JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the Caribbean
Date: 2014-05-19
Institutions: European Commission, High Representative of the Union
Subjects: Caribbean Islands, Central America, bilateral relations, corruption, development aid, drug traffic, economic and social cohesion, fight against crime, human rights, organised crime, public safety, regional cooperation













EUR-Lex - 52014JC0021 - EN











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52014JC0021

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the Caribbean /* JOIN/2014/021 final */









JOINT
COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
Elements
for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the Caribbean
I. Public Security — a common concern
The
European Union is linked to Latin America and the Caribbean by a wide-ranging
strategic partnership which was renewed and strengthened during the last Summit of the EU and the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) held in
Santiago de Chile in January 2013. The two regions maintain political, economic
and social ties of an unprecedented scale and substance. They cooperate closely
and engage in comprehensive political dialogue at all levels — regional, sub-regional (Central America, the Caribbean, Andean Community and Mercosur) and bilateral. The EU is also an
important partner for the development of Latin America and the Caribbean, with a strong accent on social cohesion, economic development, environmental
issues and
security.
Public security is a major concern in Latin America. Governments, civil society organisations and public opinion believe that it
is a key weakness with a view to the development prospects of the region. The United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on human development in Latin
America 2013–14 underlines that the region is now stronger economically, has less
poverty and more consolidated democracies, but that the weak point is crime and
a lack of security. As stated in Article 66 of the CELAC Summit’s Havana
Declaration of 29 January 2014: '…crime and violence are an obstacle for the
full development of Latin America and the Caribbean and we stress the need for
a regional consensus on public safety vision with a human development approach …’.
The EU–CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile tasked senior officials from both
sides with exploring the possibility of including public security in their
common bi-regional action plan.
The challenge posed by widespread crime, high rates
of lethal violence and the overall deterioration of public security is
particularly acute and urgent in Central America and the Caribbean. Many
countries in these two neighbouring sub-regions, given their size and
geographical location, are especially vulnerable. Their security and justice
sectors have limited capacity and are exposed to powerful transnational
criminal groups. The result is alarming levels of impunity and an increasing
threat to public security. Crime extends its influence beyond these countries
and reaches or has the potential to reach Europe. Both the Caribbean and the Central American States have adopted regional strategies on security which form a basis for
regional cooperation and call for international support.
The EU cannot be indifferent to the situation. For
many years, it has been a key partner in cooperation programmes on crime
prevention and justice in the countries of the region. EU Member States have
carried out their own, often complementary activities and projects. However,
given the scope of the danger and its significance for the EU’s development
partnership with Central America and Caribbean, fresh, joint reflection on
public security in the region is needed. The objective of this communication is
to provide input for a coherent and coordinated EU strategy for public security
in Central America and the Caribbean with a particular focus on the protection
of human rights and the promotion of reforms.
The EU strategy aims at:
1.         developing a shared public security
agenda with the region as part of an overall political and development
partnership;
2.         strengthening governments’ capacity to
tackle insecurity while upholding human rights and boosting prevention
policies;
3.         fostering regional and international
cooperation to deal with the transnational dimension of public security threats.
II. Central America and the Caribbean — a particularly urgent
challenge
In Central America and the Caribbean, important
global trade routes meet and strategic interests are at stake. This has the
potential to boost development in the region — especially through trade and
investment. However, the insecurity prevalent in the region has a detrimental
effect on economic development and governance, and hampers access to education,
health and other basic services. It also weakens democracy, human rights and the
rule of law, which are at the core of what the EU wants to promote.
Vulnerabilities are further compounded by inherited
weaknesses in economic structure (e.g. poverty, economic inequality and
unemployment), mostly affecting indigenous and Afro-descendent populations.
Social or cultural factors enhance vulnerabilities — families and community
links coming apart, increased alcohol and drug abuse and widespread
gender-related violence. Natural disasters also dampen development progress.
