JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the Caribbean
Date: 2014-05-19
Institutions: European Commission, High Representative of the Union
Subjects: Caribbean Islands, Central America, bilateral relations, corruption, development aid, drug traffic, economic and social cohesion, fight against crime, human rights, organised crime, public safety, regional cooperation

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 27.6.2014  
JOIN(2014) 21 final/2 

CORRIGENDUM 
This document corrects document JOIN(2014) 21 final of 19.5.2014. 
Concerns all language versions. 
Addition of text on page 2. 

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL 

Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the Caribbean 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

AND THE COUNCIL 

Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and 

the Caribbean 

I. Public Security — a common concern 

The  European  Union  is  linked  to  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  by  a  wide-ranging 
strategic partnership which was renewed and strengthened during the last Summit of the EU 
and the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) held in Santiago de Chile 
in  January  2013.  The  two  regions  maintain  political,  economic  and  social  ties  of  an 
unprecedented  scale  and  substance.  They  cooperate  closely  and  engage  in  comprehensive 
political  dialogue  at  all  levels  —  regional,  sub-regional (Central  America,  the  Caribbean, 
Andean Community and Mercosur) and bilateral. The EU is also an important partner for the 
development  of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  with  a  strong  accent  on  social  cohesion, 
economic development, environmental issues and climate change, as well as security. 

Public security is a major concern in Latin America. Governments, civil society organisations 
and public opinion believe that it is a key weakness with a view to the development prospects 
of  the  region.  The  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  report  on  human 
development  in  Latin  America  2013–14  underlines  that  the  region  is  now  stronger 
economically, has less poverty and more consolidated democracies, but that the weak point is 
crime  and  a  lack  of  security.  As  stated  in  Article  66  of  the  CELAC  Summit’s  Havana 
Declaration  of  29  January  2014:  '…crime  and  violence  are  an  obstacle  for  the  full 
development  of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  and  we  stress  the  need  for  a  regional 
consensus on public safety vision with a human development approach …’. The EU–CELAC 
Summit  in  Santiago  de  Chile  tasked  senior  officials  from  both  sides  with  exploring  the 
possibility of including public security in their common bi-regional action plan. 

The  challenge  posed  by  widespread  crime,  high  rates  of  lethal  violence  and  the  overall 
deterioration  of  public  security  is  particularly  acute  and  urgent  in  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  Many  countries  in  these  two  neighbouring  sub-regions,  given  their  size  and 
geographical  location,  are  especially  vulnerable.  Their  security  and  justice  sectors  have 
limited  capacity  and  are  exposed  to  powerful  transnational  criminal  groups.  The  result  is 
alarming  levels  of  impunity  and  an  increasing  threat  to  public  security.  Crime  extends  its 
influence beyond these countries and reaches or has the potential to reach Europe. Both the 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
Caribbean  and  the  Central  American  States  have  adopted  regional  strategies  on  security 
which form a basis for regional cooperation and call for international support. 

The  EU  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  situation.  For  many  years,  it  has  been  a  key  partner  in 
cooperation programmes on crime prevention and justice in the countries of the region. EU 
Member  States  have  carried  out  their  own,  often  complementary  activities  and  projects. 
However,  given  the  scope  of  the  danger  and  its  significance  for  the  EU’s  development 
partnership with Central America and Caribbean, fresh, joint reflection on public security in 
the region is needed. The objective of this communication is to provide input for a coherent 
and coordinated EU strategy for public security in Central America and the Caribbean with a 
particular focus on the protection of human rights and the promotion of reforms. 

The EU strategy aims at: 

developing  a  shared  public  security  agenda  with  the  region  as  part  of  an  overall 

1. 
political and development partnership; 

strengthening  governments’  capacity  to  tackle  insecurity  while  upholding  human 

2. 
rights and boosting prevention policies; 

fostering  regional  and  international  cooperation  to  deal  with  the  transnational 

3. 
dimension of public security threats. 

II. Central America and the Caribbean — a particularly urgent challenge 

In  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean,  important  global  trade  routes  meet  and  strategic 
interests are at stake. This has the potential to boost development in the region — especially 
through  trade  and  investment.  However,  the  insecurity  prevalent  in  the  region  has  a 
detrimental  effect  on  economic  development  and  governance,  and  hampers  access  to 
education, health and other basic services. It also weakens democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law, which are at the core of what the EU wants to promote. 

