COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision IORP II
Date: 2014-03-27
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: consumer information, cross-border cooperation, financial institution, frontier worker, regulation of investments, supplementary pension













EUR-Lex - 52014SC0102 - EN











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52014SC0102

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision IORP II /* SWD/2014/0102 final */










1.                      
Introduction

Pension systems
across the European Union (EU) have to adapt in order to ensure adequate, safe
and sustainable pensions. The Single Market, too, can contribute decisively to
this goal. The White Paper on Pensions announces that “[t]he Commission
will, in 2012, present a legislative proposal to review [Directive 2003/41/EC
on the activities and supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement
Provision]”. Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORPs)
are, like other financial institutions, an integral part of the Single Market. 
Directive
2003/41/EC marked a first step on the way to a Single Market. Ten years after
its adoption the Directive needs to be revised for five reasons. First,
prudential barriers remain which make it more expensive for employers to join
an IORP in other MSs. Second, the number of Europeans relying on
defined-contribution (DC) schemes, which shifts risks from IORPs and employers
to individuals, has increased significantly. Third, recent financial and
economic crises have shown that current minimum levels of protection for scheme
members and beneficiaries needs improving. Fourth, individuals do not receive
essential information in a comprehensible manner, which prevents them from
making informed decisions about their retirement financing. Fifth, supervisory
powers are insufficient to ensure that IORPs comply with governance and
transparency requirements. 
Taking remedial
action now to strengthening the EU’s micro-prudential regulation for IORPs is
important since improving the performance of occupational pension funds
requires long periods of time to materialise. Failing to act now would lead to
lost opportunities in terms of cost savings and investment returns, and
inadequate financial planning by millions of European. It would also increase
the burden disproportionately for the young generations and undermine
inter-generational solidarity.
This proposal
does not consider the introduction of new solvency rules for IORPs. This
decision was taken following the extensive concern expressed by stakeholders
during public consultations and on the basis of the results of EIOPA’s
Quantitative Impact Study (“QIS”) in July 2013. The Commission Services, with
the support of EIOPA, will re-examine the issue once more complete data are
available. 

2.                      
Problem definition

The Commission has identified the following
four main issues: (1) complexity of cross-border activity, (2) governance and
risk management requirements; (3) communication with members; and (4)
supervisory powers.

2.1.                
Prudential barriers restricting the development
of cross-border IORPs

The experience
of employers, IORPs and supervisors over the past years has clearly shown that
important prudential barriers restricting cross-border operations of IORPs
remain. First, there are additional prudential requirements for cross-border
activity, notably the following: i. the Directive leaves the discretionary
power to impose additional investment rules with the host supervisor in the
case of IORPs operating across borders; and ii. only cross-border pension
schemes must be fully funded at all times.
Second, several
definitions and procedures for cross-border activity are unclear, notably the
following: i. no clear definition of cross-border activity exists; ii. smooth
transfers of pension schemes from one IORP to another located in a different MS
are not ensured; and iii. the scope of prudential regulation rules applicable
in home MSs is uncertain. 

2.2.                
Governance and risk management requirements are
not sufficiently comprehensive

Direct failures
of IORPs are rarely observed. IORPs do fail, however, indirectly and there are
several indicators that these failures are caused by shortcomings in the
governance and risk management practices of IORPs. This gives rise to three
issues:
First, IORPs may not have appropriate governance
functions in place. This concerns in particular the internal audit and risk
management functions, as well as the actuarial functions for DB schemes. These
functions' roles and activities are not sufficiently defined either.
Consequently, these functions do not exist within IORPs or unqualified staff occupies
key positions in the governance structure of IORPs. Moreover, a possible
conflict of interest could arise, as the functions may be shared by an IORP and
its sponsor.  
Second, IORPs
may not take a systematic approach to their own risk assessment and may not
fully integrate the risk management system in the decision-making process of
the IORP. A general lack of a comprehensive approach to risk management of financial
institutions in the EU was revealed during the recent financial crises. 
Third, IORPs do
not necessarily use a depository in order to ensure the safety of their assets.