Governance difficulties, the presence of organised
crime and a lack of economic opportunities feed off each other. They threaten
to create a downward spiral of violence and under-development in which Central
America and the Caribbean could remain trapped for a long time. Their citizens
would be unable to benefit from the rest of Latin America’s economic growth,
while international organised crime would gain a greater foothold.
There are several consequences, as follows.
States in the region face an uphill struggle to meet
their responsibility for public security.
The most salient characteristics of this are:
•           A high degree of impunity, due to a lack
of investigative and prosecution capacity, linked to widespread corruption of
the security and justice systems[1].

•           Overcrowded and ineffective prison
systems, which instead of being pathways to reinsertion and rehabilitation
raise significant human rights concerns[2].

•           Low overall tax collection (below 18 %
of GDP), and therefore, a lack of financial capacity to fulfil State responsibilities
for the provision of public services and security. A telling consequence of
this: private security personnel outnumber police officers across the region
(e.g. in Guatemala: ~6 to 1; Honduras: ~4.9; compared to ~0.8 average of 34
European countries)[3]
, further increasing inequality of access to security.
•           Difficulties in territorial control and
border management, compounded by a number of low-key territorial disputes still
pending between states of the region, which facilitate the illegal trafficking
of people and goods across the region[4].

Worrying insecurity indicators
Indicators for public insecurity show how
dramatically criminal groups impact on the most vulnerable states. These
indicators are particularly high in Central America and significantly above the
world average in the Caribbean. Murder rates are the highest in the world and
well above the ‘epidemic’ level of 10 murders per 100 000 inhabitants in
many countries. This high murder rate is also associated to an unacceptably
high level of other crimes, seriously affecting the quality of citizens’ life.
The latest United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report 2013–14 indicates
the costs which insecurity has for economic and social development.[5]
Much of the violent crime can be traced to organised
criminal groups which compete for lucrative drug trafficking routes and
territorial control. 80 % of the illicit drugs seized entering the US passes through Central America and Mexico, according to Organisation of American States (OAS)[6]
sources. The Caribbean islands act as a major transit zone for drug shipments
from South America to Europe, the US and Canada. In 2009, more than seven tonnes
of cocaine hydrochloride were seized in the region.[7]
A whole range of other activities complement and
sustain organised crime, including human and arms trafficking, extortion and
large-scale money laundering. Drug abuse, local trafficking and related crimes
are on the rise, as are money laundering, kidnapping and murder. Attacks
against property and common crime are also widespread.
Vulnerable groups (such as women and young people)
are particularly exposed. Youth are easily drawn into criminal activities and
are often the main victims of violence. Women represent one fifth of those
murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean, compared to an average of one
eleventh worldwide.[8]
In this framework, citizens tend to lose confidence
in the ability of their governments to provide basic public services and no
longer look to their governments for security. In some cases, organised crime
controls entire regions and neighbourhoods.
Specific initiatives, such as mediation between those
involved in crime, can temporarily reduce violence. The gang truce in El Salvador, where the murder rate has fallen by 50 % since March 2012, is an example
of this. Those involved agree, however, that in order to be sustainable, these
efforts would require political endorsement by the government and sustained
comprehensive efforts to address the underlying causes of the violence.
Civil society has started to react strongly to the
crisis in public security, challenging the legitimate authorities to reform and
appealing to international donors for support. Civil society initiatives
include supporting human rights defenders and victims of violence; promoting
reconciliation, citizenship, and respect for the rule of law and for migrants’
rights; working on drug demand reduction; and supporting economic initiatives
and self–employment.   
Inter-linked security challenges, mainly
related to drugs trafficking, have an impact beyond the region.
Trafficking in drugs and the spread of gangs potentially
poses a serious risk to the EU, which accounts for 26 % of the cocaine
consumed worldwide. A significant proportion of the cocaine en route to Europe
continues to pass through the Caribbean. A joint report by the European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and EUROPOL, entitled Cocaine:
A European Union perspective in the global context (2010) highlighted a marked
increase in cocaine trafficking through South and Central America bound for Europe. Moreover, another report notes that Latin American drug cartels have a permanent
presence in several EU countries (primarily Italy, the Netherlands and Spain)[9]­.
