Special Report No 1/2014 ‘Effectiveness of EU-supported public urban transport projects’
Date: 2014-04-09
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU programme, common transport policy, distribution of EU funding, land transport, means of public conveyance, public transport, surface transport, town traffic, transport infrastructure, transport network, transport planning, underground railway, underground transport

EN 

2014 

NO 01

Special Report  Effectiveness of 

EU-supported public 
urban transport projects

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
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LUXEMBOURG

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

ISBN 978-92-9241-658-4
doi:10.2865/30848

© European Union, 2014
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
For any use or reproduction of photo 1, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder.

Printed in Luxembourg

EN 

2014 

N0 01

Special Report Effectiveness of 

EU-supported public 
urban transport projects

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Contents

02

Paragraph

Glossary

I–III 

Executive summary

1–9 

1–3 

4–5 

6–9 

Introduction

The main urban transport challenges in Europe

EU policy on urban transport

EU support for urban transport projects

10–16  Audit scope and approach

17–48  Observations

17–25  Were the projects implemented as planned in the grant applications?

20 

Most projects were physically implemented

21–22 

Four infrastructure projects had significant implementation delays

23–25 

Three projects exceeded their initial budget by more than 20 %

26–34  Did the services provided by the projects meet user needs?

28–30 

Feedback from operators’ monitoring indicators was positive

31–32 

User satisfaction surveys, when available, had positive results

33–34 

Transport services were generally accessible

35–48  Did the projects achieve their objectives in terms of utilisation?

37–38 

Few projects have as many users as expected

39–41 

Several causes of underutilisation could have been tackled

42–43 

Underutilisation may affect the achievement of expected benefits …

44–46  … which is not monitored …

47–48  … and it may also increase the financial burden for the public authorities

 
Contents

03

49–57  Conclusions and recommendations

50–52 

Project implementation

53 

Services provided by the projects

54–57  Utilisation of the projects

Annex I  — 

 EU urban transport policy: successive documents 
issued over the last decade

Annex II  — 

 Overview of audited projects at the time of the audit

Reply of the Commission

 
 
 
Glossary

04

Cohesion Fund (CF): The CF provides financial assistance to increase economic and 
social cohesion in Member States with a per capita GNP of less than 90 % of the EU 
average by financing environment and transport projects.

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): The ERDF provides financial 
assistance to promote economic and social cohesion between the regions of the 
EU. ERDF interventions are mainly implemented through operational programmes 
involving a large number of projects.

Managing authority: A national, regional or local public authority or a public 
or private body designated by the Member State to manage an operational 
programme.

Operational programme (OP): A Commission‑approved programme of EU‑funded 
investments by a Member State, which takes the form of a coherent set of priorities 
comprising multiannual measures under which projects are co‑financed.

Operator: A public or private firm running a mode of transport according to an 
operating contract signed with the project promoter. It usually receives subsidies to 
cover financial losses resulting from operations.

Programming period: The multiannual framework within which structural action 
expenditure is planned and implemented. The programming periods covered in this 
report are 2000–06 and 2007–13.

Promoter: A public legal person who is the beneficiary of ERDF or CF support to 
build a transport infrastructure or a related IT system. The mode of public transport 
and the equipment resulting from the project are often run by an operator other 
than the beneficiary.

Executive  
summary

I
The proportion of the European population residing in 
urban areas is expected to increase from 73 % in 2010 
to 82 % by 2050. Meanwhile, European cities need to 
enhance mobility and to reduce congestion, accidents 
and pollution through local mobility policies. The EU 
allocated 10,7 billion euro between 2000 and 2013 to 
co‑finance projects helping cities to implement urban 
transport such as metros, trams and buses.

II
The Court assessed whether the projects were imple‑
mented as planned, provided services that meet user 
needs and were used as much as expected. The Court 
audited the performance of 26 public urban transport 
projects directly in 11 cities in five Member States. The 
Court concludes the following.

(a)  In general, infrastructure and vehicles for most 
projects were implemented in accordance with 
project specifications (paragraph 20). Significant 
delays affected four urban transport projects 
(paragraphs 21 and 22) and three projects had 
significant cost overruns (paragraphs 23 to 25).

(b)  Once completed, almost all the projects audited 
met users’ needs (paragraphs 26 to 34). However, 
a comparison between planned use at specific 
dates and actual use shows that two thirds of 
the projects were underutilised (paragraphs 35 
to 38). This implies underperformance in terms 
of economic and social benefits (reductions in 
pollution and congestion etc.) which is generally 
not followed up by the promoters or the national 
authorities (paragraphs 42 to 46). It may also imply 
financial imbalances for the public authorities 
that have to ensure the sustainability of the urban 
transport concerned (paragraphs 47 and 48).

05

(c)  The underutilisation of public transport is mainly 
due to weaknesses in project design and mobility 
policy. Several could have been addressed at the 
project planning stage (paragraphs 39 to 41).

III
The Court recommends that the Commission should:

(a)  for projects subject to its approval, require that 
management tools will be put in place to moni‑
tor the quality of the service and the level of user 
satisfaction once the project is operational;

(b)  for projects subject to its approval, require that 
a minimum number of result indicators with re‑
lated targets are included in the grant agreements 
and are subsequently measured;

(c)  for projects subject to its approval, require that 

the estimation of the number of expected users is 
more rigorously analysed and that the choice of 
the mode of transport is supported by a quanti‑
fied comparison of different transport options;

(d)  for projects subject to its approval, require that 

urban transport projects are included in a sound 
mobility policy;

(e)  require that the aspects mentioned under 

points (a) to (d) are also addressed by the Member 
States’ authorities when managing EU‑funded 
urban transport projects.

Introduction

06

1  United Nations, Department 

of Economic and Social affairs, 
Population Division, ‘World 
urbanisation prospects: the 
2011 revision’ (http://esa.
un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm).

2 

The data indicated in this 
paragraph are included in 
the Commission’s Green 
Paper ‘Towards a new 
culture for urban mobility’, 
COM(2007) 551 final of 
25 September 2007.

3  COM(2004) 60 final of 

11 February 2004, p. 45.

The main urban transport 
challenges in Europe

EU policy on urban 
transport

04 
Over the last decade, the Commission 
has issued several policy papers on 
urban transport (see Annex I). Accord‑
ing to a Commission communication 
the objective of sustainable urban 
transport is freedom of movement, 
health, safety and quality of life for 
current and future generations, as 
well as environmental efficiency and 
inclusive economic growth, access 
to opportunities and services for all, 
including less affluent, elderly or dis‑
abled citizens3.

05 
To this end, the Commission supports 
research, encourages better manage‑
ment and disseminates good practices 
such as the establishment of urban 
mobility plans fostering modal shift, 
i.e. a reduction in the use of private 
cars and increased usage of public 
transport, as well as non‑motorised 
cycling and walking.

01 
The proportion of the European popu‑
lation living in urban areas increased 
from 71 % in 2000 to 73 % in 2010. This 
trend is expected to continue, reach‑
ing 82 % by 20501.

02 
European cities are increasingly facing 
transport‑related problems. The migra‑
tion of city dwellers to the suburbs is 
leading to settlement structures with 
long travel distances. This phenom‑
enon of urban sprawl goes hand in 
hand with an increase in car ownership 
and commuter traffic.

