Special Report No 11// 2014#The establishment of the European External Action Service #(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Date: 2014-07-01
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: European External Action Service, auditing, common foreign and security policy, operation of the Institutions

EN 

2014 

NO 11

Special Report  The establishment of  
the European External 
Action Service

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

ISBN 978-92-872-0580-3
doi:10.2865/17377

© European Union, 2014
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Luxembourg

EN 

2014 

NO 11

Special Report The establishment of  
the European External 
Action Service

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Contents

02

Paragraph

I–VI 

Executive summary

1–9 

1–6 

7–9 

Introduction

Legal basis and background

Organisational set-up

10–12  Audit scope and approach

13–67  Observations

13–22 

The establishment of the EEAS was rushed and inadequately prepared,  
beset by too many constraints and vaguely defined tasks

14–18 

The role of the EEAS was decided late and defined in vague terms

19–22 

The EEAS has faced a number of political and financial challenges

23–50  Weaknesses in the prioritisation, organisation and allocation of  

resources reduce the EEAS’s efficiency

25–28 

The EEAS did not treat as a priority the development of an overarching  
strategic framework for EU foreign policy, and did not adopt an internal strategy

29–34 

The complex organisation of the EEAS does not facilitate timely cooperation  
between departments

35–39 

EU special representatives are not sufficiently integrated in the EEAS

40–44 

The EEAS faced difficulties in staffing critical functions with the  
resources transferred

45–50 

The recruitment procedures were lengthy, costly and did not fully correct  
pre-existing imbalances

Contents

03

51–67 

Coordination with the Commission and Member States is improving,  
but is still insufficient for the EEAS to fulfil its potential

52–56 

Coordination with the Commission was partly effective

57–61 

The new set-up of EU delegations demands more coordination work and  
its administrative management is less efficient

62–64  Member States and the EEAS have not yet fully exploited the potential  

for synergies between their networks of diplomatic representations

65–67 

The potential benefits from having the EEAS as permanent chair of  
Council preparatory bodies have not been fully realised

68–73  Conclusions and recommendations

Reply of the EEAS

 
Executive  
summary

04

I
The Lisbon Treaty created the post of High Represent-
ative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also 
Vice-President of the European Commission (hereinaf-
ter HR/VP). The HR/VP aims to ensure the consistency 
of EU foreign policy and is supported in this task by 
a new diplomatic corps, the European External Action 
Service (EEAS).

 — weaknesses in the prioritisation, organisation and 
allocation of resources had reduced the EEAS’s ef-
ficiency and the EU special representatives are not 
sufficiently integrated;

 — coordination with the Commission and Member 
States had improved, but was still insufficient for 
the EEAS to fulfil its potential.

II
The EEAS became formally operational on 1 Janu-
ary 2011, comprising a headquarters located in 
Brussels and a global network of 140 delegations to 
represent the interests of the EU.

III
The audit examined whether:

 — the establishment of the EEAS was adequately 

prepared;

 — the resources of the EEAS were prioritised, organ-

ised and allocated efficiently;

 — the EEAS has coordinated effectively with the 

Commission and the Member States.

IV
With the establishment of the EEAS, the EU now has 
an operational foreign policy service, equipped with 
policy desks and crisis management structures, a wide 
network of diplomatic posts and with a balanced pres-
ence of different sources of staff. However, the Court 
found that:

 — the establishment of the EEAS was rushed and 
inadequately prepared, beset by too many con-
straints and vaguely defined tasks;

V
This report is the result of an independent assess-
ment of the establishment of the EEAS. The Court’s 
audit took place at the same time as the preparation 
of the EEAS mid-term review. The Court’s findings and 
recommendations are generally in line with the EEAS 
self-assessment, which reinforces the need to address 
the weaknesses identified.

VI
The report sets out a number of recommendations 
to enhance EEAS added value and efficiency such 
as clarifying its tasks and objectives, streamlining 
its organisational design, simplifying its administra-
tive framework, strengthening its strategic role and 
developing its planning. The report also recommends 
reviewing the appointment process and functioning of 
EU special representatives and EEAS recruitment pro-
cedures. The EEAS should work with the Commission 
to mitigate the impact of the rigidity of its financial 
and staff regulations on the efficiency of EU delega-
tions. Finally, the EEAS should continue its efforts to 
promote information sharing and co-location with 
Member States; and should assess the opportunity to 
offer certain consular services.

Introduction

05

1  Article 18 of the Treaty on the 

European Union.

2 

The High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, the Commissioner 
responsible for external 
relations, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Member 
State exercising the rotating 
Presidency.

3  Council conclusions on the 

EEAS Review, General Affairs 
Council meeting, 17.12.2013.

4  Article 27(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union states that 
the EEAS must be staffed with 
Commission and General 
Secretariat of the Council 
(GSC) officials and with 
diplomats seconded by 
Member States.

5  Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and 
functioning of the European 
External Action Service 
(OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30).

Legal basis and 
background

01 
The Lisbon Treaty created a new EU 
foreign affairs chief, the High Rep-
resentative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy who is simultane-
ously Vice-President of the European 
Commission (hereinafter HR/VP)1. The 
HR/VP is supported by a new diplo-
matic corps, the EEAS. These changes 
brought an end to the former ‘troika’ 
mechanism2 which had conducted EU 
foreign policy during the previous two 
decades.

02 
The EEAS was envisaged as the cor-
nerstone of a new EU foreign policy, 
‘a modern and operational foreign 
policy service, equipped to promote 
EU values and interests as well as to 
ensure coordination and consistency 
in the EU’s relations with the rest of 
the world’3, leveraging the efforts of 
both the EU institutions and the Mem-
ber States. To this end, its staff bring 
together the joint forces of the main 
stakeholders: the Commission, the 
Council and the Member States. The 
diverse origin of its staff was consid-
ered a critical element for its success 
and was therefore specifically stated in 
the Lisbon Treaty4.

03 
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force on 1 December 2009, the Mem-
ber States were still exploring differ-
ent options for establishing the EEAS. 
Acting on a proposal of the HR/VP 
after consulting the European Parlia-
ment and after obtaining the consent 
of the European Commission, the 
Council adopted the Council Deci-
sion of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS5 which confirmed its autonomy, 
stated the basic principles of its or-
ganisational set-up and decided which 
services would be transferred from the 
Commission and the General Secre-
tariat of the Council (hereinafter GSC) 
to the EEAS.

04 
The EEAS’s unique characteristics 
make it different from the Commission 
(a supranational institution) and the 
Council (an intergovernmental insti-
tution). Depending on whether the 
subject matter is an EU competence or 
not, it functions like a Commission de-
partment or as the GSC. When it works 
as a Commission department, the EEAS 
has the same rights and competences 
as any other department to participate 
in the internal coordination mecha-
nisms of the Commission.

06

6  Council conclusions on the 

EEAS Review, General Affairs 
Council meeting, 17.12.2013.

7  A network initiated by the 
Commission 50 years ago.

8 

The Staff Regulations of 
officials and the conditions of 
employment of other servants 
of the European Communities 
breaks EU officials down into 
two groups, according to the 
nature and importance of 
their duties: administrators 
and assistants. Administrators 
carry out administrative, 
advisory, linguistic and 
scientific duties while 
assistants carry out technical 
and clerical duties.

9  Article 6(9) of Council Decision 

2010/427/EU.

10  46 % at delegations 

(376 administrator positions) 
and 24 % at headquarters 
(559 administrator positions).

Introduction

05 
The Council Decision called for a mid-
term review of the establishment of 
the EEAS. This review, published on 
29 July 2013, summarises the progress 
made, the difficulties encountered 
and includes medium- and short-
term recommendations to improve its 
functioning. On 17 December 2013, 
the Council adopted its conclusions on 
the review6, which included support-
ing the implementation of the short- 
term recommendations and inviting 
the next HR/VP to present by the end 
of 2015 an evaluation on the organi-
sation and functioning of the EEAS 
and, if necessary, a proposal for a new 
Council decision.

06 
The Court’s audit work took place 
in parallel with the mid-term review 
carried out by the EEAS. The Court is 
aware of the review and of the related 
conclusions of the Council, and ob-
serves that in many points its conclu-
sions and recommendations converge 
with both documents. In this context, 
more particularly in the light of the 
corrective action to be taken, the 
Court provides an independent assess-
ment of a crucial new European body.

Organisational set-up

07 
The EEAS became formally opera-
tional on 1 January 2011. It comprises 
a headquarters located in Brussels 
and a global network of 140 former 
Commission delegations7, which were 
handed over to the EEAS on that date 
and upgraded to ‘EU’ delegations with 
a greater political mandate — to repre-
sent the interests of the Union.

08 
The EEAS is independent for adminis-
trative matters. It was initially staffed 
exclusively via the transfer of some 
GSC and Commission departments 
and gradually recruited Member State 
diplomats. The Council decision set 
a target that, at full capacity, one third 
of EEAS administrators8 should be dip-
lomats from the Member States9.  
As at June 2013, the EEAS had 
3 392 staff, 1 487 at its headquarters 
and 1 905 in its delegations, and Mem-
ber State diplomats occupied 33 % of 
its 935 administrator positions10.