On the EU periphery, efforts at stabilisation are undermined by illegal
trafficking networks, especially in the Gulf of Guinea.
III. The EU response
The EU faces this challenge as a long-standing
partner for the development of both sub-regions. The EU supports the Central
America Security Strategy (ESCA), adopted at the Guatemala conference in 2011 and coordinated by the Central American Integration System (SICA),
and the Caribbean Security Strategy adopted in February 2013 by the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) Heads of State.
The EU’s support will put new and existing
agreements to good use, especially the EU-Caribbean Joint Strategy and the
EU-Central America Association Agreement. It will be based on long experience
of cooperation with the region and will seek to make efficient use of the existing
cooperation instruments. It will also draw on a number of sector dialogues and
cooperation mechanisms such as the regional dialogues on drugs, migration and gender,
and national level bilateral dialogues on drugs and security.
The EU’s response reflects ongoing concerns about
the dangers arising from organised crime and State failure already recognised
in the EU Security Strategy 2003[10]
and is in line with the EU’s
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises set out in 2013.[11] The
EU approach also builds on other EU policy documents:
·        
the
Internal Security Strategy, which deals with international criminal network,
money laundering corruption and trafficking (COM/2010/673);
·        
the
Agenda for Change, which acknowledges the relationship between security and
development, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (COM/2011/637 final);
·        
the
communication Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action —
Towards a more effective approach (COM(2011) 0886);
·        
the
drugs strategy (2013-20), with its focus on a balanced, evidence-based approach
to drugs policy (2012/C 402/01);
·        
the
communication The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with civil society in external relations (COM/2012/492 final);
·        
the
strategy to combat illicit accumulation and spread of small arms and light
weapons (SALW) and ammunition, which singles out Latin America as a region
affected by the proliferation and excessive accumulation of SALW (5319/06);
·        
the
Action-Oriented Paper on strengthening the EU external dimension on action
against trafficking in human beings (19.11.2009 — 11450/5/09 REV 5);
·        
the
communication on fighting corruption in the EU (COM(2011) 308 final), which
emphasised the need to build anti-corruption capacity in partner countries);
·        
the
European Parliament study "Assessing the EU's approach to security sector
reform", with its integrated human rights-based approach, strengthening
both the efficiency and accountability of the security sector (PE 433.837);
The EU also takes into account studies and
recommendations issued by competent multilateral institutions, most notably the
UNDP reports on Citizen Security in Latin America (2013) and in the Caribbean
(2012) respectively, and the OAS reports on the Drugs Problem in the Americas (2013) and Public Security in the Americas (2008).   
The strategy
will pursue the following objectives in Central America and the Caribbean.
Objective
I. Further develop a shared public security agenda with the region
Intensified political dialogue will be the
main instrument to achieve this objective. Building on the regional strategies
adopted by both Central America and the Caribbean, the EU will work with
partner governments at national and regional level towards constructing a
shared political and operative agenda. This should provide transparency and orientation
for all stakeholders on both sides.
The High Representative and the Commission will
ensure through the established channels that the EU and Member States have adequate opportunities to exchange the information they need in order to increase
synergies and coherence in their respective activities.
I.1 Cooperative agenda based on key security
challenges at national level
The EU Delegation and EU Member States’ embassies in
the host country will cooperate closely in the analysis of the public security situation.
Conflict analysis and the ability to offer or support mediation in long-standing
conflicts will be particularly useful in this regard.
I.2 Regional dialogues with Central America and the Caribbean.
EU — Central America,
The adoption in 2011 by Central American countries
of a new Regional Security Strategy for Central America (ESCA) was a
significant achievement. Having SICA countries working together on an issue so
closely related to national sovereignty was an important step in the regional
integration process and in seeking opportunities for international cooperation.
Together with the provisional entry into force of the EU–Central America Association
Agreement, and soon, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
(PDCA), ESCA will offer new opportunities for a strengthened political dialogue
between the EU and Central America on public security issues.