Vulnerabilities are further compounded by inherited weaknesses in economic structure (e.g. 
poverty,  economic  inequality  and  unemployment),  mostly  affecting  indigenous  and  Afro-
descendent  populations.  Social  or  cultural  factors  enhance  vulnerabilities  —  families  and 
community  links  coming  apart,  increased  alcohol  and  drug  abuse  and  widespread  gender-
related violence. Natural disasters also dampen development progress. 

Governance  difficulties,  the  presence  of  organised  crime  and  a  lack  of  economic 
opportunities feed off each other. They threaten to create a downward spiral of violence and 
under-development in which Central America and the Caribbean could remain trapped for a 
long  time.  Their  citizens  would  be  unable  to  benefit  from  the  rest  of  Latin  America’s 
economic growth, while international organised crime would gain a greater foothold. 

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There are several consequences, as follows. 

States  in  the  region  face  an  uphill  struggle  to  meet  their  responsibility  for  public 
security. 

The most salient characteristics of this are: 

A  high  degree  of  impunity,  due  to  a  lack  of  investigative  and  prosecution  capacity, 

• 
linked to widespread corruption of the security and justice systems1.  

Overcrowded  and  ineffective  prison  systems,  which  instead  of  being  pathways  to 

• 
reinsertion and rehabilitation raise significant human rights concerns2.  

Low  overall  tax  collection  (below  18  %  of  GDP),  and  therefore,  a  lack  of  financial 
• 
capacity  to  fulfil  State  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  public  services  and  security.  A 
telling  consequence  of  this:  private  security  personnel  outnumber  police  officers  across  the 
region (e.g. in Guatemala: ~6 to 1; Honduras: ~4.9; compared to ~0.8 average of 34 European 
countries)3 , further increasing inequality of access to security. 

• 
Difficulties in territorial control and border management, compounded by a number of 
low-key  territorial  disputes  still  pending  between  states  of  the  region,  which  facilitate  the 
illegal trafficking of people and goods across the region4.  

Worrying insecurity indicators 

Indicators  for  public  insecurity  show  how  dramatically  criminal  groups  impact  on  the  most 
vulnerable states. These indicators are particularly high in Central America and significantly 
above the world average in the Caribbean. Murder rates are the highest in the world and well 
above  the  ‘epidemic’  level  of  10  murders  per  100 000  inhabitants  in  many  countries.  This 
high  murder  rate  is  also  associated  to  an  unacceptably  high  level  of  other  crimes,  seriously 
affecting  the  quality  of  citizens’  life.  The  latest  United  Nations  Development  Programme 
(UNDP)  report  2013–14  indicates  the  costs  which  insecurity  has  for  economic  and  social 
development.5 

Much  of  the  violent  crime  can  be  traced  to  organised  criminal  groups  which  compete  for 
lucrative drug trafficking routes and territorial control. 80 % of the illicit drugs seized entering 

1 UNDP, Regional Development Report for Latin America 2013–14: Citizen security with a human face, 
'Impunidad' (p. 36). 
2 Ibid., 'Las carceles' (p. 122). 
3 Figures for Guatemala/Honduras: ibid. (p. 150); 34 European Countries: Confederation of European Security 
Services (CoESS), Private Security Services in Europe, Facts & Figures, 2011 (p. 143). 
4 Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), Cross-border Cooperation in Latin America: Final Report, 
2010, 'Obstacles Identified' (p. 48). 
5 Reference to the UNDP’s Regional Development Report for Latin America 2013–14: Citizen security with a 
human face: ‘Many people indicate that they do not go out any more to shop or for leisure’. 

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the US passes through Central America and Mexico, according to Organisation of American 
States (OAS)6 sources. The Caribbean islands act as a major transit zone for drug shipments 
from  South  America  to  Europe,  the  US  and  Canada.  In  2009,  more  than  seven  tonnes  of 
cocaine hydrochloride were seized in the region.7 

A whole range of other activities complement and sustain organised crime, including human 
and  arms  trafficking,  extortion  and  large-scale  money  laundering.  Drug  abuse,  local 
trafficking  and  related  crimes  are  on  the  rise,  as  are  money  laundering,  kidnapping  and 
murder. Attacks against property and common crime are also widespread. 

Vulnerable  groups  (such  as  women  and  young  people)  are  particularly  exposed.  Youth  are 
easily  drawn  into  criminal  activities  and  are  often  the  main  victims  of  violence.  Women 
represent  one  fifth  of  those  murdered  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  compared  to  an 
average of one eleventh worldwide.8 

In  this  framework,  citizens  tend  to  lose  confidence  in  the  ability  of  their  governments  to 
provide basic public services and no longer look to their governments for security. In some 
cases, organised crime controls entire regions and neighbourhoods. 

Specific  initiatives,  such  as  mediation  between  those  involved  in  crime,  can  temporarily 
reduce  violence.  The  gang  truce  in  El  Salvador,  where  the  murder  rate  has  fallen  by  50 % 
since March 2012, is an example of this. Those involved agree, however, that in order to be 
sustainable,  these  efforts  would  require  political  endorsement  by  the  government  and 
sustained comprehensive efforts to address the underlying causes of the violence. 

Civil  society  has  started  to  react  strongly  to  the  crisis  in  public  security,  challenging  the 
legitimate  authorities  to  reform  and  appealing  to  international  donors  for  support.  Civil 
society  initiatives  include  supporting  human  rights  defenders  and  victims  of  violence; 
promoting reconciliation, citizenship, and respect for the rule of law and for migrants’ rights; 
working  on  drug  demand  reduction;  and  supporting  economic  initiatives  and  self–
employment.    

Inter-linked  security  challenges,  mainly  related  to  drugs  trafficking,  have  an  impact 
beyond the region. 

Trafficking in drugs and the spread of gangs potentially poses a serious risk to the EU, which 
accounts  for  26 %  of  the  cocaine  consumed  worldwide.  A  significant  proportion  of  the 
cocaine  en  route  to  Europe  continues  to  pass  through  the  Caribbean.  A  joint  report  by  the 
European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  (EMCDDA)  and  EUROPOL, 

6 OAS, Report on the Drug Problem in the Americas, 2013. 
7 OAS, Report on Citizen Security in the Americas, 2012, p.91. Seizures relate to the Bahamas, Dominican 
Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  
8 OAS, La Seguridad Publica en las Américas, 2008. 

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entitled  Cocaine:  A  European  Union  perspective  in  the  global  context  (2010)  highlighted  a 
marked increase in cocaine trafficking through South and Central America bound for Europe. 
Moreover, another report notes that Latin American drug cartels have a permanent presence 
in several EU countries (primarily Italy, the Netherlands and Spain)9. On the EU periphery, 
efforts at stabilisation are undermined by illegal trafficking networks, especially in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 

III. The EU response 

The  EU  faces  this  challenge  as  a  long-standing  partner  for  the  development  of  both  sub-
regions.  The  EU  supports  the  Central  America  Security  Strategy  (ESCA),  adopted  at  the 
Guatemala conference in 2011 and coordinated by the Central American Integration System 
(SICA), and the Caribbean Security Strategy adopted in February 2013 by the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) Heads of State. 

The  EU’s  support  will  put  new  and  existing  agreements  to  good  use,  especially  the  EU-
Caribbean  Joint  Strategy  and  the  EU-Central  America  Association  Agreement.  It  will  be 
based on long experience of cooperation with the region and will seek to make efficient use 
of the existing cooperation instruments. It will also draw on a number of sector dialogues and 
cooperation mechanisms such as the regional dialogues on drugs, migration and gender, and 
national level bilateral dialogues on drugs and security. 