09 
For 2014, the EEAS has a budget of 
519 million euro which is split between 
headquarters (41 %) and delegations 
(59 %). The Commission tops up the 
delegations’ budget with approxi-
mately 270 million euro annually. This 
is due to the fact that EU delegations 
still host a significant number of Com-
mission staff, most working on the 
implementation of EU operational 
budget for which the Commission is 
responsible.

07

11  Briefing requests support the 
preparation of high level 
meetings. The EEAS staff 
answer them through 
documents in various forms 
(e.g. speaking points, 
speeches or background 
notes).

12  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 

Estonia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Sweden and United 
Kingdom.

Audit scope  
and approach

10 
The Court audited the establish-
ment of the EEAS by answering three 
questions:

(a)  Was the establishment of the EEAS 

adequately prepared?

(b)  Were the resources of the EEAS pri-
oritised, organised and allocated 
efficiently?

(c)  Has the EEAS coordinated effec-
tively with the Commission and 
the Member States?

11 
The audit covered the preparatory 
work conducted by EU institutions and 
the Member States and the activities 
carried out by the EEAS from its launch 
on 1 January 2011 to December 2013.

12 
The Court gathered evidence for its as-
sessment through various means:

(a)  documentation analysis and litera-

ture review;

(b)  a sample of 30 briefing requests11 
made by the President of the 
Council, the President of the  
Commission, the HR/VP and other  
Commissioners during 2011–12;

(c)  a sample of 30 administrator re-

cruitment procedures: 15 at head-
quarters and 15 in delegations;

(d)  a sample of 14 EEAS staff training 
courses organised since 2011;

(e)  a quantitative analysis of EEAS 

staffing data as of 15 April 2013,  
10 January 2012 and 
25 January 2011;

(f)  a survey of a sample of 35 EU del-

egations (all 35 replied);

(g)  a survey of Member States which 
was completed by 15 of them12;

(h)  interviews with representatives 

of the GSC and nine Commission 
directorates-general to obtain 
their views on cooperation with 
the EEAS;

(i) 

interviews with EEAS managers 
and staff, with the EU Special Rep-
resentatives for Human Rights, the 
Southern Mediterranean, and Ko-
sovo, and with representatives of 
the foreign ministries of Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg and 
Poland.

Observations

08

13  The Irish electorate rejected 

the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 
before approving it in 
a second referendum on 
2.10.2009.

14  The latest overarching EU 

strategic document is still the 
2003 European Security 
Strategy which, although 
updated in 2008, does not 
reflect the evolving 
geopolitical events which 
have transformed the world. 
However, Member States 
disagree on the case for a new 
strategy as some consider that 
the principles stated in 2003 
are still valid.

15  Article 2 and Article 3 of 

Council Decision 2010/427/EU. 
In addition, in the context of 
the HR/VP’s mandate to 
ensure policy consistency with 
regard to EU external action, 
Article 9 recognises a key role 
for the EEAS in the 
programming of the 
Commission’s external action 
instruments.

The establishment of the 
EEAS was rushed and 
inadequately prepared, 
beset by too many  
constraints and vaguely 
defined tasks

15 
An important factor during this discus-
sion was that the EU’s objectives were 
not set out in an overarching EU for-
eign policy strategy, which could have 
guided this preparatory work14.

13 
This section (paragraphs 13 to 22) 
answers the first question: Was the 
establishment of the EEAS adequately 
prepared? The report analyses wheth-
er EEAS tasks are clearly specified, 
limited in number and understood 
equivalently by the Commission and 
the Member States; and whether the 
EEAS has the policy and financial tools 
it needs to perform its tasks.

The role of the EEAS was 
decided late and defined in 
vague terms

14 
Due to uncertainties concerning the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty13, the 
Member States and EU institutions did 
little preparatory work prior to set-
ting up the EEAS. As a result, when the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 
1 December 2009, the characteristics 
of the future service were still under 
discussion by the Member States, the 
Commission and the Council.

16 
Consequently, the Council decision 
does not state any objectives for the 
EEAS. Instead, it merely states its 
tasks15:

(a)  supporting the HR/VP to fulfil her 

triple-hatted mandate: conducting 
the common foreign and security 
policy, presiding over the Foreign 
Affairs Council and being Vice-
President (VP) of the Commission;

(b)  assisting the President of the 

European Council, the President of 
the Commission and the Commis-
sion itself in the exercise of their 
respective functions in the area of 
external relations;

(c)  supporting the diplomatic services 
of the Member States, the GSC and 
the Commission, and other institu-
tions and bodies of the Union, in 
particular the European Parliament 
and cooperating with them.

The EEAS has faced a num-
ber of political and financial 
challenges

19 
The establishment of the EEAS took 
place during a time of increasing 
turmoil in the southern Mediterra-
nean17. The EEAS focused its attention 
on leading the EU’s response18 which 
took priority over the development of 
foreign policy initiatives, long awaited 
by Member States and EU institu-
tions alike, such as the reform of the 
common security and defence policy 
procedures and structures and the de-
velopment of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach19.

Observations

17 
The Council decision reflects the 
agreement among the Member States, 
the European Parliament and the 
Commission at the moment of drawing 
up the text. It does not further define 
these wide-ranging tasks and says lit-
tle about their substance.

18 
As a result, departments were trans-
ferred to the EEAS not on the basis 
of their expected contribution to the 
fulfilment of EEAS objectives, but 
on the basis of their activities and 
their administrative position within 
the Commission or the GSC. This is 
particularly evident with regard to 
the external dimension of internal EU 
policies, for which the EEAS received 
no resources from the Commission16. In 
particular, the EEAS was created with 
no departments to deal with global 
issues of relevance to the EU such as 
climate change or energy security, as 
the resources dealing with these is-
sues were transferred from the former 
Commission Directorate-General for 
External Relations (DG RELEX) to other 
Commission departments before the 
establishment of the EEAS. This has 
contributed to the de facto outcome 
whereby the EEAS has had practical 
difficulties to coordinate some actions 
of the Commission with impact over 
EU foreign policy.

09

16  EU internal policies and 

actions can have significant 
impacts beyond the EU’s 
borders, likewise external 
events can also impact on EU 
internal dynamics. The 
‘external dimension of internal 
policies’ generally refers to the 
situations where the external 
aspects of internal EU policies 
have a growing foreign and 
security policy dimension. As 
an example of the impact of 
EU internal policies over EU 
foreign policy, bilateral 
relationships with Canada 
have been dominated for 
a long time by the discussion 
on the impact of the EU’s 
policies on climate change 
over the access to European 
markets of oil produced from 
tar sands.

17  The EEAS started operations 
during the Arab Spring, 
specifically on the eve of the 
international intervention in 
Libya.

18  This response included 

numerous initiatives such as 
the development of a new 
neighbourhood policy 
adopted in May 2011, the 
opening of the EU office in 
Benghazi in May 2011 and the 
appointment of a European 
Union Special Representative 
for the Southern 
Mediterranean in July 2011. 
The EU delegation to Libya 
was finally opened in 
November 2011.

19  The EU’s comprehensive 
approach is an integrated 
approach towards a country or 
a region which combines the 
use of traditional instruments 
(e.g. development assistance) 
and common foreign and 
security policy actions 
(e.g. sanctions) in support of 
a high level objective. The 
value added of such 
combination was recognised 
before (e.g. after the Balkan 
wars) but its implementation 
was affected by the 
multiplicity of EU foreign 
policy actors at that time. 
A joint communication from 
the HR/VP and the 
Commission on this subject 
was published on 11.12.2013.

10

20  Recital 15 in the preamble to 

the Council decision states 
that: ‘the establishment … 
should be guided by the 
principle of cost-efficiency 
aiming towards budget 
neutrality’.

21  The administrative tasks 

associated with the EEAS’s 
autonomy, tasks previously 
carried out by the rotating 
Presidency (e.g. chairing some 
Council working groups) and 
the new political duties of EU 
delegations (e.g. coordinating 
all EU embassies on the 
ground).

(b)  The duration of the agreements 
did not take into account the  
EEAS’s needs. For instance, the 
GSC’s support for the maintenance 
of the secured systems used for 
distributing classified information 
ended before an alternative and 
effective solution was established 
(in line with the budget neutral 
principle).

22 
No overall assessment was made to 
compare the operational costs of the 
EEAS with the costs of the previous 
structures, including Member States. 
In this respect, the establishment of 
the EEAS is likely to have brought 
Member States considerable savings. 
For example, Member States can rely 
on EEAS political reporting instead of 
producing their own reports, the rotat-
ing Presidency has a smaller workload 
in preparing and chairing Council 
working groups and the salaries of the 
seconded diplomats are now paid by 
the EEAS.

Observations

20 
In a time of austere EU and national 
budgets, the Council decided that 
the establishment of the EEAS should 
follow the principle of budgetary 
neutrality20. However, establishing 
a new institution is inherently costly, 
even more so when the resulting body 
has to carry out new tasks. Indeed, the 
Council decided it without a resource 
assessment that should have taken 
into account both the new demands21 
and the potential for synergies result-
ing from the merging of Commission 
and GSC structures.