The Secretariat General of SICA will be the main
interlocutor for coordination on this matter, partly through the ESCA Group of
Friends.
The issues to be dealt with in these exchanges with
Central American regional authorities could be:

 recent trends and developments in
     the regional security situation, taking into account best practices and
     lessons learned;
 public security policies and
     legislation in the fight against crime and impunity, the promotion of
     inclusive crime prevention and rehabilitation, assistance to victims and
     reconciliation;
 the institutional environment of public
     security, capacity building needs and the comprehensive reforms envisaged
     for the justice and security sector (police, penitentiary system and
     judiciary):
 international and regional
     cooperation between Central American countries and the opportunities,
     challenges and difficulties related to implementing the Central American
     Security Strategy; in this context, obstacles to cooperation such as
     unresolved border issues should be touched upon in a broader context;
 the added value of EU cooperation
     and its impact, as well as the future needs and direction of cooperation where
     relevant.

EU-Caribbean Joint Strategy
In November 2012, the EU and the Forum of the Caribbean Group of
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States (CARIFORUM) adopted a Joint
European Union–Caribbean Partnership Strategy, which aimed to establish a
stronger partnership between the EU and the Caribbean. The partnership seeks to
move beyond the traditional donor-recipient relationship in order to forge a
framework of mutual interests, encompassing the political dimension alongside
the traditional concerns of development cooperation and trade relations. Crime
and security together form one of the five priority areas of the partnership.
In this framework, and under Article 8 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement,
the EU carries out regular political dialogue with CARIFORUM, taking full
account of the stipulations of the region’s own Security Strategy adopted in
February 2013 by the CARICOM Heads of State.
The Caribbean Implementation Agency for Crime and
Security (IMPACS), the Regional Security System (RSS), the Caribbean Financial
Action Task Force (CFATF) and the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council
(CCLEC) are key actors in this respect. The EU has provided many of these
agencies with financial support under the 10th European Development Fund.
***
Suitable
mechanisms for linking the two regional dialogues mentioned above will be
agreed upon with SICA and CARICOM members. The existing SICA-CARIFORUM
coordination mechanism could be a good vehicle.
I.3
EU-CELAC dialogue
The existing EU-CELAC Action Plan is the overarching
framework for bi-regional cooperation. Although it covers some important issues
linked to security (in particular drugs and migration), it does not include public
security as an issue in its own right.
A potential chapter on public security in the
EU–CELAC Action Plan could define a common bi-regional understanding of the
main challenges, identify shared principles guiding joint action, and set out
the main lines of an agreed bi-regional work-programme, in terms of dialogue
and cooperation activities.
Security issues related to this strategy may also be
discussed in the framework of the bilateral political dialogues (with
interested CELAC members).
The results of existing sector dialogues (on
precursors with Bolivia,
 Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico, on security with Mexico and on drugs with Brazil) will feed into the initiatives covered by this strategy, where
relevant.
I.4 Strengthening coordination with other relevant
actors
The EU aims to strengthen discussions on security in
the region with relevant multilateral or international organisations possessing
significant expertise, such as the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB),
the World Bank, UN bodies (like the UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime — UNODC), the Commonwealth and SEGIB.[12]
The EU will also promote discussions with relevant international and regional
civil society organisations (e.g. universities, think tanks, and observatories).
The EULAC Foundation could also play a useful role in improving understanding
of the problem.
In addition, the EU will seek to intensify its
exchange on the security situation in Central America and the Caribbean with
the US and Canada; as both nations are significant actors engaged on the issue.[13] Both
countries have more recently adopted an overarching approach which, like that
of the EU, includes institutional capacity building, violence prevention and
drug demand reduction.
Objective
II. Strengthen the ability of governments to deliver quality public services
II a.     Supporting
legislative and regulatory reforms to enhance accountability
Progress has been made with regard to the
legislative and governance mechanisms underpinning the states’ capacity to
deliver services relating to public security. This capacity, however, remains
limited and clear potential exists for further cooperation between the EU,
Member States’ agencies and the institutions of the region. This cooperation
might be envisaged in fields such as justice and security sector reform;
legislative, regulatory and policy reforms to enhance human rights; illicit
trafficking; money laundering;
and the fight against corruption
and impunity.