03 
Enhancing mobility while reducing 
congestion, accidents and pollution is 
a challenge common to all major cities. 
According to the Commission2, trans‑
port congestion in and around urban 
areas costs nearly 100 billion euro 
each year, or 1 % of the EU’s GDP, due 
to delays and pollution. In addition, 
one in three fatal accidents happens in 
urban areas. Urban mobility accounts 
for 40 % of all CO2 emissions from 
road transport and up to 70 % of other 
pollutants. Noise in urban areas is also 
a serious and growing problem, mainly 
due to road traffic.

Introduction

07

07 
The EU funding allocated to urban 
transport for the 2000–06 and 2007–13 
periods totals 10,7 billion euro, i.e. 
2,9 billion euro and 7,8 billion euro, 
respectively. The total breakdown by 
Member State is provided in Figure 1.

EU support for urban 
transport projects

06 
The European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund 
(CF) may co‑finance urban transport 
projects in eligible regions of the 
Member States. The EU contribution, 
for urban transport projects, typically 
represents up to 85 % of the related 
eligible expenditure.

1
e
r
u
g
i
F

Total ERDF and CF funding allocated to urban transport for the 2000–06 and  
2007–13 programming periods (million euro)

Other
Germany
Romania
Slovakia
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Estonia
Latvia
United Kingdom
France
Spain
Ireland
Czech Republic
Italy
Portugal
Greece
Hungary
Poland

228

62
92
126
130
143
152
167

226

290

346
358

Total: 10 651 million euro

708
726

1 073

1 414

1 528

0

500

1 000

1 500

2 000

2 500

2 882

3 000

2000–06

2007–13

Source: ECA calculation based on European Commission data.

 
08

4 

5 

Total cost as stated in the 
grant application for each 
project.

From 1 January 2007 to 
25 June 2010, the threshold 
was 25 million euro in the case 
of environment projects.

09 
The two Commission directorates‑ 
general (DGs) which play a significant 
role in the area of urban transport are:

(a)  DG Regional and Urban Policy, 

which is responsible for the part 
of the EU budget that co‑finances 
urban transport projects. As part 
of its appraisal of specific projects, 
it consults other DGs, in particular 
DG Mobility and Transport;

(b)  DG Mobility and Transport which is 
responsible for EU transport policy.

Introduction

08 
Co‑financed urban transport projects 
are included in the operational pro‑
grammes (OPs) implemented by the 
Member States under shared manage‑
ment arrangements. In particular:

(a)  the Commission negotiates 

and approves OPs proposed by 
Member States, and allocates EU 
funding;

(b)  the Member States manage the 

OPs, implementing them by select‑
ing projects, and then overseeing 
and assessing these projects;

(c)  the Commission assesses national 
management and control systems, 
monitors the implementation of 
OPs, commits the EU financial con‑
tributions and pays them on the 
basis of approved expenditure;

(d)  the Commission is required to ap‑
prove specific individual projects 
submitted by the Member States. 
For the 2000–06 programming 
period the Commission’s approval 
was needed for every CF project, 
irrespective of the total cost, and 
ERDF projects whose total cost4 
exceeded 50 million euro. For the 
2007–13 programming period, one 
change made was that CF projects 
below 50 million euro 5 were no 
longer subject to Commission 
approval.

09

6 

7 

The selection criteria were: 
project cost, project type and 
planned implementation 
dates.

Light metro is an intermediate 
system between tram and 
metro. It can be regarded 
as a medium‑capacity rapid 
transit system.

8  UITP is the international 

network for public transport 
authorities and operators, 
policy decision‑makers, 
scientific institutes and the 
public transport supply and 
service industry.

9  CERTU is responsible for 

carrying out studies in the 
fields of urban networks, 
transport, urban planning 
and public facilities on behalf 
of the French state or for the 
benefit of local authorities, 
public bodies, companies 
entrusted with public‑service 
commissions or the relevant 
professions (Decree 94‑134 of 
9 February 1994).

10  Polis is a network of European 
cities and regions working 
together to deploy innovative 
technologies and policies for 
more sustainable mobility.

Audit scope and  
approach

13 
For the 2000–06 and 2007–13 pro ‑
gramming periods, the projects 
subject to the approval of the Com‑
mission represented 66 % and 78 % 
respectively of the total ERDF and CF 
funding allocated to urban transport 
(see paragraph 8(d)). The audit sam‑
ple included 17 projects which were 
subject to this approval process. The 
remaining nine projects, including the 
four smaller IT projects, were approved 
by the managing authorities in the 
Member States.

14 
At the time of the audit, 20 of the 26 
projects were completed and oper‑
ational. Three were not completed, 
two were partially completed and op‑
erational, and one was recently com‑
pleted but was not yet operational.

15 
In order to identify audit standards 
and good practice in the area of urban 
transport, the Court consulted rep‑
resentatives of several organisations 
with expertise in the area of urban 
transportation, including the UITP8 
(Union Internationale des Transports 
Publics), the CERTU9 (Centre d’Études 
sur les Réseaux, les Transports, 
l’Urbanisme et les constructions pub‑
liques) and Polis10.

10 
The main objective of this perform‑
ance audit was to assess the imple‑
mentation and effectiveness of public 
urban transport projects co‑financed 
by EU structural funds (hereafter re‑
ferred to as ‘projects’).

11 
The Court addressed the following 
questions.

(a)  Were the projects implemented as 
planned in the grant applications?

(b)  Did the services provided by the 

projects meet user needs?

(c)  Did the projects achieve their ob‑
jectives in terms of utilisation?

12 
The audit covered a sample of 26 pro‑
jects6 co‑financed by the ERDF or the 
CF during the 2000–06 and 2007–13 
programming periods. The selected 
projects are located in 11 cities in five 
Member States — Spain, France, Italy, 
Poland and Portugal. The EU funding 
allocated to urban transport in these 
five countries (5,3 billion euro) rep ‑
resents 50 % of the total EU funding 
(10,7 billion euro). The sample includes 
projects that consisted of creating, 
extending or modernising railways 
(three), metros (eight), light metros7 
(four), trams (six) and one bus project. 
They range from a single line or a sim‑
ple section to a whole network. The 
sample also includes four smaller IT 
projects relating to operating, informa‑
tion or ticketing systems (see Annex II).

Audit scope and approach 

10

16 
For each project, the audit team met 
representatives in the Member States 
of the relevant managing authority, 
project promoters in receipt of EU 
grants (usually local authorities) and 
operators (public or private compa‑
nies) managing the mode of transport. 
They also used the co‑financed facil‑
ities themselves and visited operating 
and maintenance centres.

1 Light metro in Portugal
o
t
o
h
P

©  Metro Transportes do Sul.

 
Observations

11

11  For the EU to fund completed 
projects raises the risk of 
deadweight, and therefore of 
the EU added value of such 
funding. The Court notes that 
this issue has been addressed 
by the Commission in the 
legislative proposals for the 
2014–20 financial framework.

Were the projects 
implemented as planned 
in the grant applications?