2.3.                
Members do not receive easy to understand
pension information 

Individuals need
to be properly equipped to take informed decisions about pension savings, but
there are several strong indications of unsustainable information
inefficiencies, which lead to the conclusion that members and beneficiaries are
not properly aware of developments that could negatively impact their pension
benefits. Examples are reductions of accrued pension rights, significant costs
and charges, lack of citizens' knowledge of their financial situation in
general and in particular of the fact that they generally do not save enough
for their pension.

2.4.                
There are shortcomings in the supervisory powers 

Effective
prudential supervision requires adequate powers for national supervisory
authorities to perform their function of monitoring the soundness of IORPs. In
the course of the consultations on this proposal three issues regarding
supervisory powers have been identified.
First, IORPs
have the possibility to circumvent prudential standards by chain outsourcing,
i.e. 3rd party service providers transferring activities to subcontractors.
Second, not all supervisory authorities have the power to develop necessary
tools to stress test the financial situation of IORPs. Third, supervisors could
need additional powers in order to effectively supervise any new governance and
transparency requirements introduced by this proposal.

3.                      
Subsidiarity and proportionality

Although at
present IORPs are important financing vehicles for retirement only in a few
MSs, there is potential, looking forward, for further expansion in other MSs. MSs
have been reducing, and some are still reducing, pension benefits from state
pensions. As a consequence, an adequate replacement rate for European citizens
will require additional retirement income from occupational and personal retirement
provision. In many MSs private pensions are thus expected to provide for a
larger share of retirement income over the next decades. Moreover, DC schemes
are gaining importance and could increasingly be used in a cross-border context
since their product features are simpler as compared to DB schemes.
Under Article 4
TFEU EU action for completing the internal market has to be appraised in the
light of the subsidiarity principle set out in Article 5(3) TEU. EU level
action can add value substantially because action by MSs alone will not: i.
remove obstacles to cross-border activities; ii. ensure a higher EU-wide
minimum level of consumer protection; iii. take into account positive
externalities arising from scale economies, risk diversification and innovation
inherent to cross-border activity; iv. avoid regulatory arbitrage between
financial services sectors; v. avoid regulatory arbitrage between MSs; and vi.
take into account interests of cross-border workers.
Under the
proposed action, MSs retain full responsibility for the organisation of their
pension systems as well as for the decision on the role of each of the three
pillars of the retirement system in individual MSs. The revision does not call
this prerogative into question. Neither does the revision cover issues of national
social and labour, fiscal or contract legislation. 
The proposal
takes account of the principle of proportionality, as enshrined in
Article 5(4) TEU, being adequate to reach the objectives and not going beyond
what is necessary in doing so. The selected policy options seek to strike the
right balance between public interest, protection of IORP members and
beneficiaries, as well as the costs for IORPs, sponsors and supervisors. Although
IORPs are not SMEs - many IORPs satisfy the criterion of staff headcount to be
defined as SMEs but exceed the thresholds for annual turnover and/or annual
balance sheet – it is important that regulation properly takes into account the
nature of their activities and the fact that the scale and complexity of IORPs’
activities is generally less than that of other financial institutions. The
envisaged requirements have been carefully considered, crafted as minimum
standards and tailored to IORPs' specificities. 
The proposed
action takes into account proportionality in each of the operational objectives
in the following manner: i. governance functions have been limited to those
that essential for IORPs; ii.  documentation of own-risk assessment has been
streamlined to the specificities of IORPs; iii. mandatory appointment of a
depository is limited to DC schemes rather than for all IORPs; iv. pension
benefit statement is limited to maximum two pages, focuses on essential
information and does not prevent IORPs from using additional types of
disclosure following national requirements and their own communication style;
v. new supervisory powers are only granted to the extent that they are
necessary to effectively supervise IORPs' activities; vi. supervisory reporting
is not harmonised so as to respect different national supervisory approaches;
and vii. removal of prudential barriers for cross-border IORPs is limited to
those that have raised the most important problems for stakeholders.    

