate against them since they had not been noti-
fied of the measures at issue. The General Court took the view however, that that period had begun 
to run 14 days after publication of the contested measures in the Official Journal of the European 
Union and had already expired when the documents initiating the proceedings were lodged.

The Court held that that assessment contains an error of law, although that error does not affect 
the admissibility of the action, since the action was out of time in any event. The Court observed 
that the measures at issue not only had to be published in the Official Journal, but also had to be 
communicated to the persons concerned, either directly, if their addresses were known, or, if not, 
through the publication in the Official Journal of the notice provided for in Article 7(3) of Decision 
2010/656 (98) and Article 11a(3) of Regulation No 560/2005. (99) That notice is capable of enabling the 
persons concerned to identify the legal remedies available to them in order to challenge their des-

(95)  Joined Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10 Fulmen v Council (judgment of 21 March 2012). 

(96)  The  General  Court  had  held  that  the  review  of  lawfulness  …  is  not  limited  to  an  appraisal  of  the  abstract 
‘probability’ of the grounds relied on, but must consider whether those grounds are supported, to the requisite 
legal standard, by concrete evidence and information. It had stated that the Council cannot rely on evidence 
coming from confidential sources and concluded that the Council had not adduced evidence of the applicants’ 
involvement in activities connected with nuclear proliferation.

(97)  Orders  of  13 July 2011  in  Case  T-348/11  Gbagbo  v  Council,  Case  T-349/11  Koné  v  Council,  Case  T-350/11 

Boni‑ClaverieI v Council, Case T-351/11 Djédjé v Council and Case T-352/11 N’Guessan v Council.

(98)  Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP of 29 October 2010 renewing the restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire 

(OJ 2010 L 285, p. 28). 

(99)  Council Regulation (EC) No 560/2005 of 12 April 2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed 

against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire (OJ 2005 L 95, p. 1).

50 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

ignation in the lists concerned and the date when the period for bringing proceedings expires. In 
this instance, communication of the contested acts was made not directly to the addresses of those 
concerned, but by publication of the notice. Accordingly, the time-limit for initiating the action for 
annulment ran, for each of those persons and entities, from the date of communication made to 
them by publication of the notice.

In Case C-239/12 P Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (judgment of 28 May 2013), the Court was 
required to adjudicate on the circumstances in which the interest of an applicant in bringing proceed‑
ings for annulment of a fund‑freezing measure is retained even where the measure has ceased to have 
effect after he brought his action.

Mr Abdulrahim had first of all brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the 
regulation adopting restrictive measures against him, following his inclusion on the list drawn up 
by the Sanctions Committee established in 1999 by a resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council on the situation in Afghanistan. While the case was proceeding before the General Court, 
Mr Abdulrahim’s name was removed from the Sanctions Committee list, and then from the list es-
tablished by the Commission regulation. Taking the view that the application for annulment of his 
inclusion on the list had become devoid of purpose, the General Court held (100) that there was no 
longer any need to adjudicate.

The Court set aside the order of the General Court, observing that the person concerned by the 
contested measure may retain an interest in its annulment, in order to be restored to his original 
position, in order to induce the author of the contested act to make suitable amendments in the 
future and thereby avoid the risk that the unlawfulness will be repeated, or, last, in order to bring 
an action to establish liability for reparation of the non-material harm which he has sustained by 
reason of that illegality.

Next, the Court approved the distinction which the General Court had drawn between the repeal of 
an act, which does not amount to retroactive recognition of its illegality, and a judgment annul ling 
an act, by which the act is removed retroactively from the legal order and is therefore deemed never 
to have existed. However, the Court found that the General Court had been wrong to conclude 
that that distinction would not be able to substantiate an interest on the part of Mr Abdulra him 
in securing the annulment of the regulation concerning him. The Court emphasised, in par ticular, 
the  fact  that  restrictive  measures  have  substantial  negative  consequences  and  a  considerable 
impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned. Apart from the freezing of funds as 
such, which, through its broad scope, seriously disrupts both the working and the family life of the 
persons covered, and impedes the conclusion of numerous legal acts, account must be taken of the 
opprobrium and suspicion that accompany the public designation of the persons covered as being 
associated with a terrorist organisation. (101)

2. 

Degree of involvement of an entity and imposition of restrictive measures

In Case C-348/12 P Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (judgment of 28 No-
vember 2013), the Court set aside the judgment of the General Court, (102) which was delivered in 
connection with restrictive measures against Iran with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation and 

(100)  Order of 28 February 2012 in Case T-127/09 Abdulrahim v Council and Commission.

(101)   The Court considered that the dispute was not ready for a decision on the merits and referred the case back to 

the General Court. The case is still pending.

(102)  Case T-509/10 Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft v Council (judgment of 25 April 2012).

Annual Report 2013 

51

Court of Justice 

Case-law

concerned a measure relating to an undertaking supplying products for the Iranian gas and oil 
industry. The Court found that the General Court had failed to take into account the changes in 
European Union legislation on restrictive measures and in particular the changes after Resolution 
1929 (2010) (103) of the United Nations Security Council. According to the Court, it follows explicitly 
from the European Union legislation (104) that the Iranian oil and gas industry may be subject to 
restrictive measures, particularly where it is involved in the procurement of prohibited goods and 
technology, the link between the goods and technology and nuclear proliferation being estab-
lished by the European Union legislature in the general rules.

Thus, in the light of that legislation and of the Security Council resolution, the Court held that the 
mere fact of trading in key equipment and technology for the gas and oil industry was capable of 
being regarded as support for Iran’s nuclear activities. The General Court therefore erred in law in 
holding that the adoption of restrictive measures against an entity presupposes that that entity has 
actually previously acted reprehensibly, the mere risk that the entity concerned may do so in the 
future being sufficient. The Court decided to give judgment in the matter and held that the deci-
sion to place Kala Naft on the lists of entities whose funds were frozen was lawful.

XVI. European civil service

In relation to the European civil service, the Court adjudicated on two issues of major importance.

In Case C-579/12 RX II Commission v Strack (judgment of 19 September 2013), which is the third 
judgment delivered in the context of review proceedings, provided for in the second subpara-
graph of Article 256(2) TFEU, the Court was called upon to examine the judgment of the General 
Court setting aside a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal annulling the Commission’s decision 
refusing an official’s request to carry over annual paid leave that could not be taken during a reference 
period  owing  to  long‑term  sick  leave.  The  Court  held  that  the  judgment  of  the  General  Court 
adversely affected the unity and consistency of European Union law. In upholding the decision 
refusing the request to carry forward the leave, the General Court had misinterpreted, first, Art-
icle 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) (105) as 
not covering the requirements relating to the organisation of working time referred to in Directive 
2003/88  concerning  certain  aspects  of  the  organisation  of  working  time  and,  in  particular,  the 
requirements relating to annual paid leave and, second, Article 4 of Annex V to the Staff Regulations 
as implying that the right to carry over annual leave exceeding the limit laid down in that provision 
may be granted only where the official has been unable to take leave for reasons connected with 
his activity as an official and the duties he has thus been required to perform.

(103)  Resolution 1929 (2010) of the Security Council of 9 June 2010.

(104)   See Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing 
Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39, and corrigendum at OJ 2010 L 197, p. 19) and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 of 25 October 2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 423/2007 (OJ 2010 L 281, p. 1).

(105)   Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of 
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting 
special  measures  temporarily  applicable  to  officials  of  the  Commission  (OJ  English  Special  Edition  1968(I), 
p. 30), as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 November 2010 (OJ 2010 L 311, p. 1).

52 

Annual Report 2013

Case-law 

Court of Justice

On  the  contrary,  under  the  general  principle  of  interpretation  according  to  which  a  European 
Union measure must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity 
and in conformity with primary law as a whole and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, Article 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations must be interpreted in a way which 
ensures the consistency of that provision with the right to paid annual leave as a principle of the 
social  law  of  the  European  Union  now  affirmed  by  Article  31(2)  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental 
Rights. That, according to the Court, requires an interpretation of Article 1e(2) to the effect that 
it allows the inclusion in the Staff Regulations of the substance of Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, 
as a minimum protection which could, as necessary, supplement the other provisions of the Staff 
Regulations dealing with the right to paid annual leave and, in particular, Article 4 of Annex V to 
those regulations.

Since Article 4 of Annex V to the Staff Regulations must be interpreted as meaning that it does not 
deal with the question of the carry-over of paid annual leave which could not be taken by the of-
ficial during the reference period because of long-term sick leave, the requirements arising in that 
respect from Article 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations and, more specifically, from Article 7 of 2003/88, 
must be taken into account as the minimum requirements applicable, without prejudice to the 
more favourable provisions in the Staff Regulations.

In Case C-63/12 Commission v Council, Case C-66/12 Council v Commission and Case C-196/12 Com‑
mission v Council (judgments of 19 November 2013), the Court adjudicated on the rules of the Staff 
Regulations of Officials of the European Union on the procedures for establishing the annual ad‑
justment of the remuneration and pensions of officials. The disputes between the Commission and 
the Council concerned the question whether, for 2011, it was appropriate to apply the ‘normal’ and 
automatic adjustment method laid down in Article 3 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, or the 
exception clause provided for in Article 10 of that annex, applicable ‘[i]f there is a serious and sud-
den deterioration in the economic and social situation within the Union’.

In the light of the specific provisions governing the procedures laid down in Annex XI to the Staff 
Regulations and the context of Article 10 of Annex XI, and in particular of the role allocated to the 
Council by Article 65 of the Staff Regulations, the Court held that it was the task of the Council to 
assess the objective data supplied by the Commission, in order to determine whether there was 
or was not such a serious and sudden deterioration, triggering the exception clause. The Court 
emphasised that, where the Council determines that there is a serious and sudden deterioration 
within the meaning of Article 10, the Commission is obliged to submit to the Parliament and to the 
Council appropriate proposals on the basis of that article.

The Court held, last, that, since for 2011 the Council had determined, on the basis of the data sup-
plied by the Commission, that there was a serious and sudden deterioration, it was not obliged to 
adopt the proposal submitted by the Commission on the basis of the ‘normal’ method of adjust-
ment for that year.

Annual Report 2013 

53

Composition 

Court of Justice

C — Composition of the Court of Justice

(order of precedence as at 23 October 2013)

First row, from left to right:

L.  Bay  Larsen,  President  of  Chamber;  R.  Silva  de  Lapuerta,  President  of  Chamber;  K.  Lenaerts, 
Vice-President of the Court; V. Skouris, President of the Court; A. Tizzano, President of Chamber; 
M. Ilešič, President of Chamber.

Second row, from left to right:

C.G. Fernlund, President of Chamber; A. Borg Barthet, President of Chamber; P. Cruz Villalón, First 
Advocate General; T. von Danwitz, President of Chamber; E. Juhász, President of Chamber; M. Saf-
jan, President of Chamber; J.L. da Cruz Vilaça, President of Chamber.

Third row, from left to right:

P. Mengozzi, Advocate General; J.-C. Bonichot, Judge; J. Malenovský, Judge; J. Kokott, Advocate 
General; A. Rosas, Judge; G. Arestis, Judge; E. Levits, Judge; E. Sharpston, Advocate General.

Fourth row, from left to right:

A. Prechal, Judge; M. Berger, Judge; C. Toader, Judge; A. Ó Caoimh, Judge; Y. Bot, Advocate General; 
A. Arabadjiev, Judge; D. Šváby, Judge; N. Jääskinen, Advocate General.

Fifth row, from left to right:

M. Szpunar, Advocate General; F. Biltgen, Judge; N. Wahl, Advocate General; M. Wathelet, Advocate 
General; E. Jarašiūnas, Judge; C. Vajda, Judge; S. Rodin, Judge; K. Jürimäe, Judge; A. Calot Escobar, 
Registrar.

Annual Report 2013 

55

Members 

Court of Justice

1.   Members of the Court of Justice

(in order of their entry into office)

Vassilios Skouris
Born  1948;  graduated  in  law  from  the  Free  University,  Berlin  (1970); 
awarded  Doctorate  in  Constitutional  and  Administrative  Law  at  Ham-
burg  University  (1973);  Assistant  Professor  at  Hamburg  University 
(1972–77); Professor of Public Law at Bielefeld University (1978); Professor 
of Public Law at the University of Thessaloniki (1982); Minister for Internal 
Affairs (in 1989 and 1996); member of the Administrative Board of the 
University of Crete (1983–87); Director of the Centre for International and 
European  Economic  Law,  Thessaloniki  (1997–2005);  President  of  the 
Greek  Association  for  European  Law  (1992–94);  member  of  the  Greek 
National  Research  Committee  (1993–95);  member  of  the  Higher 
Selection  Board  for  Greek  Civil  Servants  (1994–96);  member  of  the 
Academic Council of the Academy of European Law, Trier (from 1995); 
member  of  the  Administrative  Board  of  the  Greek  National  Judges’ 
College (1995–96); member of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs  (1997–99);  President  of  the  Greek  Economic  and  Social 
Council in 1998; Judge at the Court of Justice since 8 June 1999; President 
of the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.

Koen Lenaerts
Born 1954; lic. iuris, Ph.D. in Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); Mas-
ter of Laws, Master in Public Administration (Harvard University); Lec-
turer (1979–83), subsequently Professor of European Law, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (since 1983); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
(1984–85);  Professor  at  the  College  of  Europe,  Bruges  (1984–89); 
member of the Brussels Bar (1986–89); Visiting Professor at the Harvard 
Law School (1989); Judge at the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities from 25 September 1989 to 6 October 2003; Judge at the 
Court  of  Justice  since  7 October 2003;  Vice President  of  the  Court  of 
Justice since 9 October 2012.

Annual Report 2013 

57

Court of Justice 

Members

Antonio Tizzano
Born  1940;  Professor  of  European  Union  Law  at  La  Sapienza  Univer-
sity,  Rome;  Professor  at  the  Istituto  Universitario  Orientale,  Naples 
(1969–79),  Federico  II  University,  Naples  (1979–92),  the  University  of 
Catania (1969–77) and the University of Mogadishu (1967 –72); member 
of the Bar at the Italian Court of Cassation; Legal Adviser to the Perma-
nent Representation of the Italian Republic to the European Communi-
ties (1984–92); member of the Italian delegation at the negotiations for 
the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic 
to the European Communities, for the Single European Act and for the 
Treaty on European Union; author of numerous publications, including 
commentaries on the European Treaties and collections of European 
Union legal texts; Founder and Director since 1996 of the journal Il Di‑
ritto dell’Unione Europea; member of the managing or editorial board of 
a number of legal journals; rapporteur at numerous international con-
gresses; conferences and courses at various international institutions, 
including The Hague Academy of International Law (1987); member of 
the independent group of experts appointed to examine the fin ances 
of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1999);  Advocate 
General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  from  7 October 2000  to  3 May 2006; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 4 May 2006.

Allan Rosas
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws (1977) of the University of Turku (Finland); 
Professor of Law at the University of Turku (1978–81) and at the Åbo 
Akademi University (Turku/Åbo) (1981–96); Director of the latter’s In-
stitute for Human Rights (1985–95); various international and national 
academic positions of responsibility and memberships of learned soci-
eties; coordinated several international and national research projects 
and programmes, including in the fields of EU law, international law, 
humanitarian and human rights law, constitutional law and compara-
tive  public  administration;  represented  the  Finnish  Government  as 
member of, or adviser to, Finnish delegations at various international 
conferences and meetings; expert functions in relation to Finnish legal 
life,  including  in  governmental  law  commissions  and  committees  of 
the  Finnish  Parliament,  as  well  as  the  UN,  Unesco,  OSCE  (CSCE)  and 
the Council of Europe; from 1995 Principal Legal Adviser at the Legal 
Service of the European Commission, in charge of external relations; 
from March 2001, Deputy Director-General of the European Commis-
sion Legal Service; Judge at the Court of Justice since 17 January 2002.

58 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Rosario Silva de Lapuerta
Born 1954; Bachelor of Laws (Universidad Complutense, Madrid); Abog-
ado del Estado in Malaga; Abogado del Estado at the Legal Service of 
the  Ministry  of  Transport,  Tourism  and  Communication  and,  subse-
quently,  at  the  Legal  Service  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Head 
Abogado  del  Estado  of  the  State  Legal  Service  for  Cases  before  the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities and Deputy Director-
General  of  the  Community  and  International  Legal  Assistance  De-
partment (Ministry of Justice); member of the Commission think tank 
on the future of the Community judicial system; Head of the Spanish 
delegation in the ‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group with regard to the 
reform of the Community judicial system in the Treaty of Nice and of 
the Council ad hoc working party on the Court of Justice; Professor of 
Community Law at the Diplomatic School, Madrid; Co-director of the 
journal Noticias de la Unión Europea; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2003.

Juliane Kokott 
Born 1957; law studies (Universities of Bonn and Geneva); LL.M. (Ameri-
can University/Washington DC); Doctor of Laws (Heidelberg University, 
1985; Harvard University, 1990); Visiting Professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley (1991); Professor of German and Foreign Public Law, 
International Law and European Law at the Universities of Augsburg 
(1992), Heidelberg (1993) and Düsseldorf (1994); Deputy Judge for the 
Federal Government at the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Deputy 
Chairperson of the Federal Government’s Advisory Council on Global 
Change  (WBGU,  1996);  Professor  of  International  Law,  International 
Business Law and European Law at the University of St Gallen (1999); 
Director of the Institute for European and International Business Law 
at the University of St Gallen (2000); Deputy Director of the Master of 
Business Law programme at the University of St Gallen (2001); Advo-
cate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.

Annual Report 2013 

59

Court of Justice 

Members

Endre Juhász
Born 1944; graduated in law from the University of Szeged, Hungary 
(1967); Hungarian Bar Entrance Examinations (1970); postgraduate stud-
ies  in  comparative  law,  University  of  Strasbourg,  France  (1969,  1970, 
1971, 1972); official in the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (1966–74); Director for Legislative Matters (1973–74); First Com-
mercial  Secretary  at  the  Hungarian  Embassy,  Brussels,  responsible 
for European Community issues (1974–79); Director at the Ministry of 
Foreign  Trade  (1979–83);  First  Commercial  Secretary,  then  Commer-
cial  Counsellor,  to  the  Hungarian  Embassy  in  Washington  DC,  USA 
(1983–89); Director-General at the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of In-
ternational Economic Relations (1989–91); chief negotiator for the Asso-
ciation Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the European 
Communities and their Member States (1990–91); Secretary General of 
the Ministry of International Economic Relations, head of the Office of 
European Affairs (1992); State Secretary at the Ministry of International 
Economic Relations (1993–94); State Secretary, President of the Office 
of European Affairs, Ministry of Industry and Trade (1994); Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Chief of Mission of the Republic of 
Hungary to the European Union (January 1995 to May 2003); chief ne-
gotiator for the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European 
Union (July 1998 to April 2003); Minister without portfolio for the coor-
dination of matters of European integration (from May 2003); Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.

George Arestis
Born 1945; graduated in law from the University of Athens (1968); MA 
in Comparative Politics and Government, University of Kent at Canter-
bury (1970); practice as a lawyer in Cyprus (1972–82); appointed District 
Court Judge (1982); promoted to President of a District Court (1995); 
Administrative  President  of  the  District  Court  of  Nicosia  (1997–2003); 
Judge at the Supreme Court of Cyprus (2003); Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 11 May 2004.

Anthony Borg Barthet U.O.M. 
Born 1947; Doctorate in Law at the Royal University of Malta in 1973; 
entered the Maltese Civil Service as Notary to the Government in 1975; 
Counsel  for  the  Republic  in  1978,  Senior  Counsel  for  the  Republic  in 
1979, Assistant Attorney General in 1988 and appointed Attorney Gen-
eral by the President of Malta in 1989; part-time Lecturer in Civil Law at 
the University of Malta (1985–89); member of the Council of the Univer-
sity of Malta (1998–2004); member of the Commission for the Admin-
istration of Justice (1994–2004); member of the Board of Governors of 
the Malta Arbitration Centre (1998–2004); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 11 May 2004.

60 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Marko Ilešič
Born 1947; Doctor of Law (University of Ljubljana); specialism in com-
parative law (Universities of Strasbourg and Coimbra); judicial service 
examination; Professor of Civil, Commercial and Private International 
Law; Vice-Dean (1995–2001) and Dean (2001–04) of the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Ljubljana; author of numerous legal publications; 
Honorary Judge and President of Chamber at the Labour Court, Lju-
bljana (1975–86); President of the Sports Tribunal of Slovenia (1978–86); 
President of the Arbitration Chamber of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange; 
Arbitrator at the Chamber of Commerce of Yugoslavia (until 1991) and 
Slovenia (from 1991); Arbitrator at the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris; Judge on the Board of Appeals of UEFA and FIFA; Presi-
dent of the Union of Slovene Lawyers’ Associations (1993 –2005); mem-
ber of the International Law Association, of the International Maritime 
Committee and of several other international legal societies; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.

Jiří Malenovský
Born 1950; Doctor of Law from the Charles University in Prague (1975); 
senior faculty member (1974–90), Vice-Dean (1989–91) and Head of the 
Department of International and European Law (1990–92) at Masaryk 
University, Brno; Judge at the Constitutional Court of Czechoslovakia 
(1992); Envoy to the Council of Europe (1993–98); President of the Com-
mittee  of  Ministers’  Deputies  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (1995);  Senior 
Director  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (1998 –2000);  President  of 
the  Czech  and  Slovak  branch  of  the  International  Law  Association 
(1999–2001); Judge at the Constitutional Court (2000–04); member of 
the Legislative Council (1998–2000); member of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at The Hague (from 2000); Professor of Public Internation-
al Law at Masaryk University, Brno (2001); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 11 May 2004.

Uno Lõhmus
Born 1952; Doctor of Law in 1986; member of the Bar (1977–98); Visiting 
Professor of Criminal Law at Tartu University; Judge at the European 
Court of Human Rights (1994–98); Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Estonia (1998–2004); member of the Legal Expertise Committee on 
the Constitution; consultant to the working group drafting the Crim-
inal Code; member of the working group for the drafting of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure; author of several works on human rights and 
constitutional law; Judge at the Court of Justice from 11 May 2004 to 
23 October 2013.

Annual Report 2013 

61

Court of Justice 

Members

Egils Levits
Born 1955; graduated in law and in political science from the University 
of Hamburg; Research Assistant at the Faculty of Law, University of Kiel; 
Adviser  to  the  Latvian  Parliament  on  questions  of  international  law, 
constitutional law and legislative reform; Ambassador of the Republic 
of Latvia to Germany and Switzerland (1992–93), Austria, Switzerland 
and  Hungary  (1994–95);  Vice  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Justice, 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (1993–94); Conciliator at the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE (from 1997); member of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (from 2001); elected as Judge at the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1995, re-elected in 1998 and 2001; 
numerous publications in the spheres of constitutional and administra-
tive law, law reform and European Community law; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 11 May 2004.

Aindrias Ó Caoimh
Born  1950;  Bachelor  in  Civil  Law  (National  University  of  Ireland,  Uni-
versity College Dublin, 1971); Barrister (King’s Inns, 1972); Diploma in 
European  Law  (University  College  Dublin,  1977);  Barrister  (Bar  of  Ire-
land, 1972–99); Lecturer in European Law (King’s Inns, Dublin); Senior 
Counsel  (1994–99);  Representative  of  the  Government  of  Ireland  on 
many occasions before the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties; Judge at the High Court (from 1999); Bencher of the Honourable 
Society of King’s Inns (since 1999); Vice-President of the Irish Society 
of European Law; member of the International Law Association (Irish 
Branch);  son  of  Judge  Andreas  O’Keeffe  (Aindrias  Ó  Caoimh),  mem-
ber of the Court of Justice 1974–85; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
13 October 2004.

Lars Bay Larsen
Born 1953; awarded degrees in political science (1976) and law (1983) 
at  the  University  of  Copenhagen;  official  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice 
(1983–85);  Lecturer  (1984–91),  then  Associate  Professor  (1991–96),  in 
Family Law at the University of Copenhagen; Head of Section at the 
Advokatsamfund (Danish Bar Association) (1985–86); Head of Section 
(1986–91)  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice;  called  to  the  Bar  (1991);  Head  of 
Division (1991–95), Head of the Police Department (1995–99) and Head 
of the Law Department (2000–03) at the Ministry of Justice; Represen-
tative of the Kingdom of Denmark on the K-4 Committee (1995–2000), 
the Schengen Central Group (1996–98) and the Europol Management 
Board (1998–2000); Judge at the Højesteret (Supreme Court) (2003–06); 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 January 2006.

62 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Eleanor Sharpston
Born  1955;  studied  economics,  languages  and  law  at  King’s  College, 
Cambridge (1973–77); university teaching and research at Corpus Chris-
ti College, Oxford (1977–80); called to the Bar (Middle Temple, 1980); 
Barrister  (1980–87 and 1990–2005);  Legal  Secretary  in  the  Chambers 
of Advocate General, subsequently Judge, Sir Gordon Slynn (1987–90); 
Lecturer in EC and comparative law (Director of European Legal Stud-
ies)  at  University  College  London  (1990–92);  Lecturer  in  the  Faculty 
of  Law  (1992–98),  and  subsequently  Affiliated  Lecturer  (1998 –2005), 
at  the  University  of  Cambridge;  Fellow  of  King’s  College,  Cambridge 
(1992–2010);  Emeritus  Fellow  (since  2011);  Senior  Research  Fellow  at 
the Centre for European Legal Studies of the University of Cambridge 
(1998–2005); Queen’s Counsel (1999); Bencher of Middle Temple (2005); 
Honorary  Fellow  of  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford  (2010);  LL.D  (h.c.) 
Glasgow (2010) and Nottingham Trent (2011); Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 11 January 2006.

Paolo Mengozzi
Born 1938; Professor of International Law and holder of the Jean Mon-
net  Chair  of  European  Community  law  at  the  University  of  Bologna; 
Doctor honoris causa of the Carlos III University, Madrid; Visiting Profes-
sor at the Johns Hopkins University (Bologna Centre), the Universities 
of  St.  Johns  (New  York),  Georgetown,  Paris  II  and  Georgia  (Athens) 
and the Institut universitaire international (Luxembourg); coordinator 
of the European Business Law Pallas Programme of the University of 
Nijmegen; member of the Consultative Committee of the Commission 
of the European Communities on Public Procurement; Under-Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry during the Italian tenure of the Presi-
dency of the Council; member of the Working Group of the Europe-
an Community on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Director 
of the 1997 session of the research centre of The Hague Academy of 
International  Law,  devoted  to  the  WTO;  Judge  at  the  Court  of  First 
Instance  from  4 March 1998  to  3 May 2006;  Advocate  General  at  the 
Court of Justice since 4 May 2006.

Yves Bot
Born 1947; graduate of the Faculty of Law, Rouen; Doctor of Laws (Uni-
versity of Paris II, Panthéon-Assas); Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Le 
Mans; Deputy Public Prosecutor, then Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Le Mans (1974–82); Public Prosecutor 
at the Regional Court, Dieppe (1982–84); Deputy Public Prosecutor at 
the Regional Court, Strasbourg (1984–86); Public Prosecutor at the Re-
gional Court, Bastia (1986–88); Advocate General at the Court of Ap-
peal, Caen (1988–91); Public Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Le Mans 
(1991–93); Special Adviser to the Minister for Justice (1993–95); Public 
Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Nanterre (1995–2002); Public Prosecu-
tor at the Regional Court, Paris (2002–04); Principal State Prosecutor at 
the Court of Appeal, Paris (2004–06); Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2006.

Annual Report 2013 

63

Court of Justice 

Members

Jean‑Claude Bonichot
Born 1955; graduated in law at the University of Metz, degree from the 
Institut d’études politiques, Paris, former student at the École nationale 
d’administration; rapporteur (1982–85), commissaire du gouvernement 
(1985–87 and 1992–99), Judge (1999–2000), President of the Sixth Sub-
Division of the Judicial Division (2000–06), at the Council of State; Legal 
Secretary at the Court of Justice (1987–91); Director of the Private Of-
fice of the Minister for Labour, Employment and Vocational Training, 
then Director of the Private Office of the Minister of State for the Civil 
Service  and  Modernisation  of  Administration  (1991–92);  Head  of  the 
Legal Mission of the Council of State at the National Health Insurance 
Fund  for  Employed  Persons  (2001–06);  Lecturer  at  the  University  of 
Metz (1988–2000), then at the University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne 
(from 2000); author of numerous publications on administrative law, 
Community law and European human rights law; founder and chair-
man of the editorial committee of the Bulletin de jurisprudence de droit 
de l’urbanisme, co-founder and member of the editorial committee of 
the Bulletin juridique des collectivités locales; President of the Scientific 
Council of the Research Group on Institutions and Law governing Re-
gional and Urban Planning and Habitats; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 7 October 2006.

Thomas von Danwitz
Born 1962; studied at Bonn, Geneva and Paris; State examination in law 
(1986 and 1992); Doctor of Laws (University of Bonn, 1988); Internation-
al diploma in public administration (École nationale d’administration, 
1990); teaching authorisation (University of Bonn, 1996); Professor of 
German public law and European law (1996–2003), Dean of the Faculty 
of Law of the Ruhr University, Bochum (2000–01); Professor of German 
public  law  and  European  law  (University  of  Cologne,  2003–06);  Dir-
ector of the Institute of Public Law and Administrative Science (2006); 
Visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (2000), 
François  Rabelais  University,  Tours  (2001–06),  and  the  University  of 
Paris  I,  Panthéon-Sorbonne  (2005–06);  Doctor  honoris causa  of  Fran-
çois Rabelais University, Tours (2010); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2006.

Alexander Arabadjiev
Born 1949; legal studies (St Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia); Judge at 
the District Court, Blagoevgrad (1975–83); Judge at the Regional Court, 
Blagoevgrad (1983–86); Judge at the Supreme Court (1986–91); Judge 
at the Constitutional Court (1991–2000); member of the European Com-
mission of Human Rights (1997–99); member of the European Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe (2002–03); member of the National As-
sembly (2001–06); Observer at the European Parliament; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 12 January 2007.

64 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Camelia Toader
Born 1963; Degree in law (1986), doctorate in law (1997), University of 
Bucharest; Trainee judge at the Court of First Instance, Buftea (1986–88); 
Judge  at  the  Court  of  First  Instance,  Sector  5,  Bucharest  (1988–92); 
called  to  the  Bucharest  Bar  (1992);  Lecturer  (1992–2005),  then,  from 
2005, professor in civil law and European contract law at the University 
of Bucharest; Doctoral studies and research at the Max Planck Institute 
for Private International Law, Hamburg (between 1992 and 2004); Head 
of the European Integration Unit at the Ministry of Justice (1997–99); 
Judge at the High Court of Cassation and Justice (1999–2007); Visiting 
professor at the University of Vienna (2000 and 2011); taught Commu-
nity law at the National Institute for Magistrates (2003 and 2005–06); 
Member of the editorial board of several legal journals; from 2010 as-
sociate member of the International Academy of Comparative Law and 
honorary researcher at the Centre for European Legal Studies of the 
Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 12 January 2007.

Jean‑Jacques Kasel
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws; special degree in Administrative Law (Uni-
versité libre de Bruxelles, 1970); graduated from the Institut d’études 
politiques,  Paris  (Ecofin,  1972);  trainee  lawyer;  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (1972–73); Attaché, then Legation Sec-
retary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973–76); Chairman of work-
ing groups of the Council of Ministers (1976); First Embassy Secretary 
(Paris), Deputy Permanent Representative to the OECD (liaison officer 
to UNESCO, 1976–79); Head of the Office of the Vice-President of the 
Government (1979–80); Chairman of the EPC working groups (Asia, Af-
rica, Latin America); Adviser, then Deputy Head of Cabinet, of the Presi-
dent of the Commission of the European Communities (1981); Director, 
Budget and Staff Matters, at the General Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers (1981–84); Special Adviser at the Permanent Representation 
to the European Communities (1984–85); Chairman of the Budgetary 
Committee; Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of Political and Cultural 
Affairs (1986–91); Diplomatic Adviser of the Prime Minister (1986–91); 
Ambassador to Greece (1989–91, non resident); Chairman of the Policy 
Committee (1991); Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the Euro-
pean Communities (1991–98); Chairman of Coreper (1997); Ambassador 
(Brussels, 1998–2002); Permanent Representative to NATO (1998–2002); 
Marshal of the Court and Head of the Office of HRH the Grand Duke 
(2002–07);  Judge  at  the  Court  of  Justice  from  15 January 2008  to 
7 October 2013.

Annual Report 2013 

65

Court of Justice 

Members

Marek Safjan
Born  1949;  Doctor  of  Law  (University  of  Warsaw,  1980);  habilitated 
Doctor in Legal Science (University of Warsaw, 1990); Professor of Law 
(1998); Director of the Civil Law Institute of the University of Warsaw 
(1992–96);  Vice-Rector  of  the  University  of  Warsaw  (1994–97);  Secre-
tary-General  of  the  Polish  Section  of  the  Henri  Capitant  Association 
of Friends of French Legal Culture (1994–98); representative of Poland 
on the Bioethics Committee of the Council of Europe (1991–97); Judge 
(1997–98),  then  President  (1998–2006),  of  the  Constitutional  Court; 
member  (since  1994)  and  Vice-President  (since  2010)  of  the  Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law, member of the International 
Association of Law, Ethics and Science (since 1995), member of the Hel-
sinki Committee in Poland; member of the Polish Academy of Arts and 
Sciences; Pro Merito Medal conferred by the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe (2007); author of a very large number of publications 
in the fields of civil law, medical law and European law; Doctor honoris 
causa of the European University Institute (2012); Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2009.

Daniel Šváby
Born 1951; Doctor of Laws (University of Bratislava); Judge at the District 
Court, Bratislava; Judge, Appeal Court, responsible for civil law cases, 
and Vice-President, Appeal Court, Bratislava; member of the Civil and 
Family Law Section at the Ministry of Justice Law Institute; acting Judge 
responsible for commercial law cases at the Supreme Court; member 
of the European Commission of Human Rights (Strasbourg); Judge at 
the Constitutional Court (2000–04); Judge at the Court of First Instance 
from  12 May 2004  to  6 October 2009;  Judge  at  the  Court  of  Justice 
since 7 October 2009.

Maria Berger
Born 1956; studied law and economics (1975–79), Doctor of Law; As-
sistant Lecturer and Lecturer at the Institute of Public Law and Polit-
ical  Sciences  of  the  University  of  Innsbruck  (1979–84);  Administrator 
at  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Science  and  Research,  ultimately  Deputy 
Head  of  Unit  (1984–88);  official  responsible  for  questions  relating  to 
the  European  Union  at  the  Federal  Chancellery  (1988–89);  Head  of 
the  European  Integration  Section  of  the  Federal  Chancellery  (prep-
aration for the Republic of Austria’s accession to the European Union) 
(1989–92);  Director  at  the  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority,  in  Geneva 
and  Brussels  (1993–94);  Vice-President  of  Danube  University,  Krems 
(1995–96);  member  of  the  European  Parliament  (November  1996  to 
January 2007 and December 2008 to July 2009) and member of the 
Committee  on  Legal  Affairs;  substitute  member  of  the  European 
Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  (February  2002  to  July  2003); 
Councillor of the Municipality of Perg (September 1997 to September 
2009); Federal Minister for Justice (January 2007 to December 2008); 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.

66 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Niilo Jääskinen
Born 1958; law degree (1980), postgraduate law degree (1982), doctor-
ate (2008) at the University of Helsinki; Lecturer at the University of Hel-
sinki (1980–86); Legal Secretary and acting Judge at the District Court, 
Rovaniemi (1983–84); Legal Adviser (1987–89), and subsequently Head 
of the European Law Section (1990–95), at the Ministry of Justice; Legal 
Adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1989–90); Adviser, and Clerk 
for European Affairs, of the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament 
(1995–2000); acting Judge (July 2000 to December 2002), then Judge 
(January  2003  to  September  2009),  at  the  Supreme  Administrative 
Court; responsible for legal and institutional questions during the ne-
gotiations for the accession of the Republic of Finland to the European 
Union; Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.

Pedro Cruz Villalón
Born 1946; law degree (1963–68) and awarded doctorate (1975) at the 
University of Seville; postgraduate studies at the University of Freiburg 
im Breisgau (1969–71); Assistant Professor of Political Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1978–86); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1986–92); Legal Secretary at the Constitutional Court 
(1986–87); Judge at the Constitutional Court (1992–98); President of the 
Constitutional Court (1998–2001); Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu 
Berlin (2001–02); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Autonomous 
University of Madrid (2002–09); elected member of the Council of State 
(2004–09); author of numerous publications; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 14 December 2009.

Alexandra (Sacha) Prechal
Born  1959;  studied  law  (University  of  Groningen,  1977–83);  Doctor  of 
Laws  (University  of  Amsterdam,  1995);  Law  Lecturer  in  the  Law  Fac-
ulty  of  the  University  of  Maastricht  (1983–87);  Legal  Secretary  at  the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities  (1987–91);  Lecturer  at 
the Europa Institute of the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam 
(1991–95); Professor of European Law in the Law Faculty of the Univer-
sity  of  Tilburg  (1995–2003);  Professor  of  European  Law  in  the  Law 
Faculty of the University of Utrecht and board member of the Europa 
Institute of the University of Utrecht (from 2003); member of the edi-
torial board of several national and international legal journals; author 
of numerous publications; member of the Royal Netherlands Academy 
of Arts and Sciences; Judge at the Court of Justice since 10 June 2010.

Annual Report 2013 

67

Court of Justice 

Members

Egidijus Jarašiūnas
Born  1952;  law  degree  at  the  University  of  Vilnius  (1974–79);  Doctor 
of Legal Science of the Law University of Lithuania (1999); member of 
the  Lithuanian  Bar  (1979–90);  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  (Par-
liament) of the Republic of Lithuania (1990–92), then member of the 
Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania and member of the 
Seimas’  State  and  Law  Committee  (1992–96);  Judge  at  the  Constitu-
tional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (1996–2005), then Adviser to 
the President of the Constitutional Court (from 2006); Lecturer in the 
Constitutional Law Department of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Romeris 
University (1997–2000), then Associate Professor (2000–04) and Profes-
sor (from 2004) in that department, and finally Head of Department 
(2005–07);  Dean  of  the  Law  Faculty  of  Mykolas  Romeris  University 
(2007–10); member of the Venice Commission (2006–10); signatory of 
the act of 11 March 1990 re-establishing Lithuania’s independence; au-
thor of numerous legal publications; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
6 October 2010.

