REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2013 
Date: 2014-05-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: State aid, cartel, competitiveness, economic growth, energy industry, financial legislation, single market, telecommunications industry













EUR-Lex - 52014DC0249 - EN











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52014DC0249

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2013 /* COM/2014/0249 final */









REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
Report on Competition Policy 2013
INTRODUCTION -
EU COMPETITION POLICY, A TOOL TO REGAIN EUROPEAN COMPETITIVENESS 
In 2013, there have been
encouraging signs that an economic recovery is underway in Europe. Policy
actions undertaken at EU level contributed to start restoring confidence and
creating the basis for returning to a growth path. However, efforts should not
be relaxed. If the EU wants to leave the legacy of the crisis behind and
re-launch the European economy, it needs to go further. What Europe needs are
structural adjustments, an efficient allocation of resources, and productivity
growth. Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth remains at the core of Europe’s policy agenda for the decade. Boosting competitiveness across the EU is paramount for
reaching that objective.
Competitiveness is a composite
and multi-dimensional concept. The Global Competitiveness Report of the World
Economic Forum defines competitiveness as "the set of institutions,
policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country".[1] According
to the European Competitiveness Report of the European Commission, at the roots
of competitiveness are the institutional and microeconomic policy arrangements
that create conditions under which businesses can emerge and thrive, and
individual creativity and effort are rewarded.[2]
Competition policy instruments fully fit both descriptions. 
Moreover, the European Parliament’s 2013 study[3]
on competition policy concluded: “Competition plays a crucial role in
promoting productivity and innovation as drivers of economic growth. This means
that competition policy, which intensifies competition, will stimulate growth.”
It applies to
all the instruments of competition policy. Antitrust enforcement can thwart dominant
companies’ attempts to keep new entrants away from the market and prevent them
from competing effectively with them. It can also create the conditions for lower
input prices for EU industry. Merger control can keep markets open and
efficient. State aid policy protects the internal market from distortions and
helps to steer public resources towards competitiveness-enhancing objectives.
In addition, competition
and competition policy are part and parcel of the general conditions required
for innovation to flourish. They provide incentives to innovative enterprises
and start-ups, they encourage companies to become more efficient, and they
promote subsidies designed to stimulate R&D and innovation.
Competition policy
fosters competitiveness in a global context. Healthy competition in the Single Market
prepares European companies to do business on global markets and succeed. It also
underpins a modern industrial policy, as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty’s
provisions on industry (Article 173 TFEU) which states that action taken by the
EU and the Member States shall be “in accordance with a system of open and
competitive markets”.
Furthermore,
competition policy is the necessary counterpart of Single Market regulation. The
impact of the regulatory measures on firms’ strategies and investment can be
undermined if Single-Market and competition rules are not properly enforced.
State aid rules and
competition enforcement have also a significant role to play in the EU2020
strategy and in the achievement of its Flagship Initiatives. In particular,
competition policy actions are contributing to "Innovation Union",
"An industrial policy for the globalization era",
"Resource-efficient Europe" and "A Digital Agenda for
Europe"..
In 2013, all
competition-enforcement instruments have contributed to promote growth and
competitiveness across the European economy. Antitrust enforcement has deterred
and punished the artificial fragmentation of the internal market. State aid
Modernisation has
been developed to encourage the design of growth-enhancing public
spending. Important decisions have been taken in sectors of strategic
importance such as financial services, telecoms, the digital economy, and
energy. International co-operation in competition policy-making and enforcement
helped to tackle the challenges posed by the growing internationalisation of
business.
Finally, 2013 saw
two important milestones for EU competition policy. Firstly, Regulation 1/2003,[4] when
adopted, ushered in a new era in the enforcement of EU antitrust rules and has
now, a decade later, led to a stocktaking and reflection for further
improvements. Secondly, on 11 June, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a
Directive on antitrust damages actions[5]
– a long-awaited measure by stakeholders and a policy priority for the current
Commission. The debate about those issues – and those that this Report will address
– have animated the continuous structured dialogue between the Commission and the
European Parliament throughout the year (see section 8 on Competition Dialogue
with Other Institutions and, for further detail, the Commission Staff Working
Document (SWD) accompanying this Report).
1. PROMOTING
COMPETITIVENESS BY Fighting against cartels 
The success of European companies
strongly depends on competitive prices. Input costs that are artificially
inflated by anti-competitive conducts and market structures have detrimental
effects on Europe’s competiveness on global markets and on its overall growth prospects.
Needless to say, higher input costs also translate into higher final prices for
European consumers.
Robust cartel enforcement is vital
in that context. Cartels often concern input and intermediate goods and the
Commission has focused its enforcement efforts on this area. In recent years,
several successful investigations have broken up cartels that had inflated input
prices and severely harmed EU competitiveness.[6]

The Commission also concluded
such a case in 2013. In July, the Commission fined five car part suppliers,
Sumitomo, Yazaki, Furukawa, S-Y Systems Technologies (SYS) and Leoni a total of
€ 141 791 000 for their participation in one or more of five cartels for the
supply of wire harnesses to Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Renault. The cartels
covered the whole European Economic Area (EEA).[7]
Wire harnesses represent an assembly of cables transmitting signals or electric
power linking computers to various components built in a car and they are often
described as the 'central nervous system' of the car. 
Cartel enforcement leading to a more
transparent financial services sector: the interest rates derivatives cases 
Interest rate derivatives are financial
products used by banks or companies for managing the risk of interest rate
fluctuations. They derive their value from the level of a benchmark interest
rate, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) – used for various
currencies including the Japanese yen (JPY) - or the Euro Interbank Offered
Rate (EURIBOR), for the euro. 
The Euro interest rate derivatives (EIRD)
cartel operated between September 2005 and May 2008. The settling parties are
Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société Générale. The cartel sought to distort
the normal course of pricing components for those derivatives. Traders of
different banks discussed their bank's submissions for the calculation of the
EURIBOR as well as their trading and pricing strategies. Proceedings were also
opened against Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JPMorgan and the investigation in
relation to the conduct of these three companies will continue under the
standard cartel procedure. 
In the Yen interest rate derivatives (YIRD)
sector, the Commission uncovered 7 distinct bilateral infringements lasting
between 1 and 10 months in the period from 2007 to 2010. The collusion included
discussions between traders of the participating banks on certain JPY LIBOR
submissions. The traders involved also exchanged, on occasion, commercially
sensitive information relating either to trading positions or to future JPY
LIBOR submissions (once also relating to certain future submissions for the
Euroyen TIBOR – Tokyo interbank offered rate). The banks involved in one or
more of the infringements are UBS, RBS, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup and JPMorgan.