4.                      
Objectives
4.1.                
General objective

The general
objective of this initiative is to facilitate the development of occupational
retirement savings. This is in line with the Commission’s 2012 White Paper "An
Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions" in which it announced
a set of 20 initiatives aimed at helping the MSs to better balance time spent
in work and in retirement and to develop complementary private retirement
savings. The White Paper mentions that the review of the Directive would make
occupational retirement provision more efficient and safer. This would make a
decisive contribution to pension adequacy and sustainability. In its resolution
of 21 May 2013, the European Parliament considers that this proposal should
strengthen prudential standards for governance and risk management and
transparent information disclosures.

4.2.                
Specific objectives

An enhanced role
of occupational retirement savings requires better access to supplementary
schemes, including cross-border ones. This can be facilitated if employers can
effectively supply complementary private retirement savings and if people trust
pension schemes to deliver what they promise. Accordingly, this proposal –
aiming to further facilitate cross-border activity and reinforcing safety by
strengthening member protection – has four specific objectives: i. remove
remaining prudential barriers for cross-border IORPs; ii. ensure good
governance and risk management; iii. provide clear and relevant information to
members and beneficiaries; and iv. ensure that supervisors have the necessary
tools to fulfil their tasks.  

4.3.                
Operational objectives

Eight operational
objectives have been identified to attain the specific objectives. Remaining
prudential barriers can be removed by taking away the extra requirements for
cross-border IORPs and by clarifying definitions and procedures for
cross-border activity. Better governance can be achieved with three
complementary and mutually reinforcing operational objectives: (i) ensure that
IORPs are managed professionally; (ii) require documentation concerning risk
management; and (iii) protect assets from operational risk. Information to
members can be made clearer and more effective by providing a simple statement
with essential information about pension benefits on a yearly basis. Ensuring
that supervisors have the necessary tools to effectively supervise IORPs can be
achieved by granting them new powers in relation to chain-outsourcing and
stress testing and by making sure that supervisors have sufficient powers to
verify compliance with prudential and transparency requirements.    
Policy options

4.4.                
Removal of additional requirements for
cross-border activity 

In considering
the available policy options the appropriate level and focus of further
approximation of national laws should be assessed. The options under
consideration are:
Option 1 – No
policy change: different quantitative investment limits; more stringent
rules for the funding obligation for cross-border IORPs.
Option 2 – Remove
additional requirements from the Directive:  no national quantitative
investment limits; same conditions to restore full funding for cross-border and
domestic IORPs.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 2 is the preferred option
because effectively addressing the problem requires changes in the legal
framework. 
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness Facilitate cross-border activity || Efficiency || Coherence 
   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || ++ || ++ || ++ 

4.5.                
Clarifications of definitions and procedures for
cross-border activity

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change: maintains unclear
definitions and procedures for cross-border activity (different interpretations
of the definitions of cross-border activity, no provisions on cross-border transfers
of pension schemes, lack of clarity about the scope of prudential and social
and labour law rules). 
Option 2 – Guidelines
or recommendations for better enforcement and implementation of the
Directive.   
Option 3 – Clarification of definitions and
procedures for cross-border activity in the Directive.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 3 is the preferred option
because it effectively solves the problems identified by stakeholders and would
contribute to economic benefits for employers willing to join an IORP abroad.
   || Effectiveness Facilitate cross-border activity || Efficiency || Coherence 
   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || 0 || -- || 0 
 Option 3 || ++ || ++ || ++ 

4.6.                
Ensure that IORPs are managed professionally

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 - No
policy change: one governance function (actuarial function) for DB and
hybrid schemes and no functions for DC schemes.
Option 2 – Add a
risk management and an internal audit function: three governance functions for
DB and hybrid schemes and two functions for DC schemes.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 2 is the preferred option
because it improves the protection of members and beneficiaries by taking into
account the different sizes and nature of IORPs, while not unduly increasing
the administrative burden for IORPs and sponsors. 
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || More safety || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || ++ || + || + || ++ 