Carl Gustav Fernlund
Born 1950; graduated in law from the University of Lund (1975); Clerk 
at the Landskrona District Court (1976–78); Assistant Judge at an ad-
ministrative court of appeal (1978–82); Deputy Judge at an administra-
tive court of appeal (1982); Legal Adviser to the Swedish Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on the Constitution (1983–85); Legal Adviser at 
the Ministry of Finance (1985–90); Director of the Division for Personal 
Income Taxes at the Ministry of Finance (1990–96); Director of the Ex-
cise Duty Division at the Ministry of Finance (1996–98); Fiscal Counsel-
lor at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union 
(1998–2000); Director-General for Legal Affairs in the Tax and Customs 
Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (2000–05);  Judge  at  the  Su-
preme Administrative Court (2005–09); President of the Administrative 
Court of Appeal, Gothenburg (2009–11); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 6 October 2011.

68 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

José Luís da Cruz Vilaça
Born 1944; degree in law and master’s degree in political economy at 
the University of Coimbra; Doctor in International Economics (Univer-
sity of Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne); compulsory military service per-
formed  in  the  Ministry  for  the  Navy  (Justice  Department,  1969–72); 
Professor at the Catholic University and the New University of Lisbon; 
formerly  Professor  at  the  University  of  Coimbra  and  at  Lusíada  Uni-
versity, Lisbon (Director of the Institute for European Studies); Mem-
ber  of  the  Portuguese  Government  (1980–83):  State  Secretary  for 
Home Affairs, State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and State 
Secretary for European Affairs; Deputy in the Portuguese Parliament, 
Vice-President of the Christian-Democrat Group; Advocate General at 
the Court of Justice (1986–88); President of the Court of First Instance 
of the European Communities (1989–95); lawyer at the Lisbon Bar, spe-
cialising in European and competition law (1996–2012); member of the 
Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court Sys-
tem — ‘Due Group’ (2000); Chairman of the Disciplinary Board of the 
European Commission (2003–07); President of the Portuguese Associ-
ation of European Law (since 1999); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
8 October 2012.

Melchior Wathelet
Born 1949; degrees in law and in economics (University of Liège); Mas-
ter  of  Laws  (Harvard  University,  United  States);  Doctor  honoris  causa 
(Université Paris-Dauphine); Professor of European Law at the Cath olic 
University  of  Louvain  and  the  University  of  Liège;  Deputy  (1977–95); 
State Secretary, Minister and Minister-President of the Walloon Region 
(1980–88);  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  Minister  for  Justice  and  for  Small 
and Medium-Sized Businesses, the Liberal Professions and the Self-Em-
ployed (1988–92); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Justice and Eco-
nomic Affairs (1992–95); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for National 
Defence (1995); Mayor of Verviers (1995); Judge at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (1995–2003); legal adviser, then counsel 
(2004–12); Minister of State (2009–12); Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 8 October 2012.

Christopher Vajda
Born 1955; law degree from Cambridge University; licence spéciale en 
droit européen at the Université libre de Bruxelles (grande distinction); 
called to the Bar of England and Wales by Gray’s Inn (1979); Barrister 
(1979–2012); called to the Bar of Northern Ireland (1996); Queen’s Coun-
sel (1997); Bencher of Gray’s Inn (2003); Recorder of the Crown Court 
(2003–12); Treasurer of the United Kingdom Association for European 
Law (2001–12); contributor to 3rd to 6th eds of  European Community 
Law of Competition (Bellamy and Child); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 8 October 2012.

Annual Report 2013 

69

Court of Justice 

Members

Nils Wahl
Born 1961; Doctor of Laws, University of Stockholm (1995); Associate 
Professor (docent) and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair of European 
Law (1995); Professor of European Law, University of Stockholm (2001); 
Managing  Director  of  an  educational  foundation  (1993–2004);  Chair-
man of the Nätverket för europarättslig forskning (Swedish Network for 
European Legal Research) (2001–06); member of the Rådet för konkur-
rensfrågor (Council for Competition Law Matters) (2001–06); Judge at 
the General Court from 7 October 2006 to 28 November 2012; Advo-
cate General at the Court of Justice since 28 November 2012.

Siniša Rodin
Born 1963; University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law, Ph.D. (1995); University 
of Michigan Law School, LL.M. (1992); Harvard Law School, Fulbright 
Fellow and Visiting Scholar (2001–02); tenure track and tenured profes-
sor at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law, since 1987, Jean Monnet 
Chair since 2006 and Jean Monnet Chair ad personam since 2011; Cor-
nell Law School Visiting Professor (2012); Member of the Croatian Con-
stitutional Amendment Committee, President of the working group on 
EU  membership  (2009–10);  Member  of  the  Croatian  EU  membership 
negotiating team (2006–11); author of numerous publications; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 4 July 2013.

François Biltgen
Born 1958; Master’s degree in law (1981) and diploma of advanced stud-
ies (DEA) in Community law at the University of Law, Economics and 
Social Sciences, Paris II (1982); graduated from the Institut d’études poli-
tiques, Paris (1982); lawyer at the Luxembourg bar (1987 –99); Deputy 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  (1994–99);  Municipal  Councillor  of  the 
town of Esch-sur-Alzette (1987–99); Deputy Mayor of Esch-sur-Alzette 
(1997–99);  Alternate  Member  of  the  Luxembourg  delegation  to  the 
Committee of the Regions of the European Union (1994–99); Minister 
for Labour and Employment, Minister for Religious Affairs, Minister for 
Relations with Parliament, Minister with responsibility for Communica-
tions (1999–2004); Minister for Labour and Employment, Minister for 
Religious Affairs, Minister for Culture, Higher Education and Research 
(2004–09);  Minister  for  Justice,  Minister  for  the  Civil  Service  and  Ad-
ministrative Reform, Minister for Higher Education and Research, Min-
ister for Communications and the Media, Minister for Religious Affairs 
(2009–13); Joint President of the Ministerial Conference of the Bologna 
Process in 2005 and 2009; Joint President of the Ministerial Conference 
of the European Space Agency (2012–13); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 7 October 2013.

70 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Court of Justice

Küllike Jürimäe
Born 1962; law degree, University of Tartu (1981–86); Assistant to the 
Public  Prosecutor,  Tallinn  (1986–91);  Diploma,  Estonian  School  of 
Diplomacy (1991–92); Legal Adviser (1991–93) and General Counsel at 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992–93); Judge, Tallinn Court 
of Appeal (1993–2004); European Masters in Human Rights and Demo-
cratisation, Universities of Padua and Nottingham (2002–03); Judge at 
the General Court from 12 May 2004 to 23 October 2013; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 23 October 2013.

Maciej Szpunar
Born 1971; degrees in law from the University of Silesia and the College 
of  Europe,  Bruges;  Doctor  of  Law  (2000);  habilitated  Doctor  in  Legal 
Science (2009); Professor of Law (2013); Visiting Scholar at Jesus College, 
Cambridge  (1998),  the  University  of  Liège  (1999)  and  the  European 
University Institute, Florence (2003); lawyer (2001–08), member of the 
Committee for Private International Law of the Civil Law Codification 
Commission  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice  (2001–08);  member  of  the 
Board of Trustees of the Academy of European Law, Trier (from 2008); 
member  of  the  Research  Group  on  Existing  EC  Private  Law  (‘Acquis 
Group’)  (from  2006);  Undersecretary  of  State  in  the  Office  of  the 
Committee for European Integration (2008–09), then in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2010–13); Vice-Chairman of the Scientific Board of the 
Institute of Justice; Agent of the Polish Government in a large number 
of  cases  before  the  European  Union  judicature;  Head  of  the  Polish 
delegation at the negotiations on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union;  member  of 
the editorial board of a number of legal journals; author of numerous 
publications in the fields of European law and private international law; 
Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 23 October 2013.

Alfredo Calot Escobar
Born 1961; law degree at the University of Valencia (1979–84); Business 
Analyst at the Council of the Chambers of Commerce of the Autono-
mous  Community  of  Valencia  (1986);  Lawyer-linguist  at  the  Court  of 
Justice (1986–90); Lawyer-reviser at the Court of Justice (1990–93); Ad-
ministrator in the Press and Information Service of the Court of Justice 
(1993–95);  Administrator  in  the  Secretariat  of  the  Institutional  Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament (1995–96); Aide to the Registrar 
of the Court of Justice (1996–99); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
(1999–2000); Head of the Spanish Translation Division at the Court of 
Justice  (2000–01);  Director,  then  Director-General,  of  Translation  at 
the Court of Justice (2001–10); Registrar of the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2010.

Annual Report 2013 

71

Change 

Court of Justice

2. 

Change in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2013

Formal sitting on 4 July 2013

Following  the  accession  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  to  the  European  Union  on  1 July 2013,  the 
representatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  by  decision 
of  1 July 2013,  appointed  Mr  Siniša  Rodin  as  Judge  at  the  Court  of  Justice  for  the  period  from 
1 July 2013 to 6 October 2015.

Formal sitting on 7 October 2013

Following the resignation of Mr Jean-Jacques Kasel, by decision of 26 June 2013 the representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union appointed Mr François Biltgen as 
Judge at the Court of Justice for the remainder of Mr Jean-Jacques Kasel’s term of office, that is to 
say, until 6 October 2015.

Formal sitting on 23 October 2013

By  decision  of  16 October 2013,  the  representatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States 
appointed  Mr  Maciej  Szpunar  as  Advocate  General  for  the  period  from  16 October 2013  to 
6 October 2018.

In addition, on account of the resignation of Mr Uno Lõhmus, by decision of 26 June 2013 the rep-
resentatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  appointed  Ms  Küllike  Jürimäe,  a  Judge 
at  the  General  Court,  as  Judge  at  the  Court  of  Justice  for  the  period  from  6 October 2013  to 
6 October 2015.

Annual Report 2013 

73

Order of precedence 

Court of Justice

3. 

Order of precedence

From 1 January 2013 to 3 July 2013

From 4 July 2013 to 7 October 2013

V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
N. JÄÄSKINEN, First Advocate General
A. ROSAS, President of the Tenth Chamber
G. ARESTIS, President of the Seventh Chamber
J. MALENOVSKÝ, President of the Ninth 
Chamber
M. BERGER, President of the Sixth Chamber
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
C.G. FERNLUND, Judge
J.L. da CRUZ VILAÇA, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
N. WAHL, Advocate General

V. SKOURIS, President
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
N. JÄÄSKINEN, First Advocate General
A. ROSAS, President of the Tenth Chamber
G. ARESTIS, President of the Seventh Chamber
J. MALENOVSKÝ, President of the Ninth 
Chamber
M. BERGER, President of the Sixth Chamber
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, President of the Eighth Chamber
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
C.G. FERNLUND, Judge
J.L. da CRUZ VILAÇA, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
N. WAHL, Advocate General
S. RODIN, Judge

A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar

A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar

Annual Report 2013 

75

Court of Justice 

Order of precedence

From 8 October 2013 to 22 October 2013

From 23 October 2013 to 31 December 2013

V. SKOURIS, President
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, First Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, President of the Tenth Chamber
A. BORG BARTHET, President of the Sixth 
Chamber
M. SAFJAN, President of the Ninth Chamber
C.G. FERNLUND, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
J.L. da CRUZ VILAÇA, President of the Seventh 
Chamber
A. ROSAS, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
G. ARESTIS, Judge
J. MALENOVSKÝ, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
N. WAHL, Advocate General
S. RODIN, Judge
F. BILTGEN, Judge

V. SKOURIS, President
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA DE LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, First Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, President of the Tenth Chamber
A. BORG BARTHET, President of the Sixth 
Chamber
M. SAFJAN, President of the Ninth Chamber
C.G. FERNLUND, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
J.L. da CRUZ VILAÇA, President of the Seventh 
Chamber
A. ROSAS, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
G. ARESTIS, Judge
J. MALENOVSKÝ, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
N. WAHL, Advocate General
S. RODIN, Judge
F. BILTGEN, Judge
K. JÜRIMÄE, Judge
M. SZPUNAR, Advocate General

A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar

A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar

76 

Annual Report 2013

Former members 

Court of Justice

4. 

Former members of the Court of Justice

Massimo Pilotti, Judge (1952–58), President from 1952 to 1958
Petrus Serrarens, Judge (1952–58)
Adrianus Van Kleffens, Judge (1952–58)
Jacques Rueff, Judge (1952–59 and 1960–62)
Otto Riese, Judge (1952–63)
Maurice Lagrange, Advocate General (1952–64)
Louis Delvaux, Judge (1952–67)
Charles Léon Hammes, Judge (1952–67), President from 1964 to 1967
Karl Roemer, Advocate General (1953–73)
Nicola Catalano, Judge (1958–62)
Rino Rossi, Judge (1958–64)
Andreas Matthias Donner, Judge (1958–79), President from 1958 to 1964
Alberto Trabucchi, Judge (1962–72), then Advocate General (1973–76)
Robert Lecourt, Judge (1962–76), President from 1967 to 1976
Walter Strauss, Judge (1963–70)
Joseph Gand, Advocate General (1964–70)
Riccardo Monaco, Judge (1964–76)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars, Judge (1967–84), President from 1980 to 1984
Pierre Pescatore, Judge (1967–85)
Alain Louis Dutheillet de Lamothe, Advocate General (1970–72)
Hans Kutscher, Judge (1970–80), President from 1976 to 1980
Henri Mayras, Advocate General (1972–81)
Cearbhall O’Dalaigh, Judge (1973–74)
Max Sørensen, Judge (1973–79)
Gerhard Reischl, Advocate General (1973–81)
Jean-Pierre Warner, Advocate General (1973–81)
Alexander J. Mackenzie Stuart, Judge (1973–88), President from 1984 to 1988
Aindrias O’Keeffe, Judge (1974–85)
Adolphe Touffait, Judge (1976–82)
Francesco Capotorti, Judge (1976), then Advocate General (1976–82)
Giacinto Bosco, Judge (1976–88)
Thymen Koopmans, Judge (1979–90)
Ole Due, Judge (1979–94), President from 1988 to 1994
Ulrich Everling, Judge (1980–88)
Alexandros Chloros, Judge (1981–82)
Simone Rozès, Advocate General (1981–84)
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Advocate General (1981–86)
Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General (1981–88), then Judge (1988–92)
Fernand Grévisse, Judge (1981–82 and 1988–94)
Kai Bahlmann, Judge (1982–88)
Yves Galmot, Judge (1982–88)
G. Federico Mancini, Advocate General (1982–88), then Judge (1988–99)
Constantinos Kakouris, Judge (1983–97)

Annual Report 2013 

77

Court of Justice 

Former members

Marco Darmon, Advocate General (1984–94)
René Joliet, Judge (1984–95)
Carl Otto Lenz, Advocate General (1984–97)
Thomas Francis O’Higgins, Judge (1985–91)
Fernand Schockweiler, Judge (1985–96)
José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, Advocate General (1986–88)
José Carlos de Carvalho Moitinho de Almeida, Judge (1986–2000)
Jean Mischo, Advocate General (1986–91 and 1997–2003)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Judge (1986–2003), President from 1994 to 2003
Manuel Diez de Velasco, Judge (1988–94)
Manfred Zuleeg, Judge (1988–94)
Walter van Gerven, Advocate General (1988–94)
Giuseppe Tesauro, Advocate General (1988–98)
Francis Geoffrey Jacobs, Advocate General (1988–2006)
Paul Joan George Kapteyn, Judge (1990–2000)
John L. Murray, Judge (1991–99)
Claus Christian Gulmann, Advocate General (1991–94), then Judge (1994–2006)
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward, Judge (1992–2004)
Michael Bendik Elmer, Advocate General (1994–97)
Günter Hirsch, Judge (1994–2000)
Georges Cosmas, Advocate General (1994–2000)
Antonio Mario La Pergola, Judge (1994 and 1999–2006), Advocate General
(1995–99)
Jean-Pierre Puissochet, Judge (1994–2006)
Philippe Léger, Advocate General (1994–2006)
Hans Ragnemalm, Judge (1995–2000)
Nial Fennelly, Advocate General (1995–2000)
Leif Sevón, Judge (1995–2002)
Melchior Wathelet, Judge (1995–2003)
Peter Jann, Judge (1995–2009)
Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General (1995–2009)
Romain Schintgen, Judge (1996–2008)
Krateros Ioannou, Judge (1997–99)
Siegbert Alber, Advocate General (1997–2003)
Antonio Saggio, Advocate General (1998–2000)
Fidelma O’Kelly Macken, Judge (1999–2004)
Stig von Bahr, Judge (2000–06)
Ninon Colneric, Judge (2000–06)
Leendert A. Geelhoed, Advocate General (2000–06)
Christine Stix-Hackl, Advocate General (2000–06)
Christiaan Willem Anton Timmermans, Judge (2000–10)
José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues, Judge (2000–12)
Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro, Advocate General (2003–09)
Jerzy Makarczyk, Judge (2004–09)
Ján Klučka, Judge (2004–09)
Pranas Kūris, Judge (2004–10)

78 

Annual Report 2013

Former members 

Court of Justice

Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann, Judge (2004–12)
Uno Lõhmus, Judge (2004–13)
Pernilla Lindh, Judge (2006–11)
Ján Mazák, Advocate General (2006–12)
Verica Trstenjak, Advocate General (2006–12)
Jean-Jacques Kasel, Judge (2008–13)

Presidents

Massimo Pilotti (1952–58)
Andreas Matthias Donner (1958–64)
Charles Léon Hammes (1964–67)
Robert Lecourt (1967–76)
Hans Kutscher (1976–80)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars (1980–84)
Alexander John Mackenzie Stuart (1984–88)
Ole Due (1988–94)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglésias (1994–2003)

Registrars

Albert Van Houtte (1953–82)
Paul Heim (1982–88)
Jean-Guy Giraud (1988–94)
Roger Grass (1994–2010)

Annual Report 2013 

79

Statistics 

Court of Justice

D — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice

General activity of the Court of Justice

1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13)

New cases

2.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
3. 
4. 

Subject matter of the action (2013)
Actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations (2009–13)

Completed cases

5.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
6. 
7. 
8. 

Judgments, orders, opinions (2013) 
Bench hearing action (2009–13)
Cases  completed  by  judgments,  by  opinions  or  by  orders  involving  a  judicial 
determination (2009–13)
Subject matter of the action (2009–13)

9. 
10.  Subject matter of the action (2013)
11. 

Judgments  concerning  failure  of  a  Member  State  to  fulfil  its  obligations:  outcome 
(2009–13)

12.   Duration of proceedings (judgments and orders involving a judicial determination) 

(2009–13)

Cases pending as at 31 December

13.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
14.  Bench hearing action (2009–13)

Miscellaneous

15.  Expedited procedures (2009–13)
16.   Urgent preliminary ruling procedure (2009–13)
17.  Proceedings for interim measures (2013)

General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2013)

18.  New cases and judgments
19.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State per year)
20.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court or tribunal)
21.  New actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations

Annual Report 2013 

81

General activity of the Court of Justice 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13) (1)

Court of Justice

Statistics 

1. 

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  New cases

  Completed cases

  Cases pending

New cases
Completed cases 
Cases pending

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

562
588
742

631
574
799

688
638
849

632
595
886

699
701
884

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

Annual Report 2013 

83

\t\t

Court of Justice 

Statistics

2. 

New cases — Nature of proceedings (2009–13) (1)

2013

References for 
a preliminary ruling

Direct actions

Appeals

Appeals concerning 
interim measures or 
interventions

Requests for an opinion

Special forms of procedure

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

References for a preliminary ruling
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions
Requests for an opinion
Special forms of procedure (2)

Applications for interim measures

Total

302
143
105

2
1
9
562
1

385
136
97

6

7
631
3

423
81
162

13

9
688
3

404
73
136

3
1
15
632

450
72
161

5
2
9
699
1

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

(2)  The  following  are  considered  to  be  ‘special  forms  of  procedure’:  legal  aid;  taxation  of  costs;  rectification; 
application  to  set  aside  a  judgment  delivered  by  default;  third-party  proceedings;  interpretation;  revision; 
examination of a proposal by the first advocate general to review a decision of the General Court; attachment 
procedure; cases concerning immunity.

84 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

3. 

New cases — Subject matter of the action (2013) (1)

t
c
e
r
i
D

s
n
o
i
t
c
a

s
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
R

a
r
o
f

y
r
a
n
m

i

i
l
e
r
p

g
n

i
l

u
r

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

i

g
n
n
r
e
c
n
o
c

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

‑
n
e
v
r
e
t
n

i

s
n
o
i
t

2

Access to documents
Accession of new states
Agriculture
Approximation of laws
Area of freedom, security and justice
Citizenship of the Union
Commercial policy
Common fisheries policy
Common foreign and security policy
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic and monetary policy 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Energy
Environment 
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combating fraud and so forth)
Free movement of capital
Free movement of goods
Freedom of establishment
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Industrial policy
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Principles of European Union law
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Taxation
Transport

Procedure
Staff Regulations

TFEU

Others
OVERALL TOTAL

1
2
2
1

2

1

1

9
12

1
1
1
2
2

2
2
12

1

3

1
8
3
70

2
2
72

20
24
57
6
4

1
2
6
34
17
1
2
1
1
16
5

2
4
5
7
22
12
9
22
2
16
3
13

37
18
9
44
26
448

2
2
450

8

9

4
2
6

32

1

8

1
1

38
8

2
3

5
1
3

29

160

1
1
161

1

1

5

5

r
o
f
s
t
s
e
u
q
e
R

i

i

n
o
n
p
o
n
a

l
a
t
o
T

l
a
i
c
e
p
S

f
o
s
m
r
o
f

e
r
u
d
e
c
o
r
p

10
1
31
26
59
6
8
4
7
3
39
34
17
2
10
1
11
29
5

3
5
6
9
24
12
11
62
23
16
6
17

5
1
43
18
40
52
29
685

5
5
690

1

1

2

2

1

1

2
7

7
9

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

Annual Report 2013 

85

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

3
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

0
1
0
2

9
0
0
2

K
U

E
S

I

F

K
S

I

S

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

T

I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E

I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

0
5

5
4

0
4

5
3

0
3

5
2

0
2

5
1

0 5 0
1

Annual Report 2013

)
1
(

)
3
1
–
9
0
0
2
(
s
n
o
i
t
a
g

i
l

b
o
s
t
i

l

l

fi
u
f
o
t
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M
a
f
o
e
r
u

l
i
a
f

r
o
f
s
n
o
i
t
c
A
—

s
e
s
a
c
w
e
N

.

4

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

Court of Justice

3
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

0
1
0
2

9
0
0
2

3

3

4

3

4

1

2

5

1

1

1

1

1

8

2

2

3

2

3

1

3

4
5

2

3

7

2

2

4

5

5

2

1

1

4

1

3

2
1

3

1

8
5

7

5

3

1

4

4

7

7

7

1

2

1

4

2

7

3

1

1

2

2

2

1
1

2

1

7

7

4

4
1

8

9

6

1

8

3

5

0
1

9

0
1

3

3

2

4

1

3
1

4

5

5

6

2
1

1
1

8

3

6
1

5

1

3

5

7

1
1

7
1

1

2

1

1

5

3
7

8
2
1

2
4
1

l
a
t
o
T

c
i
l

b
u
p
e
R
h
c
e
z
C

k
r
a
m
n
e
D

y
n
a
m
r
e
G

i

m
u
g
l
e
B

a
i
r
a
g
u
B

l

a
i
n
o
t
s
E

d
n
a
l
e
r
I

e
c
e
e
r
G

e
c
n
a
r
F

a
i
t
a
o
r
C

n
i
a
p
S

s
u
r
p
y
C

a
i
v
t
a
L

y
l
a
t
I

g
r
u
o
b
m
e
x
u
L

a
i
n
a
u
h
t
i
L

s
d
n
a
l
r
e
h
t
e
N

y
r
a
g
n
u
H

a
t
l
a
M

a
i
r
t
s
u
A

d
n
a
l
o
P

l
a
g
u
t
r
o
P

a
i
n
a
m
o
R

a
i
n
e
v
o
l
S

a
i
k
a
v
o
l
S

d
n
a
l
n
i
F

n
e
d
e
w
S

i

m
o
d
g
n
K
d
e
t
i
n
U

Annual Report 2013 

.
)
e
s
a
c
e
n
o
=
r
e
b
m
u
n
e
s
a
c
e
n
o
(
y
t
i
r
a

l
i

m

i
s
f
o
d
n
u
o
r
g
e
h
t
n
o
s
e
s
a
c
f
o
r
e
d
n
o

i

j

e
h
t

i

f
o
n
e
k
a
t
g
n
e
b
t
n
u
o
c
c
a
t
u
o
h
t
i

w
,
s
e
s
a
c
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
n

l

a
t
o
t
e
h
t

t
n
e
s
e
r
p
e
r

)
s
e
r
u
g
fi
s
s
o
r
g
(
n
e
v
g
s
e
r
u
g
fi
e
h
T

i

)
1
(

87

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

5. 

Completed cases —  Nature of proceedings (2009–13) (1)

2013

Direct actions

Appeals

References for  
a preliminary ruling

Special forms of procedure

Requests for an opinion

Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions

References for a preliminary ruling
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions
Requests for an opinion
Special forms of procedure

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

259
215
97

7
1
9
588

339
139
84

4

8
574

388
117
117

7
1
8
638

386
70
117

12

10
595

413
110
155

5
1
17
701

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

88 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

6. 

Completed cases — Judgments, orders, opinions (2013) (1)

Judgments 
68.35%

Orders involving  
a judicial 
determination 
18.74%

Interlocutory orders 
0.94%

Other orders 
11.97%

g
n
i
v
l
o
v
n

i
s
r
e
d
r
O

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

276
74
82

2
434

References for a preliminary ruling
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions
Requests for an opinion
Special forms of procedure

Total

l
a
i
c
i
d
u

j
a

)
2
(
n
o
i
t
a
n
m
r
e
t
e
d

i

y
r
o
t
u
c
o
l
r
e
t
n

)
3
(
s
r
e
d
r
o

I

)
4
(
s
r
e
d
r
o
r
e
h
t
O

n
a
r
o
f
s
t
s
e
u
q
e
R

i

n
o
n
p
o

i

51
1
52

15
119

35
34
6

1

76

1

5

6

l
a
t
o
T

362
109
141

5
1
17
635

(1)  The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases after joinder on the ground of similarity (a set of 

joined cases = one case).

(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 

need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.

(3)  Orders made following an application on the basis of Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU (former Articles 242 EC 
and 243 EC), Article 280 TFEU (former Article 244 EC) or the corresponding provisions of the EAEC Treaty, or 
following an appeal against an order concerning interim measures or intervention.

(4)  Orders terminating the case by removal from the register, declaration that there is no need to give a decision or 

referral to the General Court.

Annual Report 2013 

89

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

7. 

Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2009–13) (1)

2013

Chambers 
(five judges)
59.03%

Chambers 
(three judges)
31.77%

Vice-President
0.81%

Grand Chamber
8.39%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

i

i

s
n
o
n
p
O
/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

i

i

s
n
o
n
p
O
/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

i

i

s
n
o
n
p
O
/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

i

i

s
n
o
n
p
O
/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

i

i

s
n
o
n
p
O
/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

Full Court
Grand Chamber
Chambers (five judges)
Chambers (three judges)
President
Vice-President

41
275
96

41
70
8 283 280
56

70 166
5

5

Total 412

83 495 406

1
1
62
71
8 288 290
91

76 132
5

5

1
1
47
62
10 300 275
83
86 177
4

4

1
47
52
8 283 348

97 180
12
12

52
18 366
91 106 197

5
90 496 444 100 544 406 117 523 491 129 620

5

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 

need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.

90 

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

8. 

Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination (2009–13) (1)  (2)

Court of Justice

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  Judgments/Opinions

  Orders

Judgments/Opinions
Orders

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

412
83
495

406
90
496

444
100
544

406
117
523

491
129
620

Total

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 

need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.

Annual Report 2013 

91

Court of Justice 

Statistics

9. 

Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination — Subject–matter of 
the action (2009–13) (1)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Access to documents
Accession of new states
Agriculture
Approximation of laws
Area of freedom, security and justice
Brussels Convention
Budget of the Communities (2)
Citizenship of the Union
Commercial policy
Common Customs Tariff (4)
Common fisheries policy
Common foreign and security policy
Community own resources (2)
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection (3)
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff (4)
Economic and monetary policy 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Energy
Environment (3)
Environment and consumers (3)
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework,  
own resources, combating fraud and so forth) (2)
Free movement of capital
Free movement of goods
Freedom of establishment
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Industrial policy
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Principles of European Union law
Public health
Public procurement
Regional policy
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Research, information, education and statistics
Rome Convention

92 

1
18
32
26
2

3
5
13
4
2
10
17
28

5
1

4

60
8

7
13
13
19
17
6
31
29
4

3

1

15
15
24

1
6
2
7
2
2
5
17
13
3
15
1

2
9
48
10

1
6
6
17
17
30
9
38
26
4

2

1

2
1
23
15
24

7
2
2
1
3
2
8
19
4
19

2
35
25
8

4
14
8
21
9
27
9
47
20
15
3
7

1

5
2
22
12
37

8
8

9

1
30
9
19
3
3
1

27
1
5

3
21
7
6
18
29
8
46
27
7
1
12

6

33
24
46

12
6

12

4
43
19
11

6

1
35

4

2
8
1
13
15
16
15
43
31
17
2
12

1

1

>>>

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Taxation
Tourism
Transport

Privileges and immunities
Procedure
Staff Regulations

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

33
3
10
44

9
481
1

5
8
13
495

36
6
16
66

4
482
4

6
4
10
496

36
8
48
49

7
535
1
1
2
5

7
544

28
8
10
64
1
14
513

3
7

10
523

27
12
34
74

17
602

13
5
18
620

EC Treaty/TFEU
EU Treaty
CS Treaty

Others
OVERALL TOTAL

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

(2)  The headings ‘Budget of the Communities’ and ‘Community  own resources’  have  been  combined  under  the 

heading ‘Financial provisions’ for cases brought after 1 December 2009.

(3)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 

1 December 2009.

(4)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been combined under a single heading for 

cases brought after 1 December 2009.

Annual Report 2013 

93

Court of Justice 

Statistics

10.  Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination — Subject matter of 
the action (2013) (1)

Judgments/
Opinions

Orders (2)

Total

Access to documents
Agriculture
Approximation of laws
Area of freedom, security and justice
Citizenship of the Union
Commercial policy
Common foreign and security policy
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection (4)
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff (5)
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Energy
Environment (4)
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combating fraud and so forth) (3)
Free movement of capital
Free movement of goods
Freedom of establishment
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Industrial policy
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Principles of European Union law
Public health
Public procurement
Research and technological development and 
space
Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Taxation
Transport

EC Treaty/TFEU

4
30
18
41
11
6
12
4
38
15
9
3
1
33
4

2
8
1
13
14
14
14
24
9
4
1
8

1
21
12
30
67
16
488

2
3
6
5
1

5
4
2
3

2

1
2
1
19
22
13
1
4

6

4
7
1
114

6
33
24
46
12
6
12
4
43
19
11
6
1
35
4

2
8
1
13
15
16
15
43
31
17
2
12

1
27
12
34
74
17
602
>>>

94 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

Procedure
Staff Regulations

Judgments/
Opinions

Orders (2)

Total

Others
OVERALL TOTAL

3
3
491

13
2
15
129

13
5
18
620

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 

need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.

(3)  The headings ‘Budget of the Communities’ and ‘Community  own resources’ have been combined under  the 

heading ‘Financial provisions’ for cases brought after 1 December 2009.

(4)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 

1 December 2009.

(5)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been combined under a single heading for 

cases brought after 1 December 2009.

Annual Report 2013 

95

Court of Justice 

Statistics

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d
t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

:
s
n
o
i
t
a
g

i
l

b
o
s
t
i

l

l

fi
u
f
o
t
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M
a
f
o
e
r
u

i

l
i
a
f
g
n
n
r
e
c
n
o
c
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

—

s
e
s
a
c
d
e
t
e
l
p
m
o
C

.

1
1

96 

)
1
(

)
3
1
–
9
0
0
2
(
e
m
o
c
t
u
o

K
U

E
S

I

F

K
S

I

S

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

T

I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E

I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

3
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

0
1
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
4

5
3

0
3

5
2

0
2

5
1

0 5 0
1

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

Court of Justice

1

2

1

2

1

1

3

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

3

2

6

5

7

1

1

1

2

4

1

1

1

3
2

0
4

1

2

1

1

5

5

1

1

1

2

5

3

4

3

2

1

3

3

3

5

1

1

1

2

7
4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

9

9

5

3

4

7

6

8

5

1

2

6

5

8

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2
7

1

2
1

6

4

4

1

4

7

8

0
1

0
1

1

2

1

2

5

4

7

1

1

2

3

1

2

4

1

1

1

5
1

1

1

6

1

7

2
2

1
1

6

1
1

7

2

3

6

5

7

1

6

7

8

3
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

0
1
0
2

9
0
0
2

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
D

t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
D

t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
D

t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
D

t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
D

t
n
e
m
e
g
n
i
r
f
n

I

d
e
r
a
l
c
e
d

c
i
l

b
u
p
e
R
h
c
e
z
C

k
r
a
m
n
e
D

y
n
a
m
r
e
G

i

m
u
g
l
e
B

a
i
r
a
g
u
B

l

a
i
n
o
t
s
E

d
n
a
l
e
r
I

e
c
e
e
r
G

e
c
n
a
r
F

a
i
t
a
o
r
C

n
i
a
p
S

s
u
r
p
y
C

a
i
v
t
a
L

y
l
a
t
I

g
r
u
o
b
m
e
x
u
L

a
i
n
a
u
h
t
i
L

s
d
n
a
l
r
e
h
t
e
N

y
r
a
g
n
u
H

a
t
l
a
M

a
i
r
t
s
u
A

d
n
a
l
o
P

l
a
g
u
t
r
o
P

a
i
n
a
m
o
R

a
i
n
e
v
o
l
S

a
i
k
a
v
o
l
S

d
n
a
l
n
i
F

n
e
d
e
w
S

i

m
o
d
g
n
K
d
e
t
i
n
U

Annual Report 2013 

.
)
e
s
a
c
e
n
o
=
s
e
s
a
c
d
e
n
o

i

j

f
o
t
e
s
a
(
y
t
i
r
a

l
i

m

i
s

f
o
d
n
u
o
r
g
e
h
t
n
o
r
e
d
n
o

i

j

r
e
t
f
a
s
e
s
a
c
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
n
e
h
t

t
n
e
s
e
r
p
e
r

)
s
e
r
u
g
fi
t
e
n
(
n
e
v
g
s
e
r
u
g
fi
e
h
T

i

)
1
(

97

3
8

0
1

3
3
1

l
a
t
o
T

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

12.  Completed cases — Duration of proceedings (2009–13) (1) 

(judgments and orders involving a judicial determination)

25

20

15

10

5

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  References for  
a preliminary ruling

  Direct actions

  Appeals

References for a preliminary ruling

Urgent preliminary ruling procedure

Direct actions
Appeals

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

17.0
2.6
17.1
15.5

16.1
2.2
16.7
14.0

16.3
2.5
20.3
15.1

15.6
1.9
19.7
15.2

16.3
2.2
24.3
16.6

(1)  The following types of cases are excluded from the calculation of the duration of proceedings: cases involving 
an  interlocutory  judgment  or  a  measure  of  inquiry;  opinions;  special  forms  of  procedure  (namely  legal  aid, 
taxation of costs, rectification, application to set aside a judgment delivered by default, third-party proceedings, 
interpretation,  revision,  examination  of  a  proposal  by  the  first  advocate  general  to  review  a  decision  of  the 
General Court, attachment procedure and cases concerning immunity); cases terminated by an order removing 
the case from the register, declaring that there is no need to give a decision or referring the case to the General 
Court; proceedings for interim measures and appeals concerning interim measures and interventions.

98 

Annual Report 2013

 
Statistics 

Court of Justice

13.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 

(2009–13) (1)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  References for 
a preliminary ruling

  Special forms of 
procedure

  Direct actions

  Appeals

  Requests for an 
opinion

References for a preliminary ruling
Direct actions
Appeals
Special forms of procedure
Requests for an opinion

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

438
170
129
4
1
742

484
167
144
3
1
799

519
131
195
4

849

537
134
205
9
1
886

574
96
211
1
2
884

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

Annual Report 2013 

99

Court of Justice 

Statistics

14.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 

(2009–13) (1)

2013

Not assigned
68.44%

Grand Chamber 
4.19%

Chambers  
(five judges) 
21.49%

Chambers  
(three judges) 
5.77%

Vice-President 
0.11%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Full Court
Grand Chamber
Chambers (five judges)
Chambers (three judges)
President
Vice-President
Not assigned

Total

65
169
15
3

490
742

1
49
193
33
4

519
799

42
157
23
10

617
849

44
239
42

1
560
886

37
190
51

1
605
884

(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the joinder 

of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).

100 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

15.  Miscellaneous — Expedited procedures (2009–13)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

1

1

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

3
1
1
5

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

4

4

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

1
8

9

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

2

2

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

7
5

12

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

1
1

2

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

4
1

5

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

14

14

Direct actions
References for a preliminary ruling
Appeals
Special forms of procedure

Total

16.  Miscellaneous — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure (2009–13)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

2
2

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

1

1

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

5
5

4
4

2
2

5
5

4
4

1
1

2
2

3
3

Police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters
Area of freedom, security and 
justice

Total

Annual Report 2013 

101

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

17.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2013) (1)

s
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
a
w
e
N

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
f

s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

i

g
n
n
r
e
c
n
o
c
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m
m

i
r
e
t
n

i

s
n
o
i
t
n
e
v
r
e
t
n

i

r
o

Outcome

d
e
t
n
a
r
g
t
o
N

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

Access to documents
State aid
Competition
Research and technological development and space
Public health

OVERALL TOTAL

1

1

2
1
1

1
5

2

2
1
1
6

(1)  The  figures  given  (net  figures)  represent  the  number  of  cases  after  joinder  on  the  ground  of  similarity  

(a set of joined cases = one case).

