COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks in the EU Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience
Date: 2014-04-08
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: aid to disaster victims, climate change, damage, economic recovery, foreign aid, man-made disaster, natural disaster













EUR-Lex - 52014SC0134 - EN











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52014SC0134

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks in the EU Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience /* SWD/2014/0134 final */









Table of Contents
1            Introduction. 3
1.1             Scope of the
Overview.. 5
1.2             Information sources
for the Overview.. 6
1.3             Main Natural and
Man-made Disaster Risks Addressed. 6
2            Natural Disaster Risks. 8
2.1             Floods. 8
2.2             Severe weather 13
2.3             Forest and wildfires. 21
2.4             Earthquakes. 24
2.5             Pandemics/Epidemics. 27
2.6             Livestock epidemics/epizootics. 30
3            Man-made Non-malicious Disaster Risks. 33
3.1             Industrial accidents. 33
3.2             Nuclear/radiological
accidents. 36
3.3             Major transport
accidents. 39
3.4             Loss of critical
infrastructure. 41
4            Man-made Malicious disaster risks. 44
4.1             Cyber-attacks. 45
4.2             Terrorist attacks. 47
5            Multi-risk Disasters. 50
5.1             Natural risks. 51
5.2             Natech risks. 51
5.3             Technological and
man-made risks. 51
6            Emerging Disaster Risks. 52
6.1             Impact of climate
change and ecosystem degradation. 52
6.1.1                   Natural
hazards. 52
6.1.2                   Implications
for infrastructure. 55
6.1.3                   Migration in
the context of climate change. 56
6.2             Space Environmental
Hazards. 57
6.2.1                   Space debris. 57
6.2.2                   Space Weather
phenomena. 58
6.2.3                   Near Earth
Objects. 59
6.3             Anti-microbial
resistance. 60
7            Conclusions. 61
8            Annexes. 66
9            Bibliography. 67

Overview
of natural and man-made disaster risks in the EU


1         
Introduction

In 2009, a
framework for European Union (EU) cooperation on disaster prevention across all
types of natural and man-made hazards was agreed upon by the EU Member States
in Council conclusions[1].
A fundamental building block for this prevention framework is risk assessment,
which together with risk analysis constitutes the basis for a successful
disaster risk management (DRM) strategy. The Council set out several steps to
build a risk assessment policy. Firstly, in 2010 the European Commission
prepared guidelines on risk assessment[2]
based on research and good practice examples that could support Member States
in the preparation of national risk assessments (NRAs). Secondly, Member States
agreed to prepare or update their own national risk assessments and to share
with the Commission and other Member States the results of these assessments[3].  
Subsequently in
2011[4], the
Council asked the Commission to develop an overview of natural and man-made disaster
risks the EU may face in the future, based on national risk assessments. The
overview would focus primarily on natural and man-made disaster risks which are
'shared', i.e. those with likely cross-border impacts, or those on a larger
scale where impacts would be experienced by more than one Member State. It would
also take into account, when relevant and possible, the future impacts of
climate change and the need for climate change adaptation. 
The overview would
help determine areas for cooperation between Member States on disaster
prevention and preparedness; it could feed into planning for civil protection
preparedness and response; and provide lessons for other policy areas such as
climate change adaptation, research and regional policies. Examples of its
relevance to other policy initiatives are the linkages with ongoing macro-regional
programmes through which several European countries are cooperating in the
field of DRM, such as the Baltic[5]
and Danube[6]
strategies, or the marine spatial planning/sea basin strategies. 
Cooperation in
the EU on risk assessment is to be enhanced and developed following adoption of
the new Civil Protection Mechanism[7].
Member States are required to complete risk assessments at national or
appropriate sub-national level and make available to the Commission a summary
of the relevant elements by 22 December 2015 and every three years thereafter
(Art.5). The legislation also confirms the importance of the risk overview and
emphasizes its links to other policies.  This
document is a first risk overview, based, at this stage and for this version,
on the Council conclusions provisions as well as the new Civil Protection Mechanism
legislation.
Furthermore, the
Commission/High Representative joint proposal for the implementation of the
Solidarity Clause[8]
includes
a provision for the regular production by the Commission and the High Representative
of a joint integrated threat assessment report at Union level as of 2015, building
on the monitoring, interpretation and sharing of information provided by Member
States.[9]
The proposal is currently being discussed in Council. 
This first
version of an overview of natural and man-made disaster risks in the EU is based,
so far, on contributions by 17 Member States: Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech
Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary
(HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL),
Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK) - and Norway (NO)
(see annex 1). Of these 18 contributions, 11 are complete or well-advanced NRAs
or summaries thereof[10].
Seven Member States are yet to assess their identified risks and produce finalised
versions of their NRAs[11]
(see annex 3). Based on current contributions, Commission services consider
that sufficient information is available to start identifying the most
important disaster risks that a large number of Member States are addressing,
focusing in particular on risks with a cross-border dimension. In addition,
information on some natural hazards, collected at a European level for research
projects, for other sectoral policies, including climate change adaptation, and
for the forecasting tools developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), can
complement the national risk assessments. 
This document
should be seen as a first step towards a full overview and the beginning of a
medium term cooperation process with Member States. This overview has been
created based on contributions of a limited number of Member States, and remains
a living document in which future contributions by Member States - including
both first and updated versions of national risks assessments – will feed into
future versions of this document.

1.1        
Scope
of the Overview
According to
Council conclusions, the EU overview of risks should "identify […]
risks or types of risks that are shared by Member States or regions in
different Member States"[12]. To
do so, it makes "use of the relevant expertise of the Member
States" and "report[s] on information that Member States have
provided with regard to risks”[13]. The overview will contribute to a shared understanding of
where disaster risks lie in Europe, what their impact and likelihood are and
how countries can work together to identify, assess and manage risks. In
fact, the production of a cross-sectoral overview of disaster risks in the EU is
enshrined in the civil protection legislation adopted in 2013, which calls upon
the Commission to "establish and regularly update a cross-sectoral
overview and map of natural and man-made disaster risks the Union may face, by
taking a coherent approach across different policy areas that may address or
affect disaster prevention and taking due account of the likely impacts of
climate change".[14]

The overview
focuses on a limited number of major disaster risks faced by EU Member
States, resulting from an analysis of the first available national risk
assessments and progress reports provided by Member States.
Probability/likelihood of occurrence, magnitude of impact, the cross-border dimension
of risks, and emerging risks are analysed based on available information. 
In this
overview, the main comparison between Member States' risk assessments is based
on an analysis of the main natural and man-made hazards identified and a first
analysis of their respective risk assessments (focusing on consequences/impacts
and probability/likelihood of risk scenarios). 'Consequence' or 'impact' are
understood as negative effects of the disaster or risk expressed in terms of
human impacts, economic/infrastructure impacts and environmental impacts.  The
terms 'probability' or 'likelihood' are understood as the probability or
likelihood of the risk occurring or taking place in the future.  As set out in the
guidelines on risk assessment and mapping prepared by the Commission, national scenario-building
and risk identification would need to consider at least all significant natural
and man-made hazards that "would occur on average once or more every
100 years (i.e. annual probability of 1% or more) and for which the
consequences represent significant potential impacts, i.e. number of affected
people greater than 50, economic and environmental costs above €100 million,
and political/social impact considered significant or very serious".[15] 
The timeframe
for most of the risk assessments submitted is set at five to ten years ahead[16]. This
time period allows for a more reliable assessment of the probability of natural
and man-made hazards occurring, and corresponds approximately to timescales for
the funding of potential actions addressing risks. The choice of a defined
shorter timeframe may also help reduce comparability issues for risks which are
important in the shorter term as compared to risks which may materialise only
in the longer term. 
Finally,
emerging risks, such as space weather events, climate change and antimicrobial
resistance for which the impacts are still difficult to assess, will be
addressed in this overview. Future versions of the overview could increase in
scope to address a wider range of risks and emerging risks. Further work on an
EU overview of risks could further provide lessons for other policies and
identify potential for future cooperation in disaster risk management at
European, regional and national levels. 

1.2        
Information
sources for the Overview

As mentioned
above, the main information sources are the national risk assessments which
Member States have shared with the Commission as part of Civil Protection
policy. This has been complemented with projects, systems, methodologies and
datasets managed by the Commission (JRC)[17]
and collected through the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination system (GDACS)
for earthquakes and tsunamis, the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), the European
Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) and the European Drought Observatory
(EDO), as well as information collected for EU funded research projects on
natural hazards and climate change.
Additional
information comes from other EU policies including Agriculture and Rural
Development, Climate, Development, Energy, Enterprise, Environment, Health and
Consumers, Home Affairs, Internal Market, Research and Innovation, Integrated
Maritime Policy and Transport.
For purposes of
comparison, the World Economic Forum's Global Risk Report[18], which
provides the positions and views of the Forum's network of leading experts on
global risks, has been used. Relevant material produced by other institutions
such as Interpol, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
and United Nations (UN) agencies have been consulted to complete the background
information on each of the natural and man-made hazards addressed. 
Terms and
concepts in this document are in line with the Commission's guidelines on risk
assessment.[19]

1.3       
Main Natural and Man-made Disaster Risks Addressed 

The overview is
based on the main risks addressed in the national risk assessments and progress
reports provided by Member States. An analysis of
the 18 national contributions currently at the European Commission's disposal
identifies 25 hazards, both natural and man-made (malicious and non-malicious).
The depth of assessment (listing, scenarios, and risk matrix analysis) of each
hazard risk varies across the risk assessments and progress reports submitted.
To avoid comparability complications in working with the limited material
available, this overview identifies the frequency of denomination of each risk.
This first-step analysis will draw a picture of the geographical distribution
of the main risks across Europe based on Member States' contributions[20] and
points to areas of potential for further work and cooperation amongst Member
States.
In fact, a number
of these hazards are also assessed in Global Risks Landscapes 2014 produced in the
World Economic Forum's Global Risk Report[21].
These converging assessments would confirm the relevance of the risks addressed
in this overview.
The frequency of
denomination of the hazards identified is represented below:
 Hazard || Frequency of denomination 
 Natural hazards ||   
 Floods || 17 
 Severe weather || 15 
 Pandemics/epidemics || 14 
 Livestock epidemics || 12 
 Wild/Forest fires || 11 
 Earthquakes || 9 
 Landslides || 7 
 Droughts || 6 
 Space weather || 4 
 Volcanic eruptions || 3 
 Harmful organisms[22] || 3 
 Tsunamis || 1 
 Man-made hazards ||   
 Industrial accidents || 15 
 Nuclear/radiological accidents || 13 
 Transport accidents || 10 
 Cyber attacks || 9 
 Terrorist attacks || 8 
 Loss of critical infrastructure || 7 
 Public disorder || 5 
 Marine/coastal pollution || 3 
 Water/food contamination || 3 
 CBRN attacks || 3 
 Refugees/unmanaged migration || 2 
 Environmental pollution Crisis outside the EU || 1 1 

Table 1: Frequency of denomination of main risks in national
risk assessments (DG ECHO, 2014)

Of all the
hazards identified in the NRA, a list of the 12 most addressed hazards can be
drawn. The main hazards listed below will be addressed in this overview:
 Category || Hazard 
 Natural hazards || Floods 
 Severe weather 
 Wild/Forest fires 
 Earthquakes 
 Pandemics/epidemics 
 Livestock epidemics 
 Man-made hazards || Industrial accidents 
 Nuclear/radiological accidents 
 Transport accidents 
 Loss of critical infrastructure 
 Cyber attacks 
 Terrorist attacks 
Table 2: Main
risks in the European Union addressed in the overview (DG ECHO, 2014)
This section
compares the way the countries contributing to the overview have analysed the
12 most commonly occurring hazards above. For each hazard, the criteria for
analysis used, the scenarios identified and the evaluation of each relevant
national risk assessment were examined. 
The national
classifications and terminologies of the types of hazards addressed may differ.
It has, in some cases, been necessary to group 'similar' hazards within one
hazard category: floods cover coastal, inland and flash floods; severe weather
includes storms, heat waves, snow/ice, and rain; pandemics and epidemics are
addressed together and refer to the main current pandemic risk in Europe,
influenza; industrial and chemical accidents and the release of chemical
substances are grouped together, as are nuclear and radiological accidents and
the release of radioactive substances; transport accidents include air, land,
maritime and hazardous material transport accidents; the variants of cyber
security threats are regrouped under cyber-attacks, as is also the case for
terrorist attacks.
When possible,
observations are drawn from the risk matrices used by Member States to plot the
different likelihood/probability and impact/consequence scores (see annex 2).
Only nine of the 18 contributions received present assessment results in the
form of a risk matrix and scenarios used for the risk evaluation (see annexes 3
& 4). The variety and varying severity of these risk scenarios
complicate at this stage the comparability of results from Member States
contributions. Moreover, although the matrices that have been sent have
generally measured probability and impact on a 5x5 scale, these categories
differ and could lead to different interpretations of severity of risks and,
ultimately, different policy conclusions. Some of the matrices are numbered 1
to 5 or use letters A to E – 1 and A being low probability/impact and 5 and E
being high probability/impact. Other matrices use various terms to express the
ranges: probability is measured from highly unlikely to highly likely or from
very low to very high; impact is measured from limited/insignificant to
catastrophic, very low to very high, minimal to very significant, or from very
low to very severe. The
available assessment criteria and scores are gathered in overview tables in
annex to this document (see annex 4).

2         
Natural Disaster Risks
2.1         
Floods

Floods are
defined as "the temporary covering by water of land not normally covered
by water".[23]
These occur frequently in all parts of the EU in the form of river, flash and
urban floods, as well as coastal flooding. Flooding is considered a complex
process involving socio-economic and physical factors. Often, its impact is
localised and limited in time; however, floods can also affect vast areas,
cross borders, and maintain high water levels for weeks. Flooding can result in
environmental conditions that are breeding grounds for diseases. While flood
risks in some areas of Europe can be considered not to be significant – areas
of low population density, low economic or ecological value – many areas are
prone to one or more flood types.  Increased soil sealing and ecosystem
degradation can be further factors aggravating the flood risk. The map below, produced
by the JRC, provides an overview of river flood hazard in Europe. It shows
areas that could potentially be inundated by a 100-year flood assuming no flood
protection up to that event:

Map
1: European flood hazard map for the 100-year return period (Alfieri et al.,
2013[24])
Flooding has significant consequences on
people, businesses, infrastructure and services, but also to the environment
and cultural heritage. A report by the European Environment Agency (EEA) studying
the floods in Europe for 1998-2009 identifies 213 recorded events, over 1,100
casualties and overall economic losses at about €60 billion[25]. Over
the past years, major floods have occurred in Europe such as the ones in Southern
and Eastern Germany and neighbouring countries in 2013 (estimated costs of €12
billion)[26],
the Elbe basin in 2002 (estimated costs of €20 billion), in Italy, France and
the Swiss Alps in 2000 (economic costs of €12 billion) and in the United
Kingdom in 2007 (accumulated losses of €4 billion).[27] In
fact, the number of floods and heavy precipitation in Northern and North-eastern
Europe has increased in recent years, in line with current projections of
increased extreme events resulting from climate change as further discussed in
section 4.[28]  
 
There is a long
history of policy and operational action in Member States to address flooding.
This has been complemented by EU legislation and other policy measures. In
2007, the EU adopted a floods directive[29]
on the assessment and management of flood risks. Its main provisions include
the requirement to assess if all river basin districts (or other unit of
management including coastal areas) are at risk from flooding, to map the flood
extent and assets and humans at risk in these areas and to take adequate and
coordinated measures (flood management plans) to reduce this flood risk. 
Article 4 of the
Floods Directive requires Member States to undertake a Preliminary Flood Risk
Assessment for each River Basin District, Unit of Management, or the portion of
an international River Basin District or Unit of Management lying within their
territory. The Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment requires an assessment of past
and potential future floods and associated adverse consequences to identify
Areas of Potentially Significant Flood Risk, which will be based on available
or readily derivable information including the requirements specified in the Floods
Directive (Article 4).
The figure below
summarises the time periods covered by the reported historic flood events. The
oldest flood event dated back to 100 AD from Spain. Most of the oldest events
relate to fluvial and sea water floods which are presumably the most notable
historically because of the extent of the damage that they may cause to human
health. The highest proportion of recent flood events are for pluvial and
groundwater floods (around 60% of events were recorded from 2000 onwards).

Figure 1: Time periods of
reported historic flood events (DG Environment)
(figure based on data AT,
BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, LT, LV, MT, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK,
UK. 
The numbers in brackets
after the source of flood refers to the number of events reported from the
number of MS)
The preliminary results show that the
most common source of reported historical flood events is by far fluvial (67% of
events) followed by pluvial (19%) and sea water (17%). The least common is for
artificial water bearing infrastructure and groundwater (both 1%). The most
common mechanism is natural exceedance (54% of events). In terms of potential
future floods the most common source of flooding is again fluvial (76% of
reported events) and the least from groundwater and artificial water bearing
infrastructure (both 2%). Natural exceedance was the most common mechanism
(45%). 
Economic consequences were most frequently
reported for historic floods (for 42% of events at the aggregated level), this
was followed by human health (28%), environment (14%) and cultural heritage
(6%).[30]
These patterns may be the result of the fact that, historically, the impacts of
floods have been reported in terms of effects on the economy and human health
rather than on the environment and cultural heritage: information on the latter
two categories may simply not be available for many events. Furthermore, vulnerability
of the population should be taken into account: for instance, socio-economic
deprived populations, with worse housing conditions, might be expected to be
more vulnerable.
The legislation reinforces the
opportunities for the public to access this information and the active involvement
of interested parties in the planning process. The EU has also
supported the development of a flood early warning system for the whole of the
EU - European Flood Awareness System (EFAS)[31]
that provides overview information for riverine floods and flash floods to the European
Commission's Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)
and complements flood forecasting activities carried out in the Member
States. EFAS is part of the COPERNICUS Emergency Management Service[32]. Flood
prevention, preparedness and response actions are a major priority for EU civil
protection policy, particularly in the context of the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism.[33]

Flood risk is also being addressed in
research projects financed under the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme
(FP6)[34]
such as project FLOODsite (Integrated Flood Risk Analysis and Management
Methodologies)[35],
as well as the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)[36] such
as the projects CORFU (Collaborative research on flood resilience in urban
areas)[37]
and IMPRINTS (Improving preparedness and risk management for flash floods and
debris flow events)[38].
More recently, the STARFLOOD (Strengthening and redesigning European flood risk
practices towards appropriate and resilient flood risk governance arrangements)[39] will
explore new ways of partnerships in risk management. Other projects focusing on
flood risk are funded by ECHO under its Civil Protection Financial Instrument
through annual call for proposals for Prevention and Preparedness in Civil
Protection, such as projects HAREN (Hazard Assessment based on Rainfall
European Nowcasts) in 2011, FLOOD CBA (Knowledge Platform for Assessing the
Costs and Benefits of Flood Prevention Measures) in 2012, and ACHELOUS (Action
of Contrast to Hydraulic Emergency in Local Urban Site) in 2013[40].
Analysis of
national risk assessments
Flood risk is
identified by 16 Member States (all contributing Member States but Cyprus) and
Norway. In the NRAs submitted by Denmark and Norway, flood hazards are
addressed as one of various severe weather phenomena to underline their
occurrence as a cascade effect of other risks such as precipitation and storms.
Bulgaria is in the process of assessing this risk.
A number of submitted
NRAs underline the particularly high risk associated with floods. Indeed,
floods are categorised as the highest risk hazard in Poland and in Hungary, one
of four highest risk hazards in the United Kingdom and one of five in Ireland.
This hazard is one of two most affecting Italy and the Czech Republic. Slovenia
ranks floods as one of two highest risk hazards; Estonia ranks it as 'high'
risk, while floods are ranked fourth in the Lithuania's priority ranking of
potential hazards. In the case of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, for
which a distinction in the assessment is made between inland and coastal
floods, worst credible case scenarios provided assess a higher risk for coastal
over inland flooding. 
Land use and
management practices can influence the intensity of fluvial and pluvial floods,
based on the different capacity of retention of water in soil and vegetation.
For example, Denmark identifies the density of buildings and the amount of
surfaced reinforced with asphalt or other surfacing material rendering seepage
difficult as a condition in assessing the risk of floods.
Denmark and
Norway address flood hazards under the category of severe weather. Denmark
focuses on storm surges, characterised by a sudden rise in sea water level
following heavy coastal storms, high tides and precipitation. Norway addresses
floods as a direct consequence of heavy precipitation and winds. The scenario
used by Sweden considers flooding as an event associated with the failure of a
river dam, also considered a loss of critical infrastructure. All these cases
thus underline the direct cascade effect between flooding and other related
hazards. 
Flood hazards
can also constitute cross-border risks affecting more than one country. For
instance, Hungary addresses the cross-border characteristic of floods by
underlining that, as a transit country for many rivers located in the
Carpathian Basin, 95% of flood waters in Hungary originate abroad.[41] 
Six Member
States provide a matrix assessing the risk of a flood scenario: Estonia,
Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding
the different forms of floods assessed (inland, coastal, combination of both)
and the absence/variety of scenarios used in NRAs, an assessment of risk
matrices suggests consensus over the high risk level of this hazard. Impact of
both coastal and inland flooding is assessed as moderate/serious or more across
all six national assessments. The level of probability is also assessed as
moderate/serious or above across most assessments, with the exception of the
Netherlands whose use of a worst-credible flood scenario incurs a comparatively
lower likelihood of occurrence.
Moreover, NRAs submitted by Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Netherlands, United
Kingdom
point to the likely impact of climate change on extreme weather events and flood
risks across the EU.
According to the UK's National Risk Register, "the rising temperatures
and sea levels associated with climate change are likely to increase the
frequency and severity of extreme weather events, and hence the flood risks
across the UK".[42]
Norway's NRA states that the country has so far been spared from the most
extreme floods, as low air temperatures limit low evaporation and precipitation
and the country has large number of lakes and forests; nevertheless, increasing
temperatures and precipitation resulting from climate change may increase the
risk of extreme floods.[43]
The impact of climate
change on floods is further explored in section 4.