The broker RP Martin facilitated one of the infringements by using its contacts
with a number of JPY LIBOR panel banks that did not participate in the
infringement, with the aim of influencing their JPY LIBOR submissions. In the
context of the same investigation, the Commission has also opened proceedings against
the cash broker ICAP. That investigation continues under the standard cartel
procedure.
Those decisions send a clear message that
the Commission is determined to fight and punish such cartels in the financial
sector. Healthy competition and transparency are crucial for financial markets
to work properly, at the service of the real economy rather than for the
interests of a few.
Another trend in recent years has
been the uncovering of cartels in services sectors. The Commission is currently
dealing with a number of cases in the area of financial services. On 4
December, the Commission fined 8 banks a total of € 1 712 468 000 for
participating in cartels in markets for financial derivatives covering the EEA.[8] Four
of them participated in a cartel relating to interest rate derivatives
denominated in the euro currency. Six of them participated in one or more
bilateral cartels relating to interest rate derivatives denominated in Japanese
yen. Those collusions are prohibited by Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. Both decisions were adopted under the settlement
procedure, and the fines imposed on the parties were reduced by 10% given their
agreement to settle.
The Commission also has several
ongoing cases in the food sector, an area of direct concern to consumers. In November, the Commission fined four European
North Sea shrimps traders - Heiploeg, Klaas Puul, Kok Seafood (all established
in the Netherlands) and Stührk (established in Germany) - a total of EUR  28
716 000 for operating a cartel.[9] Between June 2000 and January 2009 Heiploeg
and Klaas Puul agreed to fix prices and share sales volumes of North Sea
shrimps in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
In addition to those decisions,
in April the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to a number of suppliers
of smart-card chips for their alleged participation in a cartel.[10] Smart-card
chips have countless applications, such as SIM cards, bank cards, identity
cards, and many more devices. It is the Commission’s preliminary view that
certain suppliers may have co-ordinated their behaviour in the EEA to prop up prices.
The Commission initially pursued settlement discussions with certain
undertakings regarding their alleged participation. However, it eventually
reverted to the normal antitrust procedure due to lack of progress.
Finally, it should be recalled
that cartels can fragment the internal market and hamper the adjustment of
industry to changes in market conditions. Therefore the harm they cause is not limited
to the markets on which the companies involved operate but may affect the competitiveness of the whole economy.
2. ensuring effective antitrust enforcement and merger
control in the interest of businesses and consumers
Regulation
1/2003, the main procedural instrument for the enforcement of Articles 101 and
102 TFEU, entered into force on 1 May 2004. The regulation marked a turning
point as it empowered all enforcers in the EU (the Commission, national
competition authorities, and national courts) to apply EU antitrust rules to
agreements and practices liable of affecting trade between Member States, while
at the same time respecting fundamental rights of the stakeholders affected, as
protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The European
Competition Network (ECN) was created and co-operation tools were introduced to
ensure the effective and coherent application of the common rules. On that
basis, the Commission and the national Competition Authorities (NCAs) jointly
have a considerable enforcement record, underpinned by a wide range of policy
work. Since May 2004, the Commission has looked into potentially
anti-competitive practices in virtually every economic sector, adopting over 120
decisions. NCAs, on their part, have investigated over 1,600 cases in the same
period, giving rise to more than 600 enforcement decisions.
In
2013 the Commission started to look back at the experience of those ten years
to analyse the work of the EU competition authorities in the different sectors and
types of infringement. Taking stock of past priorities and achievements will
help to strengthen the already excellent co-ordination between the Commission
and the NCAs.
Regulation
1/2003 in action
Structures
of national competition authorities
EU
law relies on the Member States to ensure that there are effective and
well-equipped national competition authorities and leaves largely to them the
design of the national competition-enforcement regimes. The only explicit
requirement is that Member States designate their respective authorities
responsible for the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU in such a way that
the provisions of the Regulation are effectively complied with. In recent
years, structural reforms have taken place in many Member States. Structures of
NCAs in the European Competition Network (ECN) have generally evolved towards greater
autonomy and effectiveness. Nevertheless, questions have arisen as to the
independence and resources of some NCAs. A roll-back of achievements must be prevented.
Convergence
of enforcement powers
The regulation
left Member States the freedom to determine their own procedures and sanctions for
the application of the EU competition rules in the Member States. Apart from a
general obligation on Member States to ensure effective enforcement, in
particular through the application of the principles of effectiveness and
equivalence, these matters are not regulated or harmonised by EU law. As a
result, the Commission and NCAs apply the same substantive rules according to
different procedures and sanctions. Convergence of enforcement powers has been a
focus of ECN work for several years. The ECN has notably produced detailed
comparative reports on investigation and decision-making powers as well as a
set of ECN Recommendations on investigation and decision-making powers. As
regards sanctions for breaches of competition law, most NCAs can impose
deterrent civil/administrative fines and apply a similar basic methodology when
setting fines. Reforms leading to the increased convergence of procedures have
been encouraged by country-specific recommendations in the framework of the
Europe 2020 strategy (European Semester) and in
the context of Economic Adjustment Programmes. 
Leniency
convergence and interface with other areas of law  
Leniency
programmes are generally recognised as an important tool to detect secret
cartels. From the outset, fostering convergence and smooth interaction in that
area has been a priority within the ECN. Notably the ECN Model Leniency
Programme (MLP), developed in the ECN, provides Member States / NCAs with a
cohesive set of model rules and procedures from which they are able to draw
inspiration when drafting national measures. As a result, virtually all Member
States have introduced leniency programmes and a significant process of
alignment with the MLP has taken place. Refinements to the MLP were endorsed in
late 2012.
The Commission
will continue to pay close attention to the functioning of the overall
framework for public enforcement of the EU competition rules.
The
Commission adopted in 2013 an additional key initiative for the antitrust
regulatory environment: the proposal for a Directive on how citizens and
companies can claim damages when they are victims of infringements of the EU
antitrust rules, such as cartels and abuses of a dominant market position.[11] The
proposal is set to remove a number of practical difficulties which victims
frequently face when they try to obtain fair compensation for the damage they
have suffered as a consequence of infringements of EU competition law. 
Removing obstacles to effective compensation for victims of antitrust
infringements
The legislative proposal 
On 11 June, the
Commission adopted a Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions for
breaches of EU competition law. Under EU law, any person or company who
suffered harm because of an infringement of EU competition law has a right to
full compensation. The proposal has two complementary goals. First, to make that
EU right to compensation a reality in all Member States by removing key
practical difficulties which consumers and companies frequently face when they
seek redress. Second, the proposal aims at optimising the interplay of such
private damages claims with the public enforcement by the Commission and
national competition authorities, to safeguard strong public enforcement and to
achieve a more effective enforcement overall.