21 
The budgetary-neutral condition was 
applied strictly and only foreign policy 
structures were transferred into the 
new service. This meant that the EEAS 
did not receive resources for support 
functions. Instead, the Commission 
and the GSC continued to provide ser-
vices ranging from staff management 
(such as recruitment, medical examina-
tions or payment of salaries) to admin-
istrative support (such as IT, buildings 
or meeting room facilities). To this end, 
the EEAS signed service level agree-
ments with the Commission and the 
GSC. This was a pragmatic solution in 
the short term but, overall, the services 
provided did not fully address the 
EEAS’s needs:

(a)  The EEAS had no opportunity 

to assess or alter the scope and 
benefits of these service level 
agreements which were drafted in 
accordance with the support given 
before its establishment.

11

22  The EU currently has strategic 
partnerships with 10 countries: 
Brazil, Canada, China, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea and USA. 
These partnerships were 
entered into by the Council 
long before the EEAS was set 
up.

23  Spain, Italy, Poland and 

Sweden considered that 
a broad strategic approach for 
EU external relations was 
needed and decided to fund 
the ‘Think-tank process for 
a European Global Strategy’ 
initiative to prepare it.

24  European Parliament Report 
on the Implementation of the 
Common Security and 
Defence Policy (A7-0357/2012), 
31.10.2012.

25  Half of the Member States that 
replied to the survey thought 
that the EEAS should 
contribute more towards the 
development of EU foreign 
policies, such as regional 
strategies.

Observations

Weaknesses in the  
prioritisation, organisa-
tion and allocation of 
resources reduce the 
EEAS’s efficiency

23 
This section (paragraphs 23 to 50) 
answers the second question: Were 
the resources of the EEAS prioritised, 
organised and allocated efficiently? 
The Court audited samples of recruit-
ment procedures, briefings and train-
ing courses, and made a quantitative 
analysis of staffing data.

24 
Based on that, the Court assesses the 
management strategy, the objective 
setting and planning, the organisa-
tional structure of the EEAS, the role 
of EU special representatives and the 
management of human resources, fo-
cussing on recruitment, staff allocation 
and training.

The EEAS did not treat as 
a priority the development 
of an overarching strategic 
framework for EU foreign 
policy, and did not adopt an 
internal strategy

25 
In view of a rapidly evolving interna-
tional situation, the EEAS has favoured 
ad hoc approaches instead of pro-
posing an overarching foreign policy 
strategy. The EEAS has also opted not 
to propose an overarching approach 
to deal with the EU’s strategic partner-
ships, although the existing ones22 
had been established long before the 
Lisbon Treaty in an ad hoc way and 
may have no clear link with current EU 
foreign policy priorities. The absence 
of an overarching strategic framework 
has been criticised by some Member 
States23 and the European Parliament24, 
which expected a more proactive role 
for the EEAS in developing the EU’s 
foreign policy25.

26 
Whenever strategic guidance is miss-
ing, the EEAS consults with the EU 
institutions and the Member States to 
prepare the EU’s responses. The result-
ing ad hoc strategies are the outcome 
of intense debates before being for-
mally adopted by the Commission and 
endorsed by the Council. This process 
does not facilitate timely action.

12

26  The trio Presidency was 

established in 2007, following 
a decision by the European 
Council, according to which 
the Union’s Member States are 
divided in groups of three 
consecutive rotating 
Presidencies of the Council of 
the EU, which form the trio. It 
aims to achieve continuity and 
consistency in the work of the 
Council.

27  The Crisis Management and 

Planning Directorate (created 
in 2009), the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (2007), 
the Intelligence Analysis 
Centre (2002) and the Military 
Staff (2001). They are essential 
to deploy civilian and military 
instruments decided by the 
Council in response to crises 
(e.g. the launch of a military 
training mission in Mali in 
February 2013 to support 
stability in the Sahel region).

28  A geographical desk consists 
of one or more EEAS staff 
covering the same country. 
They are grouped into 
geographical services.

29  DG RELEX had four senior 

managers (one director- 
general and three deputy 
directors-general) and the 
GSC two senior managers (a 
director-general and a deputy 
director-general). In contrast, 
the EEAS has 13 senior 
managers.

Observations

27 
The EEAS has not yet adopted an 
internal strategy or management plan. 
In 2011 the HR/VP did, however, set 
three initial priorities:

(a)  setting up the EEAS as a working 

institution;

(b)  developing the 10 existing EU Stra-

tegic Partnerships;

(c)  strengthening the European 

Neighbourhood Policy in response 
to the Arab Spring.

Besides this limited number of priori-
ties, the EEAS was flexible enough to 
adapt to changing circumstances and 
played key facilitator roles on the 
Kosovo–Serbia dialogue and the Iran 
nuclear programme talks.

The complex organisation of 
the EEAS does not facilitate 
timely cooperation between 
departments

29 
The overall structure of the EEAS is 
complex, partly due to the fact that, 
unlike a typical ministry of foreign af-
fairs, it has additional functions which 
are characteristic of defence ministries, 
interior ministries and intelligence ser-
vices. The geographical desks, largely 
taken over from the former Commis-
sion Directorate for External Relations 
(DG RELEX), and the crisis manage-
ment structures taken over from the 
GSC27 create two distinct parts of the 
organisation, the latter reporting di-
rectly to the HR/VP.

28 
The EEAS has neither established ob-
jectives nor developed detailed criteria 
to assess the achievement of these 
priorities. It has also not developed 
a comprehensive planning framework, 
so each department decides how to 
plan its own activities. This hampers 
the EEAS’s overall efficiency, as tasks 
and resources do not necessarily fol-
low top-level objectives. In addition, 
the lack of a comprehensive planning 
framework makes it more difficult to 
integrate its activities within the wider 
context of the Commission’s annual 
work programme or the 18-month trio 
programme26 (prepared by the group 
of three rotating Presidencies and 
the GSC).

30 
The EEAS’s structure follows a pyramid 
organisational design which is more 
complex than the foreign policy struc-
tures it replaces:

(a)  geographical desks, the core func-
tion of the EEAS28, having addi-
tional levels of management than 
hitherto (see the Table);

(b)  there are more organisational 

units which are also of smaller size 
(managers have a narrower span of 
control, with approximately 20 % 
fewer staff reporting to them); and

(c)  the EEAS has twice the number 

of senior management staff as its 
predecessors29.

Observations

13

l

e Overview of management levels at EEAS, DG RELEX and GSC
b
a
T

New structure

Previous structures

EEAS

(six levels)

DG RELEX

(five levels)

GSC

(five levels)

1. HR/VP

2. Executive Secretary-General/ Chief Operating Officer 

3. Deputy Secretaries-General

4. Managing Directors

-

5. Directors

6. Heads of Division

1. Commissioner

-

-

2. Director-General

1. Secretary-General

-

2. Director-General

3. Deputy Directors-General 

3. Deputy Director-General

4. Directors

5. Heads of Unit

4. Directors

5. Heads of Unit

Source: EEAS staffing data and Official Directory of the European Union, 2010.

31 
The top-heavy nature of the EEAS is 
partly due to the Council decision, 
which envisaged the creation of direc-
torates-general for geographical areas 
and required that one third of EEAS 
staff should come from the Member 
States. As most of the management 
posts transferred to the EEAS were al-
ready occupied by permanent officials, 
the EEAS created a top-heavy struc-
ture, allowing a significant number of 
top posts to be occupied by Member 
State diplomats.

32 
The common security and defence 
policy’s structures taken over from 
the GSC were created on a case-by- 
case basis over the years without an 
overarching framework and overlap 
with other crisis management de-
partments30. The EEAS has started 
to address these issues, but this is 
a complex process which requires the 
unanimous support of Member States 
to change several Council decisions. In 
the meantime, it has established new 
mechanisms to foster coordination, 
such as the crisis management board 
and the crisis platform (see Box 1).

30 

In particular, with the crisis 
response and operational 
coordination department, the 
security policy and conflict 
prevention directorate and to 
certain extent with the global 
issues and counterterrorism 
division. For example, the 
audit revealed overlaps on 
crisis prevention, crisis 
response planning, space 
policy and security sector 
reform.

Observations

14

1
x
o
B

The crisis platform

The crisis platform is a new coordination mechanism to provide the EEAS and the Commission with clear 
political and strategic guidance for the management of a given crisis. Depending on the characteristics of 
a particular crisis, the crisis platform brings together crisis management structures, geographical and horizon-
tal departments, and relevant Commission services.

When a crisis platform is launched, the geographical managing director transfers the lead over the country to 
the Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, who coordinates the EU’s response. 
This limits the number of crises which the EU can deal with at the same time, as the crisis response managing 
director does not have sufficient resources to manage more than two crises simultaneously. As a result, a crisis 
platform for a given country may be called off when the crisis is still ongoing and the EU’s response has not 
yet taken shape (e.g. Libya).