Map
2: Participating states in the Union Mechanism assessing floods as a main risk
hazard (DG ECHO, 2014)
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

2.2         
Severe
weather

A variety of meteorological
phenomena can fall under the 'severe' or 'extreme weather' category, i.e. where
they become disruptive and necessitate the intervention of emergency services
and civil protection and/or lead to other natural disasters, such as flooding
or drought. Investing in the development of Green Infrastructure[44] can
help to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability. The severe weather
phenomena commonly cited by European countries include storms/hurricanes, heat
waves, cold spells, droughts, snow and/or ice and heavy rainfall. 
Storms are natural
phenomena consisting of strong winds and precipitation. Storms in Europe
generally originate from extra-tropical cyclones resulting from warm
subtropical air coming into contact with polar air over the Atlantic Ocean.
Large differences in these pressure systems result in the formation of storms
over western and central Europe; less frequently, these storms may progress
southward and affect southern and south-eastern Europe. It is estimated that
during 1998-2009 storms caused the death of over 700 people and were the most
costly of all natural hazards in Europe in terms of losses. The environmental
impacts of storms are also relevant: over 130 storm events have been identified
as causing "noticeable damage" to forests in Europe in the past 60
years and storms are responsible for over 50% of all primary abiotic and biotic
damage by volume from catastrophic events to forest in Europe.[45]
Storms may also have important impacts on infrastructure, posing a challenge to
transmission networks and renewable generators in the energy sector, as well as
traffic disruption, traffic accidents and damage to installations of transport
infrastructure.[46]
While no trend of storms occurring has been identified, storm-related losses
have increased in recent years due to increased exposure.[47] However, current projections of increased
extreme events resulting from climate change indicate that the risk of storms
in Europe will increase, as is further discussed in section 4.[48]    
Some sector-specific
policies both at European level (Green Paper on Forest Protection and
Information in the EU[49];
proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning
and integrated coastal management[50])
and national level have seen the light in recent years. Furthermore, further
research on storm management has been carried out through FP7 funding such as
projects MOTIVE on Models for Adaptive Forest Management[51] and MICORE
working on the morphological impacts and coastal risks induced by extreme storm
events.[52]
Further research has started in 2013 on assessing European coastal threats in
relation to extreme events in order to improve risk management and resilience:
PEARL (Preparing for Extreme and Rare events in coastal regions)[53] and
RISC-KIT (Resilience-Increasing Strategies for Coasts – toolKIT)[54]. The
RISES-AM Project (Responses to coastal climate change: Innovative strategies
for high end scenarios Adaptation and Mitigation)[55]
considers future sea level rise in its wave modelling approach.
A period of extreme heat, or heat
wave, is defined as a lengthy period of extraordinarily hot and/or humid
weather patterns for a set region. No set thresholds exist as defining heat
wave levels is region-specific. A tentative definition proposed by the World
Health organisation (WHO) identifies a heat wave as "a period when
maximum apparent temperature and minimum temperature are over the 90th
percentile of the monthly distribution for at least two days".[56] In
recent years, heat waves have been the extreme weather hazard that has had the
largest impact in terms of loss of life. The most vulnerable populations are
the elderly, the infirm and socio-economically deprived groups in dense urban
environments. Urban heat islands may exacerbate the effects of heat waves. In
2003, for example, heat waves killed some 70,000 people all across Europe. Heat
waves may also impact infrastructure, causing overheating and damage to
installations of transport networks, changing the conditions for vehicles' road
grip and affect the efficiency and output of energy infrastructure due to
reduced availability of cooling water.[57]
Northern countries are naturally less exposed to this threat than Southern
nations. Climate change may however lead to an increase in the occurrence and
intensity of heat waves in the future (see section 4).[58]
Droughts refer to
precipitation shortfalls stretching over a prolonged period of time which may
occur across all climates (different to aridity). These slow-onset phenomena
have widespread impacts of extensive geographical scope. Droughts are usually
classified in meteorological, agricultural, hydrological and socio-economic droughts,
depending on their duration and principal impacts. Over the past two decades,
the number of drought events in Europe has increased, potentially due to the
effects of climate change causing rising temperatures, heat waves and dry
winters. Regions of Europe with a moderate or high drought hazard are located
in the Mediterranean, especially the Iberian Peninsula, Southern France, parts
of Italy, Greece and Cyprus. However, to date no systematic drought risk
assessments have been implemented at European level. So far, potential
assessment possibilities and methodologies have been discussed at European
level in the Water Scarcity and Drought Expert Group under the Common
Implementation Strategy (CIS) for the Water Framework Directive (WFD). With the
reform of the CIS this group has, however, disappeared and it is still to be
decided which new working group should cover the topic. Drought hazards and
risk assessments will be part of the River Basin Management Plans under the WFD.[59] In
the meantime, the European Drought Observatory (EDO) has been producing data
allowing for the JRC to provide initial estimates of drought hazards and projected
changes across Europe (see map 3). These analyses will be refined and an
analysis of the current and future hazard and risk for droughts and heat waves
are included in the JRC work plan from 2014 to 2016. 
Projects related to droughts are also
being funded under the European Commission's FP7 programme such as the DEWFORA
(Improved drought early warning and forecasting to strengthen preparedness and
adaptation to droughts in Africa)[60]
and DROUGHT-R&SPI (Fostering European drought research and science – Policy
interfacing)[61]
projects. 
The issues related to droughts and water
scarcity and the potential role of the EDO have been highlighted in the
Communication on “Addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in
the European Union”[62]
as
well as in the European Parliament report “Towards a stronger European disaster
response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance”[63] and
the Communication on “A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources”[64].
One
example of a sector specific policy at EU level which addresses such severe
weather events, is the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[65] which
provides support for farmers to take preventive action against natural
disasters, adverse climate events and catastrophic events as well as to support
investment to restore the agricultural production potential damaged by these
events. In order to get support, Member States and regions have to introduce
this measure in their Rural Development Programmes. 
Finally, the Commission Communication on
an EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change refers to the increased
frequency of extreme weather events, such as droughts in Southern and Central Europe
(see section 4).[66]
Assessments of drought-proneness (see
projected change from 2011 baseline to scenario 2041-70) at NUTS-2 level[67] have
been undertaken also as part of the RESPONSES project (European responses to
climate change: deep emissions reductions and mainstreaming of mitigation and
adaptation)[68].
Projected changes in potential hotspots from different scenarios are indicated
in the map that follows.
Map 3(a): drought proneness together with
vulnerability hotspots 
at NUTS-2 administrative level for EU 27, baseline 2011
Map 3(b): drought proneness together with
vulnerability hotspots at NUTS-2 administrative level for EU27, scenario
2041-70
Map 3(c): projected change in
drought proneness from 2011 baseline to scenario 2041-70 
on NUTS-2 administrative level for
EU27
While heat waves have received much
media attention, the risks of extreme low temperatures, or cold spells,
are also high in Europe. No European definition exists of dangerously low
temperatures, but these can be understood as periods of nine consecutive days
during which temperatures reach -5°c or lower including six of those days
during which the lowest temperatures reach -10°c or lower. In recent years,
cold spells have had dramatic impacts affecting vulnerable populations and
groups (elderly, children, homeless, and people with ischemic diseases, chronic
respiratory diseases or asthma) with increased risk of mortality, as well as
causing disruptions in services and infrastructure (in transport
infrastructure: signalling problems, damage to embankments, etc.[69]).[70] Section
4 explores the impact of climate change on extreme temperatures. 
Heavy snow
and/or ice can have both an economic and social impact on a country
and/or region. Snow affecting large areas, that is, a number of counties or
regions, or an entire part of the country, usually significantly reduces standard
transport services. The cessation of transport services
(restrictions/disruptions of train operations; road traffic safety issues such
as increased risk of collision; risk of weather-related delays in all modes of
services[71])
and associated disruption to healthcare services (increased demand and reduced
ability to provide services) has both an economic and social impact. Other
costs associated with ice or snow includes de-icing and salting of roads,
repairs to roads and transmission cables. At the local level, there can be
social disruption caused by transport delays, people being unable to go to
work, strain on local services, power cuts, burst pipes, fatalities and
injuries. In addtion, prolonged snow or ice has an impact on vulnerable groups
such as the elderly or the homeless. 
Heavy rainfall is a
weather phenomenon directly linked with the flood hazard addressed above. Heavy
precipitation over a short period of time can be the cause of particularly
dangerous flash flooding. Heavy rain may also have other cascade effects such
as landslides, loss/damage of critical infrastructure and transport accidents.
In fact, the number of floods and heavy precipitation in Northern and North-eastern
Europe has increased in recent years, in line with current projections of
increased extreme events resulting from climate change as further discussed in
section 4.[72]
Analysis of
national risk assessments
The risk of severe
weather hazards was identified by: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden,
Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. While Greece and Italy do not focus on severe
weather as such, their assessment of floods is closely related. This analysis
will work with a definition of severe weather encompassing storms/hurricanes,
heat waves, cold waves, droughts, snow and/or ice and heavy rainfall.  
Storm hazards
are extensively covered across most of the NRAs submitted, confirming the
relevance of this risk for European countries. All but one (Romania) contributions
have included storms in their list of identified risks: Czech Republic;
Denmark; Estonia; Poland; Hungary; Ireland; Lithuania; the Netherlands;
Germany; Norway; Sweden; Slovenia; and the United Kingdom. Storms often encompass
a number of specific weather phenomena such as gale-strong winds,
thunderstorms, and are linked to hurricane hazards. Results of national risk
matrix assessments retrieved from risk matrices produced by Denmark, Estonia,
the Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary and the United Kingdom identify storms as
particularly high risk hazards. Storms are identified by Norway as the type of
severe weather causing the most damage. In its scenario assessment, Lithuania
points to the potential economic impacts of storms on electicity
infrastructure, civil aviation and its environmental impacts. Denmark's
analysis of historial evidence points to the cascade effect of storms on
coastal flooding as a result of storm surges. 
The risk of
extreme hot temperatures and heat waves is considered by Ireland, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Hungary and Sweden. With
the exception of Hungary whose risk assessment focuses on the high level of
impact of heat waves, all other Member States point to the high likelihood of
occurrence of these events. In their analysis of a heat wave scenario, both the
Netherlands and Sweden underline the high likelihood of occurrence of this hazard.

Closely linked with
the occurrence of heat waves, drought is also addressed across half of assessments
submitted: Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. In fact, Ireland, Lithuania and the
Netherlands combine droughts and heat waves under one hazard risk scenario. In
its scenario analyses and risk assessments, Lithuania, Norway and Ireland
underline the important environmental and socio-economic impacts of this
hazard, particularly in the agricultural and energy sectors. 
Across all
national risk assessments analysed, the risk of extreme low temperatures is
addressed in six European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Hungary,
Estonia and Poland). Little information is provided on this specific risk, as
this remains a hazard with relatively limited impact (Estonia, Ireland, United
Kingdom) or low likelihood of occurence (Hungary). Ireland assesses low
temperatures as a high likelihood event.
All the listed
countries assess this risk together with the risk of snow/ice. In fact, the
United Kingdom and Ireland address low temperatures and snow as one severe
weather phenomenon. Lithuania and the Netherlands also consider snow and ice as
a main hazard risk. No Southern European country has addressed this hazard,
which would represent a low risk due to the very low likelihood of occurrence.
The risk of heavy snowfall/ice is deemed to have both a relatively high impact
and probability in the countries which identified snow and/or ice as a national
risk. Most countries define heavy snowfall in terms of disruption to
transportation services. The day-to-day impact of snow and ice on the
individual and the state – through disruption to heating, transport, travel,
etc. – can be significant. The residual impact is comparatively low. The UK
estimates that periods of heavy snow can cost the economy £90 million
(approximately €105 million) while Hungary estimates that annual damages from
snow and ice repairs alone are between 15 to 20 billion HUF (approximately €59
million). The melting of
snow and/or ice may increase the risks of other hazards such as forest fires
due to longer dry periods (Hungary), flooding (Lithuania and The Netherlands),
rockslides and landslides (Norway). Lithuania lists the sudden melting of snow
or ice plugs as two of the five main causes of 'disaster floods' in the
country.
Rainfall is only
rarely addressed in the Member States' contributions. Only three Member States refer
to this natural phenomenon: Denmark, Hungary, and Germany. Denmark's analysis
of historical evidence confirms that heavy precipitation and cloudbursts have
impacted the country most markedly in recent years, particularly in vulnerable
urban areas. In fact, some cities have adopted comprehensive adaptation
strategies or specific action plans (e.g. on risk prevention, flood or water
management), or are in the process of doing so. Both Denmark and Hungary
underline that likelihood of occurrence is high.  
Overall, the
cross-border dimension of severe weather events, affecting more than one
country or region, is clear. All of the natural weather phenomena addressed
cover large territories across national borders. In addition, as Lithuania
indicates, the cascade effects of severe weather and ensuing cross-border risks
must be taken into account. 
Finally, more
severe and frequent weather conditions in the future can be expected as a
result of climate change. Denmark and Norway's assessments of storms, as well
as Ireland and Sweden's assessments of droughts and heat waves confirm these
worsening trends, which are further explored in section 4. 

Map
4: Participating states assessing severe weather as a main risk hazard (DG ECHO,
2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

2.3         
Forest
and wildfires

Forest and wildfires are a high probability
risk and a recurrent phenomenon in the EU. Approximately 70,000 forest fires
occur every year in the European Union, burning on average half a million
hectares of forest and natural lands. Forest fires are an essential component of ecosystem
dynamics; nevertheless, due to their growing intensity, recurrence and degree
of impact, forest fires are considered a main natural hazard in Europe. The main direct
effect of forest fires is the destruction of the natural landscape and the
consequent loss of ecosystem constituents. Over 95% of fires are
the consequence of malicious or unintended human action. Yearly economic losses
due to forest fires are estimated at about €2 billion. In addition to
ecological and economic losses, fires result in the loss of human lives every
year. During the summer of 2007, forest fires in Greece alone claimed 80 lives among civilians
and fire fighters.[73]
Forest fire hazards are not evenly
distributed in Europe. The meteorological conditions under which forest fires take place
determine their impact. Drought, high temperatures and strong winds facilitate fire ignition
and spread. Since these conditions are found more frequently in Southern and
South East European countries, these are the ones suffering most from the damages caused by
fires, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Portugal
and Spain. Approximately, 85% of the total annual burnt area in Europe is
located in five EU Mediterranean countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and
Greece. The forest fire season which affects Southern Europe every summer
requires a large amount of both human and material resources such as
fire-fighting planes and helicopters. In
fact, the number of forest
fires in
Southern and
Central Europe has increased
in recent years, confirming projections of
increased extreme events resulting from climate change as further discussed in
section 4.[74]
While the EU Treaty
makes no reference to specific provisions for an EU forest policy, the EU has a
long history of contributing through its policies to implementing sustainable
forest management and to Member States’ decisions on forests. The Commission
has recently adopted an EU Forest Strategy[75] that gives a new framework in
response to the increasing demands put on forests and to significant societal
and political changes that have affected forests over the last 15 years. Protection
of forests from different threats, including fire is one of the priorities of this
strategy, which also identifies prevention of fires as a key area for  Member
States to advance.  Furthermore,
the Forest Focus Regulation (EC) no. 2152/2003 provides for a Community scheme
for a harmonised, long-term monitoring of the condition of forests, including
forest fires. Created in 1998 by the JRC and the Commission Directorate General
for Environment, the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) is a
comprehensive information source for fires across the EU[76]. Its role is to
support the services in charge of the protection of forests against fires in
the EU and neighbouring countries, while also providing the European Commission
and Parliament with information on forest and wildfires in Europe. 
The
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) provides support for
forest fire prevention and restoration. In the framework of shared management,
the Member States and regions can decide on how to use the EAFRD and on the priority
they give to forest fire prevention and restoration actions. During the
programming period 2007-2013 the five Mediterranean countries allocated more
than €1.2 billion for measures targeting prevention and restoration of natural
disasters and fires. 
The Regulation on support for rural
development[77]
continues support for the period 2014-2020 for activities preventing and
restoring damage to forests from fires and other natural disasters and
catastrophic events including pests, diseases as well as climate change related
events. Eligibility conditions and amounts available for such actions will be
laid down in the new Rural Development Programmes of each Member State or
region. Eligible operations shall be consistent with the forest protection
plans established by the Member States. Support may also be provided for
investments improving forest resilience and interventions concerning climate
services[78].
Restoration measures following
disastrous forest fires are also eligible for funding through the EU Solidarity
Fund[79]. 
It is possible to assess the incidence
of forest fires on the basis of fire statistics from past years; this approach
was used to derive the map presented in the figure below. In this figure, areas
with high fire incidence are those in which the either the number of fires or
the burnt area statistics in the past years were considered high or very high.
A more complex methodology taking into account other fire related variables
such as fuels, topography, etc. will lead to a comprehensive fire risk map at
the European level.

Map 5: Forest fire incidence
in Europe (JRC, 2012) 
Analysis of
national risk assessments
An analysis of
the Member States' contributions identifies 11 Member States looking at the
risk of forest and wildfires: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia,
Estonia, Poland, Romania, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
Forest and wild
fires are a highly prominent hazard in Southern Europe. Fires are recurrent
hazards during the summer season across Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece
and Cyprus. However, of the countries listed, only Greece has so far
contributed to this overview. Further contributions may in the future address
this hazard and contribute to this analysis. 
Northern countries
such as Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Hungary and Poland have also identified
wildfires and forest fires as a threat as one large forest fire regardless of
the season may have bigger impacts than many small ones. 
The main impacts
of forest and wildfires are predominantly environmental but may also be human
and socio-economic. According to the UK, wildfires can cause damage and
disruption of transport systems and critical infrastructure (airports, power
lines, etc.), businesses and private property; in fact, "the impacts of
wildfires will be most significant if they occur close to urban areas"[80].
Notwithstanding the varying impacts highlighted across the relevant NRAs, all
countries having submitted assessable data converge on the relatively high
level of probability of occurrence of this hazard.
The cross-border
dimension of this hazard is underlined by Hungary. Indeed, fires are hazards
which progress and affect areas irrespective of national boundaries. Greece
also points to the regional dimension of this risk, stressing that all Southern
European countries are particularly vulnerable to fires in the summer period.
Finally, the
impact of climate change of the forest fire hazard is addressed by Hungary. The
importance of forest and wildfires has increased in recent years, partly due to
extreme weather conditions, low amounts of precipitation, high mean
temperatures and low/no snow cover in recent winter seasons. This is further
explored in section 4.

Map
6: Participating states assessing forest and wildfires as a main risk hazard (DG
ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

2.4         
Earthquakes

Earthquakes are generally the
result of a sudden subterranean release of energy due to an abrupt shift along
a fault fracture. In fact, more than 90% of earthquakes are caused at plate
boundaries. The
main fault lines in
Europe are
where the Eurasian plate meets the African plate and runs through the
Mediterranean Sea. Greece, Italy, Cyprus Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia as well
as Romania and Bulgaria around the Black Sea are particularly at risk.
The JRC has been involved in
earthquake risk science through various Units and actions, as well as through
participation in FP7 projects
such as Project Syner-G (Systemic
Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for buildings, lifeline networks and
infrastructure’s Safety Gain)[81] and other scientific
projects,
including
the GEM
Project (Global Earthquake Model)[82]. The JRC is also running
an operational earthquake impact assessment system in the framework of the
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)[83]. GDACS has collected
earthquake data since 2003 in Europe and globally. The JRC tool RAPID-N, used for
the risk assessment of NaTech risks at local and regional level, has also
currently been implemented for earthquakes.[84]
The consequences of earthquake hazards
are
difficult to assess in a top-down approach. Earthquakes can trigger secondary
effects (like landslides, floods
caused by dam
breaks, liquefaction,
and tsunamis resulting from submarine quakes in sea basins such as the Atlantic
west and the Mediterranean)
and local amplification (local soil conditions that amplify the seismic motion and cause more
destruction), for which local knowledge is necessary. 
Furthermore, to
assess the potential risk for infrastructure and population, local knowledge is
required on vulnerability and exposure, including the location and structural
characteristics of buildings, the applicable zonation and building codes, and the
level of compliance with the codes. Vulnerability of the population should also be taken
into account: for instance, socio-economic deprived populations, with worse
housing conditions, might be expected to be more vulnerable.
Data is generally not
available at national or European level, obliging top-down risk assessments to
make assumptions and therefore making them less precise. However, they are useful
tools to understand which
regions are most at risk and which need to be encouraged to make more detailed
risk assessments.
Based on hazard
data and overlaid with major cities (population 50000+), the JRC was able identify the
top 20 European cities at risk from earthquakes (see annex 6). Furthermore, the
European Commission is funding under its 7th Framework Programme
projects on earthquakes such as the project SHARE (Seismic Hazard Assessment in
Europe)[85], which provides the
first complete seismic hazard model across Europe based on the most
comprehensive databases of active faults, subduction zones, earthquakes, and
strong-ground motion records. The reassessed combined model of earthquake
occurrence, frequency and magnitude of future activity includes higher values
of maximum magnitudes than previously estimated. The new reference European
Seismic Hazard Map displays the ground shaking (i.e. Peak Ground Acceleration)
to be reached or exceeded with a 10% probability in 50 years, corresponding to
an average recurrence of such ground motions every 475 years, as prescribed by
the national building codes in Europe for standard buildings; the values of
expected ground shaking are in many areas higher than previously estimated, and
reach over 0.5g ('g' standing for gravitational acceleration) in the areas of
highest seismic activity. For the first time, SHARE computed for the whole
European area also the higher ground shaking expected only every 1,000-5,000
years, of importance for the risk assessment and the protection of critical
infrastructures such as dams or bridges considering the appropriate range of
resonance periods. The new European seismic hazard model is the EU's
contribution to the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) programme initiated by the
OECD. 
Other projects like
Syner-G[86] explore new ways of
assessing the systemic seismic vulnerabilities and related risks of building
lifeline or built infrastructures, such as projects REAKT (Strategies and tools
for Real Time Earthquake Risk Reduction)[87] that works on the
improvement of forecasting, early warning and real-time risk reduction, and
NERA (Network
of European Research Infrastructures for Earthquake Risk Assessment and
Mitigation)[88].
Map 7: Earthquake
hazard in Europe (FP7 Share project)
Analysis of
national risk assessments
The following Member States have identified seismic hazards in
their contributions
to this overview:
Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece (annex 7), Hungary, Italy (annex 8),
Romania, and Slovenia. 
All South-Eastern
European countries underline the particularly high risk of this natural hazard.
The human and socio-economic impacts of this hazard are of biggest concern. With its situation in
the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece – along with neighbouring countries along the
Mediterranean coast –
is in a particularly
high-risk
area for earthquakes. Historical records show a number of major earth or
seaquakes occurring there. A hazard map produced by
Greece divides the country into three areas with different hazard levels (see annex 7). Italy
is a country with high seismicity, characterised by regions where earthquake
risk is of high likelihood and low impact (Vesuvius and Etna regions) as well
as regions of low likelihood and high impact (Calabria Apennines, Eastern
Sicily). Mortality rate due to earthquake hazards in Italy is 30,000 times more
important than for any other natural hazard. Similarly, while overall seismic
activity and related seismic risk in Hungary is medium, some regions such as
Budapest-Kecskemét – one of the most active and highly populated – have a high
seismic risk. Slovenia also identifies earthquakes as one of top two high
risks.
By their very nature,
earthquakes are unpredictable hazards that occur irrespective of national
borders. The cross-border dimension of the earthquake risk is correlated to the
exposure of areas along the fault lines in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Black Sea regions. 
Across all the Member
States looking at earthquake risks, special attention is given to the need to
reduce the growing vulnerability of communities to this hazard. Indeed, urban
areas are developing in seismic areas, thus increasing the potential human and
socio-economic impacts. All contributions address the importance of reducing
the vulnerability of buildings, in line with the Eurocode 8[89] recommendations.

Map 8: Participating states assessing earthquakes as a main risk
hazard (DG ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main
risk; light grey: participating states not identifying this hazard in their
submitted national risk assessments; white: countries for which no information
is available)
2.5         
Pandemics/Epidemics

A pandemic or epidemic
can have direct impacts on life, health and well-being, and severe indirect consequences
in the form of socio-economic losses and strain on public health services and
other areas of governance.  HIV/AIDS is to date the most studied pandemic in
history. NRAs addressing pandemic threats have focused on pandemic influenza,
which has been of most relevance in recent years. While predictions over the
timing and nature of future pandemic outbreaks are difficult, it is agreed that
the most likely future pandemic will be due to a novel influenza-A virus. The
immunity of the human population to new influenza viruses with pandemic
potential is limited or absent. Influenza pandemics would primarily have
impacts on human health, as well as incurring both direct and indirect economic
costs.[90]
Furthermore, people with chronic diseases can be more vulnerable to epidemic
and pandemic hazards.    
Three flu pandemics occurred worldwide in the 20th
century. The Spanish flu killed over 20 million people between 1918 and 1919;
the Asian flu killed over one million people between 1957 and 1958; the third flu
pandemic occurred in Hong Kong in 1968-69 killing 800,000 people. Pandemics
recur every 30-40 years following a variation in the virus' antigenetic
structure, leading to the emergence of new Type A flu virus subtypes. The type
A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009 was the first of the 21st century, which resulted in
casualties in several countries and required responses at global, EU and
national level.
Another example is the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, called
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). SARS was first reported in Asia in
February 2003. The illness spread to more than two dozen countries in North
America, South America, Europe, and Asia before the SARS global outbreak of
2003 was contained. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a total
of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS during the 2003 outbreak. Of
these, 774 died. During the SARS event, tourist and transportation industries
have been heavily impacted by the restriction of movements on a global level.
The estimated income loss ranges from US$12.3-28.4 billion for East and
Southeast Asia as a whole. [91]
Preparedness and response planning to mitigate or
prevent the impacts of pandemics is carried out by Member States of the EU
through pandemic preparedness plans, a number of which have been updated since
the influenza pandemic of 2009. Strong action on health threats is already
being taken at EU-level. The European Commission, the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)[92] and the WHO Regional Office for
Europe have since 2005 been providing assistance to the Member States. 
The
Commission through its Directorate General for Health & Consumers coordinates
EU action in the field of preparedness and response planning for serious
cross-border health threats[93].
It aims at strengthening capacities to respond rapidly to any kind of emergency
affecting or likely to affect public health. This includes advising national
authorities and ensuring that they take on board the EU dimension, considering
that emergency planning at national level may also have an impact beyond
borders. An EU-level strategy is under development to coordinate rapid risk
assessments and scientific advice that can then feed into risk management
decisions at EU-level. This strategy will also ensure the inter-operability of
national plans through coordination mechanisms, analysis and communication
tools. 
EU research programmes[94]
are tackling research preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks via on-going
FP7 funded projects on emerging infectious diseases[95] where
relevant clauses are included in the grant agreement, providing the possibility
and obligation to change research priorities in case of an outbreak in order to
ensure a rapid research response. Horizon 2020[96]
also includes preparedness for new and emerging infections, including zoonosis
as a priority: the first Horizon 2020 calls published in December 2013 include
a call on the rapid identification of pathogens to improve the control of infectious
epidemics and foodborne outbreaks. Finally, the initiative on Global Research
Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R) launched in
February 2013 together with the US, Canada, China, Australia, the United
Kingdom, France and Sweden, aims to start an effective
research response within 48 hours of a significant outbreak of a new or
re-emerging epidemic. For this purpose the GloPID-R teams up funding bodies
investing in research related to new or re-emerging infectious diseases with
the objectives to strengthen the global research preparedness capacities by
addressing the scientific, administrative and financial challenges which
currently hamper international collaboration and a rapid response. 
A
recent Council and Parliament Decision addresses the important cross-border
dimension of threats to health including threats of biological origin including
communicable diseases, and chemical and environmental as well as unknown
threats. In the case of influenza epidemics with pandemic potential or other
serious events, the Commission may recognize a state of public health
emergency.[97]
The impact of climate change is of relevance to pandemic risk insofar that
changes in temperatures and climate may affect the outbreak and spread of
diseases (see section 4 on emerging risks).  
Analysis of
national risk assessments
13 Member States and Norway have
identified pandemics and/or epidemics as a main risk hazard: Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A distinction
should be made between epidemics – more localised viral outbreaks – and
pandemics – global scale outbreak. Member States tend to focus on an assessment
of pandemics based on the greater severity and the geographical scope of this
hazard. 
Pandemics are considered one of the most
severe threats with potential important human impacts on health and indirect
socio-economic impacts as a consequence of the affected manpower running vital
social and economic services. The recurrence of past pandemics suggests that
this hazard may occur a few times a century, while more localised epidemics may
occur more frequently. The overall uncertainty in measuring the level of impact
and likelihood of pandemics make it a prominent hazard central to many NRAs.   
Based on their assessment of pandemic
scenarios, the
United Kingdom and Norway assess influenza pandemics as posing the highest
overall risk of all hazards addressed. Poland identifies pandemics as
the second highest risk hazard and Estonia assesses this hazard in its top
'very high-risk emergencies' category, in both cases alongside floods.
According to Denmark, unpredictability over the likelihood and impact of this
hazard should grant it a prominent place in countries' priority ranking of
hazards. In the case of Slovenia, while pandemics only rank as a medium overall
risk, it is identified as one requiring considerable attention in future
disaster risk management initiatives. In fact, an analysis of the few matrices
provided suggests that, notwithstanding the scenario and assessment criteria
and scales used, the risk level of pandemics is high to very high across all of
the relevant Member States.
The cross-border nature of this threat
is underlined by Member States. In its scenario assessment, Lithuania
highlights the potential threat to third countries and neighbouring states in
particular. Based on their scenario assessment, Estonia, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and Denmark insist upon the cross-border dimension of this
hazard by pointing to the high volatility and global nature of pandemics,
accentuated by modern mobility beyond national borders.

Map
9: Participating states assessing epidemics/pandemics as a main risk hazard (DG
ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

2.6         
Livestock
epidemics/epizootics

The outbreak of
illness among animal populations, particularly livestock, is also a major
concern to countries in the EU. Animals and the foodstuffs production process
can be exposed to a variety of serious infectious diseases. Some animal
diseases are confined to a single species, while others can spread from one
species to another. When a livestock epidemic spreads from animals to
humans, this is called an epizootic or zoonotic development[98]. 
Some of the most
severe epidemics include classic swine fever, avian influenza, foot-and-mouth
disease, bluetongue, African Horse Sickness, Newcastle disease, West Nile virus
and rabies. Animal diseases can be distinguished in two categories:
non-zoonotic diseases, which are limited to infection amongst animals and zoonotic
diseases which are transmissible to humans. Non-zoonotic diseases, include
foot-and-mouth (a highly-contagious viral infection affecting all ruminants and
pigs), classical swine fever (a viral infection affecting swine), bluetongue (a
viral infection affecting ruminants sheep) and African Horse Sickness (a
disease affecting horses transmitted by insects). Zoonotic diseases include: the
highly pathogenic avian influenza HPAI (a viral infection of the influenza-A
virus affecting birds), rabies (a fatal viral infection affecting the nervous
system of mammals – the most recent form is present in bat populations), and the
West Nile virus (a viral infection of birds, horses and humans spread by
mosquitos). 
All of these
diseases are classified by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)[99] as
'list A' diseases, meaning that they are fast spreading diseases of major
economic importance[100].
Indeed, such epidemics can result in substantial losses for governments,
farmers and all other stakeholders involved in the livestock production chain.
In countries with a highly industrialised agricultural sector, vulnerability to
the spread of such diseases is particularly high. In addition,
epizootic/zoonotic developments may also have serious human impacts on health. 
Other serious
forms of epidemics include those affecting farmed fish and shellfish in
aquaculture, as well as outbreaks of organisms affecting the wider natural
ecosystem, with harmful effects on the economy and possibly human life (toxic
algae, jellyfish). 
Similarly to pandemics, the
impact of climate change is of relevance to livestock epidemic risk insofar
that changes in temperatures and climate may affect the outbreak and spread of
diseases (see section 4 on emerging risks).  
EU legislation
to control avian influenza is laid out in Directive 92/40/EEC, which requires
the investigation of suspected cases of avian flu, as well as the humane
killing of infected poultry and of feeding stuffs/equipment/manure as a means
of limiting the spread of the disease[101].
Directive 2000/75/EC lays out the control rules and measures to fight
bluetongue, establishing surveillance zones and possible bans on susceptible
animals leaving these areas[102].
Swine fever control measures are laid out in Directive 2001/89/EC: in the case
of an outbreak, all pigs of infected farms must be put down and cadavers
destroyed; protection and surveillance zones must be put in place[103].  Measures
to be taken to combat African Horse Sickness are laid out in Directive
92/35/EEC[104].
EU control measures for foot-and-mouth disease are laid out in Directive
2003/85/EC aiming at regaining the disease infected-free status of the
territory in question[105].
For foot-and-mouth disease provisions are also made for the use of emergency
vaccination. As a result, the EU has the biggest antigen bank worldwide for
express vaccine formulations. 
Analysis of
national risk assessments
The risk of livestock epidemics is identified
by 12 Member States: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Terminology used by Member States includes: livestock epidemics;
epizootic/zoonotic; animal diseases. In some cases, distinction is made between
epizootic and non-epizootic diseases (Denmark; Lithuania; United Kingdom). In
this overview, livestock epidemics combine both epizootic and non-epizootic
developments. 
Member States point to the potential
socio-economic and human impacts of this hazard. All countries having assessed
this risk scenario stress the impact on the production and trade of food
products (poultry, meat) and the potential human impact through health risks
associated with epizootics (Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania and the United
Kingdom). In addition, Ireland points to the potential impact on tourism as a
result of restricted access to country-side areas. 
Results gathered from national risk
matrices suggest that the risk of livestock epidemics is considered relatively
low compared to similar hazards such as human-to-human transmissible pandemics.
With the exception of Lithuania, all countries analysed ranked the probability
of occurrence of a livestock epidemic as moderate and below, which remains a
comparatively low score compared to other hazards assessed. 
Livestock epidemics and epizootics have
a clear cross-border dimension as the spread of the virus to neighbouring
countries is possible due to the fast spread of viruses and global wild fauna
migration irrespective of national borders. The cross-border dimension of this
risk is addressed by Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. In
particular, Lithuania presents a scenario addressing the impact of migrating
wild fauna in the Nemunas Delta, a well-studied passage for migrating birds
along the Baltic coast, where birds infected with High Pathogenic Avian
Influenza will increase the likelihood of viral infections in the area.
In identifying the possible future
trends of this hazard, Denmark warns that climate change and global warming may
increase the risk of livestock epidemic epizootic outbreaks as a result of
changing geographical distribution of wild animals and varying migratory
routes. Rising temperatures may also lead to the appearance of new fertile
environments for diseases so far considered exotic in Europe. The impact of
climate change as an emerging risk is further developed in section 4.

Map
10: Participating states assessing livestock epidemics as a main risk hazard (DG
ECHO, 2014)
 (dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

3         
Man-made Non-malicious Disaster
Risks
3.1         
Industrial
accidents

Establishments where
significant[106]
quantities of dangerous substances are handled or stored represent a major
source of industrial
accident
risk for
human populations and the environment.
Substances
may be considered dangerous because of health hazards (e.g. acute toxic
substances), physical hazards (e.g. explosives, highly flammable substances) or
environmental hazards. It
is of great importance to understand the hazards involved in the activities of the establishments
handling such substances,
and to keep information and maps that illustrate the possible consequences of
any accident that could happen at relevant establishments. Types of industry covered in this
category include chemical
installations, fuel storage, chemicals manufacture, general engineering, liquefied
natural gas (LNG) production, storage and distribution, cement lime or plaster
manufacture, processing of metals, production of pharmaceuticals, waste
treatment etc..
The 'Seveso' Directive on the control of major accident hazards involving
dangerous substances sets a European framework for the prevention of,
preparedness for and response to industrial accidents[107]. The Seveso Directive obliges Member States to ensure that operators
have a policy in place to prevent major accidents. Operators handling dangerous
substances above certain thresholds must notify their activities to the
relevant national competent authorities, submit safety reports, establish a
safety management system and set up an internal emergency plan. Member States
shall ensure that the public likely to be affected by an industrial accident is
regularly informed and that relevant information is kept permanently available
for the public, also electronically. National competent authorities must ensure
that external emergency plans are in place for the surrounding areas and that
mitigation actions are planned. Regular inspections must take place. Account
must also be taken of the objectives of prevention and control of
major-accident hazards in land-use planning. There is a tiered approach to the
level of controls: the larger the quantities of dangerous substances present
within an establishment, the stricter the rules ('upper-tier' establishments
have bigger quantities than 'lower-tier' establishments and are therefore
subject to tighter control).
The 'Environmental Liability
Directive' (ELD) aims at preventing and remedying environmental damage, defined
as damage to biodiversity, water and land, based on the polluter-pays principle[108]. The
Directive establishes strict liability for operators carrying out certain
hazardous activities (chemical industry and other 'big' industry, carbon
capture and storage (CCS) installations, waste management including
shipment of waste and mining waste, water related activities, handling, use,
manufacture of dangerous substances, preparations or biocides, transport of
dangerous substances, Genetically
modified organism (GMO)-related activities,
offshore oil and gas activities etc.). They are obliged to take preventive
action in case of imminent threat of environmental damage and to take remedial
action in case of damage to the above indicated natural resources and their
services (restore them to their baseline condition). The ELD does not establish
remediation for traditional damage (damage to property, personal injury/health
damage, economic loss). The Directive is supposed to create a deterrent effect
on operators, inducing them to operate their activity safely, inter alia by
carrying out risk assessments. The ELD does however not establish mandatory
financial security at EU level but leaves this decision up to the Member States
(eight have decided to introduce mandatory systems: Spain, Portugal, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece). 
Accidental releases involving
dangerous substances in chemical installations, petrochemical and oil refineries
happen frequently in Europe and demonstrate the need for better and more
efficient control of major industrial hazards.  Industrial accident prevention
and preparedness in Europe is aimed not only at preventing major catastrophes,
such as the fire in the petroleum storage depot at Buncefield (United Kingdom,
2005) or the ammonium nitrate explosion in Toulouse (France, 2001), but also at
smaller
incidents that
violate the right to a safe community, a safe workplace and a clean
environment.  Figure 1 below shows the number of major accidents in EU, European Economic Area
(EEA) and European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) countries from 2001
– 2011.[109]

Figure
2:
Number of Major Accidents in the eMARS database from 2001 – 2011 (JRC,
2012)
The number of Seveso
establishments per country is illustrated in Map 11 below (see ranked order in Annex 9). At the end of 2012,
there were 9,778 Seveso establishments in Europe. Of the total EU/EEA
establishments, approximately 47% had upper tier status and 53% lower tier
status in 2012. Typically, the most industrialised countries have the most
establishments. Together, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom account
for more than half (55%) of total Seveso establishments in Europe. 

Map
11: number of Seveso establishments in EEA countries (JRC, 2012)
Analysis of
national risk assessments
14 Member States and Norway have identified
industrial/chemical accidents in their national risk assessments, six of which
using a risk matrix: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Analysis of this hazard in this
overview regroups industrial accidents, chemical and hazardous material
(hazmat) accidents. Member States also refer to chemical contamination (Poland,
Sweden), hazardous industrial accidents (Hungary, Norway), the release of
chemical substances (Germany) and accidents with dangerous substances
(Denmark). While 'dangerous substances' generally refer to an array of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances, this section will
concentrate on chemical substances, while radiological and nuclear accidents
will be discussed in a later section of this overview.
The main consequences of industrial and
chemical accidents identified in the NRAs are: human, due to risks of fire,
explosion, and contamination; environmental, due to the risk of water and
ground contamination; and economic, due to the damage and repair costs incurred
and the cascading effect on surrounding economic activity. 
According to the results of Member
States' risk assessments, the risk of major industrial or chemical accident
scenarios is considered relatively low, due to high levels of regulation and
control measures in place (United Kingdom, Denmark), to the national phasing
out of highly dangerous substances (Denmark) and, in some cases, to few
existing lower and upper tier Seveso sites domestically (Ireland). Notwithstanding,
while other hazards may supersede industrial accidents in their assessed level
of risk (for example, in Greece these accidents are considered much less
frequent than earthquakes and wildfire), Member States insist that the risk of
industrial accidents cannot be underestimated (Greece; United Kingdom; Denmark;
Ireland). This is particularly the case as many industrial and chemical sites
may be located in close proximity to local communities (United Kingdom;
Ireland; Lithuania; Norway).  
The cross-border dimension of this risk
is relevant insofar those industrial and chemical accidents may lead to the
spreading of chemicals in the air or water (Lithuania). The risk of chemical
accidents may also be the result of a transport accident in the import of
dangerous chemical substances from neighbouring countries (Denmark). 
Finally, Denmark's risk assessment
addresses the link between climate change and industrial/chemical accidents,
pointing to growing risks of extreme weather exposing chemical plants to
increased risks of damage/disruption.

Map
12: Participating states assessing industrial/chemical accidents as a main risk
hazard (DG ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

3.2         
Nuclear/radiological
accidents

As defined by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a nuclear or radiological accident
corresponds to "any accident involving facilities or activities from
which a release of radiological material occurs or is likely to occur and which
has resulted or may result in an international trans-boundary release that
could be of radiological safety significance for another state".[110] 
There are
currently 131 nuclear reactors in operation in the EU, grouped on 56 sites in
14 Member States. Their safety record is such that although
"incidents" have occurred and continue to occur, no "major
accidents" have ever taken place[111].
In general nuclear accidents correspond to low probability/high impact type of
risks, with potentially high human, economic and environmental (marine and
inland) impacts. Due to the high potential impact of any nuclear accident,
nuclear power plants are subject to strict safety and security controls and
national authorities have strict prevention and mitigation measures in place.
Following the
accident at the Fukushima reactors (Japan) in March 2011, it was agreed that
all nuclear power plants in the EU should be reviewed by independent parties by
undergoing a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment, also
known as 'stress tests'. These 2011-12 stress tests re-assessed the safety
margins of the EU power plants against the impacts from extreme external
events, such as earthquakes and flooding. The first findings of the stress
tests were published in a Commission Communication[112] and
were followed on the technical level by the adoption of the European Nuclear
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress test report with a large number of
recommendations for technical improvements at all nuclear power plants in all
participating countries[113]
and on the political level by a second Commission Communication[114]
including an agreement to pursue further examinations.
After the Fukushima
accidents, the nuclear fission energy area of the Framework Programme of the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for nuclear research and training
activities[115]
was re-oriented towards more safety research of existing reactors (accident
prevention, probability risk assessment, severe accident management, plant life
management). In the field of radiation protection, research is focused on
better understanding the risks arising from low dose of radiation and long term
exposures such as those occurring after a nuclear accident for the most exposed
population. Better scientific knowledge in this field will help reduce
uncertainties that are the source of increasing costs of countermeasures after
an accident.
Analysis of
national risk assessments
12 Member States and Norway identify the
risk of nuclear and/or radiological accidents: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia and Sweden. Ireland and Sweden distinguish nuclear and radiological
accidents, while both indicate nuclear accident as a hazard originating abroad.
Germany addresses the threat of 'release of radioactive substances' including
the threat of nuclear/radiological accidents as well as other forms of
radioactive release.
National assessments attributed the limited
likelihood of such hazard occurring, in part due to the high level of technical
standards, organisation, authority control and safety culture. In terms of impact,
however, there is a shared view that the human, environmental and economic impacts
of a nuclear accident could be very severe, involving land/water contamination,
longer-term health complications due to exposure to radiation (cancers) or
psychological stress and important economic costs due to losses in the
agricultural sector, reduced tourism and affected industrial production. 
An analysis of risk matrices in national
assessments received confirms the high impact/low probability risk of nuclear
accidents through clear differences in the scores allocated for impact and
those for likelihood of occurrence: the probability of occurrence of a nuclear
accident obtains low to very low scores across the matrix assessments
submitted. Comparatively, impact ratings are much higher. 
The cross-border dimension of this
hazard is underlined by Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania and Norway. The
spreading of radiation in the air, the contamination of the environment and the
economic impacts will affect both the country in which the nuclear accident
occurs and neighbouring countries. In fact, Ireland identifies the threat of a
nuclear accident as an external risk – distinctive from a domestic radiological
incident –, Norway stressed that it is "surrounded" by countries with
some form of nuclear activity, and Lithuania breaks down its scenario analysis
into the internal and external dimension of the threat. 

Map
13: Participating states assessing nuclear/radiological accidents as a main
risk hazard (DG ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

3.3         
Major
transport accidents

Transport
accidents refer to maritime, air and land accidents involving the
transport of people, goods or services. Transport accidents can be caused both
intentionally (e.g. terrorist act) or unintentionally. Most common are transport
accidents related to technical or mechanical failures or involving human factors.

Maritime transport constitutes a complex
network posing several challenges from a safety, environmental and security
standpoint. The sector, with many elements of critical infrastructure, needs a
comprehensive approach in assessing associated risk landscape with quantitative
risk analysis. From a risk analysis perspective, the maritime transport is a
network of maritime operations that interface with shore-side operations at
intermodal connections as part of the overall European supply chains or
domestic commercial operations. The networks have components that include
vessels, port facilities, waterways and waterway infrastructure, and intermodal
connections and users, including crew, passengers, and navigation
infrastructure and services. With regards vessels, risk factors should be
associated with events such as on board fire, collision with another vessel,
explosion, sinking, grounding and contact with an industrial fixed structure.
In the case of cargo, oil and gas transport by sea poses both safety and
environmental challenges. Hazards include wasting oil and gas, injuries, ship and
property damage and environmental degradation. Maritime transportation of
dangerous goods and related hazards has become some of the most important
issues in transportation and environmental discussions. In addition, most major
ports, which are no longer restricted to industrial areas due to urban
development, are located next to volatile maritime infrastructure that could
lead to mass conflagration as a result of a natural event or man-made
intentional attack. These risks could have environmental impacts on much larger
areas due to toxic gas releases.  
Transport accidents in the aviation sector can occur
anywhere but are more likely near or at aerodromes.  Large aircraft
commercial air transport accidents are rare but can have significant
consequences.  Catastrophic accidents can mean large numbers of lives are
lost in one event.  In terms of numbers of fatalities losses of control
and flight into terrain represent the biggest threats.  In 1977, the
Tenerife disaster, a fatal collision between two Boeing 747 passenger aircrafts
on the Spanish island, resulted in a total of 583 fatalities, and remains the
deadliest civil accident to date.  In addition, security events (hijacking
and terrorist acts) can result in catastrophic accidents.  
Land transport accidents may occur on railways or
roads and on/in related infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels, stations, stopping-places,
freight terminals, etc. Transport accidents in the railway sector include
collisions between trains running on the same track or changing tracks; failure
of the railway infrastructure (track, bridges, embankments, etc.) or train
control system causing derailment or collision. Transport accidents in the road
sector can occur through collisions between buses, heavy goods vehicles, cars,
etc. and in connection with road works. The most common transport accidents are
road traffic crashes, accounting for around 26 000 fatalities in 2013 and many
more serious injuries, at large cost to society. In the case of severe weather
scenarios but notably for storms, heat, snow/ice and heavy rainfall, the risk
of road traffic crashes increases substantially because of reduced visibility,
slippery road surfaces or winds affecting the vehicle's direction of movement.
The risks can be reduced by properly sensitising road users to the need to
adapt speed and driving behaviour to the road conditions. Both for road and
railway sectors, accidents in tunnels, on bridges or in areas with limited
possibilities of evacuation can constitute a special risk, especially if
combined with the risk of explosion of dangerous goods and/or the risk of
on-board fire. The Mont Blanc tunnel accident of 1999 resulted both in
immediate human casualties and long-term economic and social disruptions due to
its ensuing closure for 3 years. In the rail sector, accident rates have been
showing a consistent improvement year on year, although in 2013, major derailments
occurred in Bretigny-sur-Orge, France, and in Galicia, Spain.  
Finally, in agreement with
Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
September 2008 on the inland transport of dangerous goods, competent
Authorities of the Member States may impose restrictions on transport of
dangerous goods. However, the restrictions imposed on one transport mode may just
lead to transfer of the risk to other transport mode or to alternative routes
in neighbouring countries. In some cases, the overall result may be an increase
of risk to the public (e.g. if the alternative transport mode is less safe or
if the alternative route is much longer). This transfer of risk should be taken
into account in the assessment carried out by the competent Authority deciding
the restriction.
Analysis of
national risk assessments
10 contributions address the risk
of transport accidents: Estonia, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The types of
transport accidents assessed include maritime, aircraft and land (rail &
road), as well as the transport across all types of sectors of hazardous
materials.
Despite an increase in the volume
and intensity of traffic across all three transport sectors, which would in
principle increase the probability of occurrence of major transport accidents,
higher safety standards, greater regulation and control measures have in fact brought
about a reduction of major accidents in recent years. All assessments underline
the need to look at transport accident risks due to their potentially severe
human, economic and environmental impacts.
Maritime transport accidents are
granted particular attention across the NRAs. As the below map illustrates,
most of the countries addressing this hazard have coastal borders. Lithuania,
Sweden and Norway only address maritime accidents, while Estonia and Ireland
assess the risk of maritime transport accidents higher than for other forms of
transport. Maritime transport accidents involving cruise ships, containers and
tankers tend to present high risk due to the severity of their human, economic
and environmental impacts. Through different scenarios, Estonia, Norway and
Lithuania focus on the environmental impacts of maritime accidents. Sweden's
scenario involving the contamination of waterworks highlight the human impact
of these accidents; Norway and Denmark underline the risk of high number of
casualties resulting from a maritime accident. 
Aircraft accidents may result in
high human impact of numerous casualties as is identified by Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. Land transport accidents – rail and road – are
generally considered of lower risk for the very low number of accidents
requiring an emergency response at a national scale, combined with improved
technical and safety standards across all the transport sectors (Denmark,
Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom).  
Of relevance to all forms of
transport accidents, however, is the risk of accidents in the transport of
hazardous material (hazmat)[116].
This risk is generally addressed alongside industrial accidents (Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom). The causes of such accidents are those
relevant to any transport accident, but the consequences due to spillage, fires
and explosions of these substances will resemble those of chemical accidents
identified in the above section, affecting health, property and the
environment.
The cross-border dimension of this
hazard is rarely referred to in national assessments, but its relevance is
clear. As Lithuania concludes from its scenario analysis, the spillage of fuel
or hazardous substances resulting from a major maritime transport accident may affect
waters and coastlines of neighbouring countries. 
Finally, the cascade effect of
increased extreme weather conditions resulting from climate change on transport
accidents is briefly mentioned in Denmark's assessment.

Map
14: Participating states assessing transport accidents as a main risk hazard (DG
ECHO, 2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

3.4         
Loss
of critical infrastructure

The potential for loss
of critical infrastructure has been specifically identified as a cascade effect
of most of the other risks addressed in this review.  There is also an
additional risk of direct malicious and non-malicious interference to the
normal operation of critical infrastructure. 
The impacts arising
from a loss of critical infrastructure, are the disruption to, or complete
cessation of, the delivery of essential services to large sections of the
public. Essential services include the provision of energy, water, food,
communications, health and emergency response services, transport and finance.
The effects on citizens arising from disruption or cessation of any of these
essential services will depend on the duration of the disruption, the time of
year, the resilience of the service, and the response by the authorities, but
will probably involve a societal effect, economic consequences, and in extreme
cases casualties.[117]
In 2006 a major
electricity blackout occurred, which affected 15 million households for about
two hours. The initial cause was a routine disconnection of a power line
crossing in Germany to allow a ship to pass beneath the overhead cables.
However, as a result of insufficient communication between the operators,
unexpected load flows resulted in the loss of a key distribution
interconnector. Within seconds, an electrical blackout had cascaded across
Europe, including Poland, the Benelux countries, France, Portugal, Spain,
Morocco, Greece and the Balkans.
In 2003, storms caused
a cross-border blackout when the power line which supplied electricity to Italy
from Switzerland was damaged, causing it to trip out. The cascading effect
disrupted power supply to Italy from France and Switzerland. The cascading
effect on power lines blacked out nearly all of Italy for 12 hours and part of
Switzerland for 3 hours, affecting a total of 56 million people. Hundreds were
trapped in underground trains. 110 mainline trains were cancelled, with 30,000
people stranded on trains. All flights in Italy were also cancelled; many
people spent the night sleeping in train stations, and on the streets in Rome.
Critical
infrastructures are complex interconnected systems that are subject to a wide
range of risks and hazards, are interdependent and can extend well beyond the
geographical and jurisdiction limits of one Member State. To this end,
achieving a harmonised risk assessment and risk management approach is
important (for all previously mentioned reasons, such as comparability of risks)
yet a lot remains to be done.
The European Programme
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)[118] contributed
extensively to improving the collaboration of Member States towards this
objective.
EPCIP has several elements among which a legislative one, the Council Directive
2008/114/EC setting
out to create a procedure for the identification and designation of critical
infrastructures[119],
and a common approach to the assessment of the improvements needs in the
protection of such critical infrastructures.[120]
The
revised EPCIP has taken a much more pragmatic spin fostering the implementation
of elements of risk assessment and risk management focusing on real case
studies of infrastructures of European dimension.[121]
The elements of risk
assessment and the corresponding methodologies are explicitly mentioned in the
Directive text[122].
This demonstrates the importance of risk assessment for critical
infrastructures at European level. Actually no harmonized methodology exists
and Member States are following their own respective methodologies making the
comparison and communication of risks a cumbersome process. The Joint Research
Centre is actively
supporting this by providing tools and methodologies to be implemented on these
case studies. 
The JRC has
implemented the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (ERNCIP)[123],
comprising over 200 active CIP experts from across the EU, focussing on
technological security solutions for protection of critical infrastructures.
The Commission has also funded a number of projects relevant to risk assessment
and risk management under the 'Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence
Management of Terrorism and other Security Related Risks' (CIPS) Programme
between 2007 and 2013[124];
these include: the development of a methodology for risk assessment for
enhancing security awareness in air traffic management[125]; the
assessment of resilience to threats to systems of data and control management
of electrical transmission networks[126];
and an interactive risk assessment based on Earth Observation data and an
integrated geographic information system[127].[128] In
addition, several projects related to critical infrastructure protection are
also being funded under the FP7 EU Research programme for a Secure Society[129] or
by the research programme Environment. In this latest programme, new projects started
since October 2013 – STREST (Harmonised approach to stress tests for critical
infrastructures against natural hazards)[130]
and INFRARISK (Novel Indicators for identifying critical INFRAstructure at RISK
from natural hazards) – and should enable a higher infrastructure resilience
capacity to rare and low probability extreme events, known as 'black swans'.
It is worth noting
that due to increased inter-dependence of essential services, the disruption of
one piece of critical infrastructure may trigger a domino effect causing
disruption in the functioning of other key services. In effect, the Commission
is encouraging a systems approach of risk assessment methodologies in which
critical infrastructures are treated as an interconnected network.[131]
Analysis of
national risk assessments
Loss of critical
infrastructure was identified by seven Member States: Czech Republic, Germany,
Ireland,
the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Ireland addresses
'loss of critical infrastructure' in general terms, while Poland, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom focus on disruptions to energy
supply linked to loss or damage to infrastructure "essential for the
maintenance of vital societal functions"[132]. In
the case of Germany's NRA, the threat of "outage of critical
infrastructure" is to be understood as a heading which has to be specified
during the scenario development. In fact, impacts on critical infrastructure
and their services can be considered in the risk assessment of other natural
and man-made hazards as part of the scenario structure, as is the case in risk
assessment by Germany and Denmark.
As defined in Ireland's assessment,
critical infrastructure generally includes airports, ports, power and
communications networks, transport networks and water supplies. In addressing
the risk of loss and/or damage of critical infrastructure, most NRAs however
focus on power networks and water supplies (Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom). Ireland and the United Kingdom stress that societal
and economic reliance on supply in energy, gas, oil and water increases the
impact of a threat to distribution infrastructure (dam failure scenario used by
Sweden), thus justifying the high-level risk of this hazard. 
In addition, Participating States
underline the threat of potential damage to transport infrastructure and hubs
in their risk assessment of transport accidents, looking at the economic
impacts due to disruption in transport of goods and energy supplies (Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom).[133]

Overall, while technological
developments have improved the quality and resilience of power and transport
networks, increased reliance on and use of both networks for supply in energy,
mobility and trade increase the impact and potential likelihood of loss of
critical infrastructure. The interdependency between power and communications
is well documented, as is the dependency of transport on power, but the
dependency of power on transport is less clear. Dependencies and
interdependencies can certainly increase the impact of loss of critical
infrastructure, but the link to the likelihood of such a loss is unclear. In
fact, the quantitative assessment of the risk of loss of critical infrastructure
in risk matrices provided in relevant NRAs confirms this analysis.

Map 15: Participating states assessing loss of critical
infrastructure as a main risk hazard (DG ECHO, 2014)
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)


4         
Man-made Malicious disaster risks


4.1         
Cyber-attacks

Cyber-attacks present
both current and emerging risks as European societies are increasingly
dependent on electronic networks and information systems. Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) is central to our economic growth and is
critical to the functioning of our European economic sectors. ICT underpins the
systems on which vital sectors rely on. The uninterrupted availability of the
internet and smooth information systems are central to many business models.[134] 
Cyber-attacks
are electronic attacks targeting ICT such as networks, computers and services,
either directly or indirectly connected to the internet. Cyber-attacks to which
individuals, organisations and networks are exposed can be broken down in two
categories: syntactic attacks using malicious software (e.g. viruses, worms and
Trojan horses) relevant to cyber espionage and sabotage, and semantic attacks,
through the dissemination of incorrect information to affect credibility of the
target resources, relevant in the case of cyber subversion. The Stuxnet virus
is a case of cyber sabotage, which consisted in a malicious code used to attack
the Siemens controllers used in nuclear facilities in Iran. While its impact is
questionable – it may have delayed the Iranian nuclear programme – it confirmed
that such a virus could conceivably lead to the functioning meltdown of a
nuclear power plant, the closure of pipelines or even a modification to the
chemical composition of tap water. A recent case of cyber espionage is the
cyber tool GhostNet discovered in 2009 responsible for the infection of
thousands of government and international organisation, news media and NGO
computers across 130 different countries. This virus infected the computers'
hard drives, recorded keystrokes and activated cameras and microphones. An
example of cyber subversion is the infiltration of US technology security firm
HBGary in 2011 by a group of activist hackers, Anonymous, publishing private
emails, taking down phone systems, and hacking the company's website.[135]
A Commission
Communication on the Cyber security Strategy of the European Union confirms
that cyber-attacks "are increasing at an alarming pace and could disrupt
the supply of essential services we can take for granted such as water,
healthcare, electricity or mobile services".[136] As
part of the Strategy, the Commission adopted a proposal for Directive on
network and information security (NIS) with the aim of enhancing national
capabilities and EU-level cooperation against cyber incidents. The proposal
also requires operators of energy, transport, banking and health services as
well as key internet platforms and public administrations to take appropriate
risk management measures and to report significant incidents to their national
competent authority. Other areas of the economy exposed to such threats include
government services, disaster services, food and agriculture, transport,
financial services and distribution. Overall, damages caused by cybercrimes are
globally estimated around $1 trillion annually. The protection of cyber space
has thus become a primary issue for most countries.
In an effort to
tackle European vulnerability to cyber security incidents, the European
Commission adopted in 2001 a Communication on Network and Information Security
(NIS)[137].
A European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) was also created in
2004[138].
In 2006, it adopted a Strategy for a Secure Information Society[139] and
has adopted, since 2009, an Action Plan and a Communication on Critical
Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)[140].
A Joint Communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the EU
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on a Cybersecurity strategy of the EU
"outlines the EU's vision in this domain, clarifies roles and
responsibilities and sets out the actions required based on strong and effective
protection and promotion of citizens' rights to make the EU's online
environment the safest in the world".[141]
At Member State level, the Bank of England Financial Policy Committee have
recommended that HM Treasury and other relevant bodies work with the core UK
financial system and its infrastructure on developing a programme to improve
and test the resilience of the financial system to cyber-attacks.[142] 
Analysis of
national risk assessments
The risk of
cyber-attacks is identified by: Denmark; Estonia; Hungary; Ireland; Lithuania;
the Netherlands; Norway; Poland; and the United Kingdom. 
Cyber-attacks remain an emerging risk
insofar that no real agreement exists on the nature and gravity of such threat.
Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and the United
Kingdom have indicated the growing importance of assessing the risk of
cyber-attacks due to our increasing reliance on ICT and vulnerability to these
attacks. In addition, the rapidly changing nature of such attacks as a result
of developments in ICT renders the quantification of and response to this
threat difficult. 
The cyber-attack scenario is the highest
scoring risk for the Netherlands, the highest scoring technological hazard for
Ireland and one of few 'very-high risk emergencies' for Estonia. Lithuania and
Estonia indicate a very high probability of occurrence, due to increasing
reliance on ICT, the unpredictability of the source of aggression and the
frequency of past cyber-attacks. 
The cross-border dimension of this
threat is relevant insofar that the target data of such attacks is not
generally limited to the local, regional or national levels: Lithuania
indicates that a cyber-attack on Lithuania may most likely also target data
relevant to the EU and NATO. A cross-border dimension to this threat also lies
in the source of the aggression: both Denmark and the United Kingdom define
'foreign powers' as major threats to their cyber-security. The global dimension
of this threat is clear, as sources of aggression can be located anywhere
around the globe and can, in cases, be directly linked to the threat of
terrorism.

Map
16: Participating states assessing cyber-attacks as a main risk hazard (DG ECHO,
2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

4.2         
Terrorist
attacks

Historically, terrorist attacks
in Europe have primarily been carried out by groups with local objectives, such
as Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican
Army (IRA)
in the United Kingdom. However, since the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001,
several terrorist attacks have been carried out by al-Qaeda linked groups in
Europe. In 2004, an attack which killed 191 people in Madrid was linked to an
al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell. Similarly, in 2005 a terrorist attack
targeting London's public transport system was linked to al-Qaeda. While a
number of planned terrorist attacks have been prevented by the police and
security services in the past decade, the recent attacks in Oslo and Utoya
(Norway, 2011), in Toulouse (France, 2012) and Burgas (Bulgaria, 2012)
demonstrate that the terrorist threat in Europe remains diverse and may be
driven by a variety of motivations, including religion, nationalism and
separatism, political extremism (right-wing, left-wing and anarchist terrorism).
Since the 9/11 events,
the cooperation within the EU in the fight against terrorism has intensified. A
first strategy and subsequent action plan were stepped up after the US attacks.
The EU adopted a framework decision[143]
urging Member States to align their legislation. The framework also defines
terrorism offences and harmonises the penalties that EU countries must
incorporate in their national legislation. In 2008, following the UK liquid
bomb plot, the EU adopted the EU Action Plan [144] on
Enhancing the Security of Explosives, which introduced a number of key actions
aimed at preventing the use of commercial and home-made explosives from being
used against any member of the public. Among many actions taken, the European
Commission launched a Gap Analysis on detection of explosives to measure the
existing protection capabilities against future attacks. This EU gap analysis
process is continuously revised and provides, together with other tools such as
Europol’s Explosive Ordinance Disposal Network (EEEODN), input for Member
States on present and future protection measures against terrorist attacks.
According to the
Annual reports[145] on
the implementation of the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy[146],
which was adopted in November 2005, and Europol's 'EU Terrorism Situation and Trend
Report 2013 (TE-SAT 2013)'[147] the
threat of terrorism in Europe remains strong and the number of attacks has
increased. In
terms of impact, a serious terrorist attack has the potential to have severe impacts
resulting in high levels of mortality, economic losses, public disorder, etc. 
While the overall terror threat
poses a low to moderate risk in most European countries, the risk of terrorist
attacks has become increasingly unpredictable due to the complexity and
fragmented nature of the global terror threat, which emanates not only from
structured groups and networks, but also from smaller EU-based groups and solo
terrorists. The Europol report underlines the threat from religiously inspired
terrorism and notes that the unstable situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East region has a direct relation to the threat to the European countries'
security. The convulse situation due to the civil war in Syria is also an issue
of concern, as the country has become the most attractive theatre for
radicalised EU citizens seeking to join jihadist groups. This phenomenon poses
a significant risk as those "foreign fighters" may further
radicalise, acquire specific skills and experience and return to the EU,
possibly endangering the security of the EU and the Member States. 
In line with the Objective 5 of
the Internal Security Strategy[148], the
Commission has supported efforts to promote coherent risk-based policy. In the
field of aviation security for instance, as a consequence of the discovery in
2010 of parcel bombs in an air cargo originating from Yemen, the Council
mandated the establishment of common criteria for assessing risks posed by
cargo from non-EU countries, and the incorporation of aviation security risk
assessment and relevant data into the parameters of the electronic customs risk
assessment systems. Based on a methodological approach established with Member States,
aviation security and terrorism experts, the European Commission, in
cooperation with the EEAS and Member States, has established an on-going risk
assessment process which has supported the decision on additional security
measures with a view to close identified unacceptable security gaps. The same
methodological approach, with the necessary adaptations, has guided subsequent risk
assessments on the risks posed to aviation security by liquids and terrorist-related
risks posed by passengers. 
To complement additional security
measures in the field of aviation against threats posed by cargo the European
Commission is, in close cooperation with the Member States, aviation industry
and at international levels, further developing standards and customs
electronic systems to ensure all relevant elements for risk analysis and
identification of high risk cargo are available before loading of cargo onto
the aircraft in a foreign state.
In
addition, due to the possibility that terrorist organisations could turn
to unconventional weapons, such as chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear (CBRN) materials, in 2009 the Commission adopted its Communication on
Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the
European Union – an EU CBRN action plan.[149] The Communication
was based on the finding of a CBRN Task Force established by the Commission in
February 2008. The Council adopted the conclusions of the Communication in
November 2009[150]. The Action
Plan focuses on prevention, detection, preparedness and response. It outlines national
measures that address existing gaps and promote exchanges of information and
best practices. However, in general the risk of a malign CBRN
incident within the EU is deemed to be low. An overview of
its implementation by the Member States and EU bodies is provided in the 2012
Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan[151]. The
European Commission, in addition to the research fora activities, also launched
a programme of detection trials aimed to support the practitioners with the use
of CBRN-E detection equipment in different public security domains (sport and
VIP events, CIP, transport etc.). Several projects related to the protection of
citizens against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives
(CBRNE) threats are also being funded under the EU FP7 work programme for
Secure Society.[152]
Analysis of
national risk assessments
The risk of
terrorist attacks has been identified by: Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Hungary,
Norway, the Netherlands, Poland; and the United Kingdom. 
The United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden have identified terrorism as a serious or
substantial threat to the country. However, the risk assessment of terrorist attacks
can be classified and therefore unavailable, as is the case for Slovenia. 
Northern European countries, in
particular, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have identified terrorist
attacks as a potential threat especially since the 9/11 attacks. 
The Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) in
Denmark considers that the terror threat against Denmark remains significant
mentioning in particular the Cartoon Case, which in 2005 resulted in terrorist
threats against Denmark by militant Islamist terrorist networks. In its latest
report from July 2013, the Netherlands maintains that the threat level for the
Netherlands is ‘substantial’.[153]In
2010, two bombs attacks in central Stockholm (Sweden) were linked to Islamic
terrorism and are the first official suicide attacks in Scandinavia. 
Some countries (Hungary, Norway
and the United Kingdom) mention the difficulty in assessing the risk and
consequences of terrorism and note that a more subjective methodology is
required to assess this particular risk given that it is an intentional
incident. 
National risk assessments (the Netherlands,
Hungary and the United Kingdom) note that terrorist attacks have the potential
to cause national and transnational level disasters as they can also be linked
to or associated with other risks (epidemics, pandemics, CBRN, industrial
accidents, technical failure, severe weather and cyber-attacks). For example,
bioterrorism or attacks against hazardous goods or stationary facilities with
hazardous substances could cause large scale epidemics or pandemics. 

Map
17: Participating states assessing terrorist attacks as a main risk hazard (DG ECHO,
2014) 
(dark grey: participating states assessing hazard as a main risk; light grey:
participating states not identifying this hazard in their submitted national
risk assessments; white: countries for which no information is available)

5         
Multi-risk Disasters

Many of the
risks identified by Member States in their NRAs also mention the
'consequential' or 'cascade effects' of risks. A multi-risk approach analyses
not only the risk but also takes into account possible cascade effects, i.e.
the situation for which an adverse event triggers one or more sequential
events. An in-depth multi-risk assessment requires an innovative approach which
allows for a comparison of different risks while accounting for all the
possible cascade events. It is not an alternative to a single risk analysis,
since a single risk analysis is a necessary pre-requisite for a multi-risk
analysis[154].

The FP7-funded MATRIX
project[155]
aims to develop new methods and tools to tackle multiple natural hazards in a
common framework. Risk comparability, cascading hazards and time-dependent
vulnerability in the frame of conjoint or successive hazards are explored in
this context.
It is predicated
that the so-called 'cascade effects' of risk are likely to increase due to
climate change, sea-level rise, more extreme weather conditions and the growth
of population density in hazard risk zones. 

5.1        
Natural
risks

In NRAs and progress reports submitted
by Denmark, Norway, Romania, Hungary and the United Kingdom, severe weather
phenomena such as storms, snowfall and heavy precipitation are clearly
associated to an increased risk of floods and, in the case of Italy, with
landslides. According to assessments provided by Hungary, Ireland and
Lithuania, increased risks of forest fires are linked to severe weather events such
as heat waves and lack of precipitation (i.e. droughts). Risks of earthquakes
can be associated to a greater risk of landslides in mountainous areas as
highlighted by Hungary and Italy), as well as tsunamis in the case of Greece. The
generation of tsunamis by earthquakes, underwater landslides, underwater
volcanic eruptions and impacts of meteorites is a real risk and can take
different magnitudes.

5.2        
Natech
risks

Technological accidents involving the
release of hazardous substances, fires, and explosions triggered by natural
hazards (Natechs) are increasingly recognized as an emerging risk.[156] Natech
is expected to increase in the future due to a greater number of natural and
technological hazards (climate change, industrialization) and a higher
vulnerability of society (urbanization, interconnectedness). While there is
growing awareness of Natech risks, effective risk reduction is still hampered
by a lack of Natech risk assessment methodologies and guidelines for Natech
risk management. Across the NRAs submitted such as Denmark,
Lithuania, Sweden and Norway, Natech risks include the cascade effects of severe
weather phenomena such as storms and heavy precipitation on an increased risk
of pollution, loss of critical infrastructure and transport accidents resulting
from difficult manoeuvring conditions. As underlined by Norway, Italy, Greece
and the United Kingdom, risks of landslides, earthquakes and volcanos can
increase risks of transport accidents and loss of critical infrastructure.

5.3        
Technological
and man-made risks

Direct correlation is drawn by Denmark,
Lithuania, the United Kingdom and Norway between risks of nuclear, chemical and
transport accidents and the loss of critical infrastructure with an increased
risk of contamination and environmental pollution. In fact, the United Kingdom
and Ireland also point to the impacts of risks of loss of critical
infrastructure on risks of flood and environmental pollution, as well as
further cascade effects on other forms of critical infrastructures across a
range of sectors. The loss of critical infrastructure, nuclear and industrial
accidents may also be linked to increased risks of terrorist and cyber-attacks,
as indicated by Norway and the United Kingdom. According to Estonia and Sweden,
environmental pollution – through water or air pollution – may result in
greater risks of disease outbreaks. Finally, in its assessment of pandemics
risks, Denmark underlines the link with loss of critical infrastructure due to manpower
shortages.

6         
Emerging Disaster Risks


6.1        
Impact
of climate change and ecosystem degradation

Contributions by Member States have
highlighted the role of climate change as a threat multiplier and the
importance of climate change adaptation. Either directly or indirectly, fast
and slow-onset in weather patterns increase the likelihood (floods, forest
fires, severe weather, etc.), as well as the impacts (transport accidents,
industrial accidents, etc.) of hazards. The Global Risks
Landscape (Figure 1.1 of the World Economic Forum's Global Risk Report[157])
features loss of biodiversity and ecosystem collapse amongst the 10 most likely
risks with the highest impact.

6.1.1       
Natural hazards

The Commission Communication on an EU
Strategy on adaptation to climate change points to the increase of extreme
events resulting from climate change and to the need for relevant adaptation;
it states that "the consequences of climate change are increasingly being
felt in Europe and worldwide. The average global temperature, currently around
0.8°C above pre-industrial levels, continues to rise. Some natural processes
are being altered, precipitation patterns are changing, glaciers are melting,
and sea levels are rising".[158] 
Extreme events have increased in Europe,
with more heat waves, droughts and forest fires in southern and central Europe,
while the number of floods and heavy precipitation has increased in Northern and
North-eastern Europe. The likely increase in magnitude of such events would
lead to significant economic and human consequences.[159] Projected
impacts in Europe for some of these extremes are available.
Firstly, a
simulation of the future developments in the expected annual damages resulting
from floods is illustrated below. This study presents an appraisal of the
socio-economic impacts of river floods in the European Union in view of climate
and socio-economic changes. Results indicate that current expected annual
population affected of ca. 200,000 is projected to increase up to 360,000 due
to the effects of socio-economic development and climate change. An analysis of
the potential costs of adaptation associated with the increase in protection
suggests that adaptation could be highly cost-effective. There is, however, a
wide range around these central numbers reflecting the variability in projected
climate. Analysis at the country level shows high damages, and by association
high costs of adaptation, in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Romania, Hungary
and Czech Republic. At the country level, there is an even wider range around
these central values, thus, pointing to a need to consider climate uncertainty
in formulating practical adaptation strategies.

Map
19:
Change in Expected Annual Damages (averaged over administrative level NUTS2)
from floods compared to the baseline period (1961-1990) for the 2000s (a),
2020s (b), 2050s (c) and 2080s (d), all for the A1B scenario[160].
Ensemble average results based on LISFLOOD simulations driven by 12 regional climate
models for the IPCC SRES A1B scenario (Rojas et al., 2013[161]).
Secondly, there
is growing concern in Europe about the possible rise in the severity and
frequency and heat waves of extreme drought events as a manifestation of
climate change. Russo et al.[162]
have analysed the changes in probabilities for the occurrence of extreme dry
and wet years and seasons across Europe up to the end of the 21st
century. They show that the probability of having an extreme precipitation
season is increasing over all of Europe, with wet and dry regions becoming,
respectively, wetter and drier. These authors further calculate that a heat
wave like the one in summer 2003 could become normal by 2060 onwards (Russo et
al., 2014, in preparation).
Forzierri et al.
have addressed the issue of future developments in streamflow drought
characteristics across Europe[163].
This analysis shows that streamflow droughts will become more severe and
persistent in many parts of Europe due to climate change, except for northern
and north-eastern parts of Europe. In particular, southern regions will face
strong reductions in low flows. Future water use will aggravate the situation
by 10–30% in Southern Europe, whereas in some sub-regions in Western, Central
and Eastern Europe a climate-driven signal of reduced droughts may be reversed
due to intensive water use. 
It is expected
that climate change will cause more extreme weather in the future, exposing
ecosystems and communities to increased intensity and frequency of severe
weather particularly in the coastal zones (four times as many recorded
disasters worldwide in 2009 as in 1970).[164]
For instance, sea level rise (in combination with storm surges) could increase
the risk of flooding, coastal erosion and salt water intrusion to groundwater
resources and to rivers/deltas and estuaries in these areas. Hinkel et al. (2009[165],
2010[166]) suggest that the United Kingdom,
the southern part of the Baltic coast and the north-western Mediterranean coast
are highly vulnerable to sea level rise flooding, especially in a
high-greenhouse gas emission climate scenario. Under a no-adaptation scenario,
it is estimated that between 200,000 (low-emission scenario) and 780,000 people
(high-emission scenario) people could be affected by coastal flooding by 2100.
The Climate Cost project[167] assessed
the potential economic impact of climate change in Europe’s coastal zones using
the DIVA model[168].
Projections under a medium to high emission scenario estimate a 0.37 m sea
level rise for Europe in the 2080s. Without further upgrade on coastal
protection, this would translate into average estimated damage costs of €25
billion annually. The analysis also suggests that European wetlands will be
heavily impacted, leading to economic loss that have not yet been fully valued.

Fourthly, forest
fires are likely to increase, particularly large fires as well as the
fire-prone areas that will expand in Europe. According to the PESETA II Project
which focuses on the economic impacts of climate change, "climate change
seems among the most important drivers of wildfire potential over time in
Europe".[169]
The European Commission is also funding under FP7 the research project FUME
addressing forest fires under climate and land-use change[170]; it
has already shown that with continued global warming, fire danger conditions
will increase in average and extremes and that the fire season will be longer
throughout Europe.
The Commission Communication on "Our
life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020"[171]
stresses that biodiversity — the extraordinary variety of ecosystems, species
and genes that surround us — is our life insurance, giving us food, fresh water
and clean air, shelter and medicine, mitigating natural disasters, pests and
diseases and contributes to regulating the climate. Biodiversity is also our
natural capital, delivering ecosystem services that underpin our economy. Biodiversity
loss, though not striking suddenly, is certainly one of the major threats to
living conditions on earth, fragilising the capacity for resilience of natural
and man-made ecosystems, and related ecosystem services. Its deterioration and
loss jeopardises the provision of these services: loss of species and habitats
and the wealth and employment to be derived from nature, and endangerment of wellbeing.
This makes biodiversity loss the most critical global environmental threat
alongside climate change — and the two are inextricably linked.
Current rates of
species extinction are unparalleled. Driven mainly by human activities, species
are currently being lost 100 to 1,000 times faster than the natural rate:
according to the FAO, 60% of the world's ecosystems are degraded or used
unsustainably; 75% of fish stocks are over-exploited or significantly depleted
and 75% of the genetic diversity of agricultural crops has been lost worldwide
since 1990. An estimated 13 million hectares of tropical forests are cleared
each year and 20% of the world’s tropical coral reefs have already disappeared,
while 95% will be at risk of destruction or extreme damage by 2050 if climate
change continues unabated.
While
biodiversity makes a key contribution to climate change mitigation and
adaptation, achieving the '2 degrees' target coupled with adequate adaptation
measures to reduce the impacts of unavoidable effects of climate change are
also essential to avert biodiversity loss.
Finally, changing climate
conditions may also cause an increase in the spread of serious infectious
vector-borne transmissible diseases affecting humans and/or animals. The
rise in temperatures and changing climate conditions may indeed lead to the
development of new fertile environments for certain forms of virus. In the case
of flu pandemics, warmer winters may disrupt the seasonal distribution of flu
pandemics (spreading to autumn and spring) affecting populations unexpectedly
thus increasing their vulnerability.[172]

6.1.2       
Implications for infrastructure

The impact of climate change, causing
more regular and severe weather conditions, will also have a cascade effect on
the increased risk of industrial, transport or infrastructure incidents. A
Staff Working Document annexed to the Commission Communication on the EU
strategy on climate change adaptation indicates that the rise in temperatures
and sea levels as well as the increased frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events, such as storms, heat waves and flooding, already have a
significant impact on the functioning of transport and energy infrastructure.[173]
These impacts will vary according to location, geophysical risk exposure,
adaptive capacity and resilience and level of regional economic development.[174] In
addition, the use of infrastructure becomes more hazardous under severe weather
conditions with a higher number of serious road traffic crashes as a possible
outcome.
Impacts on transport infrastructures
under extreme weather events were addressed by the EU-funded projects WEATHER[175]
assessing the impacts of weather extremes on transport systems and hazards for
European regions and EWENT[176]
assessing the impacts and consequences of extreme weather events on EU
transport systems, and MOWE – IT[177]
corroborating existing information from previous projects and providing short
and long - term policy recommendations on mitigation.  According to the EEA,
Natech accidents, industrial accidents resulting from natural events such as
floods, storms, earthquakes and forest fires, are also occurring more
frequently due to the increased frequency of extreme natural hazards.[178]
In the case of energy, climate change
will mean interconnected risks for electricity security and for investment
costs in the energy sector, including: Increased risk of flooding of energy
infrastructure (including power stations and sub-stations); Higher incidence of
extreme weather events impacting on infrastructure resilience and creating
disruptions; Variation of renewable energy resource availability and output
(solar radiation, water, etc.); Potential reduction of efficiency in power
station outputs (e.g. lower cooling efficiency of warmer water or decreased
availability of cooling water) and power transmission (e.g. capacity of
overhead lines affected by temperature changes); and changes in energy demand
patterns, possibly increasing the risk of the impact of demand peaks exceeding
grid capacity.

6.1.3       
Migration in the context of climate change

Finally, worsening
environmental conditions, combined with increased extreme natural phenomena,
may trigger unanticipated social and economic processes leading to a
geographical redistribution of capital and labour.
As highlighted
in the Commission’s April 2013 Staff Working Document on Climate Change,
Environmental Degradation and Migration[179],
evidence currently available would suggest that most movements will happen in
an intra-state context or within developing regions, and mainly from rural to
urban environments. Those most likely to migrate will be persons in the poorest
segments of societies affected by climate change who already face multiple
stressors to livelihoods and are therefore highly vulnerable to the effects of 
environmental degradation. Given that international migration requires
substantial resources, especially if it is inter-regional, new large-scale
international population movements to developed regions such as Europe are
unlikely. Nevertheless, the possibility of indirect migratory effects on the EU
should continue to be explored, as highlighted in a number of Member States'
contributions to this overview.
The reality of
migration in a climate change context will present challenges (and
opportunities) to both countries/areas of origin and destination, in particular
in the developing world[180].
Although no legal framework addressing the specific case of environmentally-induced
migration currently exists, a number of international and national instruments in
areas such as international human rights law, international refugee law, and
environmental law may provide frameworks for addressing related challenges
(e.g. the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for the protection of
victims of natural disasters). At EU level, the Temporary Protection Directive[181] does
not specifically target climate-induced migration but can be applied by the
Council in case the EU is facing a mass influx of displaced persons, even if it
does not specifically target migration related to climate change. Two Member
States (Sweden and Finland) have included provisions concerning people affected
by natural disasters in their legislation on refugee-type protection and/or
temporary protection; however, these provisions have never been applied.[182] 
In the EU
strategy on adaptation to climate change, the European Commission stresses that
further work on slow-onset environmental degradation should focus on
identifying disaster risk management mechanisms that can avoid or reduce the
need for migration. This can be achieved through contributions to disaster risk
reduction with actions in water management, biodiversity, forests,
desertification, coastal erosion, energy, health, social policy and research.[183] At
international level, a 2012 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (CoP) Decision, on approaches to
address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing
countries, acknowledges work on how impacts of climate change are affecting
patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility.[184]

6.2        
Space
Environmental Hazards

In its Resolution of 26 September 2008,
'Taking forward the European space policy', the Council recalls that space
assets have become indispensable for our economy and that their security must
be ensured.[185]
Space infrastructure is a critical infrastructure on which services that are
essential to the smooth running of our societies and economies as well as our
citizens's security depend. This infrastructure is exposed to specific threats
related to the space environment and by studying these threats it appears that
they can also directly impact earth populations and ground based infrastructure.

6.2.1       
Space debris 

Space debris has
become the most serious threat to the security, safety and sustainability of
space activities. 'Space debris' means any space object including
spacecraft or fragments and elements thereof in Earth orbit or re-entering the
atmosphere, that are non-functional or no longer serve any specific purpose
including parts of rockets or artificial satellites, or inactive artificial
satellites.
Space debris can also threaten earth population after the re-entry into the
earth atmosphere. Contrary to other space environmental hazards, the risk
induced by space debris increases exponentially as break up or collision of
space objects create chain reactions across the orbits.
With increasing
population of satellites in orbit, the number of uncontrolled re-entry events
can be assumed to increase over the coming years.[186] According
to latest estimates, there are 16,000 (catalogued) objects orbiting Earth
larger than 10cm, and between 300,000 and 600,000 or 740,000 objects larger
than 1cm (not catalogued). According to the European Space Agency, the
population of objects larger than 1 cm will continue to grow, and will reach a
total of approximately 1 million debris in 2020. Furthermore, it is estimated
that there are more than 300 million objects larger than 1mm.[187]
The EU is
promoting a Code of Conduct on outer space activities which proposes a set of
transparency and confidence-building measures designed to contribute to
enhancing the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities
including measures on Space Operations and Space Debris Mitigation. Research
activities are also on-going in the framework of EU Horizon 2020 to mitigate
the risks induced by Space debris and prevent proliferation such as active
debris removal or passivation techniques.
To detect and track space debris, the EU
will establish a support framework for space surveillance and tracking
(hereinafter referred to as 'SST'). The aim is to support the setting up and
operation of services consisting of monitoring and surveying space objects in
order to prevent damage to spacecraft resulting from collisions and proliferation
of space debris, and to predict trajectories and re-entry paths. As such, the
support framework will assess the risks of a collision between spacecraft and
space debris and generate collision avoidance alerts to the spacecraft
operators and provide information to governmental and civil protection services
in case of uncontrolled re- entries of entire spacecraft or space debris
thereof into the Earth's atmosphere.

6.2.2       
Space Weather phenomena

Space weather
can be defined as "conditions on the Sun and in the solar wind,
magnetosphere, ionosphere and thermosphere that can influence the performance
and reliability of space-borne and ground-based technological systems and can
endanger human life or health"[188].
Space weather includes a number of phenomena, such as solar flares, coronal
mass ejections; and solar energetic particle events, causing geomagnetic
storms, radiation storms and solar radio noise. These can occur at any time
during the 11-year solar cycle but during solar maximum, activity on the sun
and the possibility of space weather phenomena is higher. The present solar
cycle is not behaving as predicted: a 'solar maximum' was expected between 2012
and 2015, but does not appear to be materialising. However severe solar events
can occur at any time during the cycle, and so the importance of the cycle for
risk management is very limited
Space weather
can impact on daily life in various ways. While evidence shows that solar
storms are not a new hazard, its severity has increased with the emergence of
vulnerable technologies. The growing use of advanced technologies by
governments and businesses increases exposure and vulnerability to space
weather hazards. In the case of severe space weather, ensuing disturbances may
affect the power[189]
and transport sectors: increased radiation will affect air traffic particularly
on transpolar but also potentially over oceans and deserts, since commercial
aeroplanes are required to be in contact with ground services. It will also
affect all radio systems, especially synthetic aperture radar systems. Railway
systems may suffer disruptions to signalling systems or to on-train equipment. 
Furthermore relatively
mild solar events may also render Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
unavailable, sometimes for quite long periods; and more and more other
infrastructures, including financial trading systems and navigation systems,
are coming to rely on GNSS signals for timing or location.
The consequences
of an extreme solar event could be very severe and awareness of the risk to
infrastructures is growing among operators and regulators. Vulnerability to
this hazard is identified as one of 50 key risks in the Global Risk Report
2012.[190]
Space weather is also addressed across four of the submitted NRAs. 
The systemic
risk presented by the most severe cases of space weather would require adequate
protection of government and business systems to adapt and mitigate its impact.
In addition, the assessment of space-weather impact on society needs to
consider possible interdependencies between critical infrastructure systems
which are not routinely assessed. This is due to a lack of data that renders
any assessment of the direct and indirect societal impacts of space weather
difficult. 

6.2.3       
Near Earth Objects 

A
Near Earth Object (NEO) is any asteroid or comet that comes close to Earth,
i.e.  when the orbit of the object allows it to approach the Earth’s orbit
closer than about 45 million kilometres. A subcategory of NEOs is Potentially
Hazardous Asteroids (PHA). These asteroids have the potential to be a hazard to
Earth. PHAs are defined by how close their orbit comes to that of the Earth,
and their intrinsic brightness, which is an indicator of their size. The impact
of an object of this size could have very serious regional impacts. In the worst
case, they could entirely destroy a large city or an urban area).[191]
Scientists from
around the world have long been interested in studying the phenomenon of NEOs.
Research in this field has also been funded in the framework of EU FP7 and in
the context of the European Space Agency's Space Situational Awareness
preparatory programme. 

6.3        
Anti-microbial
resistance

Antimicrobial
resistance (AMR) is identified in the World Economic Forum's Global Risks 2014
as one of seven global societal risks and one of ten global risks scoring above
the average risk score of the risk assessment Global Risks Landscape 2014.[192] 
Like pandemics,
antimicrobial resistance is by nature a cross-border risk which affects
populations in Europe and beyond. Antimicrobial resistance can be defined as "the ability of microorganisms to withstand treatment with
drugs to which they were once susceptible"[193].
Antimicrobial
agents, in the case of antibiotics for example, have led to a dramatic
reduction in the number of deaths from infectious diseases since their
introduction 70 years ago. However, the overuse and misuse of these agents have
caused many micro-organisms to become resistant to them. This development is a
growing concern as these agents have become essential tools for modern medicine,
being used in many surgical operations.
According to the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)[194], some
25,000 deaths annually are the result of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and incur
related costs of over €1.5 billion in healthcare expenses and productivity
losses. Data from the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network
(EARS-Net[195])
shows developments in the AMR situation in Europe through large variations with
regard to pathogen types, antimicrobial agents and geographical regions: in its
annual report, the EARS-Net states that "the already high percentages
and increasing trends of antimicrobial resistance in gram-negative bacteria in
Europe […] illustrate the continuous loss of effective antimicrobial therapy
against these microorganisms and emphasise the need for comprehensive
strategies targeting all health sectors".[196]
A Commission
Action Plan against the rising threat from antimicrobial resistance contains 12
actions for implementation.[197] The
Action Plan identifies 7 priority areas in which measures are most necessary:
ensuring appropriate use of antimicrobials in both humans and veterinary
medicine; preventing microbial infection and spreading; developing new effective
antimicrobials or alternative treatments; joining forces with international
actors to contain the risk of spreading AMR; improving medical surveillance and
monitoring; promoting research and innovation; improving communication,
education and training.
The EU Framework Programmes for Research have prioritised research
to combat antimicrobial resistance since 1999. Now nearly €800 million has been
awarded to antimicrobial resistance projects, most in the area of human health,
but also in the areas of animal health, food safety, environment and
nanotechnologies.  The projects address a variety of issues, ranging from
strategies to reduce the use of antibiotics, to the development of new
antibiotics and alternative approaches (phage therapy). In addition to this, EU
funding has been invested alongside contributions from the pharmaceutical
industry within the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)[198]
public private partnership between the Commission and the European Federation
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations. Notably through the "New
drugs for bad bugs" programme which has made available a budget of some
€600 million to boost the development of new antimicrobials. Furthermore, the Commission
supports the Joint Programming Initiative on AMR (JPIAMR)[199] in
which Member States are closely collaborating to tackle antimicrobial
resistance, coordinate their activities and pool their national research in
order to increase the effectiveness and impact of European public efforts.

7         
Conclusions 

Disaster risk policies at a European
level deal with a range of issues including natural and man-made disasters,
health threats, industrial and nuclear risks, malicious threats, and others.
Some regions have developed valuable expertise for particular types of risks.
Risk assessments are a first step in seeking to mitigate such risks and
establish appropriate mechanisms to prevent as much as possible their
occurrence and impacts. Sharing these experiences will help further reducing
the impacts of hazards and allow better cooperation in facing challenges ahead.
The objective of this document has been
to provide an overview of the main natural and man-made disaster risks
addressed and assessed by 17 Member States and Norway, and submitted to the
European Commission. This has been done by compiling and analysing the content
of each contribution and the assessment methodology and criteria used by Member
States. A list of main risks, based on the frequency of denomination of risks
across the NRAs, has been drawn. The 12 most frequently identified disaster
risks are addressed in three different categories of this overview: natural
hazards (floods, severe weather, wildfire/forest fire, earthquakes, pandemics,
livestock epidemics/epizootics), man-made non malicious hazards (industrial, nuclear/radiological,
major transport accidents, and loss of critical infrastructure), and man-made
malicious threats (cyber and terrorist attacks).
Each risk has been individually analysed
qualitatively using information provided by Member States and complemented with
information retrieved from various other reports (Global Risk Report, etc.). A
background for each risk and relevant work carried out at European level
accompanies each analysis, presenting existing cooperation and pointing to
potential areas for future cooperation. 
All but one NRAs submitted so far have assessed
the risk of floods. This observation confirms a history of policy and
operational cooperation at European level. In fact, Poland, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and
Lithuania underline floods as a particularly high level risk hazard. Risks of
severe weather, pandemics, and industrial accidents are recognised by over
three quarters of NRAs and are often assessed as one of the highest-level risk
hazards to which countries are exposed. 
Certain hazards are not as extensively
identified across NRAs, despite the potential severity of their impact and/or
likelihood of occurrence: in the case of earthquakes and forest fires, Southern
European countries are substantially more vulnerable due to specific
geographical and climatic characteristics; high level standards and control
measures may reduce the risk of certain accidents (nuclear and transport for
example); finally, the risks of threats such as cyber and terrorist attacks
have been so far difficult to assess due to the relatively recent appearance of
these risks in most if not all European countries.       
The cross-border dimension of the risks is
central to the purpose of this overview and is clearly underlined across the
NRAs received. The hazards addressed in this document present cross-border
risks due to their geographical nature (earthquakes, fires, severe weather and
floods), as well as the volatility and scale of their impacts (pandemics,
livestock epidemics, nuclear/industrial accidents). The human, economic or
environmental impacts of these hazards, as well as their likelihood of
occurrence exist irrespective of national borders. In fact, the relevance of
cross-border risks may extend beyond the borders of the EU, particularly so for
countries in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods[200]. Future
versions of this overview will concentrate further on the cross-border
dimension of the risks.
In line with the Council Conclusions and
the Civil Protection legislation, this overview aims to take into account the
likely impact of climate change on the risks assessed. Work carried out by
Member States in their NRAs underlines the extent to which climate change
constitutes a threat multiplier and the importance of climate adaptation and
increasing resilience: either directly or indirectly, fast and slow-onset
environmental degradation increase the likelihood (transport accidents,
industrial accidents, etc.) as well as the impacts (floods, forest fires,
severe weather, etc.) of the hazards assessed. In fact, NRAs make reference to
the potential increasing severity and likelihood of non-natural hazards as a
result of more extreme natural disasters due to climate change and ecosystem degradation.
The overview explores the impact of climate change and ecosystem degradation as
an emerging risk, its relevance to the hazards assessed and the work carried
out at European level to address this emerging trend. The emerging risk of
space weather, which relatively few Member States have discussed, deserves to
be highlighted as an emerging risk the EU may face in the future.
Finally, complementary to the analysis
carried out in this document, overviews of the state of progress of Member
States' risk assessments, the methodology and criteria used in national risk
assessments as well as a summary of national scores for each hazard risk are
provided in annex.
The following steps are important in
further developing a comprehensive EU overview of risks and further cooperation
between Member States in disaster prevention and preparedness: 
Data availability: 

 Of 32 participating countries to
     the Mechanism for Civil Protection, 18 have contributed to this exercise.
     The submission of NRAs from Member States yet to contribute, as well as
     updates to submitted NRAs and progress reports will help complete a
     comprehensive EU overview of risks.
 Of the 18 contributions to this
     overview, nine Member States have provided information on national
     assessment criteria and scenario-building. More systematic and complete
     information on the assessment criteria and on the risk scenarios assessed
     may help the Commission carry out an informed and coherent analysis of
     risks addressed in NRAs.
 Quantitative analysis of the data
     provided is not usually possible when it concerns risks of fundamentally
     different types. Concerning the same risk in different countries' NRAs,
     quantitative analysis is a challenge, but some quantitative comparison can
     be done. Analysis is needed to resolve the differences in the scenarios
     considered, in the methodological approach, and in the underlying
     classifications of likelihood and impact (see annexes 4 & 5). In view of future
     versions of this overview and once sufficient data is available in NRAs, a
     pan-European scenario and matrix for each hazard could be conceived. As
     suggested by Member States, pan-European scenarios could build on the
     scenario-building approach undertaken in national assessments and allow
     this overview to concentrate its attention on risks with a cross-border
     dimension. Potential new areas of cooperation could be
     explored.
     Below
     is an example of risk matrix for pandemic risk using currently available data
     and taking due note of differences in the scoring of impact and
     probability, as well as the scenarios and timeframes used for assessment,
     from one Member State to the next (see annex 4):

Figure 3: Risk matrix based on MS assessment of
pandemics risk (DG ECHO, 2014)[201]
Links to other policy initiatives:

 All of the risks addressed in this
     overview are of relevance to various other policy areas. The nature and
     scope of the hazards addressed require cooperation at national, European
     and international levels in climate change adaptation, environment,
     health, agriculture, energy, transport, industry, security and defence, maritime
     policy and research policies. In addition, the cascade effects of each of
     these hazards reaffirm the need for cross-sectorial approaches to disaster
     risk management.
 The analysis of these hazards
     highlights climate change and ecosystem degradation as threat multipliers.
     The link between climate change, ecosystem degradation and the increasing
     severity and occurrence of natural disasters as well as the likelihood of
     most non-malicious man-made disasters is clear. To avoid the most serious
     risks of climate change and in particular large-scale irreversible
     impacts, global warming must be limited to below 2ºC above pre-industrial
     level. Healthy ecosystems play a major role to achieve this objective. Climate
     change adaptation, including technological and natural solutions, and a
     better understanding of the impacts of climate change on disasters will be
     central to further work and cooperation on disaster prevention and
     preparedness. It is of particular importance to ensure joint approaches
     and full coherence between national adaptation strategies, national
     biodiversity strategies and national risk management plans.
 The identification of emerging
     risks – impact of climate change and ecosystem degradation, space environmental
     hazards and antimicrobial resistance – whose level of risk may justify
     their assessment in future work on risk assessment. These emerging risks
     will require new areas of cooperation amongst Member States and beyond.
 All of the risks explored in this
     overview have, to a greater or lesser extent, a cross-border dimension.
     This characteristic justifies the need for further cooperation beyond the
     national level. The Baltic and Danube initiatives are examples of regional
     projects through which several countries are cooperating in the field of
     DRM. In the Atlantic Strategy for example, risk management was identified
     as one of its priorities and addressed through specific cross-border
     projects. Further cooperation at an international level with other relevant
     actors active in disaster prevention and preparedness (OECD, UN, etc.)
     also seems appropriate.

Next steps:

 The cross-sectoral dimension of
     this overview and the risk assessments analysed will help contribute inter
     alia to the work of the Civil Protection Mechanism – particularly with
     regards the establishment by the Commission, under Article 5 of the Civil
     Protection legislation, of a cross-sectoral overview and map of natural
     disaster risks the Union may face[202]
     – and risk management capability. The overview will also contribute to the
     implementation of EU cohesion policy and to the Commission/EEAS proposal,
     within the legal framework of the Solidarity clause, for the regular
     production by the Commission and the High Representative of a joint
     integrated threat and risk assessment report at Union level as of 2015 in
     looking more closely into potential areas of cooperation in risk
     management, and can provide background information for the
     "Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis" (ISAA) reports.
 The Commission will continue to
     welcome contributions by Member States on national risk assessments, both
     in the form of first contributions and updates to work being carried out
     at national and regional level. The Commission will integrate new
     information and material into subsequent versions of the overview. 
8         
Annexes
Annex
1: Characteristics of National Risk Assessments (DG ECHO, 2014)

 Country || No. of risks || Complete document || Risk selection criteria || Scenario || Matrix available || Time-frame 
 BG || 5 || NO || - || NO || NO || N/A 
 CY || 5 || NO || - || NO || NO || N/A 
 CZ || 3 || NO || A risk analysis is prepared for the regional level and is focused on the risks which could lead to an emergency or crisis situation. Crisis situation analysis is based on predefined 23 types of possible crisis situations || NO || NO || N/A 
 DE || 18[203] || NO || Scenarios are selected according to the criteria 'nationally relevant' and 'reasonable worst case' || NO || NO || N/A 
 DK || 10 || YES || Impacts should be very considerable in terms of magnitude, geographical scope and duration. Focus on national level as impacts manifested within borders; || NO || relative placing of event types in national picture of impacts only || N/A 
 EE || 26 || YES || Based on Emergency Act: Event, or chain of, which endangers the life or health of many people or causes significant property damage or significant environmental damage or severe and extensive disruptions in the continuous operation of vital services, which requires a prompt and coordinated response from several agencies; || NO || relative placing of event types in national picture || 1 YEAR 
 EL || 6 || NO || Any situation which has or may have an adverse impact on people, the environment or property and which may result in a call for assistance under the Civil Protection Mechanism; || NO || NO || 1 YEAR 
 HU || 8 || NO || - || NO || For natural weather hazards only || N/A 
 IE || 26 || YES || Identification of generic hazards, falling into four categories: natural, transportation, technological and civil; || NO || relative placing of event types in national picture || N/A 
 IT || 4 || NO || Focus on natural events that affect a large number of individuals, producing effects on a generality of persons and, therefore, can only be called public; || YES || NO || N/A 
 LT || 11 || YES || Events causing negative consequences on human lives, health, and property including cultural heritage and environment. Natural, technological, ecological, social and other hazards causing disasters at national level (exceeding limits of territory of 3 municipalities). Possible negative impact on neighbouring countries; || YES || 3 matrices for each impact assessed || N/A 
 NL || 39 || YES || In addition to risks assessed in previous NRAs (2007, 2008, 2009), risks identified through the National Safety and Security Strategy. Scenarios identified to assess hazards that can potentially affected NL; || YES for 7 hazards || YES || N/A 
 NO || 9 natural incidents, major accident; intentional incidents || YES || Risk associated with major undesirable - with negative consequences for basic societal values - incidents that could affect NO. Five fundamental values include; life and health; nature and environment; economy; social stability; sovereignty; || YES || YES for each category || N/A 
 PL || 18 natural hazards, major accidents and civil hazards || YES || Defined by major influence on functioning and development possibilities of nation. Effects can harm national security, pose threats to considerable number people's lives, health, property and environment in sizeable territory; can have an extraterritorial dimension; || YES || relative placing of event types in national picture || 2 YEARS 
 RO || 10 || NO || - || NO || NO || N/A 
 SE || 27 || YES || Focus on events that have low likelihood but that could have serious impacts if they do occur; each scenario threatens at least one national protection value and are designed to be of the worst probable type; || YES (7) || YES || 1 YEAR 
 SI || 24 || NO || Disasters which affect the entire or parts of the national territory. Focus on disasters already assessed and/or regional/local response plans and on reasonable worst case scenarios; || NO || YES (13) || N/A 
 UK || 80 || YES || Risks identified in consultation with government departments and stakeholders; must be plausible and in non-malicious cases, have at least 1/20,000 chance of occurring; present challenge to national government; || YES || YES one malicious, one non-malicious || 5 YEARS 
Annex 2: Risk Matrix

As
suggested in the risk assessment and mapping guidelines produced by the
Commission, a number of Participating States assessed the level of risk for
each hazard identified using a risk matrix. According to the guidelines, a risk
matrix measures risk levels on the basis of impact and likelihood using a 5x5
scale: risk matrices "help to define which risks need further or more
detailed analysis or which given risk is considered broadly acceptable or not
acceptable, according to the zone where it is located on the matrix"[204]
Template
of risk matrix provided in the guidelines:


Four levels of risk are identifiable – very high (red);
high (orange); medium (light yellow); low (green) – according the relative
placing of a risk on the graph. Comparability of each risk between the
different Member States is rendered difficult due to varying terminology,
measurement methodology, time scale, etc. An attempt at contrasting the
relative assessments of risks based on matrix assessment for each risk will
provide guidance on risks of importance and thus needing further or more detailed
analysis for the respective Participating State.
Annex
3: Summary of results of risk assessments carried out by Participating States
using the grading of risk level identified in the matrix above (DG ECHO, 2014)

 Country || Level 
 Very High || High || Medium || Low 
 CZ || Floods, severe weather, chemical accidents || Epidemic, epizootic, critical infrastructure disruption, energy shortage || Nuclear accident, financial crisis, landslides, lack of food and water || Earthquakes, immigrations 
 EE || - Large-scale marine pollution; - Large-scale coastal pollution; - Large-scale inland ground, surface water or ground water pollution; - Epidemics; - Large-scale cyber-attacks; || - Large-scale forest and landscape fires; - Large-scale fires or explosion in industrial buildings or warehouses; - Fires, explosions or collapses which injure many people; - Extensive health damage and deaths caused by ice formation or melting; - Passenger ship accidents with a large number of victims; - Mass poisoning; - Storms; - Flooding in densely populated areas; - Mass disorder; Epizootics; Mass disorder in prisons. || - Highway accidents with a large number of victims; - Aircraft accidents with a large number of victims; - Passenger train accidents with a large number of victims; - Accidents with trains transporting hazardous substances, resulting in a large number of victims or great damage to the natural environment; - Radiation emergencies with domestic causes; - Cross-border nuclear accidents. || - Extremely hot weather; - Extremely cold weather; - Massive immigration of refugees into the states. 
 HU || - || - Hurricane-like wind; - Stormy winds; - Rain; - Heat wave. || - Extremely hot weather; - Extremely cold weather. || - 
 IE || - Floods; - Cyber incident. || - Drought; - Snow; - Volcanic ash; - Storm; - High temperatures; - Low temperatures; - Air accident; - Maritime accident; - Road accident; - Rail accident; - Transport hub; - Loss Critical Infrastructure; - Infectious diseases; - Animal diseases; - Crowd safety; - Public disorder; - Disruption to Energy Supply; - Hazmat; - Fire; - Nuclear (abroad); - Terrorist activity. || - Radiation (domestic); - Water borne outbreak; - Flood borne outbreak. || - 
 LT || - Harmful mechanisms; - Drought; - Natural and catastrophic meteorological phenomena; - Flood; - Epidemics and/or pandemics; - Chemical accidents. || - Epizootics; - Pollution with radioactive materials; - Cyber-attacks. || - Hazardous radioactive find; - Other radiological accidents and events; - Events at sea; - Nuclear accidents. || - 
 NL || - Cyber-espionage; - Cyber-conflict; - IP network failure (ICT); - Manipulation of public administration; - Severe influenza pandemic; - Malicious prolonged electricity failure; - Geopolitical oil supply crisis; - Mineral shortages.   || - Satellite disruption due to solar storm; - Severe snowstorm; - Black ice; - National power failure; - Malicious power supply failure; - Response to exogenic jihadist threat; - Muslim extremism; - Crisis outside the EU; - Animal rights extremism; - Unrest in problem neighbourhoods; - Confrontation between ethnic minorities and extreme right. || - Unrest regarding Salafism; - Mild influenza pandemic; - Worst-credible coastal flood; - Nuclear incident; - Rhine Ijssel flood - Shipping accident; - Chemical accident; - Malicious gas supply failure; - Very severe storm; - Wildfire; - Extreme heat and drought; - Food shortages; - Animal rights activism; - Rail crash. || - Manipulation of share market; - Left-wing extremism. 
 NO || - Influenza pandemic. || - Nuclear accident; - Storm; - Energy shortage; - Landslide. || - Security policy crisis; - Cyber-attack (financial); - Terrorist attack; - Ship collision. || - Gas leak. 
 PL ||   || - Floods;   || - Epidemics; - Chemical contamination; - Disruption of electricity supplies; - Disruption of fuel supplies; - Disruption of natural gas supplies; - Heavy snow; - Storms; - Forest and wildfires; - Epizootics; - Plant diseases (epiphytotic); - Construction disasters; - Droughts; - Nuclear/radiological accident; Social disorder || - Low temperatures 
 SE[205] || - Prolonged heat wave; - Failure of a large dam on a river; - Disruption in the food supply due to fuel shortages; Major fire on a cruise ship. || - School shooting. || - Extensive disruption to GNSS. || - Disruption to the drinking water supply due to diesel discharge in Stockholm's raw water. 
 SI || - || - Flood; - Earthquake. || - Pandemic; - Aircraft accident; - Accident at sea; - Accident involving dangerous substances; - Drought; - Nuclear accident; - Rail accident; - Massive motorway accident including tunnel accident; - Outbreak of dangerous animal diseases. || - Storm; - Large-scale forest fire; 
 UK || - Pandemic influenza; - Coastal flooding; - Effusive volcanic. eruption || - Major industrial accidents; - Other infectious diseases; - Inland flooding; - Severe space weather; - Low temperatures and heavy snow; - Heat wave; - Catastrophic terrorist attacks; - Cyber-attacks: infrastructure; - Attacks on infrastructure; - Smaller-scale CBR attacks; - Attacks on crowded places; - Attacks on transport systems. || - Major transport accidents; - Animal diseases; - Drought; - Public disorder; - Explosive volcanic eruption; - Storms and gales. || - Severe wildfires; - Disruptive industrial action; - Cyber-attacks: data confidentiality. 

 

Identified
hazards for which risks are not (yet) assessed using a 5x5 risk matrix /
assessment not provided:
 Country || Hazards 
 BG || Earthquakes; floods; nuclear/radiological accidents; geological hazards; forest fires 
 CY || Forest fires: earthquakes; extreme weather conditions; extensive droughts and pandemics 
 DE || Animal disease; cold wave; crop pathogens/vermin; drought; extra-terrestrial hazards (solar storm, meteorite impact, space debris); heat wave; heavy precipitation; low water; outage of critical infrastructure; release of biological substances; release of chemical substances; release of radioactive substances; seismic events; storm surge; wild fire (in alphabetical order) 
 DK || Severe weather (hurricanes, floods, etc.); pandemic; livestock epidemic; transport accident; hazmat accident; marine pollution; nuclear accident; terrorist attack; cyber-attack 
 EL || Earthquakes; tsunamis; landslides; wildfires; floods; industrial accidents 
 HU || Floods; earthquakes; forest fires; industrial accidents; mass-events; terrorism; immigration; livestock epidemics 
 IT || Floods; landslides; volcanic eruptions; earthquakes 
 PL || Terrorist threats; landslides 
 RO || Floods; wildfires; droughts; earthquakes; landslides; pandemics; livestock epidemics; nuclear accidents; industrial/chemical accidents 

Annex 4: Impact/probability
assessment in NRAs (DG ECHO, 2014)

Annex 4(a): Impact/consequences criteria
 Country || Level 
 BG || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 CY || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 CZ || 0 || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 
 Criteria || No impact || < 10 victims < 500m2 1 building || < 100 victims < 1ha > 1 building || < 1000 victims < 1km2 Part of the city || > 1000 victims > 1km2 City or region 
 DE || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 DK || Serious || - || Very serious || - || critical 
 Criteria || - || - || - 
 EE || A - Insignificant || B - Light || C - Serious || D - Very serious || E - Catastrophic 
 Criteria || human: individual seriously or lightly injured persons; || human: Up to 30 seriously injured requiring hospital care; || human: Some fatalities. 31-170 injured needing care - beyond regional intervention; || human: Tens of fatalities. 171-400 injured needing care. National resources required. || human: Many tens of fatalities. Over 400 injured needing care. International resources required; 
 Assets: no or light property damage €0-575,204.84; || Assets: €639,116.49-3,131,670.80; || Assets: €1,278,233-5,106,540.70; || Assets: €1,278,233-5,106,540.70; || Assets: Foreign assistance necessary. Expenses over 0.5% of GDP; 
 Natural environment: no measurable change in species or ecosystem functions; || Natural environment: changes at scene in population levels and ecosystem function. Returns to normal without intervention; || Natural environment: Changes at scene in population of one or more species and ecosystem function. Intervention required; || Natural environment: Major changes at scene. Status quo very hard to restore; || Natural environment: Living habitats and ecosystem at scene destroyed. Impossible to restore previous situation; 
 Vital service: temporary disruptions, no direct losses; || Vital service: short-term disruptions in functioning of service; || Vital service: More than 1 daily disruption. Backup systems necessary; || Vital service: Non-functioning of service significantly reduces security of society; || Vital service: Service/field completely ceased to function; 
 EL || Limited || Minor || Moderate || Significant || Catastrophic 
 Criteria || Less than 'minor' effects || Human: injuries and/or illnesses do not result in permanent disability || Human: injuries and/or illness do not result in permanent disability || Human: injuries and/or illnesses result in permanent disability || Human: multiple deaths 
 Vital service: shutdown for 24 hours or less || Vital service: complete shutdown for more than 1 week || Vital service: complete shutdown for at least 2 weeks || Vital service: complete shutdown for 30 days or more 
 Property: less than 10% severely damaged || Property: more than 10% severely damaged || Property: more than 25% severely damaged || Property: more than 50% severely damaged 
 HU || Low || Not severe || Severe || Very severe || - 
 Criteria || Event not causing injuries requiring medical assistance, and not leading to financial consequences - (fires: below 1 ha) || Event causing mild injuries, not associated with environmental damages, or leading to minor financial consequences - (fires: 1-10 ha) || Events causing serious injuries or reversible environmental damages or leading to financial consequences - (fires: 10-100 ha) || Events causing fatal victims or irreversible environmental damages or leading to financial consequences - (fires: over 100 ha) 
 IE || 1 - Very low || 2 - Low || 3 - Moderate || 4 - High || 5 - Very High 
 Criteria || Human: limited number of people affected; 0-4 fatalities and limited number of minor injuries requiring first aid treatment || Human: 4-8 fatalities; considerable number of people affected; serious injuries with hospitalisation and medical treatment required. Localised displacement of a considerable number of people for 2-8 days. Personal support satisfied through local arrangements || Human: significant number of people in affected area impacted with multiple fatalities (8-20), multiple serious or extensive injuries (20), significant hospitalisation. Large number of people displaced for 2-8 days; up to 4,000 evacuated || Human: 20 to 50 fatalities, up to 100 serious injuries, up to 16,000 evacuated || Human: Large numbers of people impacted with significant numbers of fatalities (50+), significant injuries in the hundreds, more than 16,000 evacuated 
 Environment: simple, localised contamination || Environment: simple, regional contamination, effects of short duration || Environment: Heavy contamination localised effects or extended duration || Environment: Heavy contamination, widespread effects or extended duration || Environment: Very heavy contamination, widespread effects of extended duration 
 Infrastructure: less than €4million || Infrastructure: €4-24 million || Infrastructure: €24-80 million || Infrastructure: €80-200 million || Infrastructure: €200 million + 
 Social: localised disruption to community services or infrastructure (less than 48hrs) || Social: Community functioning with considerable inconvenience || Social: Community only partially functioning, some services available || Social: Community functioning poorly, minimal services available || Social: Serious damage to infrastructure causing significant disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged period. Community unable to function without significant support 
 IT || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 LT || 1 - insignificant || 2 - limited || 3 - high || 4 - very high || 5 - catastrophic 
 Criteria || Human: no more than 10 fatalities, more than 50 injured. No need for evacuation || Human: 10 to 20 fatalities, 50 to 100 injured; up to 300 evacuated || Human: 20 to 50 fatalities; 100 to 250 injured; 300 to 1,000 evacuated || Human: 50 to100 fatalities; 250 to 500 injured; 1,000 to 2,000 evacuated || Human: more than 100 fatalities; more than 500 injured; more than 2,000 evacuated 
 Economic/environmental: up to 0.35% of GDP || Economic/environmental: 0.35% to 0.9% of GDP || Economic/environmental: 0.9% to 1.75% of GDP || Economic/environmental: 1.75% to 2.6% of GDP || Economic/environmental: more than 2.6% of GDP 
 Political/social: assemblies of up to 1,000 people; non-disruptive meetings; disturbances of supply or outage of energy at municipal level; strikes not causing consequences; sector activities disrupted for up to 6hrs; traffic stopped for up to 3 days || Political/social: assemblies of 1,000 to 5,000 people; meetings causing upheaval and nuisances and disturbance of supply or outage of energy in up to 3 municipalities; strikes not causing consequences; sector activity disrupted 6 to 24hrs; traffic disrupted up to 10 days || Political/social: assemblies 5,000 to 10,000; meeting causing upheaval and nuisance in 3 to 5 municipalities; disturbance of supply or outage of energy in no more than 1/3 of territory; strikes not causing consequences; sector activities disrupted for 1 to 3 days; traffic disrupted for up to 20 days || Political/social: assemblies 10,000 to 20,000; meetings causing upheaval and nuisances in 5 to 10 municipalities; disturbance to supply or outage of energy no more than 2/3 of territory; strikes causing consequences; sector activities disrupted for 3 to 30 days; traffic disrupted up to 40 days || Political/social: assemblies 20,000 to 30,000; meetings causing massive upheavals and nuisance in more than 10 municipalities; disturbance of energy or outage of energy in more than 2/3 of territory; strikes with consequences on residents and authorities; sector activity disrupted for more 30 days; traffic disrupted for more 40 days 
 NL || A - Limited || B - Substantial || C - Serious || D - Very serious || E - Catastrophic 
 Criteria || - || 3xA || 3xB || 3xC || 3xD 
 NO || A - Very low || B - Low || C - Medium || D - High || E - Very High 
 Criteria || - || 3xA || 3xB || 3xC || 3xD 
 PL || A – irrelevant || B – small || C – medium || D – large || E – disastrous 
 Criteria || Life and Health: No fatalities or injured people; no one or small number of people displaced for short period of time (up to 2hrs); no one or small number of people need help (no financial or material help) || Life and Health: small number of injured people but no fatalities; first aid required; necessary displacement of people (less than 24hrs); some people need help || Life and Health: Medical help needed but no fatalities; some people require hospitalization; extra space in hospitals and additional medical personnel needed; evacuated people staying in the designated areas with possibility of return within 24hrs || Life and Health: badly injured; a lot of people hospitalized; a large number of people displaced (for more than 24hrs); fatalities; need for specific resources to help people and to remove the damage || Life and Health: large number of seriously injured; large number of hospitalized; general and long-term displacement of populations; large number of fatalities; enormous help to a considerable number of people required 
 Property: virtually no damage; None of very little impact on local community; little or no financial loss || Property: some damage; some obstacles (no longer than 24hrs); slight financial loss; no additional funds required || Property: determination of the damage sites, which require routine repair; normal functioning of the community with minor inconveniences; considerable financial loss || Property: community partially functioning, some services are unavailable; large financial losses; help from the outside needed || Property: extensive damage; community inability to function without significant external assistance 
 Environment: imperceptible effect on the natural environment || Environment: little impact on the natural environment for short-term effect || Environment: some effects on the natural environment but short-term or small effects with long-lasting effects || Environment: long-term effects on the environment || Environment: large impact on the environment and/or permanent damage 
 RO || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 SE || Limited || Substantial || Serious || Very serious || Catastrophic 
 Criteria || Human: <5 deaths and/or <25 severely injured || Human: 5-29 deaths and/or 25-99 severely injured || Human: 30-99 deaths and/or 100-499 severely injured. || Human: 100-500 deaths and/or 500-2500 severely injured || Human: >500 deaths and/or >2500 severely injured 
 Economic/environmental: <50 million SEK || Economic/environmental: 50-500 million SEK || Economic/environmental: 0.5-5 billion SEK || Economic/environmental: 5-50 billion SEK || Economic/environmental: >50 billion SEK 
 Political/social: limited || Political/social: substantial || Political/social: serious || Political/social: very serious || Political/social: catastrophic 
 SI || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 
 Criteria || - || - || - || - || - 
 UK || 1 - Limited || 2 - Minor || 3 - Moderate || 4 - Significant || 5 - Catastrophic 
 Criteria || Impact criteria: economic; fatalities; casualties; social disruption; psychological 
Annex 4(b): Probability/likelihood
criteria
 Country || Level 
 BG || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 CY || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 CZ || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 
 Criteria || Occurs less than once in 1000 years || Occurs once in 100 – 1000 years || Occurs once in 10 – 100 years || Occurs once in 1 – 10 years || Occurs more than once in 1 year 
 DE || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 DK || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 EE || 1- Very low || 2 - Low || 3 - Medium || 4 - High || 5 - Very High 
 Criteria || Probability within 1 year: 0.005% to 0.05% || Probability within 1 year: 0.05% to 0.5% || Probability within 1 year: 0.5% to 5% || Probability within 1 year: 5% to 50% || Probability within 1 year: 50% + 
 EL || E - Extremely unlikely but yet possible || D - Highly unlikely || C - Unlikely || B - Likely || A - Highly likely 
 Criteria || Probability within 1 year: less than 0.001% || Probability within 1 year: 0.001% to 0.01% || Probability within 1 year: 0.001% to 0.01% || Probability within 1 year: 0.01% to 0.1% || Probability within 1 year: more than 1% 
 HU || Rare || Uncommon || Common || Very Common || - 
 Criteria || Unlikely to occur in the next few years (10 years) - (fires: less than once a year) || May occur, but is unlikely to occur within a few years (5 years) - (fires: 1-3 times a year) || Likely to occur within 1 year - (fires: 4-25 times a year) || Highly likely to occur at least once within a year - (fires: over 25 times a year) 
 IE || 1 - Extremely unlikely || 2 - Very unlikely || 3 - Unlikely || 4 - Likely || 5 - Very likely 
 Criteria || May occur only in exceptional circumstances: once every 500+ years || Is not expected to occur; and/or no recorded incidents or anecdotal evidence; and/or very few incidents in associated organisations, facilities or communicates; and/or little opportunity, reason or means to occur; May occur once every 100-500 years || May occur at some time; and/or few, infrequent, random recorded incidents or little anecdotal evidence; some incidents in associated or comparable organisations worldwide; some opportunity, reason or means to occur; may occur once per 10-100 years || Likely to or may occur; regular recorded incidents and strong anecdotal evidence and will probably occur once per 1-10 years || Very likely to occur; high level of recorded incidents and/or strong anecdotal evidence. Will probably occur more than once a year 
 IT || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 LT || 1 - very low || 2 - low || 3 - medium || 4 - high || 5 - very high 
 Criteria || Less than once in 100 years || Once in 50 to 100 years || Once in 10 to 50 years || Once in 1 to 10 years || More often than once a year 
 NL || 1 - Highly unlikely || 2 - Unlikely || 3 - Moderately likely || 4 - Likely || 5 - Highly likely 
 Criteria || - || 10x1 || 10x2 || 10x3 || 10x4 
 NO || A - Very low || B - Low || C - Medium || D - High || E - Very High 
 Criteria || non-intentional event: more than once per 100,000 years: 0-0.05% || non-intentional event: more than once per 10,000 years: 0.05-0.5% || non-intentional event: more than once per 1,000 years: 0.5-5% || non-intentional event: more than once per 100 years: 5-50% || non-intentional event: more than once per 10 years: 50-100% 
 intentional event: no threat || intentional event: possible but not probable threat || intentional event: possible threat || intentional event: general and unspecified threat || intentional event: specific and immediate threat 
 PL || 1 – very rare || 2 – rare || 3 – possible || 4 – likely || 5 – very likely 
 Criteria || May occur only in exceptional circumstances: 1 in 500 years or even more rarely || Not expected to happen and not documented and does not exist in human communications; minimal chance, reason, or other circumstances that the events could occur: 1 in 100 years || May happen within a certain timeframe; rarely random events that are transmitted/documented orally; very few events; chance, reason of facility allowing it to occur; 1 in 20 years || Likely it will occur in most circumstances; events systematically recorded and communicated in the oral form; considerable chance, reason of facility allowing it to occur; 1 in 5 years || Expected to happen in most circumstances and/or events are very well documented and/or they operate among the population and are transmitted orally; Once a year or more 
 RO || - || - || - || - || - 
 Criteria 
 SE || Very low || Low || Medium || High || Very high 
 Criteria || ≤0.0001 on a yearly basis (≤1 in 10,000 years) || 0.0001 – 0.001 on a yearly basis (1 in 9,999 years – 1 in 1,000 years) || 0.001 – 0.01 on a yearly basis (1 in 999 years – 1 in 100 years) || 0.01 – 0.1 on a yearly basis (1 in 99 years – 1 in 10 years) || >0.1 on a yearly basis (>1 in 10 years) 
 SI || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 
 Criteria || - || - || - || - || - 
 UK || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 
 Criteria - threats || Low || Medium-low || Medium || Medium-high || High 
 Criteria - hazards || Between 1 in 20,000 and 1 in 2,000 || Between 1 in 2,000 and 1 in 200 || Between 1 in 200 and 1 in 20 || Between 1 in 20 and 1 in 2 || Greater than 1 in 2 
Annex
5: Synthesis of scores allocated (DG ECHO, 2014) 
Legend:
* indicate hazards identified but not assessed

Annex
6: Top 20 European cities at risk of human losses for earthquakes. Risk is
defined as the product of the percentile of the population (for 4,500 cities exceeding
50,000 people) and the percentile of Spectral Acceleration at T=0.2s for those
cities. (SHARE, JRC, 2013)

 City (population > 50000) || Country || Population Source: LandScan || Spectral Acceleration at T=0.2s Source: SHARE || Population Percentile || Spectral Acc. 0.2s Percentile || Risk Percentile 
 Athens || Greece ||         761,919 || 0.7 || 0.993 || 0.978 || 0.971 
 Messina || Italy ||         245,059 || 0.8 || 0.962 || 0.993 || 0.955 
 Sofiya || Bulgaria ||      1,091,857 || 0.6 || 0.996 || 0.953 || 0.949 
 Catania || Italy ||         300,140 || 0.7 || 0.973 || 0.974 || 0.948 
 Napoli || Italy ||         977,046 || 0.6 || 0.995 || 0.951 || 0.946 
 Thessaloniki || Greece ||         352,658 || 0.6 || 0.978 || 0.962 || 0.941 
 Bologna || Italy ||         372,437 || 0.6 || 0.981 || 0.955 || 0.937 
 Palermo || Italy ||         661,062 || 0.6 || 0.992 || 0.943 || 0.935 
 Reggio di Calabria || Italy ||       181,374 || 0.9 || 0.936 || 0.996 || 0.932 
 Zagreb || Croatia ||         686,771 || 0.5 || 0.992 || 0.931 || 0.924 
 Bacau || Romania ||         211,421 || 0.6 || 0.950 || 0.959 || 0.911 
 Bucuresti || Romania ||      1,840,470 || 0.5 || 0.998 || 0.908 || 0.906 
 Ploiesti || Romania ||         246,377 || 0.6 || 0.963 || 0.941 || 0.906 
 Firenze || Italy ||         367,988 || 0.5 || 0.981 || 0.920 || 0.903 
 Lisboa || Portugal ||         510,121 || 0.5 || 0.987 || 0.914 || 0.902 
 Modena || Italy ||         180,314 || 0.6 || 0.935 || 0.962 || 0.899 
 Iasi || Romania ||         351,965 || 0.5 || 0.978 || 0.919 || 0.899 
 Brasov || Romania ||         303,874 || 0.5 || 0.973 || 0.923 || 0.898 
 Perugia || Italy ||         157,718 || 0.7 || 0.917 || 0.976 || 0.895 
 Parma || Italy ||         174,469 || 0.6 || 0.931 || 0.957 || 0.891 

Annex
7:
Earthquake hazard in Greece
(Greek NRA)


Annex
8:
Italian earthquake hazard map from 2004 (Italian NRA)


Annex 9: Upper and lower tier establishments per country
(JRC, 2012)


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·        
European Commission, Directorate
General for Home Affairs (DG HOME), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/index_en.htm.
·        
European Commission,
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil protection (DG ECHO),
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding/financial_instrument_en.htm.
·        
European Commission,
Directorate General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=dg.
·        
European Commission, Progress
Report on the Implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan, May 2012. European
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated
coastal management, COM(2013) 133 final, Brussels, 12.3.2013.
·        
European Environment
Agency (EEA), "Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe", Technical
Report No. 12/2012, 2012, 201-206, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-impacts-and-vulnerability-2012.
·        
European Flood
Awareness System (EFAS), http://www.efas.eu/.
·        
European Forest Fire
Information System (EFFIS), http://forest.jrc.ec.europa.eu/effis/.
·        
European Nuclear Safety
Regulators Group, Peer review report: Stress tests performed on European
nuclear power plants, 2012, available at: http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EU%20Stress%20Test%20Peer%20Review%20Final%20Report_0.pdf.
·        
European Parliament,
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, Report on
'Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection
and humanitarian assistance', A7-0283/2011, 19.7.2011.
·        
Europol, TE-SAT
2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2013, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf.
·        
EU Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA), http://www.enisa.europa.eu/.
·        
EU Seventh Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013), http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm.
·        
EU Sixth Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development (2002-2006), http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/index_en.cfm.
·        
EU Transport in
Figures, Statistical pocketbook, 2013, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/eu-transport-in-figures-pbMIAA13001/.
·        
EWENT project, http://ewent.vtt.fi/.
·        
FLOODsite Project, http://www.floodsite.net/.
·        
Forzieri G., et al.,
"Ensemble projections of future streamflow droughts in Europe", Hydrology
and Earth System Sciences, 18:1, 2014, 85-108.
·        
FUME Project, http://www.meteo.unican.es/en/projects/fume.
·        
Gardiner B., et al.,
"Destructive Storms in European Forests: Past and Forthcoming
Impacts", Commission (DG ENV) report, European Forest Institute,
2010, 4, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/STORMS%20Final_Report.pdf.
·        
GEM Project, http://www.globalquakemodel.org/.
·        
Hinkel J., et al.,
"The vulnerability of European coastal areas to sea level rise and storm
surge", Contribution to EEA, The European Environment – state and
Outlook 2010 (SOER), 2010, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer.
·        
Hinkel J., et al.,
"Assessing risk of and adaptation to sea-level rise in the European Union:
an application of DIVA". Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for
Global Change, 15, 2010, 703–719.
·        
Horizon
2020, EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020), http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en.
·        
Innovative Medicines
Initiative (IMI), http://www.imi.europa.eu/.
·        
IMPRINTS Project, http://www.imprints-fp7.eu/en/projectes.
·        
International Atomic
Energy Agency, IAEA Safety Glossary, 2007, available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf.
·        
International Nuclear
Event Scale of the IAEA, available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf.
·        
Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, "Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to
Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX)", Special Report, 2012,
available at: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/.

·        
Joint Programming Initiative
on Antimicrobial Resistance (JPIAMR), http://www.jpiamr.eu/.
·        
Joint Research Centre,
"Overview of Disaster Risks that the EU faces", JRC Technical
Report, 2013, available at: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/29598/1/lb-na-25822-en-n.pdf.
·        
Krausmann E., et al., Space
Weather and Power Grids: Findings and Outlook, Publications Office of the
European Union, 2013.
·        
Krausmann E., Baranzini
D., "Natech risk reduction in the European Union", Journal of Risk
Research, 15:8, 2012.
·        
Marzocchi W., et.al.,
Principles of multi-risk assessment, Interaction amongst natural and man-induced
risks, European Commission Project Report, 2009, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/pdf/multi-risk_assessment.pdf.
·        
MATRIX project, http://matrix.gpi.kit.edu.
·        
MICORE Project, http://www.micore.eu/.
·        
MOTIVE Project, http://www.motive-project.net/.
·        
MOWE – IT project, http://www.mowe-it.eu.
·        
Munich RE, "Floods
dominate natural catastrophe statistics in first half of 2013", Press
Release, 9.7.2013, available at: http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2013/2013_07_09_press_release.aspx.
·        
Neoshield Project, http://www.neoshield.net/en/index.htm.
·        
NERA Project, http://www.nera-eu.org/.
·        
Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "Future Global Shocks.
Improving Risk Governance", OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies,
2011, available at: http://www.oecd.org/governance/48329024.pdf.
·        
PEARL Project, http://www.pearl-fp7.eu.
·        
PESETA II Project, http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/methodology.html.
·        
PREDEMICS Project, http://predemics.biomedtrain.eu.
·        
Rapid NaTech Risk
Assessment Tool (RAPID-N), http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
·        
REAKT Project, http://www.reaktproject.eu/.
·        
Regulation (EU)
1305/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 December 2013 on
support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Official
Journal of the European Union, L (347), 20.12.2013.
·        
RESPONSES Project, http://www.responseproject.eu/.
·        
RISC-KIT Project, http://www.risckit.eu.
·        
RISES-AM project, http://risesam.eu/.
·        
Rojas R., Feyen L.,
Watkiss P., "Climate change and river floods in the European Union:
Socio-economic consequences and the costs and benefits of adaptation", Global
Environmental Change, 23:6, 2013, 1737-1751.
·        
Russo S., et al.,
"Projection of Occurrence of extreme dry-wet years and seasons in Europe
with stationary and non-stationary Standardized Precipitation Index", Journal
Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 118, 2013, 1-12.
·        
San-Miguel-Ayanz J.,
Camia, A., "Forest Fires", in EEA, "Mapping the impacts of the
natural hazards", Technical report no. 13, 2010, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/mapping-the-impacts-of-natural.
·        
SHARE Project, http://www.share-eu.org/.
·        
Solar and Heliospheric
Observatory (SOHO), NASA, http://sohowww.nascom.nasa.gov/spaceweather/.
STARFLOOD Project, http://www.starflood.eu/.
·        
STREST Project, http://www.strest-eu.org.
·        
Syner-G Project, http://www.vce.at/SYNER-G/.
·        
Transatlantic Taskforce
on Antimicrobial Resistance, "Recommendations for future collaboration
between the US and EU", Tatfar Report, 2011, available at: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/tatfar/documents/210911_tatfar_report.pdf.
·        
Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union,
C (115), 9.5.2008.
·        
United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8
December 2012, 28.02.2013, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf.
·        
WEATHER project, www.weather-project.eu.
·        
World Economic Forum, Insight
Report: Global risks 2014. Ninth Edition, 2014, available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf.

·        
World Economic Forum, Insight
Report: Global risks 2012, Seventh Edition, 2012, available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2012/.
·        
World Health
Organisation, "Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1
November2002 to 31 July 2003", Global Alert and Response (GAR),
31.12.2003, available at: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/.
·        
World Organisation for
Animal Health, http://www.oie.int/en/.
[1] Council conclusions on a Community framework on disaster prevention
within the EU, 2979th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting,
Brussels, 30.11.2009.
[2] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on Risk
Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, SEC(2010)
1626 final, Brussels, 21.12.2010.
[3] 28 EU Member States as well as 4 third countries participating in
the Civil Protection Mechanism (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) have been invited to report on their national
risk assessments. 
[4] Council conclusions on further developing risk assessment for
disaster management within the European Union, 3081st Justice and
Home Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 11.4.2011.
[5] The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is a macro-regional
initiative regrouping Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Within the Strategy, a project aiming at the
development of scenarios and the identification of gaps for all main hazards in
the region has been developed (project 14.3), http://www.balticsea-region.eu/.
[6] The EU Strategy for the Danube region includes Germany, Austria,
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria
within the EU and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldova and
Ukraine outside. This macro-regional strategy focuses on a range of priority
areas, including priority area no.5 looking at environmental risks, http://www.danube-region.eu/.
[7] Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Official
Journal of the European Union, L (347), 20.12.2013.
[8] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official
Journal of the European Union, C(115), 9.5.2008, Article 222.
[9] European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint proposal for a Council Decision
on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the Solidarity
clause, JOIN(2012) 039 final, 21.12.2012, Article 8.
[10] DK, EE, IE, LT, HU, NL, NO, PL, SE, SI, UK.
[11] BG, CY, CZ, DE, EL, IT, RO; 14 countries have not yet provided some
form of contribution: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Spain (ES),former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Croatia (HR), Finland (FI), France (FR), Iceland (IS), Lichtenstein
(LI), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK).
[12] Council Conclusions, 30.11.2009, op.cit.
[13] Council Conclusions, 11.4.2011, op.cit.
[14] Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 20.12.2013, op.cit., Article 5(c).
[15] SEC(2010) 1626 final, 21.12.2010, op.cit., 24.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Joint Research Centre, "Overview of Disaster Risks that the EU
faces", JRC Technical Report, 2013, available at: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/29598/1/lb-na-25822-en-n.pdf.
[18] World Economic Forum, Insight Report: Global risks 2014. Ninth
Edition, 2014, available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf.

[19] SEC(2010) 1626 final, 21.12.2010, op.cit., 9-12.
[20] Out of a total of 32 countries contributing to this overview, only
18 have so far submitted an NRA or progress report, thus creating gaps in the
geographical distribution of risks.
[21] World Economic Forum, 2014, op.cit., 16.
[22] The risk of harmful organisms, as assessed by Lithuania, refers to
the penetration and spread of harmful organisms through the international
trading of plants, plant products and other objects to which phitosanitary
control is necessary. Hazardous algal blooms are another example of harmful
organisms. 
[23] Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks, Official
Journal of the European Union, L (288), 6.11.2007, Article 2.
[24] Alfieri L., et al., Advances in pan-European flood hazard mapping, Hydrological
Processes, 2013.
[25] European Environment Agency (EEA), "Mapping the impacts of the
natural hazards", Technical Report No. 13/2010, 2010, 64-65.
[26] Munich RE, "Floods dominate natural catastrophe statistics in
first half of 2013",Press Release, 9.7.2013, available at: http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2013/2013_07_09_press_release.aspx.
[27] EEA, 2010, op.cit., 64-65.
[28] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of Regions on an EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change,
COM(2013) 216 final, Brussels, 16.4.2013, 2.
[29] Directive 2007/60/EC, 6.11.2007, op.cit.
[30] The information presented above is based on a preliminary
assessment; results presented are themselves preliminary.
[31] European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), http://www.efas.eu/.
[32] See: www.emergency.copernicus.eu.
[33] Modules of participating states' assets, composed of experts and
equipment provided on a voluntary basis and to be mobilised at very short
notice can provide expertise and technical capacity for high-capacity pumping
and other flood response actions.
[34] EU Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development
(2002-2006), http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/index_en.cfm.
[35] FLOODsite Project, http://www.floodsite.net/.
[36] EU Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological
Development (2007-2013), http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm.
[37] CORFU Project, http://www.corfu-fp7.eu/.
[38] IMPRINTS Project, http://www.imprints-fp7.eu/en/projectes.
[39] STARFLOOD Project, http://www.starflood.eu/.
[40] European Commission, Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and
Civil protection (DG ECHO), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding/financial_instrument_en.htm.
[41] Hungary, National Disaster Risk Assessment, 7.
[42] United Kingdom Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil
Emergencies, 2013, 16.
[43] Norway, National Risk Assessment, 11.
[44] European
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
Regions on Green Infrastructure (GI) — Enhancing Europe’s Natural Capital,
COM (2013) 249 final, Brussels, 6.5.2013.  
[45] Gardiner B., et al., "Destructive Storms in European Forests:
Past and Forthcoming Impacts", Commission Report, European Forest
Institute, 2010, 4, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/STORMS%20Final_Report.pdf.
[46] European Environment Agency, "Climate change, impacts and
vulnerability in Europe", Technical Report No. 12/2012, 2012,
201-206, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-impacts-and-vulnerability-2012.
[47] EEA, 2010, op.cit., 33-34. See also Barredo J.I., “No upward
trend in normalised windstorm losses in Europe: 1970–2008”, Natural Hazards
and Earth System Sciences, 10, 2010, 97-104.
[48] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[49] European Commission, Commission Green Paper On Forest
Protection and Information in the EU: Preparing forests for climate change,
COM(2010) 66 final, Brussels, 1.3.2010. 
[50] European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for maritime spatial
planning and integrated coastal management, COM(2013) 133 final, Brussels,
12.3.2013.
[51] MOTIVE Project, http://www.motive-project.net/.
[52] MICORE Project, http://www.micore.eu/.
[53] PEARL Project, http://www.pearl-fp7.eu.
[54] RISC-KIT Project, http://www.risckit.eu.
[55] RISES-AM project, http://risesam.eu/.
[56] Quoted in EEA, 2010, op.cit., 42.
[57] EEA, 2012, op.cit., 201-206.
[58] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[59] Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field
of water policy, Official Journal of the European Communities, L (327),
22.12.2000.
[60] DEWFORA Project, http://www.dewfora.net.
[61] DROUGHT-R&SPI, http://www.eu-drought.org/.
[62] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council addressing the challenge of water scarcity
and droughts in the European Union, COM(2007) 414 final, Brussels, 18.7.2007.
[63] European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health
and Food Safety, Report on 'Towards a stronger European disaster response:
the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance', A7-0283/2011,
19.7.2011.
[64] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on a Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water
Resources, COM(2012) 673 final, Brussels, 14.11.2012.
[65] Regulation (EU) 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and the
Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council
Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Official Journal of the European Union, L (347),
20.12.2013.
[66] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[67] see: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction.

[68] RESPONSES Project, http://www.responseproject.eu/.
[69] EEA, 2012, op.cit., 206.
[70] European Commission, Directorate General for Health and Consumers
(DG SANCO), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/health/climate_change/policy/index_en.htm.

[71] EEA, 2012, op.cit., 206.
[72] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[73] EEA, 2010, op.cit., 47-48.
[74] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[75] European Commission, Communication of the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on a new EU Forest Strategy: for forests and the
forest-based sector, COM(2013) 659 final, 20.9.2013.
[76] European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), http://forest.jrc.ec.europa.eu/effis/.
[77] Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, 20.12.2013, op.cit., 487.
[78] The MOTIVE project is an example of project investigating adaptive
management strategies that address climate change and land use change: MOTIVE
Project, http://motive-project.net/.
[79] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing
the European Union Solidarity Fund, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L (311), 14.11.2002.
[80] UK Cabinet Office, 2013, op.cit., 8.
[81] Syner-G Project, http://www.vce.at/SYNER-G/.
[82] GEM Project, http://www.globalquakemodel.org/.
[83] The GDACS is a cooperation framework between the UN, the European
Commission and disaster managers worldwide to improve alerts, information
exchange and coordination in the first phase after major sudden-onset
disasters, http://www.gdacs.org/.
[84] Rapid NaTech Risk Assessment Tool (RAPID-N), http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
[85] SHARE Project, http://www.share-eu.org/.
[86] Syner-G Project, op.cit.
[87] REAKT Project, http://www.reaktproject.eu/.
[88] NERA Project, http://www.nera-eu.org/.
[89] Eurocodes, EN 1998 Eurocode 8: Design of structures for earthquake
resistance, http://eurocodes.jrc.ec.europa.eu/showpage.php?id=138.
[90] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
"Future Global Shocks. Improving Risk Governance", OECD Reviews of
Risk Management Policies, 2011, 29, available at: http://www.oecd.org/governance/48329024.pdf.
[91] World Health Organisation, "Summary of probable SARS cases
with onset of illness from 1 November2002 to 31 July 2003", Global
Alert and Response (GAR), 31.12.2003, available at: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/.
[92] European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), http://ecdc.europa.eu.
[93] DG SANCO, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm.
[94] Directorate General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD), http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=dg.
[95] PREPARE Project (Platform for European Preparedness Against
(Re-)emerging Epidemics), website not yet established, but will be available
soon; EMPERIE Project (European Management Platform for Emerging and
Re-emerging Infectious Disease Entities), www.emperie.eu;
PREDEMICS Project (Preparedness, Prediction and Prevention of Emerging
Zoonotic Viruses with Pandemic Potential using Multidisciplinary Approaches), http://predemics.biomedtrain.eu;
and the ANTIGONE Project (ANTIcipating the Global Onset of Novel
Epidemics), www.antigonefp7.eu.
[96] Horizon 2020, EU Framework Programme
for Research and Innovation (2014-2020), http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en.
[97] Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No
2119/98/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L (293), 5.11.2013,
article 12.
[98] Definitions may vary when translated.
[99] Formerly known as the Office International  des Epizooties, see: http://www.oie.int/.
[100] The list of 'list A' diseases is available at: http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/old-classification-of-diseases-notifiable-to-the-oie-list-a/.
[101] Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community
measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC, Official
Journal of the European Union, L (167), 14.1.2006.
[102] Council Directive 2000/75/EC of 20 November 2000 laying down
specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue, Official
Journal of the European Communities, L (327), 22.12.2000.
[103] Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community
measures for the control of classical swine fever, Official Journal of the
European Communities, L (316), 1.12.2001.
[104] Council Directive 92/35/EEC of 29 April 1992 laying down control
rules and measures to combat African horse sickness, Official Journal of the
European Communities, L (157), 10.6.1992.
[105] Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community
measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive
85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive
92/46/EEC, Official Journal of the European Communities, L (306),
22.11.2003.
[106] A quantity that is significant depends on the potency and type of
hazardous property of the substance.
[107] Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards
involving dangerous substances, Official Journal of the European Communities,
L (10), 14.1.1997,13, which will be replaced, as of 1 June 2015, by Directive
2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the control of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, Official Journal of
the European Union, L (197), 24.7.2012, 1.
[108] Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage, Official Journal of the European Union, L (143),
30.4.2004, 56.
[109] In accordance with the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) for the
control of major hazards involving dangerous substances, Member States must
report all major chemical accidents occurring in Seveso establishments to the
European Commission.  These accident reports are available to the public online
at https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu.
[110] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safety Glossary,
2007, 12, available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf.
[111] Terminology on incidents and accidents according to the categorisations
of the International Nuclear Event Scale of the IAEA, available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf.
[112] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on the interim report on the comprehensive
risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants
in the European Union, COM(2011) 784 final, Brussels, 24.11.2011.
[113] European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, Peer review report:
Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants, 2012, available
at: http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EU%20Stress%20Test%20Peer%20Review%20Final%20Report_0.pdf.
[114] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety
assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European
Union and related activities, COM(2012) 571 final, Brussels, 4.10.2012.
[115] Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the
European Community for Research, technological development and demonstration
activities (2007-2013), Official Journal of the European Union, L (412),
30.12.2006.
[116] This hazard may also be associated with the risk of
industrial/chemical accidents.
[117] European Commission, Directorate General for Home Affairs (DG
HOME), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/index_en.htm.
[118] European Commission, Communication from the Commission on a
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP),
COM(2006) 786 final, Brussels, 12.12.2006. 
[119] European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) is an asset or system which
is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions. The damage,
disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure may have significant
impacts for the well-being and security of the EU and its citizens.  
[120] Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the
assessment of the need to improve their protection, Official Journal of the
European Union, L (345), 23.12.2008.
[121] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on a new approach to the European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection Making European Critical Infrastructures more secure, SWD(2013) 318 final, Brussels, 28.8.2013.
[122] Council Directive 2008/114/EC, op.cit., Article 7.
[123] ERNCIP Project, http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php/ERNCIP/688/0/.
[124] DG HOME, Terrorism and other Security-related Risks (CIPS),
see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/terrorism-and-other-risks/index_en.htm.
[125] DORATHEA Project, HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/030.
[126] ASTROM Project, JLS/2008/CIPS/018.
[127] HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/037.
[128] SWD(2013) 318 final, Brussels, 28.8.2013, op.cit., 7.
[129] European Commission, Directorate General for Enterprise and
Industry (DG ENTR), Policy and Research in Security, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/security.
[130] STREST Project, http://www.strest-eu.org.
[131] SWD(2013) 318 final, 28.8.2013, op.cit., 7.
[132] DG HOME, op.cit.
[133] See section .3.3 Major transport accidents
[134] European Commission and High Representative of the European Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication on Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013)
1 final, Brussels, 7.2.2013, 2.
[135] World Economic Forum, Insight Report: Global risks 2012, Seventh
Edition, 2012, 25, available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2012/.
[136] JOIN(2013) 1 final, 7.2.2013, op.cit., 3.
[137] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on Network and Information Security: Proposal
for a European Policy Approach, COM(2001) 298 final, Brussels, 6.6.2001.
[138] European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/.
[139] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on a strategy for a Secure Information Society
– Dialogue, partnership and empowerment, COM(2006) 251, Brussels, 31.5.2006.
[140] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions:
enhancing preparedness, security and resilience, COM(2009) 149 final, Brussels,
30.3.2009; European Commission, Communication on Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Achievements and next steps: towards global
cyber-security, COM(2011) 163 final, Brussels, 31.3.2011.
[141] JOIN(2013) 1 final, 7.2.2013, op.cit., 3.
[142] Bank of England Financial Policy Committee, Financial Stability
Report Issue No. 33, June 2013, 5, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2013/fsrfull1306.pdf.
[143]
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),
Official Journal of the European Communities, L (164), 13.6.2002.
[144] Council of the EU, EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of
Explosives, 8311/08, Brussels, 11.4.2008.
[145] Council of the EU, Annual report on the implementation of the EU
Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Evaluation by the CTC and questions for discussion,
16471/12, Brussels, 23.11.2012.
[146] Council of the EU, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
14469/4/05, Brussels, 30.11.2005.
[147] Europol, TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,
2013, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf.
[148] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council on the EU Internal Security Strategy in
Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Brussels,
22.11.2010.
[149] European Commission, Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union –
an EU CBRN Action Plan, COM(2009)  273 final, Brussels, 24.6.2009.
[150]Council of the EU, Adoption of the Council Conclusions on the
Communication Strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan, 15505/1/09
REV1, Brussels, 12.11.2009. 
[151] European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of
the EU CBRN Action Plan, May 2012.  
[152] DG ENTR, op.cit.
[153] The Netherlands has a National Coordinator for Security and
Counter-terrorism to deal with and assess the threat of terrorist attacks,
which is also in charge of coordinating the National Risk Assessment: see https://english.nctv.nl/.
[154] Marzocchi W., et.al., Principles of multi-risk assessment,
Interaction amongst natural and man-induced risks, European Commission
Project Report, 2009, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/pdf/multi-risk_assessment.pdf.
[155] MATRIX project, http://matrix.gpi.kit.edu.
[156] Krausmann E., Baranzini D., "Natech risk reduction in the
European Union", Journal of Risk Research, 15:8, 2012; see also RAPID-N,
op.cit.
[157] Global Risk Report, 2014, op.cit., 16.
[158] COM(2013) 216 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 2.
[159] Council Conclusions on the Communication An EU Strategy on
adaptation to climate change, 11151/13, Environment Council meeting,
Luxembourg, 18.6.2013.
[160] Scenario A1B is one of three groups of the A1 scenario family
developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to describe a
different world evolving through the 21st century, and each
potentially leading to quite different GHG emissions trajectories and on which
SRES scenarios are based. A1 corresponds to a future world of very rapid
economic growth, global population that peaks mid-century and declines
thereafter, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies; A1B
corresponds to the group in which technological change in the energy system is
balanced across all sources: see http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=154.
[161] Rojas R., Feyen L., Watkiss P., "Climate change and river
floods in the European Union: Socio-economic consequences and the costs and
benefits of adaptation", Global Environmental Change, 23:6, 2013,
1737-1751.
[162] Russo S., et al., "Projection of Occurrence of extreme dry-wet
years and seasons in Europe with stationary and non-stationary Standardized
Precipitation Index", Journal Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 118,
2013, 1-12.
[163] Forzieri G., et al., "Ensemble projections of future
streamflow droughts in Europe", Hydrology and Earth System Sciences,
18:1, 2014, 85-108.
[164] Beck M.W., Shepard C.C., "Coastal Habitats and Risk
Reduction", World Risk Report, 2012, 32, available at: http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/10487.pdf.
See also EEA, 2012, op.cit. See also IPCC, "Managing the Risks of
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX)",
Special Report, 2012, available at: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/.

[165] Hinkel J., et al., "The vulnerability of European coastal
areas to sea level rise and storm surge", Contribution to the EEA SOER
2010 report, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), 2009.
[166] Hinkel J., et al., "Assessing risk of and adaptation to
sea-level rise in the European Union: an application of DIVA".
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 15, 2010, 703–719.
[167] ClimateCost Project, http://www.climatecost.cc/.
The project took into account damage and adaptation costs. Damage costs
include: total annual damage costs (2005 price), including the number of people
forced to move due to erosion and submergence (assuming the cost for people
that move is 3x the value of their per-capita GDP; land-loss costs (land below
the 1-in1 year flood level) taking into account dikes and direct erosion
ignoring nourishment, salinisation costs and the expected costs of sea and
river floods. Adaptation costs include the sum of sea dikes, river dikes and
beach nourishment.
[168] DIVA Model, http://www.diva-model.net/.
[169] PESETA II Project, http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/methodology.html.
[170] FUME Project, http://www.meteo.unican.es/en/projects/fume.
[171] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on Our life insurance, our natural capital: an
EU biodiversity strategy to 2020, COM(2011) 244 final , Brussels, 3.5.2011.
[172] European Commission, Commission White Paper on Adapting to
climate change: Towards a European framework for action, COM(2009) 147/4,
Brussels, 2009, 4; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on
Adapting to climate change impacts on human, animal and plant health
accompanying the Communication An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
COM(2013) 216 final, SWD(2013) 136 final, Brussels, 16.4.2013, 4-6. 
[173] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on
Adapting infrastructure to climate change accompanying the Commission
Communication An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change COM(2013)
216 final, SWD(2013) 137 final, Brussels, 16.4.2013, 11.
[174] SWD(2013) 137 final, 16.4.2013, op.cit., 7.
[175] WEATHER project, www.weather-project.eu.
[176] EWENT project, http://ewent.vtt.fi/.
[177] MOWE – IT project, http://www.mowe-it.eu.
[178] EEA, 2010, op.cit., 111.
[179] SWD(2013) 138 final, 2013, op.cit,
[180] See also: European Commission, Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Maximising the Development Impact
of Migration, COM(2013) 292 final, Brussels, 21.5.2013.   
[181] Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States receiving such
persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Official Journal of the
European Communities, L (212), 7.8.2001.
[182] SWD(2013) 138 final, 2013, op.cit., 18.
[183] Ibid., 24.
[184] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Report
of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from
26 November to 8 December 2012, 28.02.2013, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf.
[185] Council Resolution Taking forward the European Space Policy, CS
13569/08, Brussels, 29.09.2008.
[186] Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a
Regulation concerning the setting up and operations of European space
surveillance and tracking (SST) services
[187] Ecorys, “Study on the EU
Space Programme 2014-2020”, Draft Final Report, 18.4.2010, contract n.
SI2.541751; Booz & Company , Study "evaluation of options for a space
programme in 2014-2020", Final report, 16.5.2011, contract n.
ENTR/2009/050 lot 1.
[188] Definition produced by NASA's Solar and Heliospheric Observatory
(SOHO), http://sohowww.nascom.nasa.gov/spaceweather/. 

[189] Krausmann E., et al., Space Weather and
Power Grids: Findings and Outlook, Publications Office of the European
Union, 2013.
[190] World Economic Forum, 2012, op.cit.
[191] Neoshield Project, http://www.neoshield.net/en/index.htm.
[192] World Economic Forum, 2014, op.cit., 13-15.
[193] Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance,
"Recommendations for future collaboration between the US and EU", Tatfar
Report, 2011, available at: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/tatfar/documents/210911_tatfar_report.pdf.
[194] ECDC, http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/Pages/home.aspx.
[195] EARS-Net is based on a network of representatives from Member
States collecting routine clinical antimicrobial susceptibility data from
national AMR surveillance initiatives; see: http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/antimicrobial_resistance/database/Pages/database.aspx.
[196] European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control,
"Antimicrobial resistance surveillance in Europe", Surveillance
Report, 2012, 1, available at: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/antimicrobial-resistance-surveillance-europe-2012.pdf.
[197] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council on an Action Plan against the rising
threats from Antimicrobial Resistance, COM(2011) 748 final, Brussels,
15.11.2011.
[198] Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), http://www.imi.europa.eu/.
[199] Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Resistance (JPIAMR), http://www.jpiamr.eu/.
[200] The impact of the 2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland on European
airspace offers a telling example.
[201] This risk matrix has been compiled by the Commission using data
available in National Risk Assessment risk matrices and interpreted by the
Commission.
[202] Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 20.12.2013, op.cit., Article 5.
[203] Non-exhaustive list that will be complemented over time
[204] European Commission, SEC(2010) 1626 final, op.cit.,p.18
[205] The key for risk levels are an interpretation by the European
Commission of Sweden's risk matrix