Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 February 2014 on the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system (CON/2014/18)
Date: 2014-02-18
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Poland, financial stability, financial supervision, national law, public institution

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 18 February 2014  

on the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 

(CON/2014/18) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 13 January 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for 

Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system 

(hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 

98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national  authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and rules 

applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions 

and  markets.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article  17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the 

European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  draft  law  implements  Recommendation  ESRB/2011/3  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board 

of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities2. 

1.2  To  this  end,  a  Systemic  Risk  Board  (hereinafter  the  ‘Board’)  is  established  as  the  authority 

responsible  for  the  conduct  of macro-prudential  oversight.  The  Board  is  composed  of:  (a)  the 

NBP’s President, as Chairman; (b) the Finance Minister, as Deputy Chairman; (c) the Chairman of 

the Financial Supervision Authority; and (d) the President of the Bank Guarantee Fund. The Board 

is  to  pursue  the  objective  of  strengthening  the  national  financial  system’s  resilience  to  systemic 

risk, thereby contributing to long-term and sustainable economic growth. 

1.3  Specifically, the Board’s tasks include: 

(a) 

identifying, assessing, monitoring and mitigating systemic risk; 

(b) 

applying  macro-prudential  instruments  by  adopting  resolutions  that  may  take  the  form  of: 

(i) opinions; (ii) warnings and recommendations addressed to the authorities from which the 

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OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Board draws its members; (iii) warnings addressed to a specific part of or the entire financial 

market; 

(c)  monitoring compliance with its recommendations; 

(d) 

identifying  systemically  important  financial  institutions  and  recommending  specific 

supervisory requirements to be applied to them; 

(e) 

cooperating with the European Systemic Risk Board and other Union institutions and bodies 

as  well  as  macro-prudential  authorities  in  other  Member  States  and  international 

organisations. 

1.4  Additionally, the draft law amends, inter alia, the following laws: 

(a) 

the  Law  of  29  August  1997  on  Narodowy  Bank  Polski3,  by  enabling  NBP  to  provide  the 

Board with organisational and administrative support and the information necessary for the 

performance  of  its  macro-prudential  mandate  and  by  setting  an  additional  task  for  NBP 

defined as taking action aimed at mitigating systemic risk; 

(b) 

the Law  of  14  December  1994  on  the  Bank  Guarantee  Fund4,  by  authorising  the  Bank 

Guarantee  Fund  to  provide  to  the  Board  information  on  entities  covered  by  the  deposit 

guarantee scheme operated by the Bank Guarantee Fund; 

(c) 

the Law of 21 July 2006 on supervision of the financial market5, by allowing the Financial 

Supervision  Authority  to  provide  the  Board  with  the  information  necessary  for  the 

performance of its macro-prudential mandate;  

(d) 

the Law of 7 November 2008 on the Financial Stability Committee6, aiming to ensure that 

the Board’s tasks do not overlap with those of the Financial Stability Committee, an existing 
body with a financial stability mandate7. 

1.5  The  draft  law  also  transposes  into  Polish  legislation  that  part  of  Directive  2013/36/EU  of  the 

European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  access  to  the  activity  of  credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms8, which relates 

to procedures for the imposition of capital buffers. 

2. 

General observation 

The ECB supports the establishment of effective macro-prudential policy frameworks within the Member 

States that are in line with the guiding principles expressed in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. Moreover, 

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8 

Consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2013 item 908. 
Dz. U. of 1995 No 4, item 18. 
Dz. U. of 2006 No 157, item 1119. 
Dz. U. of 2008 No 209, item 1317. 
See  also  Opinion  CON/2008/39  and  paragraph  3.5  of  Opinion  CON/2012/58.  All  ECB  opinions  are  published  on  the 
ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338. 

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national central banks should play a leading role in macro-prudential oversight, together with the ECB, 
given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability9. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  NBP’s role in the performance of the Board’s mandate 

3.1.1  The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  grants  important  powers  to  NBP  in  the  performance  of  the 

Board’s macro-prudential mandate, in particular: (a) by designating NBP President as Chairman of 

the Board with the right of a casting vote; and (b) by assigning the task of supporting the Board’s 

activities  to  NBP,  by  ensuring  its  secretariat  and  preparing  its  meetings  and  draft  resolutions. 