To achieve those
goals, the proposal includes substantive and procedural rules on crucial
aspects of antitrust damages actions, such as access to evidence, limitation
periods for bringing an action, standing, and the burden of proof with regard
to compensation for overcharges passed on along the distribution chain. The
proposal seeks to create or provide legal certainty as to the admissibility/disclosure
of evidence produced for the purposes of public enforcement. For instance, in
order to safeguard the attractiveness of leniency programmes, it provides that
corporate leniency statements should never be disclosed in private damages
litigation. The proposal facilitates follow-on damages claims by stipulating
that final infringement decisions by national competition authorities have
probative effect.
Flanking measures
In parallel to the proposal, the Commission adopted a
Communication on quantifying antitrust harm in actions for damages based on
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to provide guidance to courts and the parties in damages actions. The
Communication is accompanied by a more comprehensive Practical Guide drawn up
by the Commission's services and translated in all official EU languages.
Finally, the proposal is complemented by the Commission Recommendation on
collective redress, which recommends that all Member States introduce
collective redress mechanisms to facilitate the enforcement of the rights that
all Union citizens have under Union law, including the right to compensation
for antitrust harm.
Furthermore, on
5 December the Commission adopted the 'merger simplification initiative'
package. The package includes the amendment of the Merger Implementing
Regulation[12] and
the adoption of a new Notice on Simplified Procedure.[13] As a
result, it is expected that the ratio of cases dealt with in simplified
procedure will be substantially increased.
The simplification initiative is a concrete example
of the Commission's commitment towards the goals of the Regulatory Fitness and
Performance (REFIT) programme,[14]
which aims at promoting growth and competitiveness by reducing regulatory
burdens for EU businesses and citizens.
3. State Aid Modernization TO steer public resources
towards competitiveness-enhancing objectives 
Like
anti-competitive business practices such as cartels, unlawful government
subsidies can tilt the level playing field, erect unnecessary barriers and
squander the growth potential of the internal market. However, government
support can also have a positive impact when it is well-targeted, tackles
market failures, and creates incentives for investments and ventures that would
not take place otherwise. 'Good' State aid can stimulate innovation and human-capital
development. EU State aid policy can also help national authorities make the
most of dwindling resources in times of budget constraints. Promoting
public spending on growth-oriented policies is a key priority for the EU in this
economic context and the main rationale of the State aid Modernisation
strategy.[15]
The strategy’s reform process is being completed; below are the main elements
the Commission worked on in 2013.
Tackling
competitiveness gaps across the EU with targeted regional aid 
In June 2013 the Commission adopted the new
Regional Aid Guidelines for the period 2014-2020.[16] The
adoption followed extensive consultations with stakeholders (Member States,
regional and local authorities, business associations, interest groups, individual
companies and citizens), the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions,
and the European Economic and Social Committee. The Regional Aid Guidelines help
reduce competitiveness gaps across the EU by supporting productive investments
in value-added projects, especially in Europe’s most disadvantaged regions.
Adapting to the challenges of broadband
infrastructure development: new Broadband State Aid guidelines
In January, the revised guidelines for
the application of EU State aid rules to the broadband sector[17]
entered into force. The guidelines help Member States achieve the objectives of
the Digital Agenda for Europe, reinforce open access obligations, improve
transparency and facilitate well-targeted aid, while simplifying the rules to
allow for faster decisions.
In addition, the adoption of a revised
Enabling Regulation[18]
introduces certain broadband infrastructure among the new categories of aid
that the Commission may decide to exempt from the obligation of prior notification,
contributing to facilitate the implementation of broadband projects.
Promoting a
sound and stable financing framework: New State aid rules for access to finance

Small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the back-bone of Europe’s economy: two out
of three jobs in the private sector as well as more than half of the total
value added created by businesses in the EU come from SMEs.
They are also an engine of European competitiveness with a key role in
innovation. But those firms often find it difficult to gain access to finance.
Against that
background, the Commission reviewed the State aid guidelines devoted to the promotion
of risk-capital investments in SMEs. The Risk Finance Guidelines set out the
conditions that Member States must meet when they grant support to promote
access to risk capital of SMEs in their
early development stages, particularly to ensure that such aid targets a proven
equity gap and does not crowd out financial operators. The new Risk Finance
Guidelines were adopted in January 2014, following two public consultations, a
workshop and a multilateral meeting with Member States. 
Rescue and restructuring State aid
guidelines to support firms in temporary difficulties
In November, the Commission launched a
public consultation in view of the revision of the State aid guidelines for the
support of troubled non-financial firms. The new rules on rescue and
restructuring will be adopted in 2014 and will preserve the delicate balance
between limiting the capacity reduction caused by the difficulties and
minimising the economic damage caused by keeping unviable
firms on the market. Keeping inefficient companies on life support has a negative
impact on public budgets and can severely hinder competitiveness and economic
growth. The principles inspiring the new guidelines aim to protect the jobs and
know-how of companies that are viable once restructured and to provide them
with the support they need to wind down non-viable operations.
Stimulating innovative
growth: New State aid guidelines for R&D&I
The Commission is also in the process of
revising the State aid guidelines for research, development and innovation
(R&D&I), with a view to adopting new rules in 2014. R&D investment
is crucial for competitiveness and is one of the headline targets of the Europe
2020 strategy.
The level of research and development in
Europe remains constrained by market failures: the revised R&D&I
framework will help translate State aid measures into higher levels of research
and innovation, bringing more flexibility and less red tape for Member States
when implementing R&D&I aid. In particular, more emphasis will be put
on close-to-the-market activities, such as experimental development (including
pilots and demonstrators), research infrastructure and innovation (including
non-technological innovation). Since 2007, the Commission has approved over 200
national schemes in research, development and innovation. 
The future State aid guidelines for
energy and environment
State aid policy contributes to the EU
long-term strategy for energy and climate change based on security of supply,
sustainability and competitiveness. It does so by opening energy markets, keeping
a level playing field, and creating incentives and an appropriate framework for
the significant investments that are needed over the coming decades. The
Commission’s current review of the State aid guidelines on energy and
environment looks at adopting new rules in 2014. The new guidelines will
complement the ETS State aid guidelines of May 2012.
While traditional elements of environmental
aid will be maintained in the new guidelines, the State Aid Modernisation
process is seeking to ensure close synergy with the Europe 2020 strategy and
its flagship initiatives. 
The overall strategic goal of the review
is to help EU countries invest better to meet the goals of EU energy policy and
to facilitate efficient support to attain a higher level of environmental protection.
It entails promoting investments in energy efficiency, better targeting public
support to renewable energy sources, and promoting the use of subsidies to
improve interconnections and develop cross-border networks. Those last two
points are among the main innovations of the new guidelines.
The new guidelines will aim at
minimising the competition distortions of environmental and energy state aid
measures, in particular by limiting the aid to the minimum and incentivising
market friendly instruments. The new guidelines will be fully consistent with
the EU climate-change and energy objectives in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy
and will support Member States in their efforts to reach them. 
4. fostering fair and stable financial sector to support the real
economy
The economic crisis originating from the
financial sector has dented confidence in financial markets. However, financial
markets that are stable, safe, open, competitive and fair are absolutely
necessary to maintain a balanced and sustainable phase of economic expansion. The
Commission has engaged in wide-ranging regulatory efforts to reduce systemic
risks and to increase the transparency of financial markets. The root causes of
the crisis and the challenges posed by the current economic juncture cannot be
addressed without combining different policy instruments. In that context,
antitrust enforcement to promote a fair and competitive financial sector
operates in conjunction with State aid control on bank restructuring. Besides
competition enforcement, there are legislative proposals which have the
objective of improving the regulatory environment.
Commission's competition policy efforts
for a more transparent financial sector: Focus on derivatives and benchmark
rates
A great deal of effort has been directed
towards the derivatives market, given its size and its role in hedging the risk
exposure for institutions such as banks, pension funds, and industrial firms.
The European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which entered into force last year, requires
the standardised derivative contracts to be centrally cleared.[19] In
the review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) the
Commission proposed that those derivatives should be traded on transparent and
organised trading platforms.[20]
The Commission’s antitrust tools are complementary to those regulatory
measures. This means, in particular, that companies that plan to provide
exchange trading should not be prevented to do so by the anti-competitive
behaviour of others. It is particularly important for credit default swaps
(CDS), given the role that those products play in the financial sector: in
2013, the gross notional value of the almost 2 million active CDS contracts
exceeded € 10 trillion.
The Commission began an investigation on
the CDS market in 2011, which resulted in a Statement of Objections being issued
on 1 July 2013. The Statement of Objections was addressed to Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, Barclays, Bear Stearns, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS as well as to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and
data service provider Markit.[21]
Following
the investigation, the Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that those
companies and associations may have co-ordinated their behaviour to jointly
prevent exchanges from entering the CDS market between 2006 and 2009, thereby
breaching EU antitrust rules that prohibit anti-competitive agreements,
concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings.
In parallel, in December, the Commission
concluded the investigation of the antitrust cases relating to the Libor,
Euribor and Tibor benchmark rates as regards the settling parties (see
above on page 4). The investigations started in 2011 and were treated as a top
priority by the Commission.[22]

Those antitrust cases highlight both
the importance and the vulnerability of benchmarks. Benchmarks affect the value
of many financial instruments, such as interest-rate swaps and forward rate
agreements as well as of commercial and non-commercial contracts such as supply
agreements, loans and mortgages. They also play an important role in risk
management. In September, the Commission proposed a draft Regulation to restore
confidence in those benchmarks.[23]
The ultimate goal of the proposal is to ensure the integrity of benchmarks by
guaranteeing that they are not subject to conflicts of interest, that they
reflect the economic reality they are intended to measure, and that they are
used appropriately.
State aid policy shaping
disciplined restructuring and balance-sheet adjustments in the banking sector
In the absence of the EU recovery and
resolution rules, which are now set out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive,[24]
State aid rules for the banking sector effectively determined the conditions
for the resolution of banks at EU level. Since the onset of the crisis, EU
governments responded to threats to financial stability by providing massive
public support to their respective banking institutions. For the past five
years, State aid policy has been used to co-ordinate the response of Member
States, preserve the level playing field in the banking sector, and make sure
that bail-outs were carried out according to similar conditions across the Union. The main elements of the restructuring decisions were to return beneficiary banks to
long-term viability, ensure burden-sharing, and eliminate competition distortions.
The Banking Communication
revamped these State aid rules as of 1 August.[25]
Until further notice, the new rules will continue to ensure a consistent policy
response to the financial crisis throughout the EU and limit competition distortions
in the internal market.
In the course of the year, the
Commission adopted several decisions on bank restructuring under the new rules.
On 6 September, the Commission temporarily approved as rescue aid, under new State
aid rules, State guarantees on newly issued liabilities of the two Slovenian
banks Factor banka d.d. and Probanka d.d. On 18 December, the Commission
approved decisions on State aid measures in favour of five Slovenian banks. The
Commission approved the restructuring plans of Nova Ljubljanska banka d.d.
(NLB) and of Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d. d. (NKBM), in particular because
they enable the banks to become viable in the long term without unduly
distorting competition. The Commission also approved aid for the orderly
winding down of Factor Banka d.d. and Probanka d.d., in particular because the
distortions of competition created by the aid will be minimised by the complete
market exit of the two banks. Finally, the Commission temporarily approved
rescue aid in favour of Abanka Vipa d.d., for reasons of financial stability. In
the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, Slovenia had to carry out an asset quality review and a stress test of the Slovenian
banking sector (AQR/ST). The assessment of the results of the AQR/ST, published
by Slovenia on 12 December, was incorporated in the Commission’s five decisions
adopted on 18 December. 
Decisions on
bank restructuring notified before 1 August 2013
In the case of
Hypo Alpe Adria Group (HGAA) the Commission approved in August 2013 a plan
according to which the operative parts of the bank in Austria and South-Eastern
Europe will be sold by mid-2015, at the latest, while the non-viable remainder
is put into an orderly wind-down process. Until the sales process is complete, Austria commits to a number of restrictions for new business, in particular relating to
risk control, thus ensuring that the marketability of the subsidiaries is
enhanced and that competition distortions are kept to a minimum.
In the case of
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the Italian government provided €2
billion to cover a capital shortfall coming from the December 2011 European Banking
Authority stress test. After ensuring that the bank’s business model is less
risky and provides for long-term viability, the Commission approved MPS’
restructuring plan in November 2013.
In addition, State aid control is
an important tool to help to ensure that banks revert to their core economic
function as lenders to the real economy, through conditionality in
restructuring decisions.
In Spain, 2013 was the first full year
of implementation of the various restructuring plans approved for the banks
that received State aid under the eighteen-month financial-assistance programme
granted in July 2012. The restructuring plans aimed at refocusing banks from
riskier activities towards SME and other corporate lending. During the first
half of 2013, the so-called subordinated liability exercises for the banks that
received State aid were completed, generating almost €13 billion of capital in
those banks and reducing the need for additional public funds. 
In 2013 the Commission, together
with the ECB and the IMF, also kept providing financial assistance to Member
States that had requested it. State aid control contributed to the economic
adjustment programmes in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus. The restructuring of the banking sectors, including extensive financial-sector
conditionality, was one of the main policy requirements addressed to those
countries.
An open, efficient and secure
Single Market for payments
The Commission
also focused its enforcement and regulatory efforts in the payments area. An
example is the antitrust investigation opened in September 2011 to examine the
standardisation process for payments over the internet carried out by the
European Payments Council (EPC) and closed in June 2013.[26]
Taking action to
ensure that standardisation processes do not affect market entry and innovation

The EPC is the
decision-making and coordination body of the European banking industry in
relation to payments. The Commission had concerns that through its work on
standards for e-payments, and in particular the e-Payments Framework, the EPC
could exclude non-bank internet providers from the e-payments market. Internet
payments are vital for the development of e-commerce and the good functioning
of the EU internal market.
In the course of the investigation, the
EPC announced its decision to stop the development of the e-Payments Framework
and any other standardisation initiatives that would have the same object or
effect. As a result, the complainant in that case, Sofort AG, withdrew its
complaint. Under those circumstances the Commission decided to close its
investigation.
The revised Payment Services Directive[27] would
explicitly allow non-bank players to operate in competition with
banks in internet and card payments. In that instance,
regulation effectively complemented antitrust enforcement. 
Another example of synergy between
ex-ante regulation and ex-post competition enforcement is the Proposal for a Regulation
on interchange fees for card-based payments,[28]
which takes account of two decades of competition proceedings involving card
companies. Interchange fees have often been under the scrutiny of competition
authorities and regulators. The Commission has adopted several decisions under
EU antitrust rules, including the MasterCard decision of December 2007.[29] There
have also been a number of national proceedings, including in Poland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the UK, Germany and France. Nevertheless, the
European card-payments market remains rather fragmented and interchange fees
vary widely. To address that issue, the Commission proposed the adoption of the
interchange-fees Regulation. The proposal aims at developing an EU-wide market
for payments, which will enable consumers, retailers and other businesses to
enjoy the full benefits of the EU internal market, including in e-commerce, in
line with Europe 2020’s Digital Agenda.
The ban foreseen
by the revised Payments Services Directive on the collection of payment card
surcharges for the interchange fee-regulated cards complements the provisions
of the Consumer Rights Directive,[30]
which should become applicable across the EU from 13 June 2014. The new rules
will prevent traders from applying payment surcharges for any means of payment
that exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of such means.  
5. Energy: the sector where “more Europe” is most needed 
Energy is one of the sectors in
which completing the Single Market will bring the greatest benefits to Europe’s businesses and citizens. However, reform efforts designed to complete an internal
market for energy, including the third Energy Package launched in 2007[31] are
taking longer than expected to have an impact on the ground. Three key challenges identified in 2013 are the EU's
increasing dependence on imported energy, increasing energy prices and lack of
investment.[32] Renewable energy will play a key
role in the transition towards a competitive, secure and sustainable energy
system.
Energy markets play a crucial
role in Europe’s economy. Energy is a key input for industry and touches upon
almost every aspect of consumers’ daily life. Energy costs have a considerable
impact on economic activity. The price of energy is a major source of concern for
European competitiveness, especially in
energy-intensive industries, and threatens Europe’s ten-year lead in
decarbonisation.
There is, however, a broad
consensus as to what is required to tackle those challenges: providing the EU
with a common framework for energy, investing in infrastructure, increasing
energy efficiency, and encouraging more efficient and better market-integrated
aid to renewables.
Competition is part of the policy
mix that can address those challenges. EU energy legislation has contributed to
the dismantling of legal monopolies, the harmonisation of rules, and has
introduced measures to support market integration and liberalisation. Competition
policy, for its part, seeks to ensure that companies do not maintain or
reinstate barriers to competition. Hence competition enforcement,
regulation and liberalisation measures all contribute to the three pillars of
EU energy policy: sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply.
Still, in some Member States
competition in the gas and electricity markets remains limited not only due to the
slow implementation of the legislation, but also due to the nature of those
sectors which are characterized by high entry-level investment and by limited physical-infrastructure
capacity. Although EU energy markets remain largely
national or regional in nature, their integration has increased. Further
integration could mitigate price fluctuations and improve overall efficiency
and competition.
In that sense, the robust enforcement
of antitrust rules underpins the effectiveness of ex-ante regulation and State
intervention should be well-designed in order to limit the impact on energy
prices.
Since 1 January, the new State aid
guidelines on the Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) are applicable. The new
framework allows Member States to relieve energy-intensive industries from
indirect costs of CO2 in their electricity price and addresses the
risk of relocation to countries outside the EU where environmental regulation
is less strict.[33]
In 2013 the Commission approved such schemes in five Member States: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK.[34]
On the other hand, plans of the German authorities to grant such support to
certain non-ferrous metals producers have been declared incompatible, as it
would have implied serious distortions of competition to the detriment of
producers in other Member States.[35]
Promoting open and competitive energy
markets by ensuring non-discriminatory access and a level playing field
In 2013, antitrust enforcement actions
have contributed or will contribute in the future to curbing energy prices by
combatting abusive or collusive behaviour leading to segmentation of markets
and inefficient allocation of energy. Cases currently under investigation by
the Commission have examined the behaviour of companies active in the
crude oil, refined oil products and biofuel sectors;[36] Gazprom,
in relation to the supply of gas to Central and Eastern Europe;[37] BEH,
in relation to the supply of electricity in Bulgaria;[38] and
power exchanges.[39]
In April, the
Commission accepted and adopted a decision that renders legally binding
commitments from ČEZ, the Czech electric incumbent.[40] An
in-depth investigation into the Czech electricity sector was opened in June
2011, following unannounced inspections in 2009. After ČEZ offered
commitments to address the Commission’s concerns, a market test was carried
out in July 2012 and its outcome was considered satisfactory. ČEZ
will divest from about 800 to 1,000 MW of its generation capacity. That
divestiture will allow a new player to enter the Czech electricity market and
compete with the incumbent.
The Commission also initiated formal
proceedings against the Romanian power exchange OPCOM,[41]
which, together with its parent company CNTEE Transelectrica, received a
Statement of Objections in May. The Commission found on a preliminary basis
that OPCOM, the operator of the only power exchange in Romania, is discriminating against companies on the basis of their place of establishment.
Power exchanges have an important role in providing public price information:
restrictive business practices, by increasing foreign traders’ costs to do
business, limit the liquidity and efficiency of electricity markets. Access to
energy markets is crucial to achieving transparent and reliable electricity
prices on the wholesale and retail markets.
As to State aid control, the Commission
opened an
in-depth inquiry into water-resources concessions to Electricidade de Portugal
(EDP) for electricity generation, to verify whether the price paid by the
Portuguese electricity incumbent EDP in 2007 for the extension of its right to
use public water resources for electricity generation was in line with EU State
aid rules.[42]
The Commission has started inquires about the rules and practices governing the
granting or extension of similar concessions in other Member States too.
6.
competition enforcement in THE digital economy to underpin the digital agenda
for europe
The digital revolution has taken almost every
sector of the economy by storm, shaping the way individuals and companies live
and do business, bringing a large variety of digital goods and services, and offering
other sectors essential inputs, prospective savings, novel information and
distribution channels. The digital sectors are major drivers of creativity and
innovation, boosting competitiveness across the economy.
Although it is extremely difficult to identify reliable measures to capture the
size of the digital economy, its contribution to GDP growth in recent
years has become more and more significant. With this in mind, the Commission
launched in 2010 its Flagship Initiative "A Digital Agenda for Europe",[43] which
was reviewed with an updated set of priorities in December 2012.
Although the basic principles and
objectives of competition policy remain the same across all sectors, a number
of features are quite specific to the digital economy. A faster churning
process is one of them. Another feature of digital markets is the rapid pace of
technological change, which constantly brings new devices and immaterial goods,
such as services, applications, and ecosystems to the market. Finally, business
models and sources of revenue change faster in digital markets than elsewhere.
Combining competition-policy instruments
to address the challenges of fast-moving market
In fast-moving markets such as ICT and
e-communication, the joint application of ex-ante regulation and ex-post
competition enforcement is necessary to safeguard the proper functioning of the
sector and help it deploy its growth potential in full.  Effective scrutiny of
the behaviour of dominant firms, as well as quick reaction in case of abuses,
is particularly important, since illegal practices may cause the early exit
from the market of small and innovative competitors.
Facilitating the dissemination of
intellectual property and knowledge is also important in the digital industries.
To that end, the Commission is reviewing its antitrust-policy framework on
technology-transfer agreements. Efficiency-enhancing technology-transfer
agreements between competitors or non-competitors promote innovation and
competitiveness. Dissemination of technology can favour competition and
increase follow-on innovation. A public consultation on the revision of the existing
guidelines and the block exemption regulation for technology transfer
agreements (TTBER) took place between February and May, in view of adopting
final texts in the spring of 2014.
Enforcing
antitrust rules in the fast moving digital market: the Google case 
The Commission
had concerns that Google may be abusing its dominant position in the markets
for web search, online search advertising and online search advertising
intermediation in the EEA. The Commission considered that such practices could
harm consumers by reducing choice and stifling innovation in the fields of
specialised search services and online search advertising. To address
Commission’s competition concerns, Google submitted a first set of commitments
in April and a revised set of commitments in October. The Commission sought
feedback on Google's revised commitments through formal requests for
information. In light of the feedback it received, the Commission came to the
conclusion that the revised commitments still fell short of adequately
addressing the competition concerns the Commission expressed in its Preliminary
Assessment. The Commission informed Google that if it wished to submit a
further revised set of commitments that adequately addressed the Commission's
concerns, it had only a very limited amount of time to do so, failing which the
Commission would revert to the procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.
Promoting connectivity and tackling
Single Market fragmentation in the telecoms sector
The absence of a real Single Market for
electronic communications hinders the development of new services accessible
throughout the internal market to the disadvantage of European consumers.  
Completing the Single Market for
electronic communications would bring significant benefits to Europe’s
businesses and citizens. On 11 September, the Commission adopted a
legislative package for a "Connected Continent: Building a Telecoms Single
Market". This package comprises a
Communication on the Telecoms Single Market, a proposal for a Regulation laying
down measures concerning the European single market for electronic
communications as well as measures to achieve a Connected Continent; it also
includes a Commission Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination
obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the
broadband investment environment. [44] 
In 2013 competition enforcement has been
quite active in the telecoms sector, preventing incumbents from protecting
their business through illegal practices and ensuring that mergers would not
lead to higher prices, poorer quality and lower levels of innovation.
Under the Merger Regulation, the
Commission is in the process of reviewing a number of major deals, including
two proposed transactions that would consolidate Mobile Network Operators in Ireland and Germany respectively. On 1 October, Hutchison 3G UK notified to the Commission its
intention to acquire sole control over Telefónica Ireland and on 6 November
the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into that merger.[45]
Similarly on 31 October, Telefónica Deutschland notified to the Commission its
intention to acquire sole control over KPN’s mobile operations in Germany known as E Plus and on 20 December the Commission
opened an in-depth investigation in to the transaction.[46] As
both those transactions would result in fewer players on wholesale and retail
markets that are already very concentrated, they will have to be reviewed
in-depth in the course of 2014.
The Commission also analysed and cleared
unconditionally in Phase I Liberty Global’s US$ 23.3 billion acquisition of
Virgin Media[47]
– the largest cable operator in the UK – and Vodafone’s €8 billion acquisition
of Kabel Deutschland, the largest cable operator in Germany.[48]
On the antitrust
side, on 23 January the Commission imposed a fine of €66.894.000 on Telefónica
and of €12.290.000 on Portugal Telecom, for agreeing not
to compete with each other on the Iberian telecommunications markets.[49] By
preserving the status quo in Spain and Portugal, the agreement contributed to
maintaining partitioning in the EU telecoms sector. Non-compete agreements are
one of the most serious violations of EU competition rules, as they potentially
result in higher prices and less choice for consumers. That specific decision
is especially relevant, since it concerned a cross-border market-sharing
agreement.
Removing
obstacles to innovation in the knowledge economy
In 2013, the Commission has been active in
relation to standard-essential patents (SEPs). SEPs are patents protecting a
technology which is essential for the implementation of an industry standard
developed by a standard-setting organisation. It is technically impossible to
make a standard-compliant product without using the technology protected by the
SEPs.
In May, the Commission sent a Statement
of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential misuse of SEPs for mobile
phones.[50]
The seeking
of an injunction before a national court is generally a legitimate remedy for a
SEP holder in case of patent infringements. However, where a successful
standard comprises patented technologies, access to the corresponding SEPs is a
precondition for any company to sell standard-compliant products on the market.
The Commission has therefore reached the preliminary conclusion that the seeking
of an injunction may constitute an abuse of a dominant position, where SEPs are
concerned and the potential licensee is willing to enter into a licence on
FRAND (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) terms. In such a situation, the
Commission considers that SEP holders should not have recourse to injunctions,
which generally involve a prohibition to sell the product infringing the
patent. SEPs holders retain the right to seek
injunctions where potential licensees refuse licenses that have been deemed to
be FRAND.
Efforts in the SEPs area have also
involved Samsung.[51]
In September, Samsung offered commitments to address the competition concerns
identified by the Commission in its Statement of Objections of December 2012. Under
the proposed commitments, Samsung proposes for a period of five
years not to seek injunctions on the basis of any of its SEPs, present and
future, that relate to technologies implemented in smartphones and tablets
against any company that agrees to comply with a specified process for
determining appropriate FRAND royalty rates by either a court or arbitral
tribunal.
7.
International co-operation in
competition policy to tackle the challenges of globalization
The increasing interdependence of
world economies is an irreversible trend: foreign direct investment had risen
to over 30% of world GDP before the crisis, while world trade has grown on
average by 5.3% a year for the past two decades. New economic giants have
appeared while the major players in the global environment have made
significant investments in each other’s economies.
The globalisation of the economy
calls for closer co-operation among competition authorities not only in Europe, but also across the globe. International co-operation between competition agencies assists
with the effective management of the challenges of globalisation and promotes
convergence on competition-policy principles and practices implemented throughout
the world. It is essential to ensure co-operation among different authorities and
consistency in the outcome of their enforcement activities. As encouraged by
the European Parliament, the Commission continued to engage in multilateral and
bilateral policy dialogues with the authorities in a number of other
jurisdictions so as to promote convergence on both substantive and procedural
competition rules. The Commission also continued to co-operate closely with
many competition agencies in day-to-day enforcement activities.
Bilateral and multilateral co-operation
for more effective competition enforcement
The EU launched negotiations with the US on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) on 8 July and with Japan on a Free Trade Agreement on 25 March. Both negotiations include provisions related
to competition that the Commission follows closely.
As to bilateral relations with non-EU competition-enforcement
bodies, in 2013 the Commission focused its efforts mainly on the EU’s main trading
partners – both traditional trading partners and major emerging economies. In
that respect, high-level dialogues were held in 2013 with representatives of
some competition agencies with which the EU has concluded a cooperation
agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding.
In the margin of the BRICS Conference on
22 November in Delhi, DG Competition signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Co-operation
in the area of competition law with the Competition Commission of India. On 17 May,
the Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Switzerland was signed. An
innovative feature of the latter and the reason why it is called a
second-generation agreement is that it will enable both competition agencies to
exchange information they have obtained in their respective investigations. The
agreement will enter into force once it has been approved by the European
Parliament and the Swiss Parliament.
Negotiations on a similar agreement
between the EU and Canada have been progressing well. In addition, the
Commission continued to engage in technical co-operation activities with other
non-EU competition authorities, in particular of China and India.
The Commission continued to monitor
closely the implementation of the provisions of the steel and shipbuilding annexes
included in the Act of Accession for Croatia[52]
– and on 1 July Croatia became a member of the EU. As to accession negotiations
with candidate countries, significant progress was made in 2013 with the
screening of Montenegro legislation and the identification of opening
benchmarks for negotiations of the competition chapter. 
The Commission
also continued its active engagement with international competition-related
fora such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the International
Competition Network (ICN), and Unctad. In 2013, it continued to co-chair the
Mergers Working Group of the International Competition Network and one of the
Sub-Groups of the Cartel Working Group. In 2013 the Commission was also the
project leader (together with US Federal Trade Commission) for the ICN Steering
Group projects on investigative processes in competition enforcement
activities.
8. COMPETITION DIALOGUE WITH
THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Structured dialogue with the European
Parliament
DG Competition engages in a continuous
structured dialogue on competition issues with the European Parliament, and its
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee in particular.
Vice-President Almunia visited ECON
twice in 2013 in the context of the structured dialogue: on 28 May for the
presentation of the Annual Report on Competition 2012, and on 26 November for
an update on key decisions and policy developments in 2013, looking ahead to
the results of the Parliament’s work in the area of competition in 2014. 
The Vice-President also attended the
Regional Policy committee on 30 May to talk about the Regional Aid guidelines,
which the committee was examining.
Two Resolutions on the Annual Reports on
Competition were adopted in 2013. In June, Parliament adopted its Resolution on
the Sanchez Presedo report, covering the 2011 ACR. The 2012 Annual Report on
Competition was sent to the ECON committee on 14 May, to enable MEPs to prepare
for the dialogue with the Commissioner. The Resolution on the Tremosa i Balcells
report was adopted on 10 December. 
In recent years, Parliament has raised
concerns about the subject of fines for competition infringements: the Commission
holds the view that the Fining Guidelines provide sufficient legal certainty
for companies and flexibility for the Commission if modification is required;
this structure has been upheld on many occasions by the European Courts. 
Structured
dialogue with the European Parliament on State Aid Modernisation
The Parliament
was formally consulted by the Council in the process of adopting the Enabling
and Procedural Regulations, cornerstones of the State Aid Modernisation, which
was a priority for DG Competition throughout 2013. The Parliament adopted its
two Resolutions in July, following in-depth work on the two proposals. As well
as the ECON committee, the TRAN committee contributed an opinion on the
Enabling Regulation. As well as its formal role in the legislative process, the
key messages made by the Parliament were taken into account by the Commission
in its revision of the guidelines in the State aid area. As Vice-President
Almunia informed MEPs during the 26 November structured dialogue, the SAM
process shall be completed in 2014 with the adoption of the rest of the State
aid guidelines.
In parallel to
and following the adoption of the Enabling and Procedural Regulations in July,
work to revise and update the raft of State aid legislation continued. There
was a third public consultation on the draft Cinema Communication on 6 May,
followed by the final text of the Communication on 14 November. ECON was
informed of that initiative, as well as the launch of the public consultation
on the guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines (Aviation Guidelines)
on 3 July, the De Minimis consultation on 17 July, the public consultation on
the General Block Exemption Regulation on 29 July, the Rescue &
Restructuring guidelines on 14 November. 
A background
paper on the Regional Aid Guidelines was sent to ECON on 16 May.
It was another
area for which COMP staff briefed MEP and Parliamentary staff. The REGI
committee tabled an Oral Question with debate on the RAG, in the context of
parallel debates on the new Regional aid maps and next programming period for
the Structural Funds.