102 

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

Court of Justice

18.  General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2013) —  

New cases and judgments

i

n
o
n
p
o

i

r
a
e
Y

r
o
f
s
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
R

y
r
a
n
m

i

i
l
e
r
p
a

g
n

i
l

u
r

s
n
o
i
t
c
a
t
c
e
r
i
D

New cases (1)

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

i

g
n
n
r
e
c
n
o
c

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

s
n
o
i
t
n
e
v
r
e
t
n

i

n
a
r
o
f
s
t
s
e
u
q
e
R

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

4
10
9
11
19
43
46
22
24
30
99
49
55
30
14
24
60
47
59
42
131
63
61
51
74
146
1 218
180
214
217
199
183
294
238
251
193
244

1
5
6
6
7
1
23
9
17
32
37
40
61
39
69
75
84
123
106
99
108
129
98
129
139
91
144
179
139

Annual Report 2013 

l
a
t
o
T

s
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
A

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
f

s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

1
1
1

1
1

1

4
10
9
11
19
43
47
23
26
35
105
55
62
31
37
33
77
79
96
82
192
102
131
127
158
270
1 324
279
322
346
297
312
433
329
395
372
383

2
2
2

5
2
1
2
7
4
4
2

1
2

1
2
6
8
5
6
6
7
6
14
17
16
11
17
23
23
21
17
19

/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
n
o
n
p
O

i

i

2
4
6
4
10
13
18
11
20
17
31
52
24
24
27
30
64
60
61
80
63
78
88
100
97
138
132
128
185
151
165
211
174
208
238
188
>>>

103

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

r
a
e
Y

r
o
f
s
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
R

y
r
a
n
m

i

i
l
e
r
p
a

g
n

i
l

u
r

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Total

141
186
162
204
203
251
256
239
264
255
224
237
216
210
249
221
251
265
288
302
385
423
404
450
8 282

s
n
o
i
t
c
a
t
c
e
r
i
D

221
140
251
265
125
109
132
169
147
214
197
187
204
277
219
179
201
221
210
143
136
81
73
72
8 827

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

15
13
24
17
12
46
25
30
66
68
66
72
46
63
52
66
80
79
77
105
97
162
136
161
1 578

New cases (1)

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

i

g
n
n
r
e
c
n
o
c

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

s
n
o
i
t
n
e
v
r
e
t
n

i

n
a
r
o
f
s
t
s
e
u
q
e
R

i

n
o
n
p
o

i

1
1
1

1
2
3
5
4
4
13
7
4
5
6
1
3
8
8
2
6
13
3
5
106

2
2

3

2

1
1

1
1

1
2
22

s
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
A

m

i
r
e
t
n

i

r
o
f

s
e
r
u
s
a
e
m

12
9
5
13
4
3
4
1
2
4
4
6
1
7
3
2
1
3
3
1
3
3

1
356

l
a
t
o
T

378
342
440
486
344
408
416
443
481
541
502
503
470
556
527
467
535
573
584
553
624
679
617
690
18 815

/
s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

)
2
(
s
n
o
n
p
O

i

i

193
204
210
203
188
172
193
242
254
235
273
244
269
308
375
362
351
379
333
376
370
370
357
434
9 797

(1)  Gross figures; special forms of procedure are not included.

(2)  Net figures.

104 

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

g
n

i
l

u
r
y
r
a
n
m

i

i
l
e
r
p
a
r
o
f
s
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
e
r
w
e
N
—
)
3
1
0
2
–
2
5
9
1
(

t
r
u
o
C
e
h
t

f
o
k
r
o
w
e
h
t
n

i

d
n
e
r
t

l

a
r
e
n
e
G

.

9
1

)
r
a
e
y
r
e
p
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M
y
b

(

1

5

6

6

7

1

9

3
2

7
1

2
3

7
3

0
4

1
6

9
3

9
6

5
7

4
8

3
2
1

6
0
1

9
9

8
0
1

9
2
1

8
9

9
2
1

9
3
1

1
9

4
4
1

>
>
>

Court of Justice

1

1

1

5

5

8

6

5

4

6

9

8

8

9

1

5

5

4

1

1

3

2

3

6

6

7

4

0
1

9

4
1

8
3

1
1

7
1

7
1

1
2

9
1

2
2

4
1

6
1

9
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

6

1

3

2

1

2

5

4

5

5

4
1

2
1

7

1
1

9
1

9
1

1
1

8
1

7

0
1

1
1

5

5

2

3

1

1

2

6

1

4

6

8

5
1

4
1

2
1

8
1

4
1

7
1

9
3

5
1

4
3

5
4

9
1

6
3

1

1

2

7
1

1

2

1

2

3

2

1

2

4

2

4

4

1
1

1
1

1
2

8
1

0
2

7
3

5
1

6
2

8
2

0
3

6
4

3
3

4
2

1
4

6
3

6
3

8
3

0
4

8
1

2
3

1

1

3

1

2

1

1

4

2

4

5

5

1

4

4

1

5

8

5

7

1
1

6
1

7

3
1

4
1

2
1

0
1

9

3
1

3
1

3
1

5
1

1
6
9
1

2
6
9
1

3
6
9
1

4
6
9
1

5
6
9
1

6
6
9
1

7
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

9
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

1
7
9
1

2
7
9
1

3
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

5
7
9
1

6
7
9
1

7
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

9
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

1
8
9
1

2
8
9
1

3
8
9
1

4
8
9
1

5
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

7
8
9
1

l
a
t
o
T

)
1
(
s
r
e
h
t
O

K
U

E
S

I
F

K
S

I
S

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

T
I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E
I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

Annual Report 2013 

105

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Justice 

Statistics

l
a
t
o
T

)
1
(
s
r
e
h
t
O

K
U

E
S

I
F

K
S

I
S

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

T
I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E
I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

9
7
1

9
3
1

1
4
1

6
8
1

2
6
1

4
0
2

3
0
2

1
5
2

6
5
2

9
3
2

4
6
2

5
5
2

4
2
2

7
3
2

6
1
2

0
1
2

9
4
2

1
2
2

1
5
2

5
6
2

8
8
2

2
0
3

5
8
3

3
2
4

4
0
4

0
5
4

1

1

6
1

4
1

2
1

4
1

8
1

2
1

4
2

0
2

1
2

8
1

4
2

2
2

6
2

1
2

4
1

2
2

2
2

2
1

0
1

6
1

4
1

8
2

9
2

6
2

6
1

4
1

6

4

7

6

5

4

4

5

4

5

2

6

7

5

6

4

8

1
1

2
1

3

6

2

4

5

3

7

4

4

4

5

5

4

2

6

3

4

2
1

1

1

1

5

3

9

4

2
8
2
8

2

1
6
5

1
1
1

3
8

4
2

2

1

1

1

5

1

1

7
1

4
1

3
1

7
1

3
6

1

2

3

1

3

1

5

6

2

7

7

8

4

3

1

1

2

3

3

1

3

0
1

1
1

4
1

4
1

6
1
1

1

2

7

4

8

0
1

6

1
1

1
1

0
6

2

6

5
3

6
1

6
5

1
3

7
5

1
3

5
1

2
1

5
1

2
1

0
2

5
2

5
1

5
1

4
2

3
2

9
1

6
2

8
1

9

7
1

8
1

3
4

3
1

9
1

0
1

4
2

1
2

3
2

2
1

4
1

2
1

8
2

8
2

6
3

0
2

9
1

4
3

4
2

4
2

2
2

4
4

6
4

1

1

9
2
4

9
7
8

2

2

1

4

2

1

1

1

2

2

3

2

4

2

4

4

1

2

1

4

9

2

8

1

1

3

3

2

1

2

3
8

0
1

3
2

2

3

4

2

6

6

0
1

3
1

8
1

0
2

4
8

3

4

3

5

5

0
1

0
3

1

1

3

5

8
2

0
1

5
2

6
3

2
2

4
2

6
4

8
5

0
7

0
5

9
3

3
4

0
5

0
4

7
3

5
4

8
4

8
1

4
3

3
4

9
3

9
2

9
4

4
4

5
6

2
6

8
3

8
2

1
2

9
2

5
1

2
2

6
3

3
4

4
2

0
1

6
1

7
1

2
1

5
1

8

9

1
2

7
1

4
2

6
2

2
1

8
2

3
3

1
3

5
1

4
2

1

2

6

5

5

7

3
1

0
1

6

9

5
5

4

5

4

3

8

8

0
1

7
1

4
1

7
1

1
1

2
2

7
2

6
1

6
2

2

2

3

1

5

0
1

4

2

5

3

3

4

7

4

8
1

1
1

4
1

8

9

1
1

6

9

1

5

1

4

2

1

2

3

1

3

2

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

4

7

6

4

4
3

7
4

4
3

4
5

2
6

7
5

4
4

1
5

6
6

6
4

9
4

9
4

7
4

3
5

9
5

3
4

0
5

1
5

7
7

9
5

1
7

9
5

1
7

3
8

8
6

7
9

2

2

2

1

5

3

4

2

5

2

3

7

4

8

4

7

7

3

3

5

8

3

4

4

3

5

6

3

6

8

6

0
1

1

3

2

1

5

3

5

7

7

7
2
2
1

6
8
8

3
1
3

6
6
1

2
7

5
1

0
5
0
2

5
5
1

4
3

0
3

3
1

7
1

9
1

6
1

2
2

9
1

4
1

0
3

9
1

2
1

3
1

5
1

0
1

8
1

8
1

4
2

1
2

7
1

2
2

4
2

5
3

7
3

4
3

8
2

6
2

8
8
9
1

9
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

1
9
9
1

2
9
9
1

3
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

7
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

9
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

1
0
0
2

2
0
0
2

3
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

5
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

9
3
7

l
a
t
o
T

1

8

9

2
2

5
1

0
1

5
6

106 

l

.
)
f
o
h
s
t
h
c
e
r
e
G
x
u
e
n
e
B
/
x
u
e
n
e
B
e
c
i
t
s
u

l

j

e
d
r
u
o
C

i

i

(
e
n
u
k
l
e
M
a
n
p
m
a
C
0
0
/
5
6
2
-
C
e
s
a
C

.
)
s
l
o
o
h
c
S
n
a
e
p
o
r
u
E
e
h
t

f
o
d
r
a
o
B
s
t
n
a
p
m
o
C

l

i

(

s
r
e
h
t

O
d
n
a
s
e

l
i

M
9
0
/
6
9
1
-
C
e
s
a
C

)
1
(

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

Court of Justice

20.  General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2013) —  

New references for a preliminary ruling  
(by Member State and by court or tribunal)

Belgium

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Denmark

Germany

Estonia

Ireland

Greece

Spain

France

Croatia

Annual Report 2013 

28
90
68
553
1
10
54

2
16
16
33
122

184
109
295
26
75
1 361
5
10
23
23
26
10
51
105
1
49
263
1
107
83
695

Cour constitutionnelle
Cour de cassation
Conseil d'État
Other courts or tribunals
Върховен касационен съд 
Върховен административен съд 
Other courts or tribunals
Ústavní soud 
Nejvyšší soud
Nejvyšší správní soud 
Other courts or tribunals
Højesteret
Other courts or tribunals
Bundesverfassungsgericht
Bundesgerichtshof
Bundesverwaltungsgericht
Bundesfinanzhof
Bundesarbeitsgericht
Bundessozialgericht
Other courts or tribunals
Riigikohus 
Other courts or tribunals
Supreme Court
High Court
Other courts or tribunals
Άρειος Πάγος
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας
Other courts or tribunals
Tribunal Constitucional
Tribunal Supremo
Other courts or tribunals
Conseil constitutionnel
Cour de cassation
Conseil d'État
Other courts or tribunals
Ustavni sud
Vrhovni sud
Visoki upravni sud
Visoki prekršajni sud

Total

739

65

34

155

2 050

15

72

166

313

886

>>>

107

Court of Justice 

Statistics

Italy

Cyprus

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Hungary

Malta

Netherlands

Austria

Poland

Portugal

108 

Corte Costituzionale
Corte suprema di Cassazione
Consiglio di Stato
Other courts or tribunals
Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο
Other courts or tribunals
Augstākā tiesa 
Satversmes tiesa 
Other courts or tribunals
Konstitucinis Teismas 
Aukščiausiasis Teismas
Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas
Other courts or tribunals
Cour supérieure de justice
Cour de cassation
Cour administrative
Other courts or tribunals
Kúria
Fővárosi ĺtélőtábla
Szegedi Ítélötáblá
Other courts or tribunals
Constitutional Court
Qorti ta' l- Appel
Other courts or tribunals
Hoge Raad
Raad van State
Centrale Raad van Beroep
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven
Tariefcommissie
Other courts or tribunals
Verfassungsgerichtshof
Oberster Gerichtshof
Verwaltungsgerichtshof
Other courts or tribunals
Trybunał Konstytucyjny
Sąd Najwyższy
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny 
Other courts or tribunals
Supremo Tribunal de Justiça
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo
Other courts or tribunals

2
119
101
1 005
4
1
21

9
1
9
7
6
10
12
10
51
15
4
2
63

2
239
95
58
148
35
304
5
98
76
250

6
24
30
3
51
62

Total

1 227

5

30

23

83

84

2

879

429

60

116
>>>

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Court of Justice

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Finland

Sweden

United Kingdom

Others

Total

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție
Curtea de Apel
Other courts or tribunals
Ustavno sodišče 
Vrhovno sodišče 
Other courts or tribunals
Ústavný Súd 
Najvyšší súd 
Other courts or tribunals
Korkein oikeus
Korkein hallinto-oikeus
Työtuomioistuin
Other courts or tribunals
Högsta Domstolen
Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen
Marknadsdomstolen
Arbetsdomstolen
Other courts or tribunals
House of Lords
Supreme Court
Court of Appeal
Other courts or tribunals
Cour de justice Benelux/Benelux Gerechtshof (1)
Complaints Board of the European Schools (2)

6
31
26

2
3

9
15
13
42
3
25
17
5
5
3
81
40
5
73
443
1
1

Total

63

5

24

83

111

561

2
8 282

(1)  Case C-265/00 Campina Melkunie.

(2)  Case C-196/09 Miles and Others.

Annual Report 2013 

109

Court of Justice 

Statistics

K
U

E
S

I

F

K
S

I

S

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

T

I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E

I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

l
a
t
o
T

K
U

E
S

4
3
7
3

4
3
1

3
5

5
5

I
F

3
1

K
S

2
1

I
S

3

0
9
1

7
6

4
3
1

5
4
1

4
1

4
1

2
6
2

3

O
R

T
P

L
P

T
A

L
N

T
M

U
H

U
L

T
L

V
L

Y
C

1
1

T
I

R
H

R
F

S
E

L
E

E
I

E
E

E
D

K
D

Z
C

G
B

E
B

8
3
6

2
1
4

9
3
2

9
8
3

2
0
2

1
2

6
7
2

8
3

7
2

6

6
7
3

3
1
0
2
-
2
5
9
1

Annual Report 2013

3
1
0
2
–
2
5
9
1

s
n
o
i
t
a
g

i
l

b
o
s
t
i

l

l

fi
u
f
o
t
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M
a
f
o
e
r
u

l
i
a
f

r
o
f
s
n
o
i
t
c
a
w
e
N

—
)
3
1
0
2
–
2
5
9
1
(

t
r
u
o
C
e
h
t

f
o
k
r
o
w
e
h
t
n

i

d
n
e
r
t

l

a
r
e
n
e
G

.

1
2

110 

0
0
7

0
0
6

0
0
5

0
0
4

0
0
3

0
0
2

0
0
1

0

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II

The General Court

Proceedings 

General Court

A — Proceedings of the General Court in 2013

By Mr Marc Jaeger, President of the General Court

In 2013 the Republic of Croatia acceded to the European Union and the General Court welcomed 
Ms V. Tomljenović as its first Croatian member on 4 July 2013. This appointment was preceded 
by that of Mr C. Wetter, who entered into office on 18 March 2013, replacing Mr N. Wahl who had 
been appointed as an Advocate General at the Court of Justice on 28 November 2012. In addition, 
on 16 September 2013, following the departure of Mr J. Azizi (Judge at the General Court from 
1995), of Mr V. Vadapalas (Judge at the General Court from 2004), of Mr S. Soldevila Fragoso and 
Mr L. Truchot (both Judge at the General Court from 2007) and of Mr K. O’Higgins (Judge at the 
General Court from 2008), Mr V. Kreuschitz, Mr E. Bieliūnas, Mr I. Ulloa Rubio, Mr S. Gervasoni and 
Mr A.M. Collins were appointed as their respective successors. Finally, following the resignation of 
Ms K. Jürimäe (Judge at the General Court from 2004) and her appointment as a Judge at the Court 
of Justice, Mr L. Madise entered into office at the General Court on 23 October 2013.

This vast renewal (accounting for a quarter of the membership) illustrates, once again, the acute 
instability in the composition of the General Court, which has had to face the challenge of integrat‑
ing eight new members into a 28‑member Court. Regenerative though this may be, it cannot but 
have an effect on the Court’s activity in 2014.

As a year in which the triennial renewal took place, 2013 also saw the election of the President, but 
also, for the first time, of a Vice‑President, Mr H. Kanninen, as well as the election of the Presidents 
of Chamber Ms M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Mr S. Papasavvas, Mr M. Prek, Mr A. Dittrich, Mr S. Frimodt 
Nielsen, Mr M. van der Woude, Mr D. Gratsias and Mr G. Berardis. The opportunity was taken to cre‑
ate a ninth chamber, with the aim of further improving the Court’s performance.

From a statistical point of view, 2013 was very revealing. On the one hand, the Court demonstrated, 
for the third year in succession, its enhanced capacity to deal with cases, resulting from the internal 
reforms implemented and the permanent optimisation of its working methods. In 2013, 702 cases 
could therefore be completed (notwithstanding the severe organisational constraints linked to the 
triennial renewal), bringing the average annual number of cases completed over the past three 
years to approximately 700. By way of comparison, that average was roughly 480 cases in 2008. In 
the space of five years, efficiency gains have thus enabled the Court’s productivity to increase by 
more than 45%. On the other hand, cases brought reached an all‑time high, with 790 new cases, 
that is to say, a jump of nearly 30% compared with 2012. The overall upward trend in the number 
of cases brought before the Court, in particular in the field of intellectual property, is thereby con‑
firmed with striking clarity. This has resulted in a significant increase in the number of cases pend‑
ing, which has passed the level of 1 300 cases (1 325). Finally, while the duration of proceedings 
overall (that is to say, including cases decided by order) saw a short‑term increase of roughly 10% 
(taking the duration to 26.9 months), it should be noted that, so far as concerns cases decided by 
judgment, a reduction of roughly one month compared with 2012 may be observed, with an aver‑
age duration of 30.6 months.

It is apparent upon examination of those various factors that, whilst the action taken by the Court 
to improve its efficiency has borne fruit, the Court has control neither over the stability of its com‑
position nor over its workload. More than ever, it is incumbent upon the competent European 
Union authorities to realise that it is absolutely essential to provide the Court with the means to 
enable it to perform its fundamental task, namely ensuring the right to effective judicial protection, 

Annual Report 2013 

113

General Court 

Proceedings

a right which entails for the European Union judicature requirements both as to quality and inten‑
sity of judicial review and of speed.

The recast of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will be submitted to the Council of 
the European Union at the beginning of 2014, will enable modernisation of its procedural arrange‑
ments and fresh efficiency gains. It is nevertheless clear that this cannot be a response capable of 
reversing the marked divergence between the Court’s capacity to give judgment and the large 
number of cases brought before it.

The following pages are intended to provide a, necessarily selective, overview of the developments 
in case‑law in 2013, and illustrate the importance of the function as European Court with jurisdic‑
tion over ordinary direct actions, both in the economic field and in areas such as public health, the 
common foreign and security policy and the environment.

I. 

Proceedings concerning the legality of measures

Admissibility of actions brought under Article 263 TFEU

1. 

Concept of a measure against which an action may be brought

In Case T‑556/11 European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v OHIM (order of 12 September 2013), 
the Court had occasion to rule on whether a decision of the President of the Office for Harmon‑
isation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) awarding the contract at issue to 
other tenderers, adopted in an open tendering procedure, constituted a measure against which an 
action for annulment could be brought, which OHIM disputed.

The Court observed, first of all, that the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU 
is a new provision of primary law under which the Courts of the European Union also review the le‑
gality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union intended to produce legal effects 
vis‑à‑vis third parties. That provision is intended to make up for a serious shortcoming in the first 
paragraph of the former Article 230 EC by providing expressly that, in addition to acts of the institu‑
tions of the European Union as defined in Article 13 TFEU, the legally binding acts of bodies, offices 
or agencies of the European Union are also to be subject to judicial review by the Courts of the 
European Union. It is clear that, by virtue of Article 115(1) of Regulation (EC) No 297/2009, (1) OHIM 
is a body of the European Union for the purposes of the second sentence of the first paragraph 
of Article 263 TFEU. Consequently, the General Court has jurisdiction to rule on actions brought 
against acts of OHIM, including acts of its President in the field of public procurement, which are 
intended to produce legal effects vis‑à‑vis third parties.

The Court then pointed out that Article 122(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that ‘[t]he Com‑
mission shall check the legality of those acts of the President of [OHIM] in respect of which Com‑
munity law does not provide for any check of legality by another body’. The scope of that provision 
is thus expressly contingent on there being no check on the legality of acts of the President of 
OHIM by another body. The Court held, however, that it must itself be regarded as ‘another body’, 
as it reviews the legality of acts. When Article 263 TFEU entered into force, the objective which 
consisted in having a decision of the European Commission in order to make acts adopted by the 
bodies or agencies of the European Union at least indirectly reviewable before the Courts of the 

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

114 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

European Union lost its purpose and cannot serve as a basis for alleging that the procedure under 
Article 122 of Regulation No 207/2009 is a mandatory step before proceedings may be brought 
before the Courts of the European Union.

2. 

Concept of a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures

In 2013 the Court provided important clarification concerning the concept of a regulatory act not 
entailing implementing measures, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

In the order of 5 February 2013 in Case T‑551/11 BSI v Council, concerning an application for annul‑
ment of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 723/11 (2) extending the anti dumping duty imposed 
by Regulation (EC) No 91/2009, (3) the Court, after first establishing that the contested regulation 
is a regulatory act within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, observed that, 
when analysing the concept of an act not entailing implementing measures, it is necessary to take 
into account the objective pursued by the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which is to enable 
a natural or legal person to bring an action against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to 
that person and does not entail implementing measures, thus avoiding a situation in which such 
a person would have to break the law in order to have access to justice.

In this case, the Court held that, since in any event the decisions received by the applicant from the 
competent national customs authorities had been adopted in application of the contested regula‑
tion, the regulation entailed implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph 
of Article 263 TFEU. That conclusion was not called into question by the objective pursued by that 
provision, since the applicant could, in principle, challenge the national measures implementing 
the contested regulation and, in that context, plead the illegality of the regulation before the na‑
tional courts — which, before determining the action, could have recourse to Article 267 TFEU — 
without first having to infringe the contested regulation. The same applied to the applicant’s argu‑
ment that the protection of his individual rights was undermined since a reference for a preliminary 
ruling, as provided for in Article 267 TFEU, would not provide him with full and effective judicial 
protection. According to consistent case‑law, the Courts of the European Union would exceed their 
jurisdiction if they were to interpret the conditions under which an individual can bring an action 
against a regulation in a way that resulted in those conditions, expressly laid down in the Treaty, 
being disregarded, even in the light of the right to effective judicial protection.

The Court was also led to interpret that concept in Case T‑93/10 Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others 
v ECHA (judgment of 7 March 2013, under appeal), an action for annulment of a decision of the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) identifying ‘pitch, coal tar, high temperature’ as a substance 
of  very  high  concern  meeting  the  criteria  set  out  in  Article  57(a),  (d)  and  (e)  of  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1907/2006. (4)

(2)  Council  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  723/2011  of  18  July  2011  extending  the  definitive  anti‑dumping 
duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the 
People’s  Republic  of  China  to  imports  of  certain  iron  or  steel  fasteners  consigned  from  Malaysia,  whether 
declared as originating in Malaysia or not (OJ 2011 L 194, p. 6).

(3)  Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti‑dumping duty on imports of 

certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2009 L 29, p. 1).

(4)  Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning 
the  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH),  establishing  a  European 
Chemicals  Agency,  amending  Directive  1999/45/EC  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  793/93  and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 
91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006 L 396, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

115

General Court 

Proceedings

The Court observed that the concept of a regulatory act within the meaning of the fourth para‑
graph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from 
legislative acts. That is the position of a decision such as that in the case in point. Such a decision is 
of general application in that it applies to situations which have been determined and has legal ef‑
fects as regards a category of persons viewed in a general and abstract manner, that is to say, with 
regard to every natural or legal person falling within the scope of Article 31(9)(a) and Article 34(a) of 
Regulation No 1907/2006. Moreover, such a decision does not constitute a legislative act since it is 
not adopted in accordance with either the ordinary legislative procedure or the special legislative 
procedure within the meaning of Article 289(1) to (3) TFEU. Last, the contested act, adopted on the 
basis of Article 59 of Regulation No 1907/2006, entails no implementing measure, since the iden‑
tification of a substance as of very high concern gives rise to information obligations without any 
other measures being necessary.

In addition, the Court observed that the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU expressly mentions 
review of the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union intended to pro‑
duce legal effects vis‑à‑vis third parties. The authors of the Treaty thus revealed their intention gen‑
erally to make the acts of the ECHA too, as an office or agency of the European Union, subject to 
review by the Courts of the European Union. Furthermore, the task of the ECHA under Article 75(1) 
of Regulation No 1907/2006, which is to manage and in some cases to implement the technical, 
scientific and administrative aspects of that regulation and to ensure consistency in the European 
Union, does not preclude the power to adopt a regulatory act.

Last, in Case T‑400/11 Altadis v Commission (order of 9 September 2013) the Court heard an appli‑
cation for annulment in part of a Commission decision declaring an aid scheme allowing the tax 
amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions to be incompatible with 
the internal market. The Commission claimed that a number of national implementing measures 
had to be adopted on the basis of the contested decision, namely, in particular, the abolition of the 
scheme at issue by the national legislature, the recovery by the tax authorities of the aid unlawfully 
granted under the scheme at issue from the beneficiaries thereof and the agreement or refusal by 
those authorities to grant the tax advantage at issue.

The Court observed that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, a decision, such as that 
in the present case, is binding in its entirety only on those to whom it is addressed. Consequently, 
the obligation to refuse to grant the advantage of the scheme at issue, to annul the tax advan‑
tages conferred and to recover any aid paid under that scheme were legal consequences of the 
contested decision that were binding on the Member State to which the decision was addressed. 
The contested decision did not, however, produce such legal effects vis‑à‑vis the beneficiaries of 
the scheme at issue. Article 1(1) of the contested decision did not define the consequences of the 
incompatibility of the scheme at issue with the internal market with regard to each of the benefi‑
ciaries of the scheme, because that declaration of incompatibility did not in itself entail any pro‑
hibition or obligation for those beneficiaries. Furthermore, the effect of the incompatibility was not 
necessarily the same for each of the beneficiaries of the scheme at issue. The consequences of the 
incompatibility therefore had to be individually itemised by a legal act emanating from the com‑
petent national authorities, such as a tax notice, which constituted a measure implementing Art‑
icle 1(1) of the contested decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 
In that context, it was immaterial whether the Member State concerned had no discretion in imple‑
menting the contested decision, since, while the lack of discretion was a criterion requiring to be 
examined before it could be determined whether the condition that the act be of direct concern 
to the applicant was satisfied, the existence of an act not entailing implementing measures consti‑
tuted a different condition from the requirement that the act be of direct concern to the applicant.

116 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

Competition rules applicable to undertakings

1. 

a) 

General issues

Complaint — Re‑examination

In Joined Cases T‑104/07 and T‑339/08 BVGD v Commission (judgment of 11 July 2013) the Court 
ruled on the possibility for the Commission of initiating a supplementary procedure following a de‑
cision rejecting a complaint, in order to re‑examine the situation forming the subject matter of 
that decision. These cases originated in a complaint lodged with the Commission by the Belgische 
Vereniging van handelaars in‑ en uitvoerders geslepen diamant (BVGD), the Belgian Association 
of Dealers, Importers and Exporters of Polished Diamonds, against a company operating in that 
sector. The BVGD complained that the agreements concluded by that company with its custom‑
ers concerning the establishment of a system for the supply of rough diamonds were contrary to 
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU. After rejecting that complaint on the ground that there was no 
Community interest in investigating it further, the Commission, in the light of the judgment of 
11 July 2007 in Alrosa v Commission, (5) delivered in the meantime by the General Court, decided to 
re‑examine it and to that end initiated a supplementary procedure.

Called upon to examine the applicant’s argument that the Commission is entitled to re‑examine 
decisions only where they impose a burden or a charge, which was not the case in this instance, the 
Court observed that the general principle of law, based on the laws of the Member States, accord‑
ing to which authorities are able to re‑examine and if need be withdraw an administrative measure 
of an individual nature has been recognised since the first judgments of the Court of Justice. The 
withdrawal of an unlawful administrative act which is favourable or which has created individual 
rights is thus permissible, provided that the institution which adopted the act complies with the 
conditions relating to reasonable time limits and the legitimate expectations of beneficiaries of the 
act, who have been entitled to rely on its lawfulness.

Nor could the Commission be criticised for not having withdrawn the initial decision rejecting the 
complaint in order then to adopt a fresh rejection decision, since such a withdrawal would have 
been contrary to the case‑law on the general principle relating to the withdrawal of administrative 
measures. Even when the measure in question does not confer individual rights, as in the case of 
a rejection decision, the Courts of the European Union, relying in particular on the principles of 
sound administration and legal certainty, limit the possibilities of withdrawal to unlawful measures. 
As only one of the bases for the rejection decision had been declared unlawful and then annulled 
by the judgment in Alrosa v Commission, the supplementary procedure could relate only to that 
basis and the rejection decision could have been withdrawn only if the Commission had inferred 
from  the  absence  of  commitments  on  the  part  of  the  companies  which  had  concluded  the 
agreement at issue that it needed to pursue the investigation in relation to that agreement, the 
illegality at issue thus affecting the decision to reject the complaint. In proceeding in the manner in 
which it did, the Commission did not confuse elements relating to the withdrawal procedure with 
the substance of the case characterised by the lack of sufficient Community interest, but simply 
examined whether the condition necessary for withdrawing a measure, namely its unlawfulness, 
was satisfied in the present case.

(5)  Case T‑170/06 [2007] ECR II‑2601.

Annual Report 2013 

117

General Court 

Proceedings

b) 

Inspections — Lawfulness of the system of inspections (Article 20(4) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003)

Joined Cases T‑289/11, T‑290/11 and T‑521/11 Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission (judgment 
of 6 September 2013, under appeal) gave the Court the opportunity to appraise the legality of the 
system of inspections put in place by Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, (6) in the context 
of actions brought against a number of Commission decisions concerning the rail transport sector 
ordering the applicants to submit to inspections. The applicants claimed that the decisions at issue, 
in that they had been adopted in the absence of a prior authorisation by a court, did not observe the 
safeguards prescribed by the principle of the inviolability of their private premises. In that context, 
they also raised a plea of illegality concerning, in particular, Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003.

In that regard, the Court observed, first of all, that the exercise of the powers of inspection con‑
ferred on the Commission by that provision vis‑à‑vis an undertaking constitutes a clear interference 
with that undertaking’s right to respect for its privacy, its private premises and its correspondence. 
However, the system put in place by Regulation No 1/2003, in particular Article 20(4) thereof, offers 
appropriate  and  sufficient  safeguards  in  such  a  way  as  to  restrict  those  powers  sufficiently,  by 
means of five categories of safeguards capable of making up for the absence of a prior court war‑
rant. The Court considered that the way in which the system put in place by Regulation No 1/2003 
was implemented in the present case allowed all the five safeguards referred to above to be en‑
sured. In particular, the inspection decisions included the elements provided for in Article 20(4) of 
Regulation No 1/2003.

First, the inspection decision must identify the subject matter and the purpose of the inspection, 
state the date on which it is to begin, indicate the penalties set out in Articles 23 and 24 of Regula‑
tion No 1/2003 and refer to the possibility of bringing an action against that decision before the 
Courts of the European Union. The statement of reasons must also state the suppositions and pre‑
sumptions that the Commission wishes to verify. Second, documents of a non‑business nature, 
that is to say, those not relating to the activities of the undertaking on the market, are excluded 
from the scope of the Commission’s investigatory powers and undertakings subject to an inspec‑
tion ordered pursuant to an inspection decision may receive legal assistance or even preserve the 
confidentiality of lawyer‑client correspondence. Furthermore, the Commission cannot compel the 
undertaking concerned to provide answers which might involve an admission on its part of the exist‑
ence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove. That principle also 
applies to questions that the inspectors might ask in the course of an inspection carried out under 
Article  20(4)  of  Regulation  No  1/2003.  Third,  the  Commission  does  not  have  excessive  coercive 
measures at its disposal which would invalidate the possibility, in practice, of opposing the inspec‑
tion under Article 20(6) of Regulation No 1/2003. Thus, Commission officials cannot obtain access 
to premises or furniture by force or oblige the staff of the undertaking to give them such access, 
or carry out searches without the permission of the management of the undertaking. Fourth, the 
Commission is under an obligation to seek assistance from the national authorities of the Member 
State on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out. That procedure triggers the applica‑
tion of the review mechanisms specific to the Member State concerned, which may be of a judicial 
nature. Fifth, the limits on the interference constituted by an inspection are also founded on the ex 
post facto review, by the Courts of the European Union, of the legality of the decision ordering the 
inspection, the existence of such review being particularly important as it may counterbalance the 
absence of a prior court warrant.

(6)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 

laid down in Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).

118 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

c) 

Judicial review — Unlimited jurisdiction

In Case T‑462/07 Galp Energía España and Others v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, 
under appeal), the Court explained that the impossibility of taking into consideration in the con‑
text of the review of legality an element not established in the contested decision, such as, in this 
instance, the statement of the sales manager of Petrogal Española, SA (which became Galp Energía 
España, SA), annexed to the application, did not apply in the context of the exercise of unlimited 
jurisdiction.

That power authorises the Court to vary the contested decision by taking into account all the fac‑
tual circumstances relied upon by the parties. It follows that the fact that it is not possible for the 
Commission to obtain a substitution of grounds in the framework of the review of legality did not 
prevent the Court from taking account, in the context of the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, of 
the statement at issue, which made it possible to establish the awareness that the applicants had of 
one of the aspects of the alleged infringement, since all the material in the case‑file had been the 
subject of an exchange of arguments between the parties.

That is particularly so because the assessment of the appropriateness of the amount of fines may 
justify the production and taking into account of additional information which is not as such re‑
quired, by virtue of the duty to state reasons provided for in Article 296 TFEU, to be set out in the 
decision. That is true, in particular, of information relating to the attribution of liability to an under‑
taking for certain unlawful conduct in respect of a given period. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out 
that additional information might concern the finding of the infringement. Unlimited jurisdiction, 
which enables the Court to take account of such information, may be exercised even if the com‑
plaint put forward relates to the finding of the infringement, since such a complaint is liable, if well 
founded, to change the amount of the fine. Moreover, the exercise by the Court of its unlimited 
jurisdiction, including where the finding of the infringement is at issue, may enable it to reduce 
the amount of a fine even though annulment, even partial, of the contested decision would not be 
possible. That is the case, for example, where, although some of the material on which the Com‑
mission relied to find that the applicant participated in the infringement is not established, that 
finding is not of such a nature as to justify the annulment of the contested decision, but only the 
reduction of the amount of the fine, in order to take account of the less active or less regular nature 
of the applicant’s participation.

d) 

Reasonable time — Judicial procedure

In Case T‑497/07 CEPSA v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, under appeal), the Court 
held that a complaint alleging that duration of the judicial procedure is unreasonable is inadmis‑
sible when submitted in the same action as that whose procedure is claimed to breach the reason‑
able time principle. If that were not the case, the bench hearing the action would, when examin‑
ing that complaint, be required to determine whether its own conduct was wrongful or unlawful, 
which could cause the applicant to have legitimate doubts as to its objective impartiality. The Court 
observed, moreover, that in the case in point the inadmissibility of the complaint in question did 
not adversely affect the applicant’s right to a court, since it would have been able to rely on such 
a complaint in an appeal against the judgment, or indeed in an action for non‑contractual liability 
on the basis of Articles 268 TFEU and 340 TFEU.

Annual Report 2013 

119

General Court 

Proceedings

2. 

a) 

Developments in the area of Article 101 TFEU

Proof of the existence of a concerted practice

Case T‑401/08 Säveltäjäin Tekijänoikeustoimisto Teosto v Commission (judgment of 12 April 2013) (7) 
enabled the Court to define further the scope of the evidential requirements which the Commis‑
sion must comply with in order to establish the existence of a concerted practice.

In that regard, the Court recalled that, where the Commission’s reasoning leading to the finding of 
the existence of a concerted practice is based on the supposition that the facts established in its 
decision cannot be explained other than by concertation between the undertakings, it is sufficient 
for the undertakings concerned to prove circumstances which cast the facts established by the 
Commission in a different light and thus allow another explanation of the facts to be substituted 
for the one adopted by the Commission. That principle does not apply, however, where proof of 
the concertation between the undertakings does not result from the mere finding of parallel con‑
duct on the market, but from documents showing that the practices were the result of concert‑
ation. In those circumstances, the burden is on the undertakings concerned not merely to submit 
an alleged alternative explanation for the facts found by the Commission but to challenge the 
existence of those facts established on the basis of the documents produced by the Commission.

