Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 March 2014 on the conflict of interest rules for senior officials of the Banco de España (CON/2014/22)
Date: 2014-03-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Spain, central bank, civil servant, conflict of interest, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC  

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 20 March 2014  

on the conflict of interest rules for senior officials of the Banco de España  

(CON/2014/22) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 14 February 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banco de España for 

an  opinion  on  a  draft  resolution  of  the  Banco  de  España’s  Governing  Council  amending  the  Banco  de 

España’s Internal Rules of 28 March 2000 as regards the conflict of interest rules for senior officials of 

the Banco de España (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and Article 282(5) of the Treaty 

on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  third  indent  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 
98/415/EC1, as the draft resolution relates to the Banco de España. In accordance with the first sentence 

of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Governing  Council  has 

adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft resolution 

1.1  The draft resolution amends the Banco de España’s Internal Rules in order to eliminate the current 

differences between the treatment of the Secretary-General and Directors-General of the Banco de 

España on the one hand, and senior public sector officials on the other, as regards restrictions on 

the exercise of private activities after termination of office.  

1.2  The  draft  resolution  provides  for  the  qualified  restriction  on  providing  services  in  private 

companies.  More  particularly,  the  two-year  restriction  on  senior  public-sector  officials  providing 

their  services  to  private  companies  after  termination  of  office  laid  down  in  general  law  will  be 

incorporated into the Banco de España’s Internal Rules and also apply to the Banco de España’s 

Secretary-General  and  Directors-General.  The  restriction  is  not  unqualified  but  applies  only  to 

private  companies  which  have  had  a  direct  connection  to  the  office  held.  A  direct  connection 

between the company and the office held at the Banco de España is considered to exist where the 

Secretary-General,  Directors-General,  the  governing  bodies  upon  a  proposal  from  the  Directors-

General or any officials responsible for bodies which report to the former by way of delegation or 

substitution  have  made  decisions  regarding  such  company.  The  restriction  does  not  apply  where 

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Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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officials have returned to their former employers to engage in activities unrelated to their office at 

the  Banco  de  España.  During  that  two-year  period,  the  former  Secretary-General  or  Directors-

General may not themselves, or through third parties or companies in which they have a direct or 

indirect stake above 10 %, enter into agreements to provide technical assistance or other services to 

the Banco de España, be it directly or through contracted or subcontracted companies. 

1.3  The  draft  resolution  also  provides  for  the  prohibition  on  providing  services  in  institutions 

supervised by the Banco de España. The draft resolution maintains the current, absolute six-month 

prohibition on the Secretary-General and Directors-General providing their services to institutions 

subject  to  the  Banco  de  España’s  supervision.  Moreover,  the  Banco  de  España’s  Executive 

Commission  will  be  allowed  to  extend  that  period  up  to  a  maximum  of  twelve  months  should  it 

consider it necessary to prevent conflicts of interest. 

1.4  As  regards  the  regime  adopted  by  the  ECB,  the  provisions  of  the  draft  resolution  are  without 

prejudice to any rules and procedures adopted by the ECB and applicable to the Banco de España’s 

Secretary-General  and  Directors-General  in  the  framework  of  the  Eurosystem  or  the  Single 

Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft resolution preserves the Banco de España’s autonomy in 

staff matters, which is an aspect of the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 

130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 

European  Central  Bank.  The  draft  resolution  should  contribute  to  ensuring  the  effectiveness  and 

independence of the supervision tasks conducted by the Banco de España.  

2.2  Similarly, as provided by Article 31(3) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20132, the ECB is in 

the process of establishing comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and 

proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest arising where 

members  of  the  Supervisory  Board  and  ECB  staff  members  who  are  engaged  in  supervisory 

activities  are  subsequently  employed  elsewhere  within  a  period  of  two  years  after  termination  of 

office.  

2.3 

In order to avoid significant differences between the conflict of interest rules and restrictions after 

employment applicable to the members of the joint supervisory teams appointed by the ECB and 

those  appointed  by  the  Banco  de  España  for  the  performance  of  the  ECB’s  supervisory  tasks,  it 

would be advisable for the Banco de España’s Internal Rules to refer to a possibility to review the 

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Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  of  15  October  2013  conferring  specific  tasks  on  the  European  Central  Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 

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rules as appropriate, taking into account the ethical rules, including rules on post-employment, that 

may be developed in the context of the SSM.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 March 2014. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

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