The EU’s response reflects ongoing concerns about the dangers arising from organised crime 
and State failure already recognised in the EU Security Strategy 200310 and is in line with 
the  EU’s  comprehensive  approach  to  external  conflict  and  crises  set  out  in  2013.11  The 
EU approach also builds on other EU policy documents: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

the Internal Security Strategy, which deals with international criminal network, money 
laundering corruption and trafficking (COM/2010/673); 
the Agenda for Change, which acknowledges the relationship between security and 
development, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (COM/2011/637 final); 
the communication Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action — 
Towards a more effective approach (COM(2011) 0886); 
the drugs strategy (2013-20), with its focus on a balanced, evidence-based approach to drugs 
policy (2012/C 402/01); 

9 Europol, Impact of Mexican OCGs on the OC situation in Europe, Scan Policy Brief — Threat Notice 012-
2013. 
10 EU Security Strategy 2003 later updated and reaffirmed by the European Council in 2008. 
11 Joint Communication of the Commission and the HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council of 11 
December 2013 on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (JOIN(2013) 30 final). 

6 

 
 
 
                                                            
• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

the communication The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s 
engagement with civil society in external relations (COM/2012/492 final); 
the strategy to combat illicit accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) and ammunition, which singles out Latin America as a region affected by the 
proliferation and excessive accumulation of SALW (5319/06); 
the Action-Oriented Paper on strengthening the EU external dimension on action against 
trafficking in human beings (19.11.2009 — 11450/5/09 REV 5); 
the communication on fighting corruption in the EU (COM(2011) 308 final), which 
emphasised the need to build anti-corruption capacity in partner countries); 
the European Parliament study "Assessing the EU's approach to security sector reform", with 
its integrated human rights-based approach, strengthening both the efficiency and 
accountability of the security sector (PE 433.837); 

The  EU  also  takes  into  account  studies  and  recommendations  issued  by  competent 
multilateral institutions, most notably the UNDP reports on Citizen Security in Latin America 
(2013) and in the Caribbean (2012) respectively, and the OAS reports on the Drugs Problem 
in the Americas (2013) and Public Security in the Americas (2008).    

The strategy will pursue the following objectives in Central America and the Caribbean. 

Objective I. Further develop a shared public security agenda with the 
region 

Intensified political dialogue will be the main instrument to achieve this objective. Building 
on  the  regional  strategies  adopted  by  both  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean,  the  EU  will 
work with partner governments at national and regional level towards constructing a shared 
political  and  operative  agenda.  This  should  provide  transparency  and  orientation  for  all 
stakeholders on both sides. 

The  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  will  ensure  through  the  established  channels 
that the EU and Member States have adequate opportunities to exchange the information they 
need in order to increase synergies and coherence in their respective activities. 

I.1 Cooperative agenda based on key security challenges at national level 

The  EU  Delegation  and  EU  Member  States’  embassies  in  the  host  country  will  cooperate 
closely in the analysis of the public security situation. Conflict analysis and the ability to offer 
or support mediation in long-standing conflicts will be particularly useful in this regard. 

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I.2 Regional dialogues with Central America and the Caribbean. 

EU — Central America, 

The adoption in 2011 by Central American countries of a new Regional Security Strategy for 
Central  America  (ESCA)  was  a  significant  achievement.  Having  SICA  countries  working 
together  on  an  issue  so  closely  related  to  national  sovereignty  was  an  important  step  in  the 
regional  integration  process  and  in  seeking  opportunities  for  international  cooperation. 
Together  with  the  provisional  entry  into  force  of  the  EU–Central  America  Association 
Agreement, and soon, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), ESCA 
will offer new opportunities for a strengthened political dialogue between the EU and Central 
America on public security issues. 

The Secretariat General of SICA will be the main interlocutor for coordination on this matter, 
partly through the ESCA Group of Friends. 

The  issues  to  be  dealt  with  in  these  exchanges  with  Central  American  regional  authorities 
could be: 

• 

recent trends and developments in the regional security situation, taking into account 
best practices and lessons learned; 

• 

•  public  security  policies  and  legislation  in  the  fight  against  crime  and  impunity,  the 
promotion of inclusive crime prevention and rehabilitation, assistance to victims and 
reconciliation; 
the  institutional  environment  of  public  security,  capacity  building  needs  and  the 
comprehensive  reforms  envisaged  for  the  justice  and  security  sector  (police, 
penitentiary system and judiciary): 
international  and  regional  cooperation  between  Central  American  countries  and  the 
opportunities,  challenges  and  difficulties  related  to  implementing  the  Central 
American  Security  Strategy;  in  this  context,  obstacles  to  cooperation  such  as 
unresolved border issues should be touched upon in a broader context; 
the  added  value  of  EU  cooperation  and  its  impact,  as  well  as  the  future  needs  and 
direction of cooperation where relevant. 

• 

• 

EU-Caribbean Joint Strategy 

In November 2012, the EU and the Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) States (CARIFORUM) adopted a Joint European Union–Caribbean Partnership 
Strategy, which aimed to establish a stronger partnership between the EU and the Caribbean. 
The partnership seeks to move beyond the traditional donor-recipient relationship in order to 
forge  a  framework  of  mutual  interests,  encompassing  the  political  dimension  alongside  the 
traditional  concerns  of  development  cooperation  and  trade  relations.  Crime  and  security 
together form one of the five priority areas of the partnership. 

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In this framework, and under Article 8 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the EU carries 
out regular political dialogue with CARIFORUM, taking full account of the stipulations of the 
region’s own Security Strategy adopted in February 2013 by the CARICOM Heads of State. 

The  Caribbean  Implementation  Agency  for  Crime  and  Security  (IMPACS),  the  Regional 
Security  System  (RSS),  the  Caribbean  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (CFATF)  and  the 
Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) are key actors in this respect. The 
EU  has  provided  many  of  these  agencies  with  financial  support  under  the  10th  European 
Development Fund. 

*** 

Suitable mechanisms for linking the two regional dialogues mentioned above will be agreed 
upon with SICA and CARICOM members. The existing SICA-CARIFORUM coordination 
mechanism could be a good vehicle. 

I.3 EU-CELAC dialogue 

The  existing  EU-CELAC  Action  Plan  is  the  overarching  framework  for  bi-regional 
cooperation. Although it covers some important issues linked to security (in particular drugs 
and migration), it does not include public security as an issue in its own right. 

A potential chapter on public security in the EU–CELAC Action Plan could define a common 
bi-regional  understanding  of  the  main  challenges,  identify  shared  principles  guiding  joint 
action,  and  set  out  the  main  lines  of  an  agreed  bi-regional  work-programme,  in  terms  of 
dialogue and cooperation activities. 

Security issues related to this strategy may also be discussed in the framework of the bilateral 
political dialogues (with interested CELAC members). 

The  results  of  existing  sector  dialogues  (on  precursors  with  Bolivia,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Peru,  Venezuela  and  Mexico,  on  security  with  Mexico  and  on  drugs  with  Brazil) 
will feed into the initiatives covered by this strategy, where relevant. 

I.4 Strengthening coordination with other relevant actors 

The EU aims to strengthen discussions on security in the region with relevant multilateral or 
international  organisations  possessing  significant  expertise,  such  as  the  OAS,  the  Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, UN bodies (like the UNDP and the 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime — UNODC), the Commonwealth and SEGIB.12 
The  EU  will  also  promote  discussions  with  relevant  international  and  regional  civil  society 
organisations  (e.g.  universities,  think  tanks,  and  observatories).  The  EULAC  Foundation 
could also play a useful role in improving understanding of the problem. 

In  addition,  the  EU  will  seek  to  intensify  its  exchange  on  the  security  situation  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean  with  the  US  and  Canada;  as  both  nations  are  significant  actors 
engaged on the issue.13 Both countries have more recently adopted an overarching approach 
which, like that of the EU, includes institutional capacity building, violence prevention and 
drug demand reduction. 

Objective II. Strengthen the ability of governments to deliver quality public 
services 

II a.  Supporting legislative and regulatory reforms to enhance accountability 

Progress  has  been  made  with  regard  to  the  legislative  and  governance  mechanisms 
underpinning the states’ capacity to deliver services relating to public security. This capacity, 
however, remains limited and clear potential exists for further cooperation between the EU, 
Member  States’  agencies  and  the  institutions  of  the  region.  This  cooperation  might  be 
envisaged in fields such as justice and security sector reform; legislative, regulatory and 
policy reforms to enhance human rights; illicit trafficking; money laundering; and the 
fight against corruption and impunity. 