In fields such as drugs policy, prevention of the diversion
of precursors, money laundering and public health, strengthened cooperation
building on existing activities in the framework of the cooperation programme
between Latin America and the European Union on drugs policies (COPOLAD) and
the Cocaine Route programme[14]
should be pursued. This cooperation could include information
sharing and operational exchanges between institutions from
the region e.g. the Inter–American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD),
the Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL),
and the Caribbean Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)
and bodies such as Europol, Interpol and the EMCDDA,
and the Maritime Analysis Operation
Centre on Narcotics (MAOC-N). Any cooperation
would take into account the capacity,
priorities and legal mandates of
the agencies and countries concerned and would aim
at improving the working mechanisms of the regional networks.
Further elements, such as the legislative and
regulatory framework for the protection of children, women and other vulnerable
groups (particularly as they are often the hardest hit by violence and
insecurity); the transparency of security-related
expenditure and the reinforcement of democratic oversight by parliaments
(supported by ombudsmen and audit bodies)
should also be promoted. Specific activities could be considered, working
together with local organisations to help support the formulation of relevant
policies and bearing in mind relevant frameworks such as UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
II b.     Building the capacity
of law enforcement, judicial and penitentiary authorities
Cooperation
between Central America, the Caribbean and the EU should promote a
comprehensive and balanced reform of the justice and security sector
institutions (including the penitentiary sector and policies encouraging
rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration). This should be accompanied
by support for policies to combat illicit trafficking, money laundering,
corruption and impunity. Support might also be given to policies aimed at
enhancing the regulation and oversight of private security companies and to the
exchange of best practices on conventional arms transfer controls.[15] 
Furthermore,
in light of the Communication on the law enforcement training scheme[16],
there might also be scope for more consistent and efficient support for the
region on law enforcement capacity-building, by offering training or by sharing
knowledge and good practice (with a possible role for EUROPOL and CEPOL).
Twinning-type projects, as currently carried out within the EU, could also
provide a good model for future cooperation with the region.  
Support for the development of national and regional
capacity to collect and analyse statistical data on crime and to monitor
crime trends would also boost evidence–based decision making and international
cooperation in the region.
II c.     Support
governments in their efforts to empower communities.
Cooperation activities are being carried out in
partnership with governments and the communities they serve, to foster socio-economic
development and reduce violence. In Central America and the Caribbean, they
particularly focus on the promotion of peaceful methods of resolving conflict
within society and the development of opportunities for all parts of the
population.  
Following further analysis, areas for cooperation
could include the promotion of economic growth; fostering professional training
and entrepreneurship as means of providing people with employment and
alternatives to crime; support for victims of violence, (including through
humanitarian assistance where appropriate); reconciliation, rehabilitation and
reinsertion projects; the development of alternatives to imprisonment for
lesser crimes; the protection of vulnerable groups in society; strengthening
mechanisms for oversight by civil society; and support for initiatives
promoting mediation, peace-building, and drug demand reduction.
***
For Objective II, as a first step, a mapping
exercise will be carried out by the EU and Member States, setting out all
activities being implemented by them in the region of relevance to public
security. This map will facilitate the sharing of experience, provide
information on possible synergies and areas for further engagement, and help
avoid duplication. It should be updated regularly, shared with the host
countries and other donors, and will feed into joint programming. This strategy
will guide future work by the EU and Member States in this field.
For its work in the field of the rule of law,
justice and security sector reform, the EU will also apply lessons learnt
through civilian EU missions in other regions of the world.
EEAS in-house expertise from the units that plan and conduct those missions, as
well as, where appropriate, military in-house expertise, could be brought in
during the planning and evaluation of activities included in this strategy, in
order to support political dialogue and cooperation activities with the region.
Ongoing or future intra- and inter-State mediation
efforts by various actors in the region could be supported on request.
Objective III. Fostering regional and
international cooperation on operational activities in order to fight
insecurity in Central America and the Caribbean
The EU will promote exchanges and cooperation between
regional institutions and international actors, especially with regard to the
trans-regional aspects of organised crime. The countries of the region face
similar problems and have broadly similar institutions; exchanging knowledge
serves to strengthen their joint capacity.
These efforts could be in the form of exchange
programmes between specialised agencies or of support for carefully targeted
attempts at trans-regional cooperation. Increased involvement by organisations
such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, within their remits and in stronger
cooperation with regional organisations/initiatives, could be useful in this
regard.
Particular
attention should be paid to better linking resources deployed in the region by
Member States (e.g. liaison officers) and EU agencies.
This could include improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and
strengthening cooperation between regional networks, such as the region’s Network
of Prosecutors against Organised Crime (REFCO), the Ibero-American
Network for International Legal Cooperation (IberRed), the Conference of
Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Countries (COMJIB) and European
networks.
In
line with the Joint Communication – EU Cyber Security Strategy, JOIN(2013)1
final of February 2013, the strategy will pursue dialogue with the relevant
international partners, to ensure effective defence capabilities, identify
areas for cooperation and avoid duplication of efforts in the field of
cybersecurity and fight to cybercrime.
Regional
networking could benefit from fostering other joint activities, such as support
for the development of coordination mechanisms to respond to complex
multi-dimensional crises and helping to put in place a more effective crisis
response and early warning capability.
Conclusion
Insecurity in Central America and the Caribbean harms millions in their daily lives and affects human rights, the rule of law and
economic development in the region. It is a significant obstacle to regional
stability and cooperation.
As the governments of the region try to rise to this
challenge, so must Europe. Its long-standing partnership and its economic and
security interests are at stake. The EU offers dialogue and practical
cooperation, knowing that it has as much to learn from its partners as it has
to give. With this strategy, the EU sets out to meet its partners in Central
America and the Caribbean with a transparent, comprehensive approach.
This strategy will guide our engagement with partner
countries in the field of security. While work with partners at sub-regional
and national levels should start as soon as possible, the next EU-CELAC summit,
to be held in 2015, could provide an appropriate opportunity for a political
evaluation of the strategy and common decisions for the whole of the continent.
 
[1] UNDP, Regional Development Report for Latin America 2013–14:
Citizen security with a human face, 'Impunidad' (p. 36).
[2] Ibid., 'Las carceles' (p. 122).
[3] Figures for Guatemala/Honduras: ibid. (p. 150); 34 European
Countries: Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), Private
Security Services in Europe, Facts & Figures, 2011 (p. 143).
[4] Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), Cross-border
Cooperation in Latin America: Final Report, 2010, 'Obstacles Identified' (p.
48).
[5] Reference to the UNDP’s Regional Development Report for Latin
America 2013–14: Citizen security with a human face: ‘Many people indicate
that they do not go out any more to shop or for leisure’.
[6] OAS, Report on the Drug Problem in the Americas, 2013.
[7] OAS, Report on Citizen Security in the Americas, 2012, p.91.
Seizures relate to the Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Saint Vincent and the
 Grenadines, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
[8] OAS, La Seguridad Publica en las Américas, 2008.
[9] Europol, Impact of Mexican OCGs on the OC situation in Europe, Scan Policy Brief — Threat Notice 012-2013.
[10]
EU Security Strategy 2003 later updated and reaffirmed by the European Council
in 2008.
[11] Joint
Communication of the Commission and the HR/VP to the European Parliament and
the Council of 11 December 2013 on the EU's comprehensive approach to external
conflict and crises (JOIN(2013) 30 final).
[12] The Ibero–American Secretariat General.
[13]
In the case of Canada, with a particular focus on the Caribbean. 
[14] Including,
under the latter, projects such as PRELAC — on chemical precursors — and
GAFISUD — on money laundering.
[15] Under the Arms
Trade Treaty. 
[16] "Establishing
a European Law Enforcement Training Scheme",  COM(2013) 172 final