Most projects were physically 
implemented

17 
When assessing whether the projects 
were implemented as planned in 
the grant applications, three aspects 
were considered by the Court, namely 
compliance with the provisions of the 
grant decisions in terms of physical 
implementation, timing and budget.

18 
Four projects were completed before 
a grant was requested11 and were 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
Another project was excluded because 
it was initially scheduled for comple‑
tion in 2015. In addition, a number of 
other projects were not considered 
under each of the three criteria due to 
delays or non‑finalisation of the total 
project costs.

19 
Finally, for this question, the audit 
covered 18 projects regarding phys‑
ical implementation (paragraph 20), 
21 concerning the respect of planned 
completion deadlines (paragraphs 21 
and 22) and 19 in relation to total costs 
incurred (paragraphs 23 to 25).

20 
In 14 projects, infrastructure, equip‑
ment and rolling stock were imple‑
mented in accordance with the project 
specifications, while very minor dis‑
crepancies were noted for three cases. 
For one other project about a third of 
the 70 information panels delivered in 
2008 had still not been installed. The 
municipalities concerned withheld 
the required permission for various 
reasons, e.g. some required payment 
of a fee.

Four infrastructure 
projects had significant 
implementation delays

21 
Eight projects met their deadline and 
seven were delayed by 9 months or 
less.

22 
Six projects were significantly behind 
schedule, including four infrastructure 
projects (see Figure 2), with delays of 
between 2 and 4 years based on the 
latest forecasts. Examples of sig‑
nificant delays affecting projects are 
outlined in Box 1.

Observations

12

2 Infrastructure projects with significant implementation delays
e
r
u
g
i
F

Metro extension in Italy (5,3 km)1

Tram construction in Italy (18,9 km)1

Light metro construction in Portugal
 (13,5 km)

Light metro construction in Portugal
(57 km)

0

1

2

3

4

5

Delay in years

1  Forecasts.
Source: ECA calculation based on promoters’ data.

1
x
o
B

Examples of significant delays affecting projects

 ο The full commissioning of a light metro (Portugal) took place in November 2008, 3 years after the initial 
planned date. The main reason was the difficulty in making the necessary land available, even though it 
was owned by the municipalities.

 ο The first line of a tram project (Italy) was completed in February 2010 with a slight delay of 3 months. Two 

additional lines were initially planned to be implemented by June 2012. Following the holding of a referen‑
dum, the route was dramatically modified in order to avoid crossing the historic city centre. This resulted in 
the postponement of the implementation by a period of 4 years.

 
 
Observations

13

Three projects exceeded 
their initial budget by more 
than 20 %

23 
Nine projects were completed within 
their initial budget.

by at least 20 %. The main factors 
causing cost overruns were techni‑
cal difficulties due to soil conditions, 
archaeological findings, administrative 
problems, contract price revisions, or 
modifications of the project. Examples 
of cost overruns that affected projects 
are given in Box 2.

24 
Ten projects exceeded their initial 
budget (see Figure 3): eight completed 
projects, and two ongoing projects 
which should have been completed 
by the time of the audit. Three com‑
pleted projects had significant cost 
overruns exceeding their initial budget 

25 
The cost overruns related to these 
projects may increase the financial 
burden for public authorities in the 
Member States, but they do not affect 
the total EU grant amount payable (see 
paragraphs 47 and 48).

3 Projects with cost overruns
e
r
u
g
i
F

Light metro construction in Portugal (57 km)
Light metro construction in Portugal (13,5 km)
Metro extension in Poland (4 km)
Metro extension in Spain (2,2 km)
Ongoing metro construction in Italy (5,3 km)1
Operating system in Portugal
Ongoing tram construction in Italy (18,9 km)1
Metro extension in Spain (0,6 km)
Light metro extension in Spain (1,5 km)
Light metro extension in Spain (0,2 km)

1,11
1,11

1,10
1,10

1,06
1,06
1,06

1,24

1,23

1,22

1,0

1,1

1,2

1,3

Cost overruns (the initial contract price equals 1,00)

1  Forecasts.
Source: ECA calculation based on promoters’ data.

 
Observations

14

2
x
o
B

Examples of cost overruns that affected projects

 ο A metro extension (Poland) encountered a series of difficulties which increased the costs by 47 million euro 
(+ 22 %). These include the occurrence of particularly unfavourable ground conditions; an exceptional rise 
in the prices of services and building materials; the redesign of the roofs of buildings further to new legis‑
lative standards; the use of modern vibration isolation methods; and a change in the designated function 
of a building.

 ο The total cost of a light metro (Portugal) was 399 million euro, i.e. 75 million euro (+ 23 %) more than the 

initial budget. The cost overrun was borne by the state budget and corresponds to 48 million euro in price 
revisions and additional works, and 27 million euro to compensate the operator for loss of income over 
3 years due to delays in releasing public land (see first example of Box 1).

Did the services provided 
by the projects meet user 
needs?

Feedback from operators’ 
monitoring indicators was 
positive

28 
Eighteen of the projects included indi‑
cators (e.g. punctuality, cleanliness of 
vehicles and information for travellers) 
which were set and monitored by op‑
erators and showed that the services 
offered by the projects were in line 
with the related targets set. The type 
and level of indicators varied between 
projects being basic and of limited 
value in some cases. Shortcomings in 
the services provided were identified 
in two cases (see Box 3).

26 
Twenty‑one projects were reviewed 
under this heading (paragraphs 26 to 
34), including one tram project where 
only one line out of three was oper‑
ational. The remaining five projects 
were not operational at the time of the 
audit.

27 
Based on surveys reviewed and on 
other feedback from project pro‑
moters and operators, public transport 
services are satisfactory for users when 
they are punctual, frequent, reliable, 
comfortable, safe, clean, easily acces‑
sible, affordable and provide appropri‑
ate information. Operators’ monitoring 
indicators and user satisfaction surveys 
were reviewed in order to assess 
whether the services provided by the 
projects met user needs. Aspects of 
the accessibility of public transport 
were also considered.

 
15

Observations

2 Train in Poland
o
t
o
h
P

Source: ECA.

3
x
o
B

Shortcomings affecting the services offered

 ο An increase in the number of trains with a delay of more than 5 minutes impacted negatively the punctu‑
ality of a metro line (Italy). The audit also noted that there was no train timetable available for the public, 
either in stations or on the trains. There were no electronic displays of expected waiting times in any of the 
four metro stations resulting from the project. When a delay occurred, there was no public announcement 
or visual display to inform users.

 ο The number of trains (Poland) circulating on the EU co‑financed rail track was 25 % lower than planned 

(three trains instead of four per hour). This was due to the limited capacity of the connecting rail track in 
the city centre, which led to congestion.

29 
Such indicators enable transport 
operators to take remedial action as 
necessary in order to improve the 
service provided to users. They can 
also be useful for operators in terms of 
operational efficiency. For example, in 
seven cases they led to an adjustment 
of transportation services to the actual 
demand.

30 
In five cases, indicators which linked 
the remuneration of the transport 
operator to the quality of the service 
provided were contractually required 
by the project promoter. This is good 
practice and an example is provided in 
Box 4.