include 

In  fields  such  as  drugs  policy,  prevention  of  the  diversion  of  precursors,  money  laundering 
and public health, strengthened cooperation building on existing activities in the framework 
of  the  cooperation  programme  between  Latin  America  and  the  European  Union  on  drugs 
policies  (COPOLAD)  and  the  Cocaine  Route  programme14  should  be  pursued.  This 
information  sharing  and  operational  exchanges  between 
cooperation  could 
institutions  from  the  region  e.g.  the  Inter–American  Drug  Abuse  Control  Commission 
(CICAD),  the  Police  Community  of  the  Americas  (AMERIPOL),  and  the  Caribbean 
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and bodies such as Europol, 
Interpol and the EMCDDA, and the Maritime Analysis Operation Centre on Narcotics 
(MAOC-N).  Any  cooperation  would  take  into  account  the  capacity,  priorities  and  legal 
mandates of the agencies and countries concerned and would aim at improving the working 
mechanisms of the regional networks. 

12 The Ibero–American Secretariat General. 
13 In the case of Canada, with a particular focus on the Caribbean.  
14 Including, under the latter, projects such as PRELAC — on chemical precursors — and GAFISUD — on 
money laundering. 

10 

 
 
                                                            
insecurity); 

Further  elements,  such  as  the  legislative  and  regulatory  framework  for  the  protection  of 
children, women and other vulnerable groups (particularly as they are often the hardest hit by 
violence  and 
the 
reinforcement  of  democratic  oversight  by  parliaments  (supported  by  ombudsmen  and  audit 
bodies)  should  also  be  promoted.  Specific  activities  could  be  considered,  working  together 
with  local  organisations  to  help  support  the  formulation  of  relevant  policies  and  bearing  in 
mind relevant frameworks such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security. 

transparency  of  security-related  expenditure  and 

the 

II b.  Building the capacity of law enforcement, judicial and penitentiary authorities 

Cooperation  between  Central  America,  the  Caribbean  and  the  EU  should  promote  a 
comprehensive  and  balanced  reform  of  the  justice  and  security  sector  institutions 
(including  the  penitentiary  sector  and  policies  encouraging  rehabilitation  and  alternatives  to 
incarceration).  This  should  be  accompanied  by  support  for  policies  to  combat  illicit 
trafficking,  money  laundering,  corruption  and  impunity.  Support  might  also  be  given  to 
policies aimed at enhancing the regulation and oversight of private security companies and to 
the exchange of best practices on conventional arms transfer controls.15  

Furthermore, in light of the Communication on the law enforcement training scheme16, there 
might  also  be  scope  for  more  consistent  and  efficient  support  for  the  region  on  law 
enforcement  capacity-building,  by  offering  training  or  by  sharing  knowledge  and  good 
practice  (with  a  possible  role  for  EUROPOL  and  CEPOL).  Twinning-type  projects,  as 
currently carried out within the EU, could also provide a good model for future cooperation 
with the region.   

Support  for  the  development  of  national  and  regional  capacity  to  collect  and  analyse 
statistical  data  on  crime  and  to  monitor  crime  trends  would  also  boost  evidence–based 
decision making and international cooperation in the region. 

II c.   Support governments in their efforts to empower communities. 

Cooperation  activities  are  being  carried  out  in  partnership  with  governments  and  the 
communities  they  serve,  to  foster  socio-economic  development  and  reduce  violence.  In 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean,  they  particularly  focus  on  the  promotion  of  peaceful 
methods  of  resolving  conflict  within  society  and  the  development  of  opportunities  for  all 
parts of the population.   

Following  further  analysis,  areas  for  cooperation  could  include  the  promotion  of  economic 
growth;  fostering  professional  training  and  entrepreneurship  as  means  of  providing  people 

15 Under the Arms Trade Treaty.  
16 "Establishing a European Law Enforcement Training Scheme",  COM(2013) 172 final   

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with  employment  and  alternatives  to  crime;  support  for  victims  of  violence,  (including 
through  humanitarian  assistance  where  appropriate);  reconciliation,  rehabilitation  and 
reinsertion  projects;  the  development  of  alternatives  to  imprisonment  for  lesser  crimes;  the 
protection  of  vulnerable  groups  in  society;  strengthening  mechanisms  for  oversight  by  civil 
society;  and  support  for  initiatives  promoting  mediation,  peace-building,  and  drug  demand 
reduction. 