31  The Executive Secretary-
General, Chief Operating 
Officer and two Deputy 
Secretaries-General.

32 

In the sample, the validation 
process took an average of 
four days and included up to 
five validators (Deputy Head 
of Division, Head of Division, 
Director, Managing Director, 
Member of the Corporate 
Board) before reaching the 
Cabinet, where there is 
a possibility that the text may 
be redrafted.

33 
The EEAS has a Corporate Board, 
composed of its four most senior of-
ficials31. It aims to ensure that activities 
carried out by the EEAS are consistent 
and contribute towards achieving the 
political objectives established by the 
HR/VP. The EEAS internal procedures 
do not consider it as a collective entity 
with a distinctive role and functions. 
Although the Corporate Board has 
facilitated coordination among the 
top managers, it could not reduce as 
expected the workload of the HR/VP, 
who still has 23 direct reporting lines.

34 
As in any diplomatic service, having 
timely access to information is of key 
importance. The audit assessed the 
effectiveness of the existing proce-
dures for the production and distribu-
tion of two main types of information 
products:

(a)  The EEAS provides support for 

the preparation of meetings held 
by the President of the European 
Council, the President of the Com-
mission, the HR/VP and Commis-
sioners by responding to briefing 
requests in due time. However, 
answers can take a relatively long 
time to be prepared, notably due 
to the validation process, which is 
the result of the EEAS’s structure32. 
Moreover, departments rarely 
receive feedback regarding either 
the text or the final outcome of the 
meeting for which a given briefing 
note was prepared, making it more 
difficult for them to improve.

 
15

33  This is a heritage from GSC 

systems, which were built to 
avoid mixing civilian and 
military information.

34  Special representatives had 
been at the disposal of the 
Council since 1996. Initially the 
Council could appoint 
a special representative 
whenever it deemed 
necessary, but, after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
only the HR/VP can propose 
this.

Observations

(b)  With the establishment of the 
EEAS, intelligence services and 
delegations were for the first 
time part of the same organisa-
tion, increasing the potential for 
combining political reporting and 
intelligence to assist decision-
makers. However, the distribution 
of intelligence products is still 
limited because of the practical 
difficulties of sharing classified 
information with some recipients. 
In this regard, most EU delega-
tions are not prepared to deal with 
classified documents, many heads 
of delegation do not yet have the 
appropriate security clearance and 
the systems used for political re-
porting and intelligence reporting 
are still incompatible33. As a result, 
access to and the use of classified 
information within the EEAS, nota-
bly by the delegations, is seriously 
constrained.

EU special representatives 
are not sufficiently  
integrated in the EEAS

35 
One of the oldest instruments of the 
common foreign and security policy is 
the deployment of EU special repre-
sentatives to deal with crises or spe-
cific tasks on behalf of the EU34. Special 
representatives are appointed by the 
Foreign Affairs Council on recommen-
dation of the HR/VP and benefit from 
strong support from Member States.

36 
Initially, the special representatives 
had an important role in helping 
coordinate foreign policy between the 
Council and the Commission, which, 
however, became redundant after the 
establishment of the EEAS. Still, taking 
into account their special tasks deal-
ing with regional problems and ad hoc 
crises, the EEAS continues to consider 
them as a useful instrument and the 
Council appreciates them as a valuable 
foreign policy tool. That is why after 
a temporary decrease in their number 
(from 12 in 2010 to 9 in 2011), there 
were 11 special representatives at the 
end of 2013.

37 
The special representatives have 
broad mandates. This allows for a high 
degree of flexibility during implemen-
tation, but also makes it more difficult 
to evaluate their performance. Despite 
being considered as ad hoc crisis-
response instrument, special repre-
sentatives are in place for an average 
of 8 years, which risks leading to their 
proliferation and an undermining of 
the role of the normal EEAS structures.

16

35 

In 2012, common foreign and 
security policy funding for 
special representatives 
amounted to 27 897 500 euro 
which is equivalent to 5,7 % of 
the total EEAS expenditure for 
2012. These amounts are 
funded by common foreign 
and security policy 
operational appropriations.

36 

In particular, the Civilian 
Planning and Conduct 
Capability which is in charge 
of operational planning and 
implementation of civilian 
common security and defence 
policy missions.

Observations

38 
In December 2013, 7 of the 11 special 
representatives were based in Brus-
sels and co-located in the premises of 
the EEAS. The EU special representa-
tives are only integrated into the EEAS 
structure when double-hatted as 
heads of delegation (4 out of the 11, all 
located outside the EU). In the absence 
of clear procedures, it is left to the 
discretion of the individual special 
representatives to decide how to man-
age coordination with the relevant 
EEAS departments, thus increasing the 
risk that their actions are inconsist-
ent with other EU actions. Only half 
of the surveyed heads of delegation 
considered that they were adequately 
informed about the activities of special 
representatives.

39 
The special representatives are funded 
by the ‘operations’ EU budget man-
aged by the Commission which, at 
times of budgetary constraint, gives 
the EEAS significant additional re-
sources outside the EEAS administra-
tive budget35. However, this also leaves 
them outside the administrative and 
management framework established 
for the EEAS, notably in terms of 
staffing, salaries, and reporting, and 
obliges them to comply with extra 
administrative and financial obliga-
tions reducing their availability for 
policymaking.

The EEAS faced difficulties in 
staffing critical functions with 
the resources transferred

40 
The EEAS started operations with 
given resources and services, with 
staff being transferred on the basis of 
their status as of 31 December 2010. 
In 2011, the EEAS performed an initial 
screening exercise focusing on the 
rationalisation of the geographical 
desks. In 2012, a second screening 
procedure was launched with more 
ambitious goals in terms of assessing 
needs and aligning resources with EU 
foreign policy priorities. These two 
screening procedures allowed the 
EEAS to strengthen its administrative 
and support functions which were not 
sufficiently staffed when it was set up.

41 
Despite 18 redeployments, the staffing 
of the delegations’ political sections 
is still not completed and no new 
resources had been provided to take 
over responsibilities relating to the 
rotating Presidency. Similarly, the rel-
evant departments36 had not received 
corresponding new staff resources for 
the operational planning and imple-
mentation of the wave of common 
security and defence policy missions 
launched in 2012 and 2013 to respond, 
in particular, to the crises in Libya, the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

17

37  Overall, 35 % of the heads of 
delegation who returned to 
Brussels have not been given 
a management function.

38  The full costs of EEAS 

recruitment procedures are 
unknown, as the EEAS Human 
Resources department only 
pays the costs for Member 
State diplomats, while EU 
institutions pay the related 
expenses for EU officials. The 
requirement that the 
delegations must finance the 
expenses for their staff when 
they participate in recruitment 
procedures has also put 
pressure on their own 
budgets.

Observations

42 
In addition to climate change and 
energy security (see paragraph 18), 
the audit revealed several areas where 
a shortage of thematic expertise was 
particularly problematic: economic 
and financial issues, common secu-
rity and defence policy expertise at 
delegation level, code of conduct in 
space, cyber-security, migration, sanc-
tions and asset recovery. The thematic 
desks are the main interlocutors with 
the Commission during the inter-
service consultation procedure which 
is the key opportunity for the EEAS to 
influence policymaking. Consequently, 
these gaps make it more difficult for 
the EEAS to ensure policy consistency 
regarding the external dimension of 
internal policies.

43 
The GSC and the Commission foreign 
policy structures used different IT 
applications. In addition, the estab-
lishment of the EEAS brought new 
requirements, for example in terms of 
secured communication networks to 
share information with delegations. 
However, the EEAS could not address 
its immediate needs, such as updating 
and integrating the applications inher-
ited from the Commission and the GSC 
and improving communications with 
the delegations and Member States.

44 
The EEAS is largely dependent on 
seconded national experts that are 
not included in the establishment plan 
(366 at headquarters and delegations 
as of June 2013). This means that more 
than half of the EEAS’s administrator 
level staff are seconded from Member 
States for a limited period and can be 
recalled, which is a risk for the EEAS’s 
institutional memory and its business 
continuity.

The recruitment procedures 
were lengthy, costly and did 
not fully correct pre-existing 
imbalances

45 
The EEAS was required to renew its 
workforce by recruiting one third of 
its executive staff from the Member 
States in two and a half years, an 
unprecedented obligation for any EU 
institution. The EEAS has reached this 
objective.

46 
Fulfilling the one third requirement 
through natural attrition was inherent-
ly difficult as most existing staff had 
permanent contracts. Subsequently, 
career prospects were affected and 
many staff left the EEAS, in particu-
lar staff coming to the end of their 
appointments at delegations37. This 
was a loss of valuable experience and 
a cause of staff distress.

47 
The EEAS’s recruitment procedures are 
lengthy, especially for head of delega-
tion positions, as the HR/VP decided 
to interview all short-listed candidates, 
no matter the size of the delegation. 
They are also costly, as many candi-
dates are located outside the EU and 
interviews are held in person in Brus-
sels38. Due to the HR/VP’s busy sched-
ule, it is difficult to arrange interviews 
with early notice or avoid last minute 
changes, resulting in additional costs, 
time delays and media criticism.