In the light of those considerations, the Court considered that, in this case, before assessing the ex‑
istence of explanations for the parallel conduct other than the explanation relating to the existence 
of concertation, it was necessary to examine whether the Commission had established the exist‑
ence of the infringement in which the applicant was alleged to have participated, relating to the 
national territorial limitations in the agreements at issue, by evidence other than the mere finding 
of parallel conduct. The Court stated that it was necessary to examine that issue before examining 
whether or not the explanations other than the one relating to the existence of concertation were 
well founded, since, if it should conclude that such evidence had been provided in the contested 
decision, those explanations, even if they were plausible, would not invalidate the finding of the 
infringement.

As regards the evidential value of the elements put forward by the Commission to prove the exist‑
ence of the concerted practice without relying on the parallel conduct of the collecting societies 
that was put in issue, the Court observed, in particular, that, so far as concerns the discussions held 
between those societies in the context of the activities managed by the International Confeder‑
ation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC), the Commission had itself stated that the 
contested decision did not prohibit the system of reciprocal representation between the collecting 
societies or any form of territorial delineation of the mandates which they granted to each other. 
Nor did the Commission criticise the collecting societies for a degree of cooperation in the context 
of the activities managed by CISAC. Rather, the Commission criticised the coordinated nature of the 
approach adopted by all of the collecting societies with regard to territorial limitations. Therefore, 
the mere fact that collecting societies met in the context of the activities managed by CISAC and 
that there was a certain amount of cooperation between them did not constitute, as such, evi‑
dence of prohibited concertation. Where the context in which meetings between undertakings ac‑
cused of infringing competition law take place shows that those meetings were necessary to deal 
collectively with issues wholly unrelated to such infringements of competition law, the Commission 

(7)  This case was one of a group of 22 cases relating to the conditions of the management of public performing 
rights of musical works and to the grant of licences by collecting societies. The contested decision was annulled 
with respect to the applicants in 21 of the cases.

120 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

cannot presume that the object of those meetings was to collude on anti‑competitive practices. 
In that respect, the Court considered that the Commission had not provided any evidence that the 
meetings organised by CISAC in which the applicant had participated had concerned the restric‑
tion of competition relating to the national territorial limitations.

As regards the plausibility of the explanations for the parallel conduct of the collecting societies 
other than the explanation relating to the existence of concertation, the Court held, in particular, 
that the Commission could not refute the explanation of the parallel conduct of those societies 
put forward by the applicant, namely that such conduct was justified by the need to combat the 
unlawful use of musical works, by merely stating that there were technical solutions which allowed 
remote monitoring as regards the forms of exploitation which the contested decision concerned. 
In that regard, where the Commission uses certain examples to render the applicant’s argument 
implausible, it has the burden of showing why those examples are relevant. Moreover, the Com‑
mission cannot criticise that undertaking for failing to provide further specifics, insamuch as it is 
the Commission which must prove an infringement. Therefore, if the Commission, at the adminis‑
trative stage, considers that the applicant has not sufficiently substantiated its explanation, it must 
continue the examination of the case or find that the undertaking concerned has not been capable 
of providing the necessary information. The Court thus held that it was not apparent from the con‑
tested decision that the Commission’s insufficient analysis was the result of the fact that it had been 
unable to obtain from the collecting societies or from CISAC, of which those societies are members, 
the evidence which it needed in order to examine whether there were plausible explanations for 
the parallel conduct of the collecting societies.

b) 

Participation in a single infringement

i) 

Distortion of competition

In  Case  T‑380/10  Wabco Europe and Others  v  Commission  (judgment  of  16  September  2013,  not 
yet published), which concerned cartels on the Belgian, German, French, Italian, Netherlands and 
Austrian markets for bathroom fittings and fixtures, the Court rejected the arguments raised by 
the Commission at the hearing that it was not obliged to establish that a distortion of compe‑
tition  resulted  from  every  meeting  of  the  association  since  ceramics  were  among  the  product 
sub‑groups covered by the single infringement. Such a characterisation did not relieve the Com‑
mission of its obligation to establish a distortion of competition in relation to each of the three 
product sub‑groups covered by the infringement. Although there is a single infringement in the 
case of agreements or contracts which, while they relate to distinct goods, services or territories, 
form part of an overall plan knowingly implemented by undertakings with a view to achieving 
a single anti‑competitive objective, a finding that there is such an infringement does not remove 
the precondition that there be a distortion of competition affecting each of the product markets 
covered by that single infringement.

ii) 

Concept of a repeated infringement

In Joined Cases T‑147/09 and T‑148/09 Trelleborg Industrie and Trelleborg v Commission (judgment of 
17 May 2013), the Court had the opportunity, after rejecting the classification of the infringement 
at issue as a single and continuous infringement, to adjudicate on the merits of classification of the 
infringement as a single and repeated infringement.

In that regard, the Court pointed out that the concept of a repeated infringement is different from 
that of a continuing infringement and that that distinction is, moreover, borne out by the use of 
the conjunction ‘or’ in Article 25(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. Thus, if an undertaking’s participation 

Annual Report 2013 

121

General Court 

Proceedings

in the infringement may be regarded as having been interrupted and the undertaking may be 
regarded  as  having  participated  in  the  infringement  before  and  after  the  interruption,  that  in‑
fringement may be categorised as repeated if, as in the case of a continuing infringement, there is 
a single objective which it pursued both before and after the interruption, a circumstance which 
may be deduced from the identical nature of the objectives of the practices at issue, of the goods 
concerned, of the undertakings which participated in the infringement, of the detailed rules for 
its implementation, of the natural persons involved on behalf of the undertakings and, last, of the 
geographic scope of those practices. The infringement is then single and repeated and, although 
the Commission may impose a fine in respect of the whole of the period of the infringement, it may 
not do so for the period during which the infringement was interrupted. Consequently, separate 
periods of infringement in which the same undertaking takes part, but in respect of which a com‑
mon objective cannot be established, cannot be categorised as a single infringement, whether 
continuing or repeated, and constitute separate infringements. In the light of those considerations, 
the Court concluded that, in this case, the Commission’s incorrect categorisation of the infringe‑
ment as a continuous infringement did not prevent the Court from re‑categorising it as a repeated 
infringement in the light of the facts in the administrative file which formed the basis of the con‑
tested decision.

c) 

i) 

Calculation of the fine

Duration of the infringement

In Case T‑566/08 Total Raffinage Marketing v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2013, under 
appeal), which concerned cartels on the candle waxes market, the Court observed that, in applica‑
tion of point 24 of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines, (8) the Commission, when 
determining the duration of the applicant’s participation in the infringement, had counted its par‑
ticipation of 7 months and 28 days as participation for a full year and that it had done likewise in 
respect of two other companies which had participated in the cartel whose periods of participa‑
tion in the infringement were 11 months and 20 days in one case and 11 months and 27 days in the 
other case. This amounted to treating different situations in the same way. Since the sole origin of 
that identical treatment was the calculation method provided for in point 24 of the 2006 Guide‑
lines on the method of setting fines, such treatment could not be regarded as objectively justified. 
As the aim of that provision is to ensure that the amount of the fine is proportionate to the duration 
of an undertaking’s participation in the infringement, it cannot constitute objective justification 
for unequal treatment, in so far as the result of its strict application in the case in point was the 
establishment of a manifestly disproportionate duration both by comparison with the actual dur‑
ation of the applicant’s participation in the infringement and in the light of the treatment of other 
participants.

ii) 

Cooperation

— 

Right not to incriminate oneself

In Galp Energia España and Others v Commission the Court had the opportunity to state that, while 
the Commission cannot compel an undertaking to provide answers which might involve an admis‑
sion on its part of the existence of an infringement, evidence of which it is incumbent upon the 
Commission to prove, the risk that the undertaking concerned might not benefit fully from the 

(8)  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ 2006 

C 210, p. 2).

122 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

2002 Leniency Notice (9) — a risk which encourages it to cooperate sincerely with the Commission, 
including by the submission of evidence or statements running counter to its interests — cannot 
be placed on the same footing as a coercive measure requiring the undertaking to admit to the 
existence of an infringement. The application of the 2002 Leniency Notice stems originally from an 
initiative by the undertaking in question which seeks to benefit from the provisions of that notice 
and not from unilateral action taken by the Commission which is imposed on that undertaking. 
Accordingly, in the absence of any coercive measure requiring the undertaking to incriminate it‑
self, statements by that undertaking admitting the existence of an infringement are not devoid of 
probative value.

— 

Conduct of the cooperating undertaking

In Case T‑412/10 Roca v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, under appeal), the Commis‑
sion claimed that, by its conduct subsequent to its application for a reduction of the amount of the 
fine, the applicant called into question the significant added value of the information which it had 
supplied, on the ground, in particular, that it did not demonstrate a genuine spirit of cooperation 
during the administrative procedure and itself diminished the usefulness of that information by 
casting doubt on its credibility.

In that regard, first, the Court observed that the contested decision did not show that any chal‑
lenge was made to the information provided by the applicant in the context of its application for 
a reduction of the amount of the fine in respect of the relevant market, in this instance the French 
market. Second, it pointed out that, in so far as the statements on which the Commission relied to 
assert that the applicant had challenged the significant value of the information which it had pro‑
vided related to unlawful practices in respect of taps and fittings on that market, those statements 
did not call into question the added value of that information, which related solely to the infringe‑
ment in respect of ceramics in France. As none of the matters put forward by the Commission in 
the contested decision or developed in the judicial proceedings supported the conclusion that the 
applicant discredited the information that it had supplied, the Court held that the Commission had 
been wrong to take the view that the applicant had, by its conduct subsequent to its application 
for a reduction of its fine, diminished the value of the evidence that it originally submitted.

d) 

Imputation of the unlawful conduct — Joint and several liability

Case T‑408/10 Roca Sanitario v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, under appeal) en‑
abled the Court to observe that, when a parent company’s liability is based solely on its subsid‑
iary’s participation in a cartel, the parent company’s liability is regarded as purely derivative, sec‑
ondary and dependent on its subsidiary and cannot therefore exceed the liability of its subsidiary. 
In those circumstances, the Court may apply to the parent company, in the action brought by the 
latter and to the extent that it has sought a form of order to that effect, any reduction of the fine 
which might be granted to its subsidiary in an action brought by the subsidiary. In doing so, the 
Court does not rule ultra petita, even if the parent company has failed to plead an error that the 
Commission allegedly made when calculating the amount of the fine.

(9)  Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3).

Annual Report 2013 

123

General Court 

State aid

1. 

Admissibility

Proceedings

In 2013 the Court provided clarification relating to the concepts of a measure open to challenge, of 
locus standi and of individual concern in State aid matters.

The Court had the opportunity to address the first two concepts inter alia in Case T‑182/10 Aiscat 
v Commission (judgment of 15 January 2013).

The Court held that a decision by the Commission to take no action on a complaint, adopted in 
the form of a letter from a Directorate‑General, constitutes an act against which a challenge may 
be brought, for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU. Examination of a complaint in State aid mat‑
ters necessarily entails the opening of the preliminary examination stage, which the Commission 
is required to close by adopting a decision under Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, (10) and 
the implied refusal to open the formal investigation procedure cannot be classified as a mere pro‑
visional measure. In addition, in order to determine whether a measure taken by the Commission 
constitutes such a decision, it is necessary to take into account only the substance of the measure 
and not whether or not it satisfies certain procedural requirements. Nor is the Commission’s obli‑
gation to adopt a decision at the close of the preliminary examination procedure subject to a con‑
dition relating to the quality of the information submitted by the complainant. The low quality 
of such information cannot therefore relieve the Commission of its obligation to initiate the pre‑
liminary examination procedure and to close it by a decision. That obligation does not require the 
Commission to carry out a disproportionate examination where the information provided is vague 
or covers a very wide area. As the Commission clearly stated in the case in point that the measures 
complained of did not seem to constitute aid, the Court concluded that the contested decision 
must be characterised as a decision adopted pursuant to Article 4(2) of Regulation No 659/1999.

As regards the locus standi of the applicant, a trade association responsible for protecting the col‑
lective interests of its members, the Court pointed out that such an association is entitled to bring 
an action for annulment of a final Commission decision on State aid matters where, in particular, 
the undertakings which it represents or some of them have individual locus standi. The Court stated 
that it is not necessary in that context that an association whose tasks as defined in its statutes 
include protecting the interests of its members should also have a specific mandate, drawn up by 
those members, in order to have locus standi to act before the Courts of the European Union. Like‑
wise, since bringing an action before those Courts was among the tasks defined in the statutes of 
the association, the fact that certain of its members might subsequently distance themselves from 
bringing a specific action did not remove its interest in bringing an action.

In  the  order  of  9  September  2013  in  Case  T‑400/11  Altadis  v  Commission,  the  Court  addressed 
the concept of individual concern. (11) The issue in this case was whether a Commission decision 
declaring an aid scheme incompatible with the internal market was of individual concern to the 
applicant, as the beneficiary of aid granted under that aid scheme. In an action for annulment of 
the decision, the Court stated that, although the applicant had been able to establish that it was 
an actual beneficiary of the scheme at issue, that was not sufficient for it to be able to be regarded 

(10)  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  659/1999  of  22  March  1999  laying  down  detailed  rules  for  the  application  of 

Article [108 TFEU] (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).

(11)  On the interpretation of this concept, see also the orders made on the same day in Case T‑429/11 Banco Bilbao 

Vizcaya Argentaria v Commission and Case T‑430/11 Telefónica v Commission (both under appeal).

124 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

as individually concerned by the Commission’s decision. In order to be individually concerned, the 
actual beneficiary of individual aid granted under a scheme of aid of which the Commission has 
ordered recovery must have benefited from aid covered by the recovery obligation laid down. 
Thus, the recovery must relate specifically to the aid which benefited the applicant in question 
and not in a general way to aid paid under the aid scheme concerned. Consequently, the status of 
actual beneficiary of an aid scheme is not sufficient to identify that beneficiary individually where, 
as in the case in question, the latter is not covered by the obligation laid down in the contested 
decision to recover the aid paid under the scheme.

2. 

a) 

Substantive issues

Concept of State aid

Case T‑499/10 MOL v Commission (judgment of 12 November 2013) provided the Court with the 
opportunity to return to the condition of selectivity that forms part of the concept of State aid. The 
case concerned an agreement signed in 2005 between the Hungarian State and an oil company, 
fixing a mining fee with respect to that company, and also the amendments of the Hungarian min‑
ing law in 2007 in that they had increased the fee applicable to that company’s competitors.

In an action brought by that company against the Commission decision classifying both of those 
measures as State aid incompatible with the common market, the Court observed, first of all, that 
the application of Article 107(1) TFEU requires it to be determined whether under a particular statu‑
tory scheme a State measure is such as to favour certain undertakings over others which are in 
a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the object pursued by the scheme in 
question. Where a State concludes with an economic operator an agreement which does not in‑
volve any State aid element, the fact that, subsequently, conditions external to such an agreement 
change in such a way that the operator in question is in an advantageous position vis‑à‑vis other 
operators that have not concluded a similar agreement is not a sufficient basis on which to con‑
clude that, together, the agreement and the subsequent modification of the conditions external 
to that agreement can be regarded as constituting State aid. However, a combination of elements, 
such as that at issue in the case in point, may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in 
such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with 
them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration of the agreement, 
while having the intention of subsequently exercising its regulatory power and increasing the fee 
rate in such a way as to place the other operators on the market at a disadvantage.

In the light of those considerations, the Court stated that the regulations at issue allowed any min‑
ing undertaking to apply for the extension of its mining rights on one or more fields on which 
it had not started extraction within five years of issuance of the authorisation. The fact that the 
applicant was the only undertaking in practice to have concluded an extension agreement in the 
hydrocarbons sector did not alter that conclusion, since that fact might be explained by an absence 
of interest on the part of other operators and thus by an absence of any extension application, or 
by an absence of any agreement between the parties on the rates of the extension fee. It followed 
that the criteria laid down by the legislation at issue for the conclusion of an extension operation 
had to be regarded as objective and applicable to any potentially interested operator.

Thus, in the absence of selectivity of the legal regime governing the conclusion of extension agree‑
ments and in the absence of any evidence that the Hungarian authorities had treated the applicant 
more favourably than any other undertaking in a comparable situation, the Court held that se‑
lectivity of the 2005 agreement could not be regarded as established. Since, moreover, the Com‑
mission had not argued that the 2005 agreement was concluded in anticipation of an increase in 

Annual Report 2013 

125

General Court 

Proceedings

mining fees, the combination of that agreement with the legislation at issue could not validly be 
categorised as State aid for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU.

In Case T‑347/09 Germany v Commission (judgment of 12 September 2013), the Court upheld the 
Commission’s decision classifying the transfer, free of charge, of certain areas of natural heritage 
to environmental protection organisations as State aid. The case originated in an action brought 
against that decision by the Federal Republic of Germany, which claimed that the Commission had 
been wrong to regard those organisations as undertakings which had been granted an advantage.

The nature of the activities at issue had to be examined, in particular, in the light of the principle 
that, in so far as a public entity carries out an economic activity that can be separated from the 
exercise of its public powers, that entity acts as an undertaking, whereas if that economic activity 
cannot be separated from the exercise of its public powers, all the activities carried out by that 
entity continue to be activities associated with the exercise of those powers. Although activity in‑
tended to protect the environment is of an exclusively social nature, the Court held that the Com‑
mission had been correct to take the view that the organisations concerned were involved in other 
activities of an economic nature and in respect of which those organisations had to be regarded 
as undertakings. By the activities authorised within the framework of the measures at issue, such 
as the sale of wood, the grant of hunting and fishing leases and also tourism, those organisations 
directly provided goods and services on competitive markets and thus pursued an interest which 
could be separated from the exclusively social objective of environmental protection. Since those 
organisations, when they engaged in the activities, were in competition with operators seeking to 
make a profit, the fact that they offered their goods and services without having such an aim was 
irrelevant.

The Court then considered whether those organisations derived an advantage from the measures 
at issue. It also answered that question in the affirmative, taking the view that the transfer free 
of charge of land which the organisations could use for commercial purposes favoured them by 
comparison with other undertakings active in the sectors concerned, which had to invest in land 
in order to be able to carry out the same activities. The Commission had therefore been correct to 
find the existence of an advantage granted to the environmental protection organisations.

b) 

Services of general economic interest

Case T‑258/10 Orange v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, under appeal), Case T‑325/10 
Iliad and Others v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013, under appeal) and Case T‑79/10 
Colt Télécommunications France v Commission (judgment of 16 September 2013) gave the Court the 
opportunity to rule on the relevance of the market failure test in the context of finding the exist‑
ence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI) in relation to the establishment and use of 
a very high‑speed broadband electronic communications network.

The Court pointed out that, while the market failure test is taken into account in assessing the com‑
patibility of aid with the internal market, it also plays a part in the determination of the actual exist‑
ence of aid and, in particular, in that of an SGEI. Thus, according to the applicable rules, if the public 
authorities consider that certain services are in the general interest and that market forces may 
not result in a satisfactory provision, they can lay down a number of specific service provisions to 
meet those needs in the form of service of general interest obligations. Conversely, in areas where 
private investors have already invested in a specific infrastructure and already provide competitive 
services, the establishment of a parallel infrastructure which is competitive and financed by public 
funds should not be categorised as an SGEI.

126 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

Taking the view that it follows from all of those rules that assessment of the existence of market 
failure constitutes a precondition for classification of an activity as an SGEI and thus for finding that 
there is no State aid, the Court observed that that assessment must be carried out at the time when 
the service intended to compensate for the failure found is put in place. The assessment must also 
include a prospective analysis of the market situation for the entire duration of the SGEI, during 
which the market failure must also be established.

Iliad and Others v Commission also provided the Court with the opportunity to clarify the concept 
of market failure, which it defined as an objective concept, the appraisal of which is based on an 
analysis of the actual situation of the market. (12)

As regards, more particularly, the use of high‑speed and very high‑speed broadband communica‑
tions networks, there is market failure capable of giving rise to the establishment of an SGEI where 
it can be shown that private investors might not be capable of ensuring in the near future, that 
is to say, at the end of a period of three years, appropriate cover for all citizens or users and that 
they might thus deprive a significant part of the population of connection. It follows from the ob‑
jective nature of the assessment of the existence of market failure that the reasons for the absence 
of a private initiative have no relevance for the purposes of that assessment. The Court concluded 
that it cannot be inferred from a particular cause of the failure found that the creation of a service 
of general economic interest was precluded.

In Iliad and Others v Commission the Court also reviewed the case‑law requirement laid down in Alt‑
mark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, (13) according to which, in order for compensation 
granted by the State to be able to escape being classified as State aid, the recipient undertaking 
must be made responsible for discharging SGEI obligations by an act of a public authority, which 
must clearly define the SGEI obligations in question. It pointed out that, although the Commis‑
sion had considered that the public service obligations in question were clearly defined both in 
the agreement delegating a public service relating to the project at issue and in the consultation 
programme sent to candidates in the selection procedure leading to the choice of the undertak‑
ing responsible for implementing that project, that programme had, however, to be regarded as 
merely a preparatory act in the procedure leading to the conclusion of the agreement. Thus, since 
it was that agreement and not the consultation programme that entrusted the SGEI to the under‑
taking responsible, it was the agreement that had to include a clear definition of the public service 
obligations of the undertaking. As the consultation programme did not constitute the relevant 
document, the Court rejected as ineffective the applicants’ argument alleging a contradiction be‑
tween the definition of those obligations in the agreement delegating the public service and the 
definition in the consultation programme.

Last, in Orange v Commission, Iliad v Commission and Colt Télécommunications France v Commission, 
the Court was led to examine the problem of compensating for the costs incurred in discharging 
the public service obligations. Recalling that such compensation cannot exceed what is necessary 
to cover all or part of those costs, taking into account the associated revenues and a reasonable 
profit for discharging the obligations in question, the Court held that, while the compensation 
must cover only the costs of using infrastructure in unprofitable areas, the revenues generated by 
the commercial use of the infrastructure in profitable areas may be assigned to the financing of the 
SGEI in the unprofitable areas. Accordingly, the coverage of the profitable areas does not necessar‑
ily mean that the subsidy granted is excessive, since it is the source of revenues that may serve to 

(12)  See also, to that effect, Colt Télécommunications France v Commission.

(13)  Case C‑280/00 [2003] ECR I‑7747.

Annual Report 2013 

127

General Court 

Proceedings

finance the coverage of unprofitable areas and thus enable the amount of the subsidy granted to 
be reduced.

c) 

Notion of serious difficulties

In Orange v Commission the Court was also able to set out considerations relating to the concept 
of serious difficulties, which, in the context of the application of the rules on State aid, require the 
initiation of the formal examination stage.

The Court recalled that the concept of serious difficulties is objective in nature. The existence of 
such difficulties must be assessed in the light both of the circumstances in which the contested 
measure was adopted and of its content, in an objective manner, comparing the grounds of the 
decision with the material available to the Commission when it ruled on the categorisation of the 
measure at issue as aid. It follows that the number and the extent of the observations submitted in 
opposition to a project by competing operators cannot be taken into account for the purpose of 
establishing the existence of serious difficulties. That consideration is even more pertinent when, 
as in the case in point, at least one of the operators submitting those objections had participated 
in the procedure for the selection of the operator to be entrusted with implementing the project 
at issue and was not chosen. To take into account the number and extent of the observations ex‑
pressed opposing such a project would amount to making the initiation of the formal examination 
procedure depend on the opposition provoked by a national project and not on the serious dif‑
ficulties actually encountered by the Commission in the context of its examination. In addition, it 
would mean that objectors to a project could easily delay its examination by the Commission by 
requiring it, by their intervention, to initiate the formal examination procedure. (14)

Last, concerning the same issue, in Orange v Commission and Iliad and Others v Commission the 
Court stated that, in an action against a Commission decision finding that there is no aid, it is for 
the applicant to show the existence of serious difficulties encountered by the Commission justify‑
ing the initiation of the formal examination procedure. The Court accepted that an applicant which 
claims breach of its procedural rights as a result of the Commission’s failure to initiate the formal 
examination procedure may rely on any plea to show that the assessment of the information and 
evidence  which  the  Commission  had  at  its  disposal  during  the  preliminary  examination  phase 
ought to have raised doubts as to the classification of the notified measure as State aid and its 
compatibility with the Treaty. It nonetheless observed that, while it is for the Courts of the European 
Union to assess the pleas aimed at challenging the compatibility of the measure with the Treaty in 
the light of the existence of serious difficulties, it is for the applicant to identify the factors that 
would show the existence of such difficulties. Where it makes reference to the arguments raised in 
support of another plea, going to the substance, it must identify precisely the arguments thus 
raised  that  are  capable  of  showing  the  existence  of  serious  difficulties.  In  this  instance,  as  the 
applicant had merely claimed that the matters put forward in one of its substantive pleas revealed 
many inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the Commission’s analysis, the Court considered that that 
vague and unsubstantiated reference did not allow it to identify the precise evidence that would 
establish the existence of serious difficulties.

d) 

Private investor in a market economy test

In Case T‑525/08 Poste Italiane v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2013), the Court heard 
an  action  for  annulment  of  the  Commission  decision  finding  that  the  remuneration  of  funds 

(14)  See also Colt Télécommunications France v Commission and Iliad and Others v Commission.

128 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

originating in postal current accounts and placed with the Italian public treasury was State aid in‑
compatible with the common market. In order to establish the existence of an advantage in favour 
of the recipient of the aid, the Commission, applying the private investor in a market economy test, 
had relied on a comparison between the rate of interest granted by the treasury to the applicant 
under the agreement concluded between the two parties and the rate which, the Commission 
maintained, would have been fixed for a private borrower in normal market conditions.

The Court held that the State intervention which, according to the Commission, had conferred an 
advantage on the applicant, namely the setting of a rate of interest under the agreement, could 
not be separated from the obligation, imposed on the applicant by the State, to pay the funds 
collected into an interest‑bearing current account. There was, in reality, a single State interven‑
tion consisting in remunerating the deposit with the treasury of funds coming from postal current 
accounts and in requiring the applicant to make that deposit. In economic terms, that State inter‑
vention had had two different consequences for the applicant. On the one hand, it had deprived 
the applicant of the possibility, open to any other bank, of using the funds coming from postal 
current accounts which it managed to make any investment which it considered appropriate; and, 
on the other hand, it had procured remuneration for the applicant. The Court concluded that the 
applicant could not benefit from an advantage unless it had received, in application of the rate of 
interest defined in the agreement, remuneration in respect of the deposit of those funds greater 
than the result which it could reasonably have obtained from the free and prudent management 
of those funds. The Commission had therefore made a manifest error of assessment in basing the 
existence of State aid on the mere finding of a positive differential between the rate of interest 
defined by the agreement and the private borrower rate.

Case T‑489/11 Rousse Industry v Commission (judgment of 20 March 2013, under appeal) enabled 
the Court to reassert the principle that, in State aid matters, where a public creditor grants pay‑
ment facilities, its conduct must be compared to that of a private creditor who seeks to recover 
sums payable to him by a debtor in financial difficulties. At the centre of this case were the loan 
agreements concluded between the applicant and a Bulgarian public fund, the claims of which 
were subsequently taken over by the Bulgarian State which granted the applicant a rescheduling 
of its debt. Finding itself unable to pay all the debts payable under that rescheduling on expiry of 
the prescribed period, the applicant asked the Bulgarian authorities for a new rescheduling plan, 
which the Bulgarian authorities notified to the Commission as restructuring aid. That notification 
led the Commission to decide that the fact that the Bulgarian State had, for several years, failed to 
require in an efficacious manner payment of the sums owed to it constituted unlawful Sate aid that 
was incompatible with the internal market. That decision was challenged by the applicant, on the 
ground that the Bulgarian authorities had acted as a private creditor would have done, so that their 
conduct could not be classified as State aid.

In hearing that action, the Court found that throughout the relevant period the applicant was sys‑
tematically in arrears in respect of the payment of considerable sums, that it recorded a consistent 
fall in its turnover and increasing losses without any prospect of its viability being reinstated. It 
than drew the conclusion that the Commission had been correct to consider that a private cred‑
itor would have taken measures against the applicant in order to recover at least part of his debt. 
Mere reminders to pay which, in spite of persistent failure to pay, are not followed by more coercive 
measures cannot be classified as measures for the effective recovery of a debt. In so far as the appli‑
cant claimed that such measures would have definitively jeopardised any recovery of the debt, the 
Court held that the applicant had submitted no evidence to the Court capable of demonstrating 
that during the relevant period there were concrete and credible factors pointing to its imminent 
return to profitability such as might have persuaded a private creditor to refrain from taking meas‑
ures to enforce payment.

Annual Report 2013 

129

General Court 

Proceedings

e) 

State aid compatible with the internal market

Case T‑92/11 Andersen v Commission (judgment of 20 March 2013, under appeal) concerned a Com‑
mission decision declaring that the public railway service contracts concluded between the Danish 
Ministry of Transport and a public undertaking were compatible with the internal market. An action 
for annulment of that decision was brought before the Court by a competitor of that undertaking, 
which took issue with the Commission for having examined the contracts at issue under Regulation 
(EC) No 1370/2007, (15) which was in force at the time of adoption of the contested decision. As 
the contested decision related to non‑notified aid, the applicant maintained that the Commission 
ought to have applied the substantive rules in force at the time when the aid was paid, namely 
Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69. (16)

The Court held that, for the purpose of determining the substantive rules applicable for the assess‑
ment of the compatibility of aid with the internal market, a fundamental distinction must be drawn 
between, on the one hand, aid which has been notified and not paid and, on the other, aid which 
has been paid without notification. As regards the former, the date on which the effects of the pro‑
posed aid are considered to occur coincides with the time when the Commission adopts the deci‑
sion on the compatibility of the aid with the common market. The aid in question would not create 
real advantages or disadvantages in the internal market until, at the earliest, the date on which the 
Commission decides whether or not to authorise it. As regards the latter, the rules of substantive 
law applicable are those in force at the time when the aid was paid, since the advantages and dis‑
advantages created by such aid arose during the period when the aid in question was paid. Since 
the measures at issue had not been notified to the Commission before being implemented, the 
Court held that the compatibility of the measures with the internal market ought to have been as‑
sessed on the basis of the substantive rules in force at the time of payment, unless the exceptional 
conditions for retroactive application were satisfied. The Court found that in this instance the new 
rules laid down in Regulation No 1370/2007 could not be applied retroactively, since it did not 
clearly follow from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect had to be given to 
them. Consequently, the Court annulled the Commission’s decision.

In Case T‑275/11 TF1 v Commission (judgment of 16 October 2013), the Court was called upon to 
examine the compatibility with the internal market of long‑term finance provided to six French 
public television channels owned by France Télévisions, a company subject to economic and finan‑
cial control by the French State. That finance, which took the form of an annual budgetary subsidy 
in favour of France Télévisions, was approved by the Commission, which had also examined, in that 
context, any effect that taxes newly introduced by the national legislation on advertising messages 
and electronic communications might have on the subsidy.

In that regard, the Court pointed out that, for a tax to be regarded as forming an integral part of an 
aid measure, it must be hypothecated to the aid, in the sense that the revenue from the charge is 
necessarily allocated to the financing of the aid and has a direct impact on the amount of the aid. It 
follows that there must necessarily be a binding provision of national law under which the charge 
must be allocated to the financing of the aid. However, the mere existence of such a provision 

(15)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public 
passenger  services  by  rail  and  by  road  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  Nos  1191/69  and  1107/70 
(OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of 26 June 1969 on action by Member States concerning the obligations 
inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ, English Special 
Edition 1969 (I), p. 276).

130 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

cannot constitute on its own a sufficient condition to establish that a tax forms an integral part of 
an aid measure. It is also necessary to examine whether the revenue from the charge has a direct 
impact on the amount of the aid. In the light of those principles, the Court held that the Commis‑
sion had been correct to consider that, under the French legislation, the new charges were not, in 
the absence of a provision to that effect, necessarily allocated to the financing of the subsidy at 
issue. That conclusion was not called into question by the existence of a certain relationship be‑
tween the new charges and the financing of the aid measure in question. The fact that the charges, 
introduced in order to cover the financing of public broadcasting in general, were used, inter alia, 
to finance the aid did not mean that the revenue from the charges was necessarily allocated to 
the aid, since it might be shared between different purposes at the discretion of the competent 
authorities and used to finance various types of expenditure other than the aid measure at issue.

TF1 v Commission also gave the Court the opportunity to make it clear that the economic efficiency 
of an undertaking in discharging its public service task cannot be validly relied on to challenge 
the Commission’s assessment as to the compatibility with the internal market of State aid intended 
for that undertaking. The test carried out on the basis of  Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium 
Magdeburg to establish whether compensation for a public service may be classified as State aid, 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, is not to be confused with the test carried out on the basis 
of Article 106(2) TFEU, which enables it to be established whether a measure to compensate for 
an SGEI, which constitutes State aid, may be regarded as compatible with the internal market. The 
economic efficiency of an undertaking entrusted with a public service in performing that service is 
irrelevant for assessing the compatibility of such compensation with the internal market in the light 
of Article 106(2) TFEU. By allowing derogations from the general rules of the Treaty, that provision 
seeks to reconcile the Member States’ interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the 
public sector, as an instrument of economic or social policy with the European Union’s interest in 
ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and preservation of the unity of the internal 
market. It is not necessary, in order for the conditions for the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to 
be fulfilled, that the financial balance of the undertaking entrusted with a public service should be 
threatened. It is sufficient that, in the absence of the rights at issue, it would not be possible for the 
undertaking to perform its public service tasks or that maintenance of those rights is necessary in 
order to enable it to discharge those tasks under economically acceptable conditions. Furthermore, 
in the absence of harmonised rules governing the matter, as in the case in point, the Commission is 
not entitled to rule either on the extent of the public service tasks assigned to the public operator, 
namely the level of the costs associated with that service, on the expediency of the political choices 
made in this regard by the national authorities, or on the economic efficiency of the public oper ator. 
It follows that the question whether an undertaking responsible for the public broadcasting service 
might fulfil its public service obligations at lower cost is irrelevant for assessing the compatibility of 
the State funding of that service in the light of the Treaty rules on State aid.

Intellectual property

1. 

a) 

Community trade mark

Absolute grounds for refusal

In 2013 the Court had the opportunity to adjudicate on a number of absolute grounds for refusal 
set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009. (17)

(17)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

131

General Court 

Proceedings

In Case T‑625/11 BSH v OHIM (ecoDoor) (judgment of 15 January 2013, under appeal), the Court 
observed that, as, first, the element ‘eco’ would be perceived to mean ‘ecological’ and, second, the 
element ‘door’ would have its normal meaning, the Board of Appeal had been correct to hold that 
the term ‘ecodoor’ would be understood immediately by the relevant public to mean ‘a door the 
construction and mode of operation of which are ecological’. The Court also stated that a sign that 
is descriptive of a characteristic of a component incorporated in a product can also be descriptive 
of the product itself. That is the case where, from the perception of the relevant public, the char‑
acteristic of the component described by the sign could have a significant impact on the essential 
characteristics of the product itself.

In Case T‑396/11 ultra air v OHIM — Donaldson Filtration Deutschland (ultrafilter international) (judg‑
ment of 30 May 2013, under appeal), the Court was called upon to examine the legality of the deci‑
sion of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM whereby, after annulling the decision of the Cancella‑
tion Division of OHIM which had upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity of the trade 
mark at issue, the Board of Appeal rejected that application as inadmissible on the ground that it 
was vitiated by an abuse of rights.

The Court recalled that the purpose of the administrative procedure laid down in Article 56(1)(a) 
of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 52(1)(a) of that regulation, is, inter alia, 
to enable OHIM to review the validity of the registration of a mark and to adopt, where necessary, 
a position which it should have adopted of its own motion under Article 37(1) of that regulation. 
In that context, OHIM is required to assess whether the mark under examination is descriptive or 
devoid of distinctive character, without the motives and earlier conduct of the applicant for a dec‑
laration of invalidity being able to affect the scope of the task entrusted to OHIM in relation to the 
public interests underlying Article 7(1)(b) and (c) and Article 56(1)(a) of that regulation. Given that, in 
applying the provisions at issue in the context of invalidity proceedings, OHIM does not rule on the 
question whether the rights of the proprietor of the mark take precedence over any rights which 
the applicant for a declaration of invalidity might have, but ascertains whether the rights of the 
proprietor of the mark were validly obtained in the light of the rules governing the registrability of 
marks, there can be no question of an ‘abuse of rights’ on the part of the applicant for a declar ation 
of invalidity. Thus, the fact that the applicant for a declaration of invalidity may file an applica‑
tion with a view to subsequently affixing the sign in question to its own products is perfectly in 
line with the public interest safeguarded by Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 of keeping 
signs freely available. Consequently, the Court held that such a circumstance cannot amount to an 
abuse of rights in any circumstances, that assessment being confirmed by Article 52(1) of Regula‑
tion No 207/2009, pursuant to which a Community trade mark may also be declared invalid on the 
basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings, which presupposes that the defendant in that 
action may obtain a declaration of invalidity even if he has used the mark in question and intends 
to continue to do so.