*** 

For Objective II, as a first step, a mapping exercise will be carried out by the EU and Member 
States,  setting  out  all  activities  being  implemented  by  them  in  the  region  of  relevance  to 
public  security.  This  map  will  facilitate  the  sharing  of  experience,  provide  information  on 
possible synergies and areas for further engagement, and help avoid duplication. It should be 
updated  regularly,  shared  with  the  host  countries  and  other  donors,  and  will  feed  into  joint 
programming.  This  strategy  will  guide  future  work  by  the  EU  and  Member  States  in  this 
field. 

For its work in the field of the rule of law, justice and security sector reform, the EU will also 
apply  lessons  learnt  through  civilian  EU  missions  in  other  regions  of  the  world.  EEAS  in-
house  expertise  from  the  units  that  plan  and  conduct  those  missions,  as  well  as,  where 
appropriate,  military  in-house  expertise,  could  be  brought  in  during  the  planning  and 
evaluation  of  activities  included  in  this  strategy,  in  order  to  support  political  dialogue  and 
cooperation activities with the region. 

Ongoing  or  future  intra-  and  inter-State  mediation  efforts  by  various  actors  in  the  region 
could be supported on request. 

Objective  III.  Fostering  regional  and 
international  cooperation  on 
operational  activities  in  order  to  fight  insecurity  in  Central  America  and 
the Caribbean 

The  EU  will  promote  exchanges  and  cooperation  between  regional  institutions  and 
international  actors,  especially  with  regard  to  the  trans-regional  aspects  of  organised  crime. 
The  countries  of  the  region  face  similar  problems  and  have  broadly  similar  institutions; 
exchanging knowledge serves to strengthen their joint capacity. 

These efforts could be in the form of exchange programmes between specialised agencies or 
of  support  for  carefully 
trans-regional  cooperation.  Increased 
involvement  by  organisations  such  as  Europol,  Eurojust  and  Frontex,  within  their  remits 
and  in  stronger  cooperation  with  regional  organisations/initiatives,  could  be  useful  in  this 
regard. 

targeted  attempts  at 

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Particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  better  linking  resources  deployed  in  the  region  by 
Member  States  (e.g.  liaison  officers)  and  EU  agencies.  This  could  include  improving  law 
enforcement  and  judicial  cooperation  and  strengthening  cooperation  between  regional 
networks,  such  as  the  region’s  Network  of  Prosecutors  against  Organised  Crime 
(REFCO), the Ibero-American Network for International Legal Cooperation (IberRed), 
the  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Justice  of  Ibero-American  Countries  (COMJIB)  and 
European networks. 

In  line  with  the  Joint  Communication  –  EU  Cyber  Security  Strategy,  JOIN(2013)1  final  of 
February  2013,  the  strategy  will  pursue  dialogue  with  the  relevant  international  partners,  to 
ensure effective defence capabilities, identify areas for cooperation and avoid duplication of 
efforts in the field of cybersecurity and fight to cybercrime. 

Regional networking could benefit from fostering other joint activities, such as support for the 
development of coordination mechanisms to respond to complex multi-dimensional crises and 
helping to put in place a more effective crisis response and early warning capability. 

Conclusion 

Insecurity  in  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  harms  millions  in  their  daily  lives  and 
affects  human  rights,  the  rule  of  law  and  economic  development  in  the  region.  It  is  a 
significant obstacle to regional stability and cooperation. 

As  the  governments  of  the  region  try  to  rise  to  this  challenge,  so  must  Europe.  Its  long-
standing  partnership  and  its  economic  and  security  interests  are  at  stake.  The  EU  offers 
dialogue and practical cooperation, knowing that it has as much to learn from its partners as it 
has to give. With this strategy, the EU sets out to meet its partners in Central America and the 
Caribbean with a transparent, comprehensive approach. 

This strategy will guide our engagement with partner countries in the field of security. While 
work  with  partners  at  sub-regional  and  national  levels  should  start  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
next EU-CELAC summit, to be held in 2015, could provide an appropriate opportunity for a 
political evaluation of the strategy and common decisions for the whole of the continent.   

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