However, the ECB notes that, in the event of the NBP President’s absence, Board meetings may be 
chaired by the Finance Minister as Deputy Chairman10. The ECB considers that having all Board 

meetings  chaired  by  an  NBP  representative  would  facilitate  the  effective  conduct  of  the  macro-

prudential policy. Replacement arrangements should ensure that NBP plays a leading role in this 
respect, in line with Recommendation ESRB/2011/311. 

3.1.2  Pursuant to Article 17 of the draft law, the Board may issue recommendations addressed to each of 

the  institutions  from  which  the  Board  draws  its  members,  including  NBP.  The  ECB  understands 

that, if read in conjunction with the definition in Article 2(3) of the draft law, Article 17 limits the 

subject  matter  of  the  Board’s  recommendations  that  are  addressed  to  NBP,  as  well  as  NBP’s 

obligation to provide information on the relevant implementation measures under Article 30a(2)(3) 

of  the  draft  law,  to  those  NBP  activities  that  may  contribute  to  mitigating  systemic  risk.  It  is 

important  that  NBP’s  involvement  in  the  performance  of  the  Board’s  mandate  and  the 

abovementioned  recommendations  do  not  affect:  (a)  NBP’s  institutional,  functional  and  financial 

independence; or (b) the performance by the European System of Central Banks of its tasks under 

the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank12.  Thus,  for  legal  certainty  reasons,  the  abovementioned  limitation,  which  may  be  inferred 

from Article 17 in conjunction with Article 2(3) of the draft law, could be replaced with an explicit 

provision stating that the Board’s recommendations addressed to NBP are without prejudice to the 

principle of central bank independence referred to in Article 130 of the Treaty. 

3.2  Relations with the Financial Stability Committee 

In order to avoid an overlap of the Board’s tasks with those of the Financial Stability Committee, 

the draft law discontinues the Committee’s regular meetings and terminates its analytical function, 

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12  

See,  for  example,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2013/66,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2013/54,  paragraph  2.1  of 
Opinion CON/2013/45 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/30. 
See  Articles  8(2)  and  11(4)  of  the  draft  law,  which  additionally  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  second  sentence  of 
Article 6(2) of the draft law. 
See recommendation B(3). See also recital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). 

See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2009/88 and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2012/55. 

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thereby transforming it into a body responsible for developing and coordinating crisis management 

procedures  and  tasks  between  members  of  the  Committee.  This  crucial  coordination  task  will 

remain necessary, since the ECB understands that the Bank Guarantee Fund, one of the institutions 

represented  on  the  Committee,  may  be  designated  as  a  resolution  authority  as  defined  in  the 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms13. However, overlaps in 

the  institutional  status  and  powers  of  the  Board  and  of  the  Committee,  as  well  as  identical 

composition  under  different  chairmanship,  could  give  rise  to  a  lack  of  clarity  with  regard  to  the 

allocation  of  responsibilities  or  to  unnecessary  duplication  of  tasks.  While  recognising  that  crisis 

management  coordination might  necessitate  different  governance  arrangements  from  those  of  the 

macro-prudential  oversight  function,  a  number  of  responsibilities  that  are  assigned  to  the 

Committee  and  the  Board  in  parallel  could  be  more  uniformly  regulated,  in  particular  such 
competences as the exchange of information between members14 or the establishment of working 
groups15. The ECB encourages the Polish authorities to review this aspect. 

4. 

Other issues 

This  opinion  is  without  prejudice  to  the  conclusions  of  the  follow-up  assessment  of  Recommendation 

ESRB/2011/3,  which  the  ESRB  will  prepare  in  accordance  with  Article  17  of  Regulation  (EU) 

No 1092/2010. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2014. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

13  
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15  

COM/2012/0280 final, available on the Commission’s website at www.europa.eu. 
Articles 13 to Article 14a of the draft law, Article 10 of the Law on the Financial Stability Committee. 
Article 9 of the draft law, Article 8 of the Law on the Financial Stability Committee. 

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