In  Case  T‑3/12  Kreyenberg  v  OHIM —  Commission  (MEMBER  OF  €e  euro  experts)  (judgment  of 
10 July 2013), the Court ruled on the merits of an action challenging the decision of the Second 
Board of Appeal in proceedings for a declaration of invalidity relating to the figurative mark MEM‑
BER  OF  €e  euro  experts,  where  the  Board  of  Appeal  adjudicated  on  the  relationship  between 
Article 7(1)(i) and Article 7(1)(h) of Regulation No 207/2009. The Court held that Article 7(1)(i) of the 
regulation must be regarded as prohibiting, on certain conditions, the registration, as trade marks 
or as elements of trade marks, emblems other than those referred to in Article 7(1)(h) of the regu‑
lation, whether those emblems are reproduced identically or are merely an imitation. The Court 
reached that conclusion on the basis of the wording of Article 7(1)(i) and two further consider‑
ations. First, it stated that the provision does not expressly restrict the scope of the prohibition to 
trade marks which reproduce an emblem identically. The wording of that provision allows it to be 

132 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

interpreted as meaning that it prohibits not only identical reproduction but also the imitation of an 
emblem by a trade mark. The Court further stated that if such an interpretation were not accepted, 
the practical effect of that provision would be substantially reduced, since it would be sufficient 
for an emblem to have been slightly modified, even imperceptibly for a person not a specialist in 
heraldry, in order for it to be capable of registration as a trade mark or an element of a trade mark. 
Second, the Court observed that the European Union legislature did not specify that only the reg‑
istration of a trade mark consisting exclusively of an emblem can be prohibited under Article 7(1)(i) 
of Regulation No 207/2009. By using the word ‘include’ in the provision concerned, the legisla‑
ture indicated that, in the circumstances laid down in that provision, the use of emblems other 
than those referred to in Article 7(1)(h) of Regulation No 207/2009 is prohibited, not only as a trade 
mark but also as an element of a trade mark. That, moreover, is consistent with the effectiveness of 
Article 7(1)(i) of Regulation No 207/2009, which is intended to provide the most complete protec‑
tion for the emblems to which it refers. By analogy with the case‑law on Article 7(1)(h) of Regulation 
No 207/2009 concerning the emblems of international intergovernmental organisations that have 
been duly communicated to the States Parties to the Paris Convention, (18) the Court concluded 
that the protection afforded to the emblems referred to in Article 7(1)(i) of that regulation is to ap‑
ply only where, taken as a whole, the trade mark consisting of such an emblem is liable to mislead 
the public as to the connection between, on the one hand, its proprietor or user and, on the other, 
the authority to which the emblem at issue relates.

b) 

Relative grounds for refusal

In Case T‑249/11 Sanco v OHIM — Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) (judgment of 14 May 2013, 
under  appeal),  the  Court  examined  the  question  of  the  assessment  of  the  complementarity  of 
goods and services covered by an application for registration.

First, the Court noted that it is only in so far as it is established that there is no similarity between 
the goods and services covered by two marks that a likelihood of confusion between those marks 
may be excluded without there being any need to carry out a global assessment, taking into ac‑
count all relevant factors, of the perception the relevant public has of the signs and of the goods 
and services at issue. In assessing the similarity between the goods and services, all the relevant 
factors relating to those goods and services should, in principle, be taken into account. Thus, for 
the purposes of the assessment of whether the goods and services are complementary, the per‑
ception of the relevant public of the importance of a product or service for the use of another 
product or service should be taken into account.

Accordingly, the complementarity between the goods and services in the context of a likelihood 
of confusion relies not on the existence of a connection between the goods and services at issue 
in the mind of that public from the point of view of their nature, their method of use and their 
distribution channels but on the close connection between those goods and services, in the sense 
that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that the public might 
think that responsibility for the production of those goods or provision of those services lies with 
the same undertaking. The fact that the method of use of a product or service is unrelated to the 
method of use of another product or service does not mean in each case that the use of one is not 
important or indispensable for the use of the other. In the light of those considerations, the Court 
held that, in the case in point, the Board of Appeal had erred in the assessment of the complemen‑
tarity between the goods covered by the earlier mark and the services of advertising, commer‑
cial agencies, franchising, export and import covered by the mark applied for and that that error 

(18)  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, as revised and amended.

Annual Report 2013 

133

General Court 

Proceedings

resulted in the Board of Appeal not taking into account all factors relevant to the assessment of the 
similarity of the goods and services in question.

In Case T‑321/10 SA. PAR. v OHIM — Salini Costruttori (GRUPPO SALINI) (judgment of 11 July 2013), the 
Court explained the concept of bad faith, referred to in Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. 
The Court observed that, under that provision, a Community trade mark is to be declared invalid, 
on application to OHIM or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings, where the 
applicant for the trade mark was acting in bad faith, which it is for the applicant for a declaration 
of invalidity to prove. The Court pointed out that the concept of bad faith referred to in that article 
is not defined, delimited or even described in any way in the legislation of the European Union. 
It must therefore be considered that, in the context of the overall analysis undertaken pursuant 
to that provision, account may also be taken of the commercial logic underlying the filing of the 
application for registration of the sign as a Community trade mark and of the chronology of events 
relating to the filing. Thus, by way of illustration, it is necessary to take into consideration, first, the 
fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third party is using, in at least one Member State, 
an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product or service capable of being confused 
with the sign for which registration is sought; second, the applicant’s intention to prevent that 
third party from continuing to use such a sign; and, third, the degree of legal protection enjoyed by 
the third party’s sign and by the sign for which registration is sought. Therefore, awareness on the 
part of the applicant for the trade mark of the commercial and corporate situation of the propri‑
etor of the earlier sign, including the fact that the proprietor’s company was experiencing a phase 
of expansion, is not in itself sufficient to establish that the applicant for the trade mark acted in 
bad faith. It is also necessary to take into consideration the applicant’s intention at the time when 
he files the application for registration. That intention, which is a subjective factor, must be deter‑
mined by reference to the objective circumstances of the particular case. Thus, for the purpose 
of assessing whether or not a trade mark applicant acted in bad faith, it is necessary to examine 
his intentions, as capable of being inferred from objective circumstances and his specific actions, 
from his role or position, from his awareness of the use of the earlier sign, from the contractual, 
pre‑contractual or post‑contractual relationship which he had with the applicant for a declaration 
of invalidity, from the existence of reciprocal duties or obligations and, more generally, from all the 
objective situations of conflicting interests in which the trade mark applicant has operated. Thus, 
the body of objective circumstances capable of shedding light on the intentions of the trade mark 
applicant include, in particular, the chronology of events leading to the registration of the con‑
tested trade mark, the potential conflict of interests of the applicant with regard to the proprietor 
of the earlier sign, the nature of the trade mark registration of which is sought and the extent of 
the reputation enjoyed by the sign at the time when the application for its registration was filed. In 
the light of those considerations, the Court held that the Board of Appeal had been correct to find 
that the contested trade mark was invalid on the basis of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

c) 

Burden of proof — Examination by OHIM of its own motion

In Case T‑571/11 El Corte Inglés v OHIM — Chez Gerard (CLUB GOURMET) (judgment of 20 March 2013, 
under appeal), the Court stated, in the context of the application of Regulation No 207/2009, that 
determining and interpreting rules of national law, in so far as doing so was essential to the activ‑
ity of the European Union institutions, was a matter of establishing the facts, not applying the law.

The Court held that, while it is true that Article 65(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be construed 
as meaning that rules of law infringement of which may give rise to an action before the General 
Court may be the province of national law or Community law, it is, however, only Community law 
which falls within the area of law, in which the maxim iura novit curia applies, whereas national 
law is an issue of fact, where facts must be adduced and the requirements of the burden of proof 

134 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

apply, and the content of national law must be demonstrated where necessary by the production 
of evidence. It follows that, as a rule, in the context of a procedure before the European Union 
institutions, it is for the party relying on national law to show that it supports his claims. While, ad‑
mittedly, OHIM must, of its own motion and by whatever means considered appropriate, obtain in‑
formation about the national law of the Member State concerned where such information is neces‑
sary to assess the applicability of the ground for refusal of registration in question and, in particular, 
the correctness of the facts pleaded or the probative value of the documents lodged, it is required 
to do so only where it already has information relating to national law, either in the form of claims 
as to its meaning, or in the form of evidence submitted whose probative force has been alleged.

In Case T‑579/10 macros consult v OHIM — MIP Metro (makro) (judgment of 7 May 2013), the Court 
stated that, in the case of a claim submitted under Article 53(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, on the 
basis of an earlier right protected under national law, it is clear from Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) 
No 2868/95 (19) that the applicant must provide particulars showing that he is entitled under the 
applicable national law to lay claim to that right.

That rule requires the applicant, in order to be able to have the use of a Community trade mark 
prohibited by virtue of an earlier right, to provide OHIM with not only particulars showing that 
he satisfies the necessary conditions under the national law whose application he is seeking, but 
also particulars establishing the content of that law. Furthermore, since Article 53(1)(c) of Regula‑
tion No 207/2009 expressly refers to Article 8(4) of that regulation, and since the latter provision 
concerns earlier rights protected under European Union legislation or under the law of the Mem‑
ber State governing the sign at issue, those principles also apply when a provision of national law 
is invoked on the basis of Article 53(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009. Rule 37(b)(ii) of Regulation 
No 2868/95 lays down similar provisions in relation to the proof of an earlier right in the event of 
an application made under Article 53(1) of Regulation No 207/2009. Thus, the issue of the existence 
of a national right is a question of fact and it is for the party which alleges the existence of a right 
fulfilling the conditions set out in Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 to establish, before OHIM, 
not only that this right arises under the national law, but also the scope of that law.

Last, in Case T‑320/10 Fürstlich Castell’sches Domänenamt v OHIM — Castel Frères (CASTEL) (judg‑
ment of 13 September 2013, under appeal), the Court ruled on the question whether the absolute 
ground for refusal of registration laid down in Article 7(1)(d) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be ex‑
amined by the Board of Appeal of its own motion if the applicant had not raised it in the procedure 
before the Board of Appeal.

First of all, the Court noted that, under Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, when considering 
absolute grounds for refusal, OHIM Examiners and, on appeal, the Boards of Appeal are required 
to examine the facts of their own motion in order to determine whether the mark registration of 
which is sought comes within one of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in Article 7 
of that regulation. It follows that the competent bodies of OHIM may be led to base their decisions 
on facts which have not been put forward by the applicant for the mark. Nonetheless, the Court 
explained that, in invalidity proceedings, OHIM cannot be required to carry out afresh the exam‑
ination which the Examiner conducted, of his own motion, of the relevant facts that could have led 
him to apply the absolute grounds for refusal. It follows from the provisions of Articles 52 and 55 
of Regulation No 207/2009 that the Community trade mark is regarded as valid until it has been 
declared invalid by OHIM following invalidity proceedings. It therefore enjoys a presumption of 

(19)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 

on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

135

General Court 

Proceedings

validity, which is the logical consequence of the check carried out by OHIM in the examination of 
an application for registration.

The Court held that, by virtue of that presumption of validity, OHIM’s obligation, under Article 76(1) 
of Regulation No 207/2009, to examine of its own motion the relevant facts which might lead it to 
apply absolute grounds for refusal is restricted to the examination of the application for a Com‑
munity trade mark carried out by the Examiners of OHIM and by the Boards of Appeal during the 
procedure for registration of that mark. In invalidity proceedings, as the registered Community 
trade mark is presumed to be valid, it is for the applicant for a declaration of invalidity to invoke 
before OHIM the specific facts which call the validity of that trade mark into question. Thus, in in‑
validity proceedings, the Board of Appeal of OHIM is not required to examine of its own motion the 
relevant facts which might lead it to apply the absolute ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(d) 
of Regulation No 207/2009.

d) 

Power to alter decisions

In Case T‑514/11 i‑content v OHIM — Decathlon (BETWIN) (judgment of 4 June 2013), the Court exam‑
ined the conditions governing the exercise of its power to alter decisions pursuant to Article 65(3) 
of Regulation 207/2009.

The  Court  emphasised  that  the  power  which  it  enjoys  pursuant  to  Article  65(3)  of  Regulation 
No 207/2009 does not have the effect of conferring on it the power to carry out an assessment on 
which the Board of Appeal of OHIM has not yet adopted a position. Exercise of the power to alter 
decisions must therefore, in principle, be limited to situations in which the Court, after reviewing 
the assessment made by the Board of Appeal, is in a position to determine, on the basis of the mat‑
ters of fact and of law as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take. In 
this instance, the Court considered that the conditions for the exercise of that power were satisfied. 
According to the Court, the Board of Appeal was required to find that, contrary to the view of the 
Opposition Division, there was no likelihood of confusion in respect of the goods covered by the 
application for registration. Consequently, the Court altered the contested decision.

In Case T‑236/12 Airbus v OHIM (NEO) (judgment of 3 July 2013), the Court ruled on the extent of the 
examination to be carried out by the Board of Appeal.

In that regard, the Court observed that, under Article 64(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, following 
the examination as to the merits of the appeal, the Board of Appeal is to decide on the appeal 
and may, in doing so, exercise any power within the competence of the department which was 
responsible for the decision appealed against. However, that power to carry out a new substantive 
examination of the application for registration, both in law and in fact, is subject to the admis‑
sibility of the appeal before the Board of Appeal. Where, as in the case in point, the Examiner has 
rejected an application for registration of a Community trade mark only in respect of the goods 
covered by that application, while allowing registration in respect of the services covered by it, the 
appeal brought by the applicant for the trade mark before the Board of Appeal can lawfully relate 
only to the Examiner’s refusal to allow registration in respect of the goods covered by the applica‑
tion. The applicant may not, by contrast, legitimately appeal before the Board of Appeal against 
the Examiner’s consent to register such an application in respect of the services. Consequently, the 
Court stated that, although it was true that, in the case in point, the applicant had appealed be‑
fore the Board of Appeal seeking the annulment of the Examiner’s decision in its entirety, the fact 
remained that, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 59 of Regulation No 207/2009, the Board of 
Appeal was legitimately seised of the appeal only in so far as the Examiner had rejected the ap‑
plicant’s claims. Accordingly, the Court held that the Board of Appeal had exceeded the limits of 

136 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

its powers, inasmuch as it had of its own motion reopened the examination of the application for 
registration of the Community trade mark in respect of the services referred to in that application 
in the light of the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7 of Regulation No 207/2009 and 
found that the mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character to distinguish those ser‑
vices within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) and (2) of that regulation.

e) 

Proof of genuine use of the trade mark

In Case T‑34/12 Herbacin cosmetic v OHIM — Laboratoire Garnier (HERBA SHINE) (judgment of 28 No‑
vember 2013), the Court defined the scope of the obligation of Boards of Appeal to state reasons 
with respect to the application of Article 15(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, which provides that 
the affixing of the Community trade mark to goods or to the packaging thereof in the Community 
solely for export purposes is to be regarded as use within the meaning of the first subparagraph 
of Article 15(1). In the case in point, the Court held that it was unable to review the legality of the 
contested decision, since the reasons which had led the Board of Appeal to disregard invoices sent 
to addressees established outside the European Union did not emerge, even implicitly, from the 
contested decision. In addition, the Court stated that examination of the question whether the evi‑
dence adduced by the applicant was sufficient for the purpose of establishing that the conditions 
laid down in Article 15(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 were satisfied required an analysis of all the 
evidence adduced by the applicant, which had not been carried out by the Board of Appeal and 
which it was not the Court’s task to carry out for the first time. The Court therefore annulled the 
contested decision on the ground that the statement of reasons was inadequate.

2. 

Designs

One case relating to Community designs is particularly deserving of attention, namely Case T‑68/11 
Kastenholtz v OHIM — Qwatchme (Watch dials) (judgment of 6 June 2013, not yet published, under 
appeal), concerning, in particular, the requirements of novelty and individual character on which 
the protection of Community designs depends. The Court observed that it follows from Article 5(2) 
of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (20) that two designs are to be deemed to be identical if their features 
differ only in immaterial details, that is to say, details that are not immediately perceptible and that 
would not therefore produce differences, even slight, between those designs. A contrario, for the 
purposes of assessing the novelty of a design, it is necessary to assess whether there are any, even 
slight, non‑immaterial differences between the designs at issue. In that regard, the Court held that 
the wording of Article 6 of Regulation No 6/2002 goes beyond that of Article 5 of the regulation. 
Consequently, the differences observed between the designs at issue in the context of Article 5 
may, especially if they are slight, not be sufficient to produce on an informed user a different overall 
impression within the meaning of Article 6 of that regulation. In that case, the contested design 
may be regarded as being new within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No 6/2002, but will 
not be regarded as having individual character within the meaning of Article 6 of the regulation. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the requirement laid down in the latter article goes beyond 
that laid down in Article 5, a different overall impression on the informed user within the meaning 
of Article 6 can be based only on the existence of objective differences between the designs at issue. 
Those differences must therefore be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of novelty in Article 5 of 
Regulation No 6/2002.

(20)  Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (OJ 2002 L 3, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

137

General Court 

Proceedings

Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures

In 2013 the Court decided 40 cases relating to fund‑freezing measures, most of which concerned 
the measures adopted by the Council against persons and entities involved in the nuclear pro‑
gramme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The judgments delivered on actions brought before the 
Court by two of those entities deserve special mention.

First, in Case T‑494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council (judgment of 5 February 2013, not yet published, 
under appeal), the Court observed that a legal person constituting an emanation of a non‑member 
State can rely on fundamental rights protection. At issue in this case was the legality of restrictive 
measures imposed by the Council on an Iranian commercial bank on the ground that it was partly 
owned by the Iranian Government. The Council, supported by the Commission, claimed that, as 
an emanation of the Iranian State, the bank could not rely on fundamental rights protection and 
guarantees.

The Court rejected that argument, observing that neither in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union nor in the Treaties are there any provisions which state that legal persons that 
are emanations of States are not entitled to the protection of fundamental rights. On the contrary, 
the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in particular Articles 17, 41 and 47, guar‑
antee the rights of ‘everyone’, a word which includes legal persons such as the applicant. Nor can 
such exclusion from the benefit of fundamental rights be based on Article 34 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, 
a provision which precludes the admissibility of applications submitted to the European Court of 
Human Rights by governmental organisations, but which does not apply to proceedings before 
the Courts of the European Union. Fundamental rights may therefore be relied upon by persons 
which are emanations of States in so far as those rights are compatible with their status as legal 
persons.

Second, in Case T‑493/10 Persia International Bank v Council (judgment of 6 September 2013), the 
Court explained the scope of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence in the context of 
the adoption of restrictive measures. The applicant, a company owned by two Iranian banks, had 
been placed on the list providing for the freezing of the funds of persons or entities regarded as 
having been involved in the Iranian nuclear proliferation programme, since the Council had consid‑
ered that the applicant should be regarded as being owned by or belonging to one of the above‑
mentioned banks, Bank Mellat. The applicant claimed that there had been a breach of its rights 
of defence and of its right to effective judicial protection in that it had not been given sufficient 
information concerning the alleged involvement of Bank Mellat in nuclear proliferation.

The Court stated that, where the Council intends to rely on information provided by a Member 
State  in  order  to  adopt  restrictive  measures  affecting  an  entity,  it  is  obliged  to  ensure,  before 
adopting those measures, that the entity concerned can be notified of the information in question 
in good time so that it is able effectively to make known its point of view. However, the belated 
disclosure of a document on which the Council relied in order to adopt or maintain the restrictive 
measures concerning an entity does not necessarily constitute a breach of the rights of the defence 
that would justify the annulment of acts adopted previously. That is the outcome only where it 
is established that the restrictive measures concerned could not have been lawfully adopted or 
maintained if the document belatedly disclosed had to be excluded as inculpatory evidence. The 
Court considered that that was not the position in the case in point, since the information belatedly 
disclosed by the Council contained no additional evidence compared with the earlier measures 
and, consequently, its exclusion as inculpatory evidence was not capable of affecting the validity 
of the adoption and maintenance of those measures. As regards, more specifically, the failure to 

138 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

disclose evidence, the Court observed that, by virtue of the principle of respect for the rights of 
the defence, the Council is not required to disclose information other than that contained in its file. 
In the case in point, it was not disputed that the Council’s file contained no additional evidence 
concerning Bank Mellat’s involvement in nuclear proliferation or concerning the applicant itself, so 
that it could not be accused of having breached the applicant’s rights of defence and its right to 
effective judicial protection by its failure to disclose such evidence.

Privileges and immunities

In Joined Cases T‑346/11 and T‑347/11 Gollnisch v Parliament (judgment of 17 January 2013), the 
Court dealt with an action for annulment of a decision of the European Parliament to waive the 
immunity of one of its members and of a decision of the Parliament not to defend that immunity. 
Those decisions had been adopted following a request to waive the applicant’s parliamentary im‑
munity made by the French Minister for Justice and Freedoms, pursuant to a request from the 
French public prosecutor, in order to pursue the investigation of the applicant for incitement to 
racial hatred and, if appropriate, to commit him for trial before the courts with jurisdiction.

The Court drew a distinction between, on the one hand, the waiving of the immunity of a Member 
of the European Parliament and, on the other, the defence of the immunity of that member. While 
the former is expressly provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the European Union, (21) the same cannot be said of the latter, for which provision is made only 
in Rule 6(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, (22) which does not define that concept and 
which constitutes an opinion that does not have binding effect with regard to national judicial au‑
thorities. Since the immunity provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7 is a matter of law and since 
the Member of the European Parliament can be deprived of his immunity only if the Parliament has 
waived it, the defence of immunity, in the context of Article 9 of the Protocol, is conceivable only 
where, in the absence of a request to waive a member’s immunity, immunity, as resulting from the 
provisions of national law of the member’s Member State of origin, is endangered, in particular 
by the action of the police or judicial authorities of that member’s Member State of origin. In such 
circumstances, the Member of the European Parliament may request the Parliament to defend his 
immunity, as provided for in Rule 6(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament. Defence of im‑
munity is thus a means whereby the Parliament, at the request of a Member of the Parliament, may 
intervene where the national authorities violate or are about to violate the immunity of one of its 
members. Conversely, where a request for waiver of immunity is made by the national authorities, 
the Parliament must take a decision to waive or not to waive immunity. In such a case, defence 
of immunity no longer has any raison d’être, since either the Parliament waives immunity and the 
defence of immunity is no longer conceivable, or it refuses to waive immunity and defence of im‑
munity is unnecessary, since the national authorities are advised that their request for waiver of 
immunity has been rejected by the Parliament and immunity therefore precludes the measures 
which those authorities could or would take. Defence of immunity is therefore devoid of purpose 
where a request for waiver of immunity is submitted by the national authorities. The Parliament is 
no longer required to take action on its own initiative because no formal request has been submit‑
ted by the competent authorities of a Member State, but must take a decision and thus respond to 
such a request.

In addition, whilst in order for an opinion of a Member of the European Parliament to be covered 
by immunity it must have been expressed in the performance of his duties, which requires a link 

(21)  OJ 2010 C 83, p. 266.

(22)  OJ 2011 L 116, p. 1.

Annual Report 2013 

139

General Court 

Proceedings

between the opinion expressed and the parliamentary duties, that is not the position with respect 
to opinions, such as that at issue in the case in point, expressed by a Member of the Parliament 
outside the Parliament in the context of duties performed by him in his capacity as a member of 
a regional body of a Member State and as President of a political group within that body. There is 
no link between the statements at issue and the duties performed as a Member of the European 
Parliament or, a fortiori, any direct and obvious link between those statements and those duties 
that might have justified the application of Article 8 of Protocol No 7 on Privileges and Immunities. 
The Court therefore held that the Parliament could not be criticised for having decided, in the light 
of the circumstances of the case and of the request submitted by the French authorities, to waive 
the applicant’s immunity in order to enable the investigation by those authorities to continue.

Public health

In Case T‑301/12 Laboratoires CTRS v Commission (judgment of 4 July 2013), the Court ruled on situa‑
tions which permit a derogation from the fundamental conditions necessary to obtain a marketing 
authorisation for medicinal products for human use. The action had as its subject matter an appli‑
cation for annulment of a Commission implementing decision refusing a marketing authorisation 
under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (23) for an orphan medicinal product for human use, the active 
substance of which was cholic acid, used to treat two rare but very serious liver disorders which, 
if not properly treated within the first weeks or months of life, can lead to death. The applicant 
challenged that decision before the Court, claiming, in particular, that the Commission had been 
wrong to consider that the well‑established use of cholic acid, within the meaning of Article 10a of 
Directive 2001/83/EC, (24) had not been proved and that the bibliographical data submitted in the 
application for authorisation were incomplete.

The Court observed, first of all, that cholic acid had been used to treat patients in France between 
1993 and October 2007, in hospital preparations issued on medical prescriptions, prepared individ‑
ually in accordance with the prescriptions of the pharmacopoeia and in compliance with the rules 
of good practice laid down in the national legislation. Those hospital preparations of cholic acid 
were intended to fulfil special needs (in particular, they were necessary to meet patients’ needs 
since there was no medicinal product on the market capable of treating the liver disorders in ques‑
tion) and, furthermore, were prescribed by a doctor following an actual examination of his patients 
and on the basis of solely therapeutic considerations. The Court concluded that the Commission 
had been wrong to consider that the use of cholic acid as a hospital preparation in France between 
1993 and October 2007 did not constitute well‑established medicinal use for the purposes of Art‑
icle 10a of Directive 2001/83.

In addition, the Court considered that the applicant had shown that it was unable to provide com‑
prehensive information on the efficacy and safety of the medicinal product at issue under nor‑
mal conditions of use owing to exceptional circumstances. The Court found that the applicant had 
shown, in summaries, the reasons why it was not possible to provide complete information about 
the efficacy and safety of the medicinal product (the rareness of the disorder and ethical consider‑
ations) and had justified the benefit/risk balance for the medicinal product concerned. It therefore 
held that the Commission had been wrong to consider in its decision that the data submitted by 

(23)  Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary 
use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (OJ 2004 L 136, p. 1).

(24)  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community 

code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 331, p. 67).

140 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

the applicant should have been comprehensive and that the applicant could not invoke the exist‑
ence of exceptional circumstances in its application made on the basis of well‑established medici‑
nal use.

The Court further observed that the Commission had no valid ground on which to consider in the 
contested decision that granting a marketing authorisation would undermine the objectives of 
Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 (25) and the protection of innovation and concluded that the refusal 
to grant such authorisation was unfounded. It therefore annulled the contested decision.

Environment

In Case T‑370/11 Poland v Commission (judgment of 7 March 2013, not yet published), the Court 
adjudicated on the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading introduced by Directive 
2003/87/EC. (26) The action, brought by the Republic of Poland, was directed against the Commis‑
sion’s decision establishing the transitional European Union‑wide rules for the free allocation of 
such quotas. (27) The Republic of Poland challenged the benchmarks used by the Commission in 
calculating the allocation of those quotas.

The Court observed, first of all, that the contested decision constitutes a measure implementing 
Directive 2003/87, which was adopted on the basis of the provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to 
environmental policy. It therefore rejected the applicant’s argument that the Commission’s deci‑
sion had been adopted in breach of Article 194(2) TFEU, which provides that the Member States are 
to have competence in relation to energy policy.

Next, the Court considered that the equal treatment of industrial installations that are in different 
situations owing to the use of different fuels when determining the product benchmarks for the 
purpose of allocating quotas in the contested decision could be regarded as objectively justified. It 
observed that the differentiation of those benchmarks by reference to the fuel used would not en‑
courage industrial installations using fuels with high CO2 emissions to seek solutions to reduce their 
emissions, but would rather encourage maintenance of the status quo, which would be contrary 
to the third subparagraph of Article 10a(1) of Directive 2003/87. In addition, such a differentiation 
would involve the risk of increased emissions because industrial installations using low CO2 emis‑
sion fuel might have to replace it with a higher CO2 emission fuel in order to be able to obtain more 
free emission allowances. Likewise, the Court considered that the choice of natural gas, a low CO2 
emission fuel, to determine the heat and fuel benchmarks was aimed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.

The Court observed, moreover, that the contested decision took appropriate account of the eco‑
nomic and social consequences of the measures designed to reduce CO2 emissions. First, the rules 
of operation would be introduced gradually from 2013. In that context, high CO2 emitting instal‑
lations,  such  as  those  using  coal  in  Poland,  which  need  a  large  number  of  allowances  for  their 

(25)  Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on medicinal 
(EEC)  No  1768/92,  Directive  2001/20/EC, 

for  paediatric  use  and  amending  Regulation 
products 
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (OJ 2006 L 378, p. 1).

(26)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC 
(OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32).

(27)  Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union‑wide rules for harmonised 

free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87 (OJ 2011 L 130, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

141

General Court 

Proceedings

production, would initially receive a greater amount of free allowances to cover their needs. Sec‑
ond, the European Union legislature had established mechanisms to support the efforts of those 
Member States with relatively lower income per capita and higher growth prospects to reduce 
carbon use in their economies by 2020.

Last, the Court pointed out that from 2013 the CO2 emissions allowances scheme would be based 
on the principle of auctioning. Thus, Member States would be able to auction all allowances not 
allocated free of charge so that installations could buy the missing allowances. That system, more‑
over, would be consistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, since installations with the highest CO2 
emissions would be required to pay for allowances or reduce their emissions.

Access to documents of the institutions

In 2013 the case‑law on access to documents dealt, in particular, with the scope of the exception 
relating to the protection of international relations laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, (28) 
and with the interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 (29) in the more specific context of ac‑
cess to information in environmental matters.

1. 

Protection of international relations

In Case T‑301/10 In’t Veld v Commission (judgment of 19 March 2013), the Court adjudicated on the 
merits of a decision applying, in particular, the exception relating to international relations, set out 
in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, in order to reject the applicant’s re‑
quest seeking access, from the Commission, to a number of documents relating to a draft inter‑
national anti‑counterfeiting trade agreement.

In that regard, the Court observed, in essence, that an institution of the European Union can legally 
refuse access by the public to documents on the basis of the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regula‑
tion  No  1049/2001  in  order  to  maintain  the  confidentiality  of  the  negotiating  positions  on  inter‑
national agreements, since such negotiation can justify, in order to ensure its effectiveness, a certain 
level of discretion to allow mutual trust between negotiators and the development of a free and 
effective discussion. Initiating and conducting negotiations in order to conclude an international 
agreement are, in principle, matters that fall within the domain of the executive, and public partici‑
pation in the procedure relating to the negotiation and the conclusion of an international agreement 
is necessarily restricted in view of the legitimate interest in not revealing strategic elements of the 
negotiations.

In that context, disclosure of the positions of the European Union or the other parties to the ne‑
gotiation of an international anti‑counterfeiting trade agreement may damage the public interest 
protected by the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001. First, it is possible that 
such disclosure could reveal, indirectly, the positions of other parties to the negotiations. Second, 
in the context of international negotiations, the positions taken by the European Union are, by de‑
finition, subject to change depending on the course of those negotiations, and on concessions and 

(28)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 

access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

(29)  Regulation  (EC)  No  1367/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  September  2006  on  the 
application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Aarhus  Convention  on  access  to  information,  public  participation  in 
decision‑making  and  access  to  justice  in  environmental  matters  to  Community  institutions  and  bodies 
(OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13).

142 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

compromises made in that context by the various stakeholders. The formulation of negotiating 
positions may involve a number of tactical considerations on the part of the negotiators, including 
the European Union itself. It is possible, moreover, that disclosure by the European Union, to the 
public, of its own negotiating positions, even though the negotiating positions of the other par‑
ties remained secret, could, in practice, have a negative effect on the negotiating capacity of the 
European Union.

Furthermore, in the context of international negotiations, unilateral disclosure by one negotiating 
party of the negotiating position of one or more other parties, even if this appears anonymous at 
first sight, may be likely to seriously undermine, for the negotiating party whose position is made 
public and for the other negotiating parties who are witnesses to that disclosure, the mutual trust 
essential to the effectiveness of those negotiations. Such disclosure is, moreover, likely to affect 
both the credibility of the Commission as a negotiating partner vis‑à‑vis the other negotiating part‑
ners and the relationship of all the negotiating parties, and thus of the European Union, with any 
third countries wishing to join the negotiations.

2. 

Access to information in environmental matters

In Case T‑545/11 Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe v Commission (judgment of 8 Oc‑
tober 2013, under appeal), the Court examined the conditions governing access of the public to 
environmental information and also the connection between Regulation No 1367/2006 governing 
access to such information and the system established by Regulation No 1049/2001.

The Court held that, in the case of a request for access to environmental information or informa‑
tion relating to emissions into the environment, it follows from recitals 8 and 15 in the preamble 
to Regulation No 1367/2006, read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 6 thereof, that that regulation 
contains provisions which replace, amend or clarify certain provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001. 
In this case, the obligation to interpret the exceptions laid down in the latter regulation strictly is 
borne out, on the one hand, by the need for the institution concerned to take account of the public 
interest in disclosure of such information and by the reference to whether that information relates 
to emissions into the environment and, on the other, by the fact that Regulation No 1049/2001 
does not contain any similar details regarding the application of those exceptions in that field.

The first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 lays down a legal presumption that 
an overriding public interest in disclosure exists where the information requested relates to emis‑
sions into the environment, except where that information concerns an investigation, in particular 
one concerning possible infringements of European Union law. Thus, the institution concerned 
is required to disclose the document where the information requested relates to emissions into 
the environment, even if such disclosure is liable to undermine the protection of the commercial 
interests of a particular natural or legal person, including that person’s intellectual property. With 
specific regard to a request for documents relating to the first authorisation of the placing on the 
market of an active substance referred to in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC, (30) such as the sub‑
stance at issue in the case in point, although that directive contains provisions intended to protect 
the confidentiality of information consisting of commercial and industrial secrets, the existence of 
such rules cannot rebut the irrebuttable presumption arising from Regulation No 1367/2006. Fur‑
thermore, although Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
enshrine, respectively, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, it cannot be 

(30)  Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market 

(OJ 1991 L 230, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

143

General Court 

Proceedings

accepted that, for the purpose of ensuring a consistent interpretation of European Union law, the 
validity of a clear and unconditional provision of secondary legislation may be called into question. 
Nor can there be any question of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 being 
disapplied in order to ensure consistency with Article 39(2) and (3) of the Agreement on the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) of 15 April 1994, (31) which 
protect commercially valuable information from public disclosure. Such an approach would in fact 
call into question the legality of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 in the 
light of those provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.

Furthermore, in Case T‑111/11 ClientEarth v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2013, under 
appeal) the issue raised was the compatibility of the Commission’s application of the exception 
provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, relating to the protec‑
tion of the purpose of inspections, with the Convention on access to information, public participa‑
tion in decision‑making and access to justice in environmental matters (the Aarhus Convention). 
The applicant claimed that that Convention does not allow any exception to the right of access to 
documents designed to protect the purpose of investigations other than those of a criminal or dis‑
ciplinary nature. The documents access to which had been refused by the Commission concerned 
the compatibility of the legislation of the Member States with European Union environmental law 
and had been prepared by the Commission in order to enable it to monitor the transposition of 
several directives by the Member States and, if necessary, to bring proceedings for failure to fulfil 
obligations.

In that regard, the Court observed that the European Union is bound by the Aarhus Convention. 
However, as regards the grounds for refusal of a request for access to environmental information, 
that convention cannot be seen, as regards its content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, 
since it provides that each party is to take the necessary measures to establish and maintain a clear, 
transparent and consistent framework to implement its provisions, each party having a wide dis‑
cretion in respect of how to organise the ways in which environmental information requested from 
public authorities is made available to the public.

In particular, Article 4(4)(c) of the Aarhus Convention is not sufficiently precise to be directly applica‑
ble, at least in relation to the institutions of regional economic integration referred to in Article 2(d) 
of that convention. The Aarhus Convention, and in particular Article 4(4)(c) thereof, was manifestly 
designed to be applicable principally to the authorities of the States which are contracting parties 
thereto and uses concepts appropriate to them, as is apparent from the reference to the framework 
of national legislation in Article 4(1). On the other hand, the convention does not take into account 
the specific features that are characteristic of institutions of regional economic integration, which 
may nonetheless accede to the convention. In particular, there is nothing in Article 4(4)(c), or in the 
other provisions of the Aarhus Convention, which makes it possible to interpret the concepts used 
in that provision and to determine whether an investigation relating to infringement proceedings 
can be covered by such concepts.

In the absence of any indication to that end, it cannot be held that the Aarhus Convention prevents 
the European Union legislature from providing for an exception to the principle of access to the 
documents of the institutions relating to the environment where those documents pertain to in‑
fringement proceedings, which form part of the constitutional mechanisms of European Union law, 
as established by the Treaties.

(31)  OJ 1994 L 336, p. 214.

144 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

Authorisation to place genetically modified organisms on the market

Case T‑240/10 Hungary v Commission (judgment of 13 December 2013) provided clarification con‑
cerning the procedure applicable to authorisation of the marketing of genetically modified organ‑
isms. The case originated from two Commission decisions, the first authorising the placing on the 
market of a genetically modified potato and the second authorising the placing on the market of 
animal feed based on that potato and the adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of the 
potato in food and other feed products for animals. Taking the view that that potato presented 
a risk for human and animal health and also for the environment, Hungary brought an action for 
annulment of those two decisions.

The Court observed, first of all, that the measures put forward by the Commission concerning the 
placing of the genetically modified products on the market had to be adopted in accordance with 
the regulatory procedure, as established in Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC. (32) That procedure 
lays down an obligation on the Commission to submit a draft of the measures to the competent 
regulatory committee. In the case in point, in having decided to seek a consolidated opinion from 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and in using that opinion in particular as a basis for the 
contested decisions without allowing the competent committees to take a position either on the 
opinion or on the amended draft decisions, the Commission had not complied with that obligation.

In that context, the Court considered that, if the Commission had complied with the applicable 
rules, the outcome of the procedure or the content of the contested decisions might have been 
substantially different. As the committee votes on the earlier drafts had been very divided and the 
findings of the abovementioned opinion had expressed more uncertainties than the EFSA’s earlier 
opinions and been coupled with dissenting minority opinions, it was not inconceivable that the 
members of the competent committees might have reviewed their position. In addition, if those 
committees had issued an unfavourable opinion, or no opinion, the Commission would have been 
required to submit the proposed authorisations to the Council, which could have decided to adopt 
a position for or against the authorisations in question. Only at the end of that procedure, and if 
the Council had failed to adopt a decision, would the Commission have been able to adopt its 
decisions.

The Court thus upheld the application and annulled the contested decisions.

II.  Appeals

Among the decisions of the Appeal Chamber of the General Court in 2013, three judgments merit 
special attention.

First, in Case T‑317/10 P L v Parliament (judgment of 11 September 2013), the Court stated that, in 
the case of the ground of dismissal relating to the loss or breach of mutual confidence between 
a member of the temporary staff and the political group of the European Parliament to which he 
was assigned, while a member of the temporary staff assigned to non‑attached members has an 
interest in being satisfied that the relationship of confidence that has been severed is indeed the 
relation between him and his direct administrative superior, the same does not apply in the case of 
a staff member assigned to a traditional political group other than that of the non‑attached, which 

(32)  Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 

powers conferred on the Commission (OJ 1999 L 184, p. 23).