Observations

18

50 
Induction training was insufficiently 
targeted to address the needs of new 
EEAS staff, as Member State diplo-
mats are not familiar with Commis-
sion procedures and practices and EU 
officials are not well trained in their 
new diplomatic functions. However, 
changes to the induction training were 
implemented in September 2013.

39  75 and 39 candidates were 
invited more than once for 
interviews in 2012 and 2013 
respectively. In 2013 the 10 
candidates with the greatest 
number of invitations 
combined 37 interviews in 
Brussels.

40 

In January 2011, 28 % and 13 % 
of the administrators were 
women and nationals of the 
Member States which joined 
the Union in 2004 and 2007 
respectively.

48 
Representatives of the Member States, 
the Commission and the GSC partici-
pate in the recruitment of sensitive 
posts, which facilitates an unbiased 
procedure in terms of origin of the 
candidates. However, the EEAS has not 
established a competency framework 
for managers as a basis for the evalu-
ation of pre-selected candidates. In 
addition, the EEAS decided not to use 
assessment centres for managerial po-
sitions despite the possible advantag-
es. For example, assessment centres 
may reduce the need for interviews39, 
provide additional input on the candi-
date’s competences and identify train-
ing and development needs.

49 
Significant gender and geographi-
cal imbalances, which already ex-
isted in the previous foreign policy 
structures40, still remained as of 
September 2013:

(a)  Too few women worked as admin-

istrators (34 %) and they were even 
more under-represented at delega-
tions (26 % of administrators) or 
within the category of managers 
(21 %).

(b)  Only 14 % of managers came from 
the Member States which joined 
the Union in 2004 and 2007, below 
the 21 % that would represent 
their share of the EU population.

19

41  The EEAS review states that 

‘Unfortunately these meetings 
have not been held frequently 
enough. The President of the 
Commission and the High 
Representative have recently 
agreed that the Relex Group of 
Commissioners should meet 
more regularly, with the High 
Representative in the Chair’.

42  The Commission reinforced 

the role of the Commissioner 
for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs by elevating the post to 
that of Vice-President, and 
giving the post-holder 
additional working 
instruments.

43  Country team meetings are 

organised by each 
geographical service on 
average twice to three times 
per year; they often do not 
include all relevant 
participants such as thematic 
desks, common security and 
defence policy structures or 
EU special representatives. 
The EEAS managing 
directorate responsible for 
counter-terrorism and 
development issues, 
DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection, DG Development 
and Cooperation — 
EuropeAid and the special 
representatives are not 
represented in the Crisis 
Management Board. 
DG Home Affairs is the only 
Commission directorate-
general represented in the 
intelligence steering board.

Observations

Coordination with the 
Commission and Member 
States is improving, but is 
still insufficient for the 
EEAS to fulfil its potential

51 
This section (paragraphs 51 to 67) 
answers the third question: Has the 
EEAS coordinated effectively with the 
Commission and the Member States? 
The Court used criteria related to the 
effectiveness of the EEAS coordination 
mechanisms with the Commission and 
the Member States, both at headquar-
ters and at delegation levels.

Coordination with the 
Commission was partly 
effective

52 
The EEAS is meant to contribute 
towards greater foreign policy con-
sistency. This mandate requires close 
cooperation with the Commission 
which under the Lisbon Treaty re-
tains responsibility for some external 
relations areas (such as development, 
trade, enlargement, humanitarian 
assistance and the external aspects of 
internal policies).

53 
As Vice-President of the Commission, 
the HR/VP plays a full part in the Com-
mission’s decision-making, but, given 
the nature of her job, she was not able 
to attend two thirds of the Commis-
sion meetings in 2012, including those 
with direct or indirect impact over EU 
foreign policy. In addition, it proved to 
be difficult to organise formal meet-
ings of External Relations Commission-
ers, with only five held in 29 months, 
all chaired by the President of the 
Commission41. In this respect, there has 
been limited progress clarifying what 
are the concrete functions/powers of 
her VP role, notably when coordinat-
ing other Commissioners. This is in 
contrast with the progress defining the 
powers of the VP role of the Commis-
sioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the Euro which was estab-
lished in October 2011 as a response to 
the gravity of the financial crisis42.

54 
At working level, there are different 
fora where the EEAS and the Com-
mission coordinate their activities. 
The audit found that country teams, 
the intelligence steering board and 
the crisis management board meet 
less frequently than envisaged and 
that participation does not include 
all relevant parties43. More systematic 
coordination took place through the 
weekly coordination meetings be-
tween the Commission’s Secretariat-
General and the Policy Coordination 
Division, and in the meetings held be-
tween the EEAS and the Commission 
directorates-general in the context of 
the Council Working Groups’ prepara-
tory work.

Observations

20

55 
The EEAS participates in the Com-
mission’s inter-service consultations, 
although its limited resources affect 
its impact on the external dimension 
of internal policies. In the common 
foreign and security policy, a field of 
intergovernmental competence, the 
HR/VP assesses whether a topic falls 
predominantly, or exclusively, under 
this category when deciding whether 
to consult the Commission. Some-
times, this is a matter of opinion and 
the proposal may nevertheless have 
implications for the Commission’s 
areas of competence.

56 
The EEAS and the Commission have 
established formal working agree-
ments to coordinate their activities. 
Overall, the new procedures are less 
flexible and more demanding than the 
ones that existed when DG RELEX was 
in charge of external relations as the 
EEAS is separated from the Commis-
sion. Although many ex-Commission 
EEAS staff still had good networks 
of contacts, which facilitated coordi-
nation, these networks are likely to 
weaken over time. In addition, the 
establishment of the EEAS as a sepa-
rate entity increased the number of 
EU institutions dealing with the same 
matters and this can make it more dif-
ficult to agree on an efficient division 
of labour, as is shown by the current 
set-up of crisis rooms within the EU 
(see Box 2).

2
x
o
B

Crisis rooms

Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide using all available 
resources, including reports from EU delegations, intelligence sources, and public media. The EEAS created 
the EU Situation Room in 2012 using existing resources which had previously been split over three separate 
departments. Although this was a positive step in the reduction of crisis rooms with similar roles, much re-
mains to be done at EU level.

In May 2013, the Commission established its own Emergency Response Centre, to provide ‘a better coordinat-
ed, faster and more efficient response when disaster strikes in Europe and the rest of the world’. In addition, 
the GSC supports the implementation of the EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements (EU-CCA), 
which were designed to ‘ensure rapid and coordinated EU cross-sector policy responses in serious crises under 
the leadership of the rotating Presidency’. Currently there is no clear division of responsibilities between the 
EU Situation Room, the Emergency Response Centre and EU-CCA structures to mitigate the evident risk of 
overlaps.

Other specific centres also continue to play a relevant role in crisis response44. The current architecture raises 
questions in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, as information and responsibilities are scattered over dif-
ferent players and, for example, the EU will only have a joint integrated threat and risk assessment report as 
of 2015.

44  The strategic analysis and response capability (DG Home Affairs), the health emergency operations facility (DG Health and Consumers), the 

emergency operations centre within the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the Frontex Situation Centre.

 
21

45  According to the replies 

received from the heads of 
delegation to the Court’s 
survey, 46 % spend 50 % or 
more of their time on 
management/administrative 
tasks.

Observations

The new set-up of EU  
delegations demands more  
coordination work and its 
administrative management 
is less efficient

57 
At delegation level the strict distinc-
tion between the administrative 
budgets of the EEAS and Commission 
has added complexity to the budget 
preparation and implementation 
stages. For example, during 2012, the 
Commission funded administrative 
costs in delegations through eight 
different directorates-general and 
three instruments. Having separated 
budgets has a negative impact on the 
efficiency of the delegations, as the 
current set-up requires more resources 
to manage the administrative budget 
and it is a source of risk in a framework 
of limited resources and decentralised 
budget implementation (see Box 3). 
In November 2013, the EEAS made 
a proposal to the Commission for sim-
plification which if implemented will 
reduce the number of funding sources 
to a maximum of two.

58 
Heads of delegation also face signifi-
cant difficulties in allocating staff to 
priorities, as they can only allocate 
Commission staff to EEAS duties within 
a limit of 20 % of their working time. In 
addition, Commission staff cannot au-
thorise EEAS expenditure. As a result, 
heads of delegation spend a signifi-
cant part of their time on administra-
tive rather than political issues, which 
hampers their effectiveness45.

59 
Heads of Delegation and desk offic-
ers at headquarters are not always 
informed about the instructions and 
reports sent between the Commission 
headquarters and Commission staff 
in delegations. This puts at risk the 
consistency of EU actions.

3
x
o
B

Financial authorisation restrictions

There are strict restrictions on which delegation staff can authorise EEAS administrative expenditure and 
Commission operational expenditure. The sole exception is the Head of Delegation, who works for the EEAS 
but is sub-delegated by the Commission to authorise Commission operational expenditure. This has led to 
situations where nobody is authorised to implement some of the fundamental steps of financial transactions, 
notably in delegations where the only EEAS administrator is the Head of Delegation: in his/her absence no 
one else can authorise EEAS administrative expenditure.

 
22

46 

In this regard, the Council has 
given its full support to further 
enhancing co-location and 
sharing reports and 
information in the Council 
conclusions on the EEAS 
review.

Observations

60 
The EEAS and the Commission coordi-
nate the management of delegations 
though EUDEL, a body that meets at 
both senior and operative levels. At 
the same time, however, the Commis-
sion also has a separate forum, ‘COM-
DEL’, to deal with Commission-specific 
matters. The EEAS does not receive the 
minutes of COMDEL meetings and is 
not consulted on relevant initiatives. 
As an example, the Commission car-
ried out a major workload assessment 
for Commission posts in delegations 
in 2011, which did not cover the rela-
tive workload of all delegation staff 
(including EEAS staff) and the EU’s 
overall priorities. The existence of two 
separate bodies to deal with delega-
tion-related matters complicates the 
working arrangements.

61 
Despite these issues, the Member 
States judge that the transformation 
of the former Commission delegations 
into EU delegations has been a consid-
erable success for the EEAS.

Member States and the EEAS 
have not yet fully exploited 
the potential for synergies 
between their networks of 
diplomatic representations

62 
The EEAS has established regular 
meetings with the diplomatic services 
of the Member States to discuss issues 
of common interest. These meetings 
were organised at different levels and 
allowed the EEAS to coordinate a wide 
range of topics, from political issues to 
administrative matters such as training 
or security.

63 
However, the new role for EU delega-
tions has not been followed by a sig-
nificant exploitation of synergies with 
the diplomatic services of the Member 
States, which is largely attributable 
to the short time passed and a lack of 
commitment from the Member States 
themselves. The co-location of EU del-
egations and Member State diplomatic 
representations is still very limited and 
common political reporting is excep-
tional. In practice, the information flow 
between the delegations and Member 
State embassies remains one-way with 
delegations receiving little informa-
tion. Co-location and common politi-
cal reporting are areas which provide 
good opportunities for the EEAS to 
provide added value46.

Observations

23

66 
Having permanent chairs was consid-
ered to represent an advantage over 
the previous rotating chair model 
due to the opportunity for long-term 
planning and more strategic thinking. 
However, according to the answers of 
the Court’s survey of Member States, 
the EEAS’s chairing of Council com-
mittees and working groups did not 
lead to a more strategic approach than 
when they were chaired by the rotat-
ing Presidency.

67 
Overall, the current set-up still requires 
close cooperation with the rotating 
Presidency, which chairs the General 
Affairs Council responsible for key 
topics, like accession negotiations, 
the Committee of permanent repre-
sentatives, and some relevant Council 
working groups such as the one on 
development. This coordination has so 
far worked in practice although its ef-
ficiency has suffered from weaknesses 
in the EEAS’s planning and agenda-set-
ting, which has led to the late submis-
sion of documents and short notice 
before international summits.

64 
The Lisbon Treaty, which set up EU 
delegations, increased expectations 
that these ‘houses of Europe’ would 
provide consular services, includ-
ing consular protection of EU citi-
zens. However, much still remains to 
be done, and the EEAS has not yet 
prepared a detailed analysis of the 
financial implications of addressing 
these issues, especially of meeting the 
expectations of some medium-sized 
and small Member States. The Member 
States have neither reached a common 
position on this issue nor agreed on 
the harmonisation of rules and legisla-
tion applicable in crisis and emergency 
situations, staff training and the distri-
bution of costs.

The potential benefits from 
having the EEAS as perma-
nent chair of Council prepar-
atory bodies have not been 
fully realised

65 
The HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs 
Council, one of the configurations of 
the Council of the European Union, 
and appoints the permanent chairs of 
some of its preparatory bodies, includ-
ing the Political and Security Commit-
tee. Although this facilitates coordina-
tion and gives the EEAS significant 
influence on the whole foreign policy 
cycle, there are some shortcomings 
such as the absence of a preparatory 
body to deal with the external dimen-
sion of internal policies.

Conclusions and 
recommendations

24

68 
This report is the result of an inde-
pendent assessment of the establish-
ment of the EEAS. The Court’s audit 
took place at the same time as the 
preparation of the EEAS mid-term 
review. The Court’s findings and 
recommendations are generally in line 
with the EEAS self-assessment, which 
reinforces the need to address the 
weaknesses identified.

69 
With the establishment of the EEAS the 
EU has an operational foreign policy 
service, equipped with policy desks 
and crisis management structures, 
a wide network of diplomatic posts 
and with a balanced presence of differ-
ent sources of staff.

70 
The establishment of the EEAS took 
place during a time of financial con-
straints and of increasing turmoil close 
to the EU’s borders. It was also rushed 
and inadequately prepared and, at 
the same time, was beset by too many 
constraints and vaguely defined tasks. 
Overall, all these factors contributed 
towards a difficult start-up environ-
ment. (See paragraphs 13 to 22)

71 
Weaknesses in the objective setting 
and planning, organisation and alloca-
tion of resources have also reduced the 
EEAS’s efficiency. The integration of 
the EU special representatives within 
the work of the EEAS is not yet suf-
ficient. As regards recruitment, the 
Court found that significant gender 
and geographical imbalances have not 
yet been fully corrected and that the 
recruitment procedures are costly and 
lengthy. (See paragraphs 23 to 50)

72 
Overall, coordination between the 
EEAS and the Commission was only 
partly effective, mainly due to the 
absence of effective coordination 
mechanisms at top level and a rigid 
financial and administrative framework 
at delegations, which takes resources 
away from political tasks. The coordi-
nation with Member States improved 
although it can be further developed 
to exploit synergies such as informa-
tion sharing or co-location, to improve 
consular services, including consu-
lar protection of EU citizens, and to 
facilitate a more strategic role for the 
Council and its preparatory bodies. 
(See paragraphs 51 to 67)

73 
Based on the above conclusions, the 
Court recommends that:

(a)  the EEAS should clarify its objec-
tives, tasks and competencies, 
streamline its organisational 
design and simplify the admin-
istrative framework in which it 
operates;

(b)  the EEAS should examine with the 
Member States and the Commis-
sion the necessity and feasibility 
of preparing a new overarching 
strategic framework for EU foreign 
affairs and security policy, to be 
submitted to the European Council 
for approval;

(c)  the EEAS should develop its 
comprehensive planning to 
strengthen the internal coherency 
of its activities and to better con-
nect them with the Commission’s 
annual work programme and the 
trio programme of the rotating 
presidencies;

Conclusions and recommendations

25

(f)  The EEAS and the Commission 

should propose a new administra-
tive and financial framework for 
the management of EU delega-
tions to reduce the complexity and 
rigidity derived from the current 
budgetary arrangements and al-
low for a flexible use of delegation 
staff in the interest of the EU;

(g)  The EEAS should continue its ef-

forts to promote information shar-
ing and co-location with Member 
States; and prepare a feasibility 
study for initiating consular ser-
vices, including consular protec-
tion of EU citizens.

(d)  the EEAS should propose to the 
Council a review of the existing 
framework applicable to the EU 
special representatives to ensure 
their smooth integration with 
the work of the EEAS, including 
clarifying the conditions for their 
appointment, the characteristics 
of their mandate, the mechanisms 
to evaluate their performance, and 
proposing changes to their admin-
istrative position including staffing 
and financial aspects;

(e)  the EEAS should review its recruit-

ment procedures on the basis of 
the lessons learnt during the first 
3 years, adopting a competence 
framework for managers, increas-
ing the use of new technologies 
to save costs, introducing the use 
of assessment centres for sensitive 
posts and being more selective on 
which posts merit the involvement 
of the political level in the selec-
tion procedure;

This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of 
the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 20 May 2014.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

Reply of  
the EEAS

26

Observations

The role of the EEAS was decided late 
and defined in vague terms

15
The task that has been assigned to the EEAS con-
sists in assisting the HR in fulfilling his/her man-
date, which in turn is to conduct the Union’s CFSP 
and CSDP as mandated by the Council, as well as 
to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external 
action.

Decisions on CFSP are subject to unanimity among 
EU Member States, the EEAS could have outlined 
an overarching foreign policy strategy only if EU 
MS would have given a clear mandate to the HR to 
proceed in that direction, which has not been the 
case. Instead, there have been some initiatives by 
a limited number of MS — such as the project for 
a ‘European Global Strategy’, promoted by Spain, 
Italy, Poland, Sweden — but not supported by oth-
ers, to which the EEAS has been closely associated.

The EU strategic approach continues to be based 
on the European Security Strategy adopted 
in 2003 and its implementation report issued 
in 2008, whose findings are in many respects still 
valid and pertinent to date (see also our comments 
to paragraph 25).