 
 
Observations

16

4
x
o
B

Example of good practice linking remuneration to quality of service

One metro operating contract (Portugal) has a wide range of indicators and targets relating to the service 
offered. They reflect the service offered, delays, functioning escalators, level of brightness, cleanliness of sta‑
tions and vehicles, and the number of failures and signal problems. At first, the related targets were not met. 
The deficiencies mainly concerned punctuality, and occasionally cleanliness and the number of failures. This 
led to monthly penalties for the operator, ranging from 10 000 euro to 30 000 euro per month. The situation 
gradually improved and the target levels were consistently achieved for all indicators.

User satisfaction surveys, 
when available, had positive 
results

Transport services were 
generally accessible

33 
Based on a physical inspection, project 
stations and vehicles were generally 
easily accessible to pedestrians, push‑
chairs and wheelchairs.

34 
Based on a review of publicly disclosed 
information (e.g. Internet) all the ser‑
vice providers for the audited projects 
offer special discount fares to favour 
access for certain classes of user such 
as students and jobseekers.

31 
User satisfaction surveys help to meas‑
ure the quality perceived by users and 
are carried out with a view to giving 
the possibility of improving transport 
services. They can highlight the most 
satisfactory aspects and any concerns 
that need to be addressed. They can 
also show changes in the level of user 
satisfaction over time, and sometimes 
provide interesting comparisons 
between the various lines of a single 
network.

32 
User satisfaction surveys were avail‑
able for nine of the audited projects. 
The scores of the different surveys 
indicated a high level of satisfaction of 
public transport users.

 
Observations

17

Did the projects achieve 
their objectives in terms of 
utilisation?

Few projects have as many 
users as expected

37 
Targets and the corresponding data on 
the usage levels were available for 12 
of the projects audited. A comparison 
between planned use at specific dates 
and actual use shows that only two 
reached the set target (see Box 5). The 
other 10 projects, including nine infra‑
structure projects, failed to meet their 
targeted utilisation level demonstrat‑
ing a dramatic rate of underutilisation 
in some cases (see Figure 4).

35 
Six projects were excluded from the 
assessment of this question due to 
their level of implementation. Para‑
graphs 36 to 48 therefore concern 
20 projects.

36 
Apart from meeting user needs (see 
paragraphs 28 to 34), the most impor‑
tant aspect to consider when assessing 
the performance of public transport is 
the level of usage, generally expressed 
in numbers of passengers, trips, kilo‑
metres travelled or rate of occupancy. 
The modal shift, e.g. people who 
change their mode of transport from 
private car to tram, can also provide 
an indication of the success of public 
transport.

5
x
o
B

Two projects for which targets and data were available and which met their 
objectives

 ο A new tram line (Italy) had 12,2 million passengers in 2012, i.e. 113 % of the target (10,8 million). According 
to its promoter, this result was mainly the result of good coordination with the bus network and integra‑
tion of fares.

 ο The annual number of trips on a bus network (France) was 99,2 % of the assumption for 2011 used in 

a socio‑economic analysis carried out in 2009. It increased by 12 %, from 4,3 million in 2008 (the year the 
project became operational) to 4,8 million in 2011 (the most recent measurement).

 
Observations

18

4 Infrastructure projects with fewer users than forecast
e
r
u
g
i
F

Metro construction in Italy (2,2 km)1

2 %

Metro extension in Spain (3,3 km)

Light metro extension in Spain (0,2 km)

Light metro extension in Spain (1,5 km)

Light metro construction in Portugal (13,5 km)

Metro extension in Portugal (4,8 km)

Tram construction in France (8,5 km)

Tram construction in France (9,5 km)

Light metro construction in Portugal (57 km)

18 %

32 %

32 %

35 %

63 %

72 %

72 %

87 %

0 %

20 %

40 %

60 %

80 %

100 %

Rate of actual users compared to planned at specific dates

1  According to the promoter, the situation should improve with the completion of other sections of this metro line.
Source: ECA calculation based on promoters’ data.

38 
For the remaining eight projects 
without targets or corresponding data, 
the Court used other sources of infor‑
mation to determine whether their 

utilisation was satisfactory. For four 
of these projects, evidence of good 
performance was noted (examples in 
Box 6) while the other four showed 
evidence of poor performance.

6
x
o
B

Examples of projects for which targets were not available but where signs of good 
performance were noted

 ο One project consisted of modernising two stretches of tramway (Poland). For one stretch, data before and 
after the project showed an increase in passengers of 49 % at rush hours, and 29 % on a working day.

 ο For the new stretch of another tramway project (Poland), data showed that there were 2 500 passengers 

per hour at rush hours, and 35 700 per working day, which is considered satisfactory according to an avail‑
able indicative benchmark12.

12  2 500 passengers for a tramway is consistent with the capacity spectrum established by the UITP for various modes of urban transport 

(http://www.btrust.org.za/library/assets/uploads/documents/2_Resource%20docs_Making%20the%20Right%20Choice.pdf).

 
 
Observations

19

Several causes of 
underutilisation could have 
been tackled

39 
The main factors over which the 
promoter and/or local authorities 
had direct influence13 and which led 
to underutilisation of the projects 
audited can be classified in two 
categories: insufficiencies in project 
design (insufficient feasibility stud‑
ies including overestimation of users) 
and, more importantly, weaknesses 
in mobility policy (lack of coordin‑
ation between modes of transport and 
with parking policy, absence of urban 
mobility plan).

40 
These factors affected the utilisation 
rates of 11 of the 14 projects which 
were assessed as being underutilised 
(paragraphs 37 and 38)14. Seven pro‑
jects were approved by the Commis‑
sion and four by the Member States’. 
Box 7 provides examples.

13  An external factor which may 
have impacted the utilisation 
of urban transport projects is 
the international economic 
and financial crisis.

14  As projects can be affected by 

multiple causes, a total of 23 
occurrences were identified 
for these 11 projects.

41 
The causes of underutilisation could 
have been subject to a more thorough 
analysis during the project design and 
planning phase.

7
x
o
B

Examples of causes of underutilisation

 ο For a light metro (Portugal) of 58 stations replacing part of a bus network, the estimation of users was 
claimed by the promoter to be overstated by about 30 % because of the lack of a reliable system for 
counting bus users. The feasibility study had identified parking policy as crucial to achieving the expected 
demand and transfer from individual to collective transport. However, P + R parking at both ends of the 
north–south line and a terminal station for the bus outside the city were still lacking. Furthermore, park‑
ing spaces were available at attractive prices in the city centre (the price in the city centre is the same as 
the P + R price, to which the price of a metro ticket should be added). The utilisation of the metro network 
is below expectations in terms of the number of passengers (87 %), the number of passengers switching 
from other modes of transport (55 %) and the occupancy rate (62 %). The occupancy rate for the last three 
stations of a line is below 5 %.

 ο A new metro station (Spain) was constructed in response to strong public demand for an end to social 

isolation. The analysis of mobility needs prior to the project did not include a quantified comparison of dif‑
ferent transport options. The number of users represents only 18 % of the target.

 ο A new tram network (France) had 8,3 million passengers per year, i.e. 72 % of the target (11,6 million). 