Annual Report 2013 

145

General Court 

Proceedings

is characterised by what is presumed to be a common political belief. In the latter case, if the rela‑
tionship of confidence is severed, that relationship no longer exists with the group as a whole and 
the question of which persons have lost confidence in the person concerned is no longer relevant. 
After observing that the existence of a relationship of confidence is not based on objective fac‑
tors and by nature is not amenable to judicial review, as the Courts of the European Union cannot 
substitute their own appraisal for that of the contracting authority, in particular in the political field 
where loss of confidence is a broad concept, the Court stated however that, if an institution which 
decides to terminate a temporary staff contract refers, in particular, to specific material facts giving 
rise to the decision to dismiss the person concerned on the basis of loss of confidence, the Court is 
required to ascertain the veracity of those material facts. In doing so, the Court does not substitute 
its own appraisal for that of the competent authority, which has found that the loss of confidence is 
made out, but merely ascertains whether the facts underlying the decision as stated by the institu‑
tion are materially correct.

Second, in Case T‑476/11 P Commission v Moschonaki (judgment of 23 October 2013), the Court 
provided clarification of the rule that the complaint within the meaning of the first indent of Art‑
icle 91(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the subsequent application 
must correspond. It observed that the fact that the pleas in law contained in the application and 
the complaint seek to challenge the substantive legality or, in the alternative, the procedural legal‑
ity of a measure does not in itself mean that those pleas may be regarded as being closely linked 
with each other. If that were so, an applicant might be able to rely for the first time before the Civil 
Service Tribunal on a plea bearing no relation to those relied on in the complaint, provided that 
those pleas, taken together, relate to either the substantive legality or the procedural legality of 
the measure at issue. In those circumstances, the appointing authority would be aware, in the con‑
text of the complaint, of only part of the objections raised against the administration. Not being in 
a position to ascertain with sufficient precision the objections or wishes of the official concerned, 
the appointing authority would therefore be unable to attempt to reach an amicable settlement. 
The concepts of substantive legality and procedural legality are too wide and abstract, in the light 
of the specific object of the head of claim at issue, to ensure that such a link might exist between 
pleas covered by exclusively by one or other of those concepts.

Nonetheless, while the immutability of subject matter and legal basis between the complaint and 
the application is necessary in order to allow an amicable settlement of disputes, since the ap‑
pointing authority is made aware, at the stage of the complaint, of the criticisms of the official 
concerned, those concepts cannot be interpreted in such a way that the possibilities for the official 
concerned of effectively challenging a decision adversely affecting him are restricted. Thus, where 
the complainant becomes aware of the reasons on which the decision adversely affecting him is 
based through the response to his complaint, or where the reasons stated in that response sub‑
stantially alter, or supplement, the reasons stated in the measure, any plea put forward for the first 
time at the stage of the application and with the aim of challenging the merits of the reasons set 
out in the response to the complaint must be considered admissible.

Third, in Case T‑107/11 P ETF v Schuerings (judgment of 4 December 2013), the Court explained the 
nature of the obligation imposed on an institution where it terminates the contract of indefinite 
duration period of a member of the temporary staff. In this instance, the Court held that, since there 
was a valid reason for dismissal, here the reduction of the sphere of activities of an agency, the 
European Training Foundation (ETF) was under no obligation to consider whether the tem porary 
staff member could have been re‑assigned to another existing post or one due to be created in 
the near future following the attribution of new powers to the ETF. While it is true that a contract of 
indefinite duration is to be distinguished, from the aspect of security of employment, from a con‑
tract  of  employment  for  a  fixed  period,  servants  of  the  European  Union  civil  service  employed 

146 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

under a contract of indefinite duration cannot fail to be aware of the temporary nature of their 
employment and of the fact that it does not confer a guarantee of employment, since the concept 
of ‘established post on the staff of one of the institutions’, within the meaning of Article 1a(1) of the 
Staff Regulations, covers only posts expressly stated to be ‘established’ or referred to in similar terms 
in the budget.

III.  Applications for interim measures

In the past year the Court received 31 applications for interim relief, a significant increase compared 
with the number of applications made in 2012 (21). In 2013 the President of the Court determined 
27 cases, as opposed to 23 in 2012. He allowed four applications in whole or in part, namely those 
giving rise to the orders of 11 March 2013 in Case T‑462/13 R Pilkington Group v Commission (under 
appeal), of 25 April 2013 in Case T‑44/13 R AbbVie v EMA (under appeal) and Case T‑73/13 R Inter‑
Mune UK and Others v EMA (under appeal) and of 15 May 2013 in Case T‑198/12 R Germany v Com‑
mission (under appeal). The first three orders, relating to issues associated with disclosure, by the 
Commission and by the European Medical Agency (EMA), of allegedly confidential information, 
follow the approach taken in three orders made in 2012. (33)

In Germany v Commission the German Government, taking the view that the limit values applicable 
in Germany for certain heavy metals in toys offered better protection than the values introduced 
by Directive 2009/48/EC, (34) had requested the Commission to approve the maintenance of its na‑
tional values. The Commission essentially rejected that request. After bringing an action for annul‑
ment of that rejection, the German Government sought the adoption of interim measures authoris‑
ing it to continue to use its own limit values pending delivery of the judgment on the substance. 
In his order of 15 May 2013, the President of the Court held that the claim seeking that the Com‑
mission be enjoined to grant such approval was admissible. Admittedly, an application for interim 
measures which seeks only to obtain suspension of operation of a purely negative decision is in 
principle inadmissible, since such suspension is not in itself capable of altering the applicant’s pos‑
ition. However, the German Government had not sought suspension of application of the rejection 
decision, but the adoption of interim measures within the meaning of Article 279 TFEU. That pos‑
sibility also exists in an action for annulment of a negative decision, since neither Article 279 TFEU, 
nor Article 104 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court nor, a fortiori, Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights permits such an application to be declared inadmissible. The President of 
the Court added that, in relation to interim measures, the judge hearing an application for interim 
relief has powers whose impact vis‑à‑vis the institutions of the European Union goes beyond the 
effects attaching to a judgment annulling a measure, provided that those interim measures apply 
only for the duration of the main proceedings, have a sufficiently close link with the main action, 
do not prejudge the decision on the main application and do not undermine the practical effect 

(33)  The essential content of those orders of 16 November 2012 in Case T‑341/12 R Evonik Degussa v Commission and 
Case T‑345/12  R  Akzo  Nobel  and  Others  v  Commission  and  of  29  November  2012  in  Case T‑164/12  R  Alstom 
v Commission (none of which were the subject of an appeal), was fully described in the 2012 Annual Report 
(pp. 155 and 156). The appeal lodged by the Commission against the order in Pilkington Group v Commission 
was dismissed by order of the Vice‑President of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2013 in Case C‑278/13 P(R). 
Following  the  appeals  lodged  by  the  EMA,  the  Vice‑President  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  by  orders  of 
28 November 2013 in Case C‑389/13 P(R) EMA v AbbVie and Case C‑390/13 P(R) EMA v InterMune UK and Others, 
set aside the orders in AbbVie v EMA and InterMune UK and Others v EMA and referred those cases back to the 
General Court.

(34)  Directive  2009/48/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18  June  2009  on  the  safety  of  toys 

(OJ 2009 L 170, p. 1).

Annual Report 2013 

147

General Court 

Proceedings

of that decision. The President of the Court held that those conditions were fulfilled in the present 
case.

As to the substance, the President of the Court found that the German Government had shown 
both the need in fact and law for the adoption of interim measures to protect the health of chil‑
dren and the urgency of those measures. He emphasised, in particular, that the controversy be‑
tween the German Government and the Commission concerning the ‘correct’ limit values for lead, 
barium, antimony, arsenic and mercury raised complex and highly technical questions which prima 
facie could not be considered irrelevant, but required a thorough examination, to be carried out in 
the context of the main proceedings. Consequently, the President of the Court ordered the Com‑
mission to authorise that the German limit values be maintained. (35)

With the exception of a few cases in which it was held that there was no need to adjudicate, the 
other applications for interim measures were all dismissed, most frequently on the ground of lack 
of urgency.

Case T‑366/13 R France v Commission (order of 29 August 2013, under appeal), concerned a Com‑
mission decision ordering the recovery from Société nationale Corse Méditerranée (SNCM) of State 
aid of more that EUR 220 million implemented by the French Republic. The French Republic main‑
tained that the repayment of such a sum by SNCM would have the inevitable consequence that it 
would become insolvent and be wound up, which would cause serious and irreparable harm to the 
French Republic, such as a breach of territorial continuity, public disorder and negative economic 
consequences in Corsica. The President of the Court observed that the contested decision was 
binding only on the French authorities and stated that that decision could not in itself oblige SNCM 
to repay the State aid. As the French authorities had taken no legally binding measure for the im‑
plementation of the contested decision, the risk that SNCM would be wound up could not be re‑
garded as sufficiently imminent to justify granting the stay of implementation sought. In any event, 
as regards the internal remedies available to SNCM to defend itself against a national recovery 
measure, the French authorities had not established that those remedies would not enable SNCM 
to avoid being wound up, by raising before the national court its individual financial situation and 
its obligation to provide maritime connections between Marseilles and Corsica. The President of 
the Court could therefore only find that the imperfection of the relevant French remedies had not 
been established. In the case in point, an action brought by SNCM before the French courts had 
to be characterised as a necessary preliminary step, as the French Republic could not establish 
urgency before the Court so long as the national authorities had not adopted any binding enforce‑
ment measures and no application had been made to the national courts for a stay of enforcement.

Case T‑397/13 R Tilly‑Sabco v Commission (order of 26 September 2013), concerned an undertaking 
which specialised in the export to Middle East countries of deep‑frozen chickens with a unitary 
weight below that of chickens sold on the European market. Its profitability depended mainly on 
the grant of a public subsidy in the form of export refunds, the aim of which is, if need be, to facili‑
tate exports in the context of the attainment of the objectives of the common agricultural policy. 
After the amount of the export refunds for deep‑frozen chickens was fixed at zero by a Commission 
regulation, the applicant claimed to have lost 80% of its overall turnover and that its financial viabil‑
ity was in jeopardy. In his order of 26 September 2013, the President of the General Court dismissed 
the application for interim relief, on the ground that the applicant, as a prudent and well‑informed 
trader, could not be unaware that the common organisation of the agricultural markets was heavily 

(35)  The  appeal  against  this  order  was  dismissed  by  order  of  the  Vice  President  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of 

19 December 2013 in Case C‑426/13 P(R) Commission v Germany.

148 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

General Court

regulated, with the Commission intervening every three months to fix the amount of export re‑
funds and adjusting that amount to variations in the economic situation. Consequently, the ap‑
plicant could not rely on a vested right that a refund fixed at a specific amount, from which it had 
benefited at a given time, would be maintained, particularly since, under the relevant legislation, 
export refunds are optional in nature; there is thus no legal obligation to maintain the system of 
those  refunds  on  a  permanent  basis,  with  the  consequence  that,  depending  on  market  fluctu‑
ations, they can be reduced or even wholly suspended. In those circumstances, the applicant ought 
to have shown reasonable diligence by taking precautionary measures with a view to diversifying 
its production and its outlets. Having failed to show such diligence, the applicant itself had to bear 
the loss occasioned by the export refunds being fixed at zero as one of the risks of business.

Annual Report 2013 

149

Composition 

General Court

B — Composition of the General Court

(order of precedence as at 23 October 2013)

First row, from left to right:

G. Berardis, President of Chamber; M. Van der Woude, President of Chamber; A. Dittrich, President 
of Chamber; S. Papasavvas, President of Chamber; H. Kanninen, Vice‑President of the Court; M. Jae‑
ger, President of the Court; M.E. Martins Ribeiro, President of Chamber; M. Prek, President of Cham‑
ber; S. Frimodt Nielsen, President of Chamber; D. Gratsias, President of Chamber.

Second row, from left to right:

E. Buttigieg, Judge; A. Popescu, Judge; I. Labucka, Judge; I. Wiszniewska‑Białecka, Judge; F. De‑
housse,  Judge;  N.J.  Forwood,  Judge;  O.  Czúcz,  Judge;  I.  Pelikánová,  Judge;  J.  Schwarcz,  Judge; 
M. Kancheva, Judge.

Third row, from left to right:

L. Madise, Judge; I. Ulloa Rubio, Judge; V. Kreuschitz, Judge; V. Tomljenović, Judge; C. Wetter, Judge; 
E. Bieliūnas, Judge; A.M. Collins, Judge; S. Gervasoni, Judge; E. Coulon, Registrar.

Annual Report 2013 

151

Members 

General Court

1. 

Members of the General Court

(in order of their entry into office)

Marc Jaeger
Born 1954; law degree from the Robert Schuman University of Stras‑
bourg; studied at the College of Europe; admitted to the Luxembourg 
Bar (1981); attaché de justice delegated to the office of the Public At‑
torney of Luxembourg (1983); Judge at the Luxembourg District Court 
(1984); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Com‑
munities (1986–96); President of the Institut Universitaire International 
Luxembourg (IUIL); Judge at the General Court since 11 July 1996; Presi‑
dent of the General Court since 17 September 2007.

Heikki Kanninen
Born 1952; graduate of the Helsinki School of Economics and of the Fac‑
ulty of Law of the University of Helsinki; Legal Secretary at the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland; General Secretary to the Committee 
for Reform of Legal Protection in Public Administration; Principal Ad‑
ministrator at the Supreme Administrative Court; General Secretary to 
the Committee for Reform of Administrative Litigation, Counsellor in 
the Legislative Drafting Department of the Ministry of Justice; Assistant 
Registrar at the EFTA Court; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities;  Judge  at  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court 
(1998–2005); member of the Asylum Appeal Board; Vice‑Chairman of 
the Committee on the Development of the Finnish Courts; Judge at the 
Civil Service Tribunal from 6 October 2005 to 6 October 2009; Judge at 
the General Court since 7 October 2009; Vice‑President of the General 
Court since 17 September 2013.

Josef Azizi
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws and Master of Sociology and Economics of 
the  University  of  Vienna;  Lecturer  and  Senior  Lecturer  at  the  Vienna 
School of Economics, the Faculty of Law of the University of Vienna and 
various other universities; Honorary Professor at the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Vienna; Ministerialrat and Head of Department at the 
Federal Chancellery; member of the Steering Committee on Legal Co‑
operation of the Council of Europe (CDCJ); representative ad litem be‑
fore the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) in proceedings 
for review of the constitutionality of federal laws; Coordinator responsi‑
ble for the adaptation of Austrian federal law to Community law; Judge 
at the General Court from 18 January 1995 to 16 September 2013.

Annual Report 2013 

153

General Court 

Members

Nicholas James Forwood
Born 1948; Cambridge University BA 1969, MA 1973 (Mechanical Sci‑
ences and Law); called to the English Bar in 1970, thereafter practising 
in London (1971–99) and also in Brussels (1979–99); called to the Irish 
Bar in 1981; appointed Queen’s Counsel 1987; Bencher of the Middle 
Temple  1998;  representative  of  the  Bar  of  England  and  Wales  at  the 
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the EU (CCBE) and Chairman 
of the CCBE’s Permanent Delegation to the European Court of Justice 
(1995–99); governing board member of the World Trade Law Associa‑
tion and European Maritime Law Organisation (1993–2002); Judge at 
the General Court since 15 December 1999.

Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro
Born 1956; studied in Lisbon, Brussels and Strasbourg; member of the Bar 
in Portugal and Brussels; independent researcher at the Institut d’études 
européennes  de  l’Université  libre  de  Bruxelles  (Institute  for  European 
Studies, Free University of Brussels); Legal Secretary to the Portuguese 
Judge at the Court of Justice, Mr Moitinho de Almeida (1986–2000), then 
to the President of the Court of First Instance, Mr Vesterdorf (2000–03); 
Judge at the General Court since 31 March 2003.

Franklin Dehousse
Born  1959;  law  degree  (University  of  Liege,  1981);  Research  Fellow 
(Fonds national de la recherche scientifique, 1985–89); Legal Adviser to 
the Chamber of Representatives (1981–90); Doctor of Laws (University 
of Strasbourg, 1990); Professor (Universities of Liege and Strasbourg; 
College of Europe; Institut royal supérieur de Défense; Université Mon‑
tesquieu, Bordeaux; Collège Michel Servet of the Universities of Paris; 
Faculties of Notre‑Dame de la Paix, Namur); Special Representative of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (1995–99); Director of European Studies 
of the Royal Institute of International Relations (1998–2003); assesseur at 
the Council of State (2001–03); consultant to the European Commission 
(1990–2003); member of the Internet Observatory (2001–03); Judge at 
the General Court since 7 October 2003.

154 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

General Court

Ottó Czúcz
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws of the University of Szeged (1971); Adminis‑
trator at the Ministry of Labour (1971–74); Lecturer (1974–89), Dean of 
the Faculty of Law (1989–90), Vice‑Rector (1992–97) at the University of 
Szeged; lawyer; member of the Presidium of the National Retirement 
Insurance Scheme; Vice‑President of the European Institute of Social 
Security  (1998–2002);  member  of  the  Scientific  Council  of  the  Inter‑
national Social Security Association; Judge at the Constitutional Court 
(1998–2004); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.

Irena Wiszniewska‑Białecka
Born 1947; Magister Juris, University of Warsaw (1965–69); Researcher 
(Assistant  Lecturer,  Associate  Professor,  Professor)  at  the  Institute  of 
Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1969–2004); Assistant 
Researcher  at  the  Max  Planck  Institute  for  Foreign  and  International 
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich (award from the Alex‑
ander von Humboldt Foundation, 1985–86); lawyer (1992–2000); Judge 
at the Supreme Administrative Court (2001–04); Judge at the General 
Court since 12 May 2004.

Irena Pelikánová
Born  1949;  Doctor  of  Laws,  assistant  in  economic  law  (before  1989), 
Dr  Sc.,  Professor  of  Business  Law  (since  1993)  at  the  Faculty  of  Law, 
Charles University, Prague; member of the Executive of the Securities 
Commission (1999–2002); lawyer; member of the Legislative Council of 
the Government of the Czech Republic (1998–2004); Judge at the Gen‑
eral Court since 12 May 2004.

Annual Report 2013 

155

General Court 

Members

Vilenas Vadapalas
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws (University of Moscow); Doctor habil. in Law 
(University of Warsaw); taught, at the University of Vilnius, internation‑
al law (from 1981), human rights law (from 1991) and Community law 
(from 2000); Adviser to the Lithuanian Government on foreign relations 
(1991–93); member of the coordinating group of the delegation negoti‑
ating accession to the European Union; Director‑General of the Govern‑
ment’s European Law Department (1997–2004); Professor of European 
Law at the University of Vilnius, holder of the Jean Monnet Chair; Presi‑
dent of the Lithuanian European Union Studies Association; Rappor‑
teur of the parliamentary working group on constitutional reform relat‑
ing to Lithuanian accession; member of the International Commission 
of Jurists (April 2003); Judge at the General Court from 12 May 2004 to 
16 September 2013.

Küllike Jürimäe
Born 1962; law degree, University of Tartu (1981–86); Assistant to the 
Public  Prosecutor,  Tallinn  (1986–91);  Diploma,  Estonian  School  of 
Diplomacy (1991–92); Legal Adviser (1991–93) and General Counsel at 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992–93); Judge, Tallinn Court 
of Appeal (1993–2004); European Masters in Human Rights and Democ‑
ratisation, Universities of Padua and Nottingham (2002–03); Judge at 
the General Court from 12 May 2004 to 23 October 2013; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 23 October 2013.

Ingrida Labucka
Born 1963; Diploma in Law, University of Latvia (1986); Investigator at 
the Interior Ministry for the Kirov Region and the City of Riga (1986–89); 
Judge,  Riga  District  Court  (1990–94);  lawyer  (1994–98  and  July  1999 
to  May  2000);  Minister  for  Justice  (November  1998  to  July  1999  and 
May 2000 to October 2002); member of the International Court of Ar‑
bitration  in  The  Hague  (2001–04);  Member  of  Parliament  (2002–04); 
Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.

156 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

General Court

Savvas S. Papasavvas
Born 1969; studies at the University of Athens (graduated in 1991); DEA 
(diploma of advanced studies) in public law, University of Paris II (1992), 
and PhD in law, University of Aix‑Marseille III (1995); admitted to the 
Cyprus Bar, member of the Nicosia Bar since 1993; Lecturer, University 
of  Cyprus  (1997–2002),  Lecturer  in  Constitutional  Law  since  Septem‑
ber 2002; Researcher, European Public Law Centre (2001–02); Judge at 
the General Court since 12 May 2004.

Miro Prek
Born 1965; law degree (1989); called to the Bar (1994); performed vari‑
ous tasks and functions in public authorities, principally in the Govern‑
ment  Office  for  Legislation  (Under‑Secretary  of  State  and  Deputy 
Director, Head of Department for European and Comparative Law) and 
in the Office for European Affairs (Under‑Secretary of State); member 
of the negotiating team for the association agreement (1994–96) and 
for  accession  to  the  European  Union  (1998–2003),  responsible  for 
legal affairs; lawyer; responsible for projects regarding adaptation to 
European legislation, and to achieve European integration, principally 
in the western Balkans; Head of Division at the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  (2004–06);  Judge  at  the  General  Court  since 
7 October 2006.

Alfred Dittrich
Born  1950;  studied  law  at  the  University  of  Erlangen‑Nuremberg 
(1970–75); articled law clerk in the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court 
district (1975–78); Adviser at the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(1978–82); Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the European Communities (1982); Adviser at 
the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, responsible for Community 
law  and  competition  issues  (1983–92);  Head  of  the  EU  Law  Section 
at  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice  (1992–2007);  Head  of  the  German 
delegation on the Council Working Party on the Court of Justice; Agent 
of the Federal Government in a large number of cases before the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities; Judge at the General Court 
since 17 September 2007.

Annual Report 2013 

157

General Court 

Members

Santiago Soldevila Fragoso
Born 1960; graduated in law from the Autonomous University of Barce‑
lona (1983); Judge (1985); from 1992 Judge specialising in contentious 
administrative proceedings, assigned to the High Court of Justice of 
the Canary Islands at Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1992 and 1993), and to the 
National High Court (Madrid, from May 1998 to August 2007), where he 
decided judicial proceedings in the field of tax (VAT), actions brought 
against general legislative provisions of the Ministry of the Economy 
and against its decisions on State aid or the government’s financial li‑
ability, and actions brought against all agreements of the central eco‑
nomic regulators in the spheres of banking, the stock market, energy, 
insurance and competition; Legal Adviser at the Constitutional Court 
(1993–98);  Judge  at  the  General  Court  from  17  September  2007  to 
16 September 2013.

Laurent Truchot
Born  1962;  graduate  of  the  Institut  d’études  politiques,  Paris  (1984); 
former  student  of  the  École  nationale  de  la  magistrature  (National 
School for the Judiciary) (1986–88); Judge at the Regional Court, Mar‑
seilles (January 1988 to January 1990); Law Officer in the Directorate for 
Civil Affairs and the Legal Professions at the Ministry of Justice (Janu‑
ary 1990 to June 1992); Deputy Section Head, then Section Head, in the 
Directorate‑General for Competition, Consumption and the Combat‑
ing of Fraud at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry 
(June 1992 to September 1994); Technical Adviser to the Minister for 
Justice  (September  1994  to  May  1995);  Judge  at  the  Regional  Court, 
Nîmes (May 1995 to May 1996); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
in  the  Chambers  of  Advocate  General  Léger  (May  1996  to  Decem‑
ber 2001); Auxiliary Judge at the Court of Cassation (December 2001 to 
August 2007); Judge at the General Court from 17 September 2007 to 
16 September 2013.

Sten Frimodt Nielsen
Born 1963; graduated in law from Copenhagen University (1988); civil 
servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988–91); tutor in inter national 
and  European  law  at  Copenhagen  University  (1988–91);  Embassy 
Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations 
in New York (1991–94); civil servant in the Legal Service of the Minis‑
try of Foreign Affairs (1994–95); external lecturer at Copenhagen Uni‑
versity (1995); Adviser, then Senior Adviser, in the Prime Minister’s Of‑
fice (1995–98); Minister Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of 
Denmark to the European Union (1998–2001); Special Adviser for legal 
issues in the Prime Minister’s Office (2001–02); Head of Depart ment and 
Legal Counsel in the Prime Minister’s Office (March 2002 to July 2004); 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  and  Legal  Counsel  in  the  Prime  Minis‑
ter’s Office (August 2004 to August 2007); Judge at the General Court 
since 17 September 2007.

158 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

General Court

Kevin O’Higgins
Born 1946; educated at Crescent College Limerick, Clongowes Wood 
College, University College Dublin (BA degree and Diploma in Europe‑
an Law) and the King’s Inns; called to the Bar of Ireland in 1968; Barrister 
(1968–82); Senior Counsel (Inner Bar of Ireland, 1982–86); Judge of the 
Circuit Court (1986–97); Judge of the High Court of Ireland (1997–2008); 
Bencher of King’s Inns; Irish Representative on the Consultative Coun‑
cil  of  European  Judges  (2000–08);  Judge  at  the  General  Court  from 
15 September 2008 to 16 September 2013.

Juraj Schwarcz
Born 1952; Doctor of Law (Comenius University, Bratislava, 1979); com‑
pany lawyer (1975–90); Registrar responsible for the commercial reg‑
ister  at  the  City  Court,  Košice  (1991);  Judge  at  the  City  Court,  Košice 
(January  to  October  1992);  Judge  and  President  of  Chamber  at  the 
Regional Court, Košice (November 1992 to 2009); temporary Judge at 
the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, Commercial Law Division 
(October 2004 to September 2005); Head of the Commercial Law Div‑
ision at the Regional Court, Košice (October 2005 to September 2009); 
external member of the Commercial and Business Law Department at 
Pavol Josef Šafárik University, Košice (1997–2009); external member of 
the teaching staff of the Judicial Academy (2005–09); Judge at the Gen‑
eral Court since 7 October 2009.

Marc van der Woude
Born  1960;  law  degree  (University  of  Groningen,  1983);  studies  at 
the  College  of  Europe  (1983–84);  Assistant  Lecturer  at  the  College  of 
Europe (1984–86); Lecturer at Leiden University (1986–87); Rapporteur 
in  the  Directorate‑General  for  Competition  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  (1987–89);  Legal  Secretary  at  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Communities  (1989–92);  Policy  Coordinator 
in  the  Directorate‑General  for  Competition  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  (1992–93);  Member  of  the  Legal  Service  of 
the Commission of the European Communities (1993–95); Member of the 
Brussels Bar from 1995; Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam from 
2000; author of numerous publications; Judge at the General Court since 
13 September 2010.

Annual Report 2013 

159

General Court 

Members

Dimitrios Gratsias
Born  1957;  graduated  in  law  from  the  University  of  Athens  (1980); 
awarded DEA (diploma of advanced studies) in public law by the Uni‑
versity of Paris I, Panthéon‑Sorbonne (1981); awarded diploma by the 
University Centre for Community and European Studies (University of 
Paris I) (1982); Junior Officer of the Council of State (1985–92); Junior 
Member  of  the  Council  of  State  (1992–2005);  Legal  Secretary  at  the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (1994–96); Supplemen‑
tary Member of the Superior Special Court of Greece (1998 and 1999); 
Member of the Council of State (2005); Member of the Special Court 
for  Actions  against  Judges  (2006);  Member  of  the  Supreme  Council 
for  Administrative  Justice  (2008);  Inspector  of  Administrative  Courts 
(2009–10); Judge at the General Court since 25 October 2010.

Andrei Popescu
Born 1948; graduated in law from the University of Bucharest (1971); 
postgraduate studies in international labour law and European social 
law, University of Geneva (1973–74); Doctor of Laws of the University 
of Bucharest (1980); trainee Assistant Lecturer (1971–73), Assistant Lec‑
turer  with  tenure  (1974–85)  and  then  Lecturer  in  Labour  Law  at  the 
University of Bucharest (1985–90); Principal Researcher at the National 
Research Institute for Labour and Social Protection (1990–91); Deputy 
Director‑General (1991–92), then Director (1992–96) at the Ministry of 
Labour  and  Social  Protection;  Senior  Lecturer  (1997),  then  Professor 
at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, 
Bucharest  (2000);  State  Secretary  at  the  Ministry  for  European  Inte‑
gration  (2001–05);  Head  of  Department  at  the  Legislative  Council  of 
Romania (1996–2001 and 2005–09); founding editor of the Romanian 
Review of European Law; President of the Romanian Society for Euro‑
pean Law (2009–10); Agent of the Romanian Government before the 
Courts of the European Union (2009–10); Judge at the General Court 
since 26 November 2010.

Mariyana Kancheva
Born 1958; degree in law at the University of Sofia (1979–84); post‑mas‑
ter’s degree in European law at the Institute for European Studies, Free 
University  of  Brussels  (2008–09);  specialisation  in  economic  law  and 
intellectual  property  law;  Trainee  judge  at  the  Regional  Court,  Sofia 
(1985–86); Legal adviser (1986–88); Lawyer at the Sofia Bar (1988–92); 
Director‑General of the Services Office for the Diplomatic Corps at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992–94); pursuit of the profession of lawyer 
in Sofia (1994–2011) and Brussels (2007–11); Arbitrator in Sofia for the 
resolution of commercial disputes; participation in the drafting of vari‑
ous legislative texts as legal adviser to the Bulgarian Parliament; Judge 
at the General Court since 19 September 2011.

160 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

General Court

Guido Berardis
Born  1950;  degree  in  law  (Sapienza  University  of  Rome,  1973),  Dip‑
loma of Advanced European Studies at the College of Europe (Bruges, 
1974–75);  official  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
(‘International Affairs’ Directorate of the Directorate‑General for Agri‑
culture, 1975–76); member of the Legal Service of the Commission of 
the European Communities (1976–91 and 1994–95); Representative of 
the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities in 
Luxembourg (1990–91); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  in  the  chambers  of  the  judge  Mr  G.F.  Man‑
cini  (1991–94);  Legal  Adviser  to  members  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities,  Mr  M.  Monti  (1995–97)  and  Mr  F.  Bolkestein 
(2000–02); Director of the ‘Procurement Policy’ Directorate (2002–03), 
the ‘Services, Intellectual and Industrial Property, Media and Data Pro‑
tection’ Directorate (2003–05) and the ‘Services’ Directorate (2005–11) 
at the Directorate‑General for the Internal Market of the Commission of 
the European Communities; Principal Legal Adviser and Director of the 
‘Justice, Freedom and Security, Private Law and Criminal Law’ Team at 
the Legal Service of the European Commission (2011–12); Judge at the 
General Court since 17 September 2012.

Eugène Buttigieg
Born  1961;  Doctor  of  Laws,  University  of  Malta;  Master  of  Laws  in 
European Legal Studies, University of Exeter; Ph.D. in Competition Law, 
University of London; Legal Officer at the Ministry of Justice (1987–90); 
Senior Legal Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990–94); Mem‑
ber of the Copyright Board (1994–2005); Legal Reviser at the Ministry of 
Justice and Local Government (2001–02); Board Member of the Malta 
Resources Authority (2001–09); Legal Consultant in the field of EU law 
from 1994, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, the Economy and 
Investment on consumer and competition law (2000–10), Legal Adviser 
to the Office of the Prime Minister on consumer affairs and competi‑
tion (2010–11), Legal Consultant with the Malta Competition and Con‑
sumer  Affairs  Authority  (2012);  Lecturer  (1994–2001),  Senior  Lecturer 
(2001–06), subsequently Associate Professor (from 2007) and holder of 
the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law (from 2009) at the University of Malta; 
Co‑founder and Vice‑President of the Maltese Association for European 
Law; Judge at the General Court since 8 October 2012.

Annual Report 2013 

161

General Court 

Members

Carl Wetter
Born 1949; Uppsala University, B.A. in economics (1974), LL.M. (1977); 
Administrative Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1977); member 
of the Swedish Bar Association (from 1983); member of the competi‑
tion law working group of ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) 
Sweden; Lecturer in competition law at Lund University and Stockholm 
University;  author  of  numerous  publications;  Judge  at  the  General 
Court since 18 March 2013.

Vesna Tomljenović
Born 1956; University of Rijeka, B.A. (1979); University of Zagreb, LL.M. 
(1984), S.J.D. (1996); University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law, Assistant Profes‑
sor (1980–98), Associate Professor (2003–09), Professor (2009–13); Uni‑
versity of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, Assistant Professor (1990–2013); 
President  of  the  Croatian  Comparative  Law  Association  (2006–13); 
Judge at the General Court since 4 July 2013.

Egidijus Bieliūnas
Born 1950; degree in law from the University of Vilnius (1973); doctorate 
in law (1978); Assistant Lecturer, Junior Lecturer and then Senior Lec‑
turer at the Law Faculty of the University of Vilnius (1977–92); Consult‑
ant in the Legal Department of the Supreme Council — Reconstituent 
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (1990–92); Adviser at the Lithuani‑
an Embassy in Belgium (1992–94); Adviser at the Lithuanian Embassy 
in France (1994–96); Member of the European Commission of Human 
Rights (1996–99); Judge at the Supreme Court of Lithuania (1999–2011); 
Senior Lecturer in the Criminal Law Department of the University of Vil‑
nius (2003–13); Representative of the Republic of Lithuania on the Joint 
Supervisory  Body  of  Eurojust  (2004–11);  Judge  at  the  Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania (2011–13); Judge at the General Court 
since 16 September 2013.

162 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

General Court

Viktor Kreuschitz
Born  1952;  Doctor  of  Laws  of  the  University  of  Vienna  (1981);  Civil 
servant in the Federal Chancellery, Constitutional Affairs Department 
(1981–97);  Adviser  in  the  Legal  Service  of  the  European  Commission 
(1997–2013); Judge at the General Court since 16 September 2013.

Anthony Michael Collins
Born 1960; Graduate of Trinity College, Dublin (Legal Science) (1984) and 
of the Honourable Society of the King’s Inns, Dublin (Barrister‑at‑Law) 
(1986); practised as Barrister‑at‑Law (1986–90 and 1997–2003) and Sen‑
ior Counsel (2003–13) at the Bar of Ireland; Legal Secretary at the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (1990–97); Director of the Irish 
Centre for European Law (1997–2000) and continues to be a Member of 
its Board of Directors; Vice‑President of the Council of European National 
Youth  Committees  (1979–81);  General  Secretary,  Organising  Bureau 
of  European  School  Student  Unions  (1977–84);  General  Secretary, 
Irish Union of School Students (1977–79); International Vice‑President, 
Union of Students in Ireland (1982–83); Member of the Administrative 
Committee of the Amicale des référendaires, Luxembourg (1992–2000); 
Member of the Permanent Delegation of the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe (CCBE) to the EU and EFTA Courts (2006–13); Judge 
at the General Court since 16 September 2013.

Ignacio Ulloa Rubio
Born  1967;  law  degree  with  honours  (1985–90)  and  PhD  studies 
(1990–93)  at  Universidad  Complutense,  Madrid;  Public  Prosecutor  of 
Gerona  (2000–03);  Judicial  and  Human  Rights  Adviser  for  the  Coali‑
tion Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq (2003–04); Civil First Instance 
Judge  and  Investigative  Judge  (2003–07),  then  Senior  Judge  (2008), 
Gerona; Deputy Head of EUJUST LEX Integrated Rule of Law Mission for 
Iraq at the Council of the European Union (2005–06); Legal Counsellor 
of the Constitutional Court of Spain (2006–11 and 2013); Secretary of 
State for Security (2012–13); Civil Expert on Rule of Law and Security 
Sector Reform at the Council of the European Union (2005–11); External 
Expert on Fundamental Rights and Criminal Justice for the European 
Commission (2011–13); lecturer and author of numerous publications; 
Judge at the General Court since 16 September 2013.

Annual Report 2013 

163

General Court 

Members

Stéphane Gervasoni
Born 1967; graduate of the Institut d’études politiques, Grenoble (1988) 
and  the  École  nationale  d’administration  (1993);  Junior  Officer  at  the 
Council of State (Judge‑Rapporteur in the Litigation Division (1993–97) 
and Member of the Social Affairs Division (1996–97)); Legal Adviser at 
the Council of State (1996–2008); Senior Lecturer at the Institut d’études 
politiques,  Paris  (1993–95);  Commissaire  du  gouvernement  attached 
to the Special Pensions Appeal Commission (1994–96); Legal Adviser 
to the Ministry of the Civil Service and to the City of Paris (1995–97); 
Secretary‑General of the Prefecture of the Département of the Yonne, 
Sub‑Prefect of the District of Auxerre (1997–99); Secretary‑General of 
the Prefecture of the Département of Savoie, Sub‑Prefect of the District 
of Chambéry (1999–2001); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (2001–05); full member of the Appeals Board of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (2001–05); Judge at the 
European Union Civil Service Tribunal (2005–11, President of Chamber 
from 2008 to 2011); Councillor of State, Deputy President of the Eighth 
Chamber of the Litigation Division (2011–13); Member of the Appeals 
Board of the European Space Agency (2011–13); Judge at the General 
Court since 16 September 2013.

Lauri Madise
Born 1974; degrees in law (Universities of Tartu and Poitiers); Adviser in 
the Ministry of Justice (1995–99); Head of the Secretariat of the Consti‑
tutional Committee of the Estonian Parliament (1999–2000); Judge at 
the Court of Appeal, Tallinn (from 2002); Member of the Judges’ Exam‑
ination Commission (from 2005); participation in legislative work con‑
cerning constitutional law and administrative law; Judge at the General 
Court since 23 October 2013.

Emmanuel Coulon
Born  1968;  law  studies  (Université  Panthéon‑Assas,  Paris);  manage‑
ment studies (Université Paris Dauphine); College of Europe (1992); en‑
trance examination for the Centre régional de formation à la profession 
d’avocat (regional training centre for the bar), Paris; certificate of ad‑
mission to the Brussels Bar; practice as a lawyer in Brussels; successful 
candidate in an open competition for the Commission of the European 
Communities; Legal Secretary at the Court of First Instance (Chambers 
of the Presidents Mr Saggio (1996–98) and Mr Vesterdorf (1998–2002)); 
Head  of  Chambers  of  the  President  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance 
(2003–05); Registrar of the General Court since 6 October 2005.

164 

Annual Report 2013

Change 

General Court

2. 

