REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2014-01-22
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, judicial reform, organised crime, prevention of delinquency













EUR-Lex - 52014DC0036 - EN











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52014DC0036

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism /* COM/2014/036 final */









1. Introduction
In 2012, the fifth year of
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), the Commission decided to
produce a longer-term assessment to give a full picture of progress. This
assessment was published in July 2012.[1]
It showed important progress in the adaptation of the basic legislative and
institutional framework, but also some important remaining gaps as well as a
need for effective and consistent implementation of the reforms. There were
still considerable challenges to be tackled. In this context it was decided to take
a longer period before the next report (18 months) see how the reforms already
implemented by Bulgaria were taking root and to give time to assess the degree
of sustainability before the next assessment. The 2012 report, its methodology
and conclusions were also endorsed in conclusions by the Council of Ministers.[2]
This report assesses the
progress made by Bulgaria in the core CVM areas of judicial reform,
anti-corruption work, and the fight against organised crime. These are issues
at the heart of the modernisation of Bulgarian society: for reform to succeed,
it needs a consistent and coherent approach based on a broad consensus in
Bulgarian society. The fact that the period covered by this report was
characterised by three different governments has not helped to build this
consensus, though events have also illustrated a widespread public aspiration
for reform. 
The Commission believes
that the monitoring process of the CVM, the opportunities provided by EU funds
and the constructive engagement of the Commission and many Member States
continues to be a valuable support to reform in Bulgaria. The next formal
report will come in around one year's time.
2. State of the reform process in Bulgaria
2.1       Reform of
the judiciary
Independence, Integrity
and Accountability 
Public confidence in the
Bulgarian judiciary is not high.[3]
CVM reports have pointed to ways to improve this confidence, through a
professional approach to managing the system to insulating judicial
appointments and decisions from political influence.[4] 
Some significant steps
have been taken since July 2012. The procedures for nominating senior
magistrates have become more public and there has been a more sustained effort
to tackle some of the management issues facing the judiciary, such as workload
imbalances. Some serious problems have been acknowledged as requiring action,
such as the need to protect the system for allocating cases from manipulation. In
the second half of 2013, there were no frontal attacks from the executive on
the judiciary.[5]
Nevertheless, as also highlighted in previous reports, concerns persist about
the independence of the judiciary in Bulgaria. 
In July 2012, the
Commission expressed a strong hope that the future management of the Supreme Judicial
Council (SJC) would position it as a key institution to drive progress in the
reform of the judiciary. Reforms in 2012 introduced more public election
procedures for the SJC. However, the conduct of the election for the SJC in
autumn 2012 did not convincingly demonstrate an open contest with professional
merit and integrity to the fore. The proceedings to elect the parliamentary
quota, while more open than in the past,[6]
suggested a significant party political influence on the process. The election
of the judicial quota suffered from the decision not to allow for direct
elections by judges.[7]
This put much influence in the hands of the existing court leadership, limiting
the opportunities for a fresh start. 
The SJC has identified its
priorities more clearly than in the past. It has also made efforts to open up,
with more outreach and with the establishment of a Civic Council to bring
advice from civil society to the SJC, comprised of key NGOs as well as
professional organisations. A vigorous civil society in this area was
identified in the July 2012 report as an important step forward for Bulgaria.[8]
However, its real influence on policy remains unclear and a clearer procedure
for consulting the Civic Council and explaining when its recommendations are not
followed would increase the effectiveness of the Civic Council. In general, the
SJC should take further steps in the direction of transparency.
The SJC has
taken some steps towards managerial reform. On workload and reallocation of
resources, a practical approach seems to be making some progress. In other
areas, such as objective appraisal and promotion procedures or introducing more
consistency into disciplinary proceedings, concrete steps so far are few. [9] The ethics committee
could be expected to act as a champion of integrity, but the SJC has not
positioned itself to make integrity a major priority.[10] As such it finds it
difficult to dispel continued concerns about political influence over its
decision-making. 
The result is that the SJC
is today not widely regarded as an autonomous and independent authority able to
effectively defend the judiciary's independence vis-à-vis the executive and