The EEAS has faced a number of political 
and financial challenges

21
Concerning the General Secretariat of the Council, 
the pattern was one of the progressive and rapid 
phasing out.

The EEAS did not treat as a priority the 
development of an overarching strategic 
framework for EU foreign policy, and did 
not adopt an internal strategy

25
Since the inception of her mandate, the HR/VP 
has repeatedly indicated that relations with stra-
tegic partners were among the priorities of EU 
foreign policy. How to make sure that the EU would 

improve its approach to these crucial relationships 
has been the subject of intense discussions, also at 
the highest political level, including at the Euro-
pean Council (September 2010) and at ministerial 
levels (Foreign Affairs Council of December 2010), 
and especially in the Gymnich format in Septem-
ber 2011 and on a number of other occasions. Due 
to the heterogeneous nature of the group of the 
strategic partner countries and of their respective 
relations with the EU, it has always been recognised 
that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to these partner-
ships might have been not the most beneficial one. 
Initially, the main focus of discussions was on stra-
tegic partnerships with the US, Russia, and China. 
Then, the focus was also on Brazil, India, and South 
Africa and, of course, on all other strategic partners. 
It is also worth mentioning that the structure of 
the strategic partnerships — which implies a set of 
regular meetings at different levels and, particularly 
the regular organisation of summits — facilitates 
a systematic follow-up by the Member States and 
the progressive adjustment of these partnerships to 
the political priorities and to the evolving interna-
tional situation. Particularly relevant, in this context, 
are the discussions which take place in the Coreper 
in the wake of the summits.

The complex organisation of the EEAS 
does not facilitate timely cooperation 
between departments

32 and Box 1 — the crisis platform
Two new mechanisms have been established to 
foster coordination, such as the crisis management 
board which deals with horizontal issues and the 
crisis platform which organises the EU response 
to a crisis from all relevant aspects (diplomatic, 
humanitarian, security, crisis management, etc.) 
with all relevant stakeholders from the EEAS and 
from the Commission (in particular ECHO and 
DEVCO). When a crisis platform is launched, the HR, 
or the ESG, or the geographical managing director 
with the crisis managing director for the opera-
tional aspects of the crisis coordinate the meeting 
in view of adopting operational conclusions with 
all actors involved in shaping the EU’s response. As 
stated in the recently adopted Communication on 
comprehensive approach, crisis platforms shall be 
organised on a very regular basis for all countries 
in crisis, like it was the case for the EU’s response in 
Libya until October 2011.

Reply of the EEAS 

27

34
With reference to indent (b), the same applies to 
reports issued by civilian CSDP missions.

In figures, 70 Heads of Delegation out of the 140 
have a security authorisation. This is a process 
that takes time due to the involvement of national 
services. However, since its creation the EEAS has 
realised considerable progress on that topic and 
the trend is still improving. Our objective is to reach 
a situation where every HoD has the appropriate 
level of security clearance. In order to do so min-
istries of foreign affairs will be informed that their 
candidates should already have as much as possible 
a security clearance.

With respect to classified information, registers are 
in place within the Delegations that have to deal 
with EU CONFIDENTIAL documents and above. RCOs 
(registry control officers) are trained and prepared 
to deal with these classified documents.

As regards the classified systems: All the delega-
tions have the possibility to send and receive 
information of EU RESTRICTED level and below — 
including reports on this level of information. The 
same system combines political and intelligence 
reporting.

Twenty-three delegations are currently equipped 
with systems allowing the sending and receipt of 
information of until level EU SECRET. This number 
will increase to 30 at the end of the year 2014 and 
the target for mid-2016 is 60. The system combines 
also the two kinds of reporting here.

Finally, a complete reworking of the classified infor-
mation systems is ongoing with the objective to 
transform the still heterogeneous current systems 
into one ‘EEAS Corporate’ system. The latter should 
be operational in 2016.

EU special representatives are not 
sufficiently integrated in the EEAS

36
Besides their mission of ensuring consistency and 
coherence of Union action, the EUSRs support the 
work of the HR/VP, in their respective regions or 
thematic areas. They play an important role in the 
development of a stronger and more effective EU 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and in the Union’s 
efforts to become a more effective, more coherent 
and more capable actor on the world stage. They 
provide the EU with an active political presence in 
key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and 
‘face’ for the EU and its policies.

37
In principle, the EUSRs coordinate their actions 
with relevant EU actors. For example, as stated in 
Article 12(2) — Coordination of the Council Deci-
sion 2011/426/CFSP of 18 July 2011 appointing the 
EUSR in BiH: In support of Union crisis manage-
ment operations, the EUSR, with other Union actors 
present in the field, shall improve the dissemination 
and sharing of information by those Union actors 
with a view to achieving a high degree of common 
situation awareness and assessment.

However it is true that their integration into the 
structures represents a challenge.

38
However, as stated in their mandate, … The EUSR 
shall be responsible for the implementation of the 
mandate, acting under the authority of the HR … 
The EUSR shall work in close coordination with 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) — 
These provisions reduce considerably the scope of 
‘discretion’.

Reply of the EEAS 

28

39
The Commission is responsible for the financial 
implementation of the Council decisions adopted 
for each mandate of the respective EUSRs. Most of 
the EUSRs’ budgets relate to staffing and logistical 
expenditure which can be seen as administrative 
expenditure by their nature, but are currently man-
aged as operational expenditure because of their 
source of financing under the CFSP budget. This 
set-up gives rise to a different set of procedures 
which is not optimal and the main reason is that 
each EUSR has to set up and manage its own office 
and handle all administrative, logistic, contractual 
and financial matters with very few staff and the 
challenge to have all the necessary specialised 
knowledge and experience to run an office. In 2013, 
the amount committed for the EUSRs under the 
CFSP budget was 23.5 million.

This could be improved substantially if the support 
staff and functions were brought together through 
one of the following options:

 — integration into the European External Action 

Service;

 — integration in a shared-service centre;

 — creation of a specific support cell.

Under the current situation, the EUSRs receive 
extensive support from FPI in certain areas (in par-
ticular on finance and contracts, procurement, use 
of FWCs for essential services and equipment) and 
also from the EEAS. The EEAS provides extensive 
logistical support (offices, office furniture, IT and 
communication equipment and services) formal-
ised through MOUs. The Brussels-based EUSRs are 
co-located in the EEAS premises and the double-
hatted EUSRS, as Head of Delegation and located 
outside the EU, share the offices and services with 
the Delegation they are based in.

However, whatever integration option would be 
taken in the future, the EUSRs would still need to 
report on their activities separately from the EEAS, 
because specific provisions in the Treaty will con-
tinue to apply to them.

The EEAS faced difficulties in staffing 
critical functions with the resources 
transferred

43
Please see comment on paragraph 34.

44
The EEAS has been conceived in a way to favour 
cross-fertilisation between the cultures of the 
national diplomatic services of the EU Member 
States and the staff coming from the European insti-
tutions. It was intended since the beginning that 
the seconded staff would essentially be rotating. 
The national experts who are seconded to the EEAS 
have the opportunity to familiarise themselves 
with the operational side of European policies 
and with the European structures. These aspects 
are undoubtedly representing a benefit for their 
respective administrations.

The recruitment procedures were 
lengthy, costly and did not fully correct 
pre-existing imbalances

47
Interviews in Brussels for the candidates to posi-
tions of Head of Delegation is deemed necessary as 
they would be occupying challenging management 
positions outside headquarters. 

Although it does sometimes happen that final inter-
views for Head of Delegation positions by the HR/
VP need to be rescheduled owing to unavoidable 
changes in her diary, every effort is made to ensure 
that candidates are always notified of the change in 
the date and/or time of their interview before they 
have to travel.

48
The EEAS did analyse the possible advantages of 
using assessment centres for managerial positions. 
We reached the conclusion that they did not repre-
sent an optimal solution for an institution like ours, 
in particular during a start-up phase and in pres-
ence of the obligation of rapidly fulfilling the quota 
of Member States diplomats.

Reply of the EEAS 

29

49
Taking the figures of February 2014 it’s true that 
women represent a lower percentage than men for 
the category of administrator, but the percentage of 
women in management positions has increased up 
to 25.5 %.

Notwithstanding the inherited geographical 
imbalance, the EEAS has made significant efforts 
to recruit MS diplomats coming from the ‘new’ 
Member States. As of February 2014, 29 % of the MS 
diplomats in management position are from the 
‘new’ Member States.

As regards gender and geographical balance, the 
success rate of women who apply remains higher 
than for men, but the problem is getting enough 
application forms by women.

On geographical imbalance, it may depend which 
figures have been used : In the 2013 staffing report, 
we highlight an increase from 16.9 to 18.6 % of 
EU-12 at AD level where the size of these countries 
correspond to 20.6 %, so not far off and improv-
ing fast. On ASTs we went from 12.7 % to 16.1 % in 
1 year. For contract agents the figures are lower.

50
The programme of the preposting seminars aiming 
at preparing staff for a first post in a delegation has 
indeed been adapted to the needs of newly nomi-
nated colleagues. During the annual seminars for 
staff in delegations, training related to diplomatic 
tasks has also been systematically organised.