Simultaneously, the use of private cars increased from 60 % of trips in 1997 to 65 % in 2011, whereas the 
objective of the urban mobility plan was already to reduce the figure to 59 % in 2005. According to the 
transport authority, demand for the tram is affected by the poor quality of the transportation services of‑
fered by the bus network and by an inadequate parking policy. The number of parking spaces in the city 
centre increased by 17 % between 2005 and 2012, while it was already considered excessive in the 2005 
plan de déplacement urbain (urban transport plan).

 
Observations

20

Underutilisation may affect 
the achievement of expected 
benefits …

42 
The grant application for every project 
submitted to the Commission for 
approval includes expected benefits, 
other than the level of use, such as 
reductions in air pollution, noise, con‑
gestion, accidents and oil consump‑
tion, which in turn should have a wider 
positive impact on the environment, 
public health, growth and employ‑
ment, in particular through reduced 
congestion.

… which is not monitored …

44 
The expected benefits are taken into 
account in the social‑economic assess‑
ment. They are an important factor for 
the decision to invest public money in 
urban transport projects, which are by 
nature financially non‑viable.

45 
While initially estimated, there was no 
systematic follow‑up to determine the 
actual expected benefits achieved for 
the projects concerned.

43 
These expected benefits are estimated 
by the project promoters on the basis 
of a key indicator such as the number 
of passengers switching from private 
cars to public transport. Therefore, if 
the utilisation rate for public transport 
projects does not meet the targets set, 
such benefits may also be affected.

46 
Nevertheless, the auditors noticed in 
two of the cities they visited that a set 
of indicators on aspects influenced by 
the co‑financed projects was estab‑
lished and subsequently monitored.

3 Tram in Italy
o
t
o
h
P

Source: ECA.

 
Observations

… and it may also increase the 
financial burden for the public 
authorities

47 
For all audited projects which are by 
nature not financially viable, op‑
erational revenue did not fully cover 
running and maintenance costs with 
the deficit being funded by public 
subsidies15.

48 
For the 14 underutilised projects, the 
fewer number of users than initially 
forecast led to lower revenue from 
ticket sales. This was offset by a public 
subsidy that was higher than planned, 
except in one case where the actual 
operational revenues exceeded expec‑
tations because of tariff increases.

21

15  For example, public subsidies 
represent 9 % of the annual 
budget for one light metro, 
66 % for another one (against 
an expected 0 %), 68 % for 
a tram, and 75 % for a bus 
network.

4 Tram and bus in France
o
t
o
h
P

Source: ECA.

 
Conclusions and 
recommendations

22

49 
The overall conclusion of the audit is 
that despite being implemented sat‑
isfactorily and generally meeting user 
needs, EU co‑financed urban trans‑
port projects are often underutilised, 
which has an impact on their overall 
performance.

Project implementation

50 
For most projects, the infrastructure, 
equipment and rolling stock were im‑
plemented in accordance with project 
specifications (paragraph 20).

51 
Significant delays of between 2 and 
4 years based on latest forecasts were 
encountered for four projects. Delays 
were due to natural or historic obsta‑
cles, late modifications, coordination 
problems and delays in making land 
available (paragraphs 21 and 22).

52 
Three projects had significant cost 
overruns in excess of 20 % due to 
delays, technical difficulties, adminis‑
trative problems and a lack of coordin‑
ation (paragraphs 23 to 25).

Services provided by the 
projects

53 
Indicators monitored by the trans‑
port operators and user satisfaction 
surveys, where available, indicate 
that the projects do meet user needs. 
However, not all audited projects 
benefited from the application of 
such management tools. Some good 
practices were identified, such as the 
inclusion of indicators in the operat‑
ing contract between the promoter 
and the oper ator whose remuneration 
is then linked to the results achieved. 
The facilities and services provided by 
the projects were generally easily ac‑
cessible (paragraphs 26 to 34).

Utilisation of the projects

54 
40 % of the projects assessed lacked 
utilisation targets and/or data. This 
prevented measurement of the project 
utilisation rate, which is a key perform‑
ance indicator for assessing the per‑
formance of public transport projects 
(paragraph 37).

55 
When information on utilisation was 
lacking, the Court gathered various 
other data in order to reach a con‑
clusion about project performance. 
Overall, the Court considers that two 
thirds of the projects are underutilised 
(paragraphs 37 and 38).

Conclusions and recommendations

23

Recommendation 2

The Commission should, for projects 
subject to its approval, require that 
a minimum number of result indicators 
with related targets are included in the 
grant agreements and are subsequent‑
ly measured, so that:

(a)  the utilisation rate of public trans‑
port, which is a key performance 
indicator for this type of project, is 
monitored and assessed;

(b)  expected benefits such as a reduc‑
tion in pollution, noise and con‑
gestion, and better road safety, are 
monitored and assessed.

Recommendation 3

The Commission should, for projects 
subject to its approval, require that the 
estimation of the number of expected 
users is more rigorously analysed and 
that the choice of the mode of trans‑
port is supported by a quantified com‑
parison of different transport options.

56 
Two main factors over which the pro‑
moter and/or the local authorities have 
a direct influence, leading to underutil‑
isation of most of the projects audited 
are weaknesses in project design and 
weaknesses in mobility policy (para‑
graphs 39 to 41).

57 
 Having fewer passengers than expect‑
ed also implies underperformance in 
terms of economic and social bene‑
fits (e.g. pollution and congestion). 
However, this is generally not followed 
up by the promoters or the national 
authorities (paragraphs 42 to 46). This 
also implies that there may be a need 
for additional public funding in order 
to ensure the financial sustainability of 
the urban transport projects con‑
cerned (paragraphs 47 and 48).

Recommendation 1

The Commission should, for projects 
subject to its approval, require that 
management tools will be put in place 
to monitor the quality of services and 
the level of user satisfaction once 
a project is operational, such as:

(a)  a minimum set of indicators with 
related targets to be included in 
operating contracts and, where 
possible, a link between the oper‑
ator’s remuneration and the results 
achieved;

(b)  user satisfaction surveys, which 

would enable appropriate action 
to be taken so as better to meet 
users’ expectations.

Conclusions and recommendations

24

Recommendation 4

Recommendation 5

The Commission should also require 
that the aspects mentioned under rec‑
ommendations 1 to 4 are addressed by 
the Member States’ authorities when 
managing EU‑funded urban transport 
projects.

The Commission should, for projects 
subject to its approval, require that 
the projects are included in a mobility 
policy which:

(a)  addresses the consistency of all 
modes and forms of transport, 
including parking policy, in the 
entire urban agglomeration;

(b)  demonstrates that it is a priority 

and the most appropriate project;

(c) 

indicates to what extent it will 
contribute to its overall objectives 
(e.g. modal shift).

This Report was adopted by Chamber II, headed by Mr Henri GRETHEN, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 5 February 2014.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

Annexes

25

I
x
e
n
n
A

EU urban transport policy: successive documents issued over the last decade

01 
White paper 2001: European transport policy for 2010: Time to decide, COM(2001) 370 final.

02 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a thematic strategy on the urban environment, 
COM(2004) 60 final.

03 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on thematic strategy on the 
urban environment, COM(2005) 718 final.

