Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 June 2014 on a systemic risk committee (CON/2014/46)
Date: 2014-06-26
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Luxembourg, central bank, financial risk, financial stability, financial supervision, institutional activity, national law, statistics

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 26 June 2014 

on a systemic risk committee 

(CON/2014/46) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  28  March  2014,  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  two  requests  from  the  Luxembourg 

Ministry of Finance: one for an opinion on a draft law establishing a systemic risk committee (hereinafter 

the ‘first draft law’) and another for an opinion on a draft law implementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council1 (hereinafter the ‘second draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion on the first and second draft laws is based on Article 127(4) 

and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents 
of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, since the two draft laws relate to the Banque centrale du 

Luxembourg  (BCL)  and  to  statistics  and  rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  insofar  as  they 

materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  In  accordance  with  the  first 

sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the first draft law 

1.1  

In  order  to  implement  Recommendations  ESRB/2011/33  and  ESRB/2013/14,  the  first  draft  law 

establishes  a  systemic  risk  committee  (hereinafter  the  ‘committee’)  with  four  members:  (a)  the 

member  of  the  government  responsible  for  the  financial  sector,  who  shall  be  the  chair;  (b)  the 

director general of the BCL, who replaces the chair in case of absence; (c) the director general of 

the  Financial  Sector  Supervisory  Commission  (‘CSSF’);  and  (d)  the  director  of  the  Insurance 

1 

2 

3 

4  

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC 
and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Recommendation  ESRB/2011/3  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  of  22  December  2011  on  the  macro-prudential 
mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1). Available on the European Systemic Risk Board’s website at 
www.esrb.europa.eu. 
Recommendation  ESRB  2013/1  of  the European  Systemic  Risk  Board  of  4  April  2013  on  intermediary  objectives  and 
instruments of macro-prudential policy (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1). 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Commission (IC)5. The BCL, subject to the authority of its director general, acts as secretary to the 

committee and is supported in this capacity by one person designated by each of the members of 
the committee. All decisions of the committee are adopted by unanimous vote6. 

1.2  The first draft law entrusts to the committee the task of coordinating the implementation of macro-
prudential policy, with a view to safeguarding the stability of Luxembourg’s financial system7. By 

virtue of Article 1(2) of the first draft law, this objective is without prejudice to the powers vested 

in the ECB and in the BCL as members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the 

Eurosystem, and those vested in the BCL pursuant to the Law of 23 December 1998 concerning the 
monetary  status  and  the  Central  Bank  of  Luxembourg8  (hereinafter  ‘the  Organic  Law’)9.  To  this 

end, the committee pursues intermediate objectives and periodically assesses the suitability of these 
objectives, as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the macro-prudential instruments chosen10.  

1.3 

In  order  to  accomplish  its  mission,  the  committee  may,  inter  alia,  carry  out  the  following  tasks: 

(a) identify,  assess  and  monitor  risks  to  financial  stability;  (b)  designate  systemically  important 

financial institutions and structures in Luxembourg; (c) issue notices, warnings regarding high risks 

to  financial  stability,  and  recommendations  addressed  to  the  CSSF,  IC,  BCL  and  other  players 

within  the  financial  sector,  including  credit  institutions,  insurance  and  reinsurance  companies, 

investment  funds,  payment  systems,  and  securities  settlement  systems,  that  are  capable,  either 

collectively  or  individually,  of  having  a  negative  impact  on  the  financial  system  or  one  of  its 
components11; (d) assess and monitor responses made by recipients referred to under item (c) above 
in accordance with the ‘comply or explain’ principle12; and (e) support cooperation and information 

exchange  at  national  and  international  level,  especially  with  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board 

(ESRB). 

1.4  The  committee  may  request  the  authorities  represented  on  the  committee  and  any  other  national 

entities  to  provide  all  economic  and  financial  information  necessary  for  it  to  fulfil  its  tasks, 

including  macroeconomic  data  and  prudential 
institutions or market infrastructures13. 

information  regarding 

individual  financial 

5  
6  
7  
8  

9  
10  
11 
12  
13  

Article 3(1) of the first draft law.  
Article 3(6) of the first draft law.  
Article 1(1) of the first draft law.  
Law of 23 December 1998 concerning the monetary status and the Central Bank of Luxembourg, as modified by the Law 
of 13 July 2007, the Law of 24 October 2008 and the Law of 10 November 2009.  
Article 1(2) of the first draft law.  
Article 1(4) of the first draft law.  
Article 4 of the first draft law.  
Ibid. 
Article 5 of the first draft law.  