Change in the composition of the General Court in 2013

Formal sitting on 18 March 2013

Following the resignation of Mr Nils Wahl, now an Advocate General at the Court of Justice, the 
representatives of the Governments of the Member States, by decision of 6 March 2013, appointed 
Mr Carl Wetter as Judge at the General Court for the remainder of Mr Nils Wahl’s term of office, that 
is to say, until 31 August 2013.

Formal sitting on 4 July 2013

Following the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union on 1 July 2013, the rep‑
resentatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  by  decision  of 
1 July 2013, appointed Ms Vesna Tomljenović as Judge at the General Court for the period from 
1 July 2013 to 31 August 2015.

Formal sitting on 16 September 2013

In the context of the partial renewal of the membership of the General Court, and replacing Mr Lau‑
rent Truchot, Mr Vilenas Vadapalas, Mr Santiago Soldevila Fragoso and Mr Kevin O’Higgins, the rep‑
resentatives of the Governments of the Member States, by decisions of 26 June and 24 July 2013, 
appointed Mr Egidijus Bieliūnas, Mr Anthony Collins, Mr Ignacio Ulloa Rubio and Mr Stéphane Ger‑
vasoni as Judges at the General Court for the period from 1 September 2013 to 31 August 2019.

By decisions of 6 March, 26 June and 24 July 2013, the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States renewed, for the same period, the terms of office of Mr Nicholas James Forwood, 
Mr Alfred Dittrich, Ms Ingrida Labucka, Mr Miro Prek, Ms Mariyana Kancheva, Mr Guido Berardis, 
Mr Eugène Buttigieg, Mr Carl Wetter and Ms Vesna Tomljenović.

Finally, following the resignation of Mr Josef Azizi, the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, by decision of 26 June 2013, appointed Mr Viktor Kreuschitz as Judge at the Gen‑
eral Court for the period from 1 September 2013 to 31 August 2016.

Formal sitting on 23 October 2013

By decision of 16 October 2013, Mr Lauri Madise was appointed as Judge at the General Court for 
the period from 6 October 2013 to 31 August 2016.

In  the  context  of  the  partial  renewal  of  the  membership  of  the  General  Court,  by  decision  of 
16 October 2013 the representatives of the Governments of the Member States renewed the term 
of office of Ms Irena Pelikánová for the period from 1 September 2013 to 31 August 2019.

Annual Report 2013 

165

Order of precedence 

General Court

3. 

Order of precedence

From 1 January 2013 to 17 March 2013

From 18 March 2013 to 3 July 2013

M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA‑BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JÜRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. van der WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge

M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA‑BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JÜRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. van der WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
C. WETTER, Judge

E. COULON, Registrar

E. COULON, Registrar

Annual Report 2013 

167

General Court 

From 4 July 2013  
to 17 September 2013

M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA‑BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JÜRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. van der WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
C. WETTER, Judge
V. TOMLJENOVIĆ, Judge

Order of precedence

From 18 September 2013 
to 22 October 2013

M. JAEGER, President of the Court
H. KANNINEN, Vice‑President
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
M. PREK, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, President of Chamber
M. van der WOUDE, President of Chamber
D. GRATSIAS, President of Chamber
G. BERARDIS, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
O. CZÚCZ, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA‑BIAŁECKA, Judge
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, Judge
K. JÜRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
C. WETTER, Judge
V. TOMLJENOVIĆ, Judge
E. BIELIŪNAS, Judge
V. KREUSCHITZ, Judge
A. COLLINS, Judge
I. ULLOA RUBIO, Judge
S. GERVASONI, Judge

E. COULON, Registrar

E. COULON, Registrar

168 

Annual Report 2013

Order of precedence 

General Court

From 23 October 2013 to 31 December 2013

M. JAEGER, President of the Court
H. KANNINEN, Vice‑President
E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
M. PREK, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, President of Chamber
M. van der WOUDE, President of Chamber
D. GRATSIAS, President of Chamber
G. BERARDIS, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
O. CZÚCZ, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA‑BIAŁECKA, Judge
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
C. WETTER, Judge
V. TOMLJENOVIĆ, Judge
E. BIELIŪNAS, Judge
V. KREUSCHITZ, Judge
A. COLLINS, Judge
I. ULLOA RUBIO, Judge
S. GERVASONI, Judge
L. MADISE, Judge

E. COULON, Registrar

Annual Report 2013 

169

Former members 

General Court

4. 

Former members of the General Court

David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (1989–92)
Christos Yeraris (1989–92)
José Luís da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95), President (1989–95)
Jacques Biancarelli (1989–95)
Donal Patrick Michael Barrington (1989–96)
Romain Alphonse Schintgen (1989–96)
Heinrich Kirschner (1989–97)
Antonio Saggio (1989–98), President (1995–98)
Cornelis Paulus Briët (1989–98)
Koen Lenaerts (1989–2003)
Bo Vesterdorf (1989–2007), President (1998–2007)
Rafael García‑Valdecasas y Fernández (1989–2007)
Andreas Kalogeropoulos (1992–98)
Christopher William Bellamy (1992–99)
André Potocki (1995–2001)
Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos (1995–2003)
Pernilla Lindh (1995–2006)
Virpi Tiili (1995–2009)
Josef Azizi (1995–2013)
John D. Cooke (1996–2008)
Jörg Pirrung (1997–2007)
Paolo Mengozzi (1998–2006)
Arjen W.H. Meij (1998–2010)
Mihalis Vilaras (1998–2010)
Hubert Legal (2001–07)
Verica Trstenjak (2004–06) 
Daniel Šváby (2004–09)
Ena Cremona (2004–12)
Vilenas Vadapalas (2004–13)
Küllike Jürimäe (2004–13)
Enzo Moavero Milanesi (2006–11)
Nils Wahl (2006–12)
Teodor Tchipev (2007–10)
Valeriu M. Ciucă (2007–10)
Santiago Soldevila Fragoso (2007–13)
Laurent Truchot (2007–13)
Kevin O’Higgins (2008–13)

Annual Report 2013 

171

Former members

General Court 

Presidents

José Luís da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95)
Antonio Saggio (1995–98)
Bo Vesterdorf (1998–2007)

Registrar

Hans Jung (1989–2005)

172 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

C — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court

General activity of the General Court

1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13)

New cases

2.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
3. 
4. 

Type of action (2009–13)
Subject matter of the action (2009–13)

Completed cases

5.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
6. 
7. 
8. 
9.  Duration of proceedings in months (2009–13) (judgments and orders)

Subject matter of the action (2013)
Subject matter of the action (2009–13) (judgments and orders)
Bench hearing action (2009–13)

Cases pending as at 31 December

10.  Nature of proceedings (2009–13)
11.  Subject matter of the action (2009–13)
12.  Bench hearing action (2009–13)

Miscellaneous

13.  Proceedings for interim measures (2009–13)
14.  Expedited procedures (2009–13)
15.   Appeals against decisions of the General Court to the Court of Justice (1990–2013)
16.  Distribution of appeals before the Court of Justice according to the nature of the 

proceedings (2009–13)

17.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2013) (judgments and orders)
18.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2009–13) (judgments and orders)
19.  General trend (1989–2013) (new cases, completed cases, cases pending)

Annual Report 2013 

173

General Court 

Statistics

1. 

General activity of the General Court —  
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13) (1) (2)

1 400

1 200

1 000

800

600

400

200

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  New cases

  Completed cases

  Cases pending

New cases
Completed cases
Cases pending

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

568
555
1 191

636
527
1 300

722
714
1 308

617
688
1 237

790
702
1 325

(1)  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  this  table  and  the  following  tables  take  account  of  special  forms  of  procedure. 
The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: application to set a judgment aside (Article 41 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court); third‑party 
proceedings (Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 123 of the Rules of Procedure); revision of 
a judgment (Article 44 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 125 of the Rules of Procedure); interpretation 
of a judgment (Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 129 of the Rules of Procedure); taxation of 
costs (Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure); legal aid (Article 96 of the Rules of Procedure); and rectification of 
a judgment (Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure).

(2)  Unless otherwise indicated, this table and the following tables do not take account of proceedings concerning 

interim measures.

174 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

2. 

New cases — Nature of proceedings (2009–13)

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  State aid

  Competition

  Intellectual property

  Other direct actions

  Appeals

  Appeals concerning 
interim measures or 
interventions

  Special forms of 
procedure

State aid
Competition
Intellectual property
Other direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions
Special forms of procedure

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

46
42
207
158
31

84
568

42
79
207
207
23

1
77
636

67
39
219
264
44

1
88
722

36
34
238
220
10

1
78
617

54
23
293
275
57

88
790

Annual Report 2013 

175

General Court 

Statistics

3. 

New cases — Type of action (2009–13)

Distribution in 2013

Actions for  
annulment 
40.38%

Actions for  
failure to act 
1.52%

Actions for  
damages
1.90%

Arbitration 
clauses
0.76%

Intellectual  
property
37.09%

Special forms 
of procedures
11.14%

Appeals
7.22%

Actions for annulment
Actions for failure to act
Actions for damages
Arbitration clauses
Intellectual property
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions
Special forms of procedure

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

214
7
13
12
207
31

84
568

304
7
8
9
207
23

1
77
636

341
8
16
5
219
44

1
88
722

257
8
17
8
238
10

1
78
617

319
12
15
6
293
57

88
790

176 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

4. 

New cases — Subject matter of the action (2009–13) (1)

Access to documents
Accession of new states
Agriculture
Approximation of laws
Arbitration clause
Area of freedom, security and justice
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories
Commercial policy
Common fisheries policy
Common foreign and security policy
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection
Culture
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic and monetary policy
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Employment
Energy
Environment
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own resources, 
combating fraud)
Free movement of goods
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals 
(REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Restrictive measures (external action)
Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Taxation
Tourism
Trans‑European networks
Transport

Staff Regulations
Special forms of procedure

Total EC Treaty/TFEU
Total Euratom Treaty

OVERALL TOTAL

2009
15
1
19

12
2

8
1

1
42

1
5

6

2
4
5

1
1
1
4
207
32
2
19

6
7
2

46

452

32
84
568

2010
19

2011
21

2012
18

24

9

9
19
1

79

4
4
24

15
1

1
1
207
17
4
15

8
3
21
4

42
1

1
533
1
25
77
636

22

5
1

11
3

11

8

20

39

34

10
4
3
2

1
6
2

219
44
2
18

3
4
93
5

67
1

1
587

47
88
722

6
3
4
1

3
1

1

1
238
41
12
23

2
3
59
1

36
1

527

12
78
617

2013
20
1
27
13
6
6
1
23
3
2

23
2
1
1
15
3
2
2
1
10

1

294
44
5
15

12
5
41

1
54
1
2
3
5
645

57
88
790

(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 December 2009, 
it was necessary to change the presentation of the subject matter of actions. The data for the year 2009 have been 
revised accordingly.

Annual Report 2013 

177

General Court 

Statistics

5. 

Completed cases — Nature of proceedings (2009–13)

250

200

150

100

50

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  State aid

  Competition

  Staff cases

  Intellectual property

  Other direct actions

  Appeals

  Appeals concerning 
interim measures or 
interventions

  Special forms of 
procedure

State aid
Competition
Staff cases
Intellectual property
Other direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions
Special forms of procedure

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

70
31
1
168
171
31

83
555

50
38

180
149
37

1
72
527

41
100
1
240
222
29

1
80
714

63
61

210
240
32

1
81
688

60
75

217
226
39

85
702

178 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

6. 

Completed cases — Subject matter of the action (2013)

Judgments

Orders

Total

Access to documents
Agriculture
Arbitration clause
Area of freedom, security and justice
Commercial policy
Common fisheries policy
Competition
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic and monetary policy
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Employment
Energy
Environment
External action by the European Union
Free movement of goods
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Restrictive measures (external action)
Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Tourism

Staff Regulations
Special forms of procedure

Total EC Treaty/TFEU
Total CS Treaty

OVERALL TOTAL

10
12
4
1
11
2
66
6

14

1
4

164
14
2
12

6
1
33
4

16

383
1
14

398

9
4
4
6
8

9
3
1

1
2

2
2
1
54
21
2
9

3
7

1
43
1
193

26
85
304

19
16
8
7
19
2
75
9
1
14
1
2
1
6
2
1
218
35
4
21

6
4
40
4
1
59
1
576
1
40
85
702

Annual Report 2013 

179

General Court 

Statistics

7. 

Completed cases — Subject matter of the action (2009–13) (1)  
(judgments and orders)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Access to documents
Accession of new states
Agriculture
Arbitration clause
Area of freedom, security and justice
Commercial policy
Common fisheries policy
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection
Culture
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic and monetary policy
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Employment
Energy
Environment
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combating fraud)
Free movement of goods
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Restrictive measures (external action)
Social policy
Social security for migrant workers
State aid
Taxation
Tourism
Transport

Staff Regulations
Special forms of procedure

Total EC Treaty/TFEU
Total CS Treaty
Total Euratom Treaty

OVERALL TOTAL

6
1
46
10
3
6
17

31

2
10

3

9

2
3
1
2
169
20
1
12

1
8
6

70

439

1
32
83
555

21

16
12

8

1
38
2

4
2
2
1

2
6
4

2
180
26
2
16

3
10
6

50
1

2
417

38
72
527

23

26
6

10
5

100
1

1
3
9
1

22
5

2
3
240
36
3
15

4
5
32
5

41

1
599

1
34
80
714

21

32
11
2
14
9

61

6
2
12
1

8

2

1
2
210
41
2
24

1
3
42
1

63
2

1
574

33
81
688

19

16
8
7
19
2

75

9
1
14
1
2
1
6
2

1

218
35
4
21

6
4
40
4
1
59

1

576
1

40
85
702

(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 December 2009, 
it was necessary to change the presentation of the subject matter of actions. The data for the year 2009 have been 
revised accordingly.

180 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

8. 

Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2009–13)

Distribution in 2013

Chambers  
(three judges) 
84.90%

Appeal  
Chamber 
8.26%

President of the  
General Court 
5.70%

Chambers  
(five judges) 
1.14%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

s
t
n
e
m
g
d
u
J

s
r
e
d
r
O

l
a
t
o
T

11

20

Grand Chamber
Appeal Chamber
President of the General 
40
Court
Chambers (five judges)
8
Chambers (three judges) 245 200 445 255 168 423 359 245 604 328 264 592 378 218 596
Single judge

50
2

50
29

54
8

56
6

56
25

50
9

40
1

2
15

2
37

31

58

27

22

15

14

29

17

20

37

13

45

54

50

19

8

9

7

3

3

Total 292 263 555 288 239 527 393 321 714 354 334 688 398 304 702

Annual Report 2013 

181

General Court 

Statistics

9. 

Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months  
(2009–13) (1) (judgments and orders)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  State aid

  Competition

  Staff cases

  Intellectual property

  Other direct actions

  Appeals

State aid
Competition
Staff cases
Intellectual property
Other direct actions
Appeals

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

50.3
46.2
52.8
20.1
23.9
16.1

32.4
45.7

20.6
23.7
16.6

32.8
50.5
45.3
20.3
22.8
18.3

31.5
48.4

20.3
22.2
16.8

48.1
46.4

18.7
24.9
13.9

(1)  The  calculation  of  the  average  duration  of  proceedings  does  not  take  account  of:  cases  ruled  upon  by 
interlocutory  judgment;  special  forms  of  procedure;  appeals  concerning  interim  measures  or  interventions; 
cases referred by the Court of Justice following the amendment of the division of jurisdiction between it and 
the Court of First Instance (now the General Court); cases referred by the Court of First Instance after the Civil 
Service Tribunal began operating.

The duration of proceedings is expressed in months and tenths of months.

182 

Annual Report 2013

 
Statistics 

General Court

10.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 

(2009–13)

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  State aid

  Competition

  Staff cases

  Intellectual property

  Other direct actions

  Appeals

  Special forms of 
procedure

State aid
Competition
Staff cases
Intellectual property
Other direct actions
Appeals
Special forms of procedure

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

161
247
1
355
358
46
23
1 191

153
288
1
382
416
32
28
1 300

179
227

361
458
47
36
1 308

152
200

389
438
25
33
1 237

146
148

465
487
43
36
1 325

Annual Report 2013 

183

General Court 

Statistics

11.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Subject matter of the 

action (2009–13) (1)

Access to documents
Accession of new states
Agriculture
Approximation of laws
Arbitration clause
Area of freedom, security and justice
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories
Commercial policy
Common fisheries policy
Common foreign and security policy
Company law
Competition
Consumer protection
Culture
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic and monetary policy
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Education, vocational training, youth and sport
Energy
Environment
External action by the European Union
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own 
resources, combating fraud)
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH regulation)
Research and technological development and space
Restrictive measures (external action)
Social policy
State aid
Taxation
Tourism
Trans‑European networks
Transport

Staff Regulations
Special forms of procedure

Total EC Treaty/TFEU
Total CS Treaty
Total Euratom Treaty

OVERALL TOTAL

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

44

57

22
2

33
8

1
247
3

6

16
1
2
25
8

2
2
5
355
42
4
41

8
17
6
160

42

65

19
2

34
27
1

288
1

6
2
38

34
5

2
3
4
382
33
6
40

8
8
28
4
152

40

61

18
3

35
25
1

37

40

15
1

41
16
1

227

200

15
3
32
1
1
18
2

2
1
1
361
41
5
43

7
7
89
4
178
1

15
4
24
1
1
13
3

1

389
41
15
42

8
7
106
4
151

2
1 119
1

48
23
1 191

1
1 235
1
1
35
28
1 300

1
1 223
1

48
36
1 308

1 176
1

27
33
1 237

38
1
51
13
13

1
45
17
3

148
2
1
7
18
13
2
1
17
1

1

465
50
16
36

14
8
107

146
1
1
3
5
1 245

44
36
1 325

(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 December 2009, 
it was necessary to change the presentation of the subject matter of actions. The data for the year 2009 have been 
revised accordingly.

184 

Annual Report 2013

 
Statistics 

General Court

12.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 

(2009–13)

Distribution in 2013

Chambers  
(three judges) 
86.42%

Not assigned
8.75%

Appeal  
Chamber
3.85%

President of the  
General Court
0.08%

Chambers  
(five judges)
0.91%

Appeal Chamber
President of the General Court
Chambers (five judges)
Chambers (three judges)
Single judge
Not assigned

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

46

49
1 019
2
75
1 191

32
3
58
1 132

75
1 300

51
3
16
1 134

104
1 308

38
3
10
1 123

63
1 237

51
1
12
1 145

116
1 325

Annual Report 2013 

185

General Court 

Statistics

13.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2009–13)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

24

20

41

38

44

52

21

23

31

27

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  New

  Brought to a conclusion

Distribution in 2013

New 
applications 
for interim 
measures

Applications 
for interim 
measures 
brought to 
a conclusion

Granted

Outcome
Removal 
from the 
register/no 
need to 
adjudicate

Dismissed

Access to documents
Agriculture
Arbitration clause
Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories
Competition
Consumer protection
Environment
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Registration, evaluation, 
authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH regulation)
Restrictive measures (external action)
State aid

Total

4
2
1

1

1
1
4
2
3

1
3
8
31

2
1
1

1
1

3
2
2

2
3
9
27

2

1

1

4

1
1

1

2
1
2

1
3
6
18

1

1

3
5

186 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

14.  Miscellaneous — Expedited procedures (2009–13) (1) (2)

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  Brought

  Granted

  Refused

  Not acted upon (3)

2009
Outcome

2010
Outcome

2011
Outcome

2012
Outcome

2013
Outcome

t
h
g
u
o
r
B

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
s
u
f
e
R

Access to documents
Agriculture
Commercial policy
Competition
Customs union and Common Customs 
Tariff
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Energy
Environment
External action by the European Union
Freedom to provide services
Law governing the institutions
Procedure
Public health
Public procurement
Restrictive measures (external action)
Social policy
Staff Regulations
State aid

4
2
2
2

1

1
1
1
1
2
5

4
3
2
2

1
1
1
2
2

1

1

1

Total 22

3 18

)
3
(
n
o
p
u
d
e
t
c
a
t
o
N

1

3

1

1

2
10

1

7
2 24

t
h
g
u
o
r
B

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
s
u
f
e
R

)
3
(
n
o
p
u
d
e
t
c
a
t
o
N

t
h
g
u
o
r
B

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
s
u
f
e
R

)
3
(
n
o
p
u
d
e
t
c
a
t
o
N

1

t
h
g
u
o
r
B

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
s
u
f
e
R

)
3
(
n
o
p
u
d
e
t
c
a
t
o
N

1

3
2

1
1

1

5

10

2

2
2

1
1

1

3

16

1

4

t
h
g
u
o
r
B

1
1
15
2

1
5

1
2
4

d
e
t
n
a
r
G

d
e
s
u
f
e
R

2

5

1
1
14
2

1

2
1
4

)
3
(
n
o
p
u
d
e
t
c
a
t
o
N

1

7
1

1

2
4

2

2

12

2
2 23

2
9 26

5 28

2
2 32

7 26

1

2

3
4

2

1

30
1

43

3

1

1

2
10

5
22

(1)  The General Court may decide pursuant to Article 76a of the Rules of Procedure to deal with a case before it 

under an expedited procedure. That provision has been applicable since 1 February 2001.

(2)  As  a  result  of  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  on 
1 December 2009, it was necessary to change the presentation of the subject matter of actions. The data for the 
year 2009 have been revised accordingly.

(3)  The  category ‘Not  acted  upon’  covers  the  following  instances:  withdrawal  of  the  application  for  expedition, 
discontinuance of the action and cases in which the action is disposed of by way of order before the application 
for expedition has been ruled upon.

Annual Report 2013 

187

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Court 

Statistics

15.  Miscellaneous — Appeals against decisions of the General 

Court to the Court of Justice (1990–2013)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
9
9
1

1
9
9
1

2
9
9
1

3
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

7
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

9
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

1
0
0
2

2
0
0
2

3
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

5
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

  Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought

  Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1)

Number of decisions against which 
appeals were brought

Total number of decisions open to 
challenge (1)

Percentage of decisions against which 
appeals were brought

16
13
25
17
12
47
27
35
67
60
67
69
47
66
53
64
77
78
84
92
98
158
132
144

46
62
86
73
105
143
133
139
224
180
225
230
225
260
261
297
281
290
339
371
338
533
514
510

35%
21%
29%
23%
11%
33%
20%
25%
30%
33%
30%
30%
21%
25%
20%
22%
27%
27%
25%
25%
29%
30%
26%
28%

(1)  Total number of decisions open to challenge — judgments, orders concerning interim measures or refusing leave to 
intervene, and all orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register or transferring 
a case — in respect of which the period for bringing an appeal expired or against which an appeal was brought.

188 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

General Court

16.  Miscellaneous — Distribution of appeals before the Court of 

Justice according to the nature of the proceedings (2009–2013)

2009

o
t
n
e
p
o
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

e
g
n
e

l
l

a
h
c

h
c
i
h
w

i

t
s
n
a
g
a
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
r
e
w
s
l
a
e
p
p
a

s
a
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

2010

o
t
n
e
p
o
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

e
g
n
e

l
l

a
h
c

h
c
i
h
w

i

t
s
n
a
g
a
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
r
e
w
s
l
a
e
p
p
a

2011

o
t
n
e
p
o
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

e
g
n
e

l
l

a
h
c

h
c
i
h
w

i

t
s
n
a
g
a
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
r
e
w
s
l
a
e
p
p
a

s
a
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

2012

o
t
n
e
p
o
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

e
g
n
e

l
l

a
h
c

h
c
i
h
w

i

t
s
n
a
g
a
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
r
e
w
s
l
a
e
p
p
a

s
a
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

2013

o
t
n
e
p
o
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

e
g
n
e

l
l

a
h
c

h
c
i
h
w

i

t
s
n
a
g
a
s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
r
e
w
s
l
a
e
p
p
a

s
a
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

s
a
s
l
a
e
p
p
A

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

23

51 45%

17

34 50%

10

37

27% 18

52

35% 16

52 31%

11

45 24%

15

33 45%

49

90

54% 24

60

40% 28

73 38%

1

3 33%

1

1 100%

i

d
a
e
t
a
t
S

n
o
i
t
i
t
e
p
m
o
C

s
e
s
a
c
ff
a
t
S

y
t
r
e
p
o
r
p

s
n
o
i
t
c
a

25

153 16%

32

140 23%

39

201

19% 41

190

22% 38

183 21%

32

119 27%

34

131 26%

59

204

29% 47

208

23% 62

202 31%

l

a
u
t
c
e

l
l

e
t
n

I

t
c
e
r
i
d
r
e
h
t

O

s
l
a
e
p
p
A

s

m
r
o
f

l

a
i
c
e
p
S

e
r
u
d
e
c
o
r
p
f
o

l
a
t
o
T

2

0%

2

2 100%

92

371 25%

98

338 29% 158

533

30% 132

514

26% 144

510 28%

Annual Report 2013 

189

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Court 

Statistics

17.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 

(2013)  (judgments and order)

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
d

l
a
e
p
p
A

r
o
y
l
l
a
t
o
t
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

d
n
a
e
d
i
s
a
t
e
s
y
l
l
a
i
t
r
a
p

k
c
a
b

l
a
r
r
e
f
e
r
o
n

r
o
y
l
l
a
t
o
t
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
D

d
n
a
e
d
i
s
a
t
e
s
y
l
l
a
i
t
r
a
p

k
c
a
b

l
a
r
r
e
f
e
r

e
h
t

m
o
r
f

l
a
v
o
m
e
R

o
t
d
e
e
n
o
n
/
r
e
t
s
i
g
e
r

e
t
a
c
i
d
u
d
a

j

l
a
t
o
T

Access to documents
Agriculture
Commercial policy
Common foreign and security policy
Competition
Consumer protection
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Environment
Freedom of movement for persons
Freedom to provide services
Intellectual and industrial property
Law governing the institutions
Public health
Public procurement
Social policy
Staff Regulations
State aid
Taxation
Transport

Total

4
5
3
9
33
1
2
3
1
2
1
25
19
1
2
1
2
18
1
1
134

1
1

1

1
1

2

1
2
1

2
2

5

1

5

5

15

6

6
5
4
12
36
1
2
4
1
2
1
33
22
1
2
1
2
23
1
1
160

190 

Annual Report 2013

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics 

General Court

18.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 

(2009–13) (judgments and orders)

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  Appeal dismissed

  Decision totally or partially 
set aside and no referral back

  Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and referral back

  Removal from the 
register/no need 
to adjudicate

Appeal dismissed
Decision totally or partially set aside and no referral 
back
Decision totally or partially set aside and referral 
back
Removal from the register/no need to adjudicate

Total

2009
83

12

4
5
104

2010

2011

2012

2013

73

6

5
4
88

101

9

6
8
124

98

12

4
15
129

134

5

15
6
160

Annual Report 2013 

191

General Court 

Statistics

19.  Miscellaneous — General trend (1989–13)  

New cases, completed cases, cases pending

New cases (1)

Completed cases (2)

Cases pending on 
31 December

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Total

169
59
95
123
596
409
253
229
644
238
384
398
345
411
466
536
469
432
522
629
568
636
722
617
790
10 740

1
82
67
125
106
442
265
186
186
348
659
343
340
331
339
361
610
436
397
605
555
527
714
688
702
9 415

168
145
173
171
661
628
616
659
1 117
1 007
732
787
792
872
999
1 174
1 033
1 029
1 154
1 178
1 191
1 300
1 308
1 237
1 325

(1)  1989: the Court of Justice referred 153 cases to the newly created Court of First Instance (now the General Court)   
1993: the Court of Justice referred 451 cases as a result of the first extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance.  
1994: the Court of Justice referred 14 cases as a result of the second extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance.  
2004–05: the Court of Justice referred 25 cases as a result of the third extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance.

(2)  2005–06: the Court of First Instance referred 118 cases to the newly created Civil Service Tribunal.

192 

Annual Report 2013

  
  
Chapter III

The Civil Service Tribunal

Proceedings 

Civil Service Tribunal

A — Proceedings of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2013

By Mr Sean Van Raepenbusch, President of the Civil Service Tribunal

1.  The  statistics  concerning  the  Tribunal’s  activity  in  2013  show  a  drop  in  the  number  of  cases 
brought (160) compared with the previous year (178). However, 2012 was notable as the year in 
which the Tribunal had registered the largest number of cases since its creation. The number of 
cases brought in 2013 is, in contrast, comparable to that of 2011 (159). That figure is nonetheless 
markedly higher than that of earlier years (139 in 2010, 113 in 2009 and 111 in 2008).

Most importantly, it must be pointed out that the number of cases brought to a close (184) repre-
sents a clear increase on that of the preceding year (121), although the latter figure is explained by 
the fact that three of the seven Judges making up the Tribunal were replaced at the end of 2011. 
The fact nonetheless remains that the Tribunal has thus achieved the best result in terms of quan-
tity since its creation.

It  follows  that  the  number  of  pending  cases  fell  compared  with  the  previous  year  (211  com-
pared  with  235  as  at  31 December 2012).  However,  that  number  remains  at  a  higher  level  than 
at 31 December 2011 (178). The average duration of proceedings, (1) for its part, has not changed 
greatly (14.7 months in 2013 compared with 14.8 months in 2012).

During the period under consideration, the President of the Tribunal adopted three orders for in-
terim measures compared with 11 in 2012 and 7 in 2011.

The statistics for 2013 also show that 56 appeals were brought before the General Court against 
decisions of the Tribunal, which represents an increase on 2011 (44) and 2012 (11). However, it must 
be pointed out in that connection that 22 of the appeals brought in 2013 were lodged by a single 
defendant. Moreover, of 39 appeals decided in 2013, 30 were dismissed and nine upheld in full or 
in part; in addition, four of the cases in which the judgment was set aside were referred back to the 
Tribunal.

Furthermore, nine cases were brought to a close by amicable settlement under Article 69 of the 
Rules of Procedure, compared with four the year before. The Tribunal has thus returned to the level 
of 2011 (8).

2. Another point of interest is that there was a further change in the composition of the Tribunal in 
2013 as a new member took office owing to the early departure of a Judge.

3. The account given below will describe the most significant decisions of the Tribunal.

(1)  Not including the duration of any stay of proceedings.

Annual Report 2013 

195

Civil Service Tribunal 

Proceedings

I. 

Procedural aspects

Conditions for admissibility

1. 

Act adversely affecting an official

In its judgment of 11 December 2013 in Case F-130/11 Verile and Gjergji v Commission, the Tribunal 
took the view, on the question of the transfer of pension rights, that the proposal of additional 
years of pensionable service which the relevant departments of an institution submit to an official 
for approval is a unilateral act, separable from the procedural framework in which it arises, which 
is derived directly from the individual right expressly conferred by Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the 
Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (the Staff Regulations) on officials and other 
staff when they take up their duties with the European Union. Consequently, the Tribunal held that 
such a proposal is an act adversely affecting an official who has requested a transfer of his pension 
rights.

2. 

Time limits for bringing proceedings

It is not uncommon for officials and other staff to lodge a succession of complaints against the 
same act. Such complaints are admissible if they are lodged within the time limit laid down by 
Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. However, the question then arises as to when the time limit for 
bringing proceedings starts to run. In its judgment of 23 October 2013 in Case F-93/12 D’Agostino 
v Commission, the Tribunal held that it began to run on the date of receipt of the decision by which 
the administration adopted its position on the whole of the argument put forward by the applicant 
within the time limit for lodging a complaint. More specifically, if the applicant has lodged, within 
the prescribed time limit, a second complaint with the same scope as the first, in that it does not 
contain any new request, new claim or new evidence, the decision rejecting that second complaint 
must be regarded as a purely confirmatory measure confirming the rejection of the first complaint, 
so that it is from the rejection of the first complaint that the time limit for bringing proceedings 
starts to run. However, where the second complaint contains new elements compared with the 
first complaint, the decision rejecting the second complaint must be regarded as a new decision 
adopted, following reconsideration of the decision rejecting the first complaint, in the light of the 
second complaint, and it is that second decision which causes the time limit for bringing proceed-
ings to begin to run.

3. 

Jurisdiction

In its judgment of 16 September 2013 in Joined Cases F-20/12 and F-43/12 Wurster v EIGE, the Tri-
bunal held that the sound administration of justice requires it to consider of its own motion a plea 
raising a matter of public policy which relates to the scope of the law’s application in that, in the 
case at hand, the contested decision was adopted on the basis of provisions which did not apply 
to the applicant. Citing the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now the General Court) of 
15 July 1994 in Joined Cases T-576/93 to T-582/93 Browet and Others v Commission, the Tribunal held 
that it would be failing in its role as arbiter of legality if it did not point out, even in the absence of 
any dispute between the parties on that point, that the contested decision was taken on the basis 
of a legal provision which was not applicable to the case at hand.

4. 

Procedure

When dealing with an application which was problematic because of its structure, the Tribunal 
took the view, in its judgment of 30 September 2013 in Case F-38/12 BP v FRA, that it was not for it 

196 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

Civil Service Tribunal

to join together as it saw fit the arguments, complaints and pleas of an application under one or 
other head of claim. It therefore held that an argument raised under one head of claim seeking the 
annulment of a first decision may not be taken into account in support of another head of claim 
seeking the annulment of a second decision, even where that argument was in fact more powerful 
against that second decision.

II.  Merits

General conditions for validity of measures

1. 

Obligation to rule on the basis of an individual and detailed examination

The Tribunal has repeatedly recalled the institutions’ obligation to undertake a detailed examin-
ation of each case before reaching a decision. In particular, in its judgment of 19 March 2013 in Case 
F-13/12 BR v Commission, it emphasised that the obligation to examine each file diligently, fully 
and impartially, derives from the right to sound administration, and from the duty to have regard 
for the welfare of officials and the principle of equal treatment. In that light, the Tribunal held, in 
its judgment of 17 October 2013 in Case F-69/11 BF v Court of Auditors, that a committee tasked 
with making an initial selection from amongst candidates for a post must inform the appointing 
authority of the respective merits of the candidates selected at that stage, because the appointing 
authority must itself be placed in a position to be aware of and appraise the elements of the assess-
ment of those candidates in order to be able to reach the final decision which it is incumbent on it 
to make. On the other hand, the fact that such a committee does not supply a comparison which 
includes the merits of the candidates who were not selected is not in itself such as to adversely af-
fect candidates.

2. 

Obligation to state reasons

It is not uncommon for internal rules to require a pre-selection committee to submit a reasoned re-
port on the candidates for a post to the appointing authority. In that regard, the Tribunal held, in its 
judgment in BF v Court of Auditors, that, if such rules are not to be rendered useless, the statement 
of reasons required must contain all the elements of assessment necessary to allow the appointing 
authority to exercise its wide prerogatives as regards appointment correctly. A report containing 
such a statement of reasons must ultimately allow the appointing authority to understand the as-
sessment made by the pre-selection committee of the candidates selected and, following consid-
eration of the comparative merits, to choose itself the candidate most suited to the performance of 
the duties which were the subject of the recruitment notice.

Further, in its judgment of 6 March 2013 in Case F-41/12 Scheefer v Parliament, the Tribunal empha-
sised that a statement of reasons cannot be deemed deficient on the ground that it does not go 
into detail. A statement of reasons is sufficient provided that it sets out the facts and legal consid-
erations having decisive importance in the context of the decision, with the result that the admin-
istration is not required to give the grounds for the grounds of its decision.

On the other hand, the case-law sometimes imposes a higher obligation to state reasons on the 
administration.

According to the judgment of 11 July 2013 in Case F-46/11 Tzirani v Commission, that is the case 
as regards decisions to close without further action an inquiry originating in a request for assis-
tance in a case of psychological harassment. In that judgment the Tribunal held that, unlike most 

Annual Report 2013 

197

Civil Service Tribunal 

Proceedings

administrative  measures  which  may  adversely  affect  an  official,  such  decisions  are  adopted  in 
a specific factual context. A case of harassment, where it is established, is often characterised by 
its duration and by its extremely destructive effect on the victim’s state of health. Moreover, such 
a situation does not in the main affect the financial interests or the career of the official, but dam-
ages him as a person, and damages his dignity and his physical and mental well-being.

In the same judgment, the Tribunal also observed that, as the applicant was convinced that she had 
been harassed, the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff required a strict interpretation of 
the obligation to state the reasons provided for by the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff 
Regulations. Consequently, the institution is required to provide as full as possible a statement of 
reasons for its rejection of a request for assistance, and the applicant must not have to wait for the 
reply to a complaint in order to know those reasons.

3. 

Implementation of a judgment annulling a measure

In three judgments of 5 November 2013 in Cases F-103/12 Doyle v Europol, F-104/12 Hanschmann 
v Europol  and  F-105/12 Knöll v Europol,  the  Tribunal  pointed  out  that,  where  a  judgment  of  the 
Courts of the European Union annuls a decision of the administration on the ground of a breach of 
the rights of the defence, it is for the administration concerned to demonstrate that it has adopted 
all  possible  measures  to  negate  the  effects  of  that  illegality.  Consequently,  the  administration 
may not confine itself to stating that it is no longer possible to reinstate the victim of that breach 
in  a  situation  where  he  can  exercise  his  rights  of  defence.  Accepting  such  an  approach  would 
amount to depriving of all meaning the obligation to ensure that those rights are respected and 
to implement the judgment finding that they have been breached. It is only where, for reasons 
not attributable to the administration concerned, it is objectively difficult, not to say impossible, 
to  cancel  the  effects  of  the  breach  of  the  rights  of  the  defence  that  the  judgment  annulling 
a measures may give rise to the payment of a sum of money in compensation.

Careers of officials and other staff

The Courts of the European Union consider that the selection board in a competition has a wide 
discretion when it verifies whether a candidate’s diploma is appropriate for the field of the compe-
tition or demonstrates the nature and length of the professional experience required. The Tribu-
nal must therefore confine itself to ascertaining whether the exercise of that power was free from 
manifest errors of assessment. In its judgment of 7 October 2013 in Case F-97/12 Thomé v Commis‑
sion, the Tribunal supplemented that case-law in holding that, where the question is whether the 
candidate’s diploma is recognised by the legislation of the State where it was issued or whether 
it meets, for the purposes of that legislation, the level required by the notice of competition, the 
interpretation which the selection board or the appointing authority gives, in response to a com-
plaint, of the national legislation does not fall within its wide discretion, so that it must be subject 
to full review by the Courts of the European Union.

In addition, it is accepted in the case-law that, if the appointing authority finds, following publica-
tion of a notice of competition, that the conditions required are more exacting than the needs 
of  the  service  demand,  it  may  either  continue  the  procedure  and,  if  necessary,  recruit  a  lower 
number of successful candidates than originally intended, or reopen the procedure by withdraw-
ing the original competition notice and putting an amended one in its place. In its judgments of 
13 March 2013 in Case F-125/11 Mendes v Commission and of 21 March 2013 in Case F-93/11 Taghani 
v Commission, the Tribunal made clear that the appointing authority may not amend, during the 
course of the procedure, the rules on the marking of certain tests in order to increase the number 
of candidates who received the pass mark in those tests. Such an approach reduces the prospects 

198 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

Civil Service Tribunal

of being among the best candidates of those who passed the tests according to the original rules. 
In that connection, the Tribunal explained that the application of the amendment in question to 
the candidates breached the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the prin-
ciple of legal certainty, in that they were entitled to expect that the candidates admitted to the 
assessment exercises would be chosen only from among those who had obtained the pass mark in 
the admission tests according to the marking scheme set out in the competition notice.

Rights and obligations of officials and other staff

1. 

Non-discrimination on the grounds of age

The question arose as to whether the appointment at a career entry grade of a successful candi-
date in a competition who had acquired considerable professional experience outside the insti-
tutions constituted discrimination on the ground of age in so far as the person concerned could 
not expect to have career prospects equivalent to those of a younger successful candidate. In its 
judgment of 12 December 2013 in Case F-133/11 BV v Commission, the Tribunal held, in that regard, 
that where a competition notice, published in order to recruit officials at a certain grade, requires 
candidates to meet a minimum professional experience requirement, the successful candidates in 
that competition must all be regarded, whatever their age and professional experience, as being in 
the same situation as regards their classification in grade. It is true that the Tribunal has conceded 
that successful candidates in such a competition who joined the European civil service after having 
obtained  considerable  professional  experience  outside  the  institutions  cannot  expect  career 
prospects equivalent to those of successful candidates who joined the European civil service at 
a younger age, because, as a rule, the career of the former will be shorter than that of the latter. 
However, as the Tribunal has pointed out, that state of affairs does not constitute discrimin ation 
on  the  ground  of  age,  but  depends  on  the  individual  circumstances  of  each  of  the  successful 
candidates.

2. 

Discrimination on the grounds of sex

Maternity leave is intended to protect, first, the biological condition of a woman during and after 
her pregnancy and, second, the special relationship between a woman and her child during the 
period following pregnancy and birth. However, in its judgment of 11 July 2013 in Case F-86/12 
Haupt–Lizer v Commission,  the  Tribunal  held  that  in  limiting  the  period  during  which  a  women 
was obliged not to work to the two weeks immediately before and after the birth, the European 
Union legislature had not intended to create a presumption that it was impossible for the person 
concerned to take any work-related action whatsoever during the other weeks of her maternity 
leave. Consequently, and given that the applicant had been informed after that two-week period 
of her inclusion on the reserve list of the competition which she sat and that she did not report any 
particular medical circumstances, the Tribunal refused, in this case, to regard maternity leave as an 
obstacle to taking the action required for the purposes of recruitment. Although the applicant was 
entitled to devote herself exclusively to her child during her maternity leave, the fact remains that 
she could not use that personal choice as a pretext for claiming that she was the victim of discrim-
ination on the ground of her sex.

Furthermore, in the same judgment, the Tribunal held that the exercise by the applicant of her 
right to parental leave could not prevent her from taking part in a recruitment procedure and that 
the refusal to take that leave into account did not constitute discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
The Tribunal observed, in that regard, that the option of taking parental leave was available to both 
women and men and that the protection afforded to such leave was less extensive than that given 
to maternity leave.

Annual Report 2013 

199

Civil Service Tribunal 

Proceedings

3. 

Psychological harassment

Following on from its judgment of 9 December 2008 in Case F-52/05 Q v Commission (set aside on 
another issue by the judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2011 in Case T-80/09 P Commission 
v Q), the Tribunal held, in Tzirani v Commission, that a decision to close the file on a request for as-
sistance based on an allegation of psychological harassment breaches Article 12a(3) of the Staff 
Regulations if the ground for that decision is the absence of any malicious intention on the part of 
the alleged harasser. In the same judgment, the Tribunal held that the second paragraph of Art-
icle 25 of the Staff Regulations does not require the disclosure to a person who made a request for 
assistance of either the final report of the administrative inquiry or the transcript of the hearings 
held in that connection. However, and provided that the interests of the persons accused and of 
those who gave witness statements to the inquiry are protected, no provision of the Staff Regula-
tions prohibits such disclosure either.

Further, Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, which is applicable to contract staff, provides that such 
staff are not to suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution which employs them 
when they are the victims of psychological harassment. However, in D’Agostino v Commission, the 
Tribunal observed that the provision is intended only to protect officials and other staff from any 
harassment, so that it cannot prevent the institution from ending a contractual relationship on 
a legitimate ground which has nothing to do with harassment.

4. 

Access to classified information

In a judgment of 21 November 2013 in Case F-122/12 Arguelles Arias v Council, the Tribunal ruled 
for the first time on the interpretation of Council Decision 2011/292. (2) It held that the appoint-
ing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (the AECC) has 
exclusive authority to decide, following completion of a security investigation by the competent 
national authorities, to grant or refuse security clearance to members of the Council’s staff. As they 
are not bound by the findings of the security investigation conducted by the national authorities, 
even where the outcome of that investigation is favourable, the Council’s appointing authority or 
AECC is not obliged to grant the person concerned security clearance if he presents a security risk, 
and thus retains the option of refusing to grant it by virtue of the duty of precaution incumbent on 
the institutions.

5. 

Duty of cooperation and loyalty

Also in its judgment in Arguelles Arias v Council, the Tribunal held that the applicant had breached 
his duty of loyalty and cooperation vis-à-vis the institution employing him in refusing to disclose 
to that institution the information which he had lodged with the national authority and which was 
such as to demonstrate that the institution’s favourable decision was well-founded, when he was 
the only person in a position to supply that information to the institution.

6. 

Access to medical file

In  its  judgment  of  16 September 2013  in  Case  F-84/12  CN  v  Council,  the  Tribunal  held  that  Art-
icle 26a of the Staff Regulations could not be regarded as breaching Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since Article 26a recognises that officials have the 

(2)  Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information 

(OJ 2011 L 141, p. 17).

200 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

Civil Service Tribunal

right to acquaint themselves with their medical files and makes clear that such access is to be in ac-
cordance with arrangements laid down by each institution. Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter does not 
require that officials have, in all circumstances, direct access to their medical file, but makes indirect 
access possible where warranted by legitimate interests of confidentiality and professional secrecy.

Emoluments and social security benefits of officials

1. 

Daily subsistence allowance

In its judgment of 19 March 2013 in Case F-10/12 Infante García‑Consuegra v Commission, the Tri-
bunal  held  that  the  daily  subsistence  allowance  under  Article  10(1)  of  Annex  VII  to  the  Staff 
Regulations is subject to two conditions: first, the condition that the official must have changed 
his place of residence in order to comply with the obligation in Article 20 of the Staff Regulations 
and, second, the condition that he must have incurred costs or inconvenience as a result of having 
to move to or set up home provisionally in his place of employment. However, the grant of the 
daily subsistence allowance is not subject to the condition that the official concerned proves that 
he was obliged to maintain a home which gives rise to expenses provisionally in his place of origin 
or former employment. Moreover, if officials are not to be excluded automatically, in breach of 
the Staff Regulations, from receiving the daily subsistence allowance, it cannot be considered that 
only those persons who have a less stable employment relationship with the institutions may be 
regarded as having set up home provisionally in their place of employment until their relocation 
has taken place. In the same judgment, the Tribunal also made clear that, as the above conditions 
are cumulative, it is for the official concerned to furnish evidence that he has incurred expense or 
inconvenience as a result of having to move to or set up home provisionally in his place of employ-
ment. Nonetheless it is for the administration to respect the choice of the person concerned with 
regard to his accommodation during the time needed to look for a permanent home in his new 
place of employment. Accordingly, except in the case of serious suspicion and clear signs that there 
is no real correspondence between the expenses claimed and the actual situation of the person 
concerned, it is not for the administration to question the official’s choice.

2. 

Sickness insurance

In its judgment of 16 May 2013 in Case F-104/10 de Pretis Cagnodo et Trampuz de Pretis Cagnodo 
v Commission, the Tribunal held that there is no provision in either the Joint Rules on Sickness In-
surance (JSIS) for Officials, referred to in Article 72 of the Staff Regulations, or in the general imple-
menting provisions adopted by the Commission requiring members to obtain an official estimate 
and to send it to the settlements office with the request for direct billing for a forthcoming hospital 
stay. Similarly, it noted that no reimbursement ceiling has been fixed for accommodation costs 
during hospitalisation, the applicable rules providing only that the proportion of the costs deemed 
excessive by comparison with normal costs in the country where the costs have been incurred is 
not to be reimbursed.

In the same judgment, the Tribunal held that the Commission is required to manage the JSIS in ac-
cordance with the principle of sound administration. When faced with excessive accommodation 
costs, the duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff obliges the Commission and, by extension, 
the JSIS settlements offices, before paying the invoice, even where direct billing has been request-
ed, to obtain information in writing from the hospital that issued the invoice and also to inform the 
member of the problem. If they do not proceed in that manner, settlement offices may not leave 
members to bear the cost of the amount considered excessive.

Annual Report 2013 

201

Civil Service Tribunal 

Proceedings

The Tribunal was also called upon to clarify the role of the Medical Committee provided for by 
Article 23 of the JSIS and the extent of the supervision it exercises over that committee. In its judg-
ment of 2 October 2013 in Case F-111/12 Nardone v Commission, it recalled that it is the duty of the 
Medical Committee to assess medical questions entirely objectively and independently and that 
that duty requires, first, that the Committee have available to it all the information it might need 
and, second, that it have full discretionary power. The Court only has the power to ascertain, first, 
whether the Committee was constituted and functioned properly and, second, whether its opinion 
is lawful, in particular whether it contains a sufficient statement of reasons. In the same judgment, 
the Tribunal made clear that where the Medical Committee is required to answer complex med-
ical questions relating to a difficult diagnosis, it must indicate in its opinion the factors in the file 
on which it has relied and, in the event of significant discrepancy, its reasons for departing from 
certain relevant medical reports drawn up at an earlier stage which were more favourable to the of-
ficial. Finally, also in that judgment, the Tribunal made clear that the Medical Committee meets the 
requirement to state reasons and the requirements of consistency and clarity where, first, it takes 
a view on the medically proven existence of each of the diseases and disorders from which the 
person concerned claims to suffer, in sufficiently clear and explicit terms to allow an assessment of 
the considerations on which the authors of the report based their findings. Second, where it takes 
a view, also in sufficiently clear and explicit terms, on the possible accidental or occupational cause 
of the diseases and disorders it considers to be proven and, finally, where it is possible, on reading 
the opinion of the Medical Committee, to establish a comprehensible link between the medical 
findings it contains and each of its conclusions.

3. 

Pensions

The Tribunal clarified various issues relating to the transfer of pension rights in its judgment in Ver‑
ile et Gjergji v Commission. In the case of a transfer of rights acquired in the service of the European 
Union to a national pension scheme (‘transfer out’), Article 11(1) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regula-
tions provides that the official concerned has the right to have ‘the actuarial equivalent of his retire-
ment pension rights, updated to the actual date of transfer, in the [European Union]’ transferred. 
On the other hand, in the case of a transfer of pension rights acquired in a Member State to the 
European Union pension scheme (‘transfer in’), Article 11(2) provides that the official concerned is 
to be entitled to have paid to the European Union the capital value, updated to the date of the ac-
tual transfer, of pension rights acquired [with the national or international scheme of which he was 
a member until then]’. In the event of a transfer out, the sum of money transferred is the ‘actuarial 
equivalent’ of the rights acquired with the European Union. In the event of a transfer in, the sum 
of money transferred is the updated capital value, that is to say, a sum of money which represents 
in physical form the pension rights acquired with the national or international pension scheme, as 
updated on the date of the actual transfer.

In that connection, the Tribunal explained that the ‘actuarial equivalent’ referred to in Article 11(1) 
of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, and the ‘updated capital value’ referred to in Article 11(2) 
thereof are two distinct legal concepts, each covered by separate rules. The ‘actuarial equivalent’ 
appears in the Staff Regulations as an autonomous concept, which is part of the system of the 
European Union pension scheme. It is defined, in Article 8 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, 
as ‘the capital value of the benefits [of the old-age pension] accruing to the official by reference 
to the mortality table referred to in Article 9 of Annex XII and subject to 3.1% interest per annum, 
which rate may be revised in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 10 of Annex XII [to the 
Staff Regulations]’. ‘Updated capital value’, on the other hand, is not defined by the Staff Regula-
tions, nor do those Regulations indicate its method of calculation, for the reason that its calcula-
tion and the detailed rules for checking such calculation are exclusively a matter for the national 
or international authorities concerned. As regards the calculation, by the competent national or 

202 

Annual Report 2013

Proceedings 

Civil Service Tribunal

international authorities, for the purposes of a transfer in of the ‘updated capital value’, that capital 
value is determined on the basis of the applicable national law and in accordance with the detailed 
rules laid down by that law or, in the case of an international organisation, by its own rules, and not 
on the basis of Article 8 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations in accordance with the rate of interest 
fixed by that provision. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Tribunal held that Article 2 
of Regulation No 1324/2008, (3) which amended the rate of interest laid down by Article 8 of Annex 
VIII to the Staff Regulations for transfers out, must not be taken into account for the calculation of 
the capital corresponding to the pension rights acquired by officials and other staff before they 
enter the service of the European Union and must not be taken into account mandatorily by the 
national or international authorities concerned when they update the capital value of the sum they 
are required to transfer.

In a judgment of 11 December 2013 in Case F-15/10 Andres and Others v ECB, the Tribunal applied 
the case-law according to which an official cannot claim an acquired right unless the facts giving 
rise to that right occurred under the rules in force prior to the amendment of those rules. Accord-
ingly, when the fact that a member of staff has reached the age of 60 allows him to claim the im-
mediate calculation of his pension rights and the payment of benefits, the fact giving rise to the 
right to a pension is the fact of having reached that age and the staff member cannot claim the 
right acquired under the previous pension scheme when he had not reached that age at the time 
the pension scheme was amended.

Finally, there is a clear distinction between the fixing of a right to a pension and the payment of 
benefits which follows from that right. In the light of that distinction, it is accepted that an acquired 
right has not been breached where changes in the amounts actually paid are the result of the 
application of the weighting applicable to pensions according to the country of residence of the 
person entitled to the pension, as such changes do not prejudice the right to a pension as such. In 
its judgment in Andres and Others v ECB, the Tribunal took the view that that case-law also applied 
to the pension conversion factors used to calculate the benefits which actually had to be paid; as 
such factors are not constituent elements of pension rights as such.

Disputes concerning contracts

In  its  judgment  in  BR  v  Commission,  the  Tribunal  recalled  that  an  institution  frequently  enjoys 
a wide discretion not just in individual cases, but also within the framework of a general policy es-
tablished, if appropriate, by an internal decision of general application, such as general implement-
ing provisions, by which it imposes limits on the exercise of its discretion. The Tribunal, however, 
also recalled that such an internal decision may not result in the institution’s waiving entirely the 
power conferred on it by the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Conditions of Employment of other 
Servants of the European Union (CEOS) to conclude or renew, as the case may be, the contract of 
a member of the temporary staff within the meaning of Article 2(b) or (d) of the CEOS up to the 
maximum period of six years. The Tribunal also stated in the judgment that the AECC may not dis-
regard the discretion conferred on it by the second paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS by mechan-
ically applying the so called ‘six-year rule’ in Article 3(1) of the Commission decision of 28 April 2004, 
under which the accumulated total duration of the services of a non-permanent member of staff, 
whatever the type of contract or posting, is limited to six years calculated over a period of 12 years. 
A mechanical application of that rule cannot, in particular, justify the limitation of the employment 

(3)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1324/2008 of 18 December 2008 adjusting, from 1 July 2008, the rate of 
contribution to the pension scheme of officials and other servants of the European Communities (OJ 2008 L 345, 
p. 17).

Annual Report 2013 

203

Civil Service Tribunal 

Proceedings

of a member of staff to a shorter period than is authorised by the second paragraph of Article 8 of 
the CEOS. In disregarding its discretion in this way, the AECC breaches the principle of sound ad-
ministration, the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of equal treatment.

Moreover, in D’Agostino v Commission, the Commission sought to rely on the fact that the AECC 
should have produced evidence of a particularly significant interest in renewing the applicant’s 
contract on the ground that the applicable rules would then have required that it renew that con-
tract for an indefinite duration. In its judgment, the Tribunal held that an institution may not, how-
ever, without making an error of law, make the question whether the interest of the service requires 
the renewal of the contract of a member of staff depend, not on the needs of that service, but on 
obligations under the CEOS which it has to apply in the event of the renewal of that contract.

However,  the  Tribunal  held,  in  its  judgment  in  Scheefer v Parliament,  that  the  reclassification  of 
a contract of fixed duration into a contract for an indefinite period, in accordance with the first 
paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS, in recognition of the fact that an institution had concluded suc-
cessive fixed-term contracts with the applicant, does not, nonetheless, deprive that institution of 
the possibility of terminating that contract under the terms of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS. The use 
of contracts for an indefinite period does not provide their signatories with the stability of an ap-
pointment as an official.

204 

Annual Report 2013

Composition 

Civil Service Tribunal

B — Composition of the Civil Service Tribunal

(Order of precedence as at 8 October 2013)

From left to right:

K. Bradley, Judge; E. Perillo, Judge; H. Kreppel, President of Chamber; S. Van Raepenbusch, Presi-
dent of the Tribunal; M.I. Rofes i Pujol, President of Chamber; R. Barents, Judge; J. Svenningsen, 
Judge; W. Hakenberg, Registrar.

Annual Report 2013 

205

Members 

Civil Service Tribunal

1. 

Members of the Civil Service Tribunal

(in order of their entry into office)

Sean Van Raepenbusch
Born  in  1956;  graduate  in  law  (Free  University  of  Brussels,  1979);  spe-
cial diploma in international law (Brussels, 1980); Doctor of Laws (1989); 
head of the legal service of the Société anonyme du canal et des instal-
lations maritimes (Canals and Maritime Installations company), Brussels 
(1979–84);  official  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
(Directorate General for Social Affairs, 1984–88); member of the Legal 
Service  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (1988–94); 
Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(1994–2005);  lecturer  at  the  University  of  Charleroi  (international  and 
European  social  law,  1989–91),  at  the  University  of  Mons  Hainault 
(European  law,  1991–97),  at  the  University  of  Liège  (European  civil 
service law, 1989–91; institutional law of the European Union, 1995–2005; 
European social law, 2004–05); numerous publications on the subject 
of European social law and constitutional law of the European Union; 
Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005; President of the 
Civil Service Tribunal since 7 October 2011.

Horstpeter Kreppel
Born in 1945; university studies in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt-am-Main 
(1966–72);  First  State  examination  in  law  (1972);  Court  trainee  in 
Frankfurt-am-Main (1972–73 and 1974–75); College of Europe, Bruges 
(1973–74); Second State examination in law (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1976); 
specialist  adviser  in  the  Federal  Labour  Office  and  lawyer  (1976); 
presiding  judge  at  the  Labour  Court  (Land  Hesse,  1977–93);  lecturer 
at  the  Technical  College  for  Social  Work,  Frankfurt-am-Main,  and  at 
the  Technical  College  for  Administration,  Wiesbaden  (1979–1990); 
national expert to the Legal Service of the Commission of the European 
Communities  (1993–96  and  2001–05);  Social  Affairs  Attaché  at  the 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Madrid (1996–2001); 
presiding judge at the Labour Court of Frankfurt-am-Main (February 
to  September  2005);  Judge  at  the  Civil  Service  Tribunal  since 
6 October 2005.

Annual Report 2013 

207

Civil Service Tribunal 

Members

Irena Boruta
Born in 1950; law graduate of the University of Wrocław (1972), doc torate 
in law (Łodz, 1982); lawyer at the Bar of the Republic of Poland (since 
1977); visiting researcher (University of Paris X, 1987 to 1988; University 
of  Nantes,  1993–94);  expert  of  ‘Solidarność’  (1995–2000);  professor  of 
labour law and European social law at the University of Łodz (1997–98 
and  2001–05),  associate  professor  at  Warsaw  School  of  Economics 
(2002), professor of labour law and social security law at Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński  University,  Warsaw  (2000–05);  Deputy  Minister  of  Labour 
and Social Affairs (1998–2001); member of the negotiation team for the 
accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Union (1998–2001); 
representative  of  the  Polish  Government  to  the  International  Labour 
Organisation  (1998–2001);  author  of  a  number  of  works  on  labour 
law and European social law; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal from 
6 October 2005 to 7 October 2013.

Maria Isabel Rofes i Pujol
Born in 1956; study of law (law degree, University of Barcelona, 1981); 
specialisation in international trade (Mexico, 1983); study of European 
integration (Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, 1985) and of Commu-
nity law (School of Public Administration, Catalonia, 1986); official of the 
Government of Catalonia (member of the Legal Service of the Minis try 
for  Industry  and  Energy,  April  1984  to  August  1986);  member  of  the 
Barcelona Bar (1985–87); Administrator, then Principal Administrator, in 
the Research and Documentation Division of the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  (1986–94);  Legal  Secretary  at  the  Court  of 
Justice 
(Chamber  of  Advocate  General  Ruiz-Jarabo  Colomer, 
January 1995 to April 2004; Chamber of Judge Lõhmus, May 2004 to 
August 2009); Lecturer on Community cases, Faculty of Law, Autono-
mous University of Barcelona (1993–2000); numerous publications and 
courses on European social law; Member of the Board of Appeal of the 
Community Plant Variety Office (2006–09); Judge at the Civil Service 
Tribunal since 7 October 2009.

208 

Annual Report 2013

Members 

Civil Service Tribunal

Ezio Perillo 
Born in 1950; Doctor of Laws and lawyer at the Padua Bar; Assistant 
lecturer and senior researcher in civil and comparative law in the law 
faculty of the University of Padua (1977–82); Lecturer in Community law 
at the European College of Parma (1990–98), in the law faculties of the 
University of Padua (1985–87), the University of Macerata (1991–94) and 
the University of Naples (1995), and at the University of Milan (2000–01); 
Member of the Scientific Committee for the Master’s in European Inte-
gration at the University of Padua; Official at the Court of Justice, in the 
Library, Research and Documentation Directorate (1982–84); Legal Sec-
retary to Advocate General Mancini (1984–88); Legal Adviser to the Sec-
retary-General of the European Parliament, Mr Enrico Vinci (1988–93); 
also,  at  the  same  institution:  Head  of  Division  in  the  Legal  Service 
(1995–99); Director for Legislative Affairs and Conciliations, Inter-Insti-
tutional Relations and Relations with National Parliaments (1999–2004); 
Director for External Relations (2004–06); Director for Legislative Affairs 
in the Legal Service (2006–11); author of a number of publications on 
Italian civil law and European Union law; Judge at the Civil Service Tri-
bunal since 6 October 2011.

René Barents
Born in 1951; graduated in law, specialisation in economics (Erasmus 
University  Rotterdam,  1973);  Doctor  of  Laws  (University  of  Utrecht, 
1981);  Researcher  in  European  law  and  international  economic  law 
(1973–74) and lecturer in European law and economic law at the Europa 
Institute of the University of Utrecht (1974–79) and at the University of 
Leiden (1979–81); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities (1981–86), then Head of the Employee Rights Unit 
at the Court of Justice (1986–87); Member of the Legal Service of the 
Commission of the European Communities (1987–91); Legal Secretary 
at the Court of Justice (1991–2000); Head of Division (2000–09) in and 
then Director of the Research and Documentation Directorate of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2009–11); Professor (1988–2003) 
and Honorary Professor (since 2003) in European law at the University 
of Maastricht; Adviser to the Regional Court of Appeal, ‘s-Hertogenbosch 
(1993–2011); Member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (since 1993); numerous publications on European law; Judge 
at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2011.

Annual Report 2013 

209

Civil Service Tribunal 

Members

Kieran Bradley 
Born in 1957; law degree (Trinity College, Dublin, 1975–79); Research as-
sistant to Senator Mary Robinson (1978–79 and 1980); Pádraig Pearse 
Scholarship to study at the College of Europe (1979); postgraduate stud-
ies in European law at the College of Europe, Bruges (1979–80); Master’s 
degree in law at the University of Cambridge (1980–81); Trainee at the 
European Parliament (Luxembourg, 1981); Administrator in the Secre-
tariat  of  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  of  the  European  Parliament 
(Luxembourg, 1981–88); Member of the Legal Service of the European 
Parliament (Brussels, 1988–95); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
(1995–2000); Lecturer in European law at Harvard Law School (2000); 
Member  of  the  Legal  Service  of  the  European  Parliament  (2000–03), 
then Head of Unit (2003–11) and Director (2011); author of numerous 
publications; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2011.

Jesper Svenningsen
Born in 1966; study of law (Candidatus juris) at the University of Aarhus 
(1989); trainee lawyer with the Legal Adviser to the Danish Government 
(1989–91); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice (1991–93); admitted to 
the Bar in Denmark (1993); lawyer with the Legal Adviser to the Danish 
Government (1993–95); Lecturer in European law at the University of 
Copenhagen; Senior Lecturer at the European Institute of Public Ad-
ministration, Luxembourg branch, then Acting Director (1995–99); ad-
ministrator with the Legal Service of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(1999–2000); official at the Court of Justice (2000–13); Legal Secretary 
(2003–13); Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 7 October 2013.

Waltraud Hakenberg
Born  in  1955;  studied  law  in  Regensburg  and  Geneva  (1974–79);  first 
State examination (1979); postgraduate studies in Community law at 
the  College  of  Europe,  Bruges  (1979–80);  trainee  lawyer  in  Regens-
burg  (1980–83);  Doctor  of  Laws  (1982);  second  State  examination 
(1983);  lawyer  in  Munich  and  Paris  (1983–89);  official  at  the  Court  of 
Justice of the European Communities (1990–2005); Legal Secretary at 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (in the Chambers 
of  Judge  Jann,  1995–2005);  teaching  for  a  number  of  universities  in 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Russia; Honorary Professor at Saar-
land University (since 1999); Member of various legal committees, as-
sociations and boards; numerous publications on Community law and 
Community procedural law; Registrar of the Civil Service Tribunal since 
30 November 2005.

210 

Annual Report 2013

Change 

Civil Service Tribunal

2. 

Change in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2013

Following the resignation of Ms Irena Boruta, by decision of 16 September 2013 the Council of the 
European Union appointed Mr Jesper Svenningsen as Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal for the 
period from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2019.

Annual Report 2013 

211

Order of precedence 

Civil Service Tribunal

3. 

Order of precedence

From 1 January 2013 to 7 October 2013

From 8 October 2013 to 31 December 2013

S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, President of the 
Tribunal
H. KREPPEL, President of Chamber 
M. I. ROFES i PUJOL, President of Chamber 
I. BORUTA, Judge
E. PERILLO, Judge 
R. BARENTS, Judge 
K. BRADLEY, Judge 

S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, President of the Tribunal
H. KREPPEL, President of Chamber
M. I. ROFES i PUJOL, President of Chamber
E. PERILLO, Judge
R. BARENTS, Judge
K. BRADLEY, Judge
J. SVENNINGSEN, Judge

W. HAKENBERG, Registrar

W. HAKENBERG, Registrar

Annual Report 2013 

213

Former members 

Civil Service Tribunal

4. 

Former Members of the Civil Service Tribunal

Heikki Kanninen (2005–09)
Haris Tagaras (2005–11)
Stéphane Gervasoni (2005–11)
Irena Boruta (2005–13)

President

Paul J. Mahoney (2005–11)

Annual Report 2013 

215

Statistics 

Civil Service Tribunal

C —  Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Civil Service 

Tribunal

General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal

1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13)

New cases

2. 
3. 

Percentage of the number of cases per principal defendant institution (2009–13)
Language of the case (2009–13)

Completed cases

Judgments and orders — Bench hearing action (2013)

4. 
5.  Outcome (2013)
6. 
7.  Duration of proceedings in months (2013)

Applications for interim measures (2009–13)

Cases pending as at 31 December

Bench hearing action (2009–13)

8. 
9.  Number of applicants

Miscellaneous

10.  Appeals against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal to the General Court (2009–13)
11.  Results of appeals before the General Court (2009–13)

Annual Report 2013 

217

Statistics 

1. 

General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal — 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2009–13)

Civil Service Tribunal

250

200

150

100

50

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  New cases

  Completed cases

  Cases pending

New cases
Completed cases
Cases pending

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

113
155
175

139
129
185

159
166
178

178
121
235

160
184
211 (1)

The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).

(1) 

Including 26 cases in which proceedings were stayed.

Annual Report 2013 

219

Civil Service Tribunal 

Statistics

2. 

New cases — Percentage of the number of cases per principal 
defendant institution (2009–13)

Percentage of number of new cases brought in 2013

Council 
3.77%

European Parliament 
5.66%

Bodies, offices and  
agencies of the  
European Union 
32.70%

European  
Commission 
49.69%

European Investment Bank 
5.03%

Court of Auditors 
0.63%

Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
0.63%

European Central Bank 
1.89%

European Parliament
Council 
European Commission
Court of Justice of the European Union
European Central Bank
Court of Auditors 
European Investment Bank
Bodies, offices and agencies of the European 
Union 

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

8.85%
11.50%
47.79%
2.65%
4.42%
0.88%
0.88%

23.01%
100%

9.35%
6.47%
58.99%
5.04%
2.88%

5.76%

11.51%
100%

6.29%
6.92%
66.67%
1.26%
2.52%
0.63%
4.32%

11.40%
100%

6.11%
3.89%
58.33%

1.11%
2.22%
4.44%

23.89%
100%

5.66%
3.77%
49.69%
0.63%
1.89%
0.63%
5.03%

32.70%
100%

220 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Civil Service Tribunal

3. 

New cases — Language of the case (2009–13)

Distribution in 2013

Italian 
13.13%

Dutch 
7.50%

German 
1.25%

Greek 
2.50%

English 
16.25%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

1
1
9
3
8
63
13

15

2

6
2
9
105
13

2

2

10
4
23
87
29
1
1
1

1
159

2
3

5
1
14
108
35

6
2
2

2
4
26
95
21

12

178

160

French 
59.38%

Language of the case
Bulgarian
Spanish
Czech
German
Greek
English
French
Italian
Hungarian
Dutch
Polish
Romanian
Slovak

Total

113

139

The language of the case corresponds to the language in which the proceedings were brought and not to the 
applicant’s mother tongue or nationality.

Annual Report 2013 

221

Civil Service Tribunal 

Statistics

4. 

Completed cases — Judgments and orders — Bench hearing 
action (2013)

Chambers sitting 
with three judges 
82.61%

Single judge 
11.96%

President 
3.80%

Full court
1.63%

Judgments 

Orders for removal 
from the register, 
following amicable 
settlement (1)

Other orders 
terminating 
proceedings

Total

Full court
Chambers sitting with three judges
Single judge
President

Total

2
89
1

92

1
8

9

55
21
7
83

3
152
22
7
184

(1) 

In the course of 2013, there were also 18 unsuccessful attempts to bring cases to a close by amicable settlement 
on the initiative of the Civil Service Tribunal.

222 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Civil Service Tribunal

5. 

Completed cases — Outcome (2013)

Judgments

Orders

t
r
a
p
n

i

r
o

l
l

u
f
n

i

d
l
e
h
p
u
s
n
o
i
t
c
A

2
1
6

2

6
3

4

9

8
41

o
n

,
l
l

u
f
n

i

d
e
s
s
i
m
s
i
d
s
n
o
i
t
c
A

j

e
t
a
c
i
d
u
d
a
o
t
d
e
e
n

s
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
a
/
s
n
o
i
t
c
A

r
o
e
l
b
i
s
s
i
m
d
a
n

i

]
y
l
t
s
e
f
i
n
a
m

[

d
e
d
n
u
o
f
n
u

i

g
n
w
o

l
l

o
f
s
t
n
e
m
e
l
t
t
e
s
e
l
b
a
c
i
m
A

h
c
n
e
b
e
h
t
y
b
n
o
i
t
n
e
v
r
e
t
n

i

n
o
i
t
c
a
e
h
t
g
n
i
r
a
e
h

n
o
r
e
t
s
i
g
e
r
e
h
t

m
o
r
f

l
a
v
o
m
e
R

o
t
d
e
e
n
o
n

,
s
d
n
u
o
r
g
r
e
h
t
o

l
a
r
r
e
f
e
r

r
o
e
t
a
c
i
d
u
d
a

j

n

i

r
o

l
l

u
f
n

i

d
l
e
h
p
u
s
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
l

p
p
A

f
o
s
m
r
o
f

l
a
i
c
e
p
s
(

t
r
a
p

)
e
r
u
d
e
c
o
r
p

7

11
4
4

5
6

8

6
51

5

2
1
6

4
10

1
1
25
55

5

1

1

1

1
9

2
1
2

1
2

1

2
11

17
17

Total

21
2
22
5
13

16
21

6

18
1
59
184

Appraisal/Promotion
Assignment/Reassignment 
Competitions
Disciplinary proceedings
Pensions and invalidity allowances
Recruitment/Appointment/
Classification in grade
Remuneration and allowances
Social security/Occupational disease/
Accidents
Termination or non-renewal of 
a contract as a member of staff
Working conditions/Leave
Other 

Total

Annual Report 2013 

223

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Service Tribunal 

Statistics

6. 

Applications for interim measures (2009–13)

Applications for interim 
measures brought to 
a conclusion

Granted in full or in 
part

Outcome

Dismissal

Removal from the 
register

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

1
6
7
11
3
28

Total

1

1

4
4
10
3
21

2
3
1

6

7. 

Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months (2013)

Completed cases

Duration of full procedure

Duration of procedure, not 
including duration of any stay of 
proceedings

Average duration

Judgments
Orders
Total

92
92
184

18.6
13.3
16.0

18.1
11.3
14.7

The durations are expressed in months and tenths of months.

224 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

8. 

Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2009–13)

Civil Service Tribunal

Distribution in 2013

Chambers sitting  
with three judges 
81.52%

Single judge 
1.42%

Cases not yet  
assigned 
15.64%

Full court 
0.47%

President 
0.95%

Full court
President
Chambers sitting with three judges
Single judge
Cases not yet assigned

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

6
1
160

8
175

1
1
179

4
185

1
156
2
19
178

1

205
8
21
235

1
2
172
3
33
211

Total

Annual Report 2013 

225

Civil Service Tribunal 

Statistics

9. 

Cases pending as at 31 December — Number of applicants

The pending cases with the greatest number of applicants in 2013

Number of applicants

492 (two cases)

486

451

35

33

30

29

26 (two cases)

25

18 (18 cases)

Fields
Staff Regulations – Remuneration – Reform of the system of remuneration and 
salary increments at the EIB
Staff Regulations – EIB – Remuneration – Annual adjustment of salaries
Staff Regulations – EIB – Remuneration – New performance system – Allocation 
of bonuses
Staff  Regulations  –  Referral  back  following  review  of  the  judgment  of  the 
General Court – EIB – Pensions – Reform of 2008
Staff Regulations – EIB – Pensions – Reform of the pension scheme
Staff Regulations – European Investment Fund – Remuneration – Annual ad-
justment of salaries
Staff  Regulations  –  European  Investment  Fund  –  Remuneration  –  Reform  of 
the system of remuneration and salary increments at the EIF
Staff Regulations – Remuneration – Officials posted to a third country – Living 
conditions allowance – Revision and adjustment of the living conditions allow-
ance – Living conditions equivalent to those usual in the European Union – 
Cessation of the grant of the living conditions allowance
Staff Regulations – Promotion – 2010 and 2011 promotion years – Establishment 
of promotion thresholds
Staff Regulations – Procedure – Taxation of costs

The term ‘Staff Regulations’ means the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the 
Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.

Total number of applicants for all pending cases (2009–13)

Total applicants

Total pending cases

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

461
812
1 006
1 086
1 867

175
185
178
235
211

226 

Annual Report 2013

Statistics 

Civil Service Tribunal

10.  Miscellaneous — Appeals against decisions of the Civil Service 

Tribunal to the General Court (2009–13)

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought

  Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1)

Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
30
24
44
11
56

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1) 

Percentage of decisions 
appealed (2)

95
99
126
87
144

31.58%
24.24%
34.92%
12.64%
38.89%

(1)  Judgments,  orders  —  declaring  the  action  inadmissible,  manifestly  inadmissible  or  manifestly  unfounded, 
orders for interim measures, orders that there is no need to adjudicate and orders refusing leave to intervene — 
made or adopted during the reference year.

(2)  For a given year this percentage may not correspond to the decisions subject to appeal given in the reference 

year, since the period allowed for appeal may span 2 years.

Annual Report 2013 

227

Civil Service Tribunal 

Statistics

11.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the General Court 

(2009–13)

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

  Appeal dismissed

  Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and no referral back

  Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and referral back

Appeal dismissed
Decision totally or partially set aside and 
no referral back
Decision totally or partially set aside and 
referral back

Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

21
9

1

31

27
4

6

37

23
3

4

30

29
2

2

33

30
3

5

38

228 

Annual Report 2013

HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 

Free publications: 

•  one copy: 

via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 

•  more than one copy or posters/maps: 

from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or  
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 

(*)  The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). 

Priced publications: 

•  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 

Priced subscriptions: 

•  via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union 

(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). 

doi:10.2862/5295

 
 
Q
D

-
A
G

-
1
4
-
0
0
1
-
E
N

-
C

3

1

0

2

T

R

O

P

E

R

L

A

U

N

N

A

N

O

I

N

U

N

A

E

P

O

R

U

E

E

H

T

F

O

E

C

I

T

S

U

J

F

O

T

R

U

O

C