Coordination with the Commission was 
partly effective

54
More effort arguably needs to be made to bring in 
the CSDP structures to improve coordination both 
with the Commission and within the EEAS itself.

Furthermore, the weekly EEAS COO-DEVCO DG 
meeting and the weekly meeting with the Cabinet 
of the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy, are important 
examples as well. In addition to periodic meetings, 
other coordination mechanisms have contributed to 
the effectiveness of the EEAS Commission collabo-
ration. Written agreements (e.g. The EEAS Commis-
sion Working Arrangements, see paragraph 56) as 
well as Committees (e.g. EUDEL, see paragraph 60) 
are good examples of such mechanisms.

56
The EU Situation Room mainly deals with political 
crises and major natural disasters outside the EU.

The European Emergency Response Centre (EERC) 
mainly deals with natural disasters outside and 
inside the EU, according to EU legislation on human-
itarian aid and civil protection.

To encourage synergies and minimise overlaps, co-
location of the EERC and the EU Situation Room was 
proposed in the EEAS Review in 2013.

The new set-up of EU delegations 
demands more coordination work and 
its administrative management is less 
efficient

57
The EEAS fully shares the Court’s analysis on the 
financial circuits in delegations which is also valid 
for the CFSP budget, in particular as regards the 
efficient management of the budget of civilian 
CSDP missions.

59
The rule applicable to the relations between HQ 
and the Delegations, as agreed between the EEAS 
and the Commission, is that all Heads of Delega-
tions should be informed of all instructions coming 
from HQ to Delegations and should see all report-
ing from their Delegation to HQ.

Reply of the EEAS 

30

64
It should indeed be recalled that consular protec-
tions remains a national competence, therefore 
delegations do not provide direct assistance to EU 
citizens. Delegations support the MS in facilitat-
ing cooperation and in helping them to provide 
assistance to unrepresented citizens. This is done 
in a number of countries. One recent example is 
South Sudan where the delegation helped the local 
coordination of evacuation unrepresented citizens 
(main nationalities of unrepresented citizens: Italy, 
Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, Greece, 
Denmark) other examples are Lebanon and Philip-
pines just to mention the most recent cases.

The potential benefits from having the 
EEAS as permanent chair of Council 
preparatory bodies have not been fully 
realised

Common reply to paragraphs 65–67
This is, indeed, still work in progress. However, 
the stability and growing experience in the Chair 
brought by those who have been doing the job 
has resulted in many benefits, and the further 
development of their role, notably in how working 
parties and committees engage with third parties 
through third country visits and regular chair’s dia-
logues with third countries, civil society and other 
stakeholders.

65
There are several Council Working Parties that deal 
with the external dimension of internal policies 
such as COTER (external dimension of terrorism), 
JAIEX (external dimension of justice and home 
affairs policies). These, however, are chaired by the 
rotating Presidency, within the sectorial domains 
they concern.

60
This dual system (COMDEL-EUDEL) does lead to mul-
tiple debates on the same issues, delays in decision-
making and can be an obstacle to direct contacts 
between the EEAS and Commission services. How-
ever, in recent months the EUDEL format has been 
adjusted and now takes place at director’s level, 
more suited for decision-making. We nevertheless 
agree that the coordination of the management of 
delegations would be less complicated if only one 
‘forum’, the EUDEL, existed.

Member States and the EEAS have not 
yet fully exploited the potential for 
synergies between their networks of 
diplomatic representations

63
In addition to the 4 co-location projects already exist-
ing, 8 co-location projects with different Member 
States have been established since the creation of the 
EEAS, in 7 third countries. Other co-location projects 
are under examination and we are confident that this 
practise will develop further. Co-locations represent 
a priority for the EEAS not only for practical and eco-
nomic reasons but also for their symbolic value.

As regards report-sharing between EU institutions 
and Member States, there is a more systematic and 
standardised system, at headquarters and delega-
tion level. The EEAS continues the practise of sharing 
reports about summits, EU and bilateral meetings, 
visits, etc. via COREU as previously done by the rotat-
ing EU presidency. The EU delegations also share 
a number of EU coordination meetings at different 
levels such as Heads of Mission, Deputy Heads of 
Mission, Economic and Trade Affairs, Cooperation, 
Press, Information and Culture, etc. Joint EU HOMs 
reports are also regularly produced by EU delegations 
and EU Member States embassies in third countries. 
Delegations also regularly distribute other reports, 
analytical surveys and assessments, and e-notes. The 
EEAS is also distributing on daily basis LTTs (Line-to-
take) on significant events in international affairs. The 
LTTs are an efficient way to make known the EU line 
on international policy issues or on other issues of 
international relevance, such as economic and trade 
issues, migration, security, etc. EU delegations nor-
mally distribute regularly LTTs to EU Member States 
embassies in third countries.

Reply of the EEAS 

31

66
It is in the nature of CFSP that most of the policy 
areas that it covers are those related to unplanna-
ble and unpredictable events and the need for an 
urgent response to crisis. The real advantages of 
having a permanent chair are: 

(1)  Having a continuous interlocutor for political dia-
logue and consultation with third countries. To take 
one example, the PSC Chair has been able to revive 
a moribund dialogue with the United States, who 
were previously uninterested in meeting a new in-
terlocutor every 6 months.

(2)  The avoidance of policy priorities being set accord-
ing to the political exigencies of delivering within 
a 6-month period. Policies such as the strategies on 
maritime security or Gulf of Guinea were prepared 
gradually and thoroughly over a much longer time-
frame and are better products.

67
The operation of coordination between bodies 
chaired by three different Presidencies (EEAS, rotat-
ing Presidency and Chair of the European Council) 
when dealing with the same policy area is a com-
plex task. To note also that the coordination process 
is made more complicated than necessary by the 
fact that the mandates of Council bodies have not 
been changed since the Lisbon Treaty, meaning 
that divisions of responsibility along CFSP/non-CFSP 
lines do not always reflect the different responsibili-
ties held by EEAS, Commission and Council.

Conclusions and recommendations

71
During the first months after the EEAS kick-off, 
all administrative services had put the focus on 
streamlining processes which were before totally 
or partially done with support of the Commission 
services (HR, IT, …). In 2012, and especially in 2013, 
the reorganisation of the EEAS headquarter struc-
ture, the redeployment of 20 AD posts from head-
quarters to delegations and the Zero-Based Review 
reallocation of delegations’ resources are the first 
initiatives to improve efficiency in planning and 
allocation of resources.

The adoption of the EEAS staff appraisal system 
in 2012 and subsequent launch of the first exercise 
in 2013 are meant to lay the foundation of a more 
comprehensive and integrated approach to perfor-
mance management.

This process is expected to gradually strengthen 
the link between the staff inputs and EEAS priori-
ties, for the benefit of the institution’s efficiency 
and effectiveness.

EEAS efficiency will actually improve through 
a closer alignment between organisational and 
individuals’ objectives.

72
Since 2012 there are regular working meetings 
between EEAS and DEVCO HR teams dealing with 
post management in delegations which represents 
relevant contributions to EEAS-COM coordination 
improvements.

Also HR systems, such as SYSPER2, have been re-
engineered to improve the co-management (Job 
Context system).

Reply of the EEAS 

32

73 (a)
The EEAS takes note of the Court’s recommendation 
and is already addressing it in the context of the 
EEAS Review. 

73 (e)
The EEAS takes note of the Court’s recommendation 
and shares the spirit of it. However it reiterates its 
doubts about the use of assessment centres at the 
present state of development of EEAS HR policies.

73 (b)
The EEAS is not convinced by the necessity and 
feasibility of a new overarching strategic framework 
for EU foreign affairs and security policy, for the rea-
sons presented above (see reply to paragraph 25). 
However it is open to re-examine the matter with 
the Council and the Commission, in the future.

73 (c)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation. At the 
same time the EEAS emphasises the efforts already 
made to assure internal and interinstitutional coher-
ence and reiterate its intention to further progress 
in this area in close coordination with other con-
cerned EU institutions and EU Member States.

73 (d)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation. Proposals 
were made to the Council and the Commission and 
will continue to be discussed.

73 (f)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation which 
would be extended to cover the management of 
CSDP civilian missions. Proposals are currently 
discussed with the Commission and the EEAS will 
continue to plea for a simplification of the financial 
management framework of delegations.

73 (g)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation and points 
out that on colocation, intense and fruitful contacts 
are ongoing with EU Member States and other 
EU institutions such as EIB. On consular services, 
bilateral contacts with Member States have taken 
place to understand their specific needs and expec-
tations. All progress in this area is dependent on 
Member States’ agreement.

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The Lisbon Treaty created a new EU foreign 
affairs chief, the High Representative for  
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also 
Vice-President of the European Commission. 
The High Representative is supported by a new 
diplomatic corps known as the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). This report 
addressed the question of whether the setting 
up of the EEAS has been managed effectively.  
It concludes both that the EEAS was established 
without adequate preparation and that its 
efficiency was impaired by shortcomings in its 
management of resources. The Court also found 
that, although coordination between the EEAS 
and both the Commission and Member States 
was improving, it was still inadequate.

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