04 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Keep Europe moving — Sus‑
tainable mobility for our continent. Mid‑term review of the European Commission’s 2001 Transport White Paper, 
COM(2006) 314 final.

05 
Communication from the Commission: Action plan for energy efficiency: realising the potential, COM(2006) 545 
final.

06 
Commission Green Paper: Towards a new culture for urban mobility, COM(2007) 551 final.

07 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action plan on urban mobility, COM(2009) 490 final.

08 
White paper: Roadmap to a single European transport area — Towards a competitive and resource‑efficient 
transport system, COM(2011)  144 final.

 
Annexes

26

Overview of audited projects at the time of the audit

I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Country/
City

Spain

Barcelona

Madrid

France

Le Havre

Val de 
Sambre

Project

Operational 
since

Total 
final3 
cost

Eligible 
cost (A)

EU grant

million euro

% of (A)

Project 
approved 
by COM or 
MS4

Extension of metro Line 3 by 0,6 km and one station

Extension of metro Line 3 by 2,2 km and two stations

Extension of light metro Line 11 by 1,5 km and two stations

Extension of light metro Line 11 by 0,2 km and two stations

Extension of metro Line 11 by 3,3 km and one station

Construction of a 13 km tram route

Operating and information system

Construction of a 8,4 km bus lanes

Valenciennes

Construction of a 9,5 km tram route, section 1

Construction of a 8,5 km tram route, section 2

Italy

Florence

Construction of a 18,9 km tram route for Lines 1, 2 and 3

Information system

Extension of metro L1 by 5,3 km and six stations

Naples

Construction of 2,2 km and four stations for Metro L6

Extension of metro L6 by 3,3 km and four stations

Poland1

Krakow

Warsaw

Modernisation/rebuilding of 4 km and purchase of 24 trams

May 2008

Construction/rebuilding of 5,4 km and purchase of 24 trams

Extension of 4 km and four metro stations, Line 1

Modernisation of 14 km rail connection to airport

Extension of 2 km rail connection to airport with tunnel

Purchase of 13 trains for the rail connection to airport

Jun 2011

Oct 2008

Sep 2008

Not yet2

Nov 2011

May 2001

Sep 2008

Dec 2003

Dec 2003

Oct 2010

Not yet2

Partially

Dec 2008

Jul 2006

Sep 2007

Partially

May 2012

Not yet

Feb 2007

Due 2015

82,5

106,9

51,8

56,9

167,6

394,7

1,9

88,7

263,7

67,8

688,0

0,3

19,3

40,5

22,7

16,7

113,9

249,5

0,7

50,7

106,1

45,4

159,9

0,3

1 524,0

1 015,0

140,9

643,0

63,7

107,2

261,7

65,1

91,5

86,2

122,3

173,1

51,9

92,0

189,8

52,5

72,1

69,7

5,5

9,6

6,8

4,4

50,3

10,0

0,3

15,9

5,1

7,5

53,3

0,1

507,0

61,2

86,5

25,7

54,2

80,1

13,7

50,5

41,1

28,5 %

23,7 %

30,0 %

26,3 %

44,2 %

4,0 %

47,1 %

31,4 %

4,8 %

16,5 %

33,3 %

33,3 %

50,0 %

50,0 %

50,0 %

49,5 %

58,9 %

42,2 %

26,1 %

70,0 %

59,0 %

MS

MS

MS

MS

COM

COM

MS

COM

COM

COM

COM

MS

COM

COM

COM

COM

COM

COM

MS

COM

COM

 
27

Project

Operational 
since

Total 
final3 
cost

Eligible 
cost (A)

EU grant

million euro

% of (A)

Project 
approved 
by COM or 
MS4

Annexes

I
I
x
e
n
n
A

Country/
City

Portugal

Lisbon

Extension of metro Line B by 4,8 km and five stations

Construction of 13,5 km of light metro with 19 stations

Construction of 57 km of light metro with 58 stations

Porto

Integrated ticketing system

Operating and information system

Total

26 projects audited

Mar 2004

Nov 2008

Mar 2006

Dec 2005

Dec 2006

295,1

352,9

1 962,0

11,2

11,2

266,0

265,0

890,4

8,1

9,7

100,0

79,5

320,2

4,4

5,3

37,6 %

30,0 %

36,0 %

54,3 %

54,6 %

COM

COM

COM

MS

MS

7 586,50

4 103,30

1 598,23

39,6 %

1  Amounts for Polish projects were converted using an average exchange rate of 1 EUR= 4 PLN.
2  These two projects were operational by the end of 2012.
3  Figures in italics correspond to amounts approved at the project application stage.
4  COM = Commission; MS = Member State.

 
Reply of the  
Commission

Executive summary

II (a)
The Commission welcomes the Court’s assessment 
that the implementation of most projects was in 
accordance with the project specifications.

The Commission welcomes that 15 out of the 21 
projects analysed were operational on time or with 
a delay of 9 months or less, which the Commission 
considers to be slight for this type of project. Some 
delays in major infrastructure projects are often 
unavoidable.

The Commission considers that the delays in the 
four projects quoted were due to specific reasons 
out of the control of the project promoter and the 
Commission. 

The Commission points out that the EU budget is 
not affected since cost overruns have to be covered 
by the national budget. It considers that many of 
the cost overruns were due to technical difficulties 
beyond the control of the project promoters. 

II (b)
The Commission welcomes the results of the audit 
concerning the users’ need. 

There was significant underutilisation of infrastruc‑
ture in five of the audited projects, with a utilisation 
rate of under 35 % of the expected data. For the 
other audited projects the utilisation rate is above 
60 % of expected users.

Delays in the implementation of projects might 
lead also to delays in the achievement of targets 
concerning utilisation. 

Public transport is the backbone of sustainable 
urban transport and contributes to a high degree 
of social inclusion. As such, support from public 
authorities is often an intended necessity.

28

II (c)
The Commission acknowledges the identified 
causes of underutilisation. However, transport is 
a derived demand and has a strong link with the 
economic situation. The possible impacts of the 
international economic and financial crisis were 
not predictable when analyses have been carried 
out at the design and planning phase. One of these 
impacts is on the mobility needs, which may have 
contributed to the underutilisation, as the signifi‑
cant slowdown of demand in urban mobility could 
not have been foreseen during the project prepar‑
ation phase. 

Furthermore, the crisis has impacted the financial 
situation of the cities and possibly their ability 
to maintain and subsidise public services with 
a negative impact on the utilisation. In any case, 
all projects were audited early in their lifetime and 
additional measures can still be taken to increase 
utilisation in the future. 

III (a)
In relation to recommendations 1 to 4, the Com‑
mission underlines that the appraisal and adoption 
procedure for major projects for the 2014–20 pro‑
gramming period will allow for an early, upstream 
review of the projects by experts specialising in 
project management, CBA analysis and technical/
engineering issues. The Commission is preparing 
delegated and implementing acts that will define 
various quality elements that need to be respected 
by all major projects. In addition, CBA guidance will 
be issued that will include practical recommenda‑
tions for specific sectors and case studies to allow 
the beneficiaries to orientate their projects towards 
the best EU added value. 