4.7.                
Require documentation of risk management   

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change: IORPs do
not carry out a systematic self-assessment of their risk profile and do not
communicate that assessment to their supervisor.
Option 2 – Introduce a Risk Evaluation for
Pensions report (REP) to document the IORP’s own risk assessment and as part of
that require qualitative descriptions of four key elements determining the
funding position: (i) explicit valuation of margin for adverse deviation
from best estimate as a risk buffer in calculation of technical provisions;
(ii) qualitative evaluation of sponsor support accessible to IORP in case of
funding shortfall; (iii) description of safety mechanisms available to IORPs in
case of funding deficit, such as mixed benefits, discretionary benefits or
ex-post benefit reductions; and (iv) qualitative evaluation of operational
risks for all schemes. The REP is reported to the supervisor.
Option 3 – Same as option 2 plus common
reporting on national solvency rules: require DB and hybrid schemes to
report to supervisor in a common format the value of their assets and
liabilities following national requirements and require them to quantify, where
applicable, security- and benefit adjustment mechanisms.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Options 2 and 3 would both
improve the  governance of IORPs. But option 2 is the preferred option because
it is expected to be more efficient for employers/IORPs as it: (i) it leaves
sufficient flexibility for IORPs to describe their particular situation in a
way that reflects the nature, scale and complexity of their activities; and
(ii) it is expected to be considerably less costly than option 3. 
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || More safety || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || + || + || + || + 
 Option 3 || ++ || + || - || + 

4.8.                
Protect assets from operational risk 

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change: IORPs are
not required to appoint a depository; no provisions on the safe-keeping and
oversight of assets functions.
Option 2 – Strengthen the safe-keeping and
oversight of assets functions; this means (i) financial instruments have to
be subject to due care and protection; (ii) records have to be kept, to be able
to identify all assets at any time and without delay; (iii) all necessary
measures need to be taken to avoid any conflicts of interest or
incompatibility; (iv) depositories or trustees need to carry out instructions
of the IORP, unless they conflict with the applicable national and/or EU
regulations; (v) ensure that in transactions involving the assets of IORPs any
consideration is remitted to it within the usual time limits; and (vi) ensure
that income produced by assets is applied in accordance with all national
and/or EU regulations.
Option 3 – Strengthen the safe-keeping and
oversight of assets functions and make the appointment of a depository
compulsory for all IORPs: same as option 2 but appointment of a depository
is compulsory. 
Option 4 – Strengthen the safe-keeping and
oversight of assets functions and make the appointment of a depository
compulsory for pure DC schemes: same as option 3 but appointment of a
depository is compulsory for pure DC schemes.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 4 is the preferred option
because it is expected to contribute to the gain for employees in terms of
better governance in a proportionate manner by avoiding unnecessary duplication
of protection against operational risk. 
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || More safety || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || + || 0 || - || 0 
 Option 3 || ++ || 0 || -- || ++ 
 Option 4 || ++ || 0 || + || ++ 

4.9.                
Make available an annual pension benefit
statement

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change: generic
scheme information is provided in most cases on request; personal information
is limited; no obligatory pre-enrolment information and no common template.    
Option 2 – Personalised information for all
stages: generic and personal information is provided once a year; pre-enrolment
information, but no common template.   
Option 3 – Standardised annual Pension Benefit
Statement (PBS) for all stages: same as option 2 but with a common
template. A short and standardised annual PBS would contain both personalised and
generic information about the pension scheme. The PBS would be produced
according to a standard template of two pages to be fine-tuned by EIOPA in a
delegated act. The PBS would be the first layer in a modern multi-layered
approach to communication, which enables national specificities to be described
in-depth in subsequent layers. 
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 3 is the preferred option
because it would enable members and beneficiaries to have a personalised
overview of their rights and entitlements. 
Comparison of policy options against
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || Provide clear and relevant information || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || + || - || + || + 
 Option 3 || ++ || ++ || + || ++ 

4.10.            
Ensure supervision of chain outsourcing and the
possibility to require stress tests

To attain this
operational objective, the following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change. 
Option 2 – Give supervisors the same powers
vis-à-vis subcontractors as vis-à-vis service providers and the possibility to
require stress tests; no harmonisation of supervisory reporting.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 2 is the preferred option
because it would increase safety for members and beneficiaries through better
supervision of IORPs and supervisors would have appropriate tools at their
disposal to do their job.
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || More safety || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || ++ || + || ++ || ++ 

4.11.            
Ensure supervision of requirements on governance
and transparency

To attain this operational objective, the
following options were considered: 
Option 1 – No policy change. 
Option 2 – Give supervisors the power to
supervise the proposed requirements on governance and transparency; no
harmonisation of supervisory reporting.
The table below
summarises the analysis of the policy options. Option 2 is the preferred option
because it would enable supervisors to supervise IORPs effectively, which is
coherent with other financial sectors in the EU.
Comparison of policy options against effectiveness,
efficiency and coherence criteria
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
   || More safety || Facilitate cross-border activity ||   ||   
 Option 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 
 Option 2 || ++ || + || ++ || ++ 

5.                      
Analysis of main impacts of the preferred policy
options

Although the
proposed action involves short-term adjustments costs, the benefit of the
entire package of preferred options is expected to outweigh the costs in the
medium to long term. 

5.1.                
Economic benefits

For employees
The proposal is
expected to provide significant economic benefits to employees. Better
governance is likely to increase risk-adjusted investment returns which help to
achieve efficient outcomes in terms of retirement income or contributions.
Better communication will help individuals make more informed decisions about
their retirement financing. Cross-border IORPs are likely to bring additional efficiency
gains, scale effects for small workforces and for mobile workers a
'one-stop-shop' could be created for their pension arrangement.
For employers
The proposed
action is expected to benefit employers and these might be even more pronounced
for SMEs and multinationals:
Companies
operating on a small or local scale could save costs by joining an
existing IORP. Better governed and more efficient IORPs are expected to lessen
a burden for their sponsor. Moreover, companies operating on a small or local
scale where no deep and efficient IORP market exists could benefit from joining
an existing IORP abroad rather than setting it up locally. Indeed, IORPs
established in MSs with established pensions expertise might extend their
service to sponsors in other MSs. The Commission Services are aware of recent
cases, where the social partners for SMEs operating in one MS had the intention
of setting up an IORP in another MS, largely to due product unavailability in
the local market. 
Many
multinationals operate an international patchwork of local pension funds. This
increases complexity, leading to less transparency, hidden risks,
inconsistencies and inefficiencies. Companies can avoid this by merging local
pension funds into one IORP. 
For SMEs
IORPs are
formally not SMEs because they generally hold assets above the threshold. Many
are, however, small financial institutions. Simplifying cross-border
definitions and procedures is likely to benefit small IORPs even more than
large IORPs because they have less financial capacity to absorb transaction
costs. Sponsors that are SMEs, including groups of SMEs, will benefit from
having easier access to IORPs already established in markets abroad, thereby
avoiding much of the initial market entry cost and benefit from the law of
large numbers.
For
supervisors
The new regime
is likely to require greater supervisory resources. However, the extent that
this reflects a change in costs for supervisors depends strongly on
pre-existing national regimes, which may already have resources for targeting
the quality of supervision of IORPs.
For Member States’ budgets 
The proposed
action is expected to have two positive impacts on MSs' budgets. First, well-governed
IORPs and a deeper market for IORPs strengthen private occupational retirement
provision. This in turn contributes to alleviating the pressure on statutory
schemes. The MSs  that have the potential to benefit most are those where the
IORP market is small in relation to the size of their economy. Second, well-informed
individuals can be expected to make better decisions about their pension
savings when they are young. As such this proposal is likely to lead to a
situation in which better informed citizens exert less pressure on statutory
pension systems which is beneficial for fiscal sustainability. 

5.2.                
Social benefits

The proposal is
expected to have a significant positive social impact. First, the demand for
any financial product is largely driven by trust and performance. The proposed
action will make occupational retirement products more efficient and safer. It is
therefore likely to contribute to increasing the coverage rate of complementary
private retirement savings, thereby strengthening social protection and income
equality in a rapidly aging society. Second, greater safety and awareness
through more effective information disclosures will make the public better
informed about the pensions gap. This incentivises individuals to take informed
decisions about the amount of savings needed for an adequate pension and the
choice of investments, in order to save efficiently. Third, the common format
of the PBS is likely to support the functioning of the labour market for people
who work in different MSs. Finally, more transparency will help social partners
to subject the management of IORPs to greater discipline and thereby
potentially enhance risk-adjusted investment returns.    

5.3.                
Environmental benefits 

The proposed action is not expected to have
any significant direct environmental impact. 

5.4.                
Costs

The expected
cost of the proposed action is an increase of the administrative burden mainly
as a one-off adjustment cost in the short-term, and somewhat higher recurrent
costs in the new regime. An estimate of the IORP industry of the administrative
burden has pointed to three elements that were expected to be the most
expensive. The proposed action avoids the two most costly elements by taken
into account proportionality in the sense that IORPs are not required to report
common quantitative funding elements in the REP and that they can reduce the
governance functions to two. DC schemes in some MSs are expected to incur an
additional cost from the appointment of a depository.

5.5.                
Macro-economic impact

The proposed
action is not expected to have any significant direct macroeconomic impact, although
three indirect benefits might be expected.  First, good governance and risk
management of IORPs is expected to reinforce their role as long-term investors
in the European economy by avoiding an excessive focus on risk-return profiles
in the short-term. Second, better performing and safer retirement products are
also expected to increase staff motivation and impact labour productivity
positively.  Third, more efficient occupational pensions, in terms of attaining
a higher level of risk-adjusted returns on assets, will contribute to support
the purchasing power of the retired population. 

5.6.                
Impact on third countries

The proposed action does not concern a
policy field in which international regulatory approaches exist. It is not
expected to have any significant direct impact on third countries. 

5.7.                
Overview of benefits and costs

The benefits of
the package of preferred options are mainly economic, as well as social given
the importance of an adequate and sustainable retirement system in an aging
economy. 
Although the
proposed action involves short-term adjustments costs, the benefit of the
entire package of preferred options is expected to outweigh the costs. The
financial gains for the employees are expected to be significant. Employers can
expect to realise further scale economies and may pass-on at least some of the
additional administrative burden to scheme members and beneficiaries. Overall
the proposed action is likely to be value creating in an ageing economy. It can
help attain a higher social outcome without undermining economic growth. 

6.                      
Monitoring and evaluation

The Commission
Services will prepare an Implementation Plan where the following actions will
be considered: meetings with MSs, exchange of best practices amongst all MSs,
training programmes addressed to national authorities. A preliminary
examination by EIOPA followed by an evaluation report by the Commission would
also be considered and envisaged. 
The evaluation
of effects of the preferred policy options shall be carried out to see to what
extent the anticipated impacts materialise. Therefore, an ex-post evaluation of
the application of the revised Directive should take place five years after the
adoption of the Directive. It shall take the form of a Commission report to the
European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social
Committee. It may be accompanied, if necessary and in the light of
developments, by policy recommendations or proposals for amendments to this
Directive. EIOPA will collect the qualitative and quantitative data. The
Occupational Pensions Stakeholder Group of EIOPA will also be consulted and the
Commission’s Financial Services User Group could also be involved. A
Eurobarometer survey and a loose survey with IORPs, employers, members and
beneficiaries will also be considered. Employers could be targeted for
questions concerning possible difficulties of setting up pension schemes
abroad. Improved disclosures by IORPs, in terms of quantity (i.e. increased
number of statements or reports) and quality of the information disclosed,
would be indicators of better transparency. On governance, the increase of
specific requirements for functions would be assessed. For cross-border
provisioning, the number of cross-border IORPs would be taken into account.