JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ELEMENTS FOR AN EU STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 2014-16
Date: 2014-04-30
Institutions: European Commission, High Representative of the Union
Subjects: Afghanistan, cooperation agreement (EU), democratisation, peacekeeping, the EU's international role













EUR-Lex - 52014JC0017 - EN











|



52014JC0017

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ELEMENTS FOR AN EU STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 2014-16 /* JOIN/2014/017 final */









ELEMENTS
FOR AN EU STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 2014-16
1.
Purpose
The
Council concluded on 20 January 2014 that the overarching strategic goal of the
EU's future role in Afghanistan should be the development of Afghanistan’s institutions to provide the resilience needed to safeguard progress to date
and provide a countrywide platform for a more effective and ultimately
sustainable Afghan state. [1]

The
EU has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan and is in the process of confirming
its financial commitment up to 2020. A number of Member States have already
indicated their continued long-term support. Afghanistan is the country which
is the largest recipient of aid from the EU.[2]
This document provides a strategic framework to better coordinate EU and Member
States’ civilian engagement in Afghanistan from mid-2014 to 2016, setting out
the EU’s objectives for the years 2014-16 and outlining the interventions planned
to achieve those objectives. The strategy needs to be sufficiently flexible to
both influence and respond appropriately to the range of potential scenarios in
  Afghanistan. The strategic goal and objectives have been developed in advance
of clarity on the size and scale of any international military presence
post-2014. Expectations as to the degree of progress and the delivery of
international assistance in support of the Government of Afghanistan’s
priorities in the event of a very limited international presence will
necessarily have to be tempered.
2.
Political context
Afghanistan
has made considerable political, security, economic and developmental progress
over the past decade. But the gains made are mostly fragile and reversible. The
country faces acute challenges over the coming three years to safeguard
progress made and put in place the necessary reforms and structures to enable Afghanistan to meet its eventual goal of a fully sustainable state.
Firm
predictions about Afghanistan in 2016 are difficult to make. It is clear that
Afghans will increasingly take control of their affairs over the coming three
years. International influence will reduce. Even in the most optimistic
scenario, Afghanistan will continue to be a fragile state with some of the
lowest human development indicators globally, dependent on international
financial assistance and prone to outbreaks of violent conflict. The central
government will need to mitigate the threats posed by the insurgency,
corruption and the criminalisation of the state — in particular from drug money
— and maintain security and service delivery in sparsely populated rural areas,
if it is to retain credibility and popular support.
Afghanistan
is located in a complex and unstable region. Despite many flaws, democracy and
freedom of speech are more advanced in Afghanistan than in much of the region.
Many of its neighbours have recent histories of internal violent conflicts that
have overspilt into Afghanistan due to the weakness of the state and linked
with and exacerbated ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. The peace process in Afghanistan should be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led, but it is clear that all regional actors have
important roles to play in both establishing a successful peace process and
maintaining any resulting peace agreement, which would benefit not just Afghanistan, but also the wider region. Increased regional cooperation and interdependence
can play an important role in underpinning a political process by creating
incentives for countries in the region to benefit from a more stable Afghanistan, in particular through promoting increased trade and commercial