All the projects subject to the approval of the 
Commission have to go through a quality review, 
which will be carried out on the basis of a set of cri‑
teria, either by the Commission or by independent 
experts (Jaspers paid from the technical assistance 
of the Commission or other entities nominated by 
Member States and agreed by the Commission). 

Reply of the Commission 

29

The Commission agrees with the Court that moni‑
toring of the contribution of projects is essential 
for verifying the correct implementation of the 
programme. The managing authorities need to 
undertake evaluation (in line with evaluation plans) 
of the impact of the EU‑funded projects on the 
achievement of targets of the priority axis, but not 
in the grant agreement. Subsequently, the results 
achieved will be included and assessed in the 
annual and final implementation reports due to be 
submitted by Member States for each operational 
programme, when these elements are included as 
result indicators for the operational programme.

III (c)
The Commission will ensure through the quality 
review of the proposals that the main alterna‑
tives have been analysed and the best option was 
selected for the implementation, including justifica‑
tion of the option chosen.

It will also ensure that the demand analysis (or 
business plan in case of productive investment), 
was based on reliable estimates and in line with the 
main demographic trends and developments in the 
respective sector to justify the need for the project 
and the overall capacity of the project facilities.

III (d)
All major projects will have to demonstrate their 
contribution to objectives set at programme 
level to promote sustainable multimodal urban 
mobility as set out in Article 5(4)(e) of Regula‑
tion (EU) No 1301/2013 (the ERDF regulation) and 
Article 4(a)(v) of Regulation (EU) No 1300/2013 (the 
Cohesion Fund regulation).

III (e)
The Commission agrees that these aspects should 
be addressed by the managing authorities and will 
promote this practice.

The new cohesion policy framework is geared 
towards result orientation, and this also has an 
impact on the way major projects are appraised by 
the Commission. In the application form (which will 
be issued in the form of a Commission implement‑
ing act), there will be a separate section where the 
projects need to present expected contributions to 
results and output indicators in the priority axis.

The Commission will propose, in the delegated act 
for quality review, conditions that Member States 
have to fulfil and confirm in the quality review 
report. This also includes feasibility and reliability 
of the demand analysis, justifying the need for 
the project and the overall capacity of the project 
facilities.

In line with the regulatory framework for the new 
programming period, all projects will include, 
where relevant, common output indicators. Result 
indicators will be agreed during the negotiation 
process of the programmes and will be set at the 
priority axis level, and then subsequently moni‑
tored during the implementation period. However, 
the specific modalities of the evaluation and moni‑
toring system, and in particular the contracting 
arrangements between the managing authorities 
and the operators, will be among the competences 
of the managing authority, as stated in Article 
125(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. Where 
appropriate, the Commission will recommend 
that major projects have a minimum set of indica‑
tors and perform ance‑based remuneration for the 
operator.

Where relevant to the project objectives, the Com‑
mission will recommend that project promoters  
carry out user satisfaction surveys.

III (b)
Through the quality review of the projects the 
Commission will ensure that projects subject to its 
approval will clearly present their contribution to 
the result indicators for monitoring progress.

The utilisation rate is not part of the common 
indicators requested to be monitored by Member 
States. However, the Commission will insist during 
the negotiations on the programmes on the inclu‑
sion, where relevant, of ‘utilisation rate of public 
transport’ in the operational programmes dealing 
with public transport and consequently in their 
monitoring system done by Member States.

Reply of the Commission 

30

Observations

20
The Commission welcomes the Court’s assessment 
that most projects’ implementation was in accord‑
ance with the project specifications.

21
The Commission welcomes that 15 out of the 21 
projects analysed were operational on time or with 
a delay of 9 months or less, which the Commission 
considers to be slight for this type of project. Some 
delays in major infrastructure projects are often 
unavoidable.

The Commission considers that significant delays 
were due to specific, unavoidable circumstances 
related to the individual projects, such as archae‑
ological findings, the need for additional soil 
consolidation or a change in political leadership. 
Neither the project promoter nor the Commission 
services could have foreseen such causes.

Box 1 — second indent
The original track design of the Italian tram project 
referred to by the Court had been approved after 
public consultation. The political changes in the 
municipality and the following referendum in 2010 
resulted in the modification of the original design 
for lines 2 and 3. Neither the project promoter 
nor Commission services could have foreseen this 
circumstance.

24
The Commission is always concerned about cost 
overruns since they might affect the economy of 
a project. However, in large infrastructure projects 
additional costs are often difficult to avoid, despite 
accurate planning, surveys and soil inspections (see 
examples in Box 2).

25
The Commission points out that the EU budget is 
not affected since cost overruns have to be covered 
by the national budget.

28
The Commission welcomes the finding that services 
offered by the projects were, in 18 out of 21 audited 
cases, monitored and in line with the related tar‑
gets set.

Box 3 — first indent
The finding on the metro line in Italy referred to 
by the Court can be explained by the fact that the 
metro line and the complementary information 
system have not yet been completed. By 2015 the 
current insulated section will be part of the greater 
metro network.

Box 3 —  second indent
For the finding on the train project in Poland 
referred to by the Court, the Commission acknow‑
ledges that the frequency of trains does not cor‑
respond to the assumptions used for the design of 
the project. The Commission will bring the mat‑
ter to the Polish authorities in the framework of 
programme monitoring and will enquire as to the 
reasons for this modification.

Box 4
The Commission welcomes the identification of 
good practices by the Court. The Commission will 
prepare guidance on cost–benefit analysis for the 
2014–20 programmes that will include a case study 
on urban transport.

32
The Commission welcomes that all available surveys 
showed a high level of satisfaction with the services 
provided.

Common reply to paragraphs 33 and 34 
The Commission welcomes the positive finding.

Reply of the Commission 

31

37
The Commission is of the opinion that the bene‑
ficiaries should give greater importance on the 
def inition of key performance indicators.

There was significant underutilisation of infrastruc‑
ture in five of the audited projects, with a utilisation 
rate of under 35 % of the expected data. For the 
Italian project, the situation should improve at the 
end of 2015 once the line is incorporated into the 
network as planned.

For the other audited projects the utilisation rate is 
above 60 % of expected users.

Delays in the implementation of projects might 
also lead to delays in the achievement of targets 
concerning utilisation.

Box 7 — third indent
The Commission acknowledges that better align‑
ment of the bus services should have taken place 
together with a reduction of the parking places 
after the completion of the projects in France. 
Corrective measures are announced by the French 
public authorities in the end of 2013. They foresee 
to put in place new lines of public transport in 
order to expand the public network and to reduce 
parking places in the centre.

47
Public transport is the backbone of sustainable 
urban transport and contributes to a high degree 
of social inclusion. As such, support from public 
authorities is often an intended necessity.

See reply to paragraphs 39 and 40.

Conclusions and recommendations

Common reply to paragraphs 39 and 40
The Commission acknowledges the identified 
causes of underutilisation. However, the possible 
impacts of the international economic and finan‑
cial crisis were not predictable when analyses were  
carried out at the design and planning phase. One 
of these impacts is on the mobility needs, which 
may have contributed to the underutilisation, as the 
significant slowdown of demand in urban mobility 
could not have been foreseen during the project 
preparation phase. Furthermore, the crisis has 
impacted the financial situation of the cities and 
possibly their ability to maintain and subsidise pub‑
lic services, with a negative impact on utilisation. 
In any case, all projects were audited early in their 
lifetime, and additional measures can still be taken 
to increase utilisation in the future.