parliamentary branches of government. The onus for defending the independence
of the judiciary, or for scrutinising whether politically-sensitive cases are
handled objectively,[11]
 often seems to fall on civil society. The SJC should acknowledge this as a
major priority and put in place transparent procedures for a consistent
handling of issues as they arise. This also suggests the need for a more
consistent policy towards the media. 
One of the main areas
influencing public perceptions of law enforcement and justice is appointments.
These have acted as a media and political focus. Concerns about important
public appointments being decided in an intransparent way and involving strong
economic and political interest groups was further strengthened by several
high-profile appointments in the course of the past year. Concrete examples
were the failed appointments to the constitutional court and the state agency
for national security (SANS).[12]
In both cases, the candidates eventually had to withdraw, but both left a
legacy of concern about how the system runs. These were only the most
emblematic cases. In other cases the outcomes were less contested, but the
process still left a picture of intransparent decision-shaping having more
influence than formal procedures, despites the improvements in transparency.[13] 
Such cases illustrate that
while transparent procedures are important for the proper functioning of public
institutions, formal rules are not always sufficient. In order to build trust
in its institutions, Bulgaria needs to develop a track record of allowing
decisions concerning appointments, including to high-level offices to be based on
a real competition between candidates in accordance with the clear standards of
merit and integrity underlined in past CVM reports.[14] An important
test case will be the upcoming nomination and election of the Chief Inspector
of the Judicial Inspectorate. Delays have given the impression that the key
factor is an inability to agree on a candidate in advance, whilst this kind of
position should be filled following an open process designed to appoint a
highly skilled professional who can show and apply full objectivity. The
election of the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation will also be an
important appointment later in 2014.
An important element in
the protection of judicial accountability and integrity is the disciplinary
procedures applied to magistrates. This needs systematic criteria with the goal
of consistency in disciplinary action.[15]
When there are no clear standards for the assessment of individual cases, the
process becomes open to arbitrary decisions. The fact that the Supreme Administrative
Court has frequently reversed SJC decisions also suggests either an
inconsistency or a lack of common interpretation of the rules. A systematic
approach to disciplinary action is a key element of judiciary independence and
integrity, as arbitrary decisions in this area tend to create the basis for –
real or perceived – undue pressure on magistrates.  
The new unit set up to
investigate crimes committed by magistrates will be responsible for a
particularly sensitive area. If it can establish a track record of objectivity
and effectiveness, this could be an important addition to the efforts to
promote integrity. However, the abuses identified by the current prosecution
leadership in the previous Prosecution Inspectorate also illustrate the risks of
self-contained bodies within the prosecution.[16]
The implementation and application of clear, transparent and accountable
procedures are essential to offset this risk. 
Legal Framework
Current discussions on the
reform of the Penal Code aim to bring the long-standing discussions on a first
draft to a conclusion and a proposal has been presented to Parliament in
January. The new code should bring important improvements. However, it should
be noted that whilst a reform of the – regularly amended – 1968 Penal Code will
be helpful, it needs to be part of a wider approach to criminal justice and be
thoroughly discussed with practitioners and the civil society. In the areas
covered by the CVM, it will be important to identify and explain provisions
designed to improve the fight against corruption and organised crime, but it
will also be important to see how the changes can be combined with a better
managed judicial and law enforcement system. This may require changes to the
Criminal Procedure Code. At the same time, the need for legislative changes
should not hold back useful practical and organisational steps that can be
taken in the short term independently of the new law. An important element in
this process should be the conclusions of an analysis of unsuccessful cases
recommended by the Commission,[17]
as well as other analyses of issues like delays in criminal proceedings (see
below). 
Strategic framework for
judicial reform
As well as the SJC, the
other key player in setting a tone of reform for the judicial system is the
Ministry of Justice. With changes in Ministerial leadership and a parliamentary
arithmetic which now makes legislative change difficult, it has been difficult
for the Ministry to provide the perspective needed, though the championing of
areas like e-justice may reap dividends in the future. If given real ownership,
the current efforts to update the longer-term strategy for judicial reform
could act as a useful focus.
The Minister of Justice
has asked leading NGOs to help analyse the state of play of the reform of the
judiciary to date.  The idea is to build upon the 2010 strategy, which has only
been implemented in part, and to cover a variety of issues including
rebalancing resources to needs, integrity issues, harmonisation of court management
practice, and the role of administrative heads. This analysis was due to be
ready in the autumn 2013 but has been delayed. It is supposed to be adopted in
2014 after consultation of the relevant stakeholders and should cover a 7 year
period to implement reforms, partly to align the timespan with programming of
support under the EU structural funds. It is important that the strategy is
subject to wide consultation, including civil society and professional
organisations, but then is adopted as an agreed roadmap by the government and
the SJC, to ensure a maximum of ownership. 
Efficiency of the
judicial and law enforcement system
The first steps are being
taken to address difficult issues of workload and the redistribution of
resources amongst courts and prosecution offices. This may encounter some
resistance from certain concerned parties, but as long as it can be shown to be
based on objective and transparent criteria, it will also act as a
demonstration that the judicial leadership can address sensitive questions.
Together with the launching of stalled competitions, this should now be resulting
in some real improvements.[18]
The work undertaken in the SJC on developing methodological guidelines to
address workload imbalance should also offer a good basis for the future. A
fair distribution of workload will not only make for a more efficient system
which better serves the Bulgarian public – it will also have consequences for
disciplinary proceedings. At present, the reality of widespread delays can too
easily be used for disciplinary cases – often on an inconsistent basis – whilst
responsibility for the problem may rather lie with the judicial leadership and
administrative heads. 
On case allocation, the
SJC intends to install a centralised system for keeping track of random case
allocation in all courts, to address concerns that the current system can be
manipulated.[19]
It is welcome that the existence of a problem has now been acknowledged. A
permanent system should benefit from outside expertise and the involvement of
stakeholders and civil society if it is to restore confidence. It is also
important to have common implementing rules, so that all parties know how the
system is translated into practice and can query any instances where rules seem
not to have been respected. 
Another important part of
the management of the judicial system is the Inspectorate attached to the
Supreme Judicial Council. As noted in past CVM reports,[20] the
Inspectorate could be a valuable tool for driving a more rigorous management
approach and for targeting identified shortcomings, re-orientating its work
from a formal to a qualitative approach to inspections. Currently the
Inspectorate will analyse statistics on the compliance with deadlines or check
the application of random case allocation, but it rarely checks the quality of
case files nor does it take into account workload issues in a systematic
manner. As a consequence, the conclusions reached by the inspectorate in an
area like random allocation do not seem to address the issues in full.  In
addition, issues related to the integrity or ethical behaviour of magistrates
are not dealt with by the Inspectorate, as the Inspectorate considers that they
fall outside the remit of its competence. These factors limit the
Inspectorate's impact in terms of addressing the wider shortcomings affecting
the judicial system in Bulgaria.[21]
An example where
management has taken a more systematic approach is in the prosecution.[22] The audit undertaken
by the Prosecutor General and the subsequent action plan provides a clear and
often frank analysis of shortcomings, and seeks to identify specific remedies.
If implemented successfully, it could yield significant results, while also
illustrating that extra resources are not always needed to galvanise change.
Whilst such a process in the prosecution cannot be automatically replicated in
the judiciary, given its less hierarchical management, it provides an example
in terms of willingness to address problems and be specific as to intended solutions.
It would however be useful to apply more transparency to the process, to ensure
that accountability for its implementation can be effective. Reform in the
prosecution also needs to go forward in the context of the wider judicial
reform strategy – problems like addressing difficulties with the use of
expertise in court need a common approach from the prosecution and the SJC.
Issues like performance assessments could also be taken forward in a way which
ensures a consistent approach for judges and prosecutors.
More generally, the
Ministry of Interior has undergone a number of significant reforms to focus on
its core purpose of law enforcement and to redeploy staff from administrative
to operational functions. The problematic practice of donations to the
Ministry, which had been restricted to public authorities and companies, has
reportedly been stopped. At the same time, the Ministry has to face challenges such
as appropriate handling of demonstrations and pressure on the borders. 
2.2       Corruption 

Widespread corruption is
perceived as a major problem and poses a significant challenge for the
Bulgarian authorities.[23]
It has clear consequences for the willingness of businesses to invest in
Bulgaria.[24]
An anti-corruption strategy was adopted by the previous government in 2010 and
it is now being updated – it could usefully involve independent outside
expertise in this work. Overall, the results of previous efforts have been very
limited. The general image is that of a weak and uncoordinated response to what
is a systemic problem throughout the public administration. Shortcomings
identified in previous CVM report remain.[25]
A number of institutional
changes have been made over the past years, but there is a tendency for these
initiatives to run into problems or simply show no visible results. For
example, the Conflict of Interest Commission, which could have played a crucial
role in targeting irregular practices at all levels in the public sector, has
instead been caught up in a serious scandal involving suspicions of strong
political influence.  The anti-corruption project BORKOR, which was promoted as
a major instrument to identify and address corruption risks, still shows no
concrete results, in spite of the resources which have been devoted to the
project. In the area of public procurement, a complex and ever changing
legislative framework has made it even more difficult to create a culture of
objectivity and rigour. Some business voices are losing confidence that a tide
of manipulation of tenders can be stemmed.[26]

There are however also some
positive developments. Since 2007 the internal inspectorates of the state
administration working under the guidance of the Inspectorate General under the
Prime Minister's Office have been strengthened. They have the potential to play
an important role in detecting and preventing irregularities as well as in
presenting proposals for further improvements in the anti-corruption system.
The practice of establishing joint teams between the investigatory agencies and
prosecution should also lead to a more effective response with regard to
serious corruption offences. It remains the case that anti-corruption efforts
are diffuse, with no single corruption authority given the authority, and the
autonomy, to drive change. The Inspectorate General could act as a nucleus for
this work, but is at present on too small a scale to have a great impact.
Experience suggests
however that of central importance to the credibility of anti-corruption action
is the successful pursuit of high level corruption, so that transgressions are
seen to be brought to justice. The lack of a track record of success in
pursuing high-level corruption cases remains an obstacle to persuading the
Bulgarian public that a serious effort is under way to address the problem. 
2.3       Organised
crime
Similarly, the lack of
overall progress on emblematic organised crime cases has inevitable
consequences for perceptions about the fight against organised crime. A number
of high-profile cases have been dropped, while for other serious crimes, such
as contract killings, no indictments have been made after several years of
investigation. 
The fact that high-profile
organised crime figures were able to escape from justice on the eve of a final
verdict in July 2012 was a source of widespread concern:[27] but the fact
that nobody was willing to take responsibility for this, and that no steps have
been taken to guarantee that this could not happen again, is an even stronger
reflection on the difficulties of the system to address the problems.[28]
The main measure taken by
the new government has been the strengthening of the state agency for national
security (SANS), which will now not only be dealing with espionage and
counter-intelligence, but also with organised crime and a variety of other
crimes considered to be significant enough to affect state security. This
includes the transfer of the special police units on organised crime (GDBOP) to
the security services (SANS). This has caused some disturbances in the
operation of the services concerned and it is important to ensure that this
effect is only transitional. More significantly, the manner in which the
decision was taken, with no consultation or justification at the time, caused
significant reputational damage to the services as well as the new government,
which can only be redressed by the services showing that the change brings improved
operational results. As discussed above, in this case the general image of a
reform prematurely implemented was further compounded by the controversy over
the appointment of the new head of the security agency. 
A key issue is also the
division of labour with the Ministry of Interior. For example, SANS will deal
with the production of drugs and international drugs trafficking, whereas the
police will deal with other drug related crimes. SANS will deal with high-level
corruption, the police with all other forms of corruption. Sometimes cases may
need to be reattributed in the course of the investigation. 
SANS and the Prosecution
have formed specialised teams to deal with corruption, trafficking, and
financial crimes.[29] 

Whilst this reorganisation
could bring some positive developments, notably by having a more integrated
approach given the links between corruption and organised crime, the new agency
will have to establish a strong track record if it is to dispel the negative
impression created by the controversial atmosphere of its creation. Particular
attention needs to be given to cooperation with law enforcement services in
other Member States.[30]
More generally, CVM
reports had recommended a comprehensive analysis of why cases in the past had
stalled or were unsuccessful, involving all the relevant government and
judicial authorities.[31]
Perceived problems like the use of expert evidence in court, insufficient
witness protection and problems with evidence need to be looked at from the
perspective of the police investigation, the prosecution and the trial phase if
improvements are to follow. Progress on this analysis has been slow and a lack of
coordination and to some extent of ownership is suggested by parallel
initiatives by the Prosecution and the SJC.[32]
Open discussions with stakeholders and civil society, followed by a clear
action plan, is needed to restore momentum to this process. 
Asset forfeiture is a key
tool to deprive organised crime groups of their illegal revenues.  The new
leadership of the asset forfeiture commission (CEPACA) seems to have delivered
a modest increase in forfeited assets. However, the new law, albeit having
improved some aspects, also included some parliamentary amendments which
created new stumbling blocks, in particular a very high unjustified wealth
threshold for the agency (CEPACA) – to intervene ex-officio. Some question
marks therefore remain with regard to the new legal set-up and its impact on
the ability of the CEPACA to act effectively.[33]
Likewise, the specialised
prosecution and courts still need to establish a track record of effectively
tackling important cases. There remains a concern that some aspects of the
design are hampering their effectiveness, particularly a lack of authority to
prioritise which leaves the institutions burdened with minor cases. The lack of
technical expertise is also often flagged by the specialised prosecution as a
serious operational problem, and the increasing importance of financial
investigation in organised crime makes this of particular importance.
3.         CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the
Commission's last report in July 2012 Bulgaria has taken a few steps forward.
There has been some degree of improvements in appointment procedures, some
useful managerial steps by the Prosecutor General and some progress by the
Supreme Judicial Council on the workload issue.
However, overall
progress has been not yet sufficient, and fragile. Public confidence is
conditioned largely by key moments when decisions or events are of sufficient
importance to warrant more general interest. Most such events over the last 18
months – a period during which Bulgaria has had three different governments –
have been the source of concern rather than reassurance, with appointments
having to be aborted due to integrity issues, the escape from justice of
convicted leaders of organised crime and a succession of revelations about
political influence on the judicial system. There remain very few cases where crimes
of corruption or organised crime have been brought to conclusion in court. 
There are voices
in favour of reform in Bulgaria, frustrated by the slow pace of change, which
deserve encouragement. To progress more quickly towards the CVM benchmarks, the
Bulgarian authorities need to work with them and to provide leadership based on
a vision centred in core principles like the rule of law and the independence
of the judiciary. This would imply a political commitment to a long-term
strategy for reform as well as concrete and practical measures in the short
term to bring the process forward. 
The Commission invites
Bulgaria to take action in the following areas:
1.         Independence, accountability and integrity of the
judiciary
The rules
governing appointments should be applied with clarity and transparency. A
series of cases where professionalism and integrity are clearly the main
drivers in an appointment process will be needed to restore public confidence,
particularly in the case of the most senior appointments. In this area Bulgaria
should:
·        
Establish a set of objective standards for
appraisals and promotions, focusing on merit, integrity and transparency, and
put in place a system to monitor and evaluate the application of those
standards in current practice, accounting for the
specifics of the functions of judges, prosecutors and investigators. In both steps, involve the professional associations and other
relevant stakeholders. 
·        
Develop a consistent practice within the SJC of
applying objective standards of merit, integrity and transparency to
appointments, including for high-level offices. 
·        
Provide guarantees for the integrity and
transparency of the system of case allocation throughout the judiciary, with a system of random allocation checked
by independent experts to ensure that administrative heads are fully
accountable for all decisions to diverge from the system. Common rules for
applying the system are needed and should apply to all courts.  
·        
Re-direct the work of the Inspectorate of the
SJC to act in a proactive manner to promote integrity and judicial efficiency. 
·        
Establish a clear procedure for the SJC to react
publicly in cases of political interference in the judiciary and prosecution.
2.         Reform of the Judicial System 
The updated strategy on judicial reform should be used to give a
direction and momentum to reform. In this area Bulgaria should:
·        
Implement the action plan for the prosecution
within the proposed timeline. Embed the action plan in the broader reform of the
judiciary. In the meantime, in the SJC, take concrete measures to address the
problem of uneven workload between courts and magistrates in an objective
manner. 
·        
The strategy should include an annual progress
report from the SJC on judicial reform measures and goals for the coming year
so as to add to the transparency of the process.

 Set a target
     for the completion of work on the new Penal Code, and for its implementation.
 Ensure the
     open involvement of all significant NGOs and professional

organisations in defining and monitoring strategies for reform.
3.         Efficiency of the judicial system
The issues of workload imbalances and distribution of resources
should continue to be addressed as well as issues like appraisals and
promotions taking full account of integrity. In addition, in this area Bulgaria
should:
·        
Establish clear procedures, standards and
penalties to ensure consistent disciplinary rulings. These should serve as the
basis for a consistent approach by administrative heads. 
·        
Make fully public the functional audit of the
prosecution offices conducted by the Prosecutor General as well as the action
plan and undertake a public consultation on the action plan. 

 Close
     loopholes in the effective implementation of court decisions, such as

absconding to evade prison sentences or failure to
apply financial sanctions
defined in court.
·        
Make concrete progress on E-justice as a means to
improve the efficiency, transparency and consistency of the judicial process in
the short- to medium-term as well as in the long-term perspective. 
4.         Corruption
Tackling corruption requires a sustained and consistent effort on
prevention, but also on pursuing transgressions and showing that wrongdoing
results in sanctions. In this area Bulgaria should: 

 Entrust a
     single institution with the task to coordinate the fight against
     corruption, to assist and coordinate the efforts in different sectors.

·        
Review and update the national anti-corruption
strategy in consultation with civil society organisations, with a standard
model of public administration having internal inspectorates with independence,
transparency and accountability. 
·        
Take steps to reduce the risk of corruption in
public procurement procedures by making them simpler and more transparent. 
·        
Review the procedures on conflicts of interest
so as to ensure their effectiveness and impartiality as well as the credibility
of the sanctioning mechanism. 
5.         Organised crime
Successful investigation and sanctioning of organised crime will
always remain the most effective way to make progress, so progress on emblematic
cases remains of central importance. In this area Bulgaria should:
·        
Prepare and implement an action plan, drawing on
the long-awaited independent and comprehensive analysis of case failures, with
a timetable for concrete measures to address all aspects and all stages of the
law enforcement and judicial system. 
·        
Specifically address the problem of high-level
defendants absconding before a final court decision, with a clear assignment of
the responsibility for any failings.
·        
Develop a clear policy governing the
relationship of the State Agency for National Security (SANS) with bodies
dealing with organised crime in other Member States, with specific operating
procedures with those bodies to ensure that cooperation is maintained and
improved. 
·        
Provide that the Specialised Court for Organised
Crime and the attached Prosecutor's Office can concentrate on high-profile
cases.  
·        
Ensure the necessary cooperation between the
Asset Forfeiture Commission and the relevant law enforcement institutions.
Carry out an independent evaluation of the new law on asset forfeiture and its
impact by summer 2014. 
[1] COM(2012) 411 final
[2] 24 September 2012
[3]  See the latest figures provided
by the World Economic Forum  http://reports.weforum.org/the-global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014/

[4] For example, COM(2012) 411, pp
6-8
[5] For example, the practice if
naming police operations after judges who had failed to impose detention
measures on arrested suspects was terminated.
[6] Technical report p. 2.
[7] COM(2012) 411 final, ref
[8] COM(2012) 411 final, p. 6.
[9] Technical report pp. 13-14.
[10] Technical report pp.
11-12.
[11] Current cases
involving allegations of wiretapping and ballot rigging will provide a test in
this respect 
[12] Technical report pp. 4
and 25.
[13] Technical report p.
5.
[14] There are
internationally recognised standards, such as those from the European Network
of Councils for the Judiciary: http://encj.net/images/stories/pdf/GA/Dublin/encj_dublin_declaration_def_dclaration_de_dublin_recj_def.pdf
 
[15] In regard to
appraisals and promotions disciplinary proceedings are sometimes taken into
account during promotion exercises and sometimes are not.
[16] Technical report p.
10.
[17] COM(2012) 411 final,
p. 21.
[18] Technical report p.
14.
[19] Technical report p.
6-7.
[20] COM(2012) 411 final,
p. 7 and 21.
[21] Technical report p.
11.
[22] Technical report p.
9.
[23] Center for the Study
of Democracy, Corruption and anti-corruption in Bulgaria (2012-2013), Policy
Brief No. 43, November 2013. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013
published by Transparency International, Bulgaria ranks second highest among
the EU Member States with regard to the perceived level of corruption.
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013)
[24] The 2013 Global
Competitiveness Report lists corruption as the most problematic factor for
doing business in Bulgaria. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf 
p. 138.
[25] COM(2012) 411 final  pp.
14.
[26] Direct contacts
between the Commission and business organisations.
[27] The fact that an
asset forfeiture case against the same group has now stalled has reinforced
this concern.
[28] Indeed, a comparable
case concerning a defendant convicted of a double murder took place in December
2013.
[29] In addition to the
unit on crimes concerning the magistracy noted above
[30] A particular problem
concerns the admissibility in some jurisdictions of evidence gathered by
security services
[31] COM(2012) 411 final,
p. 14 and 21.
[32] Technical report p.
24.
[33] Technical report p. 25-26.