activities. 
In
the short term, the ongoing insurgency and the transition of responsibility for
security compound a difficult political and economic situation. The delay in
finalising the Bilateral Security Agreement between the Government of Afghanistan
and the US, which is a prerequisite for the continued presence of international
forces, exacerbates uncertainty about the post-2014 situation. In the absence
of an inclusive peace deal, it is likely that significant divergences in the
operating environment in different areas of the country may require flexible
and different approaches, from a spectrum of more stable areas continuing to
develop more normalised state-building relationships to some conflict-afflicted
areas reverting to humanitarian-led approaches. Over 600 000 people have
been internally displaced due to the conflict. Neighbouring countries,
especially Iran and Pakistan, continue to host large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan. Humanitarian needs among the most vulnerable segments of the Afghan population
will persist for the foreseeable future. Continued progress will depend largely
on the ability of the new government to: make progress in negotiating an
inclusive political settlement with all major insurgent and militia groups;
maintain security; tackle corruption; and enact key economic and political
reforms.
The
credibility and success of the transition depend as much on strengthening
democratic and accountable governance in Afghanistan at all levels, as on the
capability of the security forces. This is a long-term, generational task, but
progress in the next three years can both prevent backsliding and provide an
important foundation for further advances in years to come. There is a major
risk that Afghanistan will face severe economic contraction if the government
is unable to generate the necessary confidence to attract investment and stem
capital flight as the international presence and assistance contracts reduce.
In particular, there is the need to create jobs for some 400 000 Afghans
entering the workforce each year. If this demand is not met, there is a risk of
a new generation of underemployed and alienated youth, which may lead to an increased
pool for insurgent recruitment and uncontrolled and illegal immigration to
neighbouring countries and Europe.
3.
Strategic goal and objectives
The
EU’s strategy focuses on the areas critical to achieving progress in
Afghanistan up to 2016, taking account of the frameworks established by
international conferences in 2011 and 2012, in particular the Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework (TMAF), which will continue to be the basis for
the relationship between the wider international community and the Government
of Afghanistan for most of this period.
The
critical importance of systemic reform to enabling progress in Afghanistan is one of the reasons why the EU will continue to champion the principles of
the TMAF, aligning assistance with government priorities and using the
collective leverage of the EU’s funding to incentivise reform. The strategy
will also be a platform for implementing the Cooperation Agreement for
Partnership and Development, which will provide the legal framework for the
EU’s long-term engagement, subject to the finalisation
of negotiations and the draft agreement being signed
by the incoming administration.
The
EU’s overarching strategic goal for 2014-16 will be the development of Afghanistan’s institutions to provide the resilience needed to safeguard progress to date
and provide the platform for a more effective and ultimately sustainable Afghan
state. 
This
goal will have four objectives which focus the EU’s engagement on the areas
where it can most add value and reinforce shared values between Europeans and
Afghans, including democracy, rule of law and human rights. The objectives have
been drawn up to be mutually reinforcing. For example, effective civilian
policing is clearly both a key component for and dependent on the existence of
the rule of law and respect for human rights. Across all areas of the EU’s
strategy in Afghanistan, tackling corruption and advancing women’s rights will
be central to our engagement. The objectives will be:

 Promoting
     peace, stability and security in the region,
     by advocating an inclusive peace accord, mitigating threats from drugs and
     organised crime and supporting the development of a professional and
     accountable civilian police service;
 Reinforcing
     democracy: Functioning democracy needs
     to be embedded through democratic oversight at national, provincial and
     district levels, inclusive and transparent elections, and capacity-building
     in key institutions of governance;
 Encouraging
     economic and human development
     including creating a transparent economic framework to encourage
     investment, raise revenue, allocate finances, strengthen resilience and improve
     access to health and education, including for the most vulnerable segments
     of the population;
 Fostering
     the rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular the rights of
     women and children, by advocating
     respect for human rights (including in particular the full implementation
     of statutory protections for the rights of women and girls), supporting
     greater equality before the law of all citizens and assisting with the
     development of a comprehensive framework to strengthen  and reform the
     justice sector.

3(a).
Promoting Peace, Stability and Security
Lasting
security will require an inclusive peace accord with insurgent groups, leading
to a significant reduction in the incidence of conflict and violence in the
country. The EU will look to promote an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive
accord and respond opportunistically to support conflict resolution. Regional
cooperation can play an important role in ensuring stability and neighbouring
countries should play a full part in promoting peace and stability. In the
interim, the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be
vital in containing the insurgency and laying the foundation for security. The 2012
  Chicago summit set out a number of commitments from the international community
to support the development of ANSF capability. But this EU strategy focuses
exclusively on the development of civilian policing.
The
EU will use its engagement and instruments, as appropriate, to:
Sub-objectives
Ø  support
an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process
leading to a political settlement that eschews violence, disavows any link with
terrorism, and respects human rights, in particular the rights of women;
Ø  enhance
political and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours;
Ø  support
the regional solution strategy for the reintegration of Afghan refugees, based
on principles of voluntary repatriation and sustainability;
Ø  strengthen
Afghan-led efforts to increase the quality and sustainability of civilian policing;
Ø  strengthen
Afghan and regional efforts to reduce organised crime and drug production,
trafficking and demand.
3(b).
Reinforcing Democracy
Embedding
functioning politics will be critical to the legitimacy of the state. This requires
functioning democratic oversight and the separation of governmental,
legislative and judicial powers. Institutional change should be complemented by
diverse and independent media, a pluralistic and active civil society, and
greater participation and representation of women in all levels of public
office. These steps will help ensure the strength of democratic institutions,
increase the state’s accountability to the people and improve effective
delivery of services to citizens.
The
EU will use its engagement and instruments, as appropriate, to support:
Sub-objectives
Ø  robust
electoral architecture and procedures;
Ø  credible
parliamentary elections in 2015, with outcomes broadly accepted by Afghans;
Ø  greater
accountability of the executive through parliamentary and independent oversight;
Ø  reduced
corruption and strengthened accountability through building the capacity  of
sub-national governance, focusing on improving service delivery and budget
administration.
3(c).
Encouraging economic and human development
Afghanistan
needs to tackle corruption to increase the population’s faith in the state and
improve investor confidence. Sustained investment and the development of both
the private sector and the rural economy will be critical to achieving the
levels of growth needed to create jobs and increase domestic revenue. These are
necessary to reduce poverty, improve livelihoods, deliver basic services,
especially health and education, and accelerate social and human development,
which remain well below regional norms.
The
EU will use its engagement and instruments, as appropriate, to support the
Government in achieving:
Sub-objectives
Ø  increased
human development, including for the most vulnerable segments of the
population, in particular in education and health;
Ø  improved
public financial management;
Ø  stronger
financial self-sustainability of the Afghan state, through increased revenue
generation;
Ø  stimulation
of the rural economy.
3(d).
Fostering the rule of law and human rights
Much
remains to be done to safeguard progress in human rights and ensure the full
implementation of statutory provisions. The development of a functioning and
effective justice system will be fundamental to ensuring that the rights of
Afghans, in particular Afghan women and girls, are upheld and to improving the
rule of law. Effective rule of law will strengthen accountability and increase
business confidence, but will require significant institutional development.
The EU will use its engagement and instruments, as appropriate, to:
Sub-objectives
Ø 
advance human rights, in particular the
rights of women and children;
Ø  support
all components of the formal justice sector in working together more
effectively in a more independent, efficient, less corrupt and accessible way,
better upholding the principles of the rule of law;
Ø  advocate
for an end to the culture of impunity for serious war crimes and human rights
abuses;
Ø  maintain
the right to freedom of assembly and strengthen the right to freedom of
expression.
4.
Conclusion
Afghans themselves will be largely responsible for
whether the transition process is a success, and provides the basis for Afghanistan to move towards its eventual goal of self-sustainability. But the international
community has highlighted on numerous occasions its willingness to provide
exceptional levels of technical and financial assistance to help Afghanistan build on progress made to date. This strategy will better coordinate the
interventions of the EU and Member States in support of the Afghan people and
the principles, including increased alignment with the objectives of the
Government of Afghanistan and incentivising key reforms. The strategy will provide
the overarching framework for an indicative implementation plan, which will set
out planned divisions of labour between EU instruments and Member States’
interventions. Although the strategic goal and objectives should be robust
enough to take account of most scenarios in Afghanistan, the implementation plan,
and especially the pace of implementation, will be highly dependent on the
security context.
[1] The Council also stated ‘The
EU will focus its efforts in areas in which it adds most value. The key
objectives should be to: promote peace,
stability and security in Afghanistan and the wider region; reinforce
democracy; encourage economic and human development, including further
improving access to health and education; and foster rule of law and respect
for human rights, in particular the rights of women and girls. The strategy
should take into account the regional dimension and maintain the flexibility to
respond appropriately to potential changes in Afghanistan.’
[2]
 This applies both as an aggregate and also for a number of individual donors,
including the EU itself, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.