Damages actions[53]
Vice-President Almunia chose to first
present the Commission proposal on Damages to ECON MEPs at an open
coordinators’ meeting in Strasbourg on 11 June, immediately following adoption
by the College. The Commission adopted the proposal on the basis of both
Articles 103 and 114 TFEU that led the Commission to transmit the proposal to
the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative
procedure. The services of the Commission attended the workshop on the proposal
on 18 September hosted by the ECON rapporteur, and the first exchange of views
held on 17 October to answer questions. 
Swiss Agreement
The services of DG Competition first
informed the European Parliament about the negotiations with the Swiss
competition authority on a second-generation agreement in November 2010. In June
2013, the Council formally requested the Parliament to give its consent to that
agreement.  DG Competition has worked with the rapporteur, participating in a
workshop for assistants, a public hearing, and a meeting with representatives
of the parliamentary groups.
Continuing to strengthen DG Competition's
communication with the ECON Committee
As in previous years, DG Competition
organised a seminar for ECON assistants and political advisers covering the
main themes in the 2012 Annual Report on Competition and which was held on 17
May at DG Competition’s premises. It was followed by an in-depth briefing for
the rapporteurs’ assistants on antitrust and State aid enforcement in the
transport sector and on State aid to banks, and by a high level briefing for
the ECON competition working group MEPs on the main policy themes.
In July, the Commission adopted a new
Banking Communication to update the guidelines published in 2008 at the start
of the financial crisis and to reflect the experience gained in the interim
period. The Commission also prepared an issues paper for the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC), which was sent to the ECON Chair.
DG Competition continued the practice of
regularly informing the relevant Parliamentary committees of public
consultations and the adoption of new guidelines and policy documents. 
DG Competition staff met many MEPs on a
bilateral basis in 2013, relating to Parliament’s work on the various
competition files. The Commission services prepared replies to 366 written Parliamentary
questions, and to 21 petitions in respect of which DG Competition was chef de
file. 
DG Competition and the ECON committee
continued their exchange of information with regard to studies; DG Competition
services informed the ECON secretariat in July of the studies commissioned by
the DG in 2013. 
DG Competition's engagement
with the EESC and the CoR 
The Commission also informed
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the
Regions (CoR) about major policy initiatives. It also participated in study
group and section meetings. On 1 February, Vice-President Almunia attended the
plenary meeting of the CoR on State Aid reform and the revision of the Regional
Aid Guidelines 2014-2020.
[1]
World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014,
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf
[2]
SEC(2011) 1188 final Part 1: Commission Staff Working Paper, European
Competitiveness Report 2011.
[3]
The Contribution of Competition Policy to Growth and the EU2020 Strategy, IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-25,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/492479/IPOL-ECON_ET(2013)492479_EN.pdf

[4]
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty.
[5]
COM(2013) 404 final: Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html.
[6]
Notable examples in the past include the fines imposed on producers of car
glass, DRAMs (memory chips used in PCs, servers and workstations), and
synthetic rubber.
[7]
Case AT.39748 – Automotive wire harnesses.
[8]
Case 39861 – Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD) and Case
39914 – Euro Interest Rate Derivatives
[9] Case
AT.39633 – Shrimps   
[10]
Case 39574 – Smart card chips
[11]
COM(2013) 404 final: Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
[12]
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013
of 5 December 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings.
[13]
Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of
certain mergers under the Merger Regulation.
[14]
COM(2013) 685 final: Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Regulatory Fitness and
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, available at http://ec.europa.eu/refit.
[15]
COM(2012)209 final: Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM).
[16]
Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, (2013/C 209/01).
[17]
EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid
deployment of broadband networks (2013/C 25/01)
[18]
Council Regulation (EU) No 733/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending
Regulation (EC) No 994/98 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal
State aid.
[19]
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/index_en.htm
[20]
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid/index_en.htm
[21]
Case AT.39745 – CDS – Information market
[22]
Case 39861 – Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD) and Case 39914 – Euro
Interest Rate Derivatives
[23]
The proposal covers a broad variety of benchmarks, not just interest rate
benchmarks such as LIBOR, but also commodity benchmarks, benchmarks used to
reference financial instruments such as energy and currency derivatives,
benchmark used in financial contracts, and benchmarks used to measure the
performance of investment funds.
[24]
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/#maincontentSec2
[25]
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-672_en.htm
[26]
Case AT.39876 – EPC online payments
[27]
COM(2013) 547 final: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on payment services in the internal market and amending Directives
2002/65/EC, 2013/36/EU and 2009/110/EC and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC.
[28]
COM(2013) 550 final: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions.
[29]
Case AT.34579 – MasterCard I
[30]
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2011 on consumer rights.
[31]
The third energy package adopted in 2007 identified
specific anti-competitive behaviours to be addressed under the EU competition
rules.
[32] See Commission
contribution to the European Council of 22 May 2013, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy2_en.pdf
[33]
Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading scheme post 2012, OJ
C158, 5.6.2012, p. 4.
[34]
Case numbers SA.37017, SA.36103, SA.37084, SA.36650 and SA.35543.
[35]
Case SA.30068 – Aid to non-ferrous metals
producers for CO2 costs of electricity.
[36] Case
AT.40054 – Oil and Biofuel Markets, see MEMO/13/435 of 14 May 2013 [NB: case
number and name not yet public on website]
[37]Case
AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, see MEMO/12/937
of 4 September 2012
[38] Case
AT.39767 – BEH electricity, see IP/121307 of 3 December 2012.
[39] Case
AT.39952 – Power Exchanges, see MEMO12/78 of 7 February 2012.
[40]
Case AT.39727 – ČEZ 
[41]
Case AT.39984 – OPCOM / Romanian Power Exchange
[42]
Case SA.35429 – Extension of use of public water resources for hydro
electricity generation
[43]
COM(2010) 245 final/2: Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe.
[44]
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connected-continent-single-telecom-market-growth-jobs
[45]
Case number M.6992 – Hutchison 3G UK / Telefónica Ireland.
[46]
Case M.7018 – Telefónica Deutschland / E-Plus.
[47]
Case  M.6880 – Liberty Global / Virgin Media.
[48]
Case M.6990 – Vodafone / Kabel Deutschland.
[49]
Case AT.39839 Telefónica and Portugal Telecom.
[50]
Case AT.39985 – Motorola - Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents.
[51]
Case AT.39939 – Samsung - Enforcement of UMTS standards essential patents.
[52]
Act of Acession to the Accession Treaty for Croatia.
[53]
COM(2013) 404 final: Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.