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2.  

Purpose of the second draft law 

2.1  The  second  draft  law  implements  Directive  2013/36/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council14  into  Luxembourg  law.  It  also  designates  the  CSSF  as  the  competent  authority  in  the 

context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 

2.2  The  second  draft  law  appoints  the  CSSF  as  the  ‘designated  authority’  within  the  meaning  of 

Articles  131,  133  and  136  of  Directive  2013/36/EU  and  Article  458  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council15. When the CSSF acts in this capacity 

with respect to capital conservation buffers, countercyclical capital buffers, buffers for systemically 

important institutions, systemic risk buffers and macro-prudential risks identified at national level, 

it makes its decisions following negotiation with the BCL in order to reach a common position and, 

depending on the case at hand, after seeking the opinion of the committee or taking into account its 

recommendations. 

2.3  The  second  draft  law  also  amends  the  Law  of  23  December  1998  establishing  a  financial  sector 

supervisory commission16, in order to authorise the exchange of information with the committee. 

3.   General observations 

3.1  The ECB welcomes that the first draft law establishes the committee, ensures that all the relevant 

authorities and institutions involved in macro-prudential policy are represented on the committee, 

and  defines  its  objectives,  mission  and  powers  in  line  with  the  guiding  principles  expressed  in 

Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 and Recommendation ESRB/2013/1. 

3.2  The  ECB  also  welcomes  that  the  second  draft  law  implements  Directive  2013/36/EU  in 

Luxembourg law, including its optional provisions. In particular, it provides the CSSF, when acting 

in its capacity as designated authority, in close coordination with the BCL, on the one hand, and the 

ECB, on the other hand, with the broadest possible range of macro-prudential tools, including the 

capital  conservation  buffer,  the  countercyclical  capital  buffer,  the  global  systemically  important 

institution (G-SII) buffer, the other systemically important institution (O-SII) buffer and a systemic 

risk buffer. 

3.3  The establishment of the committee and the cooperation arrangement between the CSSF, the BCL 

and  the  committee  established  pursuant  to  the  second  draft  law  are  without  prejudice  to  the 

14  

15  

16  

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC 
and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ, L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements 
for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 
Law  of  23  December  1998  establishing  a  financial  sector  supervisory  commission  (‘Commission  de  surveillance  du 
secteur financier’), as amended. 

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procedures  provided  for  in  Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/201317  for  close 

cooperation  between  the  CSSF,  in  continuous  close  coordination  with  the  BCL,  and  the  ECB  in 

respect  of  macro-prudential  tasks  and  tools.  This  national  institutional  framework  is  also  without 

prejudice to the ECB’s power to act in the CSSF’s stead and to apply higher requirements and more 

stringent  measures,  in  accordance  with  Articles  5(2)  and  9(1)  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 

1024/2013, on the basis of close coordination with the CSSF. 

4. 

Effective macro-prudential policy framework 

An effective macro-prudential policy framework must be designed in such a way as to foster the ability 

and willingness of the authority entrusted with macro-prudential policy to act. The framework needs to 

foster,  in  particular,  the  authority’s  ability  to  act  in  the  face  of  evolving  systemic  threats,  ensuring  the 

authority  has  access  to  information  and  that  the  authority  has  an  appropriate  range  of  macro-prudential 

instruments. It also needs to give assurances that it will act if necessary and offset any biases occurring 

due  to  its  inaction  or  insufficiently  timely  action  arising  from  difficulties  in  quantifying  the  benefits  of 

macro-prudential action, and that are often exacerbated by financial industry lobbying, political pressures, 
and the need for coordination among agencies18. The following shortcomings should be addressed with a 

view to ensure that the institutional framework provided for in the first and second draft laws would entail 

effective macro-prudential policies in Luxembourg: (a) the limited role of the BCL in the field of macro-

prudential  policy;  (b)  the  limited  powers  of  the  committee,  including  its  power  to  collect  information; 

(c) the  voting  arrangements;  (d)  the  lack  of  clarity  as  regards  the  committee’s  functions;  and  (e)  the 

committee’s disclosure policy. These issues are discussed in the sections below. 

5. 

Leading role of the BCL 

5.1  The  first  draft  law  provides  that  the  BCL  shall  act  as  secretariat  to  the  committee,  but  shall  not 

receive  any  other  preferential  treatment  as  compared  to  the  other  institutions  represented  on  the 

committee,  whether  in  terms  of  representation,  voting  arrangements,  the  power  to  put  forward 

proposals  or  the  allocation  of  specific  macro-prudential  tasks.  The  second  draft  law  endows  the 

BCL  with  an  insufficient  role  as  regards  countercyclical  capital  buffers,  buffers  for  systemically 

important institutions, systemic risk buffers and other macro-prudential measures described under 

Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 

5.2 

In principle, the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) should play a leading role in macro-

prudential  oversight,  given  their  expertise  and  existing  responsibilities  in  the  area  of  financial 

17 

18  

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 
See  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)’s  ‘Key  Aspects  of  Macroprudential  Policy’  of  10  June  2013,  in  particular 
paragraphs 71 and 87; and the IMF’s ‘Implementing Macroprudential Policy - Selected Legal Issues’ of 17 June 2013, in 
particular paragraph 35. Available on the IMF’s website at www.imf.org. 

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stability19. This is particularly the case for the BCL, which is tasked with the supervision of market 
liquidity20 and has a general mandate to contribute to financial stability21.  

5.3  The  preparatory  work  for  the  first22  and  second23  draft  laws  explain  that  the  BCL’s  leading  role 

would come about as a result of: (a) the BCL acting as chair in the absence of the chairman; (b) the 

BCL acting as the secretariat of the committee; and (c) the BCL being a party to the cooperative 

arrangement under the second draft law. However, these arguments are not convincing. First of all, 
since the committee only meets a few times a year24, the likelihood that the chair will be absent is 

limited.  Second,  the  central  bank’s  leading  role  in  the  field  of  macro-prudential  policy  may  not 

result from the (ancillary) role played by the NCB in the implementation of some of the provisions 
of  Directive  2013/36/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council25  and  Regulation  (EU) 
No 575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council26.  Third,  as  echoed  in  the  ECB’s 

previous  opinions  issued  in  respect  of  systemic  risk  committees  chaired  by  ministers  of  finance 
with the NCB acting as secretariat27, the allocation of the secretariat function to the BCL does not 

in itself amount to a leading role on the part of the NCB as recommended by the ESRB. In France, 

the leading macro-prudential role of the Banque de France results from its additional tasks in this 

field. These comprise identifying and monitoring systemic risks, contributing to the implementation 

of the committee’s decisions and making proposals to the committee on the use of specific macro-
prudential instruments28. In Germany, the leading role of the Deutsche Bundesbank results from its 

tasks  in  identifying  and  analysing  risks  and  providing  analytical  support  to  the  committee.  The 

Deutsche Bundesbank also has a right of veto as regards the adoption and publication of warnings 
and recommendations and the adoption of the annual report29. In the light of the above, the ECB 

strongly recommends that the Luxembourg legislator revisits the extent of the tasks entrusted to the 

BCL in order to effectively bolster its leading role in macro-prudential policy. 

5.4  From an operational and financial point of view, the allocation of new tasks to an NCB should not 

affect its ability to carry out its existing tasks. It is thus important that the BCL’s involvement in the 

performance  of  the  committee’s  mandate  or  the  discharge  of  any  additional  tasks  that  may  be 

19  

20  
21 
22 
23 
24 

25  

26  

27 
28 
29  

See  paragraph  2.3  of  Opinion  CON/2014/21.  All  ECB  opinions  are  published  on  the  ECB’s  website  at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See Article 2(4) of the Organic Law. 
See Article 2(6) of the Organic Law. 
See page 8 of the preparatory work for the first draft law. 
See page 70 of the preparatory work for the second draft law. 
See Article 3(12) of the first draft law. The committee shall meet every six months, or when required, upon request of its 
President or two of its members.  
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC 
and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements 
for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 
See Opinion CON/2012/106 and Opinion CON/2012/55. 
See paragraph 1.3 and paragraph 5 of Opinion CON/2012/106. 
See paragraph 1.2.2 of Opinion CON/2012/55. 

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entrusted to the BCL with regard to macro-prudential policy does not affect the BCL’s institutional, 

functional and financial independence, or that of its governor, or the performance by the ESCB of 

its  tasks  under  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  and  of  the 

European  Central  Bank.  Financial  independence,  which  is  an  element  of  the  principle  of  central 

bank  independence  referred  to  in  Article  130  of  the  Treaty,  requires  that  an  NCB  must  have 

sufficient  means  to  carry  out  its  national  tasks  as  well  as  its  ESCB-related  tasks.  The  ECB  has 

consistently  expressed  its  concern  that,  when  allocating  additional  tasks  to  NCBs,  it  must  be 

ensured that the NCB is able to fulfil its mandate, both operationally, in terms of manpower, and 
financially, in terms of appropriate financial resources30. The ECB welcomes that Article 1(2) of the 

first draft law provides that the committee’s macro-prudential objective is without prejudice to the 

powers  of  the  BCL  and  the  ECB  with  respect  to  this  objective.  However,  for  reasons  of  legal 

certainty,  the  abovementioned  provision  should  be  accompanied  by  an  explicit  provision  stating 

that the committee’s recommendations addressed to the BCL are without prejudice to the principle 

of central bank independence under Article 130 of the Treaty. 

6. 

Powers of the committee 

6.1 

In order to achieve its objectives, the committee only has the right to issue opinions and warnings 

and address recommendations, either to the authorities represented on the committee or to specific 

financial players. Accordingly, the committee exclusively relies on the enforcement powers of the 

authorities represented on it. Such an approach, without any enforcement powers for the committee 

itself, undermines the committee’s ability to influence the scope of regulation or create new macro-

prudential instruments in reaction to changing circumstances, thus also restricting its ability to act 

in the field of macro-prudential policy. 

6.2 

In  the  same  vein,  the  committee  may  only  obtain  information  and  statistics  collected  by  the 

institutions  represented  on  the  committee  and  other  domestic  institutions  in  accordance  with  the 

existing  institutional  framework,  but  may  not  request  information  from  agents  falling  outside  the 

scope of the reporting requirements. This limits the committee’s access to information, which may 

be of relevance with regard to its policy formulation. 

6.3  Furthermore, based on the restrictions currently laid down in the laws governing the BCL and the 
IC31, information and statistics may only be collected, used and shared in the context of the BCL’s 

and the IC’s respective tasks. It is therefore not entirely clear whether such information and data, in 

particular those concerning individual entities overseen by the BCL, may be legally passed on only 

30 
31  

See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/27. 
See Article 27(3) (on information provided by payment and securities settlement systems as well as issuers of payment 
instruments  to  assess  their  efficiency  and  safety)  and  Article  33(2)  (organising  the  exchange  of  information  with  the 
CSSF, the National Institute for Statistic and Economic Studies  (STATEC) and the IC ‘to the extent necessary for the 
performance of its tasks’) of the Organic Law; and Article 15(4) of the Law of 6 December 1991 on the insurance sector 
(as amended). 

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to the committee in the context of the latter’s macro-prudential policy mandate32 or whether it may 

also  be  subsequently  circulated  to  other  institutions  active  in  this  field.  The  ECB  therefore 

recommends that the Luxembourg legislator should clarify this point in the laws governing the BCL 

and  the  IC  and  ensure  that  information  concerning  individual  entities  overseen  by  the  BCL  is 

shared only with the committee. As noted in paragraph 1.2 above, the requirement for exchange of 

information stipulated in the first draft law does not prejudice the tasks performed by BCL as an 

integral part of the Eurosystem. 

6.4  However,  the  issue  described  above  does  not  apply  to  the  CSSF,  since  the  second  draft  law 

formally authorises the CSSF to exchange information with the committee33. 

7. 

Voting arrangements 

The committee’s decisions are to be taken unanimously. In practice, this voting arrangement gives each 

member  of  the  committee  a  right  of  veto,  which  could  cause  a  risk  of  paralysis  in  macro-prudential 

policy. This risk may materialise if the committee, which has exclusive competence in respect of macro-

prudential  policy,  is  unable  to  reach  a  unanimous  decision.  In  such  circumstances,  the  authorities 

represented on the committee regain the ability to act individually on the basis of their shared competence 

with regard to financial stability. 

8. 

Lack of clarity as regards the functions of the committee 

In accordance with best practice, the functions necessary to implement macro-prudential policy fall into 

three  broad  categories:  (a)  identification  of  systemic  risks;  (b)  formulation  of  a  policy  response;  and 

(c) mitigation  of  systemic  risk,  or  implementation  of  the  policy  response,  through  rule-making, 
supervision and enforcement34. However, these functions are contained in various different provisions in 

the first draft law: the enforcement function is contained in the committee’s mission statement in Article 

1(1);  the  formulation  of  policy  response  is  contained  in  Article  1(3),  which  mentions  ‘the  pursuit  of 

intermediary  objectives’;  and  the  identification  and  monitoring  of  risks  is  enumerated  among  the 

committee’s powers in Article 2. For the sake of clarity, the ECB recommends consolidating all aspects 

of  the  committee’s  functions  in  one provision.  Contrary  to  what  the  mission  statement  seems  to  imply, 

these functions are not restricted to coordinating the implementation of the macro-prudential policy by the 

authorities represented on the committee. 

32  

33  
34  

See  the  IMF’s  ‘Implementing  Macroprudential  Policy  -  Selected  Legal  Issues’,  of  17  June  2013.  See  in  particular 
paragraph 36. 
See Article 60 of the second draft law. 
See  the  IMF’s  ‘Implementing  Macroprudential  Policy-  Selected  Legal  Issues’  of  17  June  2013.  See  in  particular 
paragraphs 16 and 17. 

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9. 

Transparency of macro-prudential policy 

9.1  Section 1, Recommendation D of Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 stipulates that macro-prudential 

decisions and the reasons for making them should be made public in a timely manner, unless there 

are  risks  to  financial  stability  in  doing  so.  Such  transparency,  which  supports  accountability 

mechanisms, is of the utmost importance since it also ensures that authorities’ policies and actions 

are fully explained to and understood by stakeholders.  

9.2  Article  3(6)  of  the  first  draft  law  merely  stipulates  that  ‘the  systemic  risk  committee  shall  take 

decisions on whether to publish notices, alerts and recommendations by unanimous vote’. The ECB 

recommends  that  this  provision  should  be  amended  in  order  to  create  greater  transparency  as 

regards macro-prudential policy decisions, which should not be left entirely to the discretion of the 

authorities. 

10.  Strengthening the institutional framework 

10.1  In  view  of  the  shortcomings  described  above,  the  ECB  urges  the  Luxembourg  legislator  to 

thoroughly  review  the  first  draft  law  in  order  to  strengthen  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the 

institutional  framework  for  macro-prudential  policy  in  Luxembourg.  For  this  purpose,  the  ECB 

strongly  recommends  that:  (a)  the  BCL’s  leading  role  in  macro-prudential  policy  should  be 

bolstered;  (b)  either  the  BCL,  in  its  leading  role  in  respect  of  the  macro-prudential  policy  or  the 

committee,  should  be  endowed  with  direct  enforcement  powers,  including  those  relating  to 

collecting  information  and  statistics;  (c)  voting  and  disclosure  arrangements  should  be  more 

flexible; and (d) the overall clarity with regard to the committee’s role should be improved. Unless 

such  amendments  aim  to  accommodate  the  view  expressed  by  the  ECB  in  this  opinion,  a  further 

consultation with the ECB on the revised first draft law will be required. 

10.2  It is noteworthy that in its opinion issued on the first draft law35, the State Council of Luxembourg 

also discusses: (a) the overall weakness of the committee, which has no regulatory and enforcement 

powers of its own; (b) the lack of a clear legal basis for the exchange of aggregated and individual 

information between the committee and its members; and (c) the ability of the committee to address 

recommendations  to  individual  institutions,  including  with  regard  to  shadow  banking.  In  view  of 

these  concerns,  the  State  Council  of  Luxembourg  recommends  limiting  the  scope  of  the 

committee’s  action  to  mere  recommendations  exclusively  addressed  to  the  existing  institutions  in 

the  context  of  the  sector-specific  approach  to  financial  sector  oversight.  In  addition,  the  ECB 

considers  that  the  State  Council’s  proposal  aiming  at  removing  any  mention  of  the  Governor’s 

hierarchical  power  in  relation  to  the  secretariat  of  the  committee  is  not  compatible  with  the 

independence of the BCL and its Governor.  

35  

Opinion  of  the  Luxembourg  State  Council  No.  50.541,  available  on  the  State  Council’s  website  at  www.conseil-
état.public.lu. The Luxembourg State Council has not yet issued its opinion on the second draft law.  

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The  ECB  advises  the  Luxembourg  legislator  to  proceed  with  caution  as  regards  these 

recommendations,  which  would  unduly  weaken  the  adopted  macro-prudential  policy  framework, 

resulting, inter alia, in an inappropriate shift towards micro-prudential policy. 

10.3  This  opinion  is  without  prejudice  to  the  conclusions  of  the  ESRB’s  follow-up  assessment,  which 

will  be  prepared  pursuant  to  Article  17  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1092/2010  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council36. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 June 2014. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

36  

Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union 
macro-prudential  oversight  of  the  financial  system  and  establishing  a  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (OJ  L  331, 
15.12.2010, p. 1). 

9