See reply to paragraph 37.

41
See reply to paragraphs 39 and 40.

49
The Commission welcomes the overall audit result 
that projects generally meet user needs.

The Commission acknowledges the identified 
causes of underutilisation. However, transport is 
a derived demand and has a strong link with the 
economic situation. The possible impacts of the 
international economic and financial crisis were not 
predictable when analyses were carried out at the 
design and planning phase. One of these impacts is 
on the mobility needs, which may have contributed 
to the underutilisation, as the significant slowdown 
of demand in urban mobility could not have been 
foreseen during the project prepar ation phase. 
Furthermore, the crisis has impacted the financial 
situation of the cities and possibly their ability to 
maintain and subsidise public services, with a nega‑
tive impact on utilisation. In any case, all projects 
were audited early in their lifetime, and additional 
measures can still be taken to increase utilisation in 
the future.

Reply of the Commission 

32

50
The Commission welcomes the Court’s assessment 
that the implementation of most projects was in 
accordance with the project specifications.

51
The Commission welcomes that 15 out of the 21 
projects analysed were operational on time or with 
a delay of 9 months or less, which the Commission 
considers to be slight for this type of project. Some 
delays in major infrastructure projects are often 
unavoidable.

The Commission considers that the delays in the 
four projects quoted were due to specific reasons 
out of the control of the project promoter and the 
Commission.

52
The Commission points out that the EU budget is 
not affected since cost overruns have to be covered 
by the national budget. It considers that many of 
the cost overruns were due to technical difficulties 
beyond the control of the project promoters (see 
paragraph 24).

53
The Commission welcomes the finding that services 
offered by the projects were, in 18 out of 21 audited 
cases, monitored and in line with the related tar‑
gets set, that all available surveys showed a high 
level of satisfaction with the services provided and 
that facilities and services provided by the projects 
were generally easily accessible.

54
The Commission agrees that the beneficiaries 
should give greater importance to the definition of 
key performance indicators.

55
There was significant underutilisation of infrastruc‑
ture in five of the audited projects, with a utilisation 
rate of under 35 % of the expected data. For one 
project, the situation should improve at the end of 
2015 once the line is incorporated in the network as 
planned.

For the other audited projects the utilisation rate is 
above 60 % of expected users.

Delays in the implementation of projects might 
also lead to delays in the achievement of targets 
concerning utilisation.

56
See Commission reply to paragraph 49.

57
Public transport is the backbone of sustainable 
urban transport and contributes to a high degree 
of social inclusion. As such, support from public 
authorities is often an intended necessity.

Recommendation 1
In relation to recommendations 1 to 4, the Com‑
mission underlines that the appraisal and adoption 
procedure for major projects for the 2014–20 pro‑
gramming period will allow for an early, upstream 
review of the projects by experts specialising in 
project management, CBA analysis and technical/
engineering issues. The Commission is preparing 
delegated and implementing acts that will define 
various quality elements that need to be respected 
by all major projects. In addition, CBA guidance will 
be issued that will include practical recommenda‑
tions for specific sectors and case studies to allow 
the beneficiaries to orientate their projects towards 
the best EU added value.

All the projects subject to the approval of the 
Commission have to go through a quality review, 
which will be carried out on the basis of a set of cri‑
teria, either by the Commission or by independent 
experts (Jaspers paid from the technical assistance 
of the Commission or other entities nominated by 
Member States and agreed by the Commission).

The new cohesion policy framework is geared 
towards result orientation, and this also has an 
impact on the way major projects are appraised by 
the Commission. In the application form (which will 
be issued in the form of a Commission implement‑
ing act), there will be a separate section where the 
projects need to present expected contributions to 
results and output indicators in the priority axis.

Reply of the Commission 

33

The Commission will propose, in the delegated act 
for quality review, conditions that Member States 
have to fulfil and confirm in the quality review 
report. This also includes feasibility and reliability 
of the demand analysis, justifying the need for 
the project and the overall capacity of the project 
facilities.

Recommendation 1 (a)
In line with the regulatory framework for the new 
programming period, all projects will include, 
where relevant, common output indicators. Result 
indicators will be agreed during the negotiation 
process of the programmes and will be set at the 
priority axis level, and then subsequently moni‑
tored during the implementation period. However, 
the specific modalities of the evaluation and moni‑
toring system, and in particular the contracting 
arrangements between the managing authorities 
and the operators, will be in the competences of 
the managing authority, as stated in Article 125(3)
(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. Where appro‑
priate, the Commission will recommend for major 
projects to have a minimum set of indicators and 
performance‑based remuneration for the operator.

Recommendation 1 (b)
Where relevant to the project objectives, the Com‑
mission will recommend that project promoters  
carry out user satisfaction surveys.

Recommendation 2
Through the quality review of the projects the 
Commission will ensure that projects subject to its 
approval will clearly present their contribution to 
the result indicators for monitoring progress.

Recommendation 2 (a)
The utilisation rate is not part of the common 
indicators requested to be monitored by Member 
States. However, the Commission will insist during 
the negotiations on the programmes on the inclu‑
sion, where relevant, of ‘utilisation rate of public 
transport’ in the operational programmes dealing 
with public transport and consequently in their 
monitoring system done by Member States.

Recommendation 2 (b)
The Commission agrees with the Court that 
monitoring of contribution of projects is essential 
for verifying the correct implementation of the 
programme. The managing authorities need to 
undertake evaluation (in line with evaluation plans) 
of the impact of the EU‑funded projects on the 
achievement of targets of the priority axis, but not 
in the grant agreement. Subsequently, the results 
achieved will be included and assessed in the 
annual and final implementation reports due to be 
submitted by Member States for each operational 
programme, when these elements are included as 
result indicators for the operational programme.

Recommendation 3
The Commission will ensure through the quality 
review of the proposals that the main alterna‑
tives have been analysed and the best option was 
selected for the implementation, including justifica‑
tion of the option chosen.

It will also ensure that the demand analysis (or 
business plan in case of productive investment), 
was based on reliable estimates and in line with 
main demographic trends and developments in the 
respective sector to justify the need of the project 
and the overall capacity of the project facilities.

Recommendation 4
All major projects will have to demonstrate their 
contribution to objectives set at programme level 
to promote sustainable multimodal urban mobil‑
ity as set out in Article 5(4)(e) of Regulation (EU) 
No 1301/2013 (the ERDF regulation) and  
Article 4(a)(v) of Regulation (EU) No 1300/2013 (the 
Cohesion Fund regulation).

Recommendation 5
The Commission agrees that these aspects should 
be addressed by the managing authorities and will 
promote this practice.

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The EU allocated 10,7 billion euro between  
2000 and 2013 to co-finance projects helping  
cities to implement urban transport such as  
metros, trams and buses. In this report,  
the Court assessed whether projects were  
implemented as planned, provided services  
that meet user needs and were used as much  
as expected.

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS