COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030
Date: 2014-01-22
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU Emissions Trading Scheme, climate change policy, energy saving, greenhouse gas, reduction of gas emissions, renewable energy













EUR-Lex - 52014SC0015 - EN











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52014SC0015

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030 /* SWD/2014/015 final */









COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions

A policy framework for climate and
energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030

Contents
1............ Procedural issues and
consultation of interested parties. 9
1.1......... Organisation and timing. 9
1.2......... Consultation and
expertise. 9
1.2.1...... Consultation. 9
1.2.2...... External expertise and
contributions of Commission services. 11
1.3......... Opinion of the Impact
Assessment Board (IAB) 12
2............ Problem definition. 13
2.1......... Policy context 13
2.1.1...... State of play and general
policy context 13
2.1.2...... 2050 Roadmaps and 2030
Green Paper 14
2.1.3...... International policy
context 15
2.2......... Progress made,
challenges encountered and lessons learnt from the 2020 framework. 15
2.2.1...... General progress towards
meeting 2020 headline targets for climate and energy. 15
2.2.2...... Implementation – climate
policy. 16
2.2.3...... Progress on international
action on climate change. 17
2.2.4...... Implementation – energy
policy. 18
2.2.5...... Interaction between
headline targets and instruments. 23
2.3......... Evolution under current
policies. 24
2.3.1...... The Reference Scenario. 24
2.3.2...... The EU's medium-to
long-term security of energy supplies remains an issue. 26
2.3.3...... Ensuring competitiveness
with increasing energy costs. 26
2.3.4...... Risk of delayed investments
and high carbon lock in. 30
2.4......... What is the problem the
2030 framework should contribute to address?. 31
2.4.1...... General problems. 31
2.4.2...... Specific problem for this
policy initiative. 32
2.4.3...... Current challenges serving
as guiding principles. 32
2.4.4...... Stakeholders views
regarding the challenges related to targets and instruments and their
interactions  33
2.5......... Who is affected. 34
2.6......... The EU's right to act
and EU added-value. 34
3............ Scope and Objectives. 35
3.1......... Scope and context of the
initiative. 35
3.1.1...... Scope. 35
3.1.2...... Context 35
3.2......... Objectives. 36
3.2.1...... General objectives. 36
3.2.2...... Specific objectives. 36
3.2.3...... Operational objectives. 36
3.3......... Coherence with other
policies. 36
4............ Policy options. 37
4.1......... Policy options for
headline targets and measures. 37
4.1.1...... Basic policy options for
targets and ambition levels. 38
4.1.2...... Scenario analysis to assess
policy options for targets and measures. 39
4.1.3...... Interaction with
international climate policies. 48
4.2......... Policy options for
meeting headline targets. 49
4.2.1...... ETS. 49
4.2.2...... Sectors not covered by the
ETS. 49
4.2.3...... Options for meeting a
potential RES target 50
4.2.4...... Options for meeting a
potential EE target 50
4.3......... Options for other
targets or indicators for aspects relating to competitiveness of the energy
system and security of energy supplies. 50
5............ Analysis of impacts: 50
5.1......... Options for targets and
measures. 50
5.1.1...... Methodology. 50
5.1.2...... Environmental impacts. 54
5.1.3...... Energy system impacts. 66
5.1.4...... Economic impacts. 75
5.1.5...... Social impacts. 88
5.2......... Indicators /
aspirational objectives relating to competitiveness of the energy system and
security of supply  98
5.3......... EU action in the context
of increased international climate action. 99
5.4......... Structural measures in
the EU ETS. 103
5.4.1...... Revision of the annual
linear reduction factor 105
5.4.2...... Use of international
credits. 106
5.4.3...... Improve the functioning of
the EU ETS through addressing the market imbalance. 109
5.5......... Carbon leakage measures
in a 2030 framework. 110
5.5.1...... Indirect emissions
compensation. 113
5.5.2...... The use of auction revenues
for proactive low-carbon innovation measures. 113
5.6......... Sectors not included in
the ETS or Non ETS: Policy options for the Land Sector 114
5.6.1...... The problem.. 114
5.6.2...... The policy options for 2030. 114
5.6.3...... Comparison of options. 115
5.6.4...... Policy monitoring and
evaluation. 115
5.7......... Implementing a potential
RES target 116
5.8......... Implementing a potential
energy savings / efficiency target 118
5.9......... Differential impacts
across member states. 119
5.9.1...... Impacts on Member State
level 120
5.9.2...... Meeting the equity
challenge. 128
6............ Comparing options /
Conclusions. 131
6.1......... Comparing the scenarios. 131
6.1.1...... Environmental impacts. 131
6.1.2...... Energy system impacts. 132
6.1.3...... Economic impacts. 132
6.1.4...... Social impacts. 133
6.1.5...... Distributional impacts. 133
6.2......... General impacts and
trade-offs between policy options. 134
6.2.1...... Only a GHG target, or
several targets. 134
6.2.2...... The level of the targets. 135
7............ Annexes. 142
7.1......... The EU Reference
Scenario. 142
7.2......... Conditions enabling
cost-effective decarbonisation and their modelling. 153
7.3......... Decarbonisation
scenarios based on Ambitious Energy Efficiency policies. 159
7.4......... State of affairs and
main lessons learnt from the 2020 framework. 169
7.4.1...... Summary. 169
7.4.2...... The 20% GHG emission
target, dedicated policies and policy interactions. 171
7.4.3...... The 20% renewable energy target
and implementing measures. 182
7.4.4...... The energy efficiency
target and implementing measures. 192
7.5......... Summary report on the
analysis of the debate on the green paper "A 2030 framework for climate
and energy policies". 198
7.5.1...... Process and quantitative
results of the Public Consultation. 198
7.5.2...... Qualitative assessment of
the consultation and main findings. 201
7.5.3...... Which lessons from the 2020
framework and the present state of the EU energy system are most important when
designing policies for 2030?. 203
7.5.4...... Targets for 2030. 205
7.5.5...... Instruments. 213
7.5.6...... Competitiveness and
security of supply. 220
7.5.7...... Capacity and distributional
aspects. 226
7.6......... Existing free allocation
procedures in the EU ETS. 229
7.7......... Challenges relates to
skills and training. 230
7.8......... Extension of the scope
of the EU ETS to other sectors. 232
List of Figures
Figure 1: Average electricity generation costs and prices
in the Reference Scenario (Euro'10 per MWh) 29
Figure 2: International fuel prices developments. 94
Figure 3: Average price of electricity in final demand
sectors. 95
Figure 4: Example of build-up surplus in ETS based on
Reference emissions profile and existing cap  104
Figure 5: Example of possible supply demand pattern ETS
based on 40% GHG reduction emissions profiles, ETS cap of 43% by 2030. 106
Figure 6: Rise in average system costs, 2030, compared to
Reference, as a % of GDP for the GHG40 scenario, compared to the GDP/capita in
2010. The EU average rise is 0.15%. 123
Figure 7: Health benefits per Member State as % of 2030
GDP compared to Reference (using low value of life year lost estimates),
relative to GDP per capita. 127
Figure 8: EU-28 GDP, energy demand and energy intensity
(2000 = 100) 145
Figure 9: EU-28: Final energy consumption by sector and
share of electricity. 145
Figure 10: EU-28 Fuel shares in primary energy
consumption, carbon intensity. 146
Figure 11: EU-28: RES share: total and by sector (RES in
gross final energy consumption) 147
Figure 12: Net power generation capacity (with further
breakdown of RES capacities in right columns) 148
Figure 13: Non-CO2 GHG emissions by gas in the EU28. 151
Figure 14: LULUCF emissions in the EU28. 152
Figure 15: Upfront subsidies required to install CCS in a
new build pulverised coal plant 175
Figure 16: Estimated CO2 transfer factors for Norway and
power markets in NEW... 177
Figure 17: Impact of carbon prices on cost of gas-fired
generation. 178
Figure 18: Levelised costs of power generation (USD per
megawatt hour), first quarter 2013. 183
Figure 19 - Annual CO2 emissions reductions caused by the
RES Directive. 185
Figure 20: Comparison of European wholesale power, oil,
gas and coal prices. January 2002=100%   186
Figure 21: Renewable surcharges as a proportion of
household electricity price, 2011, in %.. 187
Figure 22: EED and Transport White paper annual reduction
impact on CO2 emissions. 194
Figure 23: Ignoring energy efficiency potential can lead
to higher carbon price. 196
Figure 24: Estimates of direct and avoided costs linked
to the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive  197
Figure 25: Stakeholders profiles – Based on 557 replies. 200
Figure 26: Stakeholders geographical distribution –Based
on 557 replies. 201
List of Tables
Table 1: Composition and drivers of system costs (ratio
to GDP of individual cost components and total amount of energy system costs) 28
Table 2: Scenarios to assess main policy options with
respect to targets and measures. 41
Table 3: Overview of main assumptions of scenarios
assessed. 42
Table 4: ETS and non-ETS emissions. 56
Table 5: Non-CO2 and non-energy related GHG emissions in
the EU28 in 2030 (MtCO2eq.) 58
Table 6: Sectoral GHG emission impacts compared to 2005. 60
Table 7: Sectoral GHG emission impacts compared to
Reference. 61
Table 8: Biomass demand for energy purposes. 62
Table 9: Land use changes EU28 (million hectares) 63
Table 10: Impact on LULUCF sink. 64
Table 11: Impacts on air pollution and air pollution
control costs in 2030 (change compared to the reference) 66
Table 12: Impacts on primary energy consumption in 2030
and 2050. 69
Table 13 Other energy system impacts. 73
Table 14: Energy system costs and sub-components. 78
Table 15: Electricity and carbon prices, energy related
costs for energy intensive industries. 81
Table 16: GEM E-3 projections of GDP impact of a 40% GHG
reduction compared to the Reference scenario  84
Table 17: E3MG projections of GDP impact of a GHG led
scenario resulting in 40% GHG reductions in 2030 compared to the Reference
scenario. 84
Table 18: E3ME projections of GDP impact for 2030
compared to Reference of scenarios based on concrete and more ambitious EE
policies. 84
Table 19: Impact of a 40% GHG reduction in 2030 on
energy-intensive sectors production assuming companies that receive free
allocation, do not incorporate the opportunity cost in their prices. 86
Table 20: Impact of a 40% GHG reduction in 2030 on
energy-intensive sectors production assuming companies that receive free
allocation, incorporate the opportunity cost in their prices. 87
Table 21: E3ME projections of employment impacts for 2030
compared to Reference of GHG reduction scenario with additional policies for EE
and RES, assuming revenue recycling to consumers and energy efficiency and
renewable energy investments. 89
Table 22: E3ME projections of employment impacts for 2030
compared to Reference of GHG reduction scenario with additional policies for EE
and RES, assuming revenue recycling to lower labour costs and energy efficiency
and renewable energy investments. 89
Table 23: GEM E-3 projections of employment impacts of a
40% GHG reduction compared to Reference  90
Table 24: Jobs associated with investments in the power
sector and energy efficiency, 2011-2030  91
Table 25: Difference in Jobs compared to Reference of
investments in the power sector and energy efficiency, 2026-2030. 92
Table 26: share of energy costs in household expenditure. 95
Table 27: Impact conditional target on GDP and production
of energy-intensive sectors, GEM-E3 model 101
Table 28: Impact international action on GDP and
production of energy-intensive sectors, PACE model 103
Table 29: Linear reduction factors from 2021 onwards to
2030 depending on different 40% GHG scenarios  105
Table 30: CER/ERU submissions in phase 2 of the ETS for
compliance purposes (MtCO2e) 107
Table 31: Projected Member State total GHG reductions vs
2005. 120
Table 32: Projected Member State GHG reductions in
non-ETS sectors vs 2005. 121
Table 33: Projected Member State renewable energy share
in final energy consumption. 121
Table 34: Projected system costs and investments
increases for the policy scenarios compared to the Reference  123
Table 35: Projected average price of electricity in final
demand sectors increases for the policy scenarios compared to the Reference. 124
Table 36: Monetised health benefits in 2030 as a
percentage of GDP. 125
Table 37: reduced air pollution control costs by 2030 as
a percentage of GDP. 126
Table 38 Reductions in energy purchases in 2030 as a
percentage of GDP, compared to the Reference Scenario  127
Table 39: Auctioning revenue projections in options
achieving 40% GHG reductions and assuming different coverage of scope of
sectors covered by auctioning. 130
Table 40: Overview table with the key results for the IA
for the different scenario projections. 138
Table 41: International fossil fuel price developments in
Reference. 143
Table 42: Energy system costs in relation to GDP per
Member State. 149
Table 43: Reductions in 2030 in the ETS, depending on
sectoral coverage. 233
Table 44: 2030 ETS auction revenue, depending on sectoral
coverage of ETS and degree of auctioning  233

1.                      
Procedural issues and consultation of interested
parties 
1.1.                
Organisation and timing

The
preparations of the Impact Assessment (IA) for the 2030 framework for climate
and energy policies formally started in April 2013 subsequent to the adoption
of the Commission's Green Paper on the matter[1],
but the IA builds on the update of the new Reference scenario (hereinafter
"EU Reference Scenario 2013" or "Reference") used as the
benchmark for the quantitative assessments, which started already in late 2011.

An interservice group (ISG) was established
in February 2013 in view of preparing the Green Paper, and this group continued
to meet to steer the work on the IA up to its finalisation. The ISG met 4 times
for the purposes of preparing this IA; on 30 May 2013, the ISG met to discuss
e.g. the work plan and the results of the EU Reference Scenario 2013; on 16
July the ISG met to discuss a first outline of the IA and first outcomes of the
consultation launched by the Green Paper, on 23 September the group met to
discuss policy options and preliminary results. The final draft IA was submitted
to the ISG group on 18 October 2013.
The
lead DGs are Climate Action (CLIMA) and Energy (ENER). The following DGs and
services were invited to the Steering Group: Agriculture and Rural Development
(AGRI), Budget (BUDG), Communication (COMM), Communications Networks, Content
and Technology (CNECT), Competition (COMP), Economic and Financial Affairs
(ECFIN), Education and Culture (EAC), Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
(EMPL), Enlargement (ELARG), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR), Environment (ENV),
EuropeAid Development & Cooperation (DEVCO), Health and Consumers (SANCO),
Home Affairs (HOME), Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), Internal
Market and Services (MARKT), Joint Research Centre (JRC), Justice (JUST),
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE), Mobility and Transport (MOVE), Regional
Policy (REGIO), Research and Innovation (RTD), Secretariat-General (SG),
Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), Trade (TRADE), Bureau of European Policy
Advisers (BEPA), Legal Service (SJ) and European External Action Service (EEAS).

1.2.                
Consultation and expertise 
1.2.1.          
Consultation

As a preparatory step for the development
of the 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, the Green Paper was
adopted on 27 March 2013[2].
It presents progress made and challenges under the current policy framework and
sets out for consultation five key issues that the 2030 framework needs to
address, namely: targets; coherence of instruments, competitiveness of the EU
economy; security of supply; and acknowledgment of the varying capacity to act of
Member States. In addition, the Green Paper consults on the main lessons learnt
to date from the 2020 framework for climate and energy policies. 
The Green Paper launched a public
consultation of all interested parties which lasted until 2 July 2013. The
Green Paper included a set of 22 questions on which the Commission sought
viewpoints and input. Some 557 contributions from a broad spectrum of
stakeholders including from 15 Member States were received. Given the very
broad participation, the consultation offered insights into a broad range of
stakeholder opinions. All of the Commission's minimum consultation standards
were met. The full report presenting results of the public consultation is
found in Annex 7.5 to this IA.
In addition to the public consultation
itself, a high-level stakeholder conference was organised on the 2030 framework
on 19 June 2013, with stakeholders and Member States represented as speakers
and with more than 200 participants in the audience. The conference provided
useful first-hand accounts on the major issues addressed by the consultation
and was a valuable complement to the formal public consultation.
Box 1: Main findings of the public consultation
The public
consultation revealed an almost universal support for the development of a
common European framework for climate and energy policies.
Many
stakeholders expect the EU to provide a 2030 framework to reduce uncertainty
among investors, governments and citizens. Member States and stakeholders
emphasized the need for climate and energy policy to continue to take into
account the three prime objectives of energy policy: competitiveness, security
of supply and sustainability.
On targets,
there is a broad consensus among the various stakeholders on the need for a new
GHG target, whereas there are diverging views on the appropriate ambition
level. Stakeholders have mixed views on the need for renewables and energy
savings targets.
On
instruments, most stakeholders agree that the European Emission Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) should remain the central instrument for the transition to a low
carbon economy. There are mixed views on the extent to which a reform of the EU
ETS is needed. Many stakeholders agree that additional policies and instruments
can be utilised to reduce emissions for non-ETS sectors. Many stakeholders
focus on the need for harmonization of policies across Europe to create a level
playing field and avoid market distortion. The Internal Energy Market's
benefits are widely recognised and this is seen as key to ensure competitive
prices and security of supply. Higher interconnection capacity between Member
States is considered fundamental to meet energy and climate objectives.
There is
broad consensus among stakeholders that innovation is essential to ensure the
flexibility and the security of the EU energy system and for the further
development of cost-effective energy options.
On
competitiveness, many stakeholders note that increased attention should be paid
to competitiveness due to the economic crisis and changing international
circumstances. The increasing cost of some climate and energy policies such as
RES support needs to be contained. There is also a general consensus that
public support schemes have to be revised to be more in line with changing
costs of deploying renewables.
On
distribution of efforts, it is widely held that a fair distribution of efforts
for the non-ETS sectors is needed; that socio-economic and geographical
differences between Member States have to be considered; and that financial
instruments can play a key role to help Member States less able to act and to
leverage private investment.
Member State Ministers in charge of energy
and climate policy had a first exchange on the main issues addressed by the
Green Paper at a joint session of the Informal Energy and Environment Councils
in Dublin on 23 April 2013. The European Council of 22 May 2013 welcomed the
Commission's Green Paper and stated they will return to this issue in March
2014. 
The Commission also organised meetings
between Member States' Director Generals in charge of energy policy (on 14
March 2013) and of climate policy (on 19 February 2013) to discuss the 2030
Framework prior to the adoption of the Green Paper.

1.2.2.          
External expertise and contributions of
Commission services

In order to ensure a complete and thorough
quantitative assessment of future impacts in the EU, the Commission contracted
the National Technical University of Athens, IIASA and EuroCare to model EU scenarios.
The energy system and CO2 emission modelling is based on the PRIMES model. The
non-CO2 GHG emission modelling is based on the GAINS model, with additional
input by the Joint Research Centre's Institute for Environment and
Sustainability concerning air pollution. LULUCF emission modelling is based on
the GLOBIOM-G4M models.
A comprehensive update of the Reference
scenario was conducted between November 2011 and June 2013 in close cooperation
between DGs ENER, CLIMA and MOVE and in association with the JRC. The
macroeconomic assumptions for the EU Reference Scenario 2013 were consulted
with and draw on work of DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee. Extensive consultations during four meetings with experts from
Member States on assumptions used and draft results took place to ensure
appropriateness and quality with regard to Member State-specific results. Moreover, in order to improve
transparency and to gain useful third party views on the methodology applied by
the Commission, the PRIMES model was peer-reviewed in 2011 by a group of
recognised modelling experts which concluded that the model is suitable for the
purpose of complex energy system modelling. 
Macroeconomic modelling, including impact
of mitigation action by third countries, was performed using the GEM-E3 model,
a general equilibrium model, maintained and used by the Joint Research Centre's
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) and the E3MG model, a
macro-econometric model run by Cambridge Econometrics. IPTS also contributed
using the POLES model which is a global sectoral
simulation model for the development of energy scenarios and global GHG
emission pathways until 2050. 
An empirical study assessing Carbon Leakage
and Competitiveness was undertaken by Ecorys[3].

ICF GHK conducted a study analysing the
employment impacts through macroeconomic modelling, using the E3ME model by
Cambridge Econometrics, and by bottom up assessment for the power sector.
In parallel to the preparations of this IA,
the Commission's services carried out an extensive analysis on energy prices
and costs. This work was led by DG ENER with close involvement of other DGs, in
particular DGs ENTR, ECFIN, EUROSTAT, CLIMA, COMP and TAXUD. 
DG ECFIN conducted a study on economic
aspects of energy and climate policies[4].
The report is composed of three chapters, investigating the evolution of
electricity and natural gas markets across the EU, with a particular focus on
the unit energy costs and the shale gas impact on the competitiveness of the EU
economy, the impact of energy and climate policies on the energy and carbon
prices, as well as the impact of renewable developments on trade.  
DG ENTR has performed an assessment of the
potential impacts of EU action in the context of international climate action on
EU industrial sectors using the PACE model of ZEW (Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung).

1.3.                
Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB)

The draft IA was submitted to the Impact
Assessment Board (IAB) on 24 October and was discussed at the IAB hearing on 20
November 2013, subsequent to which the IAB asked for a revised submission. The
IA was resubmitted on 12 December 2013. On 9 January 2014 a positive opinion
was received from the IAB.
The board recommended to be clearer about
the scope of this initiative, in particular explaining, and concentrating on,
the decisions that are to be taken now. 
The IA was adapted to address this. The Section
on objectives was adapted making clear that the IA is supporting an initiative
that will focus on the issue of climate and energy targets in a 2030
perspective, while giving general directions of future policy development
without yet proposing the implementation measures that will require further
assessments. One exception is the need to improve the functioning of the ETS
which is confronted with a large surplus. For this policy initiative a separate
Impact Assessment is prepared.
In relation to the current framework, the
board asked to more clearly explain what the lessons learnt are (e.g. the
contribution to GHG reduction, the coherence between the policy tools, the
performance of ETS) and how these have been taken into account. The following important
changes were made, but the board still recommended to be clearer on the general
assessment of the performance of the key elements of the current framework.
The lessons learned Section (which is
supported by an extensive annex) gives clearer insights on the costs related to
existing renewable support schemes, the recent guidance given by the
Commissions on this issue, the recent developments relating to aviation in the
ETS, the role of EU targets in making progress on international action and
interaction between targets and instruments. Also in the Section on problem
definition a section was added to better recognise the challenges related to
interaction of targets and instruments.
The board recommended that more information
should be provided regarding the assumptions underlying the baseline scenario
(i.e. the so called Reference scenario) and the options and that the report
should discuss the extent to which the assumption that all existing policies
will be fully implemented is realistic in light of existing experience. 
The Section on evolution under current
policies was significantly enhanced. A box was added to give a clear overview
of the main assumptions and the text was updated to add significant additional
information on what are the drivers of increased costs in this Reference
scenario. In the Section on problem definition the challenges related to
existing policies were revisited. The board still noted that more information
could be provided on the extent to which the applied baseline scenario would
require additional action. Regarding the baseline the board also noted that the
assumptions concerning the use of auctioning in different sectors and the
recycling of revenues could be improved, which was further clarified. 
The board also asked that the key impacts
and the trade-offs are made more clearly (e.g. between policy tools and with
competitiveness). To address this the concluding section of the IA as well as
the executive summary was extended to include a discussion focussing on the
trade-offs between policy options, based on the findings of the extensive
analysis of scenarios reflecting these policy options. The board still noted
that more specific conclusions should be drawn regarding the most
cost-efficient policy scenario and to which extent binding targets are
proportionate to incremental costs.
The board also asked to better explain the
distributional impacts in Member States. To meet this concern the Section on
distributional impacts was enhanced by adding significant detail on the impact
of scenarios at Member State level. 
Finally, the board asked that the
presentation of the report should be substantially improved by focussing on the
core issues with stakeholders' views being included in the main report. 
This was addressed by ensuring that problem
definition, objectives and the concluding Section focussed clearer on the scope
of this impact assessment, i.e. to support an initiative that will focus on the
issue of climate and energy targets in a 2030 perspective. Given that it also
aims to give general directions of future policy development, the main Section
on analysing the impacts could not be shortened, even though the assessment of
one policy option, i.e. the extension of the scope of the ETS, was moved to an Annex
given that option requires more analysis before a general policy direction
could be given on this options. 
Building on the stakeholder opinions that were
already described in detail in Annex 7.5 and the overview that was already
included in Section 1.2. A
discussion was added in the Section on current challenges on stakeholders opinion
on the key aspect of this initiative, e.g. the targets and their interaction in
a 2030 perspective. Also in the Section that discusses carbon leakage measures
a specific Section was added on stakeholders perspectives.

2.                      
Problem definition 
2.1.                
Policy context
2.1.1.          
State of play and general policy context

In the last 20 years, the EU has been
successful in decoupling GHG emissions from economic growth. While GHG emissions
in the EU 28 fell by 17% over the period 1990-2011, the overall economy grew by
45%[5]. This development is to
a considerable extent due to a gradual improvement in the carbon intensity of
the EU's energy mix, including due to higher shares of renewable energy, and to
a decreasing energy intensity of the EU economy, thanks to energy efficiency
measures taken across the economy including in industry, and also due to growth
in many non-energy intensive sectors, in particular services, as well as to
decreases in non-CO2 emissions, in particular in the agriculture and waste
sectors.
In parallel to these developments, the EU
has made significant progress towards the creation of internal energy markets in
electricity and gas[6],
though obstacles remain[7].
The EU is also making considerable progress in ensuring the security of energy
supplies in the EU, although dependency on one or a limited number of source
countries of natural gas in particular is still a concern for many Member
States while other supply concerns are also emerging as the energy system is evolving[8]. At the same time, energy
affordability for households and the impacts on competitiveness of EU energy
prices for industry in an international comparison are of increasing concern
for these energy consumers and for policy makers.
The Climate and Energy package adopted in
2009 presented an integrated approach based on climate and energy targets and a
set of policies to implement them. Chapter 2 of the Commission's Green Paper on
a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies together with Annex 1 of that
Green Paper provide a comprehensive overview of the climate and energy objectives
and policies applicable in a 2020 perspective (see also Annex 7.4 and Section 2.2 below on lessons learnt). But 2020 is
only an intermediate step towards a competitive and secure low carbon economy. 
As regards climate change, the long term
goal agreed in the context of the UNFCCC is to limit the global average temperature
increase to below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, which guides the EU's climate
action. In line with scientific findings reported by the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in the fourth Assessment Report, the European Council stated
in 2009 that the EU's objective, in the context of necessary reductions by
developed countries as a group, is to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95% in 2050
compared to 1990. The European Council also endorsed the objective to ensure
that global emissions reach a peak by 2020 and are reduced by at least 50%
compared to 1990 in order to increase the chances of avoiding climate change. 
The European Council has also recently addressed
energy in a more holistic way: first in February 2011 when it requested that
due consideration be given to fixing intermediary stages towards reaching the
2050 objective and stated for example that "safe, secure, sustainable and
affordable energy contributing to European competitiveness remain a priority
for Europe"; and again in May 2013 emphasising the importance of the
internal energy market and in particular stating that the EU's energy policy
"must ensure security of supply for households and companies at affordable
and competitive prices and costs, in a safe and sustainable manner",
amidst increasing concerns in this regard in many Member States and industry sectors.

2.1.2.          
2050 Roadmaps and 2030 Green Paper

In order to provide a long term perspective
on climate, energy and transport (a sector which accounts for a significant
share of both GHG emissions and energy consumption), the Commission came
forward with three initiatives in 2011 based on a consistent analytical
framework: the Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in
2050, the Energy Roadmap 2050, and the Roadmap to a Single
European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport
system (commonly referred to as the Transport White Paper)[9], which presented
fundamental aspects of the transition to a low carbon economy, cost-efficient GHG
emission reduction milestones for 2030, and "no-regret options" – i.e.:
more energy efficiency, higher shares of renewable energy and energy
infrastructure development - for the transition towards a competitive,
sustainable and secure energy system  
In reaction to these initiatives, the
European Parliament underlined the necessity of clear climate and energy
objectives for 2030, building on the Roadmaps[10].
The Council did not adopt conclusions on the Roadmaps, but Council Presidency
conclusions underlined the broad agreement by all but one Member States on the
core elements of the Roadmaps. In March 2013, the Commission came forward with
a consultative Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies.
On 22 May 2013, the European Council welcomed the Commission's Green Paper,
recognised that significant investments in new and intelligent energy
infrastructure are needed to secure the uninterrupted supply of energy at
affordable prices, and that such investments are vital for jobs and sustainable
growth and will help enhance competitiveness. The European Council recognised
the importance to have a well-functioning carbon market and a predictable
climate and energy policy framework post-2020 which is conducive to mobilising
private capital and to bringing down costs for energy investment. The European
Council invited the Commission to come forward with more concrete proposals in
time for the March 2014 European Council. The recently agreed 7th
Environmental Action Programme states that the next step for the EU's climate
and energy framework beyond 2020 is to provide a clear, legally-binding
framework and target(s) to enable investments.

2.1.3.          
International policy context

While more than 110 countries, accounting
for 85% of global emissions and including all major economies, have formally
pledged to take action to mitigate climate change in the context of the UNFCCC,
no new comprehensive international climate agreement has been achieved that
ensures that the global community as such is on track to keep global warming below
2°C.
The lack of such an agreement and the insufficient ambition of pledges, including
by major economies, have prevented the EU from raising its 2020 GHG reduction target
to 30%[11].
At the 2011 Durban UN climate conference, countries however agreed to start
negotiations on a new global agreement, applicable to all contracting parties
for the period beyond 2020, to be agreed at the UN climate conference in Paris
in 2015.  

2.2.                
Progress made, challenges encountered and
lessons learnt from the 2020 framework

A detailed and comprehensive analysis of progress
made, challenges encountered as well as lessons learnt and interactions between
the EU's extensive climate and energy policies underpinning the 2020 targets was
carried out. This analysis, supported by the responses to the public
consultation, is a fundament of this impact assessment and is presented in
detail in Annex 7.4 along with
details of relevant evaluations where these are available. As regards energy
efficiency, a more detailed assessment of progress made towards the 2020
targets and lessons learnt will be contained in the review that the Commission
will carry out in 2014 as required by the Energy Efficiency Directive.
Some of the more salient conclusions of
this analysis are summarised below. 

2.2.1.          
General progress towards meeting 2020 headline
targets for climate and energy

With a 17% reduction in 2011 compared to
1990[12],
the EU28 as a whole is on track to meet and even exceed its 2020 GHG
target of 20% compared to 1990. The 2020 cap for the sectors covered by the EU
Emission Trading System (ETS) is expected to be met. The EU as a whole is also on
track to meet the target for the non-ETS sectors. However, 13 Member States
need to make additional efforts to meet their respective national 2020 targets
under the Effort Sharing Decision, or make use of the flexibility mechanisms
foreseen therein[13].
EU and national policies, high fossil fuel prices and reduced energy demand due
to the economic crisis have contributed to GHG emission reductions. 
As regards renewable energy, its
share of gross final energy consumption was 12.7% in 2011 (compared to 8.5% in
2005). On aggregate, the EU 28 has met its interim target for 2011/2012, driven
by Member States efforts to make progress towards the national targets in the
Renewable Energy Directive. However, as the trajectory grows steeper, more
efforts will still be needed from Member States in order to reach it[14] Many Member States
need however to make additional efforts to meet their respective 2020 national
targets, and recent evolutions such as for instance retroactive changes to
support schemes is causing concern as to whether the overall EU target will be
met[15].
The 2020 target of saving 20% of the EU's
primary energy consumption (compared to projections made in 2007) is not
legally binding for Member States, but significant progress has nevertheless
been made. After years of growth, primary energy consumption peaked in
2005/2006 (at 1,825 Mtoe) and has been slightly decreasing since 2007 (to reach
1,730 Mtoe in 2011)[16],
in part due to impacts from the economic crisis, but also due to improved
energy intensity. Nevertheless, the EU is likely to miss its indicative energy
savings target of 20% compared to 2007 baseline projections for 2020 under
current policies. The EU Reference Scenario 2013 projects energy savings of some
17% in 2020 (see Section 2.3 below). 

2.2.2.          
Implementation – climate
policy
2.2.2.1.    
The EU Emission Trading System (ETS)

Since 2013 the new institutional framework
with auctioning and EU-wide harmonised benchmarks for free allocation has been in
place and constitutes a significant improvement compared to the previous
trading periods that still had national based allocation plans.
The ETS has adapted flexibly to changed
economic circumstances and lowered compliance cost for sectors covered by the ETS,
in the context of a prolonged economic recession. However, as outlined in the
Carbon Market report[17],
the economic recession and the accelerated inflow of international credits have
created a surplus of around 2 billion allowances since 2008. If unaddressed,
this will have a long lasting effect on the ability of the ETS to incentivise
low carbon investments. In combination with today's high gas to coal price
ratio it can lead to carbon lock-in. Regulatory uncertainty on the way forward
has reduced the confidence of market participants and in some cases is already
leading to fragmentation of climate policies within the EU. The lower than
expected ETS carbon prices and corresponding auctioning revenues are reducing the
envisaged related redistribution effects. 
Free allocation to energy intensive sectors
and low carbon prices have resulted in a very low risk of carbon leakage at
present[18].
State aid for electricity intensive industries in line with the related 2012
aid guidelines[19]
can be an effective way of preventing indirect impacts but has given rise to
concerns by some stakeholders regarding distortions of competition across
Member States. 
Aviation has been included since 2012 in
the EU ETS. The scope also includes incoming and outgoing international flights
in the EU. Third countries have been opposing that the EU includes flights of
foreign operators in the EU ETS[20].
To provide negotiation time for agreement on a realistic timetable for the
development of a global market-based measure (MBM) and on a framework for
facilitating the comprehensive application of regional MBMs pending the
application of the global MBM, international flights into and out of Europe in
2012 were temporarily exempted from enforcement[21]. In October 2013 the
ICAO Assembly agreed to develop by 2016 an MBM addressing international
aviation emissions and apply it by 2020. In response to this and to give
further momentum to the global discussions, the Commission has proposed
amending the EU ETS for the period 2014-2020 so that only the part of a flight
that takes place in European regional airspace is covered by the EU ETS. This
proposal is now being discussed by Council and Parliament.

2.2.2.2.    
 The Effort Sharing Decision (Non ETS)

Member States' efforts are effectively supported
by a series of measures at the EU level, including the regulation of CO2
emissions from passenger cars and vans, the Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, the
F-gas regulation and the eco-design framework setting minimum energy efficiency
standards for a range of domestic and industrial appliances. Many Member States
have also put in place national measures unrelated to EU initiatives contributing
towards their effort sharing targets, such as CO2 and energy taxation, which
also impacts energy end-price differentials between Member States and sectors.
Nevertheless, not all Member States are on
track to meet their target, so the foreseen flexibilities may be important to
ensure compliance. This was also highlighted in several responses to the consultation.
However, access to international credits for compliance and possible overachievement
at the overall EU level might impact potential prices of emission allocation
transfers between Member States and reduce related distribution effects. 

2.2.2.3.    
Fuel Quality Directive 

The Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), as
amended in 2009[22],
introduced an obligation for fuel suppliers to reduce the life cycle greenhouse
gas emissions from their supply of fuels used in road (and non-road mobile
machinery) by 6% in 2020 from a 2010 baseline.
The methodological challenge is to ensure
fuel suppliers can calculate life cycle emissions, incorporating an adequate
level of accuracy but balancing the associated administrative burden. The
development and evaluation of such a methodology is complex. In this context,
an impact assessment considering a number of options has now been finalised but
no decision on this has been taken yet.
Other major economies are reviewing proposals
for or have adopted similar legislation, e.g. the US state of California. One
benefit of such a policy is that it will apply equally to importers and
domestic producers of fuels. 

2.2.3.          
Progress on international action on climate
change

In early 2007, the EU agreed on two
headline targets for 2020 followed by the adoption of the climate and energy
package in late 2008. It included a unilateral target to reduce GHG emissions
by 20% by 2020 and a conditional of 30% depending on the level of ambition of
other countries. As the world's largest economy, the EU was the first to bring
proposals for an economy-wide target to the international negotiations. The
EU's leadership had a significant impact on other countries, and all other
major economies followed with their own pledges in the months ahead of the 2009
Climate Conference in Copenhagen. In the end, more than 90 developed and
developing countries, including all major economies, representing more than 80%
of global GHG emissions made 2020 pledges. The EU's unilateral target was
instrumental in bringing forward these pledges by others. However, not all
countries followed the EU's example in proposing a target range, and other
countries did not take sufficiently ambitious targets to allow the EU to move
to its 30% conditional target.
The pledges under the Copenhagen Accord and
Cancun decisions have led to the development and implementation of a variety of
national policies and measures, including carbon markets. While the EU ETS remains
at present the largest functioning carbon market, others are being implemented
and developed. For example, California and New Zealand have implemented carbon
markets; Australia adopted its Carbon Pricing Mechanism legislation[23]; China is pushing
ahead with the design of its seven emissions trading pilots some of which have
already commenced; South Korea is developing its trading scheme.
Major economies have enhanced their fuel
economy standards (US, China, Japan, and India is considering new policies) and
some countries have undertaken significant reforms of their tax and subsidies
to improve their energy security, with GHG emission benefits (Iran, Indonesia,
South Africa, India). More than 100 countries have renewable energy policies,
and especially fast-growing economies are developing support schemes to promote
investments in renewable energy (from Philippines to China to Chile). 
But neither the existing pledges nor
initiated measures are delivering sufficient reductions by 2020 to be on track
to prevent a dangerous 2º C rise of temperature. At the UN Climate conference
in Durban, in 2011, all countries recognised the urgent need to act
collectively with greater ambition. They agreed to negotiate by 2015 a global
climate regime applicable to all for the period after 2020 as well as to enhance
mitigation efforts to close the pre-2020 mitigation gap. The climate change
conference in Warsaw in November 2013 invited all countries to prepare their
contributions well in advance. In order to build sufficient global political
momentum, this should allow for a first informal discussion at the UN Secretary
General's Climate Summit on 23 September 2014. UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon
challenged Leaders to "bring bold pledges to set the world on a low-carbon
path". After the first quarter of 2015, all pledged contributions should
be discussed in a comprehensive manner in the international negotiations with a
view of adopting the new climate agreement at the end of 2015.

2.2.4.          
Implementation – energy policy
2.2.4.1.    
Renewable energy policy 

Substantial growth in renewable energy has
been driven by the EU and Member State binding targets provided in the
Renewable Energy Directive and the national support schemes to achieve those
targets. Generally speaking, the EU has made satisfactory progress so far towards
meeting the 20% target at the aggregate level, but many Member States must make
additional efforts to meet their individual targets. 
Most renewable energy sources are not yet fully
cost-competitive compared to other energy sources. However, in the last five
years renewable energy technologies have matured considerably and costs have
come down, most notably for solar PV, and to a lesser extent for wind; and some
renewable energy technologies for electricity generation are becoming
competitive with conventional electricity generation.  
The increase of renewable energy sources
has contributed to containing and even lowering electricity wholesale prices in
many markets by shifting the merit order curve and substituting part of the
generation of conventional thermal plants, which have higher marginal cost of
production. However, this effect on wholesale prices has hardly been reflected
in retail prices or translated into tangible benefits for consumers (especially
not for household – those large industrial electricity consumers facing prices
related to the wholesale market will have benefited). This is partly due to
insufficient competition and partly due to the extra cost for renewables
support schemes (typically passed on to final consumers, in some markets only
to households) that can outweigh the reducing impact of renewables on wholesale
prices on many markets[24].
Other studies suggest that the benefits of more electricity generation from
e.g. wind power exceed the costs of supporting it.[25]
An ongoing study by the European Commission
indicates that total expenditure on renewable support in the EU was 13.7 bn
Euros in 2009, 18.6 bn in 2010, 30.1 bn in 2011 and 34.6 bn in 2012[26]; but trends vary
across Member States and some costs are not reflected in the electricity bills
but covered by public budgets, in particular in countries with strong elements
of price regulation. On the other hand, the avoided costs of imported fuel
saved thanks to the use of renewable energy are estimated to amount to around €30
billion in 2010. Given increasing production of
renewable energy in the EU and a projected increase in fossil import prices, it
is expected that avoided fuel costs will rise in the coming years[27]. 
Short to medium term cost-efficiency of
renewables development has been affected by the choice of some Member States to
support a wide range of technologies (although such an approach could reduce
costs in the longer term as has been observed in the case of solar PV) and by national
support schemes which in many Member States have not been flexible enough to adjust
to changing circumstances (such as technology costs and level of development). On
the other hand, changes to established support schemes can increase investor
uncertainty, in particular if applied retroactively, and have contributed to
the reduced investment levels experienced in 2012 and 2013. In addition,
diverging Member State support schemes with exclusive focus on national
production exclude benefits of further integration of the internal energy market.
As regards biofuels, some national schemes raise questions of compatibility
with EU rules and some of them have been subject to complaints at the WTO. 
With the exception of Sweden and Norway,
none of the cooperation mechanisms provided for in the Renewable Energy
Directive have been made use of, and national support schemes are as regards
electricity restricted to national production. This presents a further
challenge to cost-efficient deployment across the EU and works against market
integration. At the same time, higher shares of variable renewable energy in
the electricity mix raise new concerns about grid adequacy and stability if
grids are not adapted as necessary, and underline the need for further flexibility
through market integration, grid interconnection, demand response, back-up
capacity, etc. It is clear that a "system view" must be addressed to
fully integrate renewables in the energy market in a cost-effective manner.
In order to assist Member States in
addressing these challenges, the Commission issued Guidance[28]  on support schemes
and cooperation mechanisms in November 2013, which if fully adhered to is
expected to have a significantly positive impact on cost-efficiency,
flexibility, market integration, and further sustainable development of
renewable energy in the EU. 
The merit order effect and priority access
to the grid causing lower wholesale prices can affect revenues of conventional power
plants, especially in Member States with rapid deployment of variable renewables.
In some Member States, this raises the question of how to ensure adequate investment
signals and generation adequacy. National capacity mechanisms are being
considered by some Member States as a solution, but risk fragmenting the
internal market[29].

Growth of renewables in the EU has
contributed to a globalisation of the renewable energy sector. Many new markets
have emerged across the globe, in some cases even bigger than the European
market, but at the same time the European renewables industry has been faced
with stronger competition. This has on the one hand contributed to lower
technology costs in the EU and a continued strong export position of EU firms
in particular in the wind sector, but has also resulted in difficult
competitive positions and lower market shares for many EU companies in particular
in the solar sector[30].


2.2.4.2.    
Renewable sub-target for transport 

The share of renewables in transport
reached 4.7% in 2010 compared to only 1.2% in 2005, to be compared with the 10%
target in the Renewable Energy Directive. Member States support biofuels via
mandatory blending obligations in transport fuels, tax exemptions or other
support schemes. Progress towards meeting the renewables target for transport can
contribute to lowering fuel import costs and in a context of increasing
dependence on imports of fossil fuels, can improve security of supply[31]. On the other hand,
from a strict GHG reductions perspective, current costs and support levels for 1st
generation biofuels in the transport sector in some cases imply an abatement
cost significantly higher than those of other transport options or in other
sectors of the economy[32]. The
Renewable Energy Directive requires the Commission to monitor a range of issues
surrounding biofuels and bioliquids, including their impact on sustainability
(see also Annex 7.4).
Since the adoption of the Renewable Energy
Directive, the scientific evidence base regarding the GHG emission impacts
associated with indirect land use change (ILUC) has grown. In response to the
ILUC issue, the Commission proposed to limit the amount of food-based (1st
generation) biofuels that can contribute to the relevant targets (including the
10 % renewables target for transport) and has indicated that first generation
biofuels with high estimated indirect land-use change emissions should not continue
to receive public support after 2020[33].
However, as projections indicate that Europe will need considerable amounts of
biofuels towards 2050, the Commission's proposal includes increased incentives
for advanced biofuels that do not need land for their production, such as
biofuels made from residues, algae and wastes (see also Annex 7.4). In order for the
transport sector to decarbonise in a cost-effective and sustainable manner,
technology developments of relatively small quantities of advanced renewable
fuels going beyond R&D are necessary, in line with the Commission's
proposal for limiting emissions from indirect land-use change.

2.2.4.3.    
Solid and gaseous biomass

The Commission is currently analysing the
sustainability issues associated with increased use of solid and gaseous
biomass for electricity, heating and cooling in the EU, with the view to
consider whether additional EU action is needed and appropriate. While imports
of wood pellets will increase up to 2030, most of the biomass for heating and
power production being planned to be sourced domestically[34] and therefore it is
subject to national and EU environmental and forest policies and regulations. According
to existing scientific understanding, most of the biomass supply chains
currently used in the EU provide significant carbon emission reductions
compared to fossil fuels. Only a limited number of biomass feedstocks may have
uncertain or potentially negative climate benefits. However, the comparisons
depend partly on the methodological assumptions made in the relevant studies.
The Commission is currently reviewing the scientific basis and possible
safeguards and will take this into account in the above mentioned analysis. 

2.2.4.4.    
Energy efficiency policy

As regards energy efficiency, the Energy
Efficiency Directive (EED) requires the Commission to carry out in 2014 a
detailed review of the 2020 approach. Some tentative conclusions can already be
drawn today. 
Despite the 20% energy savings target not
being legally binding on Member States, it has provided significant momentum to
the efforts to reduce energy consumption and intensity, and facilitated
agreement on strong measures, in particular the EED. 
Moreover, energy efficiency standards for a
wide range of appliances and equipment have been agreed at the EU level and
will lead to important energy savings. The estimated impact of the adopted
ecodesign and labelling measures in terms of energy savings represents around
90 Mtoe in 2020. EU Regulations relating to CO2 and cars and CO2 and vans have
led to an accelerated improvement of fuel efficiency of new cars and vans. CO2
emissions of new cars were reduced from 172 g per kilometre in 2000 to 136 g
per kilometre in 2011. 
The revised Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive (EPBD) will ensure Member States apply minimum energy performance
requirements for new buildings, but delays in implementation are a risk, which
could seriously impact the extent to which the EU takes full advantage of the cost-effective
savings potential in the buildings sector (equivalent to 65 Mtoe by 2020). The
proper and timely implementation of the EPBD could contribute significantly to
improvements in the standard of living of European citizens.
The Energy Efficiency Directive complements
these regulations and directives. It is too soon to assess its functioning as it has not yet been transposed by Member States,
but a first assessment will be made in the abovementioned 2014 review.
With regard to overall progress in the EU
in terms of energy savings, the economic crisis has fully demonstrated the
strong correlation between energy consumption and economic activity, especially
in industry. This has led to concerns that an absolute savings target is not
flexible enough to reflect the underlying dynamics of the EU economy (see also
further details in Annex 7.4).

2.2.4.5.    
Energy prices and international developments in
energy markets

While the gradual completion of the
internal energy market has helped to keep EU wholesale electricity and gas prices
in check, end-user prices for many business and households have increased
significantly in both nominal and real terms over the last decade. The EU Reference
Scenario 2013 suggests that this trend will continue also in the absence of new
policies for a variety of reasons (see Section 2.3 and Annex 7.1) below.
Developments in international markets and
exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbons has led to an increasing divergence
of prices, most notably for natural gas in the EU compared to the USA where
shale gas is now an increasingly important energy source and is considered by industrial
stakeholders to be positively contributing to the US economy's competitive
position. A the beginning of 2012, industry gas prices were some four times
lower in the USA than in Europe, but the price differential has decreased over
2013 primarily due to due to higher US prices. Natural gas prices in the US may
further increase as the cheapest shale gas basins are depleted. Shale gas can also
impact electricity prices through lower costs of input fuels.
In comparison, average end-user electricity
prices for EU industry are about twice that in the US[35] and substantially
higher than those in many other OECD economies (notable is the exception of
Japan where prices are higher than the EU average) and many major developing
economies. Between 2005 and 2012, European industry experienced electricity
price increases of 38% on average in real terms whereas the corresponding
figure was -4% for the US and +16% for Japan[36].
However, the energy intensity of industry is substantially lower in the EU than
in the US. Moreover, EU industries improved their energy intensity by 19%
between 2001 and 2011 while over the same period the US industry improved it by
only 9%[37].
This trend is driven by many factors other
than the EU's climate and energy policies (for such impacts, see Annex 7.1). According to empirical estimates,
fossil fuel prices still remain key drivers of electricity and natural gas
end-user prices. Member State decisions on network tariffs, levies and taxes
also have a significant impact on end user prices. These factors must be taken
into account when designing new policies at EU and Member State level. 
However, market opening and competition
appear to have significant downward effects on prices for both households and
industrial consumers. In the natural gas market, high import dependence and low
diversification of imports, together with market
failures can significantly contribute to increasing end-user prices. Taxes,
tariffs and levies can also have an important impact. In the electricity
market, support to less mature renewables technologies can result in higher
electricity prices for both industry and household segments. Furthermore,
in some Member States, the burden has not been evenly shared across consumer
segments, with exemptions for some industries and a correspondingly higher
burden on households [38].
A dedicated study on
EU energy prices and costs, including an international comparison, has been
undertaken in parallel to the preparations of the 2030 framework; responding to
a request from the European Council on 22 May 2013.

2.2.5.          
Interaction between headline targets and
instruments 

As foreseen already when the 2020 package
was prepared and adopted, there is clearly an interaction between the headline
targets. 
First,
measures to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy generally contribute
to reductions in GHG emissions. The cost of reducing GHG emissions through such
measures can be substantially different than the marginal cost of reducing
emissions required to reach the cap in the ETS sector (reflected by the ETS price) but at the same time delivering additional
benefits beyond GHG reductions, for instance in terms of synergies with
resource efficiency. Such measures can also address innovation-related market
failures for the energy transition. Specific efficiency measures addressing
non-price barriers such as split incentives, high private discount rates,
limited access to finance or imperfect information can be considered
complementary to carbon pricing. Specific measures to promote renewable
electricity or lower electricity consumption can be expected to lower the ETS
carbon price. This has been confirmed by recent econometric analysis[39]. 
However, the impact of the achievement of
the renewables target was taken into account in the design of the climate and
energy package, with 2020 carbon prices at that time being projected lower due
to the achievement of an ambitious RES target, but still projected to be well
above current price levels. This lower than expected ETS price and the current
surplus of allowances is largely driven by other factors such as the impacts on
demand from the economic crisis and the increasing inflow of international
credits in the system.
Second,
measures to reduce GHG emissions (both at EU and national level) can in
principle incentivise both renewables development and energy savings in and
outside the ETS sectors. This said, ETS prices would have to be at
significantly higher levels than those experienced over the last few years in
order to have a substantial impact. In addition, the ETS price alone is not
sufficient to provide incentives for developing innovative low carbon solutions
and related infrastructures that are needed for the energy transition. Indications
are that national measure such as energy and CO2 taxation have had a more
tangible impact on energy consumption than the ETS to date.  
Third, energy
savings help to ensure progress towards higher shares of renewables, as lower
energy consumption means a lower denominator in the ratio between consumption
of renewables and gross final energy consumption and therefore a higher
renewables share even without more renewables consumption. Reversely,
non-thermal renewable energy typically has much lower transformation losses
than conventional energy sources, lowering the primary energy consumption for
any given final energy consumption. Higher shares of renewable energy can
therefore help to make progress towards the energy savings target, as the
target relates to primary energy consumption.
A more detailed analysis of these
interactions - as well as the lessons learnt from other aspects of the 2020
framework – can be found in Annex 7.4.  

2.3.                
Evolution under current policies
2.3.1.          
The Reference Scenario

The EU Reference Scenario 2013 explores
the consequences of current trends, including full implementation of policies
adopted by late spring 2012. The Reference scenario has been developed through
modelling with PRIMES, GAINS and other related models and benefited from the
comments of Member States experts. 
Key
assumptions for the new EU Reference Scenario (see Annex 7.1 for details)
·                        
GDP and population growth projections until 2050
are considered as given and mirror the joint work of DG ECFIN and the Economic
Policy Committee. Recovering from the crisis (reflected by only 0.9% pa GDP
growth in 2005-2010), EU 28 GDP is expected to rise 1.5% pa from 2010 to 2020,
1.6% in 2020-30 and 1.4% pa thereafter through 2050. 
·                        
Fossil fuel import prices are projected with a
dedicated world energy system modelling exercise. They are all projected to increase
by 50% or more in the period 2010-2030, most notably in the period 2010-2020. The
oil price is projected to reach 121 $/barrel in 2030 and 143 $ in 2050 in
constant 2010 prices. Gas prices are projected to rise strongly in the short
term but decouple from oil prices somewhat after 2030. This price pattern
reflects the fact that in 2010 prices were relatively low due the economic crisis.
Moreover, the price projections assume no comprehensive global climate action that
would contain price increases.
·                        
Technology costs assumptions are based on extensive
literature review and have additionally been checked by the Commission
Services, notably the Joint Research Centre. They are dealt with in great
detail (e.g. over 100 different technologies and their vintages for power
generation). Technology costs and performance are assumed to improve over time,
the pace depending on the maturity of individual technologies. 
Key
policies included in the reference scenario
·                        
EU ETS Directive with the annual linear
reduction factor of 1.74% continuing also post-2020.
·                        
The Renewable Energy Directive (Directive
2009/28/EC): achievement of the legally binding national 2020 targets and the
transport sub-targets, taking account of National Renewables Action Plans. RES
subsidies are assumed to decline after 2020 – according to the information
provided by the Member States while generic policies facilitating RES penetration
are assumed to continue.
·                        
Implementation of the Energy Efficiency
Directive (Directive 2001/27/EU): The implementation of the Directive is
modelled in significant detail (including notably the Energy Savings Obligation
but also the presence of Energy Service Companies, public procurement
provisions and other elements) but rather in conservative manner (since for the
energy savings obligations there are several alternative measures possible),
leading overall to energy savings of -17% in 2020 compared to the relevant
baseline. 
·                        
GHG Effort Sharing Decision (Decision No
406/2009/EC) including achievement of the legally binding 2020 targets for
non-ETS emissions at aggregated EU level, assuming use of transfer provisions
between Member States.
·                        
CO2 standards for cars and vans
regulations (Regulation No 443/2009 and No 510/2011). CO2 standards for
cars are assumed to be 95gCO2/km as of 2020 and for vans 147gCO2/km
in line with current legislation. Standards are assumed constant after 2020. 
·                        
Fuel Quality Directive (Directive 2009/30/EC)
·                        
Eco-design Framework Directive (Directive 2009/125/EC) and related Commission Regulations

·                        
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
(Directive 2010/31/EU), 
·                        
the Grid expansion according to the latest 10
Year Development Plan from ENTSO-E
·                        
Implementation of the F-Gas regulation (Regulation
No. 2006/842/EC)  and Landfill Directive (Directive 99/31/EC)
·                        
Member States' specific plans on nuclear bans, phase-outs
or expansions. 
·                        
Relevant national policies.
See Annex 7.1 for a comprehensive overview of these
policies and assumptions.
The resulting projections show a decline in
total GHG emissions[40]
of 24% in 2020, 32 % in 2030 and 44 % in 2050 relative to 1990. The share of renewable
energy would increase to respectively 21%, 24% and 29% in 2020, 2030 and 2050. Energy
savings would continue to marginally increase up to 2035 but would then marginally
reverse afterwards. 
The EU would fall short of the milestone
for 2030 of 40% domestic GHG emission reductions, despite a strong decoupling
of energy consumption from economic growth and a major restructuring of the
energy system towards renewable energy and maintaining a significant nuclear
contribution, resulting in a reduction of energy related CO2 emissions by 31%
compared to 1990. 
With full implementation of current
policies, the surplus in the ETS is projected to further increase to over 2.5
billion allowances by 2020. Between 2020 and 2050 the surplus in the ETS only
gradually decrease due to longer term effects of present energy policies and
the ETS price effects from the continuation of the linear factor of 1.74% per
year after 2020. Consequently, ETS emissions are projected to fall by 36% compared
to 2005, whereas according to the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap a cost-effective
contribution of the ETS to the overall -40% GHG milestone would be around -45%
compared to 2005  (ranging from -43% to -48%). Non-ETS emissions are projected
to decrease by 20% between 2005 and 2030, mainly thanks to the continued impact
of energy efficiency policies. This would be less than the cost effective
reduction of around 30% (ranging from -24 to -36%) required to reach the overall
-40% GHG milestone.
Analysis for the Low carbon economy roadmap
also indicated that delaying efforts to reduce emissions post 2030 increases
costs over time[41].
This indicates the need for additional policies addressing notably the period
until 2030.

2.3.2.          
The EU's medium-to long-term security of energy
supplies remains an issue

In 2011, energy import dependence stood at
54%, with imports to an important extent coming from geopolitically instable
regions. Thanks to strong renewables penetration, which counteracts the
substantial decline of indigenous fossil fuel production, import dependence
increases more slowly than projected in earlier analyses undertaken before the
adoption of the climate/energy package. However, import dependence might still
rise, reaching 55% in 2030 and 57% in 2050, despite the slight decline of total
net energy imports, which decrease by 4% from 957 Mtoe 2010 to 921 Mtoe in 2030
not least due to expected significant increases in energy efficiency, translating
to a downward trend in overall energy consumption. In the long term (2050),
energy imports return to current levels. Energy imports continue to be
dominated by oil and gas, for which geopolitical stability and diversification
issues are most flagrant. Oil imports decline by only 7% by 2030 and gas
imports, for which many Member States are dependent on a very limited number of
supply countries and routes ( with corresponding impacts on pricing), continue
rising (5% between 2010 and 2030). Strongly declining net solid imports and
rising biomass imports largely neutralise each other. 
In spite of some increase in biomass
imports, it is notably the penetration of RES that helps contain external
energy dependence. RES also contribute to reducing the external energy bill of
the EU. The Reference scenario also demonstrates the positive impact of energy
savings / efficiency on containing import dependence for fossil fuels and the
external energy bill. But fossil fuel import prices[42] are assumed to
continue to increase from 2010 to 2030 for oil from 80 $ per boe to 121 $ (60€
to 93€), for gas from 38 € per boe to 65 € and for coal from 16€ per boe to
24€. Consequently the EU would be facing increasing outflows of expenditure for
purchasing fossil fuels. The external fossil fuel bill of the EU would be
rising in constant prices by around 50% from 2010 to 2030 and exceeds 2010
levels by around 80% in 2050, reaching around 500 billion € and 600 billion € (in
2010 prices) in 2030 and 2050, respectively. This, together with significant
uncertainties associated with the potential of unconventional fossil fuel
resources in the EU, suggests that present policies will lead to an EU economy
more prone to experiences of high and volatile international energy prices in
the future. This is of particular concern to energy intensive industries, which
are currently confronted with competition from the US which benefits from much
lower gas prices than the EU. Increase and diversification of supply routes can
increase competitive pricing of fossil fuels, in particular for gas.

2.3.3.          
Ensuring competitiveness with increasing energy
costs 

Total energy system costs increase
with 34.6% in the period 2010-2020, to reach around € 2112 billion in 2020.
After 2020 the growth slows down, growing with only 10.7% up to 2030 reaching €
2338 billion. Compared to GDP, energy system costs amounted to 12.8% in 2010,
and are projected to reach a peak in 2020 at 14.8%, falling thereafter to 14.0%
in 2030 and to below 2010 levels (12.3%) by 2050 (see cost decomposition in Table 1). 
Energy system costs used here is a wide metric
capturing all costs related to investments for energy using equipment or
investment helping to reduce energy consumption (direct energy efficiency
investment) as well as fuel costs for the production, distribution and
consumptions of energy economy wide including costs for energy imports. They
represent therefore are relatively large ratio to GDP in the modelling[43].
A primary reason energy system costs
increase is that a growing EU GDP, increasing by 35% over the period 2010-2030,
demands ever more of useful energy services and this is met through increased
energy consumption to the extent that it is not moderated/avoided through
improved energy efficiency. Therefore and because of greater affordability with
rising GDP, energy system costs need to be compared with GDP, resulting in a
much more limited cost impact expressed per unit of GDP.  
Moreover, rising energy system costs are
also due to the need to replace ageing infrastructure and equipment to meet demand.
Due to energy and climate policies implemented in the Reference as well as
increasing fossil fuel prices, these investments are directed more and more
towards efficient or carbon low technologies, which increase upfront investment
costs but reduce fuel costs. The overall impact on costs of this combined set
of drivers is estimated by the modelling of the Reference Scenario.
Overall this leads to increased investments
both on the demand side (e.g. building insulation, replacing equipment with
more efficient appliances) and on the supply side (refurbishment and new
investments in power generation and transmission). Costs related to investments
in the power sector, energy and transport equipment and direct efficiency
investment such as thermal insulation explain around 60% of the total energy
system cost increases until 2020.
High investments made in efficient
production and demand technologies result in a slight decrease in final energy
use in the EU in the period 2010-2030, in the context of an expanding economy,
with at the same time a reduction of gross energy consumption by 9%.
Increasing fuel costs is the other
important contributor to increasing system costs in Reference, mainly due to
increasing prices for fossil fuels themselves. While investments in energy
efficiency, renewables and to a small extent nuclear reduce fossil fuel
quantities consumed in the period 2010-2020 by 11%, increasing fossil fuel
prices (coal, oil and gas import prices in euro) are assumed to increase with
respectively 41%, 48% and 62% from the crisis level of 2010 in the decade up to
2020) cause total costs for fossil fuels themselves by around 20%. This
translates into notably higher fuel and electricity prices for end consumers
and contributes significantly to increased system costs[44]. 
If the price of fossil fuels themselves
would have been assumed not to increase after 2010 while keeping investments
and fuel consumption as in Reference, than system costs as a % of GDP would
only increase to 13.6% by 2020 and reduce back to 12.9% by 2030, or almost back
to 2010 levels of 12.8%. 
Fuel cost savings become more visible in
later years, with the share of fuel costs, including those incurred in the
electricity sector falling from 57% in 2010 to 45% in 2030 and 40% in 2050. 
ETS auction payments are already included
in electricity and fuel purchase costs. They are deducted for the calculation
of total system costs as the corresponding revenues raised and recycled back to
the economy is not an extra cost from a societal perspective. Additional
climate mitigation costs not related to energy only occur after 2030,
reflecting mainly investments in applying CCS to industrial processes which
become economic with the rising carbon prices in the reference.
Overall, there is a shift in the cost of
energy from operational costs, notably fuel costs, to capital costs. Investment
are triggered through a combination of the need to replace ageing equipment and
to install more efficient equipment due to the impact of higher energy prices
as well as the implementation of agreed legislation. 
In assessing economic impacts it is
important to note that higher capital expenditure creates income and employment
in the EU for suppliers of low carbon and energy efficient technologies
provided that the industrial leadership that the EU has enjoyed so far on such
technologies is maintained, rather than using financial resources for paying
for energy imports. 
Table 1:
Composition and drivers of system costs (ratio to GDP of individual cost components
and total amount of energy system costs)
 Composition of system costs || 2010 || 2020 || 2030 || 2050 || % of total system costs || % of total cost increase 
 2010 || 2030 || 2010-2020 || 2010-2030 
 Electricity costs || 3,6% || 4,1% || 3,8% || 3,3% || 28% || 27% || 27% || 25% 
 Of which fuel costs || 1.1% || 1.1% || 0.9% || 0.7% || 8% || 6.5% || 4% || 3% 
 Of which other costs || 2.5% || 3.1% || 2.9% || 2.6% || 20% || 20.5% || 23% || 22% 
 Fuel purchases (other than electricity) || 6,2% || 6,4% || 5,4% || 4,4% || 48% || 39% || 28% || 19% 
 Energy equipment (except for electricity) || 2,4% || 2,8% || 3,2% || 3,1% || 19% || 22% || 19% || 29% 
 Transport equipment (energy related part, incremental) || 0,6% || 1,2% || 1,7% || 1,7% || 5% || 12% || 17% || 27% 
 Direct efficiency investment cost (incremental) || 0,0% || 0,4% || 0,3% || 0,1% || 0% || 2% || 10% || 6% 
 Deducted ETS auction revenues || 0,0% || -0,1% || -0,3% || -0,4% || 0% || -2% || -2% || -6% 
 Non-energy related mitigation costs || 0,0% || 0,0% || 0,0% || 0,1% || 0% || 0% || 0% || 0% 
 Total (as % GDP) || 12,8% || 14,8% || 14,0% || 12,3% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% 
 Total (bn €) || 1569 || 2112 || 2338 || 2700 ||
Source: PRIMES
Average electricity
prices[45] are projected to increase by 31 percent in real terms between 2010
and 2030 in the Reference Scenario, from 131 to 172 €/Mwh (assuming in the
modelling that all incurred costs are fully recovered via prices). The entire
price increase is projected to happen up to 2020, while prices thereafter
remain relatively stable up to 2050. The three largest components of average
electricity prices are and are projected to remain capital costs, fuel costs
and grid and other supply costs. The various components of electricity
generation costs and prices up to 2050 are presented in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1:
Average electricity generation costs and prices in the Reference Scenario
(Euro'10 per MWh)
Source: PRIMES
2013
Generally speaking, the projected price
increase is due to three factors: the projected price increase of fossil fuels,
strong investment requirements to modernise energy infrastructure (generation
as well as transmission and distribution), and current energy and climate
policies on EU and Member State[46]
level. For each of the categories there are several drivers.
EU fossil fuel prices are projected to
increase strongly. Despite this, the fuel cost increase is contained in
the short term only contributing with 12% of the price increase up to 2020 due
to a decrease in fossil fuel consumption by 16% in the power sector. After 2020
fuel costs decrease due to renewables, energy efficiency and fuel switching. 
Capital costs for power generation are
projected to increase notably by 2020 in large part because of replacement of
obsolete plants and significant renewables penetration with lower load factors.
Also costs for additional back up capacity and after 2030 CCS investment
increase. In total, capital costs associated with increased investments
contribute 27% of the price increase up to 2020, but reduce to 19% of the price
increase by 2030, further decreasing afterwards.
Grid and other supply costs are projected
to increase also, in the short term for example due to  the investment
envisaged in the ENTSO-E ten year plan, and in the longer term for investment
for off-shore wind power plant connections and grid extensions needed for
cost-effective deployment of renewables and more decentralised supply, notably
from renewables and CHP. The projected grid cost increase is also partly due to
the need for smarter infrastructure to enable e.g. demand response. Grid and
other supply costs represent 18% of the projected price increase by 2020 and
28% by 2030.
Renewables support via feed-in tariffs or
similar measures is projected to peak in 2020 contributing to 21% of the
projected cost increases until then, and thereafter gradually phase out in the
longer run, except for very innovative technologies such as wave and tidal
energy (this cost component is referred to RES recovery in the graph above). 
Increasing carbon prices contribute
gradually to increasing electricity prices up to 2040 after which the impact
decreases slightly. With allowances prices at €11 and still largely freely
allocated in 2010 they increase to € 35 with full auctioning in the power
sector in 2030, contributing to 9% of the price increase up to 2020, and 20% by
2030. 
The remainder of the price increase (some
10%) is due to fixed operation and maintenance costs as well as taxes. While
taxes are projected to remain a significant part of future electricity prices,
there relative share is expected to stay roughly the same up to 2030.
To the extent that these price increases
are not fully compensated by fuel savings (e.g. from energy efficiency
investment) and income increases, the resulting energy costs cause concerns
with regard to the affordability of energy of vulnerable households and
industries exposed to international competition. However electricity prices for
industry increase less than for other sectors: 22% between 2010 and 2020. After
2020 prices for industry decrease significantly, so that total industrial
electricity price increase 2010 to 2030 is limited to 10%. 

2.3.4.          
Risk of delayed investments and high carbon lock
in 

Long investment cycles in particular in the
energy, industrial and buildings sectors mean that most infrastructure and
other capacity investments undertaken in the near term will still be in place
in 2030 and beyond. As pointed out by stakeholders (such as the power sector),
investors need a stable policy framework which corresponds to this time
horizon. The EU's energy system needs significant investments to ensure its
medium to long term viability and sustainability. This shift towards increased
investments already starts in the projection in the EU Reference Scenario 2013,
but the low-carbon economy and energy roadmaps indicated the need for an even larger
shift. 
Current policies do not ensure that these
additional investments take place, and with projected ETS carbon prices of 10 €/tCO2
in 2020 and 14€/tCO2 in 2025, the large surplus in the ETS and no continuation
of non-ETS targets, there may be even a significant risk that the investments
required under current trends and policies do not occur if renewables or energy
efficiency policies are not fully implemented and lead to a lock-in of
high-carbon technologies and infrastructures increasing costs to achieve the
longer term milestones of the low carbon roadmap[47]. 
In the projections of the EU Reference
Scenario 2013, such risks are to some extent mitigated by the expected later
increases in the ETS carbon price from 35 € in 2030 to 100 € in 2050, which would
for example be high enough to trigger significant Carbon Capture and Storage
(CCS) investment from 2040 onwards. While the CCS share in power generation
reaches only 0.5% in 2030, it rises to 3.4% in 2040 and 6.9% in 2050. However,
it is unclear to which extent investment decisions in practice take into
account such a long time perspective with current low carbon prices and such a
large surplus of allowances.
For more information regarding the EU Reference
Scenario 2013, see Annex 7.1.

2.4.                
What is the problem the 2030 framework should
contribute to address?
2.4.1.          
General problems 

The medium to long term challenges in the
area of climate and energy are complex and numerous. In consideration of the
general objectives of EU action in these areas and the responses to the public
consultation launched by the Green Paper (see Section 1.2 and Annex 7.5 for details), the main general
problems the 2030 framework should contribute to addressing can
be summarised as follows: 
(1)                   
The EU's present policies are not sufficient to reach
the EU's long term climate objective in the context of necessary reductions by
developed countries as a group to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95% in 2050
compared to 1990. In the context of international climate negotiations, the EU
will need to come forward with a position, including its own ambition level
ahead of 2015. This challenge is therefore interlinked with international
climate change mitigation efforts.
(2)                   
The EU's medium-to long-term security of energy
supplies remain an issue due to a persisting energy import dependence on
sometimes politically instable regions and reliance on fossil fuel usage which
in the long term will be incompatible with the EU's climate objectives unless
CCS would bring a solution to this dimension. Gradual depletion of the EU's
conventional fossil fuel resources together with expectation of continued high and
volatile fossil fuel import prices puts pressure on parts of EU industry. 
(3)                   
The EU's energy system needs significant
investments in energy infrastructure and electricity generation to ensure its
medium to long term viability and sustainability Long
investment cycles mean that infrastructure funded in the near term will still
be in place several decades from now. There are also other non-economic barriers and market failures e.g. with regard to renewables and
energy efficiency. Authorities, regulators, energy system operators, investors and manufacturers of innovative low carbon technology therefore
need urgently a clear and coherent climate and energy policy framework that
creates predictability and reduced regulatory risk. 
(4)                   
Current policies aiming at achieving a more
sustainable economy and energy system, which may reduce costs and avoid damages
in the longer run, are expected to contribute to short to medium term cost
increases, which give rise to concerns about the affordability of energy of households
and the competitiveness of EU energy prices in an international context. Future
policies must limit these concerns as much as possible. Moreover, different policies
underpinning the energy and climate targets for 2020 need to be mutually
supportive and limit as much as possible inefficiencies.
The abovementioned challenges are
intrinsically interlinked with each other and with challenges at the
international level, not the least in relation to international climate change
mitigation efforts, increasing international competition for energy resources
on global markets as global energy consumption increases, and energy price
developments in some other major economies that impacts the competitiveness of in
particular the EU's energy intensive industry sectors.

2.4.2.          
Specific problem for this policy initiative

As current projections (see Section 2.3) suggest that the EU is not on track to
meet these challenges on the basis of already agreed policies and expected
market developments, it is clear that policy initiatives are needed to ensure
that the EU is on track towards meeting the fundamental objectives of EU
climate and energy policies in the medium to long run. The unsatisfactory
projected developments under the reference scenario are – generally speaking –
due to a combination of two factors:
·                        
There are no sufficiently clear EU climate and
energy objectives for the period post 2020, and no comprehensive regulatory
framework in place to ensure that the transformation towards a competitive,
secure and sustainably energy system and economy is on par with long term
objectives.
·                        
In absence of such objectives and regulatory
framework, the energy markets and investment decisions made on a commercial
basis are under current projections not expected to lead to the
necessary transition.
In this context, it should also be recalled
that the reference scenario itself assumes that all policies already agreed to
at the EU and national level will be respected and adhered to, which still will
require continued additional efforts. For example, some Member States are not
on track to meet their obligations under the Effort Sharing Decision, but
EU-wide the non ETS target is expected to be overachieved. On renewable energy,
so far the EU has made satisfactory progress towards the renewable target, but
many Member States must make additional efforts to meet their RES target. It is
yet to be seen how Member States implement the Energy Efficiency Directive. 
The 2050 Roadmaps illustrate the key
options and pathways towards a competitive, secure and sustainable energy
system and economy in a 2050 perspective, but are in themselves not setting the
adequate objectives and policies for the period after 2020. More concrete
objectives are needed to steer policy and investment over the next decades. In this
context, the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap presents a 40% GHG reduction milestone
in 2030, and the Energy Roadmap 2050 states that "the next step is to
define the 2030 policy framework, reasonably foreseeable and the focus of most
current investors".
Therefore,
the problem this specific initiative aims to address is the lack of objectives
or definite policy framework in place to steer climate and energy policies in a
2030 perspective. 

2.4.3.          
Current challenges serving as guiding principles

As explained in Section 3 below, the purpose of the policy initiative
underpinned by this Impact analysis is primarily to propose target(s) and
objectives for climate and energy policies in a 2030 perspectives, and to
provide the general direction of policy development to meet these objectives.
Already at this stage, but also when preparing future specific proposals for
implementation (outside the scope of this policy initiative), the following
principles should be respected, building on concerns and challenges under the
current policy framework:
·                        
Climate and energy objectives are met in a
cost-effective way through policies that take into account the affordability of
energy, competitiveness and the importance of the internal market in energy. 
·                        
Policies are complementary and are internally
coherent with each other
·                        
Policies deliver a strong investment signal
without compromising the competitiveness of business and flexibility for Member
States.
·                        
Climate action is encouraged internationally and
able to adapt to changing circumstances.
·                        
Concerns about the risk of future carbon leakage
are addressed in case EU efforts are not matched by third country efforts.
·                        
The different capacities and circumstances of
Member States and consumer groups are taken into account, without distorting
competition or market integration.
·                        
The EU's medium- to long-term security of energy
supplies is addressed. 
Striking the balance between these
principles will remain challenging due to the multiple interactions. Examples
include:
·                        
Both renewables policies and energy efficiency
policies can have a tangible impact on security of energy supplies and
competitiveness due to reduced exposure to volatile and sometimes unreliable
fossil fuel supply. At the same time, such policies can have a reducing impact
on the price signal in the ETS, and pose challenges in terms of ensuring
coherence with climate policies.
·                        
Meeting climate policies in a cost effective way
may have less positive impacts on security of supply (at least import
dependency) due to e.g. abatement cost advantages of fuel switching compared to
domestic options for low-carbon energy sources. 
·                        
Meeting energy objectives (such as for
renewables) in a cost effective way on the aggregate EU level may lead to
disproportionate impacts on the relatively poorer Member States. At the same
time, internal market rules as well as subsidiarity need to be respected and
taken into account in policy design. 
A preliminary assessment of the means of
addressing these and other challenges is made in Section 5, on the basis of
which more detailed assessments will be carried out when preparing future
legislative proposals.  

2.4.4.          
Stakeholders views regarding the challenges
related to targets and instruments and their interactions 

Stakeholders across the board typically
have expressed strong support for the development of a common European energy
policy, and are against national policies that fragment the market. The EU ETS
and EU legislation on the Internal Energy Market are seen as two central
aspects for future EU climate and energy policies. There is a broad agreement
among stakeholders and Member States that the EU should agree on a 2030 target
for GHG emissions, while there are diverging views on what the appropriate
ambition level should be and how to relate to international developments in the
climate change area. 
Regarding interaction of targets and
instruments, general business organizations, energy intensive companies and
utilities typically argue that what they consider "overlapping"
targets for energy efficiency, RES and GHG distort the effectiveness of the
policies and leading to increased costs, with a preference towards a single GHG
target approach.  NGOs and many sectoral industry federations, such as
technology providers, energy efficiency and renewables industries instead
typically argue that a three-target approach is preferable as they complement
each other and ensure broader progress in the energy sector. Renewable energy
companies are for a Renewables target while recognising that the functioning
RES support schemes needs to be improved. Member Stats typically recognise the
important role of both renewables and energy efficiency, but there are
different views on whether the necessary progress in a 2030 perspective would
necessitate dedicated targets.

2.5.                
Who is affected

Climate and energy policies affect
everyone, citizens and companies alike. Whereas the impacts on the energy sector
itself, energy intensive sectors and major GHG emitting sectors currently not
covered by the ETS such as agriculture and transport[48] are obvious, the 2050 Roadmaps
(supported by the quantitative analysis in later Sections of this IA) suggest
that total investment needs actually are highest in end use sectors such as
transport and housing, often related to the need for more energy efficient
technologies. Therefore this transition of the energy system towards a low
carbon economy will affect all Europeans and all sectors of the economy. 
Member States, including regions and local
communities, will also be affected. In addition, there is a third country
dimension, in particular vis-à-vis energy supply countries and the relation
with international climate negotiations. 

2.6.                
The EU's right to act and EU added-value 

Climate change is a trans-boundary problem.
Coordination of climate action both at global and European level is therefore
necessary and EU action is justified on grounds of subsidiarity. Articles 191
to 193 of the TFEU confirm and further specify EU competencies in the area of
climate change. Many of the policy options have an important internal market
dimension and many of the required investments and infrastructures have an
important European dimension. The objectives can therefore be better achieved
by an EU framework for action. 
As regards energy, Member States are increasingly
interdependent on each other in ensuring secure, sustainable and competitive
access to energy. Moreover, the cost of the transition of the energy system
will be lower if Member States cooperate in meeting jointly established
targets. For these reasons, the energy challenges of the future are clearly on
an EU (if not global) scale, and could therefore not be addressed effectively
and efficiently through Member State measures alone. Article 194 TFEU specifies
the EU's right to act in the energy domain.
However, the role of Member State action
within this framework will remain crucial and the responsibility for continued
progress up to 2030 is shared, as was demonstrated in the climate and energy
package for 2020. All future EU action in this regard will respect both Art.
192 and 194 of the TFEU. The importance of the principle of subsidiarity
becomes especially important when specific policies to meet the overall
objectives for 2030 are formulated. Such policies must strike the balance
between the need to fully acknowledge differences between Member States
(including regional and local aspects) on the one hand, and the need to ensure
a level playing-field, cost-efficiency and undistorted competition and markets
on the EU level, on another hand. 
The proportionality of the proposed
framework is ensured by striking the balance between objectives of
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. The proportionality of
the initiative should also consider the long term benefits of the proposed
course of action up to 2030 (including the prospects of contributing to energy
security, global climate change mitigation and sustainable growth), and not
only be based on short to medium term impacts. This said, it is expected that
the policy initiative will take into account the significant efforts needed
already under already agreed policies, the economic reality in the EU, and
potential adverse impacts on specific industries and consumer groups.

3.                      
Scope and Objectives
3.1.                
Scope and context of the initiative
3.1.1.          
Scope

The policy initiative underpinned by this
Impact Assessment is only the first step to a comprehensive and detailed
solution to energy and climate challenges in a 2030 perspective. As such, the
policy initiative focuses on the broad objectives of the 2030 Framework and
some key implementation aspects; in particular the issue of climate and energy
targets in a 2030 perspective and how they interact. It is also expected to
propose the general direction of policy development in specific areas;
such as internal energy market, supply diversification, the ETS cap, including approach
to issues such as the existing large surplus or carbon leakage, and the role of
agriculture and transport in the transition towards a more competitive, secure
and sustainable energy system and EU economy.
On this basis, the policy options evaluated
in this Impact Assessment focus on the target setting as such, and to a lesser
extent on other means of ensuring progress towards meeting the abovementioned
challenges. This Impact Assessment includes a first assessment of the
implementation approach to meet the 2030 objectives for climate and energy
policies, but it should be underlined that the specific implementation measures
will require further assessments. This would be done in a second step once
there is agreement on the general approach to the 2030 framework, through
dedicated impact assessments. One concrete policy implementation that is
envisaged already now is the proposal for a structural measure to improve the
functioning of the ETS which is confronted with a large surplus. This proposal
is however supported by a separate Impact Assessment.

3.1.2.          
Context

The Commission's 2050
Roadmaps published in 2011 (the Low carbon Economy Roadmap, the Energy Roadmap
2050 and the Transport White Paper) illustrate the options and consequences of
the transition towards a competitive and secure low carbon economy, energy
system and transport sector. These roadmaps are all compatible with the EU's
agreed objective to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95% in 2050 compared to 1990, in
the context of necessary reductions by developed countries as a group to limit
global warming to below 2°C. The Low Carbon Economy Roadmap gives an indication of the cost
effective milestones for GHG reductions in the longer term context and the
Energy Roadmap indicated the needed change to the energy system in a 2030
perspective[49],
but they did not propose specific EU targets or objectives for 2030. Moreover,
the scenarios underpinning the Energy Roadmap 2050 were based on the assumption
that EU efforts to reduce GHG emissions in line with the 80 to 95% objective
would be made in the context of global mitigation efforts.  
Given that the EU must
be ready to make a strong contribution to an international climate agreement in
2015, it is necessary to urgently establish objectives for EU climate and
energy policies in a 2030 perspective that are both in the EU's own interest
and that would facilitate a successful conclusion of an international agreement,
considering more efforts if a comprehensive and fair international climate
agreement is reached. At the same time, and irrespectively of global action to
mitigate climate change, the transition of the EU's energy system is necessary
to ensure long-term competitiveness and security of energy supplies.

3.2.                
Objectives

In this context and following
from the scope presented in Section 3.1, the objectives of the initiative are: 


3.2.1.          
General objectives 

To ensure progress towards: 
·                        
A competitive, sustainable and secure EU energy
system in the medium to long run;
·                        
The EU's objective to reduce GHG emissions by
80-95% in 2050 compared to 1990, in the context of necessary reductions by
developed countries as a group to limit global warming to below 2°C.

3.2.2.          
Specific objectives

·                        
To provide more predictability and certainty for
Member States and investors and reduced regulatory risk as regards the objectives
of EU climate and energy policy in a 2030 perspective.
·                        
To agree on the general direction of policies
needed to meet climate and energy objectives in in a 2030 perspective.
·                        
To agree on an EU position as regards 2030 GHG
reductions in view of the international climate negotiations.

3.2.3.          
Operational objectives

The operational objectives for a 2030
climate and energy policy framework are to: 
·                        
Propose coherent headline target(s) for climate
and energy at the EU level to steer climate and energy policy in a 2030
perspective.      
·                        
Propose key indicators for the competitiveness
of the energy system and security of energy supply, as appropriate associated
with aspirational objectives, to keep track of progress over time and get a
clear basis for policy response.
·                        
Propose the general direction of the appropriate
design of future concrete policies needed to meet 2030 objectives:
The third operational objective must
already at this stage consider how future implementation can contribute to
equitable effort across the EU; improve the functioning of the internal market;
ensure a level playing field; provide appropriate investment signals in the energy
sector; contribute to competitive and affordable pricing of energy; diversify indigenous
as well as imported energy supplies; and develop measures to prevent the risk
of carbon leakage. 

3.3.                
Coherence with other policies

As outlined, the aim of the initiative is to develop a coherent
framework for climate and energy policies up to 2030. The work continues the
integrated approach pioneered by the climate and energy package and taken up in
the Europe 2020 headline targets. It builds on the 2050 Roadmaps developed
under the Europe 2020 Resource efficient Europe flagship initiative. Not many
other current policies are characterised by a similar long term perspective,
which extends beyond the multi-annual financial framework 2014 to 2020. In
general, coherence with related other policies is therefore addressed when
specific issues are discussed, such as the competitiveness of energy prices and
the costs link to industrial policy, the affordability
of energy links to social cohesion,  improvements in
air quality and the extent of use of biomass link to environmental policies,
certain aspects of renewables and efficiency target and policy design related
to transport policies, security of energy supply links to external policies,
including trade policies etc.

4.                      
Policy options

The 2020 Climate and Energy package
introduced mandatory targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction (-20% in
2020 compared to 1990) and for renewable energy (20% of total final energy
consumption and a 10% target of transport fuel consumption in 2020). In
addition, a 20 % energy savings target was established (compared to baseline
projections made in 2007 for the year 2020). This last target is not legally
binding on Member States, but various measures both on the EU and national
level have been put in place to contribute to achieving this objective. A
central question for the 2030 framework is the extent to which such targets
should be defined for 2030, and if so at which level and what should be the
accompanying legal and policy measures.
Specifically in the energy sector, reducing
GHG emissions requires changing the energy mix towards less carbon intensive
energy sources and consuming less energy through more energy efficiency and
changes in demand patterns. On the one hand, energy efficiency and renewable
energy policies interact with the EU ETS. On the other hand, together with
policies to reduce non-CO2 emissions, energy efficiency and renewable targets
are also the principal tools to effectively reduce emissions in the non-ETS
sectors and to respond to some challenges relating to security of supply and
competitiveness. It is therefore important to assess how targets and measures
for GHG reductions, energy efficiency and renewable energy interact in a 2030
perspective as well as to assess what their effects will be on a 2050 time
horizon. 
Hence, the main policy options analysed in
this Impact Assessment consist of different combinations of energy and climate
targets and to some extent also implementing policies, with sub-options where
relevant, with their effects presented in 2030 and 2050. For selected policy
options related to the implementation of these targets, a first illustration is
given of their impacts. Legislative proposals in this regard would be subject
to separate Impact Assessments.
In addition to climate and energy targets
for 2030, other indicators or aspirational objectives (if not targets) more
directly relating to the competitiveness and security of supply objectives of
EU energy policy could be considered in a 2030 perspective. Such indicators and
objectives would help to keep track on developments and to provide a good basis
for policy initiatives and later a benchmark to measure progress achieved. Such
options have not explicitly been subject to the scenario analysis, although the
scenarios give guidance on some important aspects, and are instead discussed in
a qualitative way in Section 5.2. 

4.1.                
Policy options for headline targets and measures

The responses to the public consultation
launched by the Green Paper and the on-going dialogue with Member States, the
European parliament and stakeholders make clear that there is a broad agreement
around the need for a 2030 targets for GHG reductions, with diverging views on
what the appropriate ambition level should be and how to relate to international
developments in the climate change area. Views are diverging among both Member
States and stakeholders on the need for 2030 targets for the other two areas
covered by the 2020 targets, namely renewables and energy efficiency. 
Moreover, it is clear from the public
consultation that the EU must ensure progress also towards other aspects of EU
energy objectives, but few advocate hard targets in this regard (see also Section
4.3 below on these aspects).

4.1.1.          
Basic policy options for targets and ambition
levels 

Due to the multitude of possible
combinations and ambition levels a selection was necessary when defining the
policy options for this Impact Assessment. On the basis of i) the various views
expressed in the response to the public consultation, ii) the need to ensure a
coherent and compatible combination of targets, policies and levels of
ambition, and iii) milestones from the Low Carbon Economy and Energy 2050
Roadmaps, and iv) the responses to the public consultation launched by the
Green Paper, the policy options and considered assessed by this Impact
Assessment are:
1.         A sole GHG target, including elements of supporting
renewables and energy efficiency policies:
2.         A GHG target combined with explicit (additional to the
reference scenario) energy efficiency measures and elements of supporting
renewables policies:
3.         A GHG target combined with a pre-set renewables target
and explicit additional energy efficiency measures:
For each of these options, sub-options
considered related to the ambition level of the targets and measures are:
A.        GHG targets of between 35 and 45 % (reductions compared to
1990 GHG emissions levels). 
B.        Pre-set RES targets[50] of 30 and 35% (or no pre-set[51] target) as a share of gross final energy consumption.
C.        Different level of ambition (moderate, ambitious and very
ambitious) for energy efficiency policies (additional to those already present
in the Reference scenario).
Renewables
and energy efficiency in the policy options
Without prejudice
to the level or sector(s) that a renewables targets could be applied to, the
policy options are based on the assumption that such a target would apply to
gross final energy consumption, with the aim to identify the differences
between scenarios with pre-defined RES targets and scenarios where renewables
development would be driven by a GHG target alone. There are no pre-defined
sub-targets for sectors such as electricity, heating and cooling, and transport
and the RES share in these sectors a result of model optimisation.  In case of
political preference for other approaches, the underlying analysis thus
provides information on what the coherent and appropriate level of e.g.
sub-targets for electricity/ heating and cooling/ transport could be. 
No explicit
energy efficiency target has been considered as a policy option given that the
discussion about achieving the 2020 energy efficiency target will only be
possible in 2014 when Member States report on the implementation of the EED and
given also that the discussions are on-going about the metric which would be
best suited for benchmarking the progress in energy efficiency. Instead, the
contribution from energy efficiency follows a bottom-up approach by assessing
the impacts of specific energy efficiency measures. In addition, the different
levels of ambition of energy efficiency policies give indications on their
respective impacts. 

4.1.2.          
Scenario analysis to assess policy options for
targets and measures
4.1.2.1.    
General approach

In order to quantitatively assess the
impacts of the policy options for targets and ambition level, a series of scenarios
have been developed, reflecting a comprehensive and consistent set of
combinations of options 1 to 3 and their sub-options A to C. 
The selected, representative scenarios –
illustrating the implications and trade-offs of the policy options presented
above – have been generated and analysed (in Section 5) primarily through economic modelling.
Their impacts are compared to the Reference
scenario, in order to get a clear and consistent presentation of their costs
and benefits. Where appropriate, some numbers are also compared to the current
situation. 
As explained in detail in Section 2.3 and Annex 7.1, the Reference scenario provides a
projection of expected developments under already agreed policies up to 2050. 
The assessed scenarios are characterised
according to whether they are based on reference conditions (i.e. the
same conditions as in the Reference scenario where there are no additional
climate and energy policies than those already agreed and decarbonisation in
2050 is not achieved) or on the enabling conditions, which the analysis
supporting the 2050 Energy and Low Carbon Economy Roadmaps demonstrated as
essential for the long term transformation. 
The scenarios based on reference conditions
achieve the respective policy targets for 2030 but are not supposed to achieve
after 2030 the necessary additional system changes to achieve a long term GHG
reductions in line with the milestones of the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap. Conversely,
scenario based on enabling conditions are supposed to continue after 2030 bringing
about  the necessary system changes to further reduce GHG emissions in-line
with the 2050 objectives.
Box 2: Enabling conditions
Enabling
conditions stem from an assumption of strong policy commitment to deeply reduce
GHG emissions in a 2050 perspective. They are delivered by broad policy efforts
that promote innovation and ensure the necessary infrastructure investments
occur in due time, as well as specific sectoral policies, which are assumed to
remove market failures and barriers to efficient energy consumption, RES penetration
and GHG reductions. 
In the
context of strong GHG reduction commitments and the dedicated polices, the
enabling conditions presuppose effective structural changes in all sectors of
economy, timely and effective market coordination as well as public acceptance.
While these enabling conditions are in particular affecting energy system
changes closer to 2050, they already start to have an effect as of 2030. The
role of these conditions is to set the framework so that specific policy
measures in areas such as energy, industry, transport, agriculture, environment
and climate policies can work smoothly in a co-ordinated way for achieving deep
GHG reductions in a timely manner, while working towards the other objectives
of these sectoral policies, such as competitiveness and energy security.
Enabling conditions were underlying the GHG reduction scenarios of the Low
Carbon Economy and Energy roadmaps 2050.
The
enabling conditions were modelled by altering modelling parameters with respect
to those included in the Reference conditions. The enabling conditions are
assumptions that act independently of carbon prices/values or economic or
regulatory incentives for renewables and energy efficiency. The enabling
conditions mainly relate to energy infrastructure development, R&D and
innovation, electrification of transport and reduction of energy demand, for
which timely market coordination and public acceptance of certain technologies
will be prerequisites. These enabling conditions are often itself related to policies.
A more detailed description is included in Annex 7.2
Main
enabling conditions include:
·        
Development at large scale of intelligent grids
and metering as well as management systems for recharging of car batteries to
facilitate demand response in power markets.
·        
Development of infrastructure to harvest
decentralised as well as remote RES for power generation; this is produced by a
streamlining of permitting procedures, higher investment, timely availability
of technology and appropriate price signal by smart and net metering.
·        
Development of carbon transportation and storage
infrastructure as well as public acceptance of the technology that leads to the
faster development of CCS.
·        
Technological progress enabling mix of hydrogen
and bio-gas in gas supply and possibility to use hydrogen-based storage.
·        
Development of electric vehicles battery
technology combined with development of battery recharging infrastructure and
public acceptance of electric vehicles leading to transport electrification.
·        
Accelerated innovation in biofuels in particular
enabling strong emission reduction in transport activities for which
electrification is not possible.
·        
Vigorous implementation of the EED, extension
and tightening of eco-design and labelling requirements together with slightly
higher consumer uptake and slightly faster development of technologies (because
economic agents act in anticipation of decarbonisation). 
·        
Vigorous implementation of EPBD - overcoming
market barriers to energy efficiency in buildings; renovations continue to be
undertaken in an energy efficient manner even if no specific regulatory
obligations were implemented at EU level after 2020 - because national energy
efficiency policies will be continued and economic agents believe that energy
efficient renovated buildings will continue to have a significantly higher
value on the real estate market.
·        
Stronger uptake of heating equipment and of
efficient appliances technology in the domestic sector reflecting increased
public acceptance and stronger innovation lowering perceived costs.
·        
The acceptance and adoption of best available
techniques in industry and in combustion applications mainly after 2030.
·                        
Facilitated access to finance (access to credit,
favourable tax regime, better access to risk guarantees and financing available
from Structural Funds and EIB).
Important
synergies exist between specific enabling conditions.
It has to
be taken into account that the implementation of such enabling conditions is
not a given and depends on different assumptions about the commitment of the EU
to tackle climate change, improve its energy security and develop a sustainable
and competitive energy system. The establishment of a 2030 framework is a
concrete step towards establishing such longer term commitment. It will need to
be seen to what extent this framework, and the enabling conditions that could
come with it, will depend on global efforts compatible with the internationally
agreed objective to limit atmospheric warming to below 2°C in a 2050
perspective.
Scenarios
reflecting strong long term EU commitment compatible with 2050 objectives
therefore include "enabling conditions" which facilitate the
transition, consistent with the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap and the Energy 2050
Roadmap. The enabling conditions supporting such scenarios should be understood
as efforts across the economy to ensure that the transition towards a low
carbon economy in a 2050 perspective goes smoothly.
As it is
not certain that the "enabling conditions" will materialise, some
policy scenarios excluding such conditions have also been assessed (i.e.
modelled with the same conditions as in the Reference scenario). These are less
ambitious scenarios which may achieve significant progress in a 2030
perspective, but do not achieve in the longer term the transformation towards a
low carbon economy with the current model setup. 
Analysing
scenarios with and without enabling conditions can also illustrate the impacts
on costs by 2030 and the benefits of implementing such enabling conditions. 
A more
detailed description is included in Annex 7.2.

4.1.2.2.    
Scenarios assessed

A large number of scenarios have been
analysed, out of which seven, representing a comprehensive sub-set, have been retained
for more detailed assessment. Table 2 provides an overview of these seven
scenarios (and the reference scenario). The assumed 2030 GHG target and, if
applicable, pre-set renewables target follows from the scenario design itself.
Between brackets the resulting projected values are given of GHG reductions and
RES share for those scenarios that do not pre-set a target, as well as the
energy savings achieved.
Table 2: Scenarios to assess main policy options
with respect to targets and measures[52]
 Scenario   || GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt 1990) || RES 2030 (% final En. Cons.) || Energy Savings in 2030[53]   
 Reference Scenario || -32.4% || 24.4% || -21.0% 
 Reference scenario conditions || 
 GHG35/EE® || 35% || No pre-set target (25.5%) || No pre-set target (-24.4%) 
 GHG37® || (37%) || No pre-set target (24.7%) || No pre-set target (-22.9%) 
 GHG40® || 40% || No pre-set target (25.5%) || No pre-set target (-24.4%) 
 Enabling conditions || 
 GHG40 || 40% || No pre-set target (26.5%) || No pre-set target (-25.1%) 
 GHG40/EE || 40% ||  No pre-set target (26.4%) || No pre-set target (-29.3%) 
 GHG40/ EE/RES30 || 40% || 30% || No pre-set target (-30.1%) 
 GHG45/ EE/RES35 || 45% || 35% || No pre-set target (-33.7%) 
The specific policies and measures included
in each of these scenarios are further described below supported by further
detail in Annex 7.2 and 7.3. 
It shall be noted that the focus of this
Impact Assessment is the 2030 perspective, but that most of the strategic
choices for 2030 have significant impacts on development after 2030.
Therefore, the analysis of these scenarios in subsequent Sections spans the
period from today up to 2050. In this context, and under the current
modelling set-up, the scenarios with reference conditions are not
compatible with the EU's objective to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95% in 2050
compared to 1990, in the context of necessary reductions by developed countries
as a group to limit global warming to below 2 degrees C. 
Table 3: Overview of main assumptions of scenarios assessed
 GHG35/EE® 
 This scenario is set in reference conditions – it does not achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. 
 General description: This scenario presents a modest ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction and is mainly driven by explicit moderate energy efficiency policies that ensure progress by addressing market imperfections and failures. 
 GHG policies: 35% reduction target. As a result, the ETS cap for stationary sources would stay as in the current legislation with the linear reduction factor (LRF) of 1.74% of the average annual allocation during phase 2 (excluding aviation). This is equivalent to an annual reduction of around 38 million allowances. 
 EE policies: moderate, explicit EE policies (represented through the Energy Efficiency Values (EEVs)[54], continuation and strengthening of the eco-design regulations, as well as improvements in industrial processes through best available technologies) are the main driver, they are the same as the Reference conditions until 2020 and after 2020 continue at higher level of intensity (than in the Reference scenario), they do not accelerate after 2030 as the scenario is not supposed to deliver the long term GHG reductions of 80% by 2050. EE policies also include stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars (80gCO2/km in 2030 and 25gCO2/km in 2050). 
 RES policies: There is no pre-set RES target and consequently no dedicated policy in support of RES (in addition to the Reference scenario), increased RES share of 25.5% is mostly achieved through the ETS. EE polices contribute to higher shares of RES as they reduce total energy consumption 
 GHG37® 
 This scenario is set in reference conditions – it does not achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. 
 General description: This scenario presents a modest ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction. It is based on the assumption of equalisation of marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions across the economy (throughout the projection period) and driven uniquely by equalising simulated carbon values in the non-ETS sectors to the ETS carbon price from the Reference Scenario. This, and other scenarios based on a GHG target only, represents a modelling least cost approach to reduce GHG emissions economy-wide without yet defining the additional policies through which this would be achieved (in the non-ETS sector). Carbon pricing incentivises GHG emission reductions, through fuel switching including RES penetration, through improving energy efficiency and by reducing non-energy related emissions. 
 GHG policies: ETS prices are the same as in Reference scenario, carbon values in the non-ETS are raised to match ETS carbon prices in Reference. The projected result is a GHG reduction of 37% relative to 1990. 
 EE policies: There are no additional EE policies compared to the Reference scenario. In the long term, the EEVs are slightly higher than in the Reference scenario to reflect the energy efficiency effect of the carbon value (see also Section 5.1.4.1 on economic impacts). CO2 standards for passenger cars do not change from the Reference (i.e. 95g CO2/km as from 2020 and throughout the projection period). 
 RES policies: There is no pre-set RES target and consequently no dedicated policy in support of RES (in addition to the Reference scenario), increased RES share of 24.7% is achieved by introduction of carbon value in the non-ETS. 
 GHG40® 
 This scenario is set in reference conditions – it does not achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. 
 General description: This scenario presents a medium ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction. It is based on the assumption of equalisation of marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions across the economy (throughout the projection period) and driven uniquely by the increasing carbon price in the ETS and simulated carbon values as described for scenario GHG37. Carbon pricing incentivises GHG emission reductions, through fuel switching including RES penetration, through improving energy efficiency and by reducing non-energy related emission. 
 GHG policies: achievement of 40% and 80% reduction targets in respectively 2030 and 2050, met through economy wide equalisation of carbon prices and values. This implies a tightening of the linear reduction factor in the ETS (see Section 5.4.1) 
 EE policies: There are no additional EE policies compared to the Reference scenario. In the long term, the EEVs are slightly higher than in the Reference scenario to reflect the energy efficiency effect of the carbon value. CO2 standards for passenger cars do not change from the Reference (i.e. 95g CO2/km as from 2020 and throughout the projection period). 
 RES policies: There is no pre-set RES target and consequently no dedicated policy in support of RES (in addition to the Reference scenario), increased RES share of 25.5% is mostly achieved in the ETS sectors. 
 GHG40 
 This scenario is set in enabling conditions – it does achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. This implies a tightening of the linear reduction factor in the ETS (see Section 5.4.1) 
 General description: This scenario presents a medium ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction that meets in 2030 a 40% GHG reduction, and in 2050 a 80% GHG reduction compared to 1990 levels. It is based on the assumption of equalisation of marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions across the economy driven by increasing carbon prices and simulated carbon values as described for scenario GHG37. In addition, as of 2035, more stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars apply to simulate electrification. Carbon pricing incentivise fuel shifts and GHG emission reductions it has also a pull effect on RES penetration and increase of energy efficiency. 
 GHG policies: achievement of 40% and 80% reduction targets in respectively 2030 and 2050 through equalisation of increasing carbon prices and values 
 EE policies: There are no additional EE policies compared to the Reference scenario. In the long term, the EEVs are higher than in the Reference scenario to reflect the energy efficiency effect of the carbon value. Stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars: 95gCO2/km in 2030 and 25gCO2/km in 2050. 
 RES policies: There is no pre-set RES target and consequently no dedicated policy in support of RES (in addition to the Reference scenario), increased RES share of 26.5% is mostly achieved in the ETS sectors. 
 GHG40/EE 
 This scenario is set in enabling conditions – it does achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. 
 General description: This scenario presents a medium ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction and is mainly driven by explicit ambitious energy efficiency policies that ensure progress by addressing market imperfections and failures. Beyond concrete EE policies, carbon pricing continues to incentivise fuel shifts, energy savings and non-energy related emission reductions. 
 GHG policies: achievement of 40% reduction target in 2030, equalisation of overall cumulative GHG emissions up to 2050 to projections of GHG40 scenario with overall ETS emissions approximating cumulative ETS emissions GHG40[55]. This implies a tightening of the linear reduction factor in the ETS (see Section 5.4.1) 
 EE policies: are ambitious, they go beyond enabling conditions (see Box 2 above). Exhaustive list is provided in Annex 7.3, key elements are: Measures speeding up the buildings renovation rate which attains on average (2020-2050) 1.69%[56] ·         Energy management systems introduced gradually over time. Extended and more ambitious energy efficiency obligations. The average annual energy savings in 2020-2030 amount to a 2.0% savings per year. ·         The measures above are most strongly driven by EEVs to trigger energy savings. The average EEV from 261€/toe in 2020 to 693€/toe in 2030 further increasing to 2108€/toe in 2050. ·         The efficiency standards for products driven by Eco-design Regulations are continuously tightened, broadened and extended to not yet regulated products to cover all energy product categories represented in the model. Additional support for smart grids and efficiency standards for power networks Wide deployment of CHP and district heating/cooling Stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars: 70gCO2/km in 2030 and 25gCO2/km in 2050 Other additional transport related measures as reflected in the White Paper on Transport. 
 RES policies: There is no pre-set RES target and consequently no dedicated policy in support of RES (in addition to the Reference scenario), increased RES share of 26.4% is mostly achieved in the ETS sectors. EE polices contribute to higher shares of RES as they reduce total energy consumption. 
 GHG40/EE/RES30 
 This scenario is set in enabling conditions – it does achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. This implies a tightening of the linear reduction factor in the ETS (see Section 5.4.1) 
 General description: This scenario presents a medium ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction and is mainly driven by explicit ambitious energy efficiency policies and pre-set RES target that ensure progress by addressing market imperfections and failures. Beyond concrete EE policies, carbon pricing continues to incentivise fuel shifts, energy savings and non-energy related emission reductions. 
 GHG policies: achievement of 40% reduction target in 2030, equalisation of overall cumulative GHG emissions up to 2050 to projections of GHG40 scenario with overall ETS emissions approximating cumulative ETS emissions GHG40[57]. 
 EE policies are ambitious (identical to those in GHG40/EE, including CO2 standards for passenger cars). 
 RES policies: There is a pre-set RES target of 30% and in modelling RES values[58] are applied in order to represent the policies necessary to achieve this target. The average RES values rise from 49€/MWh in 2020 to 56€/MWh in 2030 and decline to 36€/MWh in 2050. EE polices contribute to higher shares of RES as they reduce total energy consumption. 
 GHG45/EE/RES35 
 This scenario is set in enabling conditions – it does achieve GHG emission reductions in line with the Roadmaps in a 2050 perspective. 
 General description: This scenario presents a high ambition in terms of GHG emission reduction and is mainly driven by explicit and very ambitious energy efficiency policies and pre-set RES target that ensure progress by addressing market imperfections and failures. Beyond concrete EE policies, carbon pricing continues to incentivise fuel shifts, energy savings and non-energy related emission reductions. 
 GHG policies: achievement of 45% reduction target in 2030, equalisation of overall cumulative GHG emissions up to 2050 to projections of GHG40 scenario with overall ETS emissions approximating cumulative ETS emissions GHG40[59]. This implies a tightening of the linear reduction factor in the ETS (see Section 5.4.1) 
 EE policies: are very ambitious, they go beyond enabling conditions. Exhaustive list is provided in Annex 7.3 and the key elements are: Measures speeding up the buildings renovation rate which attains on average (2020 to 2050) 1.78%. ·         Energy management systems introduced gradually over time and present in all new constructions as of 2015. Extended and more ambitious energy efficiency obligations. The average annual energy savings in 2020-2030 amount to a 2.3% savings per year. ·         The measures above are most strongly driven by EEVs to trigger energy savings. The average EEV from 261€/toe in 2020 to 793€/toe in 2030 further increasing to 2285€/toe in 2050. ·         The efficiency standards for products driven by Eco-design Regulations are continuously tightened, broadened and extended to not yet regulated products to cover all energy product categories represented in the model. Additional support for smart grids and efficiency standards for power networks Wide deployment of CHP and district heating/cooling Stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars: 70gCO2/km in 2030 and 17gCO2/km in 2050 Other additional transport related measures as reflected in the White Paper on Transport. 
 RES policies: There is a pre-set RES target of 35% and in modelling RES values are applied in order to represent the policies necessary to achieve this target. The average RES values rise from 49€/MWh in 2020 to 142€/MWh in 2030 and decline to 27€/MWh in 2050. EE polices contribute to higher shares of RES as they reduce total energy consumption. 

4.1.2.3.    
Scenarios discarded for detailed assessment

All potential scenarios
without an explicit GHG reduction target for 2030 were discarded at the outset
as there is a broad consensus among Member States and stakeholders that such a
target is necessary (see Annex 7.5), although there are different views on
the suitable level of ambition and extent to which this target should be
conditional on international developments in the climate field.
All scenarios based on
GHG reductions in the EU below 35% and above 45% were discarded at an early
stage. The Reference scenario itself results in a 32% reduction. A 45%
reduction domestically is assessed as an upper range taking into account
reduction pathways assessed in the Commission's Low-carbon Roadmap as regards
the cost-efficient trajectory towards meeting the 2050 objectives.
A scenario mainly
driven by a 45% GHG target and moderate EE and RES policies was analysed but is
not evaluated in full in Section 5 in order to keep the number of scenarios
assessed manageable. Many of the differential effects can be assessed by
comparing the different 40% scenarios. It shows that it would be possible to
reach 45% emission reductions in the EU at lower costs and with lower
co-benefits as in the GHG45/EE/RES35 scenario. 
A scenario driven by
very ambitious levels of renewables and energy efficiency, but with a
continuation of the current reduction factor in the ETS was analysed but is not
evaluated in full in Section 5, in part as this approach would result in
continuing increases of the surplus of allowances in the EU ETS up to 2030 and
would therefore seriously undermine the future relevance of the ETS in
providing the right incentives for low-carbon investment; and in part as it
results in unwarranted system cost increases by not taking advantage of other
cost-efficient abatement potential in the non-ETS sectors or fuel switching. At
the same time, this scenario shows that it is possible to achieve 40% GHG reductions
in 2030 through renewables and energy efficiency policies rather than a
strengthening of the ETS, while such an approach appears insufficient to meet
the EU's 2050 objective for GHG reductions.
Several scenarios
including RES shares above 35% were also analysed but not in full as such
scenarios would result in GHG reductions of more than 45% in a 2030
perspective, or would need significant displacement of nuclear incompatible
with Member State plans or increased coal use, etc. to stay consistent with the
GHG reduction range. Moreover, no scenario with predefined RES levels in
specific sectors of the economy was analysed, but all scenarios provide
information on a sector level which could inform potential discussions on the
need or not for renewables targets covering sub-sectors of the economy.
No scenario with
predefined absolute energy savings objectives for 2030 were analysed in detail
as a target-setting in this regard (also considering a potential change to the
metric used for comparison) would have to be analysed once the approach to
energy savings in a 2020 perspective becomes clear[60]; but all scenarios include various levels of ambition with regard
to energy efficiency, giving indications that would be consistent with other
parameters and which could feed into discussions on target-setting in this
regard on the political level. 
Scenarios with only GHG
and renewables targets and without additional ambitious energy efficiency
policies have been analysed but not retained as the combined scenario GHG target
+ RES target + ambitious EE policies is a better reflection on potential future
policies and their interaction.

4.1.3.          
Interaction with international climate policies

To achieve the stabilisation of atmospheric
GHG concentrations at a sufficiently low level to be in line with the 2ºC
objective, IPCC AR4 concluded that on the basis of present scientific
estimations, developed countries would need to take a GHG emission reduction
target within the range of 80 to 95% below 1990 levels by 2050[61]. The IPCC did not specify the contributions that individual
developed countries or regions would need to bring to the group for achieving
this aggregate level of emission reductions of 80% to 95%, nor the emission
reductions delivered through access to the international carbon market.
The Impact Assessment accompanying the
Communication 'A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in
2050'[62] assessed how much of this target would need to be met domestically,
to contribute sufficiently to this overall target, assuming gradual
equalisation of carbon prices across countries and sectors globally (for more
information see Section 5.1 of that impact assessment). The Roadmap concluded
that the transition towards a competitive low carbon economy in line with
limiting a temperature increase to 2ºC (which necessitates strong climate
action at the global level), means that the EU should prepare for reductions in
its domestic emissions of 80% by 2050 compared to 1990, and that a cost
effective pathway towards this 80% GHG reduction would require reductions by
2030 of 40% below 1990 levels. 
This said, the Roadmap did not explicitly
distinguish between unilateral EU action and EU action within the context of a
fair and legally binding international agreement, where commitments have to be
individually ambitious, fair and in accordance with responsibilities and
capabilities; and collectively sufficient to stay on track to meet the below
2°C objective.
On this basis, two main
policy options can be considered:
(1)         
One GHG target:
no distinguishing between a unilateral EU GHG reduction ambition level and a
(higher) level in case EU action is within the context of a fair and balanced
international climate change agreement.
(2)         
Dual GHG targets:
a unilateral EU GHG reduction ambition level and a (higher) level in case EU
action is within the context of a fair and balanced international climate
change agreement.
For both options,
sub-options relate to the level of the respective GHG targets for 2030 and the
role of international offsets in the EU.

4.2.                
Policy options for meeting headline targets 

In addition to the
overall approach and ambition level as regards GHG, RES and EE presented in Section
4.1, the 2030 framework should also be as concrete as possible on the approach
to meeting such ambition levels. This includes notably the functioning of the
ETS, the approach to the sectors not covered by the ETS, as well as the
implementation approach to meeting a potential 2030 target for RES and the
implementation approach to EE. 

4.2.1.          
ETS

The functioning of the
EU ETS was characterised in the last two years of phase 2 (2008-2012) by a
large build-up of surplus allowances, with the economic crisis resulting in
emissions levels below the foreseen cap and the inflow of  a large amount of
international credits as major causes, resulting in a supply/demand imbalance.
To improve the orderly
functioning of the carbon market, the Commission has proposed
"backloading" (postponing) some of the auction volumes into the
latter part of phase 3 (2013 – 2020). The proposal is currently discussed by
Council and Parliament. While backloading would address the surplus in the
short term, it would not affect the structural surplus, which is projected to
continue up to and beyond 2020. 
To address this, the
Commission adopted a Carbon Market Report in November 2012 listing six possible
measures for structural reform of the ETS. Three of them are especially
important also within a 2030 context, i.e. a revision of the annual linear
reduction factor, extension of the scope of the EU ETS to other sectors, and
access to international credits. These options are addressed in Section 5.
Furthermore, up to 2020 specific measures
exist in the EU ETS to address carbon leakage. They are: i) free allocation of
allowances to sectors deemed to be exposed to high carbon costs and/or global
competition, ii) for the most electricity intensive sectors, the possibility
for Member States to grant state aid to compensate for indirect impacts on
electricity prices, iii) limited access to international credits. Section 5
therefore addresses policy options regarding the continuation and form of
carbon leakage provisions post 2020.  

4.2.2.          
Sectors not covered by the ETS

GHG emissions
reductions in the sectors not covered by the ETS are presently regulated up to
2020 through the Effort Sharing Decision, defining a national target for every
Member State. 
The 2030 framework will
need to assess if and how the definition of 2030 targets can contribute to the
fair distribution of efforts in a cost-efficient manner, in a way consistent
with dedicated EU energy efficiency policies, and while safeguarding the
internal market.
Furthermore, at present
the emissions and absorptions from the land use, land use change and forestry
sectors (LULUCF) are not included in the reduction targets in the current
Effort Sharing Decision. In this context, Council and Parliament have indeed
expressed the request that all sectors should contribute to cost-effective
emissions reductions. It needs to be assessed how LULUCF can be integrated into
the 2030 framework, taking note of the important role of agriculture, both in
terms of its large soil-based carbon pool, as well as in terms of representing
the most important sectoral source for non CO2 GHG emissions.

4.2.3.          
Options for meeting a potential RES target 

This IA does not
provide a detailed assessment of the various means of meeting a potential RES
objective in a 2030 perspective, but the main options for general approach to
meeting a RES objective are evaluated in a more horizontal manner. 
Such options include: 
(1)                   
Continuation of Member State specific targets
and support schemes. 
(2)                   
As option i) but with non-discriminatory
treatment of renewables coming from other Member States in national support
schemes or strong coordination between Member States, possibly under the
condition that there is sufficient transmission capacity between the Member
States involved, and 
(3)                   
A gradual Europeanization of the approach to
ensuring progress towards a 2030 objective. 

4.2.4.          
Options for meeting a potential EE target

For reasons referred to
in Section 5.8, this Impact
Assessment does not define or evaluate in detail potential implementation
approaches to meeting a potential energy efficiency / savings target for 2030.

4.3.                
Options for other targets or indicators for
aspects relating to competitiveness of the energy system and security of energy
supplies

The responses to the
public consultation make clear that many stakeholders consider that targets and
objectives for GHG reductions, RES shares and EE may be sufficient for ensuring
progress towards an environmentally sustainable energy system, but not for
progress with regard to the competitiveness of the EU energy system and
security of energy supplies; and that other targets or indicators relating to
these areas therefore should be established as part of the 2030 framework. Three
main options can be envisaged in this regard:
(1)         
No such targets or indicators are set.
(2)         
Other 2030 targets for other aspects of
competitiveness and security of supply are set, and treated in an equal manner
as potential targets for GHG, RES and EE.
(3)         
No other such targets are set, but relevant
indicators are defined to keep track of progress over time and to provide a
knowledge basis for policy action; potentially associated with aspirational
objectives in a 2030 perspective. 
Candidates for such
indicators are presented in the context of evaluating these options in Section 5.2.

5.                      
Analysis of impacts:
5.1.                
Options for targets and
measures
5.1.1.          
Methodology
5.1.1.1.    
Impacts assessed

This Section assesses
impacts of each of the main scenarios representing the basis for policy options
as defined in Section 4, supported as appropriate by other scenarios not
assessed in full detail. It focuses on the broad impacts of those options, and
to a lesser extent on the impacts of specific measures that could be put in
place to meet the ambition levels inherent in each of the scenarios / policy
options. While specific EE measures in most scenarios including "enabling policies"
(see Section 4) are represented in more detail than non-ETS GHG reduction
policies and RES policies, where mainly the cost efficient achievement of
targets are being considered, an in-depth evaluation of concrete measures to
reach yet to be agreed targets and ambition levels has to be left to more
specialised IAs once the broad policy directions have been agreed on. The
impacts of more strategic choices assessed are:
(1)         
Environmental impacts (see Section 5.1.2)
(2)         
Energy system impacts (non-economic) (see Section
5.1.3)
(3)         
Economic impacts (see Section 5.1.4)
(4)         
Social impacts (see Section 5.1.5)
In
assessing these impacts, focus is put on 2030, but an outlook for 2050 is also
provided in order to address adequately the long term impacts of the policy
choices for 2030. This is particularly important as there are long lead times
for energy investments as well as very long life-times, for example, for power
plants (20-50 years or more), grids and other energy infrastructure. Much of
the current infrastructure and nearly all the new ones constructed based on
2030 policies will still be in place after 2030 and largely also in 2050.
Environmental
impacts assessed are primarily
those related to GHG emissions, direct land use and various air pollutant
emissions. This includes the split of GHG emission reductions across sectors of
the EU economy, in particular between the energy system and other GHG
emissions, the split between various economic sectors (e.g. electricity
generation, transport, residential / tertiary sector, industry and
agriculture), as well as the split between GHG reductions in sectors within and
outside the ETS at the aggregate level.
Energy system
impacts (non-economic) concern
notably energy consumption and supply. For the supply side, an important
concern is security of supplies which involves issues of managing external
dependency through diversification of fuels, which consequently will enable the
diversification of production /import regions and transit routes. The
assessment of energy system impacts also deals with issues relating to the
balance between various energy sources including specific renewables
technologies in various sectors, energy consumption and intensities,
infrastructure development, import dependence, possible savings in energy
imports, structural change to electricity generation, heating and cooling,
development of combined heat and power (CHP) and carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS).
Economic impacts assessed include such impacts within and
outside the energy system, as well on the macro-economic level. Impacts
addressed are notably overall system costs including long-term cost efficiency
and its sub-components (fuel, investments etc.), electricity prices, the ETS
price, implicit abatement cost in the non-ETS sector, the role of energy costs
for energy intensive industries, etc.; whereas macro-economic impacts focus on
GDP impacts as well as an assessment of impacts in a globalised economy on EU
energy intensive industries that are subject to international competition, from
more ambitious climate and energy policies.
Social impacts assessed are primarily those relating to
employment, using different analytical tools and focusing mainly on the effect
of carbon pricing revenues, as well as energy efficiency and renewables
policies; and affordability for households, in particular vulnerable households
which are particularly impacted by fuel and electricity price increases. It
also includes health impacts related to the reductions of pollutant emissions
treated under environmental impacts. 

5.1.1.2.    
Modelling approach

All impacts relating to
the energy system and important parts of economic impacts and the resulting
impacts on CO2 emissions are mainly assessed by modelling of various scenarios
using the PRIMES model. This analysis is extended to non-CO2 GHG and air
pollutant emissions by linking the PRIMES and GAINS models along with linkages
to more specialised transport modelling (PRIMES-TREMOVE), agricultural and land
use models (CAPRI, GLOBIOM/G4M), which also allow covering of impacts on LULUCF
emissions. While transport modelling feeds directly into energy system
modelling, the GHG mitigation potentials from non-CO2 emissions
concern mainly activities outside the energy system, and are modelled in a
fully consistent way. 
A fundamental
analytical modelling question relates to the broad strategic choices with
respect to a long term policy strategy for which 2030 could be a milestone. As
discussed in Section 4, the energy and climate modelling with PRIMES, for
helping to assess impacts, needs to differ notably with respect to the main
long term policy thrust, which influences strongly in the long term how various
policies can interact taking account of acceptance issues. As discussed in Section
4, energy and climate policy making for 2030 can be embedded in "enabling
policies" or not. The inclusion of these policies assumes that the objectives
assessed are part of a strong, comprehensive and long term GHG reduction strategy.
This would also be facilitated by strong global action. In practice, the enabling
policies ensure the availability of necessary infrastructure, progress in
R&D and innovation and broad social acceptance of technologies which enable
decarbonisation and facilitate the development and deployment of notably
renewables and electro-mobility options (see Annex 7.2
for more information on the differences between Reference and enabling
policies). 
Another important
modelling question is the degree of concreteness of policy modelling. i.e. the
extent to which GHG and energy consumption reductions in the non-ETS sector as
well as the achievement of renewables targets are driven solely by carbon (in
the non-ETS), renewable and efficiency values without suggesting how this would
be achieved in practice, or more by the simulation of more concrete policies.
This aspect has important implications for assessing energy system impacts as
well as economic impacts. 
Direct comparison
between the various scenarios is compounded by substantial differences between
them on many dimensions. Differences between scenarios can best be understood
through a comparison of pairs of scenarios that differ only with respect to the
issue under investigation:
·      
First, scenarios with enabling
policies result over time in lower system costs and price impacts. This
highlights the benefits and importance of such enabling policies for the
transition, in particular post 2030. Until 2030, the impact of the enabling
policies is relatively small. So the effect is transparent and results can be
compared, results post 2030, however, are only directly comparable between
scenarios with enabling policies, because for all these the same carbon budget
constraint consistent with the EU's 2050 climate objective is assumed. In
scenarios with Reference setting, reductions are not achieved in-line with this
long term transformation, which also should be considered in comparing
scenarios in a 2030 perspective. Moreover, the EU Reference Scenario 2013 (with
which policy options / scenarios are compared), does not include such
assumptions about enabling settings.
·      
Second, scenarios are to various
extents stylised to achieve a transformation cost-effectively in GHG emission
abatement terms. The way to achieve the cost-efficient transformation differs
between scenarios with only GHG targets and the scenarios with GHG targets and
specific energy efficiency policies. 
a)     
For the scenarios with only GHG targets the
approach aims at an optimal split of GHG reductions between ETS and non-ETS
sectors, based on the equalization of the marginal abatement cost in these two
sectors through the use of the ETS carbon prices and the non-ETS carbon values.

b)     
For the scenarios with GHG targets and specific
energy efficiency policies, energy efficiency measures, often extensions of
existing legislation, are additionally considered compared to the GHG targets
only approach. In these scenarios specific EE policies substitute largely for
carbon values and RES targets contribute towards lowering emissions in ETS and
non-ETS sectors.
More specifically, the use of carbon values
rather than concrete energy efficiency policies in the non-ETS sectors lead to
cost efficient GHG reductions which could only be achieved in reality by an
extension of the ETS to cover the entire economy[63], while concrete policy
measures still would be needed to address market failures. Also the use of
renewable values leads to cost efficient introduction of renewables throughout
the EU economy (which may or may not be the case depending on implementation
approach). Whereas the EU ETS is a concrete policy tool, achieving set
objectives in other sectors and with respect to other targets will require
concrete policies that must be put in place to realise these transformations.
Scenarios based on concrete EE measures aim to reflect the need for concrete
policies that remove barriers to EE due to market failures, split incentives
and imperfect information among market actors. On this basis, the use of
carbon, renewables and energy efficiency values rather than specific policies
may underestimate the cost of reaching set objectives unless the theoretical
cost-optimisation can be achieved in reality, requiring an extensive set of
policies[64]
that improve the functioning of energy markets and the pass-through of price
signals, remove the barriers to energy efficiency and facilitate investment in
low carbon technologies, such as nuclear and CCS. Comparability between
scenarios with more extensive use of such "values" in so far as they
do not reflect concrete policies and assume perfect functioning markets, and
those that to a greater extent are based on concrete policies would therefore
be reduced, in particular as concrete policies are needed to address market
failures. 
·      
Third, to allow for
comparison between scenarios under enabling settings that achieve the long term
objective towards a low carbon economy, total emission budgets where kept
similar over the projection period, using the following methodology: 
a)  The scenario with only a 40% GHG emission reduction target aimed at
determining the optimal distribution of emission reduction across sectors,
notably the ETS and non-ETS while meeting the GHG reduction targets of 40% and
80% in 2030 and 2050.
b)     
The
scenarios with GHG targets and specific energy efficiency policies (as well as
additional RES targets)  build on the scenario with only a 40% GHG emission
reduction target, assuming for each period the ETS cap derived in (a) above for
comparability reasons, as well as meeting the respective GHG reduction targets
in 2030 and 2050. Moreover, due to the different focus of the modelling in
these scenarios, more emphasis was placed in economic modelling of the ETS
market[65].

To assess the complex interaction between
sectors at the aggregate macro-economic level, the GEM-E3 and the E3MG models
are used (see Section 5.1.4.2 and 5.3), with GEM-E3 being a general
equilibrium model and E3MG a macro-econometric model. Both models assess the
impact of a 40% domestic GHG reduction in the EU based on the equalisation of
marginal abatement costs through the use of "carbon values" and
compared to a Reference scenario (based on the PRIMES EU Reference Scenario
2013). This analysis assumes that third countries implement policies to achieve
their 2020 pledges in the context of the UNFCCC but do so in a conservative
manner. The impacts of more than 40% GHG emissions reductions in a 2030
perspective coupled with potential recognition of international offsets in the
ETS are also assessed through these models (see Section 5.3). This modelling set up does not allow
assessing the impacts of specific renewables objectives or energy efficiency
policies beyond those resulting from the "pull-effect" of a GHG
target[66].
Social
and in particular employment effects are also primarily analysed using the same
macro-economic models and scenarios that are used to consider macro-economic
impacts, focused on the impact of achieving a GHG target only. Furthermore, the
E3ME model was adapted to assess in addition to the achievement of GHG
reductions, also the impact of achieving higher energy efficiency in relation
to the building sector and higher renewables penetration, but only limited to
the power sector. The quantitative modelling of employment effects is enhanced
by other more qualitative means of assessing such impacts, as well as by a
dedicated study looking at employment impacts of the scenarios in the
Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050.

5.1.1.3.    
Qualitative assessment of key aspects

In addition to the quantitative assessment of impacts based
on modelling, this Impact Assessment is also based on important qualitative
assessments of various potential aspects of the 2030 framework. Such analysis
draws heavily from the results of the public consultation launched by the Green
Paper, and the extensive analysis of progress made and lessons learnt under the
2020 framework (see Section 2.2
and Annex 7.4).
Qualitative assessments are particularly important for Sections 5.4
to 5.8
containing possible implementing measures to meet set objectives for 2030; as
well as for Section 5.2
which contains options for additional indicators and / or aspirational
objectives more directly relating to the competitiveness of the energy system
and the security of energy supplies.  

5.1.2.          
Environmental impacts

This
Section first analyses how the overall GHG emission impacts are distributed
between sectors covered by the EU ETS and non-ETS sectors currently covered by
the Effort Sharing Decision. Then it assesses sectoral GHG emission impacts,
with a focus of explanations on GHG emissions other than energy related CO2
emissions, followed by a summary of sectoral GHG emission impacts. CO2
emissions from energy are discussed in Section 5.1.3.
Furthermore, this Section assesses impacts on emissions and absorptions from
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) as well as impacts on air
pollution, including health impacts.  

5.1.2.1.   
Total GHG reductions and ETS
vs. non-ETS emission reductions

Total
GHG reductions for the modelling scenarios are of course broadly in-line with
the assumed targets as listed in Table 2, differing a
little for some scenarios, because the model is run iteratively until the
emission pathway reaches the desired GHG targets. Only the GHG37 scenario is
different, in that it only assumes carbon values in the non ETS to be equalised
to those of the ETS in Reference, resulting in GHG reductions of 37% compared
to 1990.
Between
2005 and 2030, ETS emissions decrease in the Reference scenario significantly
more than non-ETS emissions, given that the ETS linear reduction factor
continues post 2020 under the ETS Directive, while some key policies impacting
the non-ETS sectors currently agreed upon do not include such a gradual
tightening. Correspondingly, additional decreases in the 37% GHG reduction
scenario under Reference settings, which re-establishes carbon price
equalisation, are significantly higher in the non-ETS compared to the ETS. 
Differences
between the different 40% GHG reduction scenarios under enabling policies are
significant. In the scenario mainly driven by ETS carbon prices and carbon
values in the non-ETS sectors, the additional emission reductions in ETS and
non-ETS sectors compared to reference are in 2030 very similar (with 11%
and 13% reductions). The lowest additional GHG reductions in the ETS of only 3%
are realised in the scenario where non-ETS GHG reductions are achieved mainly
through ambitious additional energy efficiency measures, resulting in much
higher GHG reductions in the non-ETS sectors of up to 18% more compared to
reference. The scenario results also show that higher levels or dedicated
renewables policies typically increase GHG reductions more in the ETS in
relative terms, because cost-efficient RES potentials are higher within than
outside the ETS (notably in the power sector). Adding a RES target of 30% to
the above-mentioned ambitious EE policies scenario, leads to further 4% ETS
emission reductions and a decrease of non-ETS emission reductions. The 45% GHG
reduction scenario shows higher reductions compared to reference in ETS as in
non-ETS sectors, strongly driven by the 35% RES target.
Nevertheless,
if emission reductions in 2030 are compared to 2005, the base year of current
EU GHG legislation, they are across all scenarios higher in the ETS sectors
than in the non-ETS sectors. The policy options that achieve a 40% overall GHG
reduction result in reductions compared to 2005 in ETS of between -38% to -43%,
further decreasing to -49% in the 45% scenario, and in the non-ETS sectors of
between -30% to -35%[67].
With
regard to 2050 emissions, the scenarios consistent with the 2050 GHG objective
(i.e. those with "enabling settings") show rather similar additional
emission reductions to Reference for the ETS and non-ETS sectors, usually well
over 60%. That the 45% GHG reduction scenario shows the lowest additional
reductions reflects simply the comparability condition of having the same
carbon budget constraint over the entire period up to 2050, so that higher 2030
reductions imply lower efforts later. 
Compared
to 2005, in scenarios under enabling policies that achieve a 40% overall GHG
reduction in 2030, ETS sector 2050 emission reductions are beyond 85% and still
considerably higher than non-ETS sector reductions, which are between 70 and
72%, confirming roughly the dimensions indicated by the low carbon economy
roadmap. 
Table 4: ETS and
non-ETS emissions
Scenarios
with enabling policies (compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   || "ETS + Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "ETS + concrete EE measures + RES val. [68]" 2030 / 2050 
   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Total GHG emissions (% to 1990) ||   || -40.6 / -79.6 ||   || -40.3 / -80.1 || -40.7 / -80.0 || -45.1 / -77.5 
 ETS sectors emissions (% dif. to reference) ||   || -11.2 / -68.4 ||   || -2.9 / -66.0 || -7.2 / -65.2 || -20.6 / -54.6 
 Non-ETS sectors emissions (% dif. to reference) ||   || -12.8 / -61.4 ||   || -18.0 / -63.7 || -16.1 / -64.0 || -17.6 / -62.3 
 ETS (% to 2005; Ref: -36.1/-59.3%) ||   || -43.3 / -87.1 ||   || -37.9 / -86.2 || -40.7 / -85.8 || -49.3 / -81.5 
 Non-ETS (% to 2005, Ref: -20.3/-22.9%) ||   || -30.5 / -70.3 ||   || -34.7 / -72.0 || -33.1 / -72.2 || -34.3 / -70.9 
Scenarios
with reference settings (not compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   || "Reference  settings , ETS + carbon values" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Concrete EE measures || ETS + Carbon value 
   ||   || GHG35 || GHG37 || GHG40 
 Total GHG emissions (% to 1990) ||   || -35.4 / -54.1 || -37.0 / -53.4 || -40.4 / -56.2 
 ETS sectors emissions (% dif. to reference) ||   || -0.8 / -7.6 || -2.2 / -3.7 || -9.7 / -14.2 
 Non-ETS sectors emissions (% dif. to reference) ||   || -7.0 / -23.2 || -10.2 / -23.1 || -13.4 / -25.5 
 ETS (% to 2005; Ref: -36.1/-59.3%) ||   || -36.6 / -62.4 || -37.5 / -60.8 || -42.3 / -65.1 
 Non-ETS (% to 2005, Ref: -20.3/-22.9%)) ||   || -25.9 /-40.8 || -28.4 / -40.7 || -31.0 / -42.6 
Source:
PRIMES 2014.
The main conclusions from this Section are that
achieving emissions reductions by focussing relatively more on energy
efficiency policies for any given level of GHG reductions reduces emissions in
the non-ETS more and thus reduces the reductions needed in the ETS. A high
level of renewable energy to the contrary increases reductions more in the ETS,
resulting in less needed reductions in the non-ETS to achieve a certain GHG
target. Furthermore, compared to reference, typically the non ETS sectors
reduce more, which is logical given that the ETS cap continues after 2020,
whereas in the non ETS sectors such continued tightening does not exist,
although specific policies continue to have effect.

5.1.2.2.           
Non-CO2 and non-energy
related CO2 GHG emissions

Table 5 shows the expected development of non-CO2 GHG emissions and CO2
emissions not related to energy or land use. Non-CO2 emissions are modelled
with the GAINS model, with mitigation cost curves for technical emission
reductions beyond Reference introduced in the PRIMES model. 
In the Reference
scenario, total non-CO2 GHG emissions decline by nearly 20% in 2030 compared to
2005. The reduction in agricultural non-CO2 GHG emissions, which are more than
half of all non-CO2 emissions, is 4% in the same period. The reduction in other
non-CO2 sectors is 36%. In the Reference scenario, non-CO2 emissions decrease
because of EU waste policy, national bans on landfill of biodegradable waste,
EU and national regulations to reduce F-gas emissions, inclusion of mainly
certain industrial emissions (mainly N20) in the ETS, and national
subsidies for anaerobic digesters enabling energy recovery.
The Table shows
significant further non-CO2 GHG emissions compared to Reference and compared to
2005 reductions across all policy scenarios. For the scenarios that achieve 40%
GHG reductions, the reduction is lowest in the option with a 30% RES share and
ambitious EE policies, with only 33% non-CO2 GHG reductions by 2030 compared to
2005. In general, reductions are lowest in options that have ambitious EE
policies and higher RES targets, given that in these options higher energy
savings and energy-related CO2 reductions reduce the need for reductions from
non-CO2 GHG to achieve the same overall reduction of aggregated GHG emissions.
Instead, the highest reductions are achieved in case of a 40% GHG target only
in Reference settings, reducing non-CO2 emissions by 29% compared to Reference
and 43% compared to 2005[69].
Agricultural sector
emissions follow a similar pattern but reductions are smaller since the
potential to reduce emissions at the projected carbon values is more limited.
As a result, the reduction of agricultural non-CO2 emissions (CH4 and N2O)
ranges between 19% and 28% in 2030 compared to 2005 for the scenarios that
achieve 40% GHG reductions. The GAINS model only focuses on technical emission
reduction options. The PRIMES model implements these technical emission
reduction options as long as the associated cost per ton of GHG reduced is
below the carbon value introduced in the non-ETS or ETS. In reality of course
it will require the introduction of concrete policies to achieve these
reductions now simulated through a carbon value incentive. This was for example
already the case in some of the other non-CO2 sectors with the inclusion of
industry non-CO2 emissions in the ETS and with the currently on-going review of
the F-gas regulation, for which estimated 2030 reductions[70] are in
line with the cost-effective potential simulated by mitigation cost curves and
carbon price incentives. The recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy contains
provisions which could be used by Member States to foster such emission
reductions. 
The extent to which the
technical options assumed in the modelling reduce non-CO2 emissions in a
cost-effective way depends also on technical progress achieved. On the one hand
some technical options such as the use of propionate precursors may not be
financially viable at the carbon values modelled. On the other hand genetic
improvements through breeding programmes and diet changes are being applied or
ready to be applied on farms and financially viable and some technologies (e.g.
diet changes) might be able to reduce more than assumed[71]. In
developing the 2030 framework, further work will be needed to assess mitigation
options and the practical implementation in policy terms.
The modelling did not
consider behavioural changes that result in changes in diet, which would have
mitigation potential[72].
A certain change in diet patterns in developed countries is already perceptible
and could be confirmed by 2030. Even without explicit changes of the food
patterns, potential mitigation measures could impact food production prices and
thus have consequences on the demand and supply of European agriculture, which
will require further examination.
Non-energy related CO2
emissions are to a large extent (around 75%) covered by the EU ETS, in
particular process emissions in the metal, cement and chemicals industries.
They decline in the Reference scenario by 15% in 2030 compared to 2005, mainly
driven by the continuation of the annual reduction factor in the ETS and the
projected ETS price of €35 that results from it. Emissions decrease further
only in policy options with higher carbon prices resulting from scenarios
driven uniquely by a GHG target, with a maximum among the scenarios analysed of
7% compared to Reference and 21% emission reductions between 2005 and 2030 in
the policy scenario with 40% GHG emission reductions and renewables and
efficiency policies as in Reference settings[73]. In scenarios with both ambitious RES and EE policies,
the necessary effort to reduce non-energy related CO2 emissions is lower (as
the ETS in total needs to reduce less), reflected in a lower carbon price and
carbon value, leading to increasing non-energy CO2 emissions compared to
Reference and to stable non-energy related CO2 emissions in 2030 compared to
2005. 
Table 5: Non-CO2 and non-energy related GHG
emissions in the EU28 in 2030 (MtCO2eq.)
 2005 ||   || 2030 
   ||   || Refe-rence || GHG35 (ref setting) || GHG37 (ref setting) || GHG40 (ref setting) || GHG40 || GHG40EE || GHG40  EERES 30 || GHG45  EERES 35 
   ||   ||   || GHG emission reduction vs Reference 2030 (%) 
 Total non-CO2 || 903 || 728 || -10 || -24 || -29 || -26 || -22 || -17 || -19 
 Non Agriculture || 422 || 268 || -13 || -27 || -38 || -28 || -25 || -19 || -20 
 Agriculture || 481 || 460 || -9 || -22 || -25 || -24 || -21 || -15 || -18 
 Non-energy related CO2 || 280 || 240 || 9 || -6 || -7 || -7 || 12 || 18 || 17 
   ||   || GHG emission reduction vs 2005 (%) 
 Total non-CO2 |||| -19 || -28 || -38 || -43 || -40 || -38 || -33 || -35 
 Non Agriculture |||| -36 || -45 || -54 || -61 || -55 || -52 || -49 || -49 
 Agriculture |||| -5 || -13 || -25 || -28 || -28 || -25 || -19 || -22 
 Non-energy related CO2 ||   || -15 || -7 || -20 || -21 || -20 || -4 || 0 || 0 
 Carbon price (€/tCO2) |||| 35 € in ETS 0 € in non-ETS || 27 € in ETS 1 € in non-ETS || 35 € || 53 € || 40 € || 22 € || 11 € || 15 € 
Source:
GAINS, PRIMES, CAPRI
The main conclusions of this Section are that for non-CO2
emissions, the highest reduction potential by 2030 is in the
non-agricultural sectors, even though most of these reductions are already
achieved in the Reference scenario, for instance due to inclusion of an
important share of the non-agriculture N2O emissions in the ETS,
which can be reduced at low cost. Non-energy related CO2 emissions
reduce least. Scenarios with ambitious EE and RES policies typically result in
higher reductions from CO2 in the energy system, requiring less
reductions of non-CO2 emission sources, such as from agriculture. 

5.1.2.3.           
Summary of sectoral GHG
emission impacts

Table 6 compares sectoral GHG emission reductions to 2005. In a 2030
perspective, the power CO2 sector (including district heating and
CHP) is projected, to experience the biggest reduction across all policy
scenarios, ranging from -48 to -66%. A significant part of these reductions,
-47%, is already achieved in Reference (for a detailed explanation of sectoral
trends in the Reference scenario see Annex 7.1). Above average reductions of
-36 to -61% and -36 to -49%, respectively, are also seen in the broad group of
non-agricultural non-CO2 sectors and in the residential and tertiary
CO2 sector (mainly heating and cooling of buildings and some other
fuel uses, including in agriculture, given that emissions of electrical
appliances and lighting are indirect and hence covered under the power sector).
In the industry CO2  sector, which includes refineries and covers
energy-related and process-related emissions, and in the agriculture non-CO2
sector, the reductions between 2005 and 2030 are below average and range from
-23 to -31% and -13 to -28%, respectively. The lowest emission reductions are
projected in the transport CO2 sector, ranging from -12 to -20%.
Sectoral reduction differences in 2030 between Reference settings and enabling
policies are small, as can be seen by comparing the GHG40 scenarios in both
settings.
In a 2050 perspective,
emission reductions increase significantly across all sectors in the scenarios
compatible with the 2050 GHG objective. The power sector remains with -90 to
-98% reductions compared to 2005 the sector with the highest reductions. The
agriculture sector sees with -45% to -53% the lowest reductions. 
If changes in sectoral
GHG emissions are compared to Reference (Table 7) the key insight in a 2030 perspective is that sectoral emission
impacts of the additional policy options vary considerably depending on whether
the main drivers of emission reductions are carbon prices, energy efficiency
measures or are a combination of both with RES targets. This can be illustrated
by comparing the different 40% GHG reduction scenarios. The highest additional
reductions compared to the Reference Scenario are projected to occur in the
non-agricultural non-CO2 sector, the residential and tertiary sector and in the
agriculture sector. In the scenario where carbon prices and carbon values are
the main drivers of change, the power sector also reduces emissions
significantly, and in this scenario more than the residential and tertiary
sector. In scenarios primarily driven by explicit energy efficiency measures,
the additional reduction efforts of the power sector become the smallest of all
sectors. Explicit RES targets results in additional reductions in the power
sector, leading to lower GHG reductions in all non-CO2 sectors. Industry and
transport remain across all scenarios the sectors with the smallest additional
reductions compared to Reference, with a stronger contribution of transport in
the scenarios with ambitions EE policies. 
In a 2050 perspective,
the differences between different scenarios consistent with the 2050 GHG
objective (i.e. those with enabling policies) reduce considerably. The power
sector then shows the biggest additional reductions compared to Reference
across most scenarios, followed by the buildings sector (residential &
tertiary). Transport, industry, other non-CO2 sectors and agriculture also
contribute significantly, in decreasing order.
Table 6: Sectoral GHG emission impacts compared to 2005
Scenarios with enabling settings (compatible with 2050 GHG
objectives):
 GHG emission reductions compared to 2005 ||   ||   2030 / 2050 ||   || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EERES35 
 Power generation, CHP and district heating (CO2) ||   || -46.7/ -72.9 ||   || -56.5 / -97.7 ||   || -48.4 / -96.1 || -53.3 / -95.3 || -65.6 / -89.8 
 Industry (energy + processes) (CO2)[74] ||   || -22.5 / -43.8 ||   || -27.4 / -77.8 ||   || -26.3 / -78.3 || -27.1 / -79.7 || -30.9 / -76.3 
 Residential &tertiary (mainly buildings) (CO2)[75] ||   || -31.4 / -39.1 ||   || -39.1 / -82.2 ||   || -49.0 / -88.1 || -47.3 / -87.8 || -48.5 / -87.1 
 Transport (CO2) ||   || -11.6 / -10.3 ||   || -13.6 / -63.5 ||   || -19.6 / -64.0 || -19.4 / -63.7 || -19.5 / -65.3 
 Agriculture (non-CO2) ||   || -4.5 / -3.4 ||   || -27.6 / -52.6 ||   || -24.5 / -52.6 || -18.9 / -52.6 || -21.8 / -45.4 
 Other non-CO2 sectors ||   || -36.4 / -35.3 ||   || -54.5 / -70.9 ||   || -52.4 / -69.3 || -48.7 / -69.3 || -49.2 / -68.2 
Scenarios with reference settings (not compatible with 2050
GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||   2030 / 2050 ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values or concrete EE measures (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Power generation, CHP and district heating (CO2) ||   || -46.7/ -72.9 ||   || -48.0 / -73.9 || -48.5 / -74.4 || -54.9 / -80.5 
 Industry (energy + processes) (CO2) ||   || -22.5 / -43.8 ||   || -22.6 / -50.8 || -24.1 / -47.4 || -26.9 / -49.3 
 Residential & tertiary (mainly buildings) (CO2) ||   || -31.4 / -39.1 ||   || -35.8 / -47.0 || -37.6 / -52.5 || -40.7 / -54.9 
 Transport (CO2) ||   || -11.6 / -10.3 ||   || -15.3 / -39.6 || -11.6 / -11.5 || -11.7 / -12.6 
 Agriculture (non-CO2) ||   || -4.5 / -3.4 ||   || -12.7 / -16.7 || -25.1 / -50.3 || -27.8 / -52.6 
 Other non-CO2 sectors ||   || -36.4 / -35.3 ||   || -44.9 / -46.6 || -53.6 / -67.4 || -60.6 / -69.3 
Source:
PRIMES, GAINS, CAPRI.
Table 7:
Sectoral GHG emission impacts compared to Reference
Scenarios
with enabling policies (compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
 All indicators are presented as % increase/decrease in comparison to the Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Power generation, CHP and district heating (CO2) ||   || -18.4 / -91.7 ||   || -3.1 / -85.5 || -12.4 / -82.5 || -35.5 / -62.4 
 Industry (energy + processes) (CO2) ||   || -6.3 / -60.4 ||   || -5.0 / -61.4 || -6.0 / -63.8 || -10.9 / -57.8 
 Residential & tertiary (mainly buildings) (CO2) ||   || -11.2 / -70.7 ||   || -25.6 / -80.5 || -23.2 / -80.0 || -25.0 / -78.8 
 Transport (CO2) ||   || -2.2 / -59.3 ||   || -9.0 / -59.8 || -8.8 / -59.6 || -8.9 / -61.3 
 Agriculture (non-CO2) ||   || -24.2 / -50.9 ||   || -21.0 / -50.9 || -15.1 / -50.9 || -18.2 / -43.5 
 Other non-CO2 sectors ||   || -28.4 / -55.0 ||   || -25.1 / -52.6 || -19.3 / -52.5 || -20.1 / -50.9 
Scenarios
with reference settings (not compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   || "Reference  settings, carbon values or concrete EE policies (GHG35)" 2030  /  2050 
 All indicators are presented as % increase / decrease in comparison to the Reference ||   || GHG35 || GHG37 || GHG40 
 Power generation, CHP and district heating (CO2) ||   || -2.4 / -3.6 || -3.3 / -5.4 || -15.4 / -27.9 
 Industry (energy + processes) (CO2) ||   || -0.2 / -12.4 || -2.1 / -6.4 || -5.7 / -9.7 
 Residential & tertiary (mainly buildings) (CO2) ||   || -6.5 / -13 || -9.0 / 22.1 || -13.6 / -26.0 
 Transport (CO2) ||   || -4.1 / -32.7 || 0.1 / -1.4 || -0.1 / -2.6 
 Agriculture (non-CO2) ||   || -8.7 / -13.8 || -21.7 / -48.5 || -24.5 / -50.9 
 Other non-CO2 sectors ||   || -13.4 / -17.4 || -27.0 / -49.7 || -38.0 / -52.6 
Source:
PRIMES, GAINS, CAPRI.
The main conclusions of this Section are that all sectors
need to contribute to GHG reductions, with the power sector typically reducing
the most and the transport and agricultural sectors typically reducing the
least compared to 2005 levels. Compared to the Reference scenario, reductions
in the power sector are less outspoken, with the power sector already reducing
a significant amount in the reference scenario. At the same time, sectoral
contributions are more pronounced for the residential and tertiary sectors
(mainly buildings), as well as emission reductions of non-CO2, largely due to
the fact that these sectors reduce emissions relatively
less in the Reference scenario. 

5.1.2.4.           
GHG emissions related to
land use and land use changes (LULUCF) 

LULUCF is at present a
net sink in the EU. In the reference scenario this LULUCF sink for the EU28 is
expected to gradually decline from 239 MtCO2 in 2005 to around 216
MtCO2 in 2030. This is the result of different trends among which
the development of the forest sector is the most important one. Notably overall
timber demand (energy & non-energy) increases with 17% between 2005 and
2030 and the impact of a skewed age class distribution in European forests
means that the growth increment will be gradually reduced and a higher share of
trees reaches maturity. Energy wood demand increases by some 40% in the same
period. 
Table 8 shows the impacts on biomass demand and supply of representative policy
options as estimated with the PRIMES model. 
Scenarios without
explicit RES target of 30% or 35% do not show a significant increase in demand
for biomass for energy purposes or biofuels compared to reference. Some even
show a decrease, notably in the scenario with 40% GHG reductions and ambitious
EE demand is lower than reference. 
Instead demand for
biomass for energy purposes increases notably in the scenarios with higher RES
target. In the option with 45% GHG reduction 35% RES share and very ambitious
EE policy demand increases most to 223 Mtoe. 
Most demand is met
through domestic production, with imports being limited. In the GHG40/EE
scenario demand and imports of bioenergy reduce most compared to reference. In
the GHG45/EE/RES35 scenario demand increases most, with 45 Mtoe, of which 34
Mtoe is met through domestic production and the remainder with increased
imports.
Table 8: Biomass
demand for energy purposes 
   || 2005 || 2030 
   ||   || Ref || GHG 35EE || GHG 37 || GHG 40 ref || GHG 40 || GHG 40 EE || GHG 40EE RES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Domestic production biomass feedstock (Mtoe) || 87 || 194 || 191 || 192 || 193 || 203 || 191 || 213 || 231 
 of which: forestry || 33 || 48 || 48 || 49 || 49 || 49 || 48 || 49 || 51 
 of which: crops || 4 || 65 || 62 || 63 || 64 || 69 || 59 || 78 || 92 
 of which: agricultural residues || 12 || 16 || 16 || 16 || 16 || 16 || 16 || 16 || 17 
 of which: waste || 28 || 47 || 47 || 48 || 47 || 47 || 47 || 48 || 49 
 of which: other (i.e. black liquor) || 9 || 17 || 17 || 17 || 17 || 21 || 21 || 22 || 21 
 Net imports biomass feedstock (Mtoe) || 1 || 4 || 3 || 3 || 4 || 2 || 1 || 2 || 5 
 Processing losses of feedstock (Mtoe) || 2 || 40 || 39 || 40 || 39 || 42 || 40 || 43 || 45 
 Bioenergy production (Mtoe) || 85 || 157 || 155 || 156 || 158 || 163 || 153 || 172 || 191 
 Net imports of bioenergy (Mtoe) || 0 || 21 || 20 || 21 || 22 || 19 || 14 || 20 || 32 
 Demand biomass(Mtoe) || 85 || 178 || 175 || 177 || 180 || 182 || 166 || 192 || 223 
Source:
PRIMES.
The estimated changes
in domestic production of biomass where used as input in the GLOBIOM/G4M model
to assess the impacts on the LULUCF sink. It should be noted that uncertainties
related to the monitoring of the LULUCF sink (both emissions and absorptions)
are larger than in other sectors.
What is the most
notable outcome from these projections is that most of the additional demand
for biomass production in the EU is met through increases in production from
fast rotating plantation wood, classified as a perennial crop, and only by
small increases in harvest from existing forest area. The land use changes to
meet the increased biomass demand are represented in Table 9. The main change in 2030 is the increase in cropland area (for
perennials) compared to the reference for the GHG40 scenario as well as the scenarios
with specific RES target. The increasing share of perennials increases total
agricultural production in the EU, but results in a decrease in available
cropland for other uses, affecting imports and exports of agricultural
commodities. 
The biggest indirect
impact across scenarios can be observed on the cereal market in the 45% GHG
scenario with EE and RES policies where net exports decrease by 1.5% of total
production compared to the Reference. Other commodities (livestock, forestry)
remain more or less stable. Total cropland area increases by 2 million ha but
part of the increase in perennial area (3 million ha) takes place on
conventional cropland, reducing its availability for other purposes. The effect
on the net trade balance is limited as demand for 1st generation
biofuels decreases (-1.2 Mtoe) which spares land for other uses. On the supply
side change in management systems in the crop and livestock sector and
reallocation of production help compensate for decrease in available cropland
area.
Table 9: Land use changes EU28 (million hectares)
 Areas (million hectares) || 2005 || 2030 
 Ref || GHG 35EE || GHG 37 || GHG 40 ref || GHG 40 || GHG 40 EE || GHG 40EE RES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Forest land || 138 || 146 || 146 || 146 || 146 || 146 || 146 || 146 || 146 
 Cropland || 100 || 105 || 105 || 105 || 106 || 106 || 105 || 106 || 107 
 of which: cropland for perennials (including plantation wood) || 0 || 7 || 7 || 7 || 8 || 9 || 7 || 10 || 12 
 of which: cropland other crops || 100 || 98 || 98 || 98 || 98 || 97 || 98 || 96 || 95 
 Grassland || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 || 62 
 Wetlands, settlements, other land || 73 || 75 || 75 || 75 || 75 || 75 || 75 || 75 || 75 
 Other Natural Vegetation || 73 || 59 || 59 || 59 || 59 || 58 || 60 || 58 || 58 
 TOTAL LAND || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 || 446 
Source:
GLOBIOM/G4M (rounded to millions)
In the reference the
sink decreases to 214 MtCO2. In most scenarios the impact on the
sink is small, and in the GHG 40 scenarios with ambitious EE policies the sink
even slightly increases. In the 45% GHG with ambitious EE and RES policies the
sink decreases by 7 MtCO2 to 207 MtCO2 compared to the
reference. In the latter scenario, increases of harvest removals of forest wood
to meet biomass demand (from 620 million m3 in reference to 623
million m3), translates in reduction of the forest management sink
from -126 MtCO2 in reference to -116 MtCO2. This negative
effect on the forest sink is partially compensated by the increases in
plantation wood (perennial crop, not harvested every year) which has a positive
effect on the amount of carbon stored in the soil compared to other crops
normally planted on cropland. Therefore cropland emissions in that case are
lower compared to the reference and as a result the net impact of this option
on the LULUCF sink is limited compared to the reference. In the 40% GHG cases
the LULUCF sink does not differ significantly from the reference with the sink
increasing a bit in the GHG 40% + EE compared to reference.
Table 10: Impact on LULUCF sink 
   || 2005 || 2030 
 Ref || GHG 35EE || GHG 37 || GHG 40 ref || GHG 40 || GHG 40 EE || GHG 40EE RES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Total harvest removal (million m3) || 529.4     || 620.3 || 620.2 || 620.5 || 620.5 || 620.9 || 616.5 || 620.5 || 6230.3 
 of which forest wood for energy (million m3) || 76.8 || 108.2 || 108.1 || 108.4 || 108.4 || 109.2 || 106.4 || 108.4 || 119.4 
 Plantation wood used for energy (million m3) || 136 || 98.2 || 94.2 || 107.8 || 120.6 || 130.7 || 102.7 || 131.2 || 168.5 
 LULUCF  (MtCO2) || -239.1 || -214.1 || -212.5 || -211.7 || -211.0 || -212.3 || -214.6 || -214.5 || -207.3 
 Of which: ||   
 Total forest land || -315.7 || -207.6 || -206.2 || -205.6 || -205.6 || -205.5 || -210.5 || -205.9 || -196.3 
 of which forest management || -340.2 || -126.4 || -125.2 || -124.9 || -124.9 || -124.5 || -129.3 || -125.0 || -115.5 
 of which afforestation/reforestation || -26.6 || -93.5 || -93.3 || -93.1 || -93.0 || -93.3 || -93.3 || -93.3 || -93.2 
 of which deforestation || 51.1 || 12.3 || 12.3 || 12.3 || 12.3 || 12.2 || 12.1 || 12.3 || 12.4 
 Total cropland || 35.7 || 14.4 || 14.8 || 15.1 || 15.8 || 14.1 || 15.2 || 12.6 || 9.9 
 Total grassland || 5.9 || -4.9 || -4.9 || -5.0 || -5.0 || -5.0 || -4.8 || -5.1 || -5.0 
 Harvested Wood Products || -9.4 || -60.8 || -61.0 || -61.0 || -61.0 || -60.7 || -59.3 || -60.8 || -60.7 
 Wetlands, settlements, other land || 44 || 45 || 45 || 45 || 45 || 45 || 45 || 45 || 45 
Source:
GLOBIOM/G4M, based on PRIMES biomass demand
The main conclusions of this Section are that overall the
impacts on the LULUCF sink seem limited if increased demand for bio-energy is
met largely through increased use of energy crops. This would imply a
significant expansion of cropland for bio-energy (increase of cropland with
some 10% compared to 2005, and would be larger if the development of second
generation biofuels would not decrease demand for first generation biofuels).
The eventual impact on GHG emissions would depend in part on the energy crops
used and farming practices applied and their impacts on soil carbon, which will
need further analysis. This will have knock-on effects on other policy domains,
including impacts on available land for other purposes. 
If in reality increased demand is rather met through
increased imports, or if increased demand is rather met through higher rates of
harvest removals of forest wood, the negative impact on the sink, be it
directly or indirectly through Indirect Land Use Changes, might be higher than
estimated in this assessment, while at the same time the expansion of cropland
could be more limited.

5.1.2.5.           
Air Pollution

For this analysis the
same methodology, based on the GAINS model was used as in the impact assessment
for the roadmap to a competitive carbon economy. Table 11 shows that the different options to reduce GHG emissions
in 2030 all reduce emissions of PM2.5, SO2 and NOX
compared to the reference scenario, but that such reductions are significantly
larger in scenarios including ambitious EE policies and higher RES targets, reducing
fossil fuel consumption and combustion.
The reduction in air
pollution has positive impacts on human health. The Option with a 40% GHG
reduction with moderate EE and RES policies reduces the number of life year
lost due to lower PM2.5 concentrations (a result of lower PM2.5,
SO2 and NOX emissions) by some 4 million in 2030. Whereas the option with 40%
GHG reduction, ambitious EE policies and a 30% RES target reduces impacts of PM2.5
concentrations  by 11 million life years lost the option with a 45% GHG target,
ambitious EE policies and a 35% RES target even reduces impacts by 13 million life
years lost. Impacts for the GHG35® and GH37® are lower. Similar positive
impacts occur also for mortality due to ozone, but are very small in relative
terms. 
The reduction in
mortality can also be valued economically. The Table shows that a 40% GHG
reduction with moderate EE and RES policies reduces health damage due to air
pollution by €4.8 to 11.1 billion compared to the reference[76]. This is
mainly from lower concentrations of PM2.5 that result from the joint
impact of reduction in SO2, NOX and PM2.5
emissions. In the options with ambitious EE and RES policies, reductions in
health damage are higher: 12.6 to 29.2 billion €/year for the option with a 40%
GHG target, ambitious EE policies and a 30% RES target and by €15 to nearly 35
billion/year for the option with a 45% GHG reduction, ambitious EE policies and
a 35% RES target. These health benefits are lower for the less ambitious
options in Reference settings which reduce GHG emissions by 35% or 37%.
Because of lower
emissions air pollution, costs to control them are lower as well, between €0.7
billion to €7 billion/year depending on the option assessed. 
In addition forest,
catchment and ecosystems areas where acidification and eutrophication exceed
critical loads are reduced. Other morbidity (health effects) and damage to
crops are also reduced (e.g. lower ground level ozone emissions), but these
benefits have not been quantified in this impact assessment. Furthermore,
damage to materials, crops and sensitive ecosystems (due to acidification,
excess nitrogen deposition and ground level ozone) are also expected to be
reduced. The forest area not exposed to acidification exceeding critical
loads is expected to be 1800 km2 higher for the option with a single
40% GHG target  , 3900 km2 for the option with a 40% GHG target and
ambitious EE policies, 3640 km2 in the option with a 40% GHG target,
ambitious EE policies and a 30% RES target.  The area increases to 4590 km2
for the option 45% GHG reductions, 35% RES and ambitious EE policies. A
comparable improvement occurs for the area of natural ecosystems exposed to
excessive nitrogen loads. For the option with equal carbon values and a 37% GHG
reduction the exposed area decreases with 2840 km2, in option GHG40
with 2171 km2 whereas for the option with 45% GHG reductions, 35%
RES and ambitious EE policies this area decreases with  4287 km2.
For the other options with ambitious EE policies the area protected is
comparable to the latter. 
Table 11: Impacts on air pollution and air
pollution control costs in 2030 (change compared to the reference)
 2030 || GHG 35EE || GHG 37 || GHG 40 ref || GHG 40 || GHG 40 EE || GHG 40EE RES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 SO2 (kton) || -4 || -71 || -168 || -100 || -140 || -143 || -266 
 NOX (kton) || -125 || -60 || -128 || -193 || -328 || -326 || -371 
 PM (kton) || -27 || -26 || -42 || -25 || -115 || -97 || -91 
 Health impacts (mln life years lost due to PM2.5) || -2.5 || -3.0 || -5.7 || -4.2 || -11.5 || -10.9 || -13.0 
 Premature deaths ozone (cases per year) || -178 || -68 || -132 || -233 || -455 || -450 || -455 
 Monetary damage health PM2.5 (bn€/yr). Low estimate || -2.9 || -3.5 || -6.6 || -4.8 || -13.3 || -12.6 || -15.0 
 Monetary damage health PM2.5 (bn€/yr). High estimate || -6.6 || -8.1 || -15.1 || -11.0 || -30.6 || -29.1 || -34.5 
 Monetary damage health ozone (bn€/year): Low estimate || -0.01 || 0.00 || -0.01 || -0.01 || -0.03 || -0.03 || -0.03 
 Monetary damage health ozone (bn€/year): High estimate || -0.01 || -0.01 || -0.02 || -0.03 || -0.06 || -0.06 || -0.06 
 Air pollution control costs (€2010 bn/yr) || -0.9 || -0.7 || -2.0 || -2.4 || -4.1 || -4.1 || -7.0 
 SUM reduced pollution control costs & damage reduction (€bn/yr) || 3.8 to 7.6 || 4.2 to 8.8 || 8.6 to 17.1 || 7.2 to 13.5 || 17.4 to 34.8 || 16.7 to 33.2 || 21.9 to 41.5 
Source: IIASA (2013) based on GAINS for emissions, health impacts
and air pollution control costs (in €2010). Benefit valuation uses valuation of
mortality (value of life year lost) used for the Thematic Strategy on Air
Pollution €57700 to 133000 per life year lost.
In conclusion, all policy options analysed generally come
with very significant reductions of sulphur oxide,
while reductions of particulate matter and nitrogen oxides are much more
pronounced in scenarios with ambitious energy efficiency policies. The related
health benefits are also present across scenarios, but much more pronounced in
scenarios including ambitious energy efficiency policies and renewables shares.

5.1.3.          
Energy system impacts

Primary
energy consumption[77]
is reduced in all scenarios analysed. While consumption reductions happen under
all scenarios (2 to 15% in 2030 and 5 to 32% in 2050 in comparison to the
Reference scenario), much higher reductions are achieved in scenarios with the
enabling setting, especially if they are coupled with ambitious or very
ambitious energy efficiency policies. While the renewables targets obviously
change the relative importance of each energy source in the system, they also
result in further reductions in primary energy consumption thanks to high
efficiency of RES in electricity production. Importantly, the reduction in
primary energy consumption does not come from a decrease of GDP or value added
of different sectors but primarily from technological improvements in
industrial processes in power generation (supply side) and on the demand side
(also coupled with change in consumer behaviour).
In
the Reference scenario, energy savings fall short of the 20% reduction target
in 2020 but in 2030 a 21% reduction is achieved (compared to the increasing
2007 baseline projections). For the policy scenarios the savings in 2030 range
from 23% to 34% and are the highest under the enabling setting a 45% GHG
reduction target with ambitious EE and a 35% RES target. 
As
a result of reduced primary energy consumption, the energy intensity of the EU
economy is reduced under all scenarios and most significantly under a 45% GHG
target coupled with very ambitious EE policies and RES target. Among the
scenarios resulting from 40% GHG reductions in 2030, energy intensity is
reduced the most in scenarios which contain additional RES target and energy
efficiency policies.
The
policy scenarios demonstrate significant differences in terms of the
consumption of various primary energy sources. The Table below shows both the
changes in the relative shares of fuels, as well as the changes compared to
reference, as all the scenarios achieve decreases in total energy consumption
impacting the fuel shares. As regards solid fuels (notably coal), already in
2030 their consumption in absolute terms declines substantially under all
scenarios, although compared to Reference 2030 there is a limited increase in
the scenario under a 40% GHG target coupled  with  ambitious EE policies and a
more significant increase in the scenario under 35% GHG target coupled with EE
policies. The situation changes after 2030, with the scenario under the sole
40% GHG target seeing highest increases in solid fuels consumption as of 2040
with significant CCS development counterbalancing the associated CO2 emissions.
Small increases in the scenario under 35% GHG target coupled with EE policies
finish in 2040 and later on the consumption decreases. Conversely, the
scenarios with renewables targets result in the highest decreases of solid fuel
consumption by 2050 (up to 38% by 2050 in absolute terms in comparison to the
Reference scenario). 
The
absolute consumption of nuclear energy resulting from economic modelling for
all countries allowing use of this technology decreases in 2030 in all policy
scenarios, ranging from a 0.2% reduction under the scenario driven by a sole
40% GHG target to strong decreases in scenarios with renewables targets (as
much as -59% for the scenario with a 45% GHG target coupled with strong EE
policies and 35% RES target). In 2050 the corresponding range is from + 17%
(scenario driven by sole 40% GHG reductions in 2030) to - 58% (for the most
ambitious scenario including 35% RES target).
Oil
consumption decreases in all scenarios, but much faster in those with enabling
setting reflecting the facilitation of transport electrification with such
enabling policies. Natural gas absolute consumption also declines in all
scenarios (in general less sharply than oil) but slightly more under the
scenarios featuring renewables targets, as the displacement of gas by
renewables is not fully compensated by the increased need for gas as backup
generation to variable renewables. By 2050 in all scenarios under the enabling
setting, natural gas becomes the main fossil fuel.
Consumption
of RES grows in 2030 in most scenarios. The growth is naturally the strongest
under scenarios with explicit RES targets. In 2050, there is very strong RES
growth across all scenarios in enabling settings, all achieving reductions of
around 80% GHG. Concerning specifically RES consumption[78], their
growth is to some extent driven by the GHG targets (present in all scenarios
analysed) but it can be further boosted in the presence of the dedicated RES
targets. Enabling setting presupposing the necessary grid improvements also
facilitate RES penetration. Finally, increased RES strengthens the effects of
EE through increased efficiency.
Without a dedicated RES
target for 2030, the pull effect of GHG reduction is projected to lead to RES
shares ranging from 25% to 27% in 2030 and from 30% to 51% in 2050. While RES
shares increase alongside the ambition on GHG reductions, it has to be noted
that higher ETS prices needed for more ambitious GHG cuts would not only
trigger more RES investment, but also lead to fuel switching and more energy
efficiency investment. The overall RES share in 2030 would translate into
RES-Electricity shares between 43 % and 47%.  RES-Heating & Cooling
develops in parallel with the overall RES share, while RES-Transport would
reach between 12% and 14%.
A 30% RES target on the
basis of 40% GHG reduction would entail a RES-E share of 53% in 2030. Again
RES-H&C rises similar to overall RES, while RES-T shares increases would be
no different from scenarios without a RES target. The presence of ambitious
energy efficiency policies results in some reduction in RES penetration mostly
in electricity and to a smaller extent in heating and cooling.
A 35% RES target in the
context of 45% GHG cuts would in 2030 lead to a two third contribution from RES
to electricity, slightly over one third RES contribution to heating and cooling
demand while RES-T shares would be16%.
The changes in the
energy mix translate accordingly in the power generation capacity installed for
different fuels: by 2030 all scenarios see a slight reduction in the installed
capacity of solids, except from the scenario driven by 40% GHG target coupled
with ambitious EE policies, where it remains stable. By 2050 this reverses only
for the scenario driven by a 40% GHG target, seeing power generation capacity
for solids increase, with mitigation occurring through CCS. Similarly, this
scenario is also the only one that experiences significant increases in nuclear
capacity from 2030 to 2050 whereas these capacities decline in all other
scenarios. On the other hand, capacity clearly increases for renewables in all
scenarios with enabling settings, whereas for gas it decreases for all
scenarios. Regarding the investment in power generation capacity, there
are no such clear trends as for installed capacity since investments have very
long time horizons and only partially react to policies and changing fuel
prices. A general trend can be distinguished that investments in power
generation from renewables increase (in comparison to the Reference scenario)
strongly in all scenarios in enabling setting whereas investments in gas-fired
power generation decrease for all of the scenarios. For solids, no specific
pattern can be distinguished apart from the strong decline in investments under
all scenarios featuring a RES target.
Closely
linked with energy consumption and energy mix is the issue of import
dependency. Net energy imports decrease significantly (in comparison to
the Reference) for all scenarios already in 2030 but the trend is even more
pronounced in 2050. The decreases are more significant for scenarios under the
enabling setting since these are based on the assumption of adequate
development of infrastructure for domestically produced renewables. While the
scenario driven by a 40% GHG target  demonstrates a reduction of net imports by
7% in 2030 and 45% in 2050 (compared to the Reference scenario), the scenario
combining 40 % GHG reductions, 30% RES and ambitious energy efficiency policies
brings a 16% decrease in net imports in 2030 and 53% in 2050. The scenario with
the highest ambition for GHG, RES and EE measures makes an even more pronounced
difference in 2030 but towards the end of the projected period the differences
with other scenarios become smaller reflecting the fact that all scenarios in
enabling setting reflect the same carbon budget constraint. 
Import
dependence is in the short term much less affected by policy choices and there
are little differences between scenarios in 2030with respect to the reference
scenario and present levels. In 2050, however, the Reference scenario and
scenarios in reference setting still have 51-57% import dependence whereas all
other scenarios decrease it to below 40%, due to the higher use of renewables
across scenarios and the lower use of, mainly imported, fossil fuels. While RES
targets foster the domestic production of renewable energy sources, they also
reduce overall energy consumption because of their high efficiency (including
compared to other indigenous sources). Consequently, no lower import dependence
is demonstrated in scenarios with explicit RES targets compared with those
without as import dependence is measured in relative terms[79].
As
regards the net imports for specific fuels, fossil fuels imports decline for
all the scenarios under the enabling setting throughout the projection period.
Solids imports decline for all scenarios but in the most pronounced manner in
the scenarios with RES targets, which represent much stronger reductions of the
fossil fuel import bill. On this basis, it is clear that while RES does not
necessarily impact import dependence as such, it has a positive impact on the
imports of fossil fuels in absolute terms. RES imports grow throughout the
projection period for all scenarios and there are additional increases in
imports that would be accountable to RES targets.
Net
energy import decreases translate into savings in the energy fossil fuel
imports bill. Whereas savings (calculated as a cumulative value over a 20 year period)
are very limited for scenarios in Reference settings, with enabling settings
they range from € 190 billion to € 550 billion in 2030 and from € 3404 billion
to € 4425 billion in 2050. These savings indicate that rather than paying for
exports, the EU economy can have these resources invested either in technology
development and/or new assets and/or education, all of which contribute to job
creation and economic growth.
Table 12: Impacts on primary energy consumption in
2030 and 2050. 
Scenarios
with enabling settings (compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
   ||   ||     ||   || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Primary Energy Consumption (Mtoe) ||   || 1,611 / 1,630 ||   || 1,534 / 1,393 ||   || 1,448 / 1,183 || 1,433 / 1,125 || 1,364 / 1,102 
 Energy Savings (evaluated against the 2007 Baseline projections for 2030) ||   || -21.0 / n.a. ||   || -25.1 / n.a. ||   || -29.3 / n.a. || -30.1 / n.a. || -33.7 / n.a. 
 Energy Intensity (2010 = 100)  (primary energy to GDP) ||   || 67 / 52 |||| 64 / 44 |||| 60 / 38 || 60 / 36 || 57 / 35 
 - Industry[80] ||   || 81 / 68 ||   || 78 / 55 ||   || 74 / 48 || 73 / 47 || 72 / 46 
 - Residential[81] ||   || 72 / 54 ||   || 67 / 40 ||   || 60 / 29 || 61 / 29 || 60 / 29 
 - Tertiary[82] ||   || 65 / 49 ||   || 59 / 34 ||   || 51 / 26 || 52 / 26 || 50 / 27 
 - Transport[83] ||   || 71 / 56 ||   || 70 / 44 ||   || 66 / 43 || 66 / 43 || 66 / 42 
 Primary Energy Consumption in Reference and % change compared to Reference ||   || 1611 / 1630 ||   || -4.8 / -14.5 ||   || -10.2 / -27.4 || -11.1 / -31.0 || -15.4 / -32.4 
 - Solid fuels ||   || 174 / 124 ||   || -10.8 / 7.2 ||   || 2.9 / -11.9 || -0.9 / -38.4 || -29.3 / -38.2 
 - Oil ||   || 520 / 498 ||   || -3.3 / -62.1 ||   || -10.7 / -63.0 || -10.6 / -62.9 || -11.1 / -64.0 
 - Natural gas ||   || 397 / 397 ||   || -13.2 / -36.9 ||   || -21.1 / -48.1 || -27.4 / -54 || -29.5 / -54.4 
 - Nuclear ||   || 201 / 216 ||   || -0.2 / 17.1 ||   || -7.5 / -2.7 || -21.6 / -40.9 || -59.0 / -57.6 
 - Renewables ||   || 320 / 398 ||   || 3.5 / 43.6 ||   || -4.4 / 19.5 || 9.4 / 39.7 || 30.2 / 44.9 
 Primary Energy Consumption Share of : ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 - Solid fuels ||   || 10.8 / 7.6 ||   || 10.1 / 9.5 ||   || 12.4 / 9.2 || 12 / 6.8 || 9.0 / 7.0 
 - Oil ||   || 32.3 / 30.5 ||   || 32.8 / 13.5 ||   || 32.1 / 15.6 || 32.5 / 16.4 || 33.9 / 16.3 
 - Natural gas ||   || 24.6 / 24.3 ||   || 22.5 / 17.9 ||   || 21.6 / 17.4 || 20.1 / 16.2 || 20.5 / 16.4 
 - Nuclear ||   || 12.5 / 13.2 ||   || 13.1 / 18.1 ||   || 12.8 / 17.8 || 11.0 / 11.4 || 6.0 / 8.3 
 - Renewables ||   || 19.9 / 24.4 ||   || 21.6 / 41.0 ||   || 21.2 / 40.2 || 24.5 / 49.4 || 30.6 / 52.3 
 Renewables Share[84] - Overall ||   || 24.4 / 28.7 ||   || 26.5 / 51.4 ||   || 26.4 / 50.8 || 30.3 / 59.2 || 35.4 / 61.7 
 - Share in electricity, heat. & cooling[85] ||   || 31 / 36.8 ||   || 34.2 / 51.4 ||   || 34.1 / 51.4 || 39.7 / 63.4 || 47.3 / 66.7 
 - Share in heating & cooling ||   || 23.8 / 26.6 ||   || 25.9 / 49.0 ||   || 25.8 / 46.0 || 30.6 / 53.9 || 35.2 / 54.1 
 - Share in electricity ||   || 42.7 / 50.1 ||   || 47.3 / 53.2 ||   || 46.1 / 55.2 || 53.1 / 70.3 || 65.7 / 75.8 
 - Share in transport ||   || 12 / 13.9 ||   || 12.8 / 67.9 ||   || 14.0 / 67.6 || 14.6 / 71.7 || 15.6 / 74.9 
 Net Energy Imports (2010=100) ||   || 96 / 101 ||   || 89 / 56 ||   || 83 / 50 || 81 / 47 || 78 / 46 
 Net Imports of Gas (2010=100) ||   || 105 / 122 ||   || 91 / 74 ||   || 82 / 61 || 74 / 55 || 72 / 53 
 Import Dependency (net imports to primary energy consumption) ||   || 55.1 / 56.6 ||   || 53.6 / 36.8 ||   || 52.8 / 38.2 || 51.8 / 38.0 || 52.3 / 38.2 
 Fossil Fuel Net Imports in bn €'10       (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50 ) ||   || 461 / 548 ||   || 452 / 375 ||   || 441 / 343 || 439 / 334 || 434 / 326 
 Fossil Fuels Import Bill Savings in 2011-2030/2031-2050  compared to reference (bn € '10)  (cumulative 20 year savings from imports) ||   || n.a. ||   || -190 / -3,404 ||   || -401 / -4,084 || -450 / -4,271 || -550 / -4,425 
Scenarios
with reference settings (not compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values or EE policies (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Primary Energy Consumption (Mtoe) ||   || 1,611 / 1,630 ||   || 1,542 / 1,441 || 1,576 / 1,553 || 1,548 / 1,542 
 Energy Savings (evaluated against the 2007 Baseline projections for 2030) ||   || -21.0 / n.a. ||   || -24.4 / n.a. || -22.9 / n.a. || -24.4 / n.a. 
 Energy Intensity (2010 = 100)  (primary energy to GDP) ||   || 67 / 52 ||   || 64 / 46 || 66 / 49 || 65 / 49 
 - Industry ||   || 81 / 68 ||   || 78 / 61 || 81 / 68 || 81 / 68 
 - Residential ||   || 72 / 54 ||   || 67 / 48 || 68 / 48 || 66 / 47 
 - Tertiary ||   || 65 / 49 ||   || 61 / 45 || 60 / 41 || 57 / 39 
 - Transport ||   || 71 / 56 ||   || 69 / 45 || 71 / 56 || 71 / 56 
 Primary Energy Consumption in Reference and % change compared to Reference ||   || 1611 / 1630 ||   || -4.3 / -11.6 || -2.2 / -4.7 || -3.9 / -5.4 
 - Solid fuels ||   || 174 / 124 ||   || 7.6 / -15.8 || -2.8 / -3.5 || -15.7 / -7.5 
 - Oil ||   || 520 / 498 ||   || -4.6 / -25.4 || -0.8 / -2.6 || -1.6 / -3.7 
 - Natural gas ||   || 397 / 397 ||   || -13.1 / -13.9 || -4.4 / -9.8 || -6.1 / -14.2 
 - Nuclear ||   || 201 / 216 ||   || -2.8 / 0.8 || -2.5 / -6.5 || -2.5 / -4.0 
 - Renewables ||   || 320 / 398 ||   || -0.4 / 2.7 || -1.1 / -1.5 || 0.4 / 1.2 
 Primary Energy Consumption Share of : ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 - Solid fuels ||   || 10.8 / 7.6 ||   || 12.1 / 7.2 || 10.7 / 7.7 || 9.5 / 7.4 
 - Oil ||   || 32.3 / 30.5 ||   || 32.2 / 25.8 || 32.7 / 31.2 || 33.1 / 31.1 
 - Natural gas ||   || 24.6 / 24.3 ||   || 22.4 / 23.7 || 24.1 / 23 || 24.1 / 22.1 
 - Nuclear ||   || 12.5 / 13.2 ||   || 12.7 / 15.1 || 12.4 / 13 || 12.7 / 13.4 
 - Renewables ||   || 19.9 / 24.4 ||   || 20.7 / 28.3 || 20.1 / 25.2 || 20.8 / 26.1 
 Renewables Share - Overall ||   || 24.4 / 28.7 ||   || 25.5 / 33.7 || 24.7 / 29.9 || 25.5 / 31.0 
 - Share in electricity, heating & cooling ||   || 31.0 / 36.8 ||   || 32.6 / 39.6 || 31.6 / 38.5 || 32.9 / 39.9 
 - Share in heating & cooling ||   || 23.8 / 26.6 ||   || 24.6 / 28. 6 || 24.4 / 28.3 || 25.5 / 30.5 
 - Share in electricity ||   || 42.7 / 50.1 ||   || 45.4 / 52.2 || 43.1 / 50.9 || 44.6 / 51.4 
 - Share in transport ||   || 12.0 / 13.9 ||   || 12.9 / 34.4 || 12.0 / 15.8 || 12.0 / 16.8 
 Net Energy Imports (2010=100) ||   || 96 / 101 ||   || 90 / 81 || 94 / 96 || 92 / 94 
 Net Imports of Gas (2010=100) ||   || 105 / 122 ||   || 91 / 104 || 100 / 110 || 99 / 104 
 Import Dependency (net imports to primary energy consumption) ||   || 55.1 / 56.6 ||   || 53.7 / 51.3 || 55.1 / 56.4 || 54.8 / 55.5 
 Fossil Fuel Net Imports in bn €'10       (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50 ) ||   || 461 / 548 ||   || 451 / 470 || 459 / 529 || 457 / 518 
 Fossil Fuels Import Bill Savings in 2011-2030/2031-2050 compared to reference (bn € '10)  (cumulative 20 year savings from imports) ||   || n.a ||   || -198 / -1554 || -46 / -382 || -83 / -592 
Source: PRIMES 2014.
Final
energy demand declines in a similar manner as primary energy consumption with
similar differences in magnitude of the decreases brought by the enabling
setting, energy efficiency policies and RES targets. The residential and
tertiary sectors experience the strongest reduction (in comparison to the
Reference) as these can most easily switch fuels, and as they are targeted by a
majority of energy efficiency policies improving significantly insulation. The
relative share of electricity increases in final energy demand, especially for
the scenarios with specific RES targets.
Gross
electricity generation decreases by 2030 for all scenarios in comparison to the
Reference. In 2030-2050 it continues to decrease for all scenarios except the
one driven by sole 40% GHG reduction target. For scenarios that achieve 40% GHG
reductions in 2030 and the long term GHG reductions goals by 2050, the
scenarios with ambitious energy efficiency would see no reduction in generation
from solids, but this reverses after 2030 with electricity generation from
solids (with CCS), as well as nuclear, increasing only in the scenario driven
by a sole 40% GHG reduction target. For all scenarios generation from
renewables increases and increases are most significant for scenarios with RES
targets.
The
growing role of renewables is reflected in annual electricity grid cost (grid
maintenance and investment), which is already significant in the Reference scenario.
Differences with regard to the Reference are visible only for scenarios
with RES targets. As renewable energies require more sophisticated
infrastructure (electricity lines, smart grids, storage facilities, etc.), the
grid costs are higher under the scenarios featuring RES targets by 4%-10 % in
2030 and by 6%-11% in 2050 in comparison to the Reference scenario. 
Among
impacts on technologies, a key impact to be observed is the increase observed
for shares of electricity produced from combined heat and power (CHP), which 
increase substantially already in 2030 under scenarios with RES targets
(between 2 to 3 percentage points compared to Reference) whereas they stay
almost constant for other scenarios. This is due to synergies between the
increased penetration of renewable energies and co-generation which mainly uses
biomass as a feedstock. In 2050, however, the CHP shares decline (in comparison
to the Reference) for all scenarios as there is increasing competition for
biofuels/biomass feedstocks in transport. The sharpest largest decrease happens
under the scenario driven by a 40% GHG target for 2030
Concerning
CCS development, the development (observed in terms of shares of electricity
from CCS (presented in the Table) or CO2 emissions captured by CCS) is very
slow up until after 2030 in all scenarios. For the scenarios with ambitious EE
there is actually a decrease compared to Reference. Post 2030, almost all
scenarios show the increase in emissions captured but the most significant
deployment happens under the scenario driven by a 40% GHG target partly
because, under carbon pricing as main driver, solids coupled with CCS become a
cost effective option to mitigate CO2 emissions, especially due to the higher
ETS prices. This is also reflected in the higher share of coal in the fuel mix
under that scenario. In 2050, CCS deployment increases quite significantly in
all scenarios, except in the scenario driven by 45% GHG and 35% RES targets in
2030. In general, the CCS share in 2050 is significantly lower in scenarios
with RES targets.
Energy
related CO2 emissions decrease between 2 to 15 percentage points in 2030 and by
between 4 to 49 percentage points in 2050 (in comparison to the Reference).
Only very small decreases are achieved for the scenarios under the Reference
setting, causing the EU to miss the 80% GHG reduction objective for 2050. The
decreases in 2030 are highest for the most ambitious scenario in terms of GHG,
RES and energy efficiency measures.
As
regards carbon intensity of power generation[86], there are important improvements in
all the scenarios, including in the Reference scenario. The strongest
improvements occur already in 2030 under the most ambitious scenario in terms
of GHG, RES and energy efficiency measures, while other scenarios achieve much
greater improvements in a post-2030 perspective.
Table 13 Other energy system impacts
Scenarios
with enabling settings (compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||   ||     || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EE RES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Final Energy Demand (Mtoe) ||   || 1,126 / 1,151 ||   || 1,073 / 885 ||   || 991 / 752 || 995 / 747 || 978 / 743 
 - Industry share ||   || 27.3 / 26.8 ||   || 27.5 / 28.3 ||   || 28.2 / 28.7 || 27.7 / 28.3 || 27.9 / 28.3 
 Residential share ||   || 26.4 / 26.4 ||   || 25.9 / 25.5 ||   || 25.3 / 21.9 || 25.6 / 22.0 || 25.3 / 22.2 
 -Tertiary share ||   || 14.9 / 15 ||   || 14.2 / 13.4 ||   || 13.4 / 12.2 || 13.7 / 12.2 || 13.3 / 12.7 
 -Transport share ||   || 31.4 / 31.8 ||   || 32.4 / 32.9 ||   || 33.1 / 37.2 || 33.0 / 37.5 || 33.5 / 36.8 
 Gross Electricity Generation (TWh) ||   || 3,664 / 4,339 ||   || 3,532 / 5,040 ||   || 3,431 / 4,210 || 3,428 / 4,196 || 3,279 / 4,271 
 - Solids Share ||   || 13 / 8.4 ||   || 11.6 / 10.1 ||   || 15.3 / 9.3 || 14.2 / 5.6 || 8.0 / 4.9 
 - Oil Share ||   || 0.6 / 0.5 ||   || 0.5 / 0.1 ||   || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.4 / 0.2 || 0.7 / 0.2 
 - Natural Gas Share ||   || 19.5 / 17.3 ||   || 15.3 / 12.5 ||   || 14.2 / 11.6 || 11.9 / 9.8 || 13.3 / 9.1 
 - Nuclear share ||   || 21.8 / 21.3 ||   || 22.6 / 21.6 ||   || 21.4 / 21.3 || 18.0 / 12.8 || 9.8 / 8.9 
 - Renewables share ||   || 44.5 / 51.6 ||   || 49.3 / 54.2 ||   || 48.0 / 56.2 || 54.9 / 69.4 || 67.3 / 73.7 
 - of which hydro share ||   || 10.8 / 9.8 ||   || 11.2 / 8.6 ||   || 11.5 / 10.2 || 11.7 / 10.5 || 12.5 / 10.3 
 - of which wind share ||   || 21.0 / 24.8 ||   || 23.9 / 26.5 ||   || 22.6 / 26.4 || 26.0 / 33.4 || 31.4 / 36.4 
 - of which Solar, tidal, etc. share ||   || 5.8 / 8.4 ||   || 6.4 / 9.5 ||   || 6.1 / 9.5 || 6.9 / 12.1 || 8.9 / 12.6 
 - of which Biomass & waste share ||   || 6.6 / 7.9 ||   || 7.5 / 8.6 ||   || 7.5 / 9.3 || 10.0 / 12.0 || 13.3 / 12.9 
 CCS indicator (% of electricity from CCS) (difference in p.p.) ||   || 0.45 / 6.9 ||   || 0.77 / 14.72 ||   || 0.29 / 10.82 || 0.23 / 7.47 || 0.25 / 3.01 
 CHP indicator (% of electricity from CHP) (difference in p.p.) ||   || 16.1 / 16.2 ||   || 16.4 / 14.0 ||   || 16.4 / 14.4 || 17.8 / 15.6 || 19.6 / 15.8 
 Energy related CO2 emissions reduction vs 2005 ||   || -30.5 / -42.9 ||   || -36.8 / -80.9 ||   || -38.1 / -81.7 || -40.1 / -81.8 || -45.7 / -79.9 
 Carbon intensity of power generation  (per MWhe+MWhth) ||   || 17.8 / 7.9 ||   || 15.1 / 0.7 ||   || 18.0 / 1.3 || 16.1 / 1.5 || 12.1 / 3.0 
 Annual Electricity Grid Cost in Reference (€'10 per MWhe) and % change compared to Reference ||   || 39.97 / 44.83 ||   || 2.7 / -0.4 ||   || 0.7 / -3.0 || 3.9 / 5.8 || 10.3 / 10.9 
Scenarios
with reference settings (not compatible with 2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||   ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values Or concrete EE measures (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Final Energy Demand (Mtoe) ||   || 1,126 / 1,151 ||   || 1,074 / 995 || 1,099 / 1,091 || 1,082 / 1,075 
 - Industry share ||   || 27.3 / 26.8 ||   || 27.4 / 27.6 || 27.9 / 28.4 || 28.2 / 28.7 
 Residential share ||   || 26.4 / 26.4 ||   || 26.1 / 27.0 || 25.8 / 24.8 || 25.4 / 24.5 
 -Tertiary share ||   || 14.9 / 15.0 ||   || 14.6 / 15.7 || 14.1 / 13.2 || 13.7 / 12.8 
 -Transport share ||   || 31.4 / 31.8 ||   || 31.8 / 29.7 || 32.2 / 33.6 || 32.7 / 34.0 
 Gross Electricity Generation (TWh) ||   || 3,664 / 4,339 ||   || 3,531 / 4,339 || 3,586 / 4,180 || 3,534 / 4,111 
 - Solids Share ||   || 13.0 / 8.4 ||   || 15.5 / 6.9 || 12.9 / 8.5 || 10.6 / 8.4 
 - Oil Share ||   || 0.6 / 0.5 ||   || 0.5 / 0.3 || 0.6 / 0.5 || 0.6 / 0.5 
 - Natural Gas Share ||   || 19.5 / 17.3 ||   || 14.2 / 16.9 || 19.2 / 16.9 || 19.5 / 15.5 
 - Nuclear share ||   || 21.8 / 21.3 ||   || 22.0 / 21.5 || 21.7 / 20.6 || 22 / 21.6 
 - Renewables share ||   || 44.5 / 51.6 ||   || 47.2 / 53.5 || 45 / 52.5 || 46.5 / 53.0 
 - of which hydro share ||   || 10.8 / 9.8 ||   || 11.2 / 9.9 || 11.0 / 10.2 || 11.2 / 10.4 
 - of which wind share ||   || 21.0 / 24.8 ||   || 22.3 / 24.9 || 21.3 / 25 || 22.0 / 25.1 
 - of which Solar, tidal, etc. share ||   || 5.8 / 8.4 ||   || 6.1 / 8.7 || 5.7 / 8.5 || 5.8 / 8.3 
 - of which Biomass & waste share ||   || 6.6 / 7.9 ||   || 7.3 / 9.2 || 6.8 / 8.2 || 7.2 / 8.5 
 CCS indicator (% of electricity from CCS) (difference in p.p.) ||   || 0.45 / 6.9 ||   || 0.27 / 4.82 || 0.5 / 6.96 || 0.73 / 9.44 
 CHP indicator (% of electricity from CHP) (difference in p.p.) ||   || 16.1 / 16.2 ||   || 16.5 / 16.8 || 16.2 / 16.3 || 16.4 / 15.5 
 Energy related CO2 emissions reduction vs 2005 ||   || -30.5 / -42.9 ||   || -33.3 / -54.1 || -32.3 / -46.4 || -35.9 / -49.6 
 Carbon intensity of power generation (per MWhe+MWhth) ||   || 17.8 / 7.9 ||   || 18 / 7.7 || 17.6 / 7.8 || 15.6 / 6.1 
 Annual Electricity Grid Cost in Reference (€'10 per MWhe) and % change compared to Reference ||   || 39.97 / 44.83 ||   || 0.3 / 4.0 || 0.0 / -1.2 || 1.0 / -1.0 
The main conclusions from this Section are that the policy
scenarios demonstrate significant differences in terms of the consumption of
various primary energy sources (notably in terms of coal, gas and RES) with
impacts on power generation capacity and power generation investment.
Nevertheless, primary energy consumption is reduced and significant energy
savings are achieved in all scenarios analysed, especially in scenarios with
ambitious EE policies and RES targets. Consequently, the energy intensity of
the EU economy is reduced. 
While some scenarios have a pre-set RES target, other
scenarios also see RES shares increase – thanks to the pull effect of the GHG
reduction, though to a lower level than the pre-set target. Net imports
decrease significantly for all scenarios and in more pronounced manner under
the scenarios with ambitious EE policies. While there are only small
differences in terms of import dependence which is also altered by energy
savings, the positive impacts of scenarios are well visible in the fossil fuels
import bill savings. The savings are the highest for scenarios with ambitious
EE policies and RES targets. Finally all scenarios have impact on development
of CHP and CCS, which visibly increase their penetration, with the scenario
focussing on GHG only having the highest shares of CCS. Because of all the
above, carbon intensity of the power generation improves significantly.

5.1.4.          
Economic impacts 
5.1.4.1.           
Economic impacts in the
energy system

As explained in Section
2.3,
the EU Reference scenario 2013 projecting the consequences of already adopted
policies as well as developments largely unrelated to policy shows until 2020
an increasing ratio of total energy system cost to GDP, from 12.8 % in 2010 to
14.0 % in 2030, and then decreasing to 12.3 % in 2050. This development
reflects rising energy import prices, the need to replace ageing energy
infrastructure and the extension and enhancement of network infrastructures and
other investment costs in the framework of already agreed policies; while the
benefits of this investment in terms of fuel spending is more tangible in the
longer term. The policy scenarios evaluated all show higher energy system costs
up to 2030 and beyond. Compared to the EU Reference Scenario 2013, energy
system costs in policy scenarios are in the year 2030 0.03 to 0.84 percentage
points higher compared to GDP (see Table 14). These additional increases are smaller than
those resulting under the Reference scenario itself. This said, differences
between policy scenarios and the Reference scenario as regards the average
annual system costs over the period 2011 to 2030 are small in relative terms,
though differences exist between policy scenarios. In 2050, all policy
scenarios show significantly higher total energy system costs compared to GDP
than the Reference scenario, of 0.33 to 3.18 percentage points, the lower range
representing scenarios that would not be compatible with 2050 climate
objectives. The scenario driven by 35% GHG target combined with EE policies produces
the lowest system cost increases compared to the Reference scenario in 2030 of
0.03%.  Over the period 2011-2030, it even produces lower system costs compared
to the Reference scenario as strengthening of moderate energy efficiency
policies after 2020, as opposed to gradual phase out assumed in the EU
Reference Scenario 2013, contributes to further removal of barriers, bringing
financial benefits for consumers related to stationary uses and offsetting a
large part of the additional capital costs (even though including disutility
costs, costs remain higher than in Reference) [87]. 
In
assessing energy system costs, a series of important considerations should be
made: the energy modelling simulates economic decision making of various agents
in power generation, industrial sectors, services, households, agriculture and
transport. Such decisions involve investment choices, not only in power
generation but also, for instance, in industrial equipment, heating boilers and
appliances. The inter-temporal dimension of such investment decisions is
modelled based on weighted average costs of capital (WACC) for power generation
and on different discount rates for energy users according to the sector.
Moreover,
energy policies addressing barriers to energy efficiency, such as lack of
finance, of information or split incentives can lead to lower discount rates,
notably if Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) come into play and take care of
services and households' energy operations and investment. In simulating the
economic decision-making such lower discount rates are applied where, for
example, lack of information and finance is addressed by specialised companies
that provide energy services in a professional way on the basis of highly
energy efficient equipment installed at the consumer site. This action is
thereby facilitating economically rational choices of energy consumers by, for
example, providing professional support through such ESCOs in order to better
exploit the existing substantial energy efficiency potential, with both energy
consumers and ESCOs benefiting from the significant energy costs savings
available. Also, the total energy economy benefits via, for example, lower
energy import costs and lower energy supply investment requirements contribute
to lowering the system costs.  
Discount
rates also play a role in determining annuities for investments in the context
of calculating energy system costs. Energy system costs from an end user
perspective as calculated in the modelling comprise mainly three elements: annuities
for capital expenditure on energy using equipment, fuel and electricity costs,
including the capital expenditure for the production and distribution of
electricity as well as so-called direct energy efficiency costs incurred (not
related to energy equipment itself), such as expenditure for insulation. So
far, reduced discount rates in the context of economic decision making of
agents, following from energy efficiency policies, have not been applied in the
same way to calculate the capital cost and direct energy efficiency investment
component of energy system costs. With energy efficiency policies increasingly
changing energy markets by addressing market failures and imperfections, it
appears appropriate to revisit this issue in future analyses. 
With
this in mind, the modelling results suggest that such system cost increases
both for 2030 and 2050 are the highest in the scenario with a 45% GHG
reduction, ambitious EE and 35% RES in 2030 (see Table 14). Clearly, the level of ambition as regards
renewables and energy efficiency policies impact system costs[88] while at the same time reduce compliance costs related to
the ETS itself (and have a positive impact on the fossil fuel trade balance).
It has to be noted that costs are, in part, higher in the scenarios that
achieve 40% and 45% GHG reductions with ambitious EE and RES because the
achieved levels of EE and RES penetration are higher than those achieved in the
scenarios focusing only on GHG reductions as well as considering the different
modelling approaches implemented which reduce comparability among scenarios (see
Section 5.1). The costs should be thus measured against the benefits in terms
of energy security and energy savings. The long term costs and cost-efficiencies
of the various scenarios are challenging to assess with any precision. What is
clear is that technology development is necessary for long-term cost efficiency
and needs specific R&D support at a right scale. The impacts of these
developments can have significant impacts on technology costs. 
The
modelling results also show synergies between ambitious RES and EE policies.
Adding a specific renewables target (higher than what otherwise would have
resulted) to a comparable scenario with ambitious EE policies but without such
a RES target has a very low impact on cost increases and investment
expenditures in generation and boilers in relative terms (see Table 14). In other words, the benefits from additional
RES targets in terms of local employment as well as domestic investment
expenditure rather than outflows of income for fossil fuel imports have a
positive growth and further employment effects with only limited additional
energy system costs . In addition, there are important interactions between the
two areas, with higher energy efficiency resulting in lower energy consumption,
which directly impacts the share of renewables (which is measured as a
percentage of final energy consumption). Strong energy efficiency measures can
therefore themselves contribute to increased shares of renewables
because of reduced need for additional new renewables development.  
The
components of energy system costs differ substantially across policy
scenarios. Energy Purchases (including fuel, steam and electricity costs) are
significantly reduced in all scenarios, most notably in scenarios with explicit
EE policies and RES targets; while investment costs increase, again more
notably in scenarios with explicit EE policies and RES targets (see Table 14). This is due to the higher levels of EE and
RES achieved in these scenarios, as well as to the approach to how policies are
modelled. Furthermore, energy investments in the residential sector increase
property values because of their improved energy performance (for which the
benefit is captured in the model through lower fuel costs) by an amount that
would correspond to some 40% of the cost of investments in energy efficiency in
the residential sector[89].
These
indications should be put in the context of the EU's deteriorating trade
balance for fossil fuels. While the EU possesses significant reserves of
certain fossil fuels, in particular coal, reduced fuel costs would positively
impact the EU's trade balance and keep funds in the EU economy. Moreover, while
higher investment expenditures add to system costs, investment costs for the
"buyer" will be revenue for the "seller", i.e. for sectors
and companies providing technologies and solutions for the reduction of
emissions, the improvement of energy efficiency, the deployment of renewables,
etc. In an increasingly open world economy, part of this revenue will go to
companies outside the EU, but such investments have greater potential for
driving jobs and growth in the EU than fuel imports, in particular due to the
local nature of much energy efficiency investment, renewables installation,
etc. and the industrial and technological leadership the EU companies still
have in terms of energy efficient and low-carbon technology (see also social
impacts Section 5.1.5).

Table 14: Energy
system costs and sub-components[90]
Scenarios with enabling settings (compatible with 2050 GHG
objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Carbon values" 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EE RES35 
 Total System Costs in bn €'10    (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 2,067 / 2,520 ||   || 2,069 / 2,727 ||   || 2,089 / 2,881 || 2,089 / 2,891 || 2,102 / 2,925 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP    (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 14.30 / 13.03 ||   || 14.31 / 14.10 ||   || 14.45 / 14.90 || 14.45 / 14.95 || 14.54 / 15.12 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP increase (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) compared to Reference in % points    ||   || n.a. ||   || 0.01 / 1.07 ||   || 0.15 / 1.87 || 0.15 / 1.92 || 0.24 / 2.09 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP in 2030/2050      (2010 value: 12.76 %) ||   || 14.03/ 12.30 ||   || 14.18 / 13.96 ||   || 14.57 / 15.25 || 14.56 / 15.35 || 14.87 / 15.48 
 Total system Costs as % of GDP increase compared to Reference in % points, in 2030/2050 ||   || n.a. ||   || 0.15 / 1.65 ||   || 0.54 / 2.95 || 0.54 / 3.05 || 0.84 / 3.18 
 Energy Purchases in bn €'10 in Reference and change compared to Reference   (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 1,454 / 1,586 ||   || -18 / -192 ||   || -34 / -339 || -31 / -319 || -23 / -308 
 Investment Expenditures in bn €'10 in Reference and change compared to Reference (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50 ) ||   || 816 / 949 ||   || 38 / 239 ||   || 59 / 365 || 63 / 384 || 93 / 384 
 Industry ||   || 19 / 30 ||   || 5 / 58 ||   || 18 / 122 || 18 / 122 || 22 / 118 
 Residential and tertiary ||   || 50 / 38 ||   || 25 / 79 ||   || 40 / 175 || 34 / 183 || 47 / 176 
 Transport ||   || 660 / 782 ||   || 2 / 61 ||   || 2 / 59 || 2 / 59 || 2 / 71 
 Grid ||   || 37 / 41 ||   || 4 / 15 ||   || 1 / 1 || 3 / 6 || 5 / 11 
 Generation and boilers ||   || 50 / 59 ||   || 3 / 26 ||   || -2 / 7 || 5 / 13 || 18 / 8 
Scenarios with reference settings (not compatible with 2050
GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values Or concrete EE measures (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Total System Costs in bn €'10    (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 2,067 / 2,520 ||   || 2,064/2,584 || 2,073/2,569 || 2,074/2,590 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP    (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 14.30 / 13.03 ||   || 14.28 / 13.36 || 14.34 / 13.28 || 14.35 / 13.39 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP increase (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) compared to Reference in % points    ||   || n.a. ||   || -0.02[91] / 0.33 || 0.04 / 0.25 || 0.05 / 0.36 
 Total System Costs as % of GDP in 2030/2050      (2010 value: 12.76 %) ||   || 14.03 / 12.3 ||   || 14.06 / 12.94 || 14.16 / 12.63 || 14.23 / 12.71 
 Total system Costs as % of GDP increase compared to Reference in % points, in 2030/2050 ||   || n.a. ||   || 0.03 / 0.64 || 0.13 / 0.33 || 0.20 / 0.41 
 Energy Purchases in bn €'10       (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50) ||   || 1,454 / 1,586 ||   || -26 / -191 || -8 / -58 || -8 / -65 
 Investment Expenditures[92] in bn €'10 in Reference and change compared to Reference      (average annual 2011-30 / 2031-50 ) ||   || 816 / 949 ||   || 17 / 101 || 19 / 30 || 30 / 37 
 Industry ||   || 19 / 30 ||   || 11 / 32 || 0 / 0 || 0 / 0 
 Residential and tert. ||   || 50 / 38 ||   || 8 / 14 || 22 / 35 || 33 / 43 
 Transport ||   || 660 / 782 ||   || 0 / 51 || 0 / 0 || -1 / -1 
 Grid ||   || 37 / 41 ||   || -2 / 5 || -1 / -3 || -2 / -4 
 Generation and boilers ||   || 50 / 59 ||   || 0 / 0 || -1 / -2 || 0 / -1 
Source: PRIMES 2014.
The
total investment expenditure will obviously differ between various sectors of
the economy, with the most pronounced additional (in comparison to the
Reference scenario) needs especially in the residential sector (between € 8
billion to € 47 billion of average additional annual spending in 2011-30) but
also in industry. The EU Reference scenario 2013 projects significant
investment expenditures in both transport and the energy sector up to 2030 and
beyond, but in a 2030 perspective there are no significant changes in relative
terms. Post 2030, investment expenditures in the transport sector increase very
significantly, in large part relating to electrification. Additional investment
expenditure for industry (annual average) compared to the EU Reference Scenario
2013 range from almost zero to € 22 billion[93]. The lower ranges are representing the
scenarios in reference setting with 37% target without ambitious EE and the
upper ranges represent the more ambitious scenarios featuring EE and RES
policies. Investment expenditures in industry are also more pronounced in
scenarios with ambitious EE measures because they foresee the introduction of
best available technologies for all industries, in particular compared to
scenarios solely based on carbon and efficiency values.  
Other
important economic impacts directly affecting all energy consumers are impacts
on electricity prices[94], the ETS price and the abatement cost in the
non-ETS sectors presented in Table 15 below. The significant increases in electricity
prices already under the Reference scenario (31% increase in real terms until
2030, compared to 2010) are described in Annex 7.1,
with important drivers being the impact of rising energy import prices of all
fossil fuels by 40% and more up to 2020, the need for strong necessary
infrastructure investment to replace obsolete capacity and extend the grids, as
well as agreed policies to achieve the energy and climate objectives of the
package. Electricity price changes compared to the EU Reference Scenario 2013
range from – 1% to +11% in the year 2030. Except for the scenario driven by the
most ambitious GHG, RES and EE, the increases (or even decreases) are fairly
moderate. The positive reducing impact on electricity prices from ambitious
energy efficiency policies[95] – both in a 2030 and 2050 perspective is
noticeable. In the scenario driven by 40%GHG target and ambitious EE policies
price projections for 2030 are actually lower than in the EU Reference Scenario
2013. 
Assuming
cost-efficient deployment of RES across the EU, the analysis suggests that
adding an explicit renewables target of 30% in 2030 to a scenario already
including ambitious EE policies would lead to only slightly higher electricity
prices reflecting impacts on investment expenditures for the deployment of new
capacity and adaptation of the electricity system[96] that overcompensate for the low operational
costs of most renewables. Without ambitious EE policies, the impact of higher
RES penetration on electricity prices would be higher, reflecting the need for
more RES deployment to ensure a specific share if energy consumption is higher.
Contrary
to electricity prices, differences between policy scenarios are very pronounced
with regard to the ETS price although projections in this regard are associated
with significant degrees of uncertainty. Under the EU Reference Scenario 2013,
the ETS price is expected to reach 35 €/tCO2 in 2030 and 100 €/tCO2 in 2050. In
the policy scenarios, it is expected to reach between 11 and 53 €/tCO2 in 2030,
depending on the specific scenario (see Table 15). In a 2050 perspective, a continuation of the
approach to 2030 would result in 85 to 264 €/tCO2, depending on the scenario.
Scenarios based on more ambitious and explicit energy efficiency policies and
higher ambition levels for renewables than those that would result from single
GHG target and carbon pricing demonstrate a significantly lower ETS
price compared to scenarios driven by a GHG target. This reflects the positive
contribution of both renewables and energy efficiency to emission reductions in
the ETS sectors, in particular in the power sector (both directly and
indirectly through lower electricity consumption), as well as, (driven by
ambitious efficiency policies) shifting emission reduction efforts from ETS to
non-ETS sectors to attain the same overall GHG reduction. Higher levels of
renewables and energy efficiency than those resulting from scenarios driven by
a GHG target will therefore have a moderating impact on the ETS price and
compliance cost, but will at the same time significantly reduce incentives from
the ETS itself for a switch in power generation to less CO2 intensive fuels or
the introduction of new technologies such as CCS.  
Energy
related costs (including operational and energy intensive capital costs) for
energy intensive industries compared to their value added are projected to
increase from 38 % in 2010 to 44% in the Reference scenario and by between 44%
to 46 % in 2030 in the policy scenarios, with relatively small differences
between them and also in comparison to the EU Reference scenario 2013 in that
time perspective. The highest increases occur for scenarios with ambitious
energy efficiency. In a 2050 perspective, this ratio is projected to increase
significantly under the policy scenarios, but significantly less in the
scenarios based solely on carbon and efficiency values. 
Table 15:
Electricity and carbon prices, energy related costs for energy intensive
industries
Scenarios with enabling settings (compatible with 2050 GHG
objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EERES35 
 Average Price of Electricity[97]  (€/MWh) ||   || 176 / 175 ||   || 179 / 183 ||   || 174 / 178 || 178 / 192 || 196 / 197 
 ETS carbon price               (€/t of CO2-eq) ||   || 35 / 100 ||   || 40 / 264 ||   || 22 / 158 || 11 / 152 || 14 / 85 
 Implicit carbon price non-ETS (€/tCO2) ||   || 0 / 0 ||   || 40 / 264 ||   || 22 / 158 || 11 / 152 || 15 / 85 
 Average Renewables value (€/ MWh) ||   || (5)                                                    334 / 16 ||   || (6)                                                    334 / 15 ||   || (7)                                                    334 / 15 || (8)                                                     556 / 36 || (9)                                                     1134 / 46 
 Average energy efficiency value (€/ toe) ||   || (10)                                                 1181 / 95 ||   || (11)                                                 1184 / 604 ||   || (12)                                                 6693 / 2108 || (13)                                                  6693 / 2108 || (14)                                                  7793 / 2285 
 Share of energy costs in energy intensive industries[98] ||   || 41.8 / 41.0 ||   || 42.1 / 54.2 ||   || 44.5 / 72.4 || 44.0 / 71.8 || 45.3 / 71.8 
Scenarios with reference settings (not compatible with 2050
GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values Or concrete EE measures (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Average Price of Electricity  (€/MWh) ||   || 176 / 175 ||   || 174 / 176 || 176 / 175 || 181 / 180 
 ETS carbon price (€/tCO2) ||   || 35 / 100 ||   || 27 / 99 || 35 / 100 || 53 / 152 
 Implicit carbon price non-ETS (€/tCO2) ||   || 0 / 0 ||   || 1 / 1 || 35 / 100 || 53 / 152 
 Average Renewables value (€/ MWh) ||   || (15)                                                 334 / 16 ||   || (16)                                                 334 / 15 || (17)                                                 334 / 15 || (18)                                                 334 / 16 
 Average energy efficiency value (€/ toe) ||   || (19)                                                 1181 / 95 ||   || (20)                                                 3321 / 405 || (21)                                                 1181 / 137 || (22)                                                 2209 / 111 
 Share of energy costs in energy intensive industries ||   || 41.8 / 41.0 ||   || 43.5 / 48.4 || 41.9 / 40.9 || 42.2 / 41.1 
Source:
PRIMES 2014.
It
should be noted that long term projections of electricity prices and ETS prices
but also other indicators are associated with a significant degree of
uncertainty, and are sensitive to assumed GDP and world energy prices as well
as projected production levels and the resulting impacts on energy consumption.
Electricity price projections, as other energy modelling output, are based on
the assumption of a perfectly functioning internal energy market and prices
reflect all actual costs plus a required rate of return (not more and not less)
for generation, transmission and distribution and other electricity system
costs such as electricity storage.
The main conclusions of this Section are that
system costs increase in all policy scenarios by 2030. These increases are,
however, very small  for the scenario resulting in 35% GHG reductions and are
for other scenarios small in comparison to changes in the Reference scenario
itself. In the Reference scenario, the ratio of total energy system cost to GDP
increases until 2030 and later decreases. For the scenarios achieving 40% GHG
reductions, costs are lowest for the scenario only focusing on GHG reductions. Higher
levels of ambition as regards RES targets and EE policies increase costs while
reducing ETS carbon prices. 
There are also synergies between ambitious RES
and EE policies. Adding a specific RES target to a scenario already benefiting
from ambitious EE policies, results in low cost impacts. The components of
energy system costs differ substantially across policy scenarios. Energy
Purchases are significantly reduced in all scenarios, most notably in scenarios
with explicit EE policies and RES targets. But investment costs increase, again
more notably in scenarios with explicit EE policies and RES targets.
Importantly, these investments have great potential for driving jobs and growth
in the EU. 
The electricity prices increase considerably in the Reference
scenario until especially 2020 and stabilise later. The electricity prices
further increase in majority of policy scenarios, while they actually decrease
in the scenario with 40% GHG target coupled with ambitious EE policies and in
the scenario with 35% GHG target coupled with moderate EE policies. Prices
remain stable in the scenario driven by the 37% GHG target. These changes are
fairly moderate except for a more pronounced increase in the scenario driven by
the most ambitious GHG, RES and EE policies. Assuming cost-efficient deployment
of RES across the EU, adding a pre-set renewables target of 30% to a scenario
already including ambitious EE policies would lead to only slightly higher
electricity prices. 
Contrary to electricity prices, differences between policy scenarios
are very pronounced with regard to the ETS price. Scenarios based on more
ambitious EE policies and RES targets demonstrate a significantly lower ETS
price.

5.1.4.2.           
Overall GDP impacts

Based on the modelling
approach presented in Section 5.1.1,
the impact on GDP in 2030 from various scenarios has been assessed. The
analysis focuses on the GHG40 reduction scenario[99]. The
modelling is based on carbon values in the non-ETS sector with GEM E3 and E3MG
macro-economic modelling tools. These tools did not allow for a similar
examination of the impact of additional EE policies and RES targets. Another macroeconomic
model, E3ME, was adapted[100]
to analyse the impacts on employment of both the GHG target and combinations of
EE and RES policies[101]. 

In all scenarios
presented in this Section, it is assumed that third countries do not take
measures beyond the pledges they made at present in the context of the UNFCCC. 
Some further
considerations on impacts related to action by third parties, or the impact of
conditional targets in case of a global agreement in line with limiting global
climate change below 2°C, are assessed in Section
5.3.
In assessing
macroeconomic impacts, as well as sector specific impacts and employment
impacts in subsequent sub-sections, the assumptions made about carbon pricing
throughout the economy are important. In the modelling-setup used, potential
negative impacts on GDP from the ambition levels assessed in this impact
assessment are significantly contained and at times even reverted, if carbon
pricing is achieving the same cost of GHG emissions throughout the economy, and
if the revenues from this carbon pricing would be used to lower labour costs.
Such carbon pricing could in principle only be achieved by extending the ETS to
cover the entire EU economy or by applying a tax at a level of the current ETS price
level to all sectors outside the ETS. The Commission has proposed[102] to amend
energy taxation in a manner to incorporate carbon pricing. Annex 7.8
also discusses the impacts of extending the scope of the ETS to other sectors.
Moreover, it is clear that due to low price elasticity of energy demand in many
sectors that would be subject to such a CO2 tax – together with other market
failures and imperfections, such a CO2 tax would need to be accommodated with
policies directed at remedying these issues, as discussed in Section 5.8.
Table 16 gives an overview of the projected GDP impacts based on
the GEM E3 model. As regards the GHG-lead scenario resulting in 40% GHG
reductions, it projects a loss of between 0.1% and 0.45% of GDP depending on
the approach to carbon pricing in the non-ETS sectors and the use of auctioning
in the ETS. Negative impacts are more limited if carbon pricing is applied throughout
the economy (i.e. via ETS or carbon tax) and if revenues are used to lower
labour costs. This confirms previous assessments[103] that
carbon pricing can achieve more positive macroeconomic outcomes if revenues
from these carbon pricing tools are used in a manner beneficial for the entire
economy, for example if tax revenues are used to reduce labour taxation costs,
and thus improve competitiveness across the economy.
Table 16: GEM E-3 projections of GDP impact of a
40% GHG reduction compared to the Reference scenario 
 Auctioning in ETS || Only Power sector || Only Power sector || Only Power sector || All sectors ETS 
 Tax in the Non ETS sectors || No || No || Yes || Yes 
 Recycling method for revenues from carbon pricing || Subsidy for consumers || Labour cost reduction || Labour cost reduction || Labour cost reduction 
 GDP % change compared to Reference 
 -0,45% || -0,40% || -0,21% || -0,10% 
 Source: GEM E3, JRC, IPTS
The E3MG and E3ME
modelling tools were also used to simulate impacts of the scenarios with
"enabling setting", compared to the Reference scenario (where GHG
emissions are only reduced by 32% in 2030). With recycling of auctioning used
towards lowering labour costs (which is not assumed in the Reference scenario),
impacts on GDP in the
scenario led by a 40% GHG target based on carbon values of a higher emission
reduction would be limited. Extended auctioning to all sectors in the ETS and
introducing taxation in the Non ETS could actually result in a limited positive
impact increasing GDP compared with the Reference case.
Table 17: E3MG projections of GDP impact of a GHG
led scenario resulting in 40% GHG reductions in 2030 compared to the Reference
scenario
 Auctioning in ETS || Only Power sector || All sectors ETS 
 Tax in the Non ETS sectors || No || Yes 
 Recycling method for revenues from carbon pricing || Labour cost reduction all sectors 
 GDP % change compared to Reference 
 Gross Domestic Product || 0,0% || 0,2% 
Additional modelling
using E3ME model was carried out in order to assess the impact on the GDP and
employment of the introduction of ambitious energy efficiency policies and
renewables targets. It assumes carbon pricing in the form or auctioning in the
ETS for the power sector and carbon taxation in the non ETS which is used to
lower labour taxation. The differences between scenarios in terms of GDP are
small but positive (see Table 18). 
Table 18: E3ME projections of GDP impact for 2030
compared to Reference of scenarios based on concrete and more ambitious EE
policies
 GDP (€2005m) || 2030 change compared to Reference 
 Reference || 15631346 ||   
 GHG40EE || 15716872 || 0.55% 
 GHG40EERES30 || 15702597 || 0.46% 
 GHG45EE RES35 || 15714010 || 0.53% 
The main conclusions of this Section are that
overall the impact on economic growth of achieving a 40% GHG reduction target,
with or without ambitious EE or additional RES targets is limited, with impacts
by 2030 to be less than 1% of GDP. Impacts depend
notably on the approach to carbon pricing (auctioning and/or taxation) and the
extent to which revenues from carbon pricing are used to lower labour taxation.
Also higher levels of energy efficiency and
renewables, requiring higher level of investments could result in positive GDP
impacts. 
Scenarios
resulting in lower GHG reductions are expected to have relatively lower impacts
on GDP compared to the reference scenario.

5.1.4.3.           
Sectoral impacts 

The GEM E3 model was
also used to assess impacts of a step up to 40% GHG reductions on the
production of industrial sectors with relative high energy needs and exposed to
international competition and what the role is of free allocation or
auctioning.
Normally, the GEM E3
model assumes that the ETS companies optimise profits by fully taking into
account the opportunity cost of freely allocated allowances when setting the
prices of the goods they sell. In microeconomic theory, such an assumption
would constitute a profit optimising strategy. The product price thus includes
the carbon price even for those allowances that companies received for free.
This modelling set-up is the base case in GEM E3, including in the Reference
scenario where auctioning is assumed only in the power sector. This modelling
set-up is also reflecting allocation systems where the free allocation is fixed
for an indefinite period, determined by a one-off historic grandfathering. 
But not all industries
agree that this behaviour correctly describes what takes place. Some, certainly
the energy intensive sectors exposed to outside competition, claim that they do
not engage in such type of price-setting, when they receive allowances for
free. They claim that they see free allocation rather as a compensation for the
costs of the introduction of a carbon price on emissions which they do not
include in the pricing of their goods. This type of behaviour focuses on
keeping production volumes and market share high. This behaviour could also
reflect a situation where future allocation depends on production decisions
made today. Examples can be closure rules that reduce or stop free allocation
when production decreases or closes down and rules for capacity expansions and
new entrants. Furthermore, if periodic updating of free allocation (on the
basis of benchmarks and updated production figures) also takes place,
production decisions today will impact future allocation. In such systems,
companies may have an incentive to maintain or even increase production, on the
basis of the expectation that this will be reflected in the future in terms of
the amount of free allocated allowances in the next period. 
For a discussion on the
extent to which free allocation is at present fixed or flexible based on
production in the ETS, see Annex 7.6.
To assess the impact of
auctioning or free allocation in the scenario driven by a 40% GHG reduction
target and carbon values, both modelling set-ups reflecting different company
behaviours are modelled in GEM E3. On the one hand, it is assumed that
companies include opportunity costs of freely allocated allowances in their
price setting, and on the other hand it is assumed that companies do not
include the opportunity cost of freely allocated allowances.
Table 19 gives the results of the set of modelling runs that assume
company behaviour towards free allocation is not to include opportunity costs
in their prices whereas  Table 20 gives the results that assume that companies do include
opportunity costs. These assumptions are also implemented each time in the
Reference case. Furthermore, for the assessed policy scenarios it is assumed
that labour costs are reduced if carbon pricing is generated. 
In Table 19 three scenarios are compared to the Reference scenario:
·                        
Full auctioning in the ETS, no taxation in the
Non ETS.
·                        
Only auctioning for the Power sector, free
allocation for other sectors in the ETS, no taxation in the Non ETS
·                        
Only auctioning for the power sector, free
allocation for other sector in the ETS, taxation in the Non ETS
Table 19: Impact of a 40% GHG reduction in 2030 on
energy-intensive sectors production assuming companies
that receive free allocation, do not incorporate the opportunity cost in their
prices. 
 Reference || Scenario 1 || Scenario 2 || Scenario 3 
 Auctioning in ETS || Only Power || All sectors || Only Power || Only Power 
 Free allocation || Sectors other than Power || No || Sectors other than Power || Sectors other than Power 
 Tax in the Non ETS sectors || No || No || No || Yes 
 Change in 2030 production compared to Reference 
 Ferrous metals || na || -6,1% || -1,6% || -0,1% 
 Non-ferrous metals || na || 0,2% || -0,5% || 1,4% 
 Chemical Products || na || -1,1% || -0,4% || 0,8% 
 Non-metallic minerals || na || -4,5% || -0,8% || -0,2% 
The sector experiencing
the largest relative increase in production compared to the Reference scenario
if allowances are allocated free of charge is the ferrous metals sector with
4.5% higher production with free allowances (comparing scenario 2 to scenario
1), followed by the non-metallic minerals with an improvement of 3.7% compared
to a scenario with no free allowances.
Two effects are at
play: first companies receiving free allocation are inclined to increase
production compared to auctioning because they do not need to include the cost
of the allowance in their price setting and they want to maximise volume,
whereas with auctioning this incentive does not exist and they actually will
include the cost for allowances in their price. Furthermore, due to the volume
increases in production, also emissions increase in those sectors if no
additional action would be taken. In order to meet the target, additional
emission reductions in the power sector need to be realised[104] or
increased abatement efforts in the industrial sector need to be undertaken
which actually results in an overall higher carbon price in case of free
allocation compared to auctioning (where this incentive to increase production
does not exist). Furthermore, this increased price generates increased carbon
revenues which results in higher revenue recycling and subsequent lower labour
costs. But this effect is less important. A sensitivity analysis performed on
scenario 2, recycling auctioning revenue to subsidise consumer spending rather
than lowering labour costs, only lowers the beneficial impact of free
allocation on average for these sectors by 0.045%. Only the Non-ferrous metals
sector seems negatively affected in scenario 2 with free allocation compared to
the situation with auctioning, with higher carbon prices having a higher impact
on this sector, potentially also due to increased electricity price impacts.
Overall, all sectors
benefit in scenario 3 from the increased revenues from taxation in the Non ETS
sectors, as the modelling set-up assumes that this would result in higher
reductions in labour costs and the resulting positive impact on overall cost
structure of these sectors.
Table 20 instead gives results of the set of modelling runs that
assume companies include the opportunity costs of free allowances in their
prices to ensure profit maximisation. 3 scenarios are compared to the Reference
scenario:
·                        
Only auctioning for the Power sector, free
allocation for other sector in the ETS, no taxation in the Non ETS
·                        
Full auctioning in the ETS, no taxation in the
Non ETS.
·                        
Full auctioning in the ETS, taxation in the Non
ETS
Table 20: Impact of a 40% GHG reduction in 2030 on
energy-intensive sectors production assuming companies that receive free
allocation, incorporate the opportunity cost in their prices.
   || Reference || Scenario 1 || Scenario 2 || Scenario 3 
 Auctioning in ETS || Only Power || Only Power || All sectors || All sectors 
 Free allocation || Sectors other than Power || Sectors other than Power || No || No 
 Tax in the Non ETS sectors || No || No || No || Yes 
 Change in 2030 production compared to Reference 
 Ferrous metals || na || -3,3% || -2,8% || -1,9% 
 Non-ferrous metals || na || -0,1% || 0,6% || 1,8% 
 Chemical Products || na || -0,6% || -0,1% || 0,7% 
 Non-metallic minerals || na || -2,8% || -2,6% || -2,3% 
Here the impact of free
allocation compared to auctioning (scenario 1 compared to scenario 2) is the
opposite of those seen in Table 19, with production actually decreasing in case of free
allocation. The reason for this is that in both scenarios, companies
incorporate the value of an allowance in their price, and thus price setting is
identical, be it with auctioning or free allocation. The difference in impacts
is explicable in macroeconomic terms, with auctioning and subsequent revenue
recycling leading to higher economic output (see also Section 5.1.4.3),
improving output also in the energy intensive industrial sectors. Also in this
run, all sectors benefit from increased taxation in the non ETS, lowering all
sector labour costs and improving competitiveness of the energy intensive
industrial sectors.
It seems from the above
results that if the market situation does not allow sectors to incorporate
opportunity costs of free allocation, but rather use the free allocation to
maintain and maximise production volumes, then the impact of 40% GHG reductions
combined with auctioning on their total production is notably negative,
compared to a situation with free allocation. On the other hand if many sectors
would behave in this manner, then carbon prices will be somewhat higher in the
case of free allocation compared to auctioning (which is negative for sectors
sensitive to indirect impacts on electricity prices due to increased carbon
prices). 
If companies instead
incorporate the cost of free allocation in their price setting, then there is
little direct impact on their production from the choice between free
allocation and auctioning, and indirectly, through an improved macroeconomic
outlook, auctioning might even increase their production volume. Of course,
this depends to what extent auctioning revenue is recycled in a manner that
improves overall economic efficiency. 
The main conclusions of these Sections are that many of
those industries that cannot include the opportunity costs of free allocation
in its prices because of competitive pressures would be adversely impacted
unless counteracting measures are in place. In particular free allocation of
allowances would be an effective means of reducing the risk on carbon leakage
and preserve the output of those industries. But it is expected that for
different industrial sectors and products, different levels of cost
pass-through exist. A thorough understanding
of cost pass-through based on empirical evidence while at the same time
considering changing circumstances in a 2030 perspective would therefore be needed to
elaborate carbon leakage measures that provide adequate safeguards but avoid
over-compensation of industry for costs recovered in the market in case of a
40% GHG reduction target. 
For a more in-depth
assessment of policy design issues regarding free allocation and auctioning and
the impact on carbon leakage in a 2030 framework, see Section 5.5.

5.1.5.          
Social impacts

Social impacts analysed in this Section focus on
employment and distributional effects (including notably affordability of
energy for vulnerable customers) Section 5.1.5.1 starts with the macroeconomic analysis of employment impacts. Section 5.1.5.2
then looks at more sectoral level detail, focussed on the power sector and
impacts of increased energy efficiency measures. Finally, Section 5.1.5.3
addresses the findings on affordability of energy, with a focus on vulnerable
customers.

5.1.5.1.           
Macroeconomic assessment of
employment impacts.

The assessment is based
on a number of macroeconomic modelling tools.
One modelling tool,
E3ME, was adapted to look at the impact of a 40% GHG reduction target as well
as ambitious energy efficiency and renewables policies. Also, the GEM-E3 model tool
was used to look at the impact of options achieving a 40% GHG reduction only,
but was not used to assess impacts of additional EE and RES policies and
targets.
E3ME
The E3ME model
in adapted form  (for a more detailed
explanation, see introduction of Section 5.1.4.2) was applied to analyse the impacts on employment of both the GHG
target and combinations of EE and RES policies.  
First it was assumed
that auctioning revenues are transferred to private citizens. In the Reference
scenario it is assumed that there is only auctioning for the power sector. In
the policy scenarios, it is assumed that taxation in the non ETS sectors is
also introduced, and that this pays for additional investments in EE and RES.
Any remaining revenues are transferred to private citizens. In case of a 40%
GHG reduction and ambitious EE and 30 % renewables, revenues from auctioning and
taxation are not sufficient to cover all the additional investments, and are
therefore assumed to be financed by capital coming from private citizens.
This model projects
that compared to the Reference case, the scenario led by a 40% GHG reduction in
2030 would create on the aggregate level of around 0.7 million additional jobs
(645,000) and the scenario based on 40% GHG reduction, ambitious explicit EE
policies and a 30% RES target would generate 1.25 million additional jobs in a
2030 perspective, compared to the Reference scenario (see Table 21).
Aggregate employment
effects mask greater patterns of structural change at sectoral level because of
the restructuring processes taking place. At sectoral level, investments in
renewable energy power generation capacity and energy-efficient equipment and
technologies create jobs in basic manufacturing, engineering and transport
equipment, utilities, construction, and their supply chains. On the other hand,
extraction industries are negatively affected in the GHG 40% scenarios. This
impact is more moderate in the scenario with ambitious energy efficiency and
30% RES due to higher reductions in oil and gas and less so in coal than in the
scenario with moderate EE and RES policies. 
This will also matter
for distributional impacts. A study by the OECD indicates that concentration of
employment in the most polluting industries in relatively low GDP per capita
countries within the EU area presents a risk that the adjustment costs
associated with the transition towards a low carbon economy could be greater
where living standards are below the EU average[105]. 
Table 21: E3ME projections of employment impacts
for 2030 compared to Reference of GHG reduction scenario with additional
policies for EE and RES, assuming revenue recycling to
consumers and energy efficiency and renewable energy investments
 2030 employment ||  ‘000s of persons || % change compared to Reference 
 Reference || GHG 40% || GHG 40% + EE + 30% RES || GHG 40% || GHG 40% + EE + 30% RES 
 Agriculture || 9391 || 9402 || 9407 || 0,1% || 0,2% 
 Extraction Industries || 500 || 479 || 498 || -4,2% || -0,4% 
 Basic manufacturing || 14839 || 14913 || 14944 || 0,5% || 0,7% 
 Engineering and transport equipment || 15277 || 15367 || 15429 || 0,6% || 1,0% 
 Utilities || 2280 || 2301 || 2308 || 0,9% || 1,2% 
 Construction || 16599 || 16708 || 16890 || 0,7% || 1,8% 
 Distribution and retail || 35314 || 35348 || 35452 || 0,1% || 0,4% 
 Transport || 9411 || 9455 || 9471 || 0,5% || 0,6% 
 Communications, publishing and television || 20307 || 20384 || 20440 || 0,4% || 0,7% 
 Business services || 41048 || 41225 || 41293 || 0,4% || 0,6% 
 Public services || 66735 || 66797 || 66814 || 0,1% || 0,1% 
 Total employment || 231701 || 232379 || 232947 || 0,3% || 0,5% 
Additional modelling
using the E3ME model for the scenarios with ambitious EE and RES policies was
carried out assuming that carbon pricing in the form or auctioning in the ETS
for the power sector and taxation in the non ETS is used to lower labour costs,
and not simply recycled to consumers. The differences between scenarios in
terms of GDP and employment compared  to Reference are small but positive (more
employment with 31% and even 34% primary energy savings than under Reference)
and are mainly due to lower carbon prices from EE and RES, which under the
modelling assumptions would lead to lower CO2 tax revenue and the corresponding
lower reduction of labour costs explaining the difference of impacts on
employment than presented in Table 21.
Table 22: E3ME
projections of employment impacts for 2030 compared to Reference of GHG
reduction scenario with additional policies for EE and RES, assuming revenue
recycling to lower labour costs and energy efficiency and renewable energy
investments
 Employment (thousands of persons) || 2030 change compared to Reference 
 Reference || 231861 ||   
 GHG40EE || 232132 || 0.12% 
 GHG40EERES30 || 232081 || 0.09% 
 GHG45EE RES35 || 232075 || 0.09% 
GEM E3
Looking at employment
impacts also by applying the GEM E3 model primarily to assess the economic
impacts of reducing GHG emissions by 40% (see Sections  5.1.4.2
and 5.1.4.3 above) provides a complement to the E3ME as it also
reflects the impact from various implementation approaches to carbon pricing
and the ETS (see Table 23), but does not assess the impact of more ambitious EE and
RES policies[106].
Negative employment
impacts in some sectors are smaller for scenarios with more carbon pricing
through taxation in sectors outside the current ETS. With the assumption that
the associated revenue is used to lower labour costs (e.g. through lower
employer's social charges), overall employment effects can be positive compared
to Reference in case of full auctioning and carbon taxation in the Non ETS,
adding in total 430,000 jobs in a 2030 perspective. 
Sectors typically
gaining are those that manufacture equipment. Sectors typically being affected
negatively are the metals sectors, whereas employment impacts in other energy
intensive industrial sectors are smaller or even positive (primarily due to
decreases in labour costs, provided this is what carbon tax revenue would be
used for). 
The modelling with GEM
E3 confirms what other economic literature typically indicate, i.e. that
increasing the tax level on resource use and reducing it on, for example,
labour could have a beneficial impact on growth and employment, with even a net
positive outcome on employment in case of both full auctioning in the ETS and
carbon taxation in the Non ETS, making labour relatively cheaper than capital
and thus increasing total employment, even if the overall impact on GDP remains
negative. Therefore, a tax shift from labour towards CO2 tax (in the
non-ETS sectors) may reduce the cost of the climate policy compared to cases
where this shift is not applied. This underlines the importance for Member
States to use revenues from such potential CO2 taxation in a targeted and
efficient manner. 
Table 23: GEM E-3 projections of employment impacts
of a 40% GHG reduction compared to Reference
   || Scenario 1 || Scenario 2 || Scenario 3 || Scenario 4 
 Auctioning in ETS || Only Power sector || Only Power sector || Only Power sector || All sectors ETS 
 Tax in the Non ETS sectors || No || No || Yes || Yes 
 Recycling method for revenues from carbon pricing || Subsidy for consumers || Labour cost reduction || Labour cost reduction || Labour cost reduction 
 2030 Employment change compared to Reference 
 % change employment || -0,61% || -0,44% || -0,02% || 0,20% 
 Millions of jobs 
 Millions of jobs || -1.33 mio || -0,96 || -0,04 || 0,43 
 Ferrous metals || -4% || -4% || -3% || -2% 
 Non-ferrous  metals || 0% || 0% || 2% || 2% 
 Chemical Products || -1% || -1% || 0% || 1% 
 Non-metallic minerals || -3% || -3% || -3% || -2% 
 Source: GEM E3, JRC, IPTS
For a summary of this Section, see end of Section 5.1.5.2

5.1.5.2.           
Sectoral analysis related to
employment

In addition to the macroeconomic modelling in the previous Section,
a dedicated employment study was conducted of selected sectors. It focused on
employment impacts of additional investments in the power sector (covering
coal, oil, gas, nuclear, wind, solar, biomass)[107] and
retrofitting of energy efficiency equipment in buildings (e.g. houses, flats)
and non-industrial buildings (e.g. public buildings, offices). This analysis
focuses on key sectors involved in the transformation towards lower GHG
emissions. It attempts to estimate how many jobs would be created directly by
these investments[108].
Table 25 provides estimates of the employment effects in terms of
number of jobs generated with capital investments made that year according to
PRIMES data. On this basis, the Reference scenario projects investments that
are the equivalent of 750,000 jobs per annum. Additional employment in the two
policy scenarios analysed over this period represents some 219,000 to 304,000
jobs, illustrating the positive impact of both ambitious EE policies and a RES
developments at the aggregate level. 
The biggest increases
in employment result from changes in energy efficiency requirements in the
residential and tertiary sector. Employment generated by these investments is
49% and 67% higher than in the Reference case. The employment changes due to
increased investments in the power generation sector are smaller but positive
on the aggregate level, with losses in oil, gas and coal power plants and
nuclear power (the latter only in the scenario with ambitious EE measures and a
30% RES target). 
It is to be noted that
no job estimates are given for operational expenditure, and thus the employment
impact is not assessed due for instance to increased demand for biomass,
decreased demand for fossil fuels or maintenance of power plants (be it fossil
fuels or renewables).
Table 24: Jobs associated with investments in the
power sector and energy efficiency, 2011-2030
 Average annual employment 2011-2030 related to investments || Reference || GHG 40% || GHG 40% + EE + 30% RES || Change compared to Reference 
 GHG 40% || GHG 40% + EE + 30% RES 
 ('000) || ('000) || ('000) || ('000) || % change || ('000) || % change 
 Nuclear || 46 || 47 || 28 || 1 || 2% || -18 || -40% 
 Wind || 152 || 170 || 183 || 18 || 12% || 31 || 21% 
 Solar || 69 || 72 || 74 || 3 || 4% || 5 || 7% 
 Coal || 26 || 26 || 24 || 1 || 2% || -2 || -7% 
 Oil || 2 || 2 || 2 || -0 || -13% || -1 || -26% 
 Gas || 31 || 26 || 21 || -5 || -17% || -10 || -31% 
 Biomass || 18 || 21 || 44 || 3 || 16% || 26 || 139% 
 Total Power Generation Investments || 345 || 365 || 376 || 20 || 6% || 32 || 9% 
 Residential || 295 || 408 || 428 || 113 || 38% || 133 || 45% 
 Tertiary || 110 || 196 || 250 || 86 || 78% || 140 || 127% 
 Total Energy Efficiency Investments || 405 || 604 || 678 || 199 || 49% || 273 || 67% 
 Total || 750 || 968 || 1.054 || 219 || 29% || 304 || 41% 
Under both scenarios
employment impacts in the last 5 years up to 2030 are more pronounced with up
to 823,000 additional jobs compared to Reference, mainly due to high
investments in energy efficiency. 
Table 25: Difference in Jobs compared to Reference
of investments in the power sector and energy efficiency, 2026-2030
 Difference from Reference Average annual employment 2026-2030 related to investments || GHG 40%   || GHG 40% + EE + 30% RES 
 ('000) || % change || ('000) || % change 
 Nuclear || 4 || 4% || -61 || -63% 
 Wind || 51 || 42% || 60 || 50% 
 Solar || 15 || 55% || 11 || 40% 
 Coal || 3 || 29% || -7 || -58% 
 Oil || -0 || -50% || -0 || -58% 
 Gas || -12 || -44% || -19 || -67% 
 Biomass || 8 || 47% || 72 || 443% 
 Total Power Generation Investments || 69 || 23% || 56 || 19% 
 Residential || 245 || 109% || 361 || 160% 
 Tertiary || 182 || 272% || 406 || 609% 
 Total Energy Efficiency Investments || 427 || 146% || 767 || 263% 
 Total || 496 || 83% || 823 || 138% 
Other
studies also underline the job creation potential of certain RES development
and EE policies. A study on the economic assessment of low-carbon vehicles[109] concludes that depending on the model used, net jobs
created from the manufacturing of fuel-efficient automotive components and from
a general boost to the wider economy as a result of decreased spending on
imported oil, could represent between 356,000 and 443,000 new jobs. 
In conclusion, these
different analytical tools suggest that on the aggregate level there may be a
positive net contribution from policies reflecting the various scenarios
analysed, especially in scenarios with explicit EE measures and renewables
targets. Impacts on the sectoral level is expected to differ and the analysis
suggest that the negative impact will be most pronounced in extraction
industries and most positive in sectors providing solutions to more efficient
energy use and renewables development. Negative employment effects can be
contained or even reverted in other sectors depending on the approach to carbon
pricing, most notably carbon taxation in non-ETS sectors and use of taxation
revenue to lower employers' fees.
The main conclusions of both Section 5.1.5.1
and Section 5.1.5.2 are that overall net employment impacts are limited can be positive compared to the reference scenario on the aggregate level. Reduction of labour taxation, compensated by increasing
revenues from carbon pricing would be beneficial for employment. Also the focus
on ambitious energy efficiency and RES targets are expected to increase
employment compared to scenarios without them. Between sectors,
differences can be larger, with typically sectors meeting the need for
increased investments seeing employment growth compared to the reference scenario,
such as equipment and the building sectors, whereas employment in e.g.
extracting industries for fossil fuels are expected to decrease.  
The above analysis does not fully capture issues related to
skills, job mobility and restructuring across and within sectors. For a
discussion on skills and training, see Annex 7.7.

5.1.5.3.           
Affordability of energy

What matters for
affordability of energy is both operational and capital expenditure related to
energy use, operational expenditure (cost) being dependent on both energy
prices and consumption volumes, which are impacted by the efficiency of energy
use. These expenditures need to be seen in relation to available household
income. Energy prices as such are of particular relevance for those consumers
which have very low incomes or that, for other reasons, cannot take advantage
of cost saving energy efficiency investments. At the same time, such
investments often raise energy related capital costs.
As shown and explained
in Annex 7.1,
both prices for fossil fuels and electricity are projected to increase in the
Reference scenario. For fossil fuel prices, this takes place during the period
up to 2030 and beyond due to projected rising fuel import prices. As regards
electricity, there are relatively small changes resulting from most of the
policy scenarios analysed. With respect to fossil fuels, the EU is a net
importer. Fuel import prices are an exogenous variable in the assessment with
the PRIMES model and thus end-user prices for coal and gas are therefore not
affected by the design of the scenarios and main options for headline targets
in 2030. For this reason, the other
price related part of this Section focuses on electricity prices, while it will
be equally important to ensure affordable gas supplies to households in a 2030
perspective. 
Figure 2: International fuel prices developments
For electricity, price
increases already happen in the Reference scenario, mainly until 2020. This is
caused by a complex interaction of a series of factors, including rising import
prices for gas and coal, the need for infrastructure investment to replace, for
example, obsolete generation capacity and extend energy networks, as well as
agreed policies to achieve the EU's 2020 energy and climate objectives. (see Section
2.3 for a detailed analysis of developments under the
reference scenario)After 2020, prices are rather stable in the Reference scenario.
Overall import prices for fossil fuels are increasing significantly over the
period 2010-2030.
As shown in Figure 3 and explained in Section 5.1.4.1, electricity price increases in a 2030 perspective are projected to be
similar to those under the reference scenario, but somewhat lower in the
scenario combining ambitious energy efficiency measures with a 40% GHG target.
Projected price increases in 2030 are the most pronounced in the scenario
combining a 45% GHG target, a 35% renewables target and ambitious energy
efficiency policies. Among the scenarios resulting in 40% GHG reductions in
2030, the one based on a sole GHG target with moderate renewables and energy
efficiency policies is projected to result in a small price increase of less
than 2% compared to the Reference scenario in a 2030 perspective. Implementing
ambitious efficiency policies is expected to reduce electricity prices in 2030,
but by very little in relative terms. The scenario including a RES target of
40% sees an increase of around 1% compared to the Reference scenario, if met in
the context of ambitious energy efficiency policies. As further described in Section
5.1,
these projections are based on a cost-efficient approach to meeting targets on
the EU level.
Figure 3:
Average price of electricity in final demand sectors 
Source:
PRIMES 2013
Though limited compared
to the Reference scenario, these price increases in most of the policy
scenarios can put some additional pressure on the affordability of electricity
supply in particular for consumers who cannot afford or otherwise are prevented
from taking energy efficiency measures, unless adequate policies or measures
are in place to address the issue. The drivers behind price increases in the
policy scenarios are largely the same as in the reference scenario (see Section
2.3).
For assessing
affordability for households in general what matters is ultimately the energy cost
compared to the available income, and not the price itself. This is – in
addition to the energy price – impacted by the amount of energy consumption and
by the investment costs incurred to save energy. The share of energy related
costs in household expenditures increases in the Reference scenario in the
period to 2030, and decreases afterwards back to today's level. In the policy
scenarios, additional increases in 2030 are small, ranging from 0.2 to 0.5
percentage points in the scenarios with a 40% target, with the lowest increase
in the case of the single GHG target combined with moderate efficiency and
renewables policies. The highest increase occurs in the 45% GHG target combined
with 35% RES target and very ambitious efficiency policies. This reflects the
fact that in 2030 the additional investment expenditures across scenarios are
still higher than the energy savings generated by these investments. When
assessing costs, see also Section 5.1
on the modelling set-up of the various scenarios.
Table 26: share of energy costs in household
expenditure
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Carbon val." 2030 / 2050 ||     || "Concrete EE measures" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG40 ||   || GHG40EE || GHG40EERES30 || GHG45EERES35 
 Share of energy related cost (including transport) in household expenditure (in %, 2010: 12.4%) ||   || 14.6 / 12.6 ||   || 14.8 / 14.1 ||   || 15.1 / 15.0 || 15.0 / 15.1 || 15.3 / 15.3 
 Share of energy related cost (excluding transport) in household expenditure (in %, 2010: 7.5%) ||   || 9.3 / 8.0 ||   || 9.4 / 8.7 ||   || 9.5 / 9.7 || 9.4 / 9.8 || 9.7 / 9.9 
 Avg. electricity price incr. compared to 2010 price (%) ||   || 30.8 / 30.1 ||   || 33.3 / 36.2 ||   || 29.9 / 33.9 || 32.3 / 43.2 || 45.7 / 46.6 
 Average electricity price change compared to ref. (percentage points) ||   || n.a. ||   || 1.9 / 4.7 ||   || -0.7 / 2.2 || 1.1 / 10.1 || 11.3 / 12.7 
Scenarios
with Reference settings (not compatible with
2050 GHG objectives):
 Indicator   ||   ||     ||   || "Reference settings, carbon values or concrete EE measures (GHG35)" 2030 / 2050 
   ||   || Reference ||   || GHG35® || GHG37® || GHG40® 
 Share of energy related cost (including transport) in household expenditure (in %, 2010: 12.4%) ||   || 14.6 / 12.6 ||   || 14.6 / 13.2 || 14.8 / 13 || 14.9 / 13.1 
 Share of energy related cost (excluding transport) in household expenditure (in %, 2010: 7.5%) ||   || 9.3 / 8.0 ||   || 9.3 / 8.0 || 9.5 / 8.4 || 9.6 / 8.5 
 Avg. electricity price incr. compared to 2010 price (%) ||   || 30.8 / 30.1 ||   || 29.6 / 30.8 || 31.3 / 30.6 || 35.0 / 33.7 
 Average electricity price change compared to ref. (percentage points) ||   || n.a. ||   || -1.0 / 0.6 || 0.3 / 0.4 || 3.2 / 2.8 
Source:
PRIMES.
The results for 2030 do
not point to a general affordability problem caused specifically by the 2030
targets and policies evaluated in this IA, but could rather arise due to
developments projected already under the Reference case, (see also Section 5.1.4.1
on the uncertainties involved in projecting electricity prices; similar
uncertainties exist also with fossil fuel price projections). Energy efficiency measures have a triple role to
play in addressing affordability of energy: First, they have a lowering impact
on the price itself (as illustrated by Figure 3). Second, they reduce consumption and therefore mitigate
the effect of price increases. Third, the investments needed to achieve higher
levels of energy efficiency often come with additional capital cost, which may
be substantial in the medium term and may be prohibitive where consumers are
required to pay up front. The cost-efficiency of the energy efficiency
improvements must be ensured. Moreover, some households may suffer from
liquidity constraints or not have
correct or complete information with regard to the options at their disposal. The current Energy Efficiency Directive and
other EU legislation include elements addressing these issues, but such
elements may have to be strengthened in a 2030 perspective. 
On this basis, it
appears that targeted assistance for energy efficiency investment or schemes ensuring adequate availability of
service choices or addressing level and quality / comprehension of information
available to consumers should be
prioritized as key tools to address affordability of energy in the context of
the EU's transition to an integrated and market-based energy system. Assistance
through social systems for vulnerable consumers, particularly when these are
complementary to the measures above, may have a positive effect. On the other
hand, direct intervention in the market to regulate prices indiscriminately or
in a general manner would undermine the long-term sustainability of the
electricity system. The Commission is currently working with stakeholders
(consumer representatives, regulators, Ministries, NGOs, industry, ombudsmen
etc.) to prepare guidance to Member States on how to best assist vulnerable
energy consumers. A report, foreseen for the end of 2013, will address these
issues in more detail.
In addition, the
projections for household costs and energy price increases also illustrate the
fundamental importance of designing policy at the EU and national level in a
way that contains cost impacts to a minimum. A cost-efficient approach to
implementation to meet 2030 objectives is one important element, while at the
same time keeping in mind the long term cost implications of the policy choices
for 2030. For natural gas as much as for electricity, enhanced competition,
supply diversification and an adequate approach to tariffs and taxation[110] are all
important aspects in contributing to affordably energy supplies in the EU, and
will at the same time contribute towards more secure energy provision. These
same issues are equally relevant for ensuring competitive energy prices for
industry in an international comparison.
These aspects are
already addressed by EU and national policy and will have to continue and be
strengthened over the period up to 2030 (see also Section 5.2 addressing
related indicators / aspirational objectives) through social policies for
vulnerable consumers.    
For a summary of this Section, see end of Section 5.1.5.4.

5.1.5.4.           
Citizen involvement in
energy markets

Several
barriers exist to the involvement of citizens in the energy markets (as
explained in the problem definition), and they are often common across the
European Union. Economic barriers to the involvement of citizens as investors
in the energy markets depend largely on the risk profiles of investments.
Specific policies aiming at EE and RES deployment has proven to be suited to reduce
the barriers to the involvement of citizens (88% of renewable energy capacity
in Germany is owned by entities other than conventional energy companies, among
them 35% by individuals). Policies aiming at addressing non-economic barriers
to citizens' involvement are not necessarily linked to specific targets (for EE
and RES). However, policy options with specific targets or strong EU measures
could be expected to increase the likelihood for successful Europeanization of
measures targeting such non-economic barriers through harmonised framework for
planning, information and best practice exchange, citizen involvement and
reduction of administrative barriers.
The main
conclusions of both Sections 5.1.5.3 and 5.1.5.4 are that both fossil fuel prices (up
to 2030) and electricity prices (up to 2020) are expected to increase already
in the Reference scenario, putting pressure on the affordability of energy.
Ambitious EE policies can reduce the electricity prices in 2030 perspective
whereas RES policies lead to small increases in prices if accompanied by
ambitious energy efficiency policies. All scenarios implying GHG reductions at
40 percent or less demonstrate small differences compared to the Reference
scenario. 
The share
of energy-related costs (operational and capital costs) in households'
expenditure increases in the Reference scenario up to 2030 and the additional
increases in policy scenario are relatively small. The balance is expected to
shift from operational costs to capital costs. EE investment can have a
sizeable, containing impact on operational energy expenditure and thereby
contribute to affordability but may require targeted
assistance to facilitate investments for vulnerable consumers. 
Policy
options with concrete EE policies and RES targets can facilitate the
involvement of citizens in the energy markets.

5.2.                
Indicators / aspirational objectives relating to
competitiveness of the energy system and security of supply

On the basis of the
introduction to this aspect in Section 4, the following advantages and
disadvantages of the various options for other targets than those relating to
GHG, RES and EE should be considered (for options around what such indicators
could be, see end of this Section): 
Option 1: No such
targets or indicators are set.
The main advantage of
this option is that it would not add complexity to the 2030 framework.
The main disadvantage
of this option is that if would significantly remove visibility of and
importance given to other aspects of security of supply and competitiveness
than those addressed by RES and EE targets and policies, and that it would not
be compatible with the strong emphasis by Parliament and Member States in the
European Council on the importance and complexity of these other objectives.
Option 2: Other 2030
targets for other aspects of competitiveness and security of supply are
set, and treated in an equal manner as potential targets for GHG, RES and EE.
The main advantage of
this approach is that it would fully recognise the complexity of the
competitiveness and security of supply objectives, and the fact that progress
in this regard cannot be ensured solely through potential targets and measures
for GHG, renewables and energy savings. Moreover, it would provide a clear
mandate for strong policies in these areas at EU and national level to ensure
that the targets are met.
A major disadvantage of
this option is that it would add complexity to the framework as such and would
significantly complicate interactions and coherence between various energy and
climate areas. It would be particularly difficult to ensure that progress
towards a broader set of targets is made at the same time due to complex
interactions, and difficult policy decisions would arise if progress towards
meeting one target works against another. Such trade-offs between
competitiveness targets and environmental sustainability targets would be
particularly sensitive. Moreover, targets should only be set for areas where
concrete policies to achieve them are conceivable, and if it is feasible to
capture complex objectives in one or a limited set of targets. Due to the
international dimension of both competitiveness and security of supply (e.g.
price differentials, import diversification), and the heterogeneous approaches
and concerns of Member States in relation to these objectives, simple but
comprehensive targets at the EU level, progress on which could be ensured
through concrete EU policies, are not easily conceivable.  
Option 3: No other
such targets are set, but relevant indicators are defined to keep track
of progress over time and to provide a knowledge basis for policy action;
potentially associated with aspirational objectives in a 2030 perspective. 
The main advantage of
this approach is that it would recognise the importance of other aspects of
competitiveness and security of supply than those addressed by RES and EE
targets and policies without setting binding targets that could be difficult to
implement and fully integrate with other binding measures. Moreover, by
following the development of such indicators over time, policy makers would get
a good basis for development and / or adaption of policy direction if need be.
In order to ensure that such policy action is taken on the basis of real
developments, aspirational objectives in a given time perspective could be
defined with respect to these indicators 
The general
disadvantage of this option can be deducted from an e contrario assessment of
the above-mentioned advantages of options 1) and 2).
Indicators /
aspirational objectives that could be considered, in part based on the outcome
of the public consultation, are:
·                        
End-price differentials for gas and electricity
between the EU and other major economies.
·                        
Level of market integration, through for example
numbers of energy market coupling and the level of interconnections between
Member States.
·                        
Reliance on indigenous energy resources / degree
of energy self-sufficiency in the EU.
·                        
Diversification of energy imports (routes,
fuels, countries).
·                        
Grid stability / continuous and uninterrupted
energy supply. 
·                        
CCS 
The main
conclusions of this Section is that hard targets for other aspects of security
of energy supply might add unwarranted complexity to the framework and be
difficult to enforce; while a key set of indicators, some of which with
aspirational objectives, could be a useful to acknowledge that all energy
objectives in a 2030 perspective cannot be met solely by GHG, RES and EE.

5.3.                
EU action in the context of increased international climate action

The EU's current GHG
target for 2020 is set at 20% below 1990 levels, but with a 30% reduction
conditional on a global and comprehensive agreement, provided that other
developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and
that developing countries contribute adequately according to their
responsibilities and respective capabilities.
This approach was
agreed in order to limit impacts on the EU economy in case our efforts would
not be reciprocated by the international community and to provide an incentive
to other economies to commit to GHG reductions. At the same time, the
conditional target adds an element of uncertainty to the ultimate ambition
level for 2020. In this sense, dual targets (the higher of which is conditional
to international climate action), or a single conditional target, work against
the long term predictability of the framework, amidst persisting uncertainties
whether and when a sufficiently comprehensive international climate agreement
will be agreed. At the same time, a dual approach contains the impacts on those
sectors of the economy especially hard hit by unilateral climate targets, by
not committing to the higher level unless competitors in third countries also
face comparable carbon constraints. These considerations are equally valid in a
2030 perspective.
This impact assessment
provides information for a political decision on potential targets and policies
for GHG, energy efficiency and renewable energy. This includes information on
the impacts of unconditional targets or conditional targets to international
climate action. If a unilateral as well as conditional GHG target for 2030 were
to be the preferred approach, the fundamental question is at what level these
targets should be set. The impact assessment in Section 5.1
assesses a range of 35% to 45% of domestic reductions, without assessing what
the impact would be of additional action in third countries.
This Section assesses what
the impact would be of a higher conditional target for the EU, with at the same
time sufficient global action to limit global warming to below 2°C. 
The precise level of
such a conditional target for the EU in the context of an international
agreement would depend on many elements of the international agreement, most
notably the extent to which mitigation commitments in the new agreement would
collectively be sufficient to stay on track towards the -2°C objective, as well
as individually ambitious, fair and in accordance with responsibilities and
capabilities. This will clearly require action by all parties, comparable
reduction targets by countries with similar responsibilities and capabilities
as the EU, and considerable emission reduction efforts by emerging economies to
enable their emissions to peak before 2030. 
To inform negotiations,
modelling comparison exercises have typically explored various distributions of
global mitigation efforts, how they differ from distributing efforts according
to the cost-effective potential, their economic impacts for different regions
often expressed as % of GDP, and their relation with past, current and future
emission levels or other indicators. Targets differ between approaches, with
the highest targets most often attributed to higher income countries.
The modelling for the
Low Carbon Roadmap focussed on what the EU contribution domestically could be
for global reductions to be achieved cost efficiently, but does not pre-judge
if the resulting reductions would represent a fair contribution to global
action together with other regions’ reductions[111]. 
In order to simulate
potential costs of a conditional target, and without prejudice to any eventual
position on what a potential unilateral and a potential conditional target may
be, two examples are assessed based on 35% unilateral and 45% conditional, and
40% unilateral and 50% conditional GHG targets below 1990 levels by 2030[112]. For the
unconditional target, it is assumed that international offsets are not
permitted (see Section 5.4.2 for a
discussion in this regard).
The GEM E3 model was
used to assess the impact of the unilateral and conditional GHG reductions by
2030 compared to 1990. Table 27 gives an overview of the impact on GDP and the production
for energy intensive sectors typically deemed to be exposed to international
competition.
·                        
First the impact of the unilateral GHG reduction
in the EU is assessed without additional action in third countries and with no
access to international credits both for the 35% GHG reduction and the 40% GHG
reduction in the EU[113].

·                        
Second, the impact of a the conditional GHG
reduction in the EU is assessed, with other countries also taking action in line
with what is needed to achieve the 2ºC objective, both for a 45% and a 50% GHG
reduction in the EU compared to 1990[114].

·                        
Third, the impact of allowing emission trading
between countries under the conditional target is assessed. In this case the EU
would achieve 35/40% reductions domestically and acquire a number of
international credits to comply with the  45/50% GHG reduction target. 
Compared to the
unilateral, lower targets, scenario, the GDP impacts of the conditional,
higher, scenarios (including international climate action) are worse with no
access to international credits, as the differences in marginal abatement cost
is not taken advantage of. With the possibility to acquire international
credits and use them for compliance purposes in the ETS, the negative GDP
impact from a higher conditional target would be smaller but still larger than
if the EU would have reduced emissions to -35% or -40% without the others
taking action. In the scenarios with global action, the additional negative
impacts on aggregated EU GDP is in large part driven by the fact that also
global GDP would be negatively impacted by the necessary global climate
mitigation.
Impacts on specific
industrial sectors vary, but the benefits from global climate change efforts
for sectors subject to global competition are large and with access to
international offsets most of the EU sectors analysed would experience
significantly higher levels of production in 2030 under the conditional 45/50%
target than under the unconditional 35/45% targets. The only exception is the
non-metallic minerals sector that would see production decrease in the case of
a 50% target with 40% achieved domestically.
This analysis confirms
that for the EU's energy intensive industries subject to international
competition, production output and relative global market share would be
positively impacted by similar emission constraints being imposed also in third
countries if international offsets would be permitted, with of course positive
impacts largest, in case the EU target is the smallest.
Table 27: Impact conditional target on GDP and
production of energy-intensive sectors, GEM-E3 model 
 Reference || 35% GHG reduction domestically || 45% GHG reduction domestically || 45% GHG reduction target of which 35% is achieved domestically 
 Other countries || As in Reference || As in Reference || Achieve reduction target in line with global action domestically || Achieve reduction target in line with global action. but allowing part of the effort though international carbon markets 
   || EU || EU || EU || EU || Global 
 Total GHG vs 1990 || -32% || -35% || -45% || -35% || / 
 ETS GHG vs 2005 || -36% || -37% || -49% || -34% || na 
 Non-ETS GHG vs 2005 || -20% || -25% || -35% || -28% || na 
 GDP (% vs Reference) || na || -0,21% || -2,20% || -0,53% || -1,86% 
   || Impact on  production energy intensive industries compared to Reference 
 Ferrous metals || na || -2,3% || 7,3% || 18,7% || -5,2% 
 Non-ferrous metals || na || -0,1% || 2,6% || 5,8% || -3,1% 
 Chemical Products || na || -0,5% || 10,1% || 9,5% || -2,9% 
 Non-metallic minerals || na || -2,2% || -6,3% || 2,1% || -3,8% 
 Reference || 40% GHG reduction domestically || 50% GHG reduction domestically || 50% GHG reduction target of which 40% is achieved domestically 
 Other countries || As in Reference || As in Reference || Achieve reduction target in line with global action domestically || Achieve reduction target in line with global action. but allowing part of the effort though international carbon markets 
   || EU || EU || EU || EU || Global 
 Total GHG vs 1990 || -32% || -40% || -49% || -42% || / 
 ETS GHG vs 2005 || -36% || -43% || -54% || -45% || na 
 Non-ETS GHG vs 2005 || -20% || -30% || -38% || -32% || na 
 GDP (% vs Reference) || na || -0,45% || -3,40% || -1,22% || -1,97% 
 Impact on  production energy intensive industries compared to Reference || 
 Ferrous metals || na || -3.5% || -2,6% || 8,7% || -5,2% 
 Non-ferrous metals || na || -0.3% || -0,6% || 3,5% || -3,4% 
 Chemical Products || na || -0.7% || 5,9% || 6,1% || -2,9% 
 Non-metallic minerals || na || -2.8% || -12,5% || -2,9% || -4,0% 
In addition the PACE
model was used to perform an analysis comparing the impact of international
action in-line with the 2°C objective. 
PACE is a general
equilibrium model that has a higher degree of sectoral differentiation between
industrial sectors than the GEM E3 model. However, it only models CO2 emissions
from fuel combustion. In the Reference scenario, the model assumes full
auctioning of ETS allowances in the power sector, a decreasing share of free
allocation for sectors not on the carbon leakage list, reaching 0% in 2027, and
fully free allocation (100%) for sectors on the carbon leakage list. The
sectors listed in Table 28 below are such industrial sectors. They produce goods
other than energy. Emission reductions in the Reference scenario are below
those calculated for the Reference scenario for PRIMES or GEM-E3: CO2
emission reductions in 2030 are only 25% below 1990 level. 
For the policy
scenarios it is assumed that:
·                        
Either continued free allocation is applied for
the sectors on the carbon leakage list
·                        
or that auctioning is introduced for these
sectors.
Furthermore the
modelling assumes for all scenarios a nominal GHG reduction target of 40% by
2030. However, in most scenarios the existing surplus of carbon credits on the
ETS market is gradually consumed. This leads to a reduced GHG reduction from
the nominal 40% to 36%. With the exception of a “global action” scenario,
assumed to be consistent with the globally agreed 2°C objective, non-EU countries climate action assumes a
freeze of their commitments in 2020 at the level of their Copenhagen pledges[115]. 
All scenarios assume
that sectors included in the carbon leakage list do not include the opportunity
costs of free allowances in their product prices and that a carbon tax is
introduced in the non-ETS. All revenues from carbon pricing are returned as a
lump sum to consumers.
The resulting losses of
production do not appear to be very large. However, this is in part due to a
significant effort already being included in the Reference scenario[116]. Free
allocation of ETS-allowances reduces the production losses compared to a
scenario where ETS allowances would be auctioned. Global action impacts EU
competitive sectors positively (although less outspoken than in the GEM E3
modelling). EU GDP impacts of global action are positive, driven by the improved competitiveness impact.  Gradual
consumption of the ETS allowances surplus reduce impacts in a number of sectors
compared to a situation whereby the surplus is not consumed, and GHG reduction
efforts are larger.     
Table 28: Impact
international action on GDP and production of energy-intensive sectors, PACE
model
   || Refe-rence || No consumption of ETS-surplus || Consumption of ETS surplus || Consumption of ETS surplus, || Consumption of ETS-surplus and  global action in-line with 2C 
 Free allocation for energy intensive industrial sectors || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || No 
 Total GHG vs 1990 || -25% || -40% || -36% || -36% || -36% 
 ETS GHG vs 2005 || -37% || -49% || -41% || -41% || -41% 
 Non-ETS GHG vs 2005 || -10% || -27% || -27% || -27% || -27% 
 GDP (vs Reference) ||   || -0,7% || -0,6% || -0,6% || -0,4% 
   || Impact on  production of energy intensive industries compared to Reference 
 Cement || na || -1,1% || -1,3% || -2,4% || -2,1% 
 Bricks, tiles and construction products || na || -0,5% || -1,1% || -3,1% || -2,8% 
 Iron and steel ‐ production || na || -0,6% || 0,5% || -1,6% || -0,3% 
 Aluminium || na || -1,8% || -1,0% || -2,4% || -1,0% 
 Fertilizers || na || -1,4% || 0,2% || -1,5% || 2,3% 
 Organic chemicals || na || -0,9% || 0,3% || -1,5% || 1,5% 
 Inorganic chemicals || na || -1,5% || 0,0% || -1,7% || 1,1% 
The main conclusion of this Section are that benefits from
global efforts to meet the 2°C objective for most
EU sectors subject to global competition are clearly positive compared to a
situation that the EU would take unilateral action. Impacts on EU sectors of
any step-up to such conditional target can be reduced through access to
international offsets.

5.4.                
Structural measures in the
EU ETS

A surplus has built up
rapidly in the EU ETS by the end of phase 2 (2008-2012). This was primarily due
to the economic crisis resulting in emissions well below the total cap and the
inflow of a large amount of international credits, allowed under the ETS
directive to enter over the period 2008-2020. Figure 4 gives an overview of the build-up of the surplus up to
2030 under the Reference scenario[117].
At the end of phase 2, the surplus was already over 2 billion allowances and
this is projected to continue to grow to over 2.5 billion by 2020, to only
gradually reduce afterwards. The recent proposal of the Commission to change
the coverage of aviation under the ETS, limiting it to European regional
airspace and exempting certain flights from lower income countries with small
shares of global aviation[118],
is expected to further increase this overall surplus[119]. 
Figure 4: Example of build-up surplus in ETS based
on Reference emissions profile and existing cap 
Based on the outcome of
the public consultation launched by the Commission's Carbon Market Report[120], options
for structural measures preferred by many stakeholders include: 
(1)                   
Early revision of the linear reduction factor to
maintain the long term credibility of the ETS…
(2)                   
…combined with the retirement of allowances to
maintain credibility in the short-term
(3)                   
A reserve mechanism that would allow for a more
dynamic supply of allowances which would not focus on prices but rather on
supply / demand imbalances of allowances. 
Of these 3 options,
options 2 and 3 are clearly linked to addressing the surplus in order to bring
the supply/demand balance back in equilibrium, rather than determining the
ambition level for 2030. These are therefore discussed and assessed in a
separate impact assessment regarding a structural measure to strengthen the EU
ETS. 
Of the six initially
proposed structural measures, three are inherently linked to the 2030
framework, notably the revision of the linear reduction factor, the extension
of the scope of the EU ETS post 2020 and the use of international credits post
2020.  The revision of the linear reduction factor will be part of the
decisions to be taken on the overall 2030 framework. International credits need
to be considered in the light of the link with international efforts and
climate finance. Instead, the decision to extent the scope will still require
further analysis, while a qualitative assessment is taken up in Annex 7.8.

5.4.1.          
Revision of the annual
linear reduction factor 

According the ETS
Directive, the ETS cap for stationary sources decreases linearly, with an
annual amount equal to 1.74% of the average annual allocation during phase 2
(excluding aviation), referred to as the linear reduction factor[121]. This is
equivalent to an annual reduction of around 38 million allowances. 
The
scenario with 40% GHG reductions and moderate EE and RES policies up to 2030
achieves emission reductions in the ETS of 43% by 2030 compared to 2005.
Setting a cap at this 2030 emission level would require a change of the linear
reduction factor. A revised linear reduction factor applied from 2021 onwards
to all sectors included in the ETS would require a linear reduction factor of
2.2% to be coherent with a 2030 cap equal to 43% reductions[122]. The
resulting surplus in 2030 is equivalent to around 2.3 billion allowances.
The interaction of
different targets and policies impact the emissions in the ETS over the full
time period 2013-2030. In the 40% GHG + ambitious EE policies, total emissions
in the ETS are higher than in the 40% GHG scenario, whereas in the GHG +
ambitious EE and 30% RES they are actually lower. A linear reduction factor for
the other 40% scenarios leading to the same surplus is given in the Table below.
Table 29: Linear
reduction factors from 2021 onwards to 2030 depending on different 40% GHG
scenarios
   ||  Linear reduction factor if changed from 2021 onwards up to 2030 to achieve a surplus of 2.3 billion allowances in 2030, all sectors included 
 GHG40 || -2.2% 
 GHG40/EE || -2.1% 
 GHG40/ EE/RES30 || -2.3% 
Scenarios
resulting in less than 40% GHG reductions compared to 1990 would require a
smaller or no increase of the factor. 
Figure 5 applies the same linear reduction factor of 2.2% starting
from 2021 onwards and shows the impact on the surplus using the three 40% GHG
scenarios, confirming that if the linear reduction factor is kept constant
across scenarios, the surplus in 2030 would be lowest in case of ambitious EE
policies and highest in case of ambitious RES targets. 
All these scenarios
resulting in a 40% GHG emission reductions result in a decline of the surplus
after 2020. However this only happens gradually, such that a surplus of around
2 billion allowances or more remains by 2030. This is a level similar to the
Reference scenario, but under these scenarios with lower emissions and a more
ambitious cap in 2030. In a 2030 perspective, the lowest remaining surplus
results from the scenario with a strong focus on ambitious EE policies and the
highest surplus results from the scenario with a 30% RES target. 
Figure 5: Example of possible supply demand pattern
ETS based on 40% GHG reduction emissions profiles, ETS cap of 43% by 2030 
It should be noted that
in the 40% GHG only scenario, emission reductions are required to reach 40% GHG
reductions in 2030 and 80% GHG reductions in 2050, and carbon values are set
accordingly to achieve these emission reductions cost efficiently (see also Section
5.1.1).
However, in this specific scenario, the model does not assess the potential
impact in the short to mid-term of high surplus levels on the risk of potential
short sightedness by companies when making investment decisions. As outlined in
the carbon market report, today's market surplus clearly risks affecting price
formation, in a way that short term prices may not reflect longer term
scarcity, which can affect incentives to reduce emissions in the short to
medium term despite the longer term scarcity.
Therefore, the
modelling represents a situation where the market after 2020 would have to
continue to operate for more than a decade with rather high surpluses, be it
shrinking ones, strongly driven by longer term considerations with respect to
scarcity and costs. If long term considerations are not sufficient to create
market certainty, ETS prices may actually be lower, emissions higher and the
surplus lower than projected in the scenarios with 40% GHG reductions. This
would mean that despite the fact that the cap is in line with an overall 40%
GHG target, the emissions in 2030 would be considerably higher. 
40% GHG reductions in
2030 could be achieved also without changing the linear reduction factor
(through strong renewables and energy efficiency policies), but such an
approach would only increase the surplus significantly, thus not addressing the
current surplus in the ETS and undermining the relevance of the ETS in
providing incentives for low-carbon investment in the medium to long term. 
The main conclusion of this Section is that setting a 2030
cap at the level of the projected 2030 emissions levels in the ETS and
consistent with a GHG reduction target of 40%, would require a linear reduction
factor from 2021 onwards of around 2.2%. This would gradually improve the
market balance but by itself be insufficient to fully address the surplus. It
thereby may result in insufficient incentives to actually reduce emissions in
line with the cap and thus result in less emission reductions than needed to
achieve a 40% GHG reduction overall by 2030.

5.4.2.          
Use of international credits

The
amount of international credits that can be used in the ETS for compliance in
phase 2 and 3 (2008-2020) is fixed[123]. The total entitlement is now estimated to be
around 1.6 billion credits[124]. The default situation is that no additional
entitlements are created after 2020. 
Domestically, the use
of international credits was intended to contain compliance costs and as such
also address concerns about carbon leakage. They were also seen as a buffer
against short term fluctuations in demand that could not be met through the
supply in allowances. These credit entitlements allowed under the ETS
legislation have been generous. The present inflow of ERU/CERs into the EU ETS
for compliance purposes[125] correspond to half of the existing 2 billion
surplus. 
Table 30:
CER/ERU submissions in phase 2 of the ETS for compliance purposes (MtCO2e)
 Mt CO2-eq. || 2008 || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || 2012 || Phase 2 
 CER/ERUs || 83.5 || 80.6 || 137.2 || 253.7 || 503.7 || 1,058.7 
Source:
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2013): "2012 compliance: shades of grey
revealed".
The use of international
credits is intended to deliver reduced compliance costs, transfer sustainable
technologies to third countries while engaging them in stronger climate action.
For these reasons, the EU decided that the conditional offer of 30% GHG
emission reductions by 2020 would allow for an increase in the use of credits
by up to 50% of the increased effort.
The Clean Development
Mechanisms (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are the instruments through
which credits have been generated. There are several difficulties associated
with them. Additionality and baselines are notoriously difficult to establish
with serious concerns about transparency of methods used often related to JI.
Many projects are therefore contested by many stakeholders. There is a potential
for excessive rents and perverse incentives. There are concerns about unequal
geographical distribution of projects and human rights. With CDM, there is a
lack of an own contribution to mitigation by the seller. It remains to be seen
to what extent the UN review of both Kyoto mechanisms can alleviate these
concerns which resulted in restrictions by buying countries. The EU banned
credits from afforestation and reforestation projects and later restricted
credits from certain industrial gases[126]. 
Any further use of
international credits in a 2030 framework needs to address how many could be
used (quantity?) and what type could be used (quality?).
Under business as usual
(Reference scenario) there is no demand for international credits in the EU ETS
(see Figure 4) after 2020, given that it would only add to the already
potentially very large surplus of allowances (and credits as allowed up to 2020
in the ETS). This remains true even where a 2030 target is set to deliver a 40%
GHG reduction. If overall emissions are to be reduced by 40% by 2030 compared
to 1990, then even with a 43% reduction target in the EU ETS compared to 2005,
there could still be a surplus in the EU ETS amounting to around 2 billion
allowances by 2030.  This is reflected in the default situation, whereby no
further credits are used for compliance after 2020. Hence, limiting the access
to international credits is a necessary but in itself, i.e. without other
options, suboptimal option to address the ETS surplus.
An unconditional
domestic target with no additional access to international credits would create
investor certainty towards the level of reduction that will need to be achieved
within the EU. Demand shocks in the EU ETS could be contained through the
remaining large surplus of allowances, potentially complemented by a mechanism
to stabilise the market (see separate impact assessment regarding a structural
measure to strengthen the EU ETS.) and the Article 29a mechanism of the ETS
Directive avoiding risks of large sustained price increases. 
Nevertheless, to
facilitate a high level of ambition by 2030 in the rest of the world, the EU
could also set a conditional target for 2030. This would be implemented if
international conditions are right. A 2030 framework with an unconditional
target not allowing for additional large inflows of international credits and a
conditional one allowing a large share of additional efforts being met through
international credits, could create more certainty on what is really necessary
domestically than the current 2020 targets, which did not give industry such
certainty.
A conditional target
with demand for international credits offer third countries the potential to
benefit from demand from the EU’s carbon market, creating substantial climate
finance flows if matched by similar demand from high income parties within an
international agreement.
Post 2020, in light of
an ambitious international agreement, it is essential that the EU can guarantee
that only high quality credits enter the EU ETS. Both the generation and use of
international credits need to contain an element of net mitigation action. An
important step will be to move away from project-based mechanisms towards
sectoral approaches, certainly in more advanced economies. First steps in this
direction have been taken. In the Durban Climate Conference in 2011, the EU
secured the establishment of a New Market Mechanism (NMM) and in parallel, the
EU continues to work towards a substantially reformed CDM. More economically
advanced countries should move away from the CDM towards the implementation of
the NMM, while over time, the CDM would increasingly be focussed on Least
Developed Countries (LDCs). This is already reflected in EU legislation. From
2013, CDM credits from new projects are only accepted for compliance in the EU
ETS if they are from LDCs. 
Through EU legislation,
it could be ensured that credits entering the EU ETS come from systems which
include an element of own contribution or from Parties taking appropriate
action in the fight against climate change. EU ETS legislation will ultimately
determine what can be used for compliance. If the rules for the implementation
of the NMM cannot be agreed through the UNFCCC, the EU has the option to pursue
the establishment of such a mechanism bilaterally or in cooperation with other
major buyers.
The main conclusions of this Section are that investor
certainty in the EU may benefit from an unconditional GHG reduction target with
no additional access to international credits, while allowing that a large
share of the additional effort to meet a conditional target comes from
international credits. This may incentivise further development of a genuine
international carbon market that captures own appropriate action by all parties.

But to create a genuine level playing field, the EU
interest lies in promoting the development and implementation of compatible
emissions trading systems throughout the world. Linking of systems enables
participants in one system to use units from a linked system for compliance
purposes. New systems have been established or are being planned in many
countries[127] and most systems are open to enter into linking
agreements. If systems are compatible in design and similar in ambition,
linking can be done without harming investor certainty with respect to the
required domestic reductions. Examples how this can be done include linking
with Switzerland, where negotiations are well underway.

5.4.3.          
Improve the functioning of
the EU ETS through addressing the market imbalance 

As outlined in the
Carbon Market Report and in Section 5.4.1,
improving the functioning of the ETS will require addressing the growing
structural supply-demand imbalance. The Commission has proposed to backload
some auctioning of allowances to later into phase 3 to address this on the
short term. When backloading would be implemented, this will first decrease the
existing surplus, to increase again towards the end of phase 3, and will
therefore not address the surplus in the mid to long term. 
In Section 5.4.1
it was also shown that a change of the linear factor in line with the assessed
emission reductions for 2030 would only gradually impact the supply demand
imbalances and not address the surplus sufficiently in the short to mid-term. 
Theoretically, it would
be possible to adopt a more ambitious linear reduction factor in a way it is
set not only to achieve a certain reduction, but also to consume the surplus at
the same time. For instance to get to a surplus in 2030 at around half the
annual cap, while achieving the 40% GHG, would require a linear reduction
factor of around 3.4%, which by 2045 would have reduced the ETS cap to zero[128]. This is
clearly no practical manner to improve the functioning of the market and create
longer term investor certainty. 
Addressing the surplus
will therefore require a structural measure with a more direct approach, such
as for instance the creation of a market stability reserve or the permanent
retirement of some allowances. 
This latter option
would impact the total cap even though it can be implemented without changing
the linear reduction factor. It would result in a reduction of the total
allowances available to operators in the ETS. 
The creation of a
market stability reserve would not change the cap or the amount of allowances
available for operators in the ETS as well as potentially prevent the creation
of future structural supply-demand imbalances, depending on its design. This
can improve the functioning of the market and ensure the market takes into
account better long term fundamentals. If decided well before the end of phase
3 and implemented as of around 2020, it could dampen the effects of a
resurgence of the surplus in 2020 when backloading would increase the supply
again.
For more information regarding the assessment of these
options, see the Impact Assessment as regards the establishment of a Structural
measure to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System. This not only looks into
the establishment of these mechanisms in the context of the existing
legislation (as represented in the Reference scenario), but also has a
sensitivity analysis included on how it would function in case of a change of
the linear reduction factor as discussed in Section 5.4.1
above.

5.5.                
Carbon leakage measures in a 2030 framework

Carbon leakage is
defined in the ETS directive as an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in
third countries where industry would not be subject to comparable carbon
constraints, due to the impact of the ETS[129]. An empirical study[130] was
recently finalised that explored whether there was evidence of such carbon
leakage among the energy intensive industries in the period 2005-2012, i.e.
phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS. A main conclusion of the study was that this was
not the case and that carbon leakage was successfully prevented, notably
through the provision of free allocation of emission allowances. 
There was actually in
aggregate considerable surplus of allowances accrued by industry up to 2012[131]
translating into considerable potential resources for the involved sectors. The
empirical study for instance estimated that the cement, clinker and lime
producers participating in the EU ETS have received in the period 2008-2011 160
million allowances beyond their verified emissions. For the pulp, paper and
paperboard producers this was estimated to be equivalent to over 57 million
allowances for the period 2008-2012.
The use of international
credits was initially intended to contain upwards price risks, and as such also
address concerns about carbon leakage. But in retrospect, it appears that these
credit entitlements may have been too generous, in particular in the light of
unexpected developments impacting the ETS, notably the economic crisis. It is
expected that the inflow of these international credits has added a number of
allowances corresponding to more than half of the expected surplus in the ETS
market by 2020. For an analysis of the potential use of international credits
in a 2030 framework, see Section 5.4.2.
Industry, commenting on
the study, pointed out that whereas free allocation indeed has protected the
existing production facilities in the EU, it does not protect against what some
argue can be called "investment leakage". They claim that investments
in the EU are halted because of perceived higher future costs related to
climate policy in the EU than in other regions, resulting in those investments
taking place in those other regions instead, i.e. carbon investment leakage.
This investment leakage
affects, according to industrial stakeholders, both the recurrent investments
needed to keep installations highly efficient (leading thus to relative
reductions in efficiency), as well as negatively impacting investment decisions
regarding major new plants, resulting in increased production outside of the
EU.
It was not possible in
the study to empirically assert whether investment leakage has occurred. Trends
of the type described could be due to a number of factors not related to the
ETS, and often associated with the effects of globalisation in general, such
as:
·                        
A maturing European economy, slow population
growth and slower GDP growth compared to emerging economies which create
economically more beneficial circumstances for investment in industries outside
Europe (Europe experienced a similar period of rapid industrialisation after
WWII).
·                        
Lower factor prices including labour, land and
energy. 
·                        
Lower regulatory burden related to, for
instance, safety, labour and environmental regulation (whereas often political
instability, regulatory risk and currency risk are perceived as higher burdens
in those economies).
The empirical study
noted that the carbon costs as a share of total costs during the period studied
tended to be too small to be the main driver of relocation or investment
decisions when compared to, for instance, labour, energy or raw material costs.
One conclusion was that energy costs in total, and especially the recent
development of unconventional fuels in the US, is starting to play a role in
the investment decisions for some sectors.
Regarding the future, Section
5.1.4
assesses the situation where indeed carbon constraints are further increased in
the EU to achieve a 40% GHG reduction by 2030, whereas in other countries they
remain as in the Reference case. Table 19 gives the resulting impact on EU industries, assessed with
the GEM E3 model. This analysis seems to indicate that impacts on industrial
sectors can be alleviated to some extent if free allocation is continued, while
some factors like benchmarks and production data are reviewed periodically.
However, it would potentially increase carbon prices in the ETS because
industrial sectors with free allocation distributed on the basis of future
production levels might be incentivised to increase production in order to
obtain more free allocation in following periods, and as such results in
additional, more costly GHG reductions elsewhere in the ETS. With the
introduction of increased levels of auctioning for all those sectors in the EU
ETS after 2020 and up to 2030, impacts of a unilateral increase of the target
to 40% are projected to be negative for them.
Section 5.3
assessed what the impacts on these sectors would be in case of a conditional
target beyond the 40% that could only be implemented if other regions also undertake
strong climate action. For all four energy intensive industrial sectors[132], it was
projected that there would be a strong relative improvement of the competitive
position of EU industries, actually resulting in significant production
increase in three of the sectors, if accompanied with access to the
international carbon market for the additional target beyond 40%. For two of
the sectors this was actually even the case if the unconditional target would
be fully met domestically, even without access to the international carbon
market (see Table 27).
Overall the results
seem to indicate that carbon leakage measures are not necessary in case
sufficient global action is undertaken, but that some level of free allocation,
through periodic review of factors determining free allocation, can be
beneficial in a situation whereby the EU would step up its reduction effort to
40% GHG reductions by 2030 with third countries not undertaking comparable
action. If it would be decided to preserve the approach of free allocation
through benchmarking up to 2030 to address the risk of carbon leakage, a number
of important design features will need to be revisited:
·                        
A periodic revision of the benchmark values may be needed to reflect the technological developments which have
happened since the benchmark values were first determined in 2011, based on
2006-2008 data. Such a revision could be envisaged to take into account
technological developments, which most likely are not taking place at the same
pace in all sectors. A reflection would also be needed for which products there
should be benchmarks, whether the current system of fall-back approaches can be
refined, and whether the determination of the benchmark values should continue
to be based on the average of the 10% best in the EU, or on any other basis.
·                        
Baseline years to be taken into account. The current free allocation system multiplies benchmark values with
production data for certain Reference years. There would need to be a reflection
whether and when the Reference years used for phase 3 free allocations should
be reviewed, such that phase 4 free allocation would be based on production
data from more recent years. Such a system would provide a closer link between
allocation and production levels, but it may also be more complex and lead to
less certainty for the installations in the long term. It may be useful to
consider reviewing both benchmarks and production data in combination to
provide more clarity at the time decisions are taken and reduce uncertainty as
a result of too frequent reviews.
·                        
Maximum amount of free allocation. In the current system, the amount of free allocation is calculated
bottom-up based on benchmarks and production data, but there is also a top-down
maximum amount of allowances allowed. The maximum amount is currently a fixed
share of the total cap. Such a cap is crucial as a backstop to ensure also long
term environmental integrity of the system and to correct possible
misconceptions and/or misapplications of the free allocation system ensuring
transparency and equitable burden-sharing among sectors. But it needs to be
assessed if the present share of the total decreasing cap should be amended,
taking into account different opportunities to reduce emissions for those
sectors receiving free allocation and those not. Lessons learnt from the first
years of phase 3 should be taken into account.
·                        
Carbon leakage. Free
allocation after 2020 should in principle only be provided to those sectors
that are really affected by the risk of carbon leakage. This requires further
reflection based on the growing experience with free allocation based on carbon
leakage status in phase 3 as well as a review of climate policy efforts
undertaken by other major countries. The purpose of free allocation should be
to address competitiveness concerns in an accurate manner, while avoiding
over-allocation and maintaining appropriate incentives for low carbon growth
and emission reductions. It needs to be recognised that the real carbon leakage
situation of sectors on the present carbon leakage list may differ considerably
– some may face much stronger competitive pressure than others. Some might
operate in truly global markets, while others might merely be sectors where
import and export constitute an important share of production and consumption,
but where goods are still subject to significant diversification. Therefore,
some reflection may be needed if some form of progressiveness would be useful,
recognising that for some sectors within the larger group that can be deemed
exposed to a risk of carbon leakage it would make sense to provide for
relatively more free allocation than for others. Such a division groups can
lead to a more accurate picture of the competitiveness situation of sectors,
but could increase the complexity of any analysis. Another element which may
merit reflection is the relation between the length of validity of the carbon
leakage list and the length of the trading period, taking into account both
regulatory predictability and developments affecting the competitiveness
situation of industrial sectors.

5.5.1.          
Indirect emissions compensation

Currently, indirect ETS
costs in electricity prices, passed on to industrial electricity consumers, can
be compensated for the most electro-intensive industries via national subsidies
subject to state aid scrutiny. Stakeholders have expressed concern that this
will result in different treatment across Member States for the same sectors,
depending on the willingness and ability of Member States to provide state aid.
It merits reflection if this approach should be continued and to what extent
such support is warranted, which is linked to the quite complex impact of
climate policies on electricity prices. If yes, it needs to be considered if it
could be improved to avoid as much as possible the distortion of intra-EU
competition and to ensure a level playing field. Furthermore, in case of
sufficient global action, the continuation of these measures may no longer be
necessary.

5.5.2.          
The use of auction revenues for proactive
low-carbon innovation measures   

Higher levels of free
allocation to industry will result in fewer allowances for auctioning. It could
as such reduce the capacity to use auctioning as a distributional tool across
Member States even though carbon prices may also actually increase (see Section
5.1.4).
Auction revenue or other forms of ETS related revenues (such as what is
currently done with the so called NER 300) could also be used in a more targeted
manner, for example towards demonstration and deployment of promising new
technologies for the energy intensive industries subject to ETS. Such funding
would in principle not directly alleviate carbon leakage, but could in the
longer term be crucial to ensure that industrial sectors can make a successful
transition to low carbon production. A dedicated programme at the EU level
could be more efficient in creating break-through technologies due to scope and
size than if spread out over 28 Member States. To ensure efficient use of such
funding, earmarking revenues for technology subsidies should be specific rather
than general, targeting technologies that suffer from pervasive market and
coordination failures in development and / or take-up by individual firms. 
Stakeholders' opinions
on the risk on carbon leakage typically agree that some measures may be needed.
The energy intensive industry and general business organizations note that European
industry needs enhanced protection mechanisms, including the use of allowance
revenues within industry with some suggesting also the development of an
EU-wide instrument to replace the national state aid mechanisms regarding
indirect ETS costs related to electricity prices. Trade unions typically agree
that energy intensive industries should be preserved in the EU but note that
the carbon leakage list needs to be reviewed. Instead NGOs, RES organizations,
non-energy intensive companies and part of academia say there is little
evidence for carbon leakage, that there needs to be more focus in carbon
leakage instruments, with specifically NGOs stressing that free allowances are
discouraging investments in low carbon technologies.
The main conclusions from this Section are that at present
there is no evidence that carbon leakage has occurred already. But for the
future, as long as other regions do not take comparable action on climate
change, continued free allocation on the basis of periodically updated
benchmarks can be a suitable tool to address the risk on carbon leakage with
free allocation focussing more on these industries that cannot easily
differentiate prices from those of outside competitors. 
Indirect impacts from carbon prices on electricity prices
can be compensated through state aid, but it needs to be considered if
improvements are needed to avoid distortion of intra-EU competition. In case of
strong global action, the continuation of these measures should be reviewed.
Continued funding of innovation through schemes like the NER300 do not address
directly carbon leakage but if well implemented can focus on much needed
break-through technologies also within industry, it could reduce costs to meet
long term objectives and create a technological advantage.

5.6.                
Sectors not included in the
ETS or Non ETS: Policy options for the Land Sector

The question on the
extension of the scope of the ETS to include sectors at present covered in the
non ETS, in particular fuels for transport and heating, is addressed in Annex 7.8 on
structural measures. The question on distributional aspects of target setting
in the non ETS is addressed in Section 5.9.
This Section addresses
policy design options for (non-energy related) emissions from agriculture, and
emissions and removals from Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), in
short AFOLU (agriculture, forestry and land use). 

5.6.1.          
The problem

While the land sector
presents modest mitigation potential in the EU, it does incorporate two important
carbon pools: forest biomass and soil organic carbon. The correct handling of
these – through land use management approaches for forest and agriculture – is
essential in order to a) optimise further removals and b) avoid emissions,
wherever cost-effectively possible.
In Section 5.1.2,
it is shown that these carbon stocks are overall expected to decline over time
under current policies. This is due in part to increased use of biomass for
energy purposes. It also gives estimates of further land use changes under
policy scenarios with higher greenhouse gas and renewables targets, which have
knock-on effects on land use practices within the EU, and can also lead to
increased bio-energy import, potentially causing carbon leakage and indirect
land use changes. However, these scenarios do not include actions to increase
removals and reduce emissions through specific measures. 
Moreover, global demand
for food and feed is expected to continue to rise under current trends, thereby
affecting the agricultural sector in the EU, and associated greenhouse gas
emissions. 
The protection,
therefore, of these AFOLU carbon pools will be of growing importance in a
post-2020 framework. 
In contrast with the
non-CO2 emissions in the Agriculture sector (which is currently
within the scope of the Effort Sharing Decision), the LULUCF sector is not
included in the reduction commitment in the current 2020 Climate and Energy
package. In the context of the Climate and Energy Package, The Council and the
European Parliament have indeed expressed the request that all sectors should
contribute to cost-effective emissions reductions. 
The current LULUCF
legislative framework provides for a step-wise progression to improve data and
introduce best practice, as preparation for the inclusion of the sector within
the overall 2030 policy framework.  

5.6.2.          
The policy options for 2030

An approach for the
integration of the land sector into an EU framework could in principle be based
on one of three options:
·                        
Option 1 (“Status Quo”): Maintain non-CO2
Agriculture sector emissions in a potential future Effort Sharing Decision, and
further develop a LULUCF sector policy approach separately. 
·                        
Option 2 (“Effort Sharing”): Include the LULUCF
sector into a potential future Effort Sharing Decision; 
·                        
Option 3 (“Land Sector Pillar”): Merging the
LULUCF and Agriculture non-CO2 sector emissions into one new and independent
pillar of the EU’s climate policy 
For the pros and cons
of a new Effort Sharing Decision in a 2030 perspective, see Section 5.9

5.6.3.          
Comparison of options

Option 1 (Status quo)
continues the separate treatment of LULUCF, outside the Effort Sharing Decision
(ESD)[133].
However, this status quo does not imply a no-action scenario, as targets and
appropriate measures could be developed separately. Flexibilities with other
sectors could be considered. However, the major disadvantage of this option
would be that agricultural and LULUCF emissions would be addressed with different
policy tools, while they concern the same agricultural activities. 
Option 2 (Effort
sharing) would increase the number of sectors in the ESD and thus increase
flexibility for Member States to achieve a given target. It would also have the
advantage, compared to option 1, that Member States could develop an integrated
approach for agriculture and forestry. Certain synergies and trade-offs could
potentially be better addressed[134].
However, it needs to be
borne in mind that, although specific flexibilities are allowed, the ESD is
developed around a linear trajectory with an annual compliance cycle. It will
need to be further assessed whether the inclusion in the ESD of LULUCF
emissions/removals, which are characterised by potentially large annual
fluctuations, long time horizons and uncertainties related to data reliability
(unless sophisticated monitoring techniques are used) is compatible with the
Effort Sharing Decision[135].
In addition, the cost-effective potential for removals is certainly
geographically variable which may make the sharing of effort in the ESD more
complicated. 
In summary, option 2
would add flexibility and enable an integrated approach, but would increase
complexity and raise methodological issues, including consequences in terms of
target setting. 
Option 3 (land sector
Pillar) would have similar advantages to option 2. It would enable a more
dedicated policy approach that takes into account the specificities of the
sector, and can build on and use the Common Agriculture Policy to deliver. In
this context, it would need to be considered which instruments (e.g. national
targets, dedicated EU measures, or national measures financed through rural
development policy measures) are most suitable. Assuming that this option would
also comprise fixed national targets, it would lack the advantage of
flexibility between sectors within the overall ESD, but give an opportunity for
a policy approach that would reflect the sector's particularities (permanence,
long time cycles, natural variability etc.). 

5.6.4.          
Policy monitoring and evaluation

The application of
today’s accounting rules together with the development of more accurate
monitoring and reporting methods – under Decision 529/2013 – should further
improve the data and information availability.
The effect that
different accounting rules (e.g. flexibilities between different activities;
caps on credits and debits; reference levels etc.) could have on the absolute
number of credits/debits generated by these two sectors in a post-2020
international framework, will need to be further assessed.
The main conclusions of this Section are that there are
benefits of integrating land use and agricultural mitigation policies. Both
options 2 and 3 would deliver this. Option 2 may make the sharing of effort in
the ESD more complicated. Instead option 3 could reduce national flexibility
across sectors, but would allow to reflect the sector's particularities better,
including through further improved incentives for climate friendly and smart
agriculture within a post-2020 Common Agricultural Policy. 

5.7.                
Implementing a potential RES
target

As explained already in
Section 4.2,
the purpose of this impact assessment is not to evaluate in detail the various
possible means of meeting a potential renewables target for 2030. Such a
detailed evaluation would be carried out in preparation of any future
legislative proposals in this regard if there is political agreement on a 2030
renewables target as such. 
At this stage some more
general considerations concerning practical design suffice, building on the
assessment of lessons learnt from the 2020 framework and the responses to the
public consultation. Three main aspects of implementation would have to be
considered:
·                        
The level at which the target should be applied
/ who should be the obligated entity, where three main options are conceivable:
EU level, Member State level through differentiated national targets, or at the
level of energy suppliers.
·                        
If the target should be applicable to energy
consumption as such, or rather to specific sectors and / or energy carriers
such as electricity, heating and cooling or transport.
·                        
If the implementing approach should be based on
technical neutrality between various renewables options, or if differentiated
approaches for each type of renewable technology should be applied.
On this basis, three
main options for implementation of a potential legally binding renewables
target for 2030 can be identified:
(1)                   
Continuation of Member State specific targets
and support schemes. 
(2)                   
As option i) but with a non-discriminatory
opening of national support schemes or strong coordination between Member
States, possibly under the condition that there is sufficient transmission
capacity between the Member States involved, and 
(3)                   
A gradual Europeanization of the approach to
ensuring progress towards a 2030 objective. 
For all these main
options, sub-options can be defined, including
(a)                   
Target applicable to all energy consumption, or
only subsets of energy consumption (in specific sectors such as transport, or
for specific energy carriers such as electricity or heat)
(b)                   
Target met in a technology neutral approach, or
through specific approaches to specific renewables technologies.
Without pre-empting the
outcome of a future more detailed assessment were a legislative proposal to be
made, and also considering that some of these aspects would not be decided on
the EU level depending on the main option chosen, there are several important
trade-offs in choosing between these options and sub-options that policy makers
at any level should consider.
First, an EU-level
target would avoid setting national targets which potentially could lead to
development of renewables where the resources are the most abundant, and
thereby in theory improving cost-efficiency at the aggregate EU level in
meeting a set objective. At the same time, if Member States do not have
specific targets, they would have less incentive to mitigate administrative
barriers and facilitate uptake through grid developments and necessary licensing.
Moreover, Member State targets could better ensure a balanced development of
renewables across the EU economy and society. An EU level target would also
require giving the EU the means to deliver on such a target through concrete
policies on the ground, going beyond current levels of harmonisation.
Second, meeting an EU
target without national support schemes (which would result from national
targets unless Member States decide to combine support schemes across national
borders) but with schemes at the EU level would be less distortive to
competition and market integration, but would at the same time reduce Member
State flexibility to adapt to specific circumstances and decide themselves how
to finance / support RES developments. 
Third, technology neutrality
and equal treatment of all renewable options without sector specific targets or
support schemes would improve short to medium term cost-efficiency, at least in
theory. On the other hand, truly technology neutral approaches would typically
lead to excess profits for producers of more cost-competitive renewables; and
would not ensure development, deployment and cost-reductions that could be
necessary for cost-efficiency in the longer term, in particular if the EU were
to agree on more ambitious renewables objectives post 2030 (as suggested by the
Roadmap 2050, however not the subject matter of this Impact Assessment).
Moreover, the development of innovative, currently more costly RES technologies
might be hampered, impacting thereby on longer term industrial leadership of EU
companies.
The quantitative
assessment of scenarios and options in Section 5.1 above and the specific
information on system cost and price impacts from various renewable levels is
based on the assumption of cost-efficient deployment of renewables in the EU
post 2020, on the basis of implementation of the legally binding national RES
targets for 2020. Potential future decisions at the EU or national level would
have to be based on detailed analysis (including modelling) of the various options. 
Such analysis focusing less on optimising cost-efficiency at the EU level
throughout the period up to 2050 could result in higher system cost and price
impacts.
Other measures to
support renewables development
As the text of the
current Renewable Energy Directive makes clear, a renewable energy target is
only partly about the structuring of possible support. As shown under the
current framework, a target can drive several other policy measures which can
be implemented at European or national level, which are necessary to remove the
barriers to the growth of renewable energy and reduce the cost of renewable
energy. Such measures which are already required include increased development
of energy infrastructure, improved and fairer grid access for renewable energy,
smoother and faster regimes for product and project planning authorisation,
greater consistency of certification procedures across Member States, for
products and for equipment installers, consistent training and qualification
regimes for the EU labour force, and so on. The "soft" measures
contained in the current Renewable Energy Directive will also need to be
reviewed in the 2030 framework independently of the target discussion, with a
view to removing redundant ones and strengthening cost effective ones. 
Were a EU renewable
energy target, or national targets, for 2030 not to be adopted, then the
importance of such soft measures for removing barriers to renewable energy
would increase in order to ensure progress also in absence of a target.
However, such measures would not necessarily be developed by Member States on
their own initiative. For any cost effective renewable energy growth, such soft
measures would need to be regulated for separately, and where appropriate at
the EU level to ensure a level playing field and the integrity of the internal
energy market. (In the same way infrastructure planning and energy efficiency
measures have been adopted at the European level instead of leaving Member
States to develop their own different measures under a legally binding target
framework).
Renewable energy in transport
 The work on indirect land-use change has
demonstrated how the transport sector is in need of incentives for deployment
(at this stage small amounts) of advanced alternative fuels. Thus, innovation
in advanced renewable fuels will be important to reduce costs of such renewable
fuels, which will be needed to increase competitiveness, security of supply and
GHG reduction in the transport sector. This will be in addition to continued push
for electric vehicles and modal shift as set out in the White paper for
Transport." 
Sustainability of
solid and gaseous biomass
The Commission is
currently analysing the sustainability issues associated with increased use of
solid and gaseous biomass for electricity, heating and cooling in the EU, with
the view to decide whether additional EU action is needed and appropriate.
While imports of wood pellets will increase up to 2030, according to
projections the major part of biomass for heating and power production is
expected to be sourced domestically. According to existing scientific
understanding, most of the biomass supply chains currently used in the EU
provide significant carbon emission reductions compared to fossil fuels. Only a
limited number of biomass feedstocks may have uncertain or potentially negative
climate benefits. However, the comparisons depend partly on the methodological
assumptions made in the relevant studies. The Commission is currently reviewing
the scientific basis and possible safeguards and will take this into account in
the above mentioned analysis.
Irrespective of
potential future sustainability criteria for these aspects currently under
discussion and not subject of this impact assessment, it will remain important
in this regard to improve the greenhouse gas mitigation benefits of biomass
through: (i) sustainable forest management practices that enhance forest
productivity; (ii) minimization of process chain emissions; and (iii) efficient
use of biomass to displace greenhouse gas–intensive fuels. However it should be
considered that not all biomass types per se deliver GHG benefits, and the
overall GHG mitigation benefits should be assessed in this light.
The main
conclusion of this Section is that there are several options for implementation
of a potential legally binding renewables target for 2030. Detailed evaluation
of possible approaches would be carried out in preparation of any future
legislative proposals in this regard if there is political agreement on a 2030
renewables target as such.
If the 2030
framework were not to include an explicit RES target, other supporting measures
relating to e.g. infrastructure, planning and permitting, grid access, targeted
funding etc. would remain important.   

5.8.                
Implementing a potential energy
savings / efficiency target

None of the scenarios /
policy options presented and analysed in previous Sections will materialise
unless there is significant improvement of energy efficiency, driven inter
alia by public policy across the EU economy up to 2030 and beyond. Energy
efficiency is therefore fundamental for the transition. 
All scenarios quantitatively analysed in Section
5.1 include explicit or implicit assumptions about such public policies to
varying degrees, but the purpose of this impact assessment is not to evaluate
in detail the various means of meeting a potential energy efficiency
target/objective for 2030. Such assessment should not and cannot be made except
as part of the 2014 review of the approach to energy savings in a 2020 perspective.
This 2014 review should also consider if energy intensity rather than absolute
energy savings could be a more suitable basis for post 2020 objectives in
sectors of the economy where energy consumption is strongly correlated with
economic activity; provided that implicit or explicit sectoral targets would be
considered appropriate and cost-effective. 
Irrespective of any potential 2030 targets
in this regard, and without prejudice to the 2014 review, it will be important
also in a 2030 perspective to continue policies at the EU level which ensure a
high level of energy efficiency, especially in areas such as buildings, energy
consuming appliances, vehicles etc. to ensure a level playing field and
safeguard the internal market for related products.  There will be a need to
foster governance and the capacity of market actors and policymakers to
introduce energy efficiency measures and to improve the finance-ability and
risk profile of energy efficiency investments. 
Price elasticity of
energy demand is low in many sectors of the economy, in particular in the
residential and transport sectors. In industry too, energy-saving measures with
short payback times are often not taken up. Energy prices (including the
indirect impact from the ETS) will in many situations not be enough to drive
the necessary developments in a 2030 perspective, underlining the need for
specific policies. A mix of EU level and more flexible Member State approaches
in defining and implementing energy efficiency policies (as under the current
framework) would safeguard the internal market and undistorted competition on
the one hand, and facilitate taking into account national and regional
circumstances in a non-distortive manner on the other.
The main
conclusion from this Section is that energy efficiency is fundamental for the
decarbonisation, and that all policy scenarios analysed therefore include
explicit or implicit assumptions about such public policies to varying degrees.

This IA
does not evaluate in detail the various means of meeting a potential energy
efficiency target/objective for 2030. Such assessment will be part of the 2014
review of the approach to energy savings in a 2020 perspective.

5.9.                
Differential impacts across
member states 

The
adoption of GHG and RES targets as well as and EE policies would have different
impacts on different Member States, depending on how such targets and ambition
levels are met. The modelling setup is based on the assumption that EU-wide
targets are met in a cost-optimal way, while reflecting existing policies of
the Member States already included in the Reference Scenario. This Impact
Assessment does not quantitatively address impacts of various implementation
approaches with respect to distribution of efforts between Member States and
between the Member State and the EU level, on, for example, non-ETS emissions
and RES, and future assessments will determine if priority should be given to
cost-efficiency at the EU level or other considerations such as ensuring an
equitable effort sharing, and to what extent flexibility mechanisms can
contribute to both. 
With this in mind, this
Section provides an indication of the impacts on Member States of different
levels of policies and targets which would result in a cost-efficient approach
on the EU level in a 2030 perspective, and compares those impacts to the
Reference, where at the same time it should be remembered that the Reference
scenario in itself implies significant investments. Then, the distribution of
additional system costs and investments is analysed, as well as benefits to
health, the environment and fuel savings. Finally, an overview is given of
possible means to address issues of equity and capacity. All results shown are
indicative and associated with a significant degree of uncertainty as a detailed
verification of Member State results has not been carried out. 

5.9.1.          
Impacts on Member State
level
5.9.1.1.    
GHG emission reductions and Renewables shares

Total GHG as well as
non-ETS emission reductions per Member State in 2030 are shown in 
Table 31 and 
Table 32 for:
·                        
the option with 35% GHG reductions and EE
policies
·                        
the range associated with options achieving  40%
GHG reductions
·                        
the option with 45% GHG reduction, ambitious EE
policies and a 35% RES target
The Reference year is
2005 as this is the base year for current legislation regulating GHG emissions
in both the ETS and non-ETS sectors.
Table 31: Projected Member State total GHG
reductions vs 2005 
 % total GHG reductions || Reference 2020 || Reference 2030 || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/RES35 
 EU || -19% || -28% || -3% || -8% || -9% || -14% 
 BE || -18% || -19% || -5% || -8% || -12% || -14% 
 BG || -17% || -22% || -4% || -8% || -16% || -22% 
 CZ || -23% || -32% || -2% || -1% || -8% || -8% 
 DK || -27% || -35% || -6% || -9% || -12% || -15% 
 DE || -22% || -35% || -1% || -6% || -8% || -14% 
 EE || -14% || -31% || 3% || -1% || -11% || -15% 
 IE || -15% || -23% || -6% || -10% || -13% || -14% 
 EL || -29% || -47% || -3% || -4% || -8% || -14% 
 ES || -21% || -19% || -6% || -8% || -11% || -15% 
 FR || -21% || -28% || -5% || -9% || -12% || -15% 
 HR || -17% || -22% || -4% || -9% || -9% || -16% 
 IT || -25% || -30% || -4% || -6% || -10% || -15% 
 CY || -22% || -24% || -4% || -5% || -8% || -11% 
 LV || -1% || 5% || -14% || -14% || -27% || -31% 
 LT || -6% || -15% || -6% || -12% || -16% || -22% 
 LU || -16% || -18% || -4% || -4% || -10% || -11% 
 HU || -27% || -33% || -3% || -7% || -9% || -11% 
 MT || -43% || -49% || -3% || -5% || -6% || -8% 
 NL || -12% || -20% || -3% || -9% || -14% || -17% 
 AT || -12% || -23% || -2% || -8% || -10% || -11% 
 PL || 9% || -5% || -6% || -7% || -14% || -9% 
 PT || -29% || -41% || -2% || -6% || -7% || -10% 
 RO || -15% || -20% || 0% || -4% || -9% || -10% 
 SI || -15% || -18% || -6% || -9% || -14% || -18% 
 SK || -14% || -17% || -3% || -6% || -8% || -14% 
 FI || -9% || -14% || -3% || -7% || -11% || -22% 
 SE || -10% || -16% || -4% || -7% || -13% || -18% 
 UK || -28% || -38% || -2% || -7% || -10% || -12% 
Table 32: Projected Member State GHG reductions in
non-ETS sectors vs 2005
 % GHG reductions in       non- ETS || Reference 2030 || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/RES35 
 EU || -20% || -6% || -10% || -14% || -14% 
 BE || -15% || -6% || -9% || -17% || -17% 
 BG || -13% || -6% || -12% || -13% || -12% 
 CZ || -10% || -5% || -13% || -17% || -17% 
 DK || -20% || -6% || -11% || -13% || -13% 
 DE || -33% || -5% || -8% || -14% || -13% 
 EE || -9% || -8% || -14% || -19% || -17% 
 IE || -7% || -7% || -14% || -18% || -17% 
 EL || -32% || -4% || -7% || -9% || -9% 
 ES || -13% || -7% || -10% || -14% || -14% 
 FR || -23% || -6% || -11% || -15% || -15% 
 HR || -12% || -7% || -13% || -15% || -16% 
 IT || -23% || -5% || -8% || -12% || -11% 
 CY || -11% || -7% || -9% || -14% || -13% 
 LV || -3% || -8% || -14% || -18% || -15% 
 LT || -9% || -9% || -14% || -19% || -17% 
 LU || -16% || -4% || -4% || -11% || -11% 
 HU || -19% || -4% || -10% || -14% || -14% 
 MT || -17% || -6% || -10% || -12% || -11% 
 NL || -20% || -5% || -8% || -12% || -13% 
 AT || -19% || -5% || -8% || -13% || -13% 
 PL || 7% || -10% || -19% || -24% || -21% 
 PT || -24% || -5% || -10% || -11% || -11% 
 RO || -6% || -6% || -12% || -13% || -14% 
 SI || -5% || -6% || -9% || -15% || -15% 
 SK || -6% || -5% || -11% || -16% || -16% 
 FI || -21% || -4% || -9% || -12% || -10% 
 SE || -21% || -4% || -8% || -12% || -11% 
 UK || -25% || -5% || -10% || -14% || -14% 
Without prejudice to a
future assessment of means of meeting a potential 2030 target for RES, 
Table 33 provides, for the
same scenarios the range of percentage of RES in final energy demand that would
follow from a cost-efficient deployment on the EU level[136], compared
to the 2020 targets and the 2030 projections under the Reference Scenario.
Table 33: Projected Member State renewable energy
share in final energy consumption
 % RES Share in final energy || RES target 2020 || Reference 2030 || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 
 EU || 20% || 24% || 1% || 1% || 6% || 11% 
 BE || 13% || 16% || 1% || 1% || 7% || 9% 
 BG || 16% || 20% || 2% || 0% || 8% || 14% 
 CZ || 13% || 15% || 0% || 0% || 2% || 6% 
 DK || 30% || 37% || 3% || 1% || 7% || 11% 
 DE || 18% || 25% || 1% || 2% || 5% || 10% 
 EE || 25% || 32% || -1% || -3% || 8% || 15% 
 IE || 16% || 24% || 3% || 1% || 5% || 10% 
 EL || 18% || 21% || 4% || 4% || 8% || 15% 
 ES || 20% || 24% || 1% || 0% || 4% || 12% 
 FR || 23% || 28% || 1% || 1% || 9% || 18% 
 HR || 20% || 24% || 0% || 1% || 5% || 12% 
 IT || 17% || 20% || 1% || 0% || 6% || 7% 
 CY || 13% || 22% || 1% || 0% || 2% || 6% 
 LV || 40% || 37% || 6% || 1% || 14% || 17% 
 LT || 23% || 22% || 1% || 1% || 17% || 28% 
 LU || 11% || 11% || 1% || 0% || 1% || 2% 
 HU || 13% || 15% || 0% || 1% || 4% || 13% 
 MT || 10% || 25% || 1% || 1% || 3% || 5% 
 NL || 14% || 18% || 0% || 1% || 6% || 8% 
 AT || 34% || 39% || 1% || 2% || 5% || 7% 
 PL || 15% || 18% || 0% || 0% || 3% || 4% 
 PT || 31% || 42% || 0% || 0% || 3% || 6% 
 RO || 24% || 29% || 0% || -1% || 2% || 7% 
 SI || 25% || 28% || 2% || 2% || 5% || 14% 
 SK || 14% || 17% || 1% || 0% || 6% || 12% 
 FI || 38% || 38% || 1% || 0% || 10% || 26% 
 SE || 49% || 54% || 2% || 1% || 7% || 16% 
 UK || 15% || 18% || 2% || 1% || 8% || 10% 

5.9.1.2.    
Energy system costs, investments and electricity
prices

As discussed above, the
model runs are based on the assumption that EU-wide targets are met in a
cost-optimal way, given existing policies and assumed future policies of the
Member States already reflected in the Reference Scenario. The scenario results
show that such cost-optimal pathways would tend to lead to higher relative investment
expenditures and system costs (as a percentage of GDP) in lower-income Member
States, reflecting e.g. sometimes higher potential for cost-efficient GHG
abatement, energy savings and RES deployment in those Member States. Moreover,
the "denominator effect" implies that the ratio between costs and GDP
is higher if GDP is lower. For the scenarios modelled, in the short term, these
costs are only partially compensated by energy savings (see Section 5.1).
On the other hand, benefits to air quality and human health are expected to be
higher in lower income Member States (see below). 
The tendency of lower
income Member States to have higher additional system costs as percentage of
GDP is illustrated below in Figure 6 for the -40% GHG only scenario. Spreads
in other scenarios are of similar shape but with a size proportional to the
average cost of the scenario. Note that the numbers for system costs do not
take into account the existing redistribution between Member States of
allowances within the EU-ETS.
Figure 6: Rise in average system costs, 2030,
compared to Reference, as a % of GDP for the GHG40 scenario, compared to the GDP/capita in 2010. The EU average rise is 0.15%.
Table 34 and Table 35 give an overview in the form of ranges of impacts compared
to Reference for the option with 35% GHG reduction and EE policies, scenarios achieving
a 40% GHG reduction and the option with 45% GHG reduction, ambitious EE
policies and a 35% RES target, for system costs ranges, investment expenditures
and electricity price impacts. 
Higher system costs are
associated with increased investment expenditures, which compared to GDP, are
typically higher in lower income Member States. Similarly increased investment
expenditures impact electricity prices with electricity price increase smaller
or even negative for the option with least emissions reductions mainly achieved
through more energy efficiency (the option with 35% GHG reduction and EE
policies), and on the opposite side the option with highest investments in EE
and RES (option with 45% GHG reduction, ambitious EE policies and a 35% RES
target) seeing strong electricity price increase. 
But it should be noted
that for the scenarios that invest in ambitious energy efficiency measures
without ambitious RES, cost decreases for electricity prices are actually
highest for lower income countries. This underlines that ambitious EE reduces
the pressure for additional investments in the power sector, thus lowering
electricity prices. 
Table 34: Projected system costs and investments
increases for the policy scenarios compared to the Reference
   || System Costs as a % of GDP in 2030, 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points || Average Annual Investment Expenditures as a % of Average Yearly GDP for 2011-2030, 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 || GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 
 EU || 0.03% || 0.15% || 0.54% || 0.84% || 0.12% || 0.21% || 0,44% || 0.73% 
 BE || 0.16% || 0.20% || 1.05% || 1.24% || 0.22% || 0.27% || 0,68% || 0.90% 
 BG || 0.47% || 0.41% || 2.21% || 3.07% || 0.29% || 0.43% || 1,02% || 1.60% 
 CZ || 0.01% || 0.30% || 0.62% || 0.79% || 0.19% || 0.32% || 0,65% || 0.83% 
 DK || 0.14% || 0.15% || 0.52% || 0.40% || 0.07% || 0.16% || 0,30% || 0.40% 
 DE || 0.05% || 0.28% || 0.78% || 0.90% || 0.11% || 0.22% || 0,44% || 0.61% 
 EE || -0.04% || 0.26% || 1.02% || 1.35% || 0.11% || 0.43% || 0,94% || 1.19% 
 IE || 0.06% || 0.10% || 0.36% || 0.37% || 0.10% || 0.13% || 0,34% || 0.40% 
 EL || 0.33% || 0.20% || 1.08% || 1.38% || 0.29% || 0.23% || 0,60% || 0.83% 
 ES || 0.10% || 0.12% || 0.46% || 0.91% || 0.11% || 0.15% || 0,33% || 0.61% 
 FR || -0.10% || -0.08% || 0.34% || 0.86% || 0.06% || 0.14% || 0,30% || 0.62% 
 HR || 0.05% || 0.22% || 0.87% || 0.99% || 0.09% || 0.32% || 0,62% || 0.81% 
 IT || 0.02% || 0.17% || 0.67% || 0.84% || 0.11% || 0.20% || 0,43% || 0.60% 
 CY || 0.25% || 0.07% || 0.56% || 0.84% || 0.10% || 0.17% || 0,35% || 0.63% 
 LV || 0.11% || 0.32% || 1.20% || 1.41% || 0.20% || 0.43% || 0,86% || 1.05% 
 LT || 0.25% || 0.32% || 1.92% || 2.23% || 0.23% || 0.39% || 0,91% || 1.51% 
 LU || -0.07% || 0.07% || 0.31% || 0.37% || 0.11% || 0.14% || 0,27% || 0.32% 
 HU || 0.25% || 0.18% || 1.00% || 1.33% || 0.35% || 0.43% || 1,03% || 1.36% 
 MT || 0.26% || 0.16% || 0.67% || 0.85% || 0.00% || 0.17% || 0,25% || 0.43% 
 NL || 0.28% || 0.19% || 1.13% || 1.31% || 0.21% || 0.25% || 0,64% || 0.83% 
 AT || -0.03% || 0.06% || 0.24% || 0.34% || 0.09% || 0.14% || 0,31% || 0.38% 
 PL || 0.14% || 0.32% || 0.99% || 1.35% || 0.20% || 0.40% || 0,72% || 0.97% 
 PT || 0.19% || 0.20% || 1.11% || 1.25% || 0.09% || 0.17% || 0,34% || 0.45% 
 RO || -0.11% || 0.22% || 0.65% || 1.22% || 0.11% || 0.34% || 0,62% || 0.96% 
 SI || -0.09% || 0.08% || 0.85% || 1.57% || 0.04% || 0.23% || 0,47% || 0.80% 
 SK || 0.06% || 0.17% || 0.64% || 0.84% || 0.19% || 0.31% || 0,66% || 0.96% 
 FI || -0.03% || 0.27% || 0.43% || 0.60% || 0.18% || 0.20% || 0,52% || 0.80% 
 SE || 0.02% || 0.18% || 0.25% || 0.74% || 0.10% || 0.18% || 0,33% || 0.51% 
 UK || -0.05% || 0.07% || 0.28% || 0.38% || 0.10% || 0.21% || 0,44% || 0.57% 
Table 35: Projected
average price of electricity in final demand sectors increases for the policy
scenarios compared to the Reference
 Average Price of Electricity (€/MWh), ||   Reference 2030 || 2030 policy scenarios percentage deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 
 EU || 176 || 0% || -1% || 3% || 11% 
 BE || 207 || -1% || -2% || 3% || 7% 
 BG || 115 || -1% || -6% || 7% || 8% 
 CZ || 154 || -1% || -14% || 7% || -5% 
 DK || 284 || 3% || 0% || 2% || 0% 
 DE || 240 || 0% || -1% || 4% || 5% 
 EE || 119 || -6% || -9% || 12% || 1% 
 IE || 173 || 2% || 0% || 3% || 4% 
 EL || 148 || -1% || -1% || 4% || 8% 
 ES || 162 || 1% || -1% || 3% || 16% 
 FR || 124 || -2% || -2% || 10% || 43% 
 HR || 141 || -1% || -7% || 1% || -2% 
 IT || 186 || 0% || -1% || 3% || 6% 
 CY || 131 || 2% || 2% || 5% || 14% 
 LV || 169 || -2% || -4% || 3% || 1% 
 LT || 153 || -7% || -10% || 12% || 31% 
 LU || 138 || 6% || 1% || 8% || 7% 
 HU || 137 || -3% || -5% || 3% || 3% 
 MT || 150 || 1% || 1% || 6% || 12% 
 NL || 205 || 0% || 0% || 6% || 12% 
 AT || 161 || -3% || -4% || -1% || -2% 
 PL || 157 || -4% || -8% || 9% || 1% 
 PT || 137 || 4% || 1% || 5% || 6% 
 RO || 116 || -6% || -6% || 4% || 5% 
 SI || 155 || -8% || -4% || 6% || 15% 
 SK || 136 || 0% || -3% || 3% || 3% 
 FI || 162 || 0% || -5% || 3% || -1% 
 SE || 137 || 2% || 2% || 3% || 18% 
 UK || 204 || 1% || 2% || 4% || 9% 
The higher effort
compared to GDP by lower income Member States suggests that compensatory
measures and / or target differentiation to ensure an equitable 2030 framework
will remain necessary. However, energy systems costs are to some extent
compensated by positive impacts on energy security and health, and this should
also be taken into account. Possible equity mechanisms will be discussed later
in this Section.
The size and scope of
the equity challenge depends on the combination of targets and policies finally
chosen and the manner how they will be implemented, but also on the way to
define what would be an equitable distribution of efforts. There is no single,
objective metric to measure the equity challenge and way of addressing
imbalances. 
As
an illustration, one could calculate the increases in energy system costs
compared to Reference for achieving an EU-wide 40% GHG reduction, in so far as
they are above the EU average cost increases, for those Member States
with a 2010 GDP/capita lower than 90% of the EU average, for different combinations
of EE policies and RES targets. This gives an indication of the level of
transfers that would be needed to bring costs per GDP to equal levels with the
EU average for the lower income Member States. The average annual transfer
needed would be some  € 1.7 to 4.6 billion per year on average 2021 to 2030 in
scenarios resulting in 40% GHG reductions in 2030. The figures are €1.4 billion
for the GHG35 scenario with moderate energy efficiency policies and €4.8
billion for the scenario which reduces 45% GHG with ambitious energy efficiency
and 35% RES. 

5.9.1.3.    
Environmental and health impacts

The environmental and
health benefits received by the Member States should also be taken into account
when considering costs and benefits. Reduced fossil fuel consumption improves
health conditions through lower emissions of pollutants and lowers costs for
air pollution control with benefits being disproportionately larger in lower
income Member States expressed as a % of GPD and much larger in scenarios with
ambitious energy efficiency policies and a renewables target. See also Table 36 and Table 37.
Table 36:
Monetised health benefits in 2030 as a percentage of
GDP 
 Health benefits in 2030 as % of GDP || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level,                          in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Range scenarios with -40% GHG reduction || GHG45/EE/ RES35 
 Low valuation || High valuation || Low valuation || High valuation || Low valuation || High valuation 
 Min. || Max. || Min. || Max. 
 EU28 || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,03% || 0,08% || 0,07% || 0,18% || 0,09% || 0,21% 
 BE || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,04% || 0,10% || 0,04% || 0,10% 
 BG || 0,14% || 0,31% || 0,18% || 0,37% || 0,42% || 0,86% || 0,55% || 1,26% 
 CZ || 0,05% || 0,13% || 0,06% || 0,20% || 0,14% || 0,46% || 0,21% || 0,48% 
 DK || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,02% || 0,05% || 0,02% || 0,05% 
 DE || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,05% || 0,04% || 0,11% || 0,08% || 0,17% 
 EE || 0,02% || 0,06% || 0,00% || 0,11% || 0,01% || 0,25% || 0,11% || 0,26% 
 IE || 0,00% || -0,01% || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,01% || 0,03% 
 EL || 0,06% || 0,13% || 0,06% || 0,12% || 0,13% || 0,28% || 0,17% || 0,40% 
 ES || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,02% || 0,05% || 0,04% || 0,12% || 0,05% || 0,11% 
 FR || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,01% || 0,05% || 0,03% || 0,11% || 0,04% || 0,10% 
 HR || 0,04% || 0,08% || 0,04% || 0,11% || 0,10% || 0,25% || 0,12% || 0,27% 
 IT || 0,05% || 0,11% || 0,04% || 0,12% || 0,09% || 0,27% || 0,14% || 0,32% 
 CY || 0,00% || 0,00% || 0,00% || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% 
 LV || 0,04% || 0,09% || 0,03% || 0,16% || 0,06% || 0,36% || 0,15% || 0,35% 
 LT || 0,04% || 0,09% || 0,04% || 0,15% || 0,10% || 0,34% || 0,14% || 0,33% 
 LU || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,01% || 0,04% || 0,02% || 0,04% 
 HU || 0,06% || 0,14% || 0,08% || 0,20% || 0,17% || 0,47% || 0,21% || 0,50% 
 MT || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,03% || 0,06% || 0,03% || 0,06% 
 NL || 0,00% || 0,00% || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,04% || 0,09% || 0,05% || 0,11% 
 AT || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,02% || 0,05% || 0,04% || 0,12% || 0,06% || 0,13% 
 PL || 0,14% || 0,32% || 0,15% || 0,69% || 0,36% || 1,59% || 0,66% || 1,53% 
 PT || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,02% || 0,09% || 0,05% || 0,20% || 0,08% || 0,18% 
 RO || 0,09% || 0,20% || 0,15% || 0,40% || 0,35% || 0,92% || 0,47% || 1,09% 
 SI || 0,04% || 0,10% || 0,05% || 0,12% || 0,10% || 0,27% || 0,12% || 0,28% 
 SK || 0,04% || 0,08% || 0,05% || 0,14% || 0,11% || 0,33% || 0,14% || 0,31% 
 FI || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,02% || 0,07% || 0,04% || 0,08% 
 SE || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,01% || 0,02% 
 UK || -0,02% || -0,04% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,03% || 0,06% || 0,01% || 0,03% 
Source:
Mortality impacts based on IIASA (2013), Health benefit valuation uses
valuation of mortality (value of life year lost) used for the Thematic Strategy
on Air Pollution of €57700 (low estimate) and €133000 (High estimate) 
Table 37:
reduced air pollution control costs by 2030 as a percentage of GDP
 2030 reduced air pollution control costs as % of GDP || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points || 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 || 
 EU28 || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,04% 
 BE || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 BG || 0,05% || 0,08% || 0,18% || 0,42% 
 CZ || 0,01% || -0,01% || 0,03% || 0,04% 
 DK || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,03% 
 DE || -0,01% || 0,00% || 0,02% || 0,04% 
 EE || -0,05% || -0,01% || 0,08% || 0,13% 
 IE || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,02% 
 EL || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,05% || 0,09% 
 ES || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,04% || 0,05% 
 FR || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 HR || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,03% || 0,05% 
 IT || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,05% 
 CY || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 LV || 0,03% || 0,01% || 0,08% || 0,08% 
 LT || 0,02% || 0,01% || 0,05% || 0,05% 
 LU || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,04% || 0,04% 
 HU || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,05% 
 MT || 0,00% || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% 
 NL || 0,00% || 0,02% || 0,04% || 0,05% 
 AT || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 PL || 0,04% || 0,05% || 0,07% || 0,08% 
 PT || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 RO || -0,01% || 0,04% || 0,07% || 0,13% 
 SI || 0,03% || 0,05% || 0,10% || 0,12% 
 SK || 0,01% || 0,00% || 0,02% || 0,05% 
 FI || 0,01% || 0,02% || 0,05% || 0,08% 
 SE || 0,01% || 0,01% || 0,03% || 0,03% 
 UK || -0,01% || 0,00% || 0,01% || 0,01% 
Source: IIASA (2013)
Figure 7: Health benefits per Member State as % of
2030 GDP compared to Reference (using low value of life year lost estimates),
relative to GDP per capita 
(Note scale differences of Y-axes)
 
Source:
IIASA (2013), Benefit valuation uses valuation of mortality (value of life year
lost) used for the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution of €57000 (Low estimate) 
Overall health benefits
for scenarios that reduce emissions by 40% for Member States with a 2010
GDP/capita lower than 90% of the EU average, and that have system costs higher
than the EU average, are in the range of € 1.8 to 6.4 billion assuming a low
value of life year lost estimate and in the range of € 4.1 to 14.8 billion
assuming a high value of life year lost estimate. Air pollution control costs
decrease between € 0.67 and 0.95 billion compared to Reference for this group
of countries for scenarios reducing 40% GHG emissions.

5.9.1.4.    
Energy Purchases

As a percentage of GDP,
it is countries with a 2010 GDP/capita lower than 90% of the EU average which
see the greatest benefits. Energy purchases decline especially strongly in the
scenarios with ambitious energy efficiency policies.
Table 38 Reductions in energy purchases in 2030 as
a percentage of GDP, compared to the Reference Scenario
 2030 Energy Purchases  compared to Reference as a % of GDP || 2030 policy scenarios deviation from the Reference Scenario level, in percentage points 
 GHG35/EE || Minimum for GHG -40% scenarios || Maximum for  GHG- 40% scenarios || GHG45/EE/ RES35 
 EU || -0.47% || -0.20% || -0.78% || -0.59% 
 BE || -0.61% || -0.26% || -0.82% || -0.77% 
 BG || -1.34% || 0.00% || -2.23% || -1.54% 
 CZ || -0.77% || 0.15% || -1.70% || -1.47% 
 DK || -0.26% || -0.24% || -0.53% || -0.64% 
 DE || -0.54% || -0.18% || -0.87% || -0.85% 
 EE || -0.87% || -0.18% || -1.96% || -1.71% 
 IE || -0.27% || -0.18% || -0.46% || -0.48% 
 EL || -0.53% || -0.21% || -0.70% || -0.57% 
 ES || -0.41% || -0.14% || -0.63% || -0.28% 
 FR || -0.43% || -0.25% || -0.68% || -0.05% 
 HR || -0.52% || -0.36% || -1.28% || -1.19% 
 IT || -0.44% || -0.21% || -0.63% || -0.52% 
 CY || -0.45% || -0.17% || -0.96% || -0.73% 
 LV || -0.93% || -0.47% || -1.70% || -1.74% 
 LT || -0.89% || -0.21% || -1.38% || -0.58% 
 LU || -0.23% || -0.15% || -0.26% || -0.23% 
 HU || -0.83% || -0.46% || -1.69% || -1.70% 
 MT || -0.27% || -0.11% || -0.49% || -0.26% 
 NL || -0.42% || -0.22% || -0.62% || -0.58% 
 AT || -0.53% || -0.23% || -0.88% || -0.90% 
 PL || -0.93% || -0.09% || -1.85% || -1.74% 
 PT || -0.41% || -0.21% || -0.33% || -0.30% 
 RO || -0.91% || -0.28% || -1.73% || -1.48% 
 SI || -0.75% || -0.13% || -1.00% || -0.35% 
 SK || -0.51% || -0.29% || -1.19% || -1.03% 
 FI || -0.64% || -0.18% || -1.34% || -1.27% 
 SE || -0.39% || -0.19% || -0.79% || -0.33% 
 UK || -0.33% || -0.18% || -0.66% || -0.56% 

5.9.2.          
Meeting the equity challenge

If the distribution of
efforts based on cost-effective optimisation were to be regarded as
insufficiently fair, this could be addressed through various equity mechanisms.
These could in principle include the measures in place up to 2020, e.g.
differentiation of targets for non-ETS GHG reductions and RES, distribution of
EU-ETS auctioning revenues and leveraging private investment flows through
smart financial instruments. Any detailed assessment of impacts from various
approaches to target setting will be subject to separate Impact Assessments if
the Commission comes forward with dedicated proposals in this regard. Some
general considerations are found below. 

5.9.2.1.    
Leveraging private investment flows through
smart financial instruments

As discussed in Section
2.3,
even the Reference Scenario projections would require significant investment in
a 2030 perspective both on the supply and demand sides, e.g. for electricity
supply and for more efficient energy using equipment as well as building
insulation. The current economic crisis poses additional challenges in the
short term, as the cost and ability to finance the necessary investments varies
across Member States and sectors of the EU economy. A long term issue of
differing abilities is involved insofar as conditions for access to finance
remain different for governments, consumers and business across different
Member States.
The scenarios evaluated
in this Impact Assessment all result in additional investment expenditures,
with different impacts in different Member States. 
For illustrative
purposes, the analysed scenarios resulting in 40% GHG emission reductions imply
additional investment needs compared to the Reference scenario of some 11 to 21
€ billion annually on average between 2021 to 2030 in Member States with 2010
GDP/capita below 90% of the EU average. The additional investment needs above
EU average would be some 3.1 to 7.6 € billion annually on average between 2021
to 2030. 
To fund these long-term
investments, governments, households and businesses of all sizes need access to
long-term financing. As pointed out by the Commission’s Green Paper on Long
Term Financing[137],
getting the long-term financing process right is central to supporting
structural economic reform and returning to the long-run trend of sustainable
economic growth. 
A variety of financial
instruments could in principle be used to address the capacity
challenge, including EIB Bonds, the Project Bonds Initiative, Refinancing
Guarantees, Public-Private Risk Sharing Arrangements, etc. Importantly, these
instruments leverage private investment flows: a large investment flow could be
stimulated at relatively smaller fiscal cost. The sources and targets of these
flows could be chosen to alleviate the different capabilities of Member States
to finance long term investments in the energy system. Investors in the source
state would profit from relatively stable, low-risk revenues. The investment
flows to the target state would generate growth and jobs. 
In this regard, it
should be remembered that the EU already provides investment support for sustainable growth across
Member States, including by developing and deploying financial engineering
mechanisms. The five European
Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon2020 are of particular importance in
this regard. Investments in energy efficiency and the transformation of the
energy system are among the targets of these programmes. At least 20% of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework will be spent on climate action. For the year
2014 alone, the draft budget indicates that this represents approximately
€28billion.

5.9.2.2.    
Differentiation of ambition level for GHG
reductions for non-ETS

Without prejudice to a
future decision in this regard, the ambition level for GHG reductions in the
non-ETS sectors could in principle be differentiated by assigning a
proportionally higher effort to higher-income Member States, such that the
overall EU target is still reached. This approach was applied in the current
package[138]. 

The relative size of
emissions is such that, were differentiated targets to be applied, there is
scope to increase the ambition level in the Non ETS in higher income Member
States, in order to enable a lower ambition level in lower income Member
States. Member States with a GDP/capita above 110% of the EU average will
represent around 58% of total emissions in 2020, whereas this is only 20% for
Member States with a GDP/capita of less than 75% of the EU average. 
A disadvantage of continuing
with differentiated targets in the non-ETS sectors is that overall costs would
increase, if no cost efficient transfers would materialise and targets are met
predominantly domestically. The cost-effective potential in lower-income Member
States would then not be fully exploited. Examples include refurbishment of
housing and renewables development, both of which have more potential in some
relatively lower income Member States than in some relatively higher income
ones, but which would require higher relative investment rates compared to GDP
in those countries.
Furthermore, given the
higher ambition levels foreseen for 2030, such a differentiation could pose
greater challenges than in the 2020 Package. The scenarios achieving 40% GHG
reductions compared to 1990 show that an EU-wide reduction of 30% to 35% will
be required in non-ETS sectors compared to 2005. Keeping a similarly large
spread in targets as in the current package for 2020 (the spread was 40
percentage points from -20% to + 20% depending on the Member State) would lead
to very high ambition levels for some higher-income Member States whose
domestic potential for making such reductions is relatively limited. The
scenario that would result in 35% GHG reductions in 2030 would imply lower reductions
in the non-ETS sectors, resulting in lesser efforts needed in all Member
States.
It is however not
necessary that such targets are met domestically. Flexibility mechanisms
already exist in the Effort Sharing Decision which allow for allowance transfers
between Member States. The current Impact Assessment does not estimate at what
ambition level differentiated targets could be set, taking into account the
flexibility to trade in the Non ETS. It does not assess how the framework for
allowance transfers in the Non ETS can be improved to ensure that indeed cost
efficiency through transfers is reached and that tangible benefits arise for
those Member States overshooting targets. The use of such transfers, together
with financial instruments, could help as a catalyst for energy-efficiency
investments, that may be cost-effective in lower income Member States, but
whose citizens have a lower ability to finance upfront investments. 

5.9.2.3.    
Distribution of EU-ETS Auctioning Revenues

Under the current EU-ETS,
88% of allowances to be auctioned are distributed to the Member States on the
basis of their share of verified emissions from EU-ETS installations in 2005.
10% are allocated to the least wealthy EU Member States as an additional source
of revenue to help them invest in reducing the carbon intensity of their
economies and adapting to climate change. The remaining 2% is given as a 'Kyoto
bonus' to nine EU Member States which by 2005 had reduced their greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 20% of levels in their Kyoto Protocol base year or
period. 
Such redistributive
mechanisms could be continued up to 2030, with the value of such transfers
depending on the (rising) CO2 prices and the number of auctioned allowances,
which would decline under current policies. The below table gives an indication
of the size of auctioning revenues expected for different scenarios, for
auctioning to the power sector only and full ETS auctioning. 
The extent to which
revenue from auctioning would be used in a targeted manner towards e.g. demonstration
and deployment of promising new technologies (such as what is currently done
with the so called NER 300) would lower the amounts available purely for
distribution between Member States.
Table 39:
Auctioning revenue projections in options achieving 40% GHG reductions and
assuming different coverage of scope of sectors covered by auctioning
 Billions of Euros || Auctioning only in the power sector || Auctioning in all ETS sectors 
   || 2030 || Average 2021-2030 || 2030 || Average 2021-2030 
 Reference || 27 || 17 || 56 || 34 
 35% GHG + EE || 20 || 13 || 43 || 27 
 40%GHG Reference settings || 34 || 23 || 77 || 48 
 40% GHG Enabling settings || 25 || 18 || 57 || 37 
 40% GHG + EE || 17 || 14 || 35 || 28 
 40% GHG 30% RES + EE || 7 || 8 || 16 || 17 
 45% GHG 35% RES + EE || 7 || 9 || 18 || 20 
Under the assumption that
free allocation would continue outside the power sector also post 2020, 12% of
the auctioning revenue (the share currently used to address distributional
aspects) would amount to 0.8 to 2.8 billion € on an annual basis over the
period 2021-2030. (These figures can be compared with the above average system
costs in countries with GDP/capita below 90% of the EU average, as discussed in
the previous Section). 
Depending on the scenario,
and the desired results for equity, a higher share of auctioning revenue would
have to be used to address distributional issues if this were to be the only
means of addressing it. The
potential could increase by expanding auctioning to other sectors or the scope of
EU-ETS as a whole (impacts and challenges of these options are discussed in Annex
7.8), or expanding the share of auctioning revenue used for
distributional purposes. In this context, it should also be kept in mind that
projections of the ETS price are associated with significant uncertainty (see Section
5.1.4.1), which may impact the perceived value of future redistribution. 
The main conclusions of this Section are that if 2030 climate
and energy targets are met in a cost-efficient manner on the aggregate EU
level, costs relative to GDP are typically highest in lower income Member
States and in scenarios that require highest investment expenditures due to
ambitious EE and RES. At the same time, environmental and health benefits as
well as fuel savings are also highest in these countries. Several options, all
needing further assessment, have been identified that could help to address
these distributional issues so as to allow an equitable outcome. 

6.                      
Comparing options / Conclusions

As explained in Section
4, the main policy options
assessed by this Impact Assessment relate to the combination and ambition level
of potential headline climate and energy targets for 2030, including
information on possible policy options to implement these. On the basis of the
extensive analysis of the seven representative scenarios in Section 5. Section 6.1 provides a detailed comparison of the
scenarios used to evaluate and compare the policy options whereas Section 6.2 compares the trade-offs between the main
policy options.

6.1.                
Comparing the scenarios

Table 40 give an overview of the main impacts of the different scenarios
assessed. All impacts are with respect to 2030 if not otherwise stated, while
keeping in mind that impacts and differences between scenarios may be quite
different in a post 2030 perspective, as further explained in Section 5.1 and illustrated by the Low carbon Economy
Roadmap and the Energy Roadmap 2050.

6.1.1.          
Environmental impacts

All scenarios demonstrate reduced GHG
emissions compared to the Reference scenario. With respect to 1990 levels, the
reduction levels are inherent in the scenario definition and for this reason
lower in GHG35/EE® and GHG37® and higher in GHG45/EE/RES35. Scenarios differ
however with regard to the balance of GHG reductions in the various sectors of
the economy: scenarios with ambitious energy efficiency policies typically
reducing GHG emissions more in the sectors outside of the ETS. In most
scenarios, the power sector reduces emissions most compared to 2005 levels and
the transport and agriculture sector reducing least. In scenarios with
strong energy efficiency policies but without an explicit renewables target,
reductions in the residential sector are substantial at levels similar of that
of the power sector.
Emissions and absorptions from Land Use,
Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) are somewhat increased by increased
production and consumption of renewable energy (and thus increased bio-energy
demand) if increased demand for bio-energy is met largely through increased use
of perennial energy crops. The eventual impact on GHG emissions would also
depend in part on type of crops used and farming practices, as well as land use
changes outside Europe to the extent imports are impacted.
With respect to pollutant emissions, all
scenarios evaluated in this regard show clear benefits with respect to the
Reference scenario, with more pronounced benefits in scenarios with ambitious
energy efficiency policies and RES targets, due to the resulting reduction of
fossil fuel consumption.

6.1.2.          
Energy system impacts

All scenarios show reduced energy
consumption (both primary and final) compared to the Reference scenario, with
more pronounced energy savings and improved energy intensity in scenarios with
strong energy efficiency policies, with highest improvements in those scenarios
that next to ambitious energy efficiency policies also include  a renewables
target. 
The share of renewables increase modestly
compared to the Reference scenario in the scenarios led by GHG emission
reductions, but are more pronounced in scenarios with explicit renewables
targets (at levels inherent with the design of such scenarios). Without a
dedicated RES target for 2030, the pull effect of GHG reduction is projected to
lead to RES shares ranging from 25% to 27% in 2030, depending on the level of
the GHG target being 35% or 40%. The joint renewables share for electricity and
heating & cooling is 34%, whereas this increases to 40% for the scenario
that also achieves an overall renewables target of 30%.
The consumption of fossil fuels is
projected to decrease in all scenarios compared to the Reference scenario, with
higher reduction levels for gas and oil in particular in scenarios with
ambitious energy efficiency policies. The use of oil and natural gas in
particular is further reduced in scenarios with ambitious energy efficiency
policies. As regards nuclear energy, the scenario driven by a GHG target
projects no change in 2030, whereas scenarios with explicit renewables targets
demonstrate significant decreases. Explicit energy efficiency policies also
reduce the share of nuclear, but to a lesser degree. The share of CCS in power
generation is projected to be lower than in the Reference scenario in scenarios
with more ambitious energy efficiency policies and a renewables target,
reflecting the lower projected incentives from the ETS in those scenarios.

6.1.3.          
Economic impacts

Energy system costs increase in all
scenarios compared to the Reference scenario, albeit by less than the projected
increase under the Reference scenario itself. Energy system costs increases can
be lower with relatively lower ambition levels for energy efficiency policies.
It is noteworthy that adding a 30% renewables target to a scenario with GHG
emissions reduction of 40% if combined with ambitious energy efficiency
policies has a very marginal impact on total energy system costs. The
components of system costs change in the scenarios compared to the Reference
scenario, with more pronounced capital costs and lower operational costs due to
fuel savings. This tendency is more pronounced in scenarios with ambitious
energy efficiency policies, reflected in higher investment needs in such
scenarios, in particular in the built-up segment.
Electricity prices are
projected to be relatively similar to the Reference scenario, which in itself
demonstrates significant increases, with a containing impact of energy
efficiency policies in those scenarios including them. Adding a renewables
target to a given scenario results in electricity price increases, although
impacts are very limited in the case of a 30% renewables target. Without
ambitious EE policies, the impact of higher renewables penetration on
electricity prices would be higher, underlining the important interactions
between the two policy areas. 
The ETS price differs substantially across
the various scenarios, reflecting the positive contribution of both renewables
and energy efficiency to emission reductions in the ETS sectors. At the same
time, such policies reduce both costs and incentives from the ETS itself for
other types of abatement.
Energy costs (including capital and
operational costs) relative to added value in the energy intensive sectors
increase in all scenarios, with slightly more in scenarios including explicit
energy efficiency policies.
GDP impacts for scenarios reducing
emissions by 40% GHG can be either negative or positive. This depends to a
large extent on the future approach to auctioning and CO2 taxation in the
non-ETS sectors and the use of the related revenue. Furthermore, for the
scenarios evaluated in this regard, impacts on GDP are generally speaking
projected to be positive in scenarios with explicit energy efficiency polices. 
Impacts on the sector level differ, but the
positive impact from international climate action and the possibility for
international emissions trading is noticeable for most energy intensive
sectors. Overall, in the case of insufficiently strong global action, the
results suggest that free allocation can have a positive impact on these sectors,
notably for sectors that are not including the opportunity cost of free
allocation in the price of their products.

6.1.4.          
Social impacts

The overall net employment impacts, as for
GDP, depend on the approach to auctioning in the ETS and CO2 taxation in the
non-ETS sectors. Employment impacts are positively impacted by using carbon
pricing revenue to lower labour costs. The analysis also suggests that the
employment effect will overall be positive in scenarios with ambitious energy
efficiency policies (in part through the associated investments) and renewables
targets, reflecting the significant job-creation potential in these areas.
Whereas relatively small impacts on the
overall employment level are expected, significant shifts in employment among
or within sectors are expected. Such impacts will require the implementation of
adequate labour market policies. Employment impacts are in particular projected
to be negative for instance for energy extraction sectors, compensated by
employment increases in for instance engineering, basic manufacturing,
transport equipment, construction sector and business services. 
Health impacts are expected to be positive
in all scenarios due to lower pollutant emissions from the energy system, with
these impacts being more pronounced in scenarios with ambitious energy
efficiency policies and renewable energy targets due to the resulting higher
reduction of fossil fuel consumption.
Affordability of energy for households is
negatively affected under the Reference scenario, but is not significantly
impacted compared to the Reference scenario in the scenarios resulting in GHG
reductions of 35 or 40% (see above on energy prices). Post 2030, energy prices
and costs for households are projected to increase significantly in scenarios
not including ambitious energy efficiency policies. As such, energy efficiency
improvements typically need investment resulting in capital cost increases in
such scenarios. The extent to which households are able to proceed with such
investment depends on the means of financing it.

6.1.5.          
Distributional impacts

The analysis indicates that provided that
the EU as such applies a cost-effective approach to meeting the 2030 targets,
the efforts needed in lower income Member States are relatively larger than for
higher income countries, with relatively higher increases in investments and
energy system costs compared to GDP, but also relatively higher benefits in
terms of, for example, fuel savings and related impacts on trade balances, as
well as for air quality and health. Several distributional mechanisms are
conceivable to allow for more equitable outcomes, such as differentiation of
targets, the distribution of auctioning revenues and the use of smart financial
instruments, structural funds etc. Such options should be analysed in more
detail when preparing legislative proposals.

6.2.                
General impacts and trade-offs between policy
options

As mentioned in Section
1.2, there is a broad agreement
among stakeholders and Member States that the EU should agree on a 2030 target
for GHG emissions, while there are diverging views on what the appropriate
ambition level should be and how to relate to international developments in the
climate change area. 
As regards the other
headline targets for 2020 (renewables share and energy savings), there are
mixed views on whether the progress in this regard in a 2030 perspective would
necessitate dedicated targets, and if yes, at what level such targets should be
set. In this context, and on the basis of the extensive analysis in Section 5, the main policy choices centre around
three issues, while at the same time recalling that other aspects of the
competitiveness of the energy system and security of energy supply are equally
important in a 2030 perspective: 
i)    only a GHG
target, or also including targets for Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency;
ii)   the level and
coherence of the targets 
iii)  the interlink
with global climate action 
There are several important trade-offs.

6.2.1.          
Only a GHG target, or several targets

·              
A single GHG target would have the advantage of
reduced complexity of the 2030 framework and would in principle allow to
achieve GHG reductions cost efficiently. Nevertheless, this may risk to not
sufficiently reflect the complexity of energy objectives in a 2030 perspective
which in addition to environmental sustainability (including GHG reductions)
are competitiveness and security of supply. 
·              
Whatever the policy choice dedicated energy
efficiency and renewables policies, including in the sectors outside the ETS
will be required to transform the energy system and achieve the GHG reduction
efficiently in order to address market failures, imperfect information, and
investor certainty; thereby better ensuring that the necessary investment takes
place. 
·              
A single GHG target would in principle treat
options for GHG reductions in a non-discriminatory and technology neutral way
without preferential treatment of energy efficiency or renewable energy.
However, higher efforts geared towards energy efficiency and renewable energy
beyond what is needed to achieve a GHG target would result in higher benefits
relating to e.g. improvements in fuel efficiency, security of supply, reduction
of the negative trade balance for fossil fuels, environmental impacts and
health. For example, a single GHG target without more ambitious RES and energy
efficiency targets is expected to result in lower positive impacts on the EU's
negative trade balance (net energy imports) in a 2030 perspective and beyond.
It is also expected to result in lower GDP and employment compared to a
Framework based on more ambitious targets for also renewables and energy
efficiency. Macro-economic benefits associated with the recycling of auctioning
revenues into lower labour costs would increase. 
·              
A single GHG target would result in lower energy
related cost increases and necessary investments if met in an optimal way as
represented by the use of carbon values in the modelling approach compared to a
situation with 3 targets if renewable and energy efficiency targets would be
set at a level above their cost-effective potential to meet the GHG target. The
containing impact on the ETS price is substantial from a Framework that would
include set ambitions levels or strong policies for also renewables and energy
efficiency. This would have a direct positive impact on the ETS compliance
costs for sectors with a risk of carbon leakage as well as on the indirect
impact of the ETS on electricity prices if objectives would be met in a
cost-effective manner on the EU level. At the same time, renewables and energy
efficiency investment going beyond what is needed to achieve cost-effectively a
certain GHG target, would come with additional capital costs and lower
operational costs only in the medium to long term, which overall would result
in higher energy system costs, while the effects will differ among consumer
groups depending on how these investments are financed. 

6.2.2.          
The level of the targets
6.2.2.1.    
The GHG target

·                        
A 40% GHG target would ensure that the EU is on
the Low-Carbon Economy Roadmap's cost-effective track towards meeting the EU's
2050 GHG objective to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95 percent in 2050 compared to
1990, in the context of necessary reductions by developed countries as a group.
While that 2050 target could in principle be reached also with a 35 percent
target for 2050, the Commission's current analysis suggests that it would come
with additional costs over the entire time period, up to 2050, while having
lower costs in a 2030 perspective. Moreover, health benefits and impacts on the
energy trade balance are larger with a higher level of ambition.  
·                        
The 2020 target implies a 20 percent reduction
over three decades and a 40 percent target in 2030 would imply the same
reductions in one decade, strictly looking at the targets. On the other hand,
so far we have achieved 18% reduction in 22 years (1990-2012), and going to a
40% target would mean a further 22% reduction in 18 years (2013-2030).
·                        
The EU's unilateral 20% GHG target for 2020
appears to have been more successful in inducing other countries pledges than
the conditional 30% GHG target for 2020.A 40% target would give a strong
message to the international community in the process leading up to the
international climate conference in 2015, expected to reach agreement on the
global approach to GHG abatement for the period post 2020. At the same time,
keeping in mind that the EU's agreed 2050 GHG objective can only be met through
international climate action it leaves the  question open if the EU's initial
contribution to an international agreement  should be lower
·                        
Specifically for the ETS:
·        
A 35% GHG target would not require a change to
the current Linear Reduction Factor, whereas a 40 or 45% GHG target would
require a change. 
·        
In both cases the ETS will be confronted with a
large surplus of allowances in the short to mid-term, which may affect
investment decisions negatively and results in sub-optimal investment decisions
which risks not meeting the level of the emissions cap in 2030, indicating that
a structural measure that improves the functioning of the ETS is required. 
·        
As long as other
regions do not take comparable action on climate change, continued free
allocation on the basis of periodically updated benchmarks can be a suitable
tool to address the risk on carbon leakage, if focussed on industries that
cannot easily differentiate prices from those of outside competitors. 
·                        
A 40% GHG target, and notably if coupled with
stronger energy efficiency and renewable measures, would result in stronger
benefits in terms of the energy independency, the EU's external fuel bill and
health impacts. This increases investments in goods and sectors that benefit
the EU's GDP, employment and competitiveness in new growth sectors. There is no
universal way of quantifying the economic value of such benefits and costs and
the net impact to the society considering higher energy system costs and energy
investments are difficult to determine.

6.2.2.2.    
Other targets

·                        
As regards renewables, is clear that a high
level of ambition would come with significant benefits in terms of greater
reliance on indigenous energy sources and the associated benefits in terms of
energy trade balance (to the extent that renewables no not replace other
domestic energy sources). A high level of ambition would also better drive
growth in the renewables sector. At the same time, the level of ambition must
be coherent with the overall level of ambition for GHG due to the multiple
interactions and not result in unwarranted impacts to continue with other
low-carbon energy sources incentivised by the ETS or result in unwarranted
restrictions of Member State flexibility to achieve GHG reductions outside the
ETS.
·                        
Moreover, a high level of ambition with regards
to renewable energy could be expected to necessitate deployment of a broader
range of renewables technologies, which could contribute to making less mature
technologies cost-competitive faster, and thereby ensure their long-term and
cost-efficient contribution to the transformation of the energy system also
post 2030. At the same time, a level of ambition that depends on deployment of
not yet cost competitive technologies would require specific measures beyond
for instance the incentives coming through the ETS and could thus come with
short to medium term cost increases, with associated operational cost savings
more tangible in the longer term. In addition, deployment of not yet
cost-competitive renewable energy may, depending on the specific supportive
framework, lead to tensions with the internal energy market and cause
competitiveness concerns for conventional energy sources needed also as the
energy system goes through the transition.
·                        
As regards energy efficiency, the trade-offs
between different levels of ambition is similar to that of renewables in the
sense that a high level of ambition could lead to short to medium term cost
increases that pay off only in the medium to long run. At the same time, a high
level of ambition has the potential to better contain the operational energy
cost impact of higher energy prices as well as the potential cost impacts of
ambitious GHG and renewables targets due to its lowering impact on reducing
total energy consumption itself, which is a key concern for certain energy
consumers. Moreover, given a certain GHG target to be achieved, health benefits
and impacts on the energy trade balance are larger with a higher level of
ambition regarding energy efficiency, which is also expected to lead to more
positive GDP and employment impacts. Again, this has to be weighed against
potential impacts on short to medium term cost increases.
Table 40:
Overview table with the key results for the IA for the different scenario
projections
   || Ref. || GHG35/EE ® || GHG37 ® || GHG40 ® || GHG40 || GHG40/EE || GHG40/ EE/RES30 || GHG45/  EE/RES35 
   || Main features scenarios 
 Reference or enabling conditions || Ref. || Ref. || Ref. || Ref. || Enabling || Enabling || Enabling || Enabling 
 GHG reductions vs 1990 || -32.4% || -35.4% || -37.0% || -40.4% || -40.6% || -40.3% || -40.7% || -45.1% 
 Renewables share[139] - Overall || 24.4% || 25.5% || 24.7% || 25.5% || 26.5% || 26.4% || 30.3% || 35.4% 
 Renewables share[140] - E-H&C || 31.0% || 32.6% || 31.6% || 32.9% || 34.2% || 34.1% || 39.7% || 47.3% 
 Energy savings[141] || -21.0% || -24.4% || -22.9% || -24.4% || -25.1% || -29.3% || -30.1% || -33.7% 
   || Other environmental impacts 
 GHG emissions reduction in ETS Sectors vs 2005 || -36% || -37% || -38% || -42% || -43% || -38% || -41% || -49% 
 GHG emissions reduction in non-ETS Sectors vs 2005 || -20% || -26% || -28% || -31% || -30% || -35% || -33% || -34% 
 CO2 emission reductions vs 2005 || -29% || -32% || -32% || -35% || -36% || -36% || -37% || -43% 
 Power generation +District Heating || -47% || -48% || -49% || -55% || -57% || -48% || -53% || -66% 
 Industry || -22% || -23% || -24% || -27% || -27% || -26% || -27% || -31% 
 Residential, Services & Agriculture || -31% || -36% || -38% || -41% || -39% || -49% || -47% || -49% 
 Transport || -12% || -15% || -12% || -12% || -14% || -20% || -19% || -19% 
 Non-CO2 emission reductions vs 2005 || -19% || -28% || -38% || -43% || -40% || -38% || -33% || -35% 
 Agriculture || -4% || -13% || -25% || -28% || -28% || -25% || -19% || -22% 
 Other non-CO2 sectors || -36% || -45% || -54% || -61% || -55% || -52% || -49% || -49% 
 Reduced pollution control & health damage costs (€bn/yr)[142] || n.a. || 3.8 to 7.6 || 4.2 to 8.8 || 8.6 to 17.1 || 7.2 to 13.5 || 17.4 to 34.8 || 16.7 to 33.2 || 21.9 to 41.5 
   || Ref. || GHG35/EE ® || GHG37 ® || GHG40 ® || GHG40 || GHG40/EE || GHG40/ EE/RES30 || GHG45/  EE/RES35 
 Import dependency || 55.1% || 53.7% || 55.1% || 54.8% || 53.6% || 52.8% || 51.8% || 52.3% 
 Net Energy Imports (2010=100) || 96 || 90 || 94 || 92 || 89 || 83 || 81 || 78 
 Net Imports of Gas (2010=100) || 105 || 91 || 100 || 99 || 91 || 82 || 74 || 72 
 Energy Intensity[143] (2010=100) || 67 || 64 || 66 || 65 || 64 || 60 || 60 || 57 
 Renewables share[144] - Overall || 24.4% || 25.5% || 24.7% || 25.5% || 26.5% || 26.4% || 30.3% || 35.4% 
 - share in heating & cooling || 23.8% || 24.6% || 24.4% || 25.5% || 25.9% || 25.8% || 30.6% || 35.2% 
 - share in electricity || 42.7% || 45.4% || 43.1% || 44.6% || 47.3% || 46.1% || 53.1% || 65.7% 
 - share in transport || 12.0% || 12.9% || 12.0% || 12.0% || 12.8% || 14.0% || 14.6% || 15.6% 
 - share in electricity – heat. & cool. || 31.0% || 32.2% || 31.6% || 32.9% || 34.2% || 34.1% || 39.7% || 47.3% 
   || Primary energy mix & Gross Electricity Generation 
 Primary Energy Consumption (Mtoe) || 1,611 || 1,542 || 1,576 || 1,548 || 1,534 || 1,448 || 1,433 || 1,364 
 - Solids share || 10.8% || 12.1% || 10.7% || 9.5% || 10.1% || 12.4% || 12.0% || 9.0% 
 - Oil share || 32.3% || 32.2% || 32.7% || 33.1% || 32.8% || 32.1% || 32.5% || 33.9% 
 - Natural gas share || 24.6% || 22.4% || 24.1% || 24.1% || 22.5% || 21.6% || 20.1% || 20.5% 
 - Nuclear share || 12.5% || 12.7% || 12.4% || 12.7% || 13.1% || 12.8% || 11.0% || 6.0% 
 - Renewables share || 19.9% || 20.7% || 20.1% || 20.8% || 21.6% || 21.2% || 24.5% || 30.6% 
 Gross Electricity Generation (TWh) || 3,664 || 3,531 || 3,586 || 3,534 || 3,532 || 3,431 || 3,428 || 3,279 
 - Gas share || 19.5% || 14.2% || 19.2% || 19.5% || 15.3% || 14.2% || 11.9% || 13.3% 
 - Nuclear share || 21.8% || 22.0% || 21.7% || 22.0% || 22.6% || 21.4% || 18.0% || 9.8% 
 - CCS share || 0.45% || 0.27% || 0.50% || 0.73% || 0.77% || 0.29% || 0.23% || 0.25% 
   || Ref. || GHG35/EE ® || GHG37 ® || GHG40 ® || GHG40 || GHG40/EE || GHG40/ EE/RES30 || GHG45/  EE/RES35 
   || Economic and social impacts 
 Total System Costs, avg annual 2011-30 (bn €) || 2,067 || 2,064 || 2,073 || 2,074 || 2,069 || 2,089 || 2,089 || 2,102 
 compared to reference (bn €) ||   || -3 || +6 || +7 || +2 || +22 || +22 || +34 
 Total system cost as % of GDP increase compared to Reference in 2030 in % points || n.a. || -0.02% || +0.13% || +0.20% || +0.15% || +0.54% || +0.54% || +0.84% 
 Investment Expenditures[145], avg annual 2011-30 (bn €) || 816 || 833 || 835 || 846 || 854 || 875 || 879 || 909 
 compared to reference (bn €) ||   || +17 || +19 || +30 || +38 || +59 || +63 || +93 
 Energy Purchases, avg annual 2011-30 (bn €) || 1,454 || 1,428 || 1,447 || 1,446 || 1,436 || 1,421 || 1,423 || 1,431 
 compared to reference (bn €) ||   || -26 || -8 || -8 || -18 || -34 || -31 || -23 
 Fossil Fuel Net Imports, avg annual 2011-30 (bn €) || 461 || 451 || 459 || 457 || 452 || 441 || 439 || 434 
 compared to reference (bn €) ||   || -10 || -2 || -4 || -9 || -20 || -22 || -27 
 Average Price of Electricity[146] (€/MWh) || 176 || 174 || 176 || 181 || 179 || 174 || 178 || 196 
 compared to reference (€/MWh) ||   || -2 || +1 || +6 || +3 || -1 || +2 || +20 
 ETS price (€/t of CO2-eq.) || 35 || 27 || 35 || 53 || 40 || 22 || 11 || 14 
 Energy costs for Energy Intensive Industries[147] || 41.8% || 43.5% || 41.9% || 42.2% || 42.1% || 44.5% || 44.0% || 45.3% 
 Energy related expenditures of households[148] || 9.3% || 9.3% || 9.5% || 9.6% || 9.4% || 9.5% || 9.4% || 9.7% 
 GDP impacts || na || Typically smaller impacts than -40% GHG options || GEM E3 model: -0.45% to -0.10%[149] E3MG + E3ME models: 0.0% to +0.55%[150] || Typically higher impacts than -40% GHG 
 Employment impacts || na || GEM E3 model: -0.61% to 0.20%[151] E3ME model: 0.3% - 0.5%[152] 
 Distributional impacts between MS || na || Lower income Member States have higher costs, but benefit more from reduced air pollution Costs spread more for options with higher system costs 

7.                      
 Annexes
7.1.                
The EU Reference Scenario

Context, key assumptions and overall
framework 
The new Reference scenario informs about
the expected outcome from implementing the already agreed policies in the
context of the 2020 package (serving therefore as baseline for this IA). It can
therefore enlighten the policy debate on the impacts of an option with no
further EU action, while laying the basis for analysing the impacts of
additional policy action aimed at in the energy and climate framework for 2030.
For a comprehensive presentation of methodology and results (for EU and per
each Member State) see the European Commission report "EU Energy,
Transport and GHG emission trends until 2050 – Reference Scenario 2013"[153].
The new EU Reference scenario modelling,
finalised in 2013, was jointly supervised by DGs ENER, CLIMA and MOVE based on
EU energy system and CO2 emission modelling with PRIMES, transport activity
modelling as well as specific modelling related to non-CO2 GHG with GAINS and
CAPRI. It involved world energy modelling for determining international fossil
fuel prices as well as macro-economic and sectoral modelling – all through
2050. Member States experts had been involved in various stages, starting with
replies to an extensive policy questionnaire and encompassing four rounds of
commenting on economic, transport activity, energy and non-CO2 and LULUCF
emission results. The energy modelling is done in five year steps starting with
2015 and based on Eurostat statistics through 2010.
The assumptions related to GDP have been
taken from the joint work of DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee. The
2012 Ageing report[154]
provided the population and long term GDP growth projections, while the short
and medium term GDP growth projections were based on DG ECFIN (following 2012
agreement reached in the Economic Policy Committee). These were then further
developed for having the proper inputs for energy and transport modelling
(notably value added of the various sectors and subsectors regarding energy
intensive activities). The EU economy is assumed to continue growing after
having overcome the economic crisis. Average annual GDP growth between 2010 and
2030 is projected at 1.5% pa, decreasing thereafter to 1.4% pa due to
demographic change (ageing population). After slight growth over this and the
next two decades population is stagnant from 2040 onwards.
GDP growth rates vary over time and across
Member States, reflecting the crisis and the subdued prospects in some
countries affected particularly hard. They also allow for greater economic
cohesion with higher growth rates especially in new Member States. For example,
GDP development in 2010 to 2015 ranges from significant decreases in Greece to
a growth rate of nearly 4% pa in Estonia. Over the longer term from 2015 to
2030, the EU economy grows at 1.6% pa. The lowest growth in this period would
materialise in Germany (0.8% pa, also due to its shrinking population) while
economic activity in a couple of Member States would be growing faster than 2%
pa (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Spain and Ireland).
The Reference scenario has been developed
in the framework of limited global climate action, especially regarding non-EU
regions. It assumes that third countries live up to their Copenhagen/Cancun
pledges, but there is no assumption on any further significant climate action
in these countries. This is similar for the EU, which in this Reference
scenario, despite implementing its unconditional GHG reduction target and
renewables targets, would not be stepping up efforts in 2020 and beyond.
Fossil fuel import prices are seen
increasing, so that the oil price might reach 121 $/barrel in 2030 and 143 $ in
2050 (corresponding to 110 €, all in constant 2010 prices). With 2% inflation
(ECB target) this corresponds to 180 $ in 2030 in nominal terms (315 $ in
2050). Gas prices rise stronger in the short term due to increasing demand
notably from Asia (China, post-Fukushima Japan), from 38 € (10)/boe in 2010 to
62 €/boe in 2020. After 2030, gas prices decouple somewhat from oil prices,
among others due to shale gas exploitation in the US and some other regions;
coal prices remain considerably lower by comparison (24 € (10)/boe in 2030 and
31 € in 2050).
Table 41: International fossil fuel price
developments in Reference
  EU fuel import prices || 2010 || 2020 || 2030 || 2050 
 Oil (in $2010 per boe) || 80 || 115 || 121 || 143 
 Oil (in €2010 per boe) || 60 || 89 || 93 || 110 
 Gas (in €2010 per boe) || 38 || 62 || 65 || 63 
 Coal (in €2010 per boe) || 16 || 23 || 24 || 31 
Source: PROMETHEUS
Technology developments are dealt with in
great detail. In each period energy investment is modelled endogenously on the
basis of a wide portfolio of different energy technologies, notably for power
and heat generation, along with energy demand, cost and price numbers derived
simultaneously in the modelling while making sure that grids and interconnector
capacity allows for implementing the already agreed policies. The modelling
takes also into account the potential need for delivering simultaneously
electricity and heat when considering CHP investment options. Technology
performance improves over time, the pace depending on the maturity of
individual technologies, based on expert judgements including from JRC.
Technology learning translates also into cost digression at different rates
according to technologies (over 100 different ones for power generation).
The policy framework for the EU can be
summarised as achieving the RES and GHG targets as agreed within the 2020
energy and climate package. Moreover, other policies agreed by spring 2012 are
included (such as the CO2 standards for cars / vans, implementation measures of
the Eco-design Directive, Energy Performance of Buildings Directive etc.) as
well as the Energy Efficiency Directive, for which there had been political
agreement in the first half of 2012.
The modelling assumptions include the
following elements:
·        
The Grid expansion follows the latest 10 Year
Development Plan from ENTSO-E, without making any judgement on the likelihood
of certain projects materialising.
·        
The 2020 targets on RES including the RES in
transport sub-target will be achieved, but there is no assumption on targets
for later years. Beyond the reflection of currently adopted national policies,
RES values are used as key modelling tool to ensure cost-efficient target
achievement at national level. 
·        
RES subsidies decline after 2020 starting with
on-shore wind; RES aids for most technologies decline to zero by 2050, except
for innovative maritime RES, such as wave and tidal energy. Increasing use of
RES co-operation mechanisms will also help to reduce RES costs. Generic
policies on facilitating RES penetration (e.g. streamlined authorisation
procedures) continue. 
·        
Additional energy efficiency policies are
modelled along the lines of the various provisions of the Energy Efficiency
Directive reflecting e.g. building insulation or the savings required from
utilities and retailers regarding energy consumption at their customers' sites.
The fulfilment of the energy savings obligation is modelled with Energy
Efficiency Values.
·        
Similarly, other energy efficiency measures,
notably the eco-design regulations have been taken into account influencing
energy consumption increasingly over time as obsolete appliances etc. are being
removed while new items, subject to eco-design standards, are entering the
market.
·        
The ETS cap is assumed to continue declining at
a linear factor of 1.74% according to the ETS Directive. As a consequence, ETS
prices increase throughout the projection period as the ETS cap is decreasing
and the current surplus of allowances is gradually decreasing. The different
allowance allocation rules (auctioning, free allocation based on benchmarks)
for the different sectors foreseen in the legislation are reflected in the
modelling, including the transitional provisions to full auctioning in the
power sector and the provisions for sectors at risk of carbon leakage.
·        
The legally binding targets GHG targets under
the Effort Sharing Decision for 2020 turn out to be achieved at the EU level
under Reference Scenario conditions[155],
notably thanks to progress to be achieved by CO2 standards for cars and vans
and energy efficiency policies and taking into account flexible mechanisms
among Member States. Carbon values in the non-ETS sectors are therefore zero.
·        
Nuclear investment is endogenous, but non-nuclear
Member States remain non-nuclear, except for Poland where some nuclear
investment takes place; nuclear in Belgium and Germany is phased out according
to existing legislation.
·        
CCS penetration is driven by ETS prices (apart
from funding for demonstration plants); regulatory and acceptance issues that
have come to the fore recently have been taken into account, especially
regarding storage, as well as the comments from Member States during the
consultation, leading to limited CCS uptake.
·        
Energy taxes in € per boe are constant in real
terms, i.e. are assumed to rise in line with inflation. All prices and costs
have been expressed in euros of 2010.
Key trends on energy consumption and
intensity
Under Reference scenario conditions, total
energy demand in EU-28 is expected to decline from current levels. In 2030 the
EU would be using 9% less energy than in 2010, with energy consumption
remaining flat thereafter. 
Given significant economic growth over
decades this means an improvement of energy intensity (energy consumption
related to GDP) by 33% up to 2030 and by 48% in 2050, when the EU would consume
only slightly more than half the energy required per unit of GDP compared with
the situation in 2010. 
Figure 8: EU-28 GDP, energy demand and energy
intensity (2000 = 100)
Nevertheless, the Reference scenario would
not quite reach the indicative energy savings objective for 2020 of 20% below
projections as defined by the European Council of March 2007 (in operational
terms this is evaluated against the 2007 Baseline), but would yet achieve
almost 17% against this earlier EU projections for 2020. Using the same metric
for 2030 would give rise to energy savings of 21% below these projections made
for 2030 in 2007. 
Final energy consumption is expected to
decline 3% by 2030 and increase again to the 2010 level by 2050. This is mainly
driven by significant decreases in households, tertiary and transport up to
2030 where in particular the instruments of the Energy Efficiency Directive
(EED) and the CO2 from cars regulation exert downward pressure on energy
consumption overcompensating rising incomes. After 2030 the effects of these
policies aimed at 2020, with some longer term effects, are overruled by the
upward pressure from rising income.
Figure 9: EU-28: Final energy consumption by sector
and share of electricity
Electricity demand rises 12% between 2010
and 2030, increasing further through 2050 (+32% on 2010). Driving forces for
this include greater penetration of appliances following economic growth
overcompensating effects of eco-design standards on new products, increasing
use of heat pumps and electro-mobility. The share of electricity in final
energy consumption rises consequently from 21% in 2010 to reach 24% in 2030 and
28% in 2050.
Fuel mix and implied decarbonisation 
One salient feature of the Reference is the
strong restructuring of the energy supply side by 2030 and even more by 2050
(in terms of primary energy). These changes are driven by strong policy efforts
in this decade and a continuation of enabling measures for renewables post
2020, rising fossil fuel prices and the continuation of the ETS linear
reduction factor.
There is pronounced restructuring towards
RES to the detriment of all other energy sources. 
·        
Despite losing 3 percentage points (pp) by 2030
and a total of 5 pp by 2050 oil remains the most important energy source
through 2050 ;
·        
Solid fuels are most affected by the policy
driven restructuring falling 5 pp by 2030 and a total of 8 pp by 2050, when
their share would be less than half of what is was in 2010; the emergence of
CCS supported by ETS in the longer term is attenuating somewhat this trend;
Figure 10: EU-28 Fuel shares in primary energy
consumption, carbon intensity
·        
Gas declines least of all fossil fuels keeping
more or less its current share of 25% through 2030 and loosing just one pp up
to 2050;
·        
Nuclear experiences a slight dip around 2020/30
when it will have lost one pp to return thereafter to its current share of
slightly over 13%.
·        
RES gain 9 pp from 2010 by 2030 and 14 pp by
2050 making them the third most important primary energy source (after oil and
gas) in 2030 and the second most important one (just ahead of gas) in 2050; 
Using the concept of RES in gross final
energy consumption (according to the RES Directive), the 2020 target might be
slightly overachieved (20.9%), reflecting MS comments in the consultation; the
RES share would be further rising supported by longer term effects of policies
for 2020, technology progress and market trends to reach 24.4% in 2030 and
28.7% in 2050.
The RES target for transport is also
expected to be achieved (10.3% in 2020) with a slight further increase of this
share to 12.0% in 2030 and 13.9% in 2050. The RES contribution will be most
important in electricity consumption accounting for 35.2% in 2020, 42.7% in
2030 and 50.1% in 2050. Also in heating and cooling there would be significant
RES penetration reaching 21.5% in 2020, 23.8% in 2030 and 26.6% in 2050.
Biomass plays a key role in these trends.
In 2010 the percentage of total primary renewable energy generated by biomass
and waste was 70%. This number drops to 62% in 2020 and 56% in 2030, falling
slightly below 50% in 2050. The role of wind and solar becomes more important
accordingly. In absolute terms, biomass demand is increasing significantly
until 2020 and keeps on growing slowly until 2050.
Figure 11: EU-28: RES share: total and by sector
(RES in gross final energy consumption)
Overall, the dominance of fossil fuels in
primary energy supplies diminishes with their share falling from 76% in 2010 to
68% in 2030 and 62% in 2050. As a consequence of this fuel switching and some
CCS penetration, the carbon intensity of EU energy supplies decreases 17% in
2030 (32 % in 2050) from its 2010 level. Reflecting also energy intensity
improvements, energy combustion related CO2 emissions decrease 24% below 2010
levels by 2030, and 37% by 2050. 
The resulting sectoral trends on energy
related CO2 are as follows:
·        
CO2 emissions from power generation are expected
to fall from current levels by 41% in 2030 (71% in 2050) due to strong fuels
switching and some CCS penetration;
·        
Transport related CO2 emissions, which increased
by 26% between 1990 and 2010, would decrease only 9% between 2010 and 2030,
remaining virtually flat thereafter;
·        
Other sector trends are also declining; they
fall in between the strong decrease in power generation and the more limited
one in transport. Industry is decreasing by 7% below current levels until 2030
and 18% until 2050, district heating and energy transformation emissions sink
by 27% below current levels until 2030 (39% by 2050), residential falling by
21% respectively 29% and the tertiary sector by 36% until 2030 and 45% by 2050.
Power generation and capacity
requirements
Rising electricity demand, due to its
convenient features for a multitude of uses and rising incomes (leading to e.g.
more widespread penetration of appliances), together with RES policies, ETS and
technological progress bring about a restructuring of electricity generation
towards RES to the detriment of mainly solid fuels. RES account for almost 45%
of power generation in 2030 and slightly over 50% in 2050. Following phase-out
decisions in some Member States the nuclear contribution (in TWh) declines in
2020-25 but returns to the current level by 2050. Similarly, gas based power
generation decreases somewhat through 2025 giving way to RES, but comes back to
current levels by 2050. The downward trend for solid fuels is present
throughout the projection period.
These changes in the structure of power
generation have even more profound changes regarding capacity requirements,
given that the strongly penetrating RES have lower load factors than e.g. coal
and nuclear plants. Consequently capacities grow faster than generation, while
the share of RES in capacity is even higher than in generation. Given the key
role of gas as a back-up fuel for RES, there is significant growth of gas
capacities between 2010 and 2050 whereas generation from gas in 2050 is
virtually the same as in 2010.
Net power generation capacities become
dominated by RES, which account for 55% of capacity in 2030 and 62% in 2050.
The RES capacity of some 850GW in 2050 corresponds to the current total power
generation capacity from all energy sources combined. 
Figure 12: Net power generation capacity (with
further breakdown of RES capacities in right columns)
   
The expansion of RES capacities throughout
the projection period is mainly driven by on-shore and off-shore wind as well
as solar. Tidal and wave energies penetrate in the long run in some countries
having good potentials, such as France, Ireland, Portugal and UK.
Following these changes in generation
structure and despite growing electricity production, power generation would
further decarbonise. The share of RES and nuclear combined in gross electricity
generation would increase from currently 49% to reach 58% in 2020, 66% in 2030
and 73% in 2050. In addition, CCS would make some inroads in the long run with
a timid share of less than 1% until 2030 increasing however to 7% by 2050.
Energy prices, system costs and
investments 
Energy prices are increasing significantly
until 2020 and show somewhat diverging trends afterwards, largely related to
significantly increasing world fossil fuel prices[156] in the context of
significant energy system restructuring:
Diesel prices for private transport users
increase 20 % from 2010 to 2020 and rise thereafter almost 4% per decade up to
2050; mainly driven by increasing oil import prices.
Oil and gas prices for heating increase by
38% respectively 47% from 2010 to 2020. Heating oil prices continue to rise
significantly thereafter (over 5% per decade up to 2050), while gas prices for
households remain more or less at 2020 levels, mainly driven by the trends in
oil and gas import prices, which see a decoupling of both prices only in the
longer term.
Average electricity prices for end users
rise more strongly by 2020, by 31%, assuming in the modelling that incurred
costs (including some profit margin) are fully recovered via prices. This
reflects a set of different factors: Gas and coal import prices rise by 62% and
41% respectively over the current decade; power generation investment increases
significantly; old capital stock (for generation, transmission and
distribution) is being replaced generally with more efficient and less carbon
intensive power plants; RES targets are achieved implying lower load factors
(more generation capacity for a given amount of electricity generation) and the
need for back-up capacity; grid investments increase significantly to support
greater market integration and RES penetration. Moreover, electricity savings
(from policies and higher prices) mean lower sales levels diminishing thereby
the basis for sharing out the fixed cost elements, which dominate total
electricity costs, thereby increasing the cost per unit of electricity
delivery. ETS allowance expenditures contribute only a marginal part, given
that carbon prices are very low until 2020 with the projected carbon prices
becoming important for electricity prices only in the longer run. Electricity
prices for industry increase less than for other sectors: 22% between 2010 and
2020. After 2020 electricity prices are flat – actually even marginally
decreasing, reaping thereby the benefits from fuel input savings (e.g. from RES
and energy efficiency, which reduce fossil fuel input). Prices for industry
decrease significantly, so that total industrial electricity price increase
2010 to 2030 is limited to 10%.
Affordability and competitiveness effects
related to energy are ultimately not a matter of prices, but are determined by
cost, i.e. the product of prices and consumption levels; notably energy
efficiency policies lead to a reduction of consumption thereby alleviating
adverse price effects. Total energy system costs related to GDP, which stood at
12.8% in 2010 peak in 2020 at 14.8%  as a consequence of heavy energy
investment, falling thereafter to 14.0% in 2030 and back to 2010 levels by 2050
(12.3%) thanks to fuel cost savings in later years. 
Table 42 gives the
overview of total energy system costs over time for all Member States. It shows
they are comparably higher in lower income Member States, confirming that lower
income Member States are also the most energy intensive EU economies[157]. Inefficiencies and
obsolete infrastructure is an important reason as well as different economic
structure with a relatively lower share of GDP in services and relatively
larger share of household spending for meeting basic heating and cooling needs.

Table 42: Energy system costs in relation to GDP
per Member State
 2010 || 2020 || 2030 || 2040 || Change to 2030 from 2010 
 EU28 || 12,76% || 14,83% || 14,03% || 13,08% || 1,27% 
 BE || 13,47% || 16,53% || 15,77% || 14,39% || 2,31% 
 BG || 25,45% || 30,32% || 31,20% || 31,36% || 5,75% 
 CZ || 19,72% || 21,51% || 20,38% || 19,50% || 0,66% 
 DK || 10,75% || 11,36% || 10,81% || 10,40% || 0,06% 
 DE || 12,67% || 14,57% || 13,96% || 13,33% || 1,28% 
 EE || 20,26% || 21,88% || 21,17% || 20,62% || 0,91% 
 IE || 10,47% || 11,50% || 9,97% || 9,16% || -0,50% 
 EL || 12,65% || 16,45% || 15,88% || 15,29% || 3,23% 
 ES || 12,25% || 14,36% || 12,97% || 12,20% || 0,72% 
 FR || 11,08% || 12,69% || 11,59% || 10,66% || 0,51% 
 HR || 19,57% || 22,22% || 21,79% || 20,80% || 2,22% 
 IT || 12,33% || 14,78% || 14,30% || 13,51% || 1,97% 
 CY || 16,03% || 17,42% || 17,65% || 15,81% || 1,62% 
 LV || 25,60% || 27,78% || 26,55% || 25,64% || 0,95% 
 LT || 22,16% || 24,11% || 23,72% || 21,61% || 1,56% 
 LU || 11,84% || 12,65% || 11,46% || 10,60% || -0,38% 
 HU || 22,24% || 25,98% || 26,30% || 25,90% || 4,06% 
 MT || 13,38% || 14,23% || 14,43% || 13,58% || 1,05% 
 NL || 12,19% || 14,88% || 14,07% || 12,99% || 1,89% 
 AT || 12,22% || 13,98% || 13,41% || 12,57% || 1,19% 
 PL || 21,08% || 22,66% || 23,30% || 22,26% || 2,22% 
 PT || 15,95% || 19,56% || 18,46% || 17,35% || 2,51% 
 RO || 18,82% || 22,59% || 23,58% || 23,59% || 4,75% 
 SI || 17,80% || 21,39% || 21,06% || 20,33% || 3,25% 
 SK || 19,78% || 21,64% || 20,47% || 19,25% || 0,68% 
 FI || 15,46% || 17,19% || 17,13% || 16,49% || 1,67% 
 SE || 13,72% || 13,83% || 11,96% || 11,09% || -1,76% 
 UK || 10,81% || 12,84% || 12,00% || 10,52% || 1,19% 
Heavy energy investment is undertaken both
on the supply and demand sides, notably for electricity supply and for more
efficient energy using equipment as well as building insulation. Energy-related
investments (excluding transport) are 47% higher in the decade 2021-30 compared
to the decade 2001-10, which was marked by rather low investments; these
investments in the next decade are however 21% lower than those during this decade
to 2020, where strong efforts are needed for implementing the 2020 targets and
policies. Transport-related investments are projected exceed those in 2001-10
by 31%, while they are expected to be 20% higher than such investment in the
current decade.
Such heavy investment that continues beyond
2030 leads to greater importance of capital expenditure (largely creating
income in the EU) versus operational expenditure, notably related to fossil
fuel imports.
Drivers of GHG emission trends beyond
energy related CO2
Around 5% of current total EU GHG emissions
excluding LULUCF are non-energy (combustion) related CO2 emissions. They stem
mainly from industrial processes in the metals, minerals and chemicals sectors
and are mostly covered by the EU ETS; the remainder of CO2 from non-energy
combustion sources stems from fugitive emissions in energy sectors (close to
10% of such emissions) while less than 5% of them are from solvents and waste.
Having decreased significantly between 1990 and 2010, non-energy related CO2
emissions might increase in the next 10-15 years, due to expected recovery of
economic growth and limited remaining cheap mitigation options. With increasing
ETS allowance prices after 2025, they return in 2030 to the current level.
Thereafter there might be considerable CCS penetration due to sufficiently high
ETS allowance prices, which combined with lower fugitive emissions from lower
fossil fuel production would lead to falling total non-energy related CO2
emissions, down 63% in 2050 compared with 2010.
CH4, N20 and F-Gases, often summarised as
non-CO2 emissions, account currently for 17% of total EU GHG emissions
excluding LULUCF. They have decreased significantly between 1990 and 2010. They
are expected to further decrease by 12% below 2010 levels in 2030 (or 19%
compared to 2005) and stagnate later on. CH4 emissions are projected to
decrease above average (19% due to declining trends in fossil fuel production,
improvements in gas distribution and waste management) and N2O emissions fall
below average (4%) until 2030, both remaining flat thereafter. F-Gases would
reduce by 8% between 2010 and 2030, largely driven by EU and Member State's
policies (i.e. the F-gas regulation and mobile air conditioning directive);
F-gases would increase somewhat between 2030 and 2050 in line with economic
developments. 
Figure 13: Non-CO2 GHG emissions by gas in the EU28
The sectoral non-CO2 emission trends and
their drivers vary more strongly: 
·                        
Since 2013 more than 80% of industry sector non-CO2
emissions are covered by the EU ETS (Non-CO2 emissions of nitric and adipic
acid production, PFC emissions from aluminium production). The resulting price
incentive and (previous) national legislation leads to sectoral emission
reductions of 55% between 2010 and 2030, making full use of existing cheap
mitigation options, while for the period after 2030 slight increases at low
level are projected in line with economic trends.
·                        
A similar decrease of 55% between 2010 and 2030
is expected for the waste sector, strongly driven by environmental legislation,
such as the full effects of the Landfill directive and improvements in waste
management. Also an increasing amount of CH4 is recovered and utilised, thereby
impacting on these trends towards lower emissions. After 2030, however, a
moderate increase is projected, reflecting trends in economic development.
·                        
The agricultural sector is responsible for more
than half of all non-CO2 emissions. While the agricultural non-CO2 emissions
have reduced by 23% between 1990 and 2011, they are projected to roughly
stabilize at current levels as a result of different trends which compensate
each other, such as decreasing herd sizes but increasing milk yields and
increased use of more efficient mineral fertilisers. These trends are impacted
by the EU common agricultural policy, e.g. the decoupling of direct support
from production, abolishment of milk quota and cross-compliance with
environmental laws, such as the nitrate directive.
·                        
CH4 and N2O emissions from the energy sectors
are expected to decrease by 28% from current levels in 2030, and further 13%
between 2030 and 2050. In the absence of specific mitigation policies, this
reflects mainly trends in energy activity, in particular the reduced production
of coal and natural gas in the EU. 
·                        
Emissions from air conditioning and
refrigeration decrease by 13% until 2030, also thanks to existing legislation
(i.e. mobile air conditioning), but are projected to slightly increase after
2030.
·                        
Emissions from the wastewater sector and remaining
other sectors are projected to increase moderately in line with economic
development trends. 
LULUCF emissions and removals
The carbon sink composed of land use, land
use change and forestry in the EU 28 is expected to decrease somewhat over
time. The LULUCF sink for 2000 to 2010 is estimated to be around 250 Mt CO2eq
including harvested wood products (see LULUCF biomass, soil in the figure). The
sink is expected to decline to around 200 Mt CO2eq in 2030. This result comes
from several opposing trends. In forestry, afforestation is increasing
resulting in an increasing sink over time. Deforestation is declining resulting
in a decreasing source. The forest management sink, however, decreases over the
time horizon. The main driving force is the expected increase in timber demand
especially but not exclusively for energy purposes. Whereas total timber demand
increases by more than 15% between 2005 and 2030 timber demand for energy
purposes would increase by more than 40%. The harvested wood products stock
however increases from around 10 Mt CO2eq. in 2005 to 60 Mt in 2030. Cropland
emissions are expected to decline over time whereas grassland emissions remain
more or less stable mainly as a result of the expected conversion of land from
other purposes to grassland.
Figure 14: LULUCF emissions in the EU28

7.2.                
Conditions enabling cost-effective
decarbonisation and their modelling

Greenhouse gas emission reductions in line
with the EU's long term climate objective imply structural changes in all
sectors of the economy and good coordination of these changes. Public
acceptance of structural change is also crucial, which relates to issues such
as transmission lines, smarter grids and carbon storage. In the absence of such
co-ordination and public acceptance of strategic elements for bringing about
strong decarbonisation in a process over several decades, other interlinked
elements of the EU decarbonisation strategy, such as strong RES penetration,
may be significantly delayed. This could impact negatively on technical
features and the cost-effectiveness of achieving the long term climate
objective in 2050 as well as an appropriate emission trajectory up to 2050 and
beyond, restraining substantially the cumulative additions from emissions to
GHG concentrations with a view to contributing towards achieving the 2 degree
objective.
As analysed in detail in the modelling for
the 2050 roadmaps, decarbonisation is a long-term process which depends on
coordinated decisions and implementation of measures by numerous actors,
including energy consumers, energy producers and distributors, infrastructure
investors and regulators, technology developers and providers of R&D and
innovation funding. Some of the measures may be contentious as they affect the
interests of local populations. Nevertheless deep decarbonisation at the pace
needed for achieving the 2 degrees objective requires that crucial
infrastructure elements such as those on transmission lines are put in place in
time. Good anticipation of future climate change mitigation commitments is of
crucial importance for all actors to make decisions enabling deep structural
changes and for the coordination of these decisions.
Typical market coordination issues between
different actors arise in the decarbonisation process: technology and equipment
providers need to anticipate strong market development to undertake investment
enabling learning and economies of scale; customers need to see infrastructure
development and accept technologies to massively uptake the new technologies;
and infrastructure developers need to anticipate the expected massive uptakes
to make the appropriate infrastructure investment in a timely manner. Timing is
another essential factor linked to effective decarbonisation for which good
anticipation and coordination are essential: in many cases, particularly for
infrastructure, the development often has to occur prior to their justification
by demand and this will only occur if there is good anticipation. In other
cases the momentum created by the policies implemented until 2020 should not be
lost when these policies end and also this can only be assumed to occur under
good anticipation of strong emission reductions in the time period post 2020.
The conditions enabling cost-effective emission
reduction through market coordination and good anticipation clearly depend on
public action and policy. Predictability depends on strong policy commitment
over a long term schedule of greenhouse gas emission reduction and the
enforcement mechanisms of measures aiming at implementing this reduction. A
climate and energy policy framework is a key facilitator for such a
coordination, and targets underpinned by specific instruments like the EU ETS
giving carbon price signals and specific energy efficiency and renewable energy
policies provide both direction and key incentives. However, as the analysis
for the Roadmap for moving towards a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 and
the Energy Roadmap 2050 has shown, in case of relevant market coordination issues,
appropriate measures go beyond. To ensure better policy and market
coordination, enabling public policies include strengthened and perhaps
refocused R&D and innovation funding fostering infrastructure
investment through regulatory policies. There are synergies with more specific
sectoral policies, especially regarding the adoption of standards for
technologies to facilitate market uptake and acceptance.
Decarbonisation under poor enabling
conditions, which are approximated with reference settings for modelling,
implies that actors could, in view of policy and market uncertainties, opt for
decisions that in the long term prove sub-optimal, resulting in technology and
infrastructure lock-ins and higher costs of climate mitigation. Such decisions
without a long term decarbonisation horizon would also imply lower technology
progress and lower exploitation of cost-effective potentials. Obviously the
costs and feasibility of deep emission reductions and the necessary magnitude
of economic incentives such as carbon prices will be significantly higher if
market coordination failures and poor anticipations prevail during the long
decarbonisation process. 
Enabling conditions stemming from a
vigorous overall decarbonisation strategy need however to be delivered through
policy efforts, including specific sectoral policies on the removal of market
failures and barriers to efficient energy consumption and GHG reduction.
Enabling conditions set the framework so that specific policy measures in areas
such as energy, industry, transport, agriculture, environment and climate
policies can work smoothly in a co-ordinated way for achieving deep
decarbonisation in a timely manner, while working towards the other objectives
of these sectoral policies, such as competitiveness and energy security.
Enabling conditions were underlying most of
the decarbonisation scenarios of the Low carbon economy and Energy roadmaps
2050 (except the scenarios assuming delays in certain actions and
technologies). In the following, the enabling conditions underlying the 2030
policy scenarios in line with the long term decarbonisation objectives are
further specified and explained. The enabling conditions are modelled by
altering modelling parameters with respect to those included in the Reference
scenario (reference settings). The enabling conditions are presuppositions that
act independently of carbon prices/values or economic or regulatory incentives
for renewables and energy efficiency. The enabling conditions include the
following: 
Enabling cost-effective decarbonisation
of power generation
For enabling a near complete
decarbonisation of the power sector, a combination of appropriate improvement
of infrastructures, fostered technological innovation and social acceptance for
key technologies is modelled:
Intelligent grids and metering: intelligent IT systems in power distribution and in metering, as
well as for managing recharging of car batteries are assumed to develop at
large scale so as to become common practice before 2030; they help demand response
in power markets, thus inducing further energy efficiency; they support better
integration into network operations and wider diffusion of decentralised RES;
they support micro-CHP and they ensure management of battery recharging/discharging
bringing significant benefits for smoother load curves and higher system
stability while providing even the possibility to have the electricity stored
in car batteries function as a (limited) buffer. Smoother load curves also
improve the economics of capital intensive power technologies, facilitating
carbon-free and low-carbon power generation investments. Although the effects
of the developments regarding intelligent grids and metering can only be
observed in the time period after 2030, it is essential for the developments to
occur already in the time period 2020-2030, as only such a development can lead
to a large scale and quick uptake of the above mentioned technologies in the
time period after 2030. The commitments for 2030 and 2050 must be firm in order
to incite/oblige infrastructure developments before these are justified by
demand. A strong market coordination is necessary as well as strong commitments
by regulated bodies such as DSOs, as it is difficult to assume that these
developments would occur entirely based on initiatives of privately owned
institutions. Safety and security of supply must be broadly tested and be
operational in order for the large scale transformations after 2030 to occur.
Infrastructure to harvest decentralised
as well as remote RES for power generation: higher
RES potentials and earlier availability of this potential is assumed,
especially for decentralised RES and remote areas offering big potential for
wind and maritime RES; this is enabled by a portfolio of synergetic
developments involving  streamlining of permitting procedures, higher
investment in and timely availability of grids (both high voltage, incl. DC
lines for e.g. remote wind areas, and smart grids supporting management of
decentralised RES, storage of RES generated electricity in form of hydrogen as
well as electricity demand response to high RES availability through
appropriate price signal by smart and net metering (that also accounts for
RES/CHP electricity flowing from consumers to the grid); these policies,
despite not including financial support to RES, imply higher potential at equal
cost levels, hence higher uptake of RES technologies, compared to Reference, in
the period after 2020. The enabling conditions imply that the total potential
of RES increases between 4 and 6% by 2030 compared to the Reference scenario
for wind –onshore, wind-offshore and solar PV. The additional potential is
mainly in highly decentralised RES (which depend on distribution grid
infrastructure, discussed above) and in large scale offshore wind in remote
areas (which depends on long distance DC systems to be also developed). The
developments and the supporting infrastructure are assumed to develop before
2030 and to accelerate after 2030. The higher RES potential by 2030 allows
approx. 3 p.p. higher RES-E share in 2030 compared to a scenario without
enabling setting with equal emission reduction target in 2030.
Carbon transportation and storage
infrastructure and acceptance: the development of
CCS is not only linked to the development of the technology to capture the
carbon at various stages of the combustion or industrial processes but is also
critically linked to the availability of infrastructure for the transportation
and storage of carbon. Higher potential of CCS compared to Reference is assumed
for the time period from 2030 onwards; the enabling policies ensure timely
development of transport and storage infrastructure which helps removing
uncertainties easing CCS investment in power generation. It is also assumed
that a stable long term EU commitment on the need for deep decarbonisation as
well as good anticipation of strong emission reduction commitments induce
higher acceptability of CCS in the EU than under the Reference scenario
conditions; however regarding cost-quantity curves for storage the assumptions
indicating relatively high storage costs in many MS are maintained.; the
importance of the enabling setting is the preparation for large scale adoption
and penetration of CCS beyond 2030 when the technology has also become more
mature. Further the wider enabling environment and the higher acceptance of CCS
can be seen by a wider geographical distribution of CCS: e.g. some countries do
not have CCS in the Reference scenario in 2030 while carbon is stored in the
context of scenarios under enabling conditions. Without the enabling setting
already in the time period to 2030 large scale adoption after 2030 would be
further delayed, making the achievement of the decarbonisation targets more
cumbersome. 
Gas and hydrogen: technological progress enabling mix of hydrogen and bio-gas in gas
supply and possibility to use hydrogen-based storage for balancing RES power
and so exploiting variable at larger scale; these options develop after 2035,
although testing for safety and security of supply must occur already in the
previous decade anticipating the strong commitments for emission reductions.
The analysis of enabling conditions does
not deal with the institutional and regulatory issues, addressed above, to
bring about such conditions, but is clearly highlights the need for such
outcomes.
Enabling decarbonisation and
electrification of transport
In the transport sector thanks to the
anticipation of strong commitments towards emission reductions and successful
market coordination electrification is enabled by a combination of the
development of battery recharging infrastructure, and R&D to improve the
performance and costs of batteries for vehicles This allows specific policy
instruments, such as regulatory measures on CO2 standards to be more effective
in bringing about market acceptance and uptake of electric vehicles as key
means to achieve decarbonisation of transport. Similarly strengthened R&D
being up to the challenge of deep decarbonisation objectives supports
innovation in biofuel supply, which facilitates decarbonisation in transport
uses without electrification option. 
Battery technology development: Substantial R&D is assumed to take place in the decade
2020-2030 allowing for the cost of batteries to decrease compared to the
Reference already in 2030; costs for batteries are assumed to be around 15%
lower than in the Reference scenario already in 2030. Lacking this development
even if infrastructure were available the penetration of electric vehicles in
the transport sector would remain limited, due to the high costs of the
vehicles. At the basis of the R&D developments is the assumption of
successful market coordination policies to build confidence so as battery
technology providers and car manufacturers succeed great progress in battery
costs and performance so as to make EV cars competitive, together with the
assumption about the development of recharging infrastructure. 
Transport sector-recharging
infrastructure: Battery recharging infrastructure
is assumed to develop in a timely manner, achieving shortly after 2030 a
sufficient coverage to allow customer confidence about recharging not only in
houses or city centres but also in public areas in wider metropolitan areas and
on highways. The enabling environment, driven by the anticipation of strong
emission reductions, pushes toward stronger market coordination, which leads to
the development of transport recharging infrastructure (and the necessary
changes in the grid infrastructure-see below) as well as R&D for vehicle
batteries. The development of infrastructure particularly regarding safety,
large scale demonstrations, etc. are all assumed to occur in the decade
2020-2030; if such developments triggered by strong coordination would not
occur, the large scale development of infrastructure and the large scale
penetration of electric vehicles beyond 2030 could not materialise. The cost of
achieving the same emission reduction in transport in a scenario which fails to
deliver such an infrastructure and a similar scenario including enabling and subsequent
development of recharging infrastructure for transport would be approx. five
times higher.   
Market acceptance: Beyond 2030, CO2 regulations for vehicles are assumed to
become sufficiently strict so as to enable transport electrification developing,
the more significantly, the more the stronger the enabling conditions are to
support specific policy instruments such as CO2 standards[158]. The availability of
both recharging infrastructure and mature battery vehicles at affordable prices
leads to higher market acceptance of the new technology and therefore high
market penetration beyond 2030, which is possible thanks to the coordinated
activity pursued by diverse actors in the decade 2020-2030.
Innovation in biofuels: In particular in order to enable strong emission reduction in
transport activities for which electrification is not possible, such as long
distance truck haulage, ships and aviation, biomass related innovation policies
and agriculture policies are assumed to develop appropriately so as to allow
the development of new generation bio-energy feedstock (basically
lignocellulosic crops) at large scale already in early years of the 2020-2030
decade. The developments in agriculture are assumed to take place at the same
time as large scale improvements in advanced biofuel production, initially
targeted at the road transport sectors; the earlier developments of the road
transport sector already around 2025 allow for a significantly larger scale
deployment of fungible bio-fuels mainly after 2030. The share of advanced
biofuels in total biofuels increases typically by 10 percentage points in a
scenario with enabling settings in 2030 compared to a scenario without the
enabling setting. A new industry would emerge with vertical integration ranging
from agriculture, industrial-scale collection and pre-treatment, bio-refineries
with new conversion technologies, product standardization and
commercialisation.
Enabling substantive emission reductions
in other demand side sectors 
Overcoming some market barriers to
Energy Efficiency in Buildings: In anticipation of
strong emission reduction commitment until 2050, the energy efficiency effort
regarding thermal integrity of houses and buildings is assumed to continue
after 2020 at a moderate pace, contrasting deceleration of such efforts after
2020 as assumed under Reference scenario conditions given that related ambition
levels in the Energy Efficiency Directive and Effort Sharing Decision are only
defined until 2020. The enabling environment is driven by the fact that
renovations continue to be undertaken in an energy efficient manner even if no
specific regulatory obligations were implemented at EU level because actors
believe that e.g. energy efficient renovated buildings will continue to have a
significantly higher value on the real estate market, in view of strong
emission reductions to 2050. It is important that such building modernisation
action continues and is not delayed beyond 2030 as it would otherwise not be
possible for the building stock to achieve high enough renovation rates to
compensate for the previous inactivity. Given the longevity of the building
stock and the low renovation rates, the enabling setting mainly ensures that
on-going renovations post 2020 are used to also improve thermal integrity even
if direct policies or economic incentives are not strong in the decade
2020-2030 at an EU level. The intensity of the assumed effort in the context of
the enabling settings is however lower than the existing potential and it
includes only highly cost-effective energy saving cases. Specific energy
efficiency policies at both EU and MS level have to come in addition for
actually exploiting the building renovation opportunities for decarbonisation
up to its economic potential. Enabling conditions encompass just the highly
cost-effective decarbonisation within a deliberate long term GHG reduction
strategy. Enabling conditions imply higher investment in thermal integrity of
houses/buildings after 2020, facilitating efficiency improvements compared to a
scenario without the enabling policies. The efficiency effort is assumed to
accelerate at a faster pace after 2030 compared to the decade 2020-2030. This
continued action after being also encouraged by the recently adopted EE
Directive creates an enabling environment which partly overcomes some of the
market barriers which are particularly strong in the building sector. A more
substantial removal of market barriers can only occur through relentless and
ambitious targeted action/EE policies as mirrored in some of the scenarios
which include policies going beyond the enabling settings. 
Heating equipment and appliances
technology uptake in the domestic sector: more
accelerated uptake of efficient technologies in the households and tertiary
demand sectors reflecting increased acceptance and stronger innovation is
enabled by lowering perceived cost parameters and by assuming higher learning
rates of demand side technologies as a result of a stable long term EU
commitment on deep decarbonisation leading to better anticipation of future
emission reduction commitments. Enabling policies ensure better acquaintance of
customers with advanced technologies, including heat pumps which allow for
higher use of electricity in heating/cooling applications, higher efficiency
and thus lower emissions. This is particularly the case for heating/cooling
equipment where the stronger renovations also lead to a faster renewal of
equipment. Faster renewal and higher uptake of advanced technologies bring
benefits in terms of unit costs as the learning potential is exploited earlier
than in the absence of the enabling policy. Yet the assumptions for the
enabling settings leave significant potential untapped regarding efficiency
progress for energy equipment and appliances, which are additionally developed
in the context of ambitious emission reduction scenarios, in particular and to
a greater extent in those that include ambitious and very ambitious energy
efficiency policies. 
Energy efficiency innovation diffusion
in Industry: the acceptance and adoption of best
available techniques in industry and in combustion applications is assumed to
accelerate after 2020 at a pace above the Reference scenario due to the
anticipation of strong commitments for emission reductions; the assumed
enabling environment would be mainly based on a better innovation and
technology policy framework and also through hedging against future emission
costs by the industry as result of higher predictability about strong emission
reduction commitments in the future. Best available techniques uptake in
industry is assumed to become common practice and to accelerating mainly after
2030; the effects of the industrial BAT enabling setting are assumed to be
limited until 2030, compared to potential. The enabling context is modelled by
assuming higher market acceptance of advanced technologies earlier in the
period after 2020, compared to the Reference scenario, notably in the domain of
heat recovery techniques, cogeneration, low enthalpy heat processing and
horizontal systems controlling and managing energy in industry. Thanks to lower
perceived costs, the industry accelerate the uptake of advanced technologies
which implies that learning potential is tapped on earlier, bringing benefits
in terms of cost reductions. Only very cost-effective BAT in industrial
applications are assumed in the context of the enabling conditions; obviously
additional drivers such as carbon prices and direct policy measures would lead
to further uptake of BAT in industry. 
Interactions: Obviously there are synergies between the above mentioned enabling
conditions. For example the conditions allowing power generation to further
reduce emissions also facilitate energy efficiency and emission reduction in
final demand through substitutions of fossil fuels for electricity. Similarly,
conditions better managing RES in power sector through hydrogen storage also
reduce emissions in gas supply when some of the excess hydrogen with respect to
storage capacity is fed into the natural gas grid easing thereby emission cuts
at final demand level. The system-wide synergies have significant effects even
in the absence of high carbon prices/values or specific RES or energy
efficiency incentives.  
All the above mentioned cases require
long-term predictability and long-term commitment of investors, in particular
for infrastructure development but also for enabling a faster pace of
technology progress and uptake, thus removing market barriers preventing the
tapping of or full realisation of cost-effective potentials. The long-term
commitment of investors and the active participation of all actors to the
enabling settings can only be achieved if there is long term regulatory
certainty about the commitments for 2030 and 2050 and in particular good
anticipation of the strong emission reductions beyond 2030. It is clear that
the majority of the benefits deriving from the enabling environment settings
are felt in the time period after 2030 in the context of strong decarbonisation
commitments. 

7.3.                
Decarbonisation scenarios based on Ambitious
Energy Efficiency policies 

Role of Energy
Efficiency (EE) in decarbonisation scenarios
The Energy Roadmap 2050
has demonstrated that EE is a major component of any decarbonisation strategy
and can therefore be called a no regret option. It is present to a very
significant degree in any such scenario, but its magnitude can change - not
least in correspondence to the decarbonisation ambition. With given GHG
ambition (target), the magnitude of EE varies according to the recourse that is
made on switching directly or indirectly (via the use of low carbon electricity
in end use sectors) to fuels with no or few CO2 emissions (e.g. RES,
nuclear, fossil fuels with CCS) The type of energy efficiency measures involved
is also important, on which this note provides a lot of details. 
In the EE focused
decarbonisation scenarios the strong EE policies modelled are either ambitious
or very ambitious regarding the level of GHG reduction and reflect direct
policy interventions rather than generic action such as carbon pricing (which
may be implemented complimentary to more specific measures). This note will
address EE policies and measures under a 40 GHG reduction target for 2030
compared with 1990 (ambitious EE) and even more EE policies under a 45%
reduction target (very ambitious).
Decarbonisation
scenarios differ with respect to EE, mainly by the extent to which market
barriers to cost-effective energy efficiency are addressed. 
Addressing Market
Barriers to EE
Market barriers limit
the uptake of energy efficient investment in cases where such energy efficient
investment decisions would be undertaken by fully rationally deciding agents if
there were not one or more of the following market barriers and distortions.
Such market barriers concern purchasing (or capital budgeting) situations, in
which new and highly efficient technology with high upfront capital costs is
confronted with fuel and electricity savings that materialise only in later
years, while there is uncertainty about future technology performance as well
as on the availability of related infrastructure (e.g. smart grids, recharging
of electric vehicles). Such situations do not only occur in case of purchasing
equipment, appliances, vehicles, etc. but are also present in case of high
capital costs for renovation/construction investments. 
Market barriers are
present in all demand sectors with the probable exception of heavy industry
where the share of energy costs in production costs is so high that the
majority of efficiency saving is undertaken already in a reference scenario
context as it improves economic competitiveness of the sectors. In the
household sector purchases and investments regarding energy efficient
solutions, which would be economic in the medium and long-term, are often not
made due to limited access to capital funding as well as the uncertainty and
lack of information available to decision makers. Moreover, there are split
incentives, which arise for instance in situations, in which the tenant of a
house/dwelling would greatly benefit from better insulation or heating boilers,
but cannot make the investment. While the owner of the building could make such
investments, he might not have a proper incentive, since the savings in fuel
costs do not accrue to him. In other sectors of the economy, such as services
and smaller industries, the share of energy expenditure in total costs is not
sufficient to ensure that energy saving investments are made on fully rational
economic grounds; decision making on non-energy related issues is generally considered
more important so that often the available capital is spent for purposes other
than energy efficiency. 
Specific energy
efficiency measures have been developed and implemented to address such
barriers, thereby enabling higher effectiveness of market instruments than in
the absence of such efficiency measures. Policy interventions for removing such
barriers work through many channels including the
reduction of the high subjective discount rates of consumers preventing the
choice of normally cost-effective energy efficient solutions. A more detailed
list of policies and measures can be found below.
The modelling mirrors
these bottom-up energy policy instruments with specific modelling instruments which
are described in detail later in this section. In this
context it is important to note here that explicit EE
policies, in the form of additional strong specific action, act differently to
generic instruments favouring energy savings such as energy taxes or carbon
pricing. While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, the following note
focuses on specific EE action. More generic approaches use carbon pricing as
the main instrument to achieve decarbonisation. Such carbon pricing approaches,
while achieving fuel switching and some energy savings by increasing variable
energy costs, does not explicitly address market barriers. This means that in
such carbon pricing approaches a part of the energy saving potential remains
untouched. 
Including carbon
pricing on energy use acts in two directions: overall reduction of energy
demand and on switching to fuels that emit less or no CO2 (including
electricity, the production of which is also influenced by the carbon price).
There is a complex interplay of many factors, which requires comprehensive
modelling. This energy system and market modelling deals with all interactions
and side effects, which results in a market equilibrium, including on the
carbon price, that fulfils the needs of suppliers and demanders and reduces the
CO2 emissions by the economically optimal amount. Such an optimum does however
not necessarily lead to an optimal situation regarding the level of energy
consumption (as this is a different objective). Moreover, carbon prices, like
energy prices, cannot address market barriers to EE. This requires specific EE
policies, which are dealt with in this note.   
Energy Efficiency
(EE) interacts with the energy system in three ways, through:
(1)                   
The overall setting, i.e. the EE dimension of an overall long term policy setting that
enables reaching the European Council's decarbonisation objective for 2050 (at
least 80% GHG reduction on 1990 with a view to the necessary EU contribution to
reach the overall 2 degrees objective) and a sustainable, secure and
competitive energy system;
(2)                   
Additional policy
measures to promote EE with different instruments in all sectors of the economy
(specific and generic ones);
(3)                   
Indirect effects
stemming from changes in the EU ETS and energy product prices as well as
changes in fuel mix that have also EE repercussions.
Energy Efficiency
policies and measures
EE policies and measures already adopted
relate to a variety of areas including:
·                        
Energy performance of buildings Directive (EPBD)
·                        
Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) with many
individual provisions and measures 
–              
Building renovation
–              
Exemplary role of public authorities including
increased Renovation rates in central government buildings
–              
Purchasing by public bodies
–              
Energy efficiency obligation on energy
distributors and/or retail sellers (energy efficiency obligation schemes) or
alternative policy measures (e.g. financing, fiscal, voluntary, and information
measures)
–              
Energy audits and energy management systems
–              
Better metering and billing
–              
Consumer information and empowering programme
–              
Supply side energy efficiency including CHP and
grid requirements and promotion of demand response
–              
Greater role of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs)
·                        
Eco-design Directive and all implementing
Regulations
·                        
Energy Labelling Directive and its delegated
Regulations
·                        
CO2 standards in transport  
·                        
Excise and emission taxes, fiscal incentives
(e.g. tax rebates) 
In addition measures like the EU ETS, road
pricing and congestion charges, local policies to encourage walking, cycling
and public transport use as well as measures to promote the development and use
of innovative technologies help improving energy efficiency, sometimes as
welcome side effect. There are furthermore fiscal incentives (e.g. tax rebates)
for final consumers and businesses as well as the support through programmes,
such as the Intelligent Energy Europe Programme, technical assistance
facilities the Cohesion Fund and the Framework Programmes for RTD. All these
on-going activities have been taken into account in the calibration of the
model to the latest statistical data and the estimation of behavioural
equations and parameters. Strengthening of such framework conditions in these
decarbonisation scenarios with strong EE is dealt with under "overall
settings" and "financial support" below.
The Reference scenario includes all the
adopted energy efficiency policies both at national and EU level up to late
spring 2012[159]
including the EED, on which political agreement was reached by that time. On
the latter the modelling has taken a rather conservative view, since there has
not been yet a transposition in national legislation while for the energy
savings obligations there are several alternative measures possible – albeit
within limits. With the EED focusing on 2020 and older eco-design standards
becoming less effective regarding energy consumption over time (when old items
have been replaced with those fulfilling the eco-design standards of e.g.
2010), EE effects from policy after 2020 in a reference scenario setting would
diminish. Assuming a strong additional policy impetus from a 2030
energy/climate framework can change this situation in two ways: first, the
implementation of the EED can become stronger and there might be follow-up
legislation beyond 2020. Therefore in the context of a 2030 framework, the policies along the lines of those listed above are continued
in the modelling up to 2030 and beyond, and are intensified in the ambitious
and very ambitious EE scenarios. Ambitious EE policies represent a level of EE
policies that, in the modelling, act as the main ingredient in non-ETS sectors
for reaching 40% GHG reduction in 2030 compared with 1990. Very ambitious EE
polies in such EE focused scenarios ensure large parts of the necessary non-ETS
contribution for reaching GHG reductions of 45% in 2030 (for more details see
below). The modelling has considered EE action in all sectors, including
stationary and mobility energy uses, electricity and heat supply.
GHG targets give a
strong additional impetus on pursuing EE that has also intrinsic other benefits
in terms of economic efficiency (competitiveness, affordability), energy
security and reduction of non-GHG related pressure on the environment.
Overall settings
The changes stemming
from reconfirmed commitments for a strong decarbonisation strategy related to
EE are part of the "enabling settings", which is assumed for
the scenarios describing developments under a long term strategic vision of
policy makers that is well communicated to stakeholders, so that the necessary
strong changes in infrastructure and framework conditions are broadly accepted
(see Annex 7.2 for more details). 
A contrasted set of
scenarios (reference settings) does not assume such enabling settings,
but keeps the relevant policies at the level already adopted with a view to
2020 (which exhibit also a significant level of ambition[160]), while
looking at the long term consequences of the adopted policies when combined
with new initiatives undertaken for extending current policy developments to
2030. For details on the reference setting and its impact on policy scenarios
see Annex 7.1 and the forthcoming publication: "EU energy,
transport and GHG trends to 2050 – Reference scenario 2013".
Impacts of EE via
the "enabling setting"
This Section deals with
the EE measures that are present in all decarbonisation scenarios that are
based on a long term decarbonisation strategy to 2050 and beyond - i.e. all
scenarios that do not assume a "reference setting".
EE measures as part of
the enabling setting (used for a wider range of scenarios) include:
·                        
Up to 2020, a vigorous implementation of
the current policy framework, notably 
–              
the Energy Efficiency Directive,
–              
 the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive,
–              
 the extension and tightening of Ecodesign and
Labelling requirements
The modelled
implementation and reaction to some measures, notably regarding eco-design
standards projects slightly faster uptake of more improved and advanced
technologies than under pure reference scenario setting driven by better
anticipation by consumers with respect to long term decarbonisation
·                        
After 2020, developments are in line with the
2050 Roadmaps framework and assume commitment to decarbonisation in this time
horizon. Consequently, the policy ambition in energy efficiency is gradually scaled-up,
creating the "enabling settings" for the decarbonisation (including
on grid extension, reinforcement and smartening, hydrogen storage and better
conditions for CCS). With respect to energy efficiency the "enabling
settings" include : 
–              
continuation of energy efficiency policies
mostly at national level after 2020, contrasting the assumptions of reference
that no additional policies are added after 2020; this implies higher
investment in thermal integrity of houses/buildings after 2020, compared to the
reference[161];

–              
more accelerated uptake of efficient
technologies in the demand sectors enabled by lowering perceived cost
parameters and by assuming higher learning rates of demand side technologies,
including development of highly efficient CHP for industrial applications; 
–              
enabling transport electrification in the longer
term via recharging infrastructure, progress in battery technology starting
from 2025 and developing mainly after 2030; 
In addition to the
elements above a continuation of the framework conditions with regard to access
to finance present in the "reference settings" also post 2020 is
assumed. This includes adjustment of public accounting rules, standardisation
of adapted financing tools and certain fiscal incentives, but also:
·                        
A wider deployment of soft loans, grants, credit
lines, loan guarantees, and special funds, modelled through the reduction of
the discount rate to show more availability of funds, etc. with lower risk to
household.
·                        
Favourable tax regime for households investing
in more energy efficient renovation and vehicles.
·                        
A wider deployment of risk guarantees, credit
lines, and other mechanisms to standardise and bundle project types, and
awareness and capacity building efforts among the finance community.
·                        
Continued support from Structural Funds, mainly
channelled thanks to the setting of an appropriate legal framework (EED, EPBD),
including the removal of legal barriers to the use of energy performance
contracting (adjustment of rules on accounting of public deficits). Standardisation
of adapted financing instruments also play a role in reducing the risk
perceived by private investors.
·                        
Support from the EIB on the technical
assistance, direct loans or loan guarantees for energy efficiency projects,
risk-sharing facilities.
Modelling
instruments in PRIMES related to EE policies
Given the complex
interactions of millions of energy suppliers and hundreds of millions of energy
consumers that bring about the efficiency of the energy system in the EU, the
PRIMES modelling - representing such interactions in a stylised way - deploys
an extended set of modelling instruments dealing with EE aspects. In contrast
to procedures in other models, which apply simple optimization approaches, the
PRIMES model takes into account different investment behaviours regarding
energy use and its ensuing efficiency in the various sectors. This enables the
model to represent barriers and distortions as well as their removal as a
result of policy intervention. 
The PRIMES model
represents energy efficiency by simulating different measures with different
techniques. These model specific instruments affect the context and conditions
under which individuals, in the modelling represented by stylized agents per
sector, make their decisions on energy consumption. These modelling instruments
include: 
·              
Model parameters mirroring technology
performance or the effects of building codes or eco design regulations over
time, where ambitious policy approaches justify making strong assumptions about
enhanced technical and economic performance of future technologies that are
made available for future choices by consumers within the model projection.
·              
Factors that affect perception of net energy
costs (investment costs minus perceived benefits) including risk factors (e.g.
risk related to maintenance costs or technical reliability of advanced
technologies if chosen prior to fully established commercial maturity of such
technologies), which are influenced by energy efficiency policies (awareness
raising instruments, education, labelling, etc.); such changes influence the
mix of different technologies delivering the same type of energy services that
exists in reality and is therefore also reflected in the modelling; The policy
induced changes assumed in the ambitious and very ambitious EE scenario for
household appliances lead to perceived cost decreases in the more advanced
technology options of between 10% and 40% (with the higher values being
attributed to very efficient heating/cooling equipment) compared to the costs
that are perceived under reference scenario settings, which themselves are
between 12 and 20% lower (depending on equipment type) than would have been
perceived in the absence of the energy efficiency policies. 
·              
Reduced discount rates for certain sectors,
reflecting changes in the decision making conditions and constraints of e.g.
households and services (e.g. replacement of layman's dealing with energy
consumption by optimized provision through energy service companies (ESCOs);
the (high) subjective discount rates which prevail in capital-budgeting
decisions when such decisions are taken solely by individuals are reduced,
moving  closer to business interest rates ; the involvement of ESCO and the
obligation for energy distributors and retail sellers to facilitate energy
efficiency investment at the premises of final customers enable individuals to
make more cost-effective choices thanks to the professional support of e.g.
ESCOs and utilities that are obliged to achieve energy savings with their
customers. (Lower discount rates reduce the high weight that initial investment
costs have compared with future energy cost savings). In addition, these
measures also induce lower technical and financial risk, hence reducing the
perceived costs of new technologies and saving investments, (see also point
above on perception of costs). In PRIMES the discount rate for household
consumers are assumed to be at 17.5% under business-as-usual conditions
following extensive literature review on discount rates of private consumers.
In the context of the Reference scenario this rate was progressively decreased
to 12% from 2020 onwards throughout the entire projection period to reflect the
Energy Efficiency Directive. Scenarios with more ambitious EE policies have
even lower discount rates (see below). 
·              
Efficiency values (EVs) reflecting a variety of
broad and sometimes un-identified instruments that bring about efficiency
improvements; in the most concrete form they would represent the price of White
Certificates, reflecting the marginal costs of reaching an energy savings
obligation, e.g. for energy distributors and retail sellers regarding EE at
final customers sites, or a large range of other pertinent measures, such as
energy audits, good energy advice to consumers on the various benefits of EE
investment and better practices, targeted energy efficiency education,
significant voluntary agreements, etc. 
In addition there are
intrinsic model features, such as rational decision making by actors based on
transparency regarding prevailing prices (which is aimed at by energy related
labelling). Moreover, the modelling deals explicitly with excise and emission
taxes and the effects of the EU ETS on fuel and electricity prices through
taking them into account in the formation of consumer prices.
EE in energy supply
(e.g. generation, transmission, storage, distribution, CHP, refining, etc.) is
dealt with directly in the various supply modules that represent supply chains
and their complex interactions directly in a detailed way.
Some of the policies
measures listed above focus on specific sectors (e.g. building directive,
regulations on eco-design of appliances, mandatory audits for large companies),
whereas others are generic in nature (consumer information, ESCOs, energy
efficiency obligations for distributors/retailers regarding their final energy
consumers, financial schemes, improved efficiency of network tariffs and
regulations, promotion of demand response). Therefore, sectors are generally
affected by more than one policy measure and might therefore also require the
application of more than one modelling instrument. A given policy often affects
various sectors directly (generic measures) or indirectly through
interdependencies in the modelling. Policy instruments inter-act providing
synergies, but have also overlaps. 
Ambitious and
very ambitious EE policies/measures – changes in modelling parameters
The ambitious and very
ambitious policy scenarios focus on enhanced removal of market barriers in a
direct way to allow greater penetration of energy efficient practices. These
scenarios encompass ambitious EE policies, which go well beyond the enabling
setting (which is already significantly stronger than the EE context in the
Reference scenario). Such policies include:
·                        
Measures speeding up the buildings renovation
rate. The enhancement of the building renovation rate is driven by
cost-optimality considerations under the requirement of near-zero energy
standards for new buildings, which are assumed also for renovations on the
basis of standards or intrinsic incentives for such course of action (Such high
standards for new building are already present in the enabling setting and
largely in the Reference scenario thanks to the Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive). The increased rate of building renovation is mainly supported by
the energy efficiency obligations on utilities and retail sellers (see below),
through wide use of Energy Performance Contracting (ESCOs) and thanks to the
removal of regulatory barriers, as well as other measures, for example an
obligation that whenever a dwelling is sold or rented it has to meet a certain
efficiency level. The extent of renovation in the model is determined by
cost-effectiveness considerations[162];

·                        
Energy management systems in all new
construction from 2015 in the very ambitious EE scenario, while under ambitious
EE policies, such systems are introduced more gradually over time. 
·                        
Extended and more ambitious energy efficiency
obligations. Energy efficiency obligations are extended beyond 2020 and their
post-2020 ambition is increased through obligations going beyond 1.5% savings
per year (enshrined in current legislation only up to 2020 including a great
deal of flexibility for on alternative measures and further provisions that can
reduce the cumulative savings effect). The strong energy efficiency scenarios
take a less conservative view on the implementation of these obligations up to
2020 (less use of flexibility provisions than under Reference scenario
conditions). Moreover, they assume the removal of such (transitory)
flexibilities and assume in addition the enhancement of such strengthened
obligations beyond the time period to 2020. The average annual energy savings
in 2020-2030 amount to a 2.0% savings per year with ambitious EE policies and
to 2.3% pa with very ambitious EE policies. The expected savings in 2030,
calculated as reduction of final energy consumption without transport and ETS
sectors from a hypothetical non EE projection and expressed as percentage
reduction relative to 2010 consumption level, reach 23% in the ambitious EE
scenario and 26.4% in the very ambitious EE scenario, much above the 7.7%
projected in the reference 2013 scenario. Compared to scenarios which assume
only carbon prices which drive equally high GHG emission reductions, the EE scenarios,
which include in addition the EE bottom-up measures, are projected to add
approximately 10 percentage points in terms of the EE indicator (as calculated
above).
·                        
The measures in these EE policy areas (three
bullets above) are most strongly driven by a modelling instrument named
“Efficiency Values (EV)” to trigger energy savings. EV represent the marginal
cost of achieving one further unit of energy savings (e.g. reduction of heat
needs in building by one tonne of oil equivalent). The higher the EV, the more
energy savings are realised taking into account upward sloping and progressive
marginal cost relationships. The EV essentially mirrors the implementation of
energy saving obligations, which could be mechanisms, such as white certificate
systems, or other direct obligations enforcement approaches. The average EV in
the ambitious EE scenario increases from 261.5€/toe in 2020 to 343.5€/toe in
2025 and 693€/toe in 2030 further increasing to 2108€/toe in 2050 (1283€/toe in
2040). In the very ambitious EE scenarios EVs reach the following somewhat
higher levels after 2020: 356€/toe in 2025, 793€/toe in 2030, 1394€/toe in 2040
and 2284.5€/toe in 2050. (EV are the same in 2020 in both strong EE scenarios).

·                        
The efficiency standards for products driven by
Ecodesign Regulations and their possible further strengthening are continuously
tightened regarding existing requirements, broadening of the categories of the
products covered and by applying requirements to not yet regulated products to
cover all energy product categories represented in the model. This does not
involve speculation on technology breakthroughs. On the contrary, new minimum
requirements for products are set at today’s best available technology level,
which over time correspond to the least life-cycle cost outcome of consumer
choices taking account of economies of scale, technology progress, better
craftsmen skills in installation, maintenance and management of such products
in more complex energy efficient configurations. This is further supported by
the broad introduction of smart appliances. All these EE changes are driven by
regulation, learning from best practices, other supportive measures such as
efficiency labelling, support by obliged utilities that have to save energy at
their customers' sites, ESCOs and other synergetic soft measures. 
·                        
Wide deployment of energy performance
contracting (EPC) and strong penetration of ESCOs, which is mirrored by a
further reduction of discount rates for households from in 2020 under Reference
scenario conditions to 11 % in 2025, 10% in 2030 and 9% from 2040 onwards,
where the rate remains through 2050. For services, offering particular high
potential for EPC, the discount rate goes down from 10% in 2020 to 9.5% in 2025
and 8.5% in 2030 to 2050.
·                        
Further strengthening of other measures under
the EED concerning e.g. EE fostering practices of public authorities, energy
audits and management systems, consumer information.
·                        
National energy efficiency measures are assumed
to continue throughout the projection period at the same intensity as in 2020.
·                        
Various additional measures on industry
regarding the implementation of BAT (best available techniques) in industry
including the assumption of stricter application of existing and future
legislation, for which a strengthening over time in line with the improvement
of the best available technology has been assumed; such strengthened
legislation would reduce investors uncertainty and thereby risk premiums for
such advanced investment;  this particularly influences heat recovery in
various energy uses, various specific processes and horizontal measures such as
energy management and control systems; further enhancement of resource
efficiency (more recycling for metals, glass and paper).
·                        
Additional support for smart grids and efficiency
standards for power networks, allowing further reduction of losses in
transmission and distribution both for power networks and steam distribution
resulting in further efficiency improvements in transmission, storage and
distribution efficiency 
·                        
Lower electricity demand brought about by EE
policies leads to lower transmission losses in the grid due to the fact that
the loss fraction is not linked proportionally to the transmitted power (losses
have a power relationship to the amount of electricity transmitted: in cases of
lower electricity demand and less frequent high demand, losses are strongly
reduced as is the case in the ambitious and very ambitious scenarios)
·                        
Wider deployment of CHP and district
heating/cooling through measures for enabling distributed heating/cooling and
steam (infrastructure), early deployment of highly efficient CHP in industry
(incentives and control policies) and facilitation of high efficient CHP in the
electricity markets, modelled  as part of the EED obligations on MS to
guarantee transmission and distribution from high efficient co-generation,
provide priority or guaranteed access to the grid from such cogeneration as
well the national supportive schemes to increase the CHP share; the modelling
reflects such obligations and ambitions for a strong CHP penetration when
simulating electricity and heat supplies and their combined production and
distribution.
·                        
Stronger CO2 standards for passenger cars post
2020 reaching 85g CO2/km in 2025, decreasing to 70g in 2030 and 60g CO2/km in
2035; 35g in 2040 and 25g in 2050[163].

·                        
More stringent standards for LDVs reaching 110 g
CO2/km in 2030 and after that further decreasing to 90 g CO2/km in 2035, 70 g
in 2040 and 60g in 2050.
·                        
For HDVs improvements in specific fuel
consumption are assumed to reach about 1.1% per year between 2010 and 2030 and
2030-2050 due to technological improvements including new rules to allow
manufacturers to develop more aerodynamic lorries[164], the wide adoption of
eco-driving, deployment of intelligent transport systems, and the
internalisation of external costs.
·                        
Standards on specific CO2 emissions of
motorcycles and mopeds. 
·                        
Other additional transport related measures with
energy efficiency benefits (i.e. internal market measures, infrastructure for
CNG, electricity, hydrogen and LNG[165],
taxation, internalisation of local externalities), as reflected in the White
Paper on Transport, which start being effective already before 2020[166] but given their long
term nature might have a particularly strong impact after 2020. Taxation
related measures cover CO2 based vehicle taxation, removal of the favourable
tax treatment of company cars and the implementation of the proposal for a
revised Energy Taxation Directive, plus financial incentives linked to
environmental performance (e.g. bonus/malus). Internal market measures covering
the further opening of transport markets and removing regulatory,
administrative and technical barriers and the wide deployment of intelligent
transport systems. Other soft measures like eco-driving and fuel efficiency
labelling are also considered.
·                        
Improvements in non-road mobile machinery are
driven by the generic measures related to internal market measures (see above).

7.4.                
State of affairs and main lessons learnt from
the 2020 framework
7.4.1.          
Summary
7.4.1.1.    
The 20% GHG emissions reduction target and
dedicated policies

1. The EU has
achieved substantial GHG emission reductions and is on track to meet and even
exceed the 20% target 
2. The EU ETS
has produced an EU-wide carbon price signal to achieve emission reductions
cost-effectively and a European carbon market which complements the completion
of the internal energy market. The inclusion of aviation as a further step
towards a global carbon market has led to criticisms from third countries.
3. The Effort
Sharing Decision ensures that non-ETS sectors contribute their target share in
a flexible way. The EU is on track to meet the -10% target below 2005 levels,
however 13 Member States need to make additional efforts to meet their
respective national 2020 targets or make use of the flexibility mechanisms. 
4. The ETS has
adapted flexibly to the crisis but has and will continue (in the foreseeable
future) to have a large surplus of emissions allowance, largely as a result of
the sustained economic recession and a large inflow of international credits
5. The surplus
has resulted in an ETS price signal too weak to significantly affect the price
of fossil fuelled power generation, which if unaddressed will have a long
lasting effect on the ability of the ETS to provide an incentive to invest in
low carbon energy technologies such as renewables. In combination with today's
high gas to coal price ratio, it can lead to carbon lock-in.
6. The low ETS
price has also increased the need for public funding to achieve longer term
emission reductions. However, while a (higher) carbon price is an important
driver, it alone may not be enough to provide sufficient incentives for
developing innovative low carbon technologies and related infrastructures.
7. The current
impact of the ETS price on power prices is marginal. Its influence on demand
side energy savings is therefore limited. However, at substantially higher
levels of the ETS price, the impact on power prices and on electricity savings
could be considerable.
8. Free
allocation to energy intensive sectors and along with low carbon prices have
resulted in a very low risk of carbon leakage at present. State aid for
electricity intensive industries can be an effective way of preventing indirect
impacts but has given rise to concerns by some stakeholders regarding
distortions of competition across Member States.
9. A number of
EU policies, high fossil fuel prices and reduced demand due to the crisis have
contributed to GHG emission reductions. Well-designed, specific, energy savings
measures addressing non-price barriers such as split incentives, high private
discount rates, limited access to finance or imperfect information are
complementary to price signals. The CO2 and cars regulation is a good example
of such effective complementary regulation. 
10. The low
ETS carbon prices and corresponding auctioning revenues, the overachievement of
the effort sharing targets at the overall EU level combined with access to
international credits on prices of emission allocation transfers between Member
States reduce related redistribution effects envisaged in the climate and
energy package.
11. Regulatory
uncertainty about the way forward and concerns about a lack of effectiveness of
the ETS have reduced the confidence of carbon market participants and are in
some cases already leading to a fragmented approach to decarbonisation within
the EU which would be contrary to the internal energy market.
12. The
obligation of the amended Fuel Quality Directive for all fuel suppliers to
reduce the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from their supply of road fuels
by 6% in 2020 has proven to be complex to implement but has the benefit that it
will apply equally to importers and domestic producers of fuels.
13. The
pledges under the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun decisions have led to a variety
of national policies and measures, including carbon markets. However, the
existing pledges are not delivering sufficient reductions by 2020 and no new
comprehensive international climate agreement has been achieved yet that ensures
that the global community as such is on track to keep global warming below 2ºC.

7.4.1.2.    
The 20% renewable energy target and implementing
measures

1. The
renewable target has contributed to good progress in penetration of renewable
energy in the EU energy mix
2. The EU has
made good progress towards the 2020 target, but not all Member States are
likely to meet their respective targets without additional efforts
3. The efforts
to promote a range of renewable energy technologies have significantly reduced
the costs of these technologies 
4. The 2020
renewable target is expected to contribute to significant reductions in GHG
emissions. 
5. Between
1990 and 2011, renewable energy production in the EU is likely to have
contributed to decreased import dependence, having grown by 90 mtoe per year
during that period. Renewables production also helps to reduce fuel costs.
6. Renewable
energy production in the EU has created or maintained somewhere between 800,000
and 1.2 million gross jobs by 2011 
7. Increasing
renewable energy in the power generation mix has contributed to reduced
wholesale power prices but its support mechanisms have contributed to increased
retail prices.
8. While the
financing costs of renewables remain high, in markets in which predictable
long-term policies are in place, the business case is strong and there are many
circumstances in which renewables can be competitive
9. Though
essential to ensure uptake and long-term development, support for renewables
alongside an ETS, notably for renewable electricity, has the potential to drive
down the carbon price and in turn reduce the incentive for investments in
renewables. 
10. One
important challenge is the integration of more variable renewable power
generation in the electricity grid. It is clear that greater market integration
of renewables is necessary, together with adaptation and modernisation of the
electricity grid and market functioning to adapt to a system of sustainable
electricity production.
11. Renewable
electricity generation (with low marginal costs) also poses new challenges for
the operation of traditional "energy only" electricity markets
12. Support
schemes for renewable energy need to be fit for purpose and efficient. The
costs of developing renewable energy have been unnecessarily increased in some
cases by poorly designed support schemes.
13. While the
promotion of conventional biofuels has been successful in terms of quantities
produced, it has been a costly way to achieve GHG emission reductions and there
are increasing concerns on their sustainability; certainty about the long term
perspectives of advanced sustainable biofuels is necessary to ensure
deployment, as biofuels can be important for energy security, rural employment
and renewable energy uptake in the transport sector. 

7.4.1.3.    
The energy efficiency target and implementing
measures

1. Significant
progress has been made towards meeting the 20% energy efficiency target
2. Going
forward, the Energy Efficiency Directive will help to ensure progress, but it
is doubtful that the 2020 target will be met with current policies (even if the
gap is projected to be now only 3 percentage points vs 11 percentage points
projected in 2010).
3. Challenges
in maintaining progress in energy efficiency include ensuring proper
implementation and mobilising funds
4. The 2020
target for energy efficiency has been instrumental in ensuring progress,
although a relative target for some sectors might better reflect the structural
dynamics of the EU economy
5. Energy
efficiency measures are expected to contribute to some reductions in GHG
emissions by 2020, in particular in the non-ETS sectors.  
6. Some energy
efficiency measures, notably those impacting electricity consumption, have the
potential to drive down the carbon price and to make the achievement of GHG emissions
reductions more costly than they would otherwise be. However, the current
surplus of allowances in the ETS is largely driven by other factors...
7. ... on the
other hand, if cost‐effective energy efficiency opportunities are not exploited, a higher
carbon price is needed to deliver the same level of emissions reductions...
8. Specific
efficiency measures are also necessary to correct certain market and
behavioural failures which a carbon price alone will not correct
9. Energy
efficiency measures can positively contribute to energy security and
competitiveness

7.4.2.          
The 20% GHG emission target, dedicated policies
and policy interactions

1. The EU
has achieved substantial GHG emission reductions and is on track to meet and
even exceed the 20% target 
In 2011, EU 28
emissions in the scope of the climate and energy package (including
international aviation) were 16.9 % below the 1990 level, and 2012 emissions
are estimated to have fallen by 18% below the 1990 level. Excluding
international aviation (Kyoto Protocol scope), the EU 28 reduced emissions in
2011 by 18.3% below the 1990 level[167].As
illustrated by the new reference scenario, over-achievement of the overall GHG
target of 20% even seems possible at the EU level (see Annex 7.1). National GHG projections submitted
under the Monitoring Mechanism Decision in 2013, quality checked and aggregated
by the European Environmental Agency, also point in this direction[168]. 
2. The EU
ETS has produced an EU-wide carbon price signal to achieve emission reductions
cost-effectively and a European carbon market which complements the completion
of the internal energy market. The inclusion of aviation as a further step
towards a global carbon market has led to criticisms from third countries.
The 20% GHG
reduction target for 2020 is in part implemented via the EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS). The 2020 cap for the sectors covered by the ETS, reflecting a
21% decrease of electricity and industry ETS emissions below 2005 levels is expected
to be met. This is illustrated by the new reference scenario, which also takes
full account of the temporal flexibilities in achievement of the cap (banking
and use of banked allowances). 
The ETS has
produced an EU-wide, uniform, carbon price signal that influences daily
operational and strategic investment decisions of large industrial
installations and in the power sector. It covers and creates a level European
playing field for more than 10,000 installations and nearly 50% of all EU GHG
emissions. The new institutional framework with auctioning and EU-wide
harmonised benchmarks for free allocation has been in place since 2013 and
constitutes a significant improvement compared to the previous trading periods
that still had national based allocation plans.
Since 2012,
aviation has also been included in the EU ETS. Unlike the cap on the number of
emission allowances for fixed installations (which decreases yearly), that for
aviation is fixed at 5% below a 2004-2006 average emission level baseline. The
legislation applies also to incoming and outgoing international flights in the
EU. This resulted in criticism from third countries opposing the inclusion of
flights of foreign operators originating from their countries into the EU ETS.
To provide negotiation time for the adoption of an internationally agreed
solution by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) General
Assembly in autumn 2013, international flights into and out of Europe in 2012
were temporarily exempted from enforcement. The EU legislation is designed to
be amended in the light of a global agreement.
3. The
Effort Sharing Decision ensures that non-ETS sectors contribute their target
share in a flexible way. The EU is on track to meet the -10% target below 2005
levels, however 13 Member States need to make additional efforts to meet their
respective national 2020 targets or make use of the flexibility mechanisms. 
The Effort
Sharing Decision (ESD) sets national targets for GHG emissions in the sectors
not covered by the EU ETS. National targets for 2020 are distributed between
Member States according to economic capacity. Some need to reduce emissions
compared to 2005 while others are permitted a limited growth in emissions. In
addition, a trajectory of corresponding absolute emission limits is defined for
each Member States for the years 2013 to 2019. 
The combined
target aims to achieve a 10% emission reduction at the EU level in 2020
compared to 2005. In aggregate, the EU is on track to achieve the 10% reduction
target, but significant differences exist between Member States. 13 Member
States need to make additional efforts to meet their respective national 2020
targets under the ESD, or make use of the flexibility mechanisms foreseen
therein[169].

The ESD
enables Member States to meet their targets for each of the years 2013-20
flexibly, be it through the acquisition of international credits or through
trade with Member States outperforming their targets. This should enable
reductions at least cost. Given the temporal flexibilities in achievement of
the target trajectory, given that the ESD has been in force for only a few
months and given also that 2013 emission limits can be met by most Member
States, to date trade between Member States has not yet occurred. The
importance of the foreseen flexibilities was also highlighted in several
responses to the stakeholder consultation.
4. The ETS
has adapted flexibly to the crisis but has and will continue (in the
foreseeable future) to have a large surplus of emissions allowance, largely as a result of the sustained economic recession and a large
inflow of international credits
The deep and
protracted macro-economic crisis has significantly reduced demand for
allowances. The ETS has adapted flexibly to changed economic circumstances and
lowered compliance cost for sectors covered by the scheme. However, as a result
of this reduced demand in combination with the accelerated inflow of
international credits and what in some cases has been an over-allocation of
allowances by Member States for phase 2 covering the period 2008 to 2012, an
imbalance between supply and demand has resulted in a surplus of around 2
billion allowances building up since 2008[170]. 

While from 2014 onwards the rapid build-up of the
surplus is expected to come to an end, the overall surplus is not expected to
decline significantly during phase 3. The magnitude of the surplus by 2020 will
depend significantly on longer term energy developments, such as the
penetration of renewable energy and on-going efforts to increase energy efficiency,
as well as on the speed of economic recovery.
While the use
of international credits has been part of a cost effective solution to emission
reductions and a first step towards a global carbon market, it has also
contributed to uncertainty on what effort is required domestically, as well as
having contributed to the surplus of allowances in the ETS. Furthermore, EU
industry and governments via the Clean Development Mechanism have indirectly
supported technological modernisation in competing sectors, especially in
emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil. 
5. The surplus has resulted in an ETS price signal too weak to
significantly affect the price of fossil fuelled power generation, which if
unaddressed will have a long lasting effect on the ability of the ETS to
provide an incentive to invest in low carbon energy technologies such as
renewables. In combination with today's high gas to coal price ratio, it can
lead to carbon lock-in.
When the three 2020 targets were agreed, the expectation was that
there would be a positive impact from the GHG target and in particular from the
ETS on both energy efficiency and renewables by increasing notably the price of
electricity generation based on fossil fuels and the resulting price signal to
energy consumers and a comparative advantage for generators of electricity from
renewable energy sources.
Indeed, by creating an incentive for companies to invest in
technologies that cut emissions as well as by increasing notably the price of
electricity generation based on fossil fuels, the ETS is meant to be a key
driver of investments in low carbon technologies[171]. The market price of
allowances - the ‘carbon price’ – creates a greater incentive the higher it is[172].
But the recent level of the ETS price has been too low to produce
such incentives. The combination of an increasing supply of allowances and
international credits on the one hand, and low demand on the other, has been
reflected in the observed ETS price evolution since 2008. From a high of just
short of 30 €/t CO2 in 2008, the ETS price reached a historic low of 3 €/t CO2
in May 2013, slightly increasing to around 5 €/t CO2 since then.
According to many companies included in the
ETS, the ETS price at current levels has become increasingly less important for
investment decisions[173].
And this is in spite of the fact that the ETS emission cap decreases to around
-21% by 2020 compared to 2005 and continues to decrease at the same pace after
2020, in principle giving a legal guarantee that major low carbon investments
will be needed. 
The low carbon price has been one of the driving factors, along with
falling coal prices and a correspondingly increasing gas to coal price ratio,
for the recent growth in the consumption and imports of coal witnessed in the
EU, alongside falling consumption of natural gas[174]. This provides one
illustration of how the EU ETS is at current low prices not incentivising
switching away from the more polluting forms of power generation. 
6. The low ETS price has also increased the need for public funding
to achieve longer term emission reductions. However, while a (higher) carbon
price is an important driver, it alone may not be enough to provide sufficient
incentives for developing innovative low carbon technologies and related
infrastructures.
A low carbon price does not only negatively affect low carbon
investments, it also increases the need for public support for low carbon
technology development necessary to achieve emissions reductions. 
Taking the example of carbon capture and storage (CCS), the lower
the carbon price, the higher the public funding required to install CCS in a
new pulverised coal plant. At 5 €/t CO2 and the current stage of technology
development, more than €800 million of public finances would be required to
install CCS in a coal plant, while this amount falls to less than €200 million
for a carbon price of 30 €/t CO2[175].
Figure 15: Upfront subsidies required to install CCS
in a new build pulverised coal plant
Source: PROPORTIONATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
accompanying the document Commission Regulation (EU) No .../.. of XXX amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 in
particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be
auctioned in 2013-2020
Also, an increasing value of ETS allowances would directly benefit a
limited number of available investments in low carbon projects as of the 300
million allowances from the EU-wide new entrants reserve for phase 3 that are
available to stimulate the construction and operation of large-scale
demonstration CCS projects as well as innovative renewable energy technologies
(NER300 programme), 100 million allowances are to be monetised by the end of
2013. This means that every €1 increase (or avoided drop) in the carbon price
in 2013 will lead to a €100 million increase in revenue available for these
types of projects[176].
Irrespective of the level of the carbon price, some commentators
have argued that carbon pricing by itself is insufficient to drive investment
in research and development of new technologies[177], while others have
reflected that while the carbon price can contribute to the financial viability
of a low-carbon project, uncertainty about the future carbon price may
complicate decision-making particularly for financing of projects[178]. Empirical studies
found some impacts of the EU ETS on innovation, however with limited scope[179].
In addition, the ETS price is only one element in the economic
decision to invest or not in low carbon technologies. The optimal investment
solution is always specific to the demand and supply situation of the investor and
the expectations he or she has about the evolution of electricity, fuel and
carbon prices as well as other operational costs, demand levels and profiles,
the behaviour of competitors and the stability of the regulatory and market
framework. 
One survey[180]
revealed not only that the ETS alone may not be sufficient to drive low-carbon
investments, but also that there are a variety of other factors that companies
consider more important or as important as the ETS for investment choices. For
instance, power generators reported that access to fuel and public perception
that affects the permitting process are important factors for investment
decisions, and power technology companies reported that technology-specific
policies such as feed-in tariffs, where they exist, are the most important
factors for sales and R&D investments.
7. The
current impact of the ETS price on power prices is marginal. Its influence on
demand side energy savings is therefore limited. However, at substantially
higher levels of the ETS price, the impact on power prices and on electricity
savings could be considerable.
The impact of carbon prices on power prices has typically been
measured by considering the CO2 transfer factor for power supplied by
combustion plants. The transfer factor is defined as the increase in the annual
average power wholesale price associated with a CO2 cost of 1 €/ton CO2, i.e.
the transfer factor is measured as €/MWh per €/ton CO2. 
The average transfer factor in a thermal power system is the average
of the marginal CO2 cost for all hours during the year. In a thermal system
with a mix of different technologies and fossil fuels, it has been estimated
that the average transfer factor lies between the transfer factor for gas power
generation (0.4 tCO2/MWh) and coal power generation (0.8-0.9 tCO2/MWh)[181]. 
However, if the share of renewable electricity generation increases
or the system has a high share of older, less efficient, coal generation
facilities, the average transfer factor may be outside this range. For Combined
Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT's) plants for example, which are expected to be the
thermal power plant of choice in the future to act as back-up for renewable
energy power plants, the transfer factor can be even lower than 0.4 tCO2/MWh.
In the recent Impact Assessment (IA) on backloading, an average CO2
emissions factor from power production in the EU of 0.465 tCO2/MWh is used.
This was also the CO2 emissions factor used in the IA for the state aid
measures in the ETS and in the IA relating to the 2010 carbon leakage decision.
Making the simplifying assumption of full cost pass through, it would mean that
a 1 Euro increase in the carbon price would translate into an increase in the
electricity price of € 0.465/MWh. 
The cost of electricity for EU industry as an end-user in 2012 was
between € 94/MWh and € 226/MWh with an average of around € 137/MWh[182]. Thus assuming a
transfer factor of 0.465 tCO2/MWh, a €5 increase in the carbon price would lead
to a €2.3/MWh increase in electricity prices, amounting to 1.7% of €137/MWh,
which must be considered insignificant in relative terms, not least given the
conservative assumption of full cost pass-through. The relative impact on
wholesale prices would however of course be greater.
On this basis, it is clear that the ETS at present price levels only
has a marginal impact on wholesale electricity prices. The impact from the ETS
is dwarfed by the fluctuations and modest upward trend of wholesale prices
noticed over the last three years (largely driven by other factors than the ETS),
let alone changes in end-user prices over the same period. In addition, there
is some evidence that short term price elasticity of electricity demand and
hence the short term effects of price changes on energy savings are limited
(see point 9). 
However, even if energy demand is deemed relatively price inelastic
in the short term, it cannot be concluded that any price increases will not
have an impact on behaviour.
Significantly higher carbon and/or energy prices could change the price
elasticity of demand observed, providing much increased incentives for
consumers to invest in more energy efficient products.
It should also be highlighted that CO2 transfer factors vary
considerably between Member States, and can be quite considerably higher than
the EU average. As an example, estimated transfer factors for the power market
areas in North West Europe (Nordics, Germany and the Netherlands) are
illustrated in Figure 16 below[183]. 
Figure 16: Estimated
CO2 transfer factors for Norway and power markets in NEW
Source: Carbon Price Transfer in Norway,
Poyry/Thema Consulting Group, 2011.
All transfer factors in the Figure above lie between the typical
emission factors for gas (0.4 tCO2/MWh) and coal generation (0.8-0.9 tCO2/MWh),
shown by the horizontal lines in the Figure. The highest transfer factor in
this group is in Denmark (Zealand = 0.76 tCO2/MWh), which has the highest share
of coal power generation, and the lowest transfer factor is in the Netherlands
(= 0.5 tCO2/MWh), with the highest share of gas power generation. 
Note that the estimated transfer factor for Norway (=0.6 tCO2/MWh –
also shown in Figure 16)
appears to be high given that Norwegian power generation is almost 100% based
on renewables and as such, practically CO2 free. This is because of the high
interconnectivity of the Norwegian market with neighboring, Nordic markets,
which have substantial thermal power generation.  There is thus a spill-over
effect of the carbon intensity of power generation on neighboring,
interconnected markets, and the more interconnected the markets, the greater
the convergence in national transfer factors from CO2 into electricity prices
(as well as electricity prices themselves)[184].
But even with a transfer cost at the low end of these estimates, it
would not take a very high carbon price before the impacts on the costs of
power generation become substantial. An analysis undertaken by Frontier
Economics for Business Europe[185]
assuming a (rather low) transfer factor of 0.3 tCO2/MWh for a CCGT plant, a
relatively high ETS price of €50/t of CO2 would amount to around 20% of the
total costs of gas-fired generation, and a more modest level of €20/t of CO2
would still equate to around 9% of total costs (see Figure below)[186]. 
Figure 17: Impact of carbon prices on cost of
gas-fired generation.
Source: Frontier Economics, 2013.
For such transfer factors to have an impact on consumers however,
the degree to which such costs are passed through to either household or
industrial consumers must be assessed. As long as price regulation persists in
parts of the EU as it still does today, and as long as the completion of the
internal energy market continues to be further delayed, consumers in a number
of Member States will continue to be artificially insulated from such cost
increases and the incentive effect of the ETS dampened.
8. Free allocation to energy intensive sectors and along with low
carbon prices have resulted in a very low risk of carbon leakage at present.
State aid for electricity intensive industries can be an effective way of
preventing indirect impacts but has given rise to concerns by some stakeholders
regarding distortions of competition across Member States.
See for more background information to the study 'Carbon Leakage
Evidence Project - Factsheets for selected sectors'[187].
9. A number
of EU policies, high fossil fuel prices and reduced demand due to the crisis
have contributed to GHG emission reductions. Well-designed, specific, energy
savings measures addressing non-price barriers such as split incentives, high
private discount rates, limited access to finance or imperfect information are
complementary to price signals. The CO2 and cars regulation is a good example
of such effective complementary regulation. 
It is not
possible to say how much of the total EU GHG emissions reductions is directly
attributable to the ETS. GHG emissions have also decreased due to the impact of
the economic crisis and high fossil fuel prices, which have given additional
incentives for fuel efficiency. Emissions reductions have also been achieved
through the other policies implemented in the Climate and Energy Package[188] and related EU law, notably energy efficiency
measures such as the eco design framework setting minimum energy efficiency
standards for a range of domestic and industrial appliances and the fossil fuel
displacement generated by strong growth in the use of renewable energy, also
driven through specific support measures. 
Further reductions in particular in non-ETS
sectors have been generated by other
supporting national and sectoral EU policies and range for the EU from policies
that regulate CO2 emissions and improve energy efficiency for cars and vans, to
the Regulation on certain fluorinated greenhouse gases and Mobile
Air-Conditioning Systems Directive to specific waste, environmental and
agricultural policies. 
Supporting the logic of a combination of carbon pricing as a
broad-brushed tool and complementary EU energy efficiency policy measures, the
IEA[189] argues that carbon pricing does not address several market and
behavioural failures such as split incentives, high private discount rates,
limited access to finance or imperfect information in areas such as appliance
electricity use, road fuel consumption and building heating and cooling energy
use and considers that policies which address such failures can therefore be
considered complementary to carbon pricing. 
Low price elasticity of energy demand[190] in the EU is an
oft-cited reason for a possible ineffectiveness of carbon (or energy) prices to
address certain energy efficiency barriers[191], with some evidence that price elasticities of residential energy
demand in the short term are generally low, with some variations by country and
region. The high price needed to achieve changes in residential energy demand
only by price changes would lead to challenges on other issues, i.e.
distributive effects, economic impacts, equity issues[192]. Such low elasticities can be explained as follows: with regard to
heating, while residential consumers can switch between several sources, in
reality switching is deemed too costly an investment, even in the long term[193]. Moreover, many residential energy users are faced with financial
constraints that limit the possibility to make upfront energy saving
investments even if such investments would pay back in a relatively limited
period of time.
On the other hand, several studies for the transport and building
sectors indicate that in the long term energy demand can be rather elastic,
with price elasticities being significantly higher than in the short term[194]. Other studies have
found that the combined impact of information and price instruments increases
effectiveness most[195].

Such evidence provides some support for an EU approach which
combines instruments to achieve GHG emission reductions via improvements in
energy efficiency, in particular in non-ETS sectors. However, given that
certain specific measures reducing energy demand also impact on quantity-based
carbon pricing instruments such as the EU-ETS, care has to be taken to take
account of these interactions when designing the measure [196]. 
Another way in which the EU ETS can have an effect on energy
efficiency is via auctioning revenues used to fund energy efficiency measures.
One example is Germany, which has earmarked ETS auctioning revenues to be
deposited into a “Special Energy and Climate Fund”, which will serve the
purpose of financing various environmental and energy efficiency policies[197]. The French
government has also announced recently that all the proceeds from ETS
auctioning will finance the renovation of at least 500,000 homes per year, with
a scope to achieve the EU energy efficiency objectives[198]. The carbon price
plays an important part, as it will determine how much funds become available
for such measures.
10. The low
ETS carbon prices and corresponding auctioning revenues, and the impact on
prices of emission allocation transfers between Member States of the
overachievement of the effort sharing targets at the overall EU level combined
with access to international credits reduce related redistribution effects
envisaged in the climate and energy package.
See the detailed analysis of distributional effects under lower
carbon prices as assumed in the Climate and Energy Package in the Member State results analysis of
options beyond 20% GHG emission reductions[199].
The now projected overachievement of the Effort Sharing Decision at EU level in
reference highlights the salience of this issue. 
11. Regulatory uncertainty about the way forward and concerns about
a lack of effectiveness of the ETS have reduced the confidence of carbon market
participants and are in some cases already leading to a fragmented approach to
decarbonisation within the EU which would be contrary to the internal energy
market.
Some Member States concerned about the
evolution of the ETS have taken, or are considering taking national measures,
such as carbon price floors or taxes for carbon intensive fuels in ETS sectors.
There is a concern that the regulatory uncertainty about the way forward with
the ETS is increasing the risk of policy fragmentation, in turn threatening the
Single Market, with national and sectoral policies undermining the role of the
ETS and the level playing field it has created. 
12. The obligation of the amended Fuel Quality Directive for all
fuel suppliers to reduce the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from their
supply of road fuels by 6% in 2020 has proven to be complex to implement but
has the benefit that it will apply equally to importers and domestic producers
of fuels
The Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), as
amended in 2009 as part of the Climate and Energy package[200], introduced an
obligation for fuel suppliers to reduce the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions
from their supply of fuels used in road (and non-road mobile machinery) by 6%
in 2020 from a 2010 baseline. The FQD target is expected to be met by
substituting fossil fuels with a) lower GHG intensity fuels including
sustainable biofuels, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and methane (Compressed
Natural Gas, Liquid Natural Gas and bio-methane), b) with electricity and
hydrogen, and c) by reducing upstream emissions of fossil fuels in and outside
of the EU. 
While the methodology for calculating the greenhouse gas emissions
for biofuels was included in the FQD at the time of adoption, the methodology
to be used by suppliers for calculating the lifecycle greenhouse gas intensity
of fossil fuels was left to be developed through comitology. The methodological
challenge is to ensure fuel suppliers can calculate life cycle emissions,
incorporating an adequate level of accuracy but balancing the associated
administrative burden. The development and evaluation of such a methodology is
complex. 
In this context, a draft implementing
measure harmonising the method for calculating greenhouse gas emissions from
fossil fuels and electricity in road vehicles was submitted to the Fuel Quality
Committee of the Member States on 4 October 2011. The Committee vote on the
implementing measure held on 23 February 2012 resulted in a "no
opinion", given that a number of Member States claimed to be unable to
finalise their position in the absence of an assessment of the economic impacts
of the proposed measures. In accordance with the relevant comitology procedure,
an impact assessment considering a number of options was finalised in August
2013, and will be followed by a new Commission proposal to the Council.
Other major economies are reviewing
proposals for or have/ has adopted similar legislation: The states of
California and Oregon in the USA and the province of British Columbia in Canada
have adopted legislation for reducing life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from
transport fuels; commonly known as Low Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS). In addition
the governors of the state of Washington and eleven other north-eastern states
have either directed their respective departments to evaluate and develop a
similar LCFS or have joined to evaluate and develop one standard for their
region. The latter includes the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont.
One benefit of such a policy is that it will apply equally to
importers and domestic producers of fuels.
13. The pledges under the Copenhagen
Accord and Cancun decisions have led to a variety of national policies and
measures, including carbon markets. However, the existing pledges are not
delivering sufficient reductions by 2020 and no new comprehensive international
climate agreement has been achieved yet that ensures that the global community
as such is on track to keep global warming below 2ºC.
More than 110 countries, accounting for 85%
of global emissions and including all major economies in the global community
have formally pledged to take action to mitigate climate change in the context
of the UNFCCC. 
The EU ETS is at present the largest
functioning carbon market, but others are being implemented and developed. For
example, Australia adopted its Carbon Pricing Mechanism legislation; China is
pushing ahead with the design of its seven emissions trading pilots which could
begin in late 2013; South Korea is developing its trading scheme.
Major economies have enhanced their fuel
economy standards (in US, China, Japan, and India is considering new policies)
and some countries undertaken significant reforms of their tax and subsidies to
improve their energy security (Iran, Indonesia, South Africa, India). Over 100
countries have renewable energy policies, and especially fast-growing economies
are developing support schemes to enable investments in renewable energy (ex:
Philippines, China and Chile). 
But the existing pledges are not delivering
sufficient reductions by 2020 to be on track to prevent a dangerous 2º C rise
of temperature. At the UN Climate conference in Durban in 2011, the need to act
collectively, and with greater urgency and ambition was recognised. All parties
agreed to negotiate by 2015 a global climate regime applicable to all after 2020
and agreed to enhance mitigation efforts to close the pre-2020 mitigation gap.

7.4.3.          
 The 20% renewable
energy target and implementing measures

1. The
renewable target has contributed to good progress in penetration of renewable
energy in the EU energy mix
By 2011,
renewable energy represented 12.7 % of the EU's gross final energy consumption.
The key instrument for achieving this progress has been the Renewable Energy
Directive[201]
and the national measures implementing it. The share of renewable energy has
increased in every Member State since 2005. By 2010, 20 Member States had
already exceeded the indicative 2011/2012 targets. 
Member States
have also progressed towards meeting the 10% by 2020 renewable energy target in
transport. In 2010, renewable energy use in the transport sector was 4.7% of
the energy consumed in that sector (above 95% of which was biofuel - amounting
to 4.5%), only marginally falling short of the planned 2010 EU share of
renewable energy in transport (of 4.9%).
The Directive
established national legally binding targets which have provided the incentives
to national governments to undertake a range of measures to improve the uptake
of renewable energy. These include improvements to national planning and
equipment/installation authorisation processes and electricity grid operations
(connection regimes etc.), some of which are explicitly required by the
Directive. Financial support has also been used by Member States to increase
uptake, compensating for the various market failures that result in suboptimal
levels of renewable energy.
2. The EU
has made good progress towards the 2020 target, but not all Member States are
likely to meet their respective targets without additional efforts
The progress to date means that the EU has met its interim target.
However, as the trajectory grows steeper, more efforts will still be needed
from Member States in order to reach it[202].
In addition, not all Member States are on track to meet their respective
targets, and recent evolutions such as for instance retroactive changes to
support schemes is causing concern as to whether the overall EU target will be
met.
3. The efforts to promote a range of renewable energy technologies
have significantly reduced the costs of these technologies 
Some renewable
technologies in certain markets are already competing with state of the art
fossil-fuelled power generation, even at low levels of the ETS price[203]. 
Figure 18 below shows the latest IEA
estimations of the levelised costs[204]
of power generation in the OECD. 
Figure 18: Levelised
costs of power generation (USD per megawatt hour), first quarter 2013
Source: IEA, 2013, Medium Term Market
report on Renewable Energy
Within the
cost ranges for different technologies shown in the chart, OECD Europe is
included, taking into account the prevailing carbon price in the first quarter
of 2013, which has been very low. And yet, it can be seen that at the lowest
end of the range, a number of RES technologies (geothermal, hydro and onshore wind,
for instance) are in some cases already competing with new coal and gas power
generation, even at very low carbon price levels.
At the other
end of the scale, those renewable technologies which would clearly need a
strong carbon price signal to compete without additional support include solar
PV (in particular small scale) and offshore wind. 
However, the costs of decentralised solar PV systems are becoming
lower than retail electricity prices that system owners would otherwise pay in
places such as Spain, Italy, southern Germany, southern California, Australia
and Denmark[205].
And according
to the latest data on Germany, solar PV currently
receives a feed-in tariff equivalent to only 137 $/MWh (102 €/MWh)[206]. For countries
further south in Europe with more sunlight the costs could be even lower. 
4. The 2020 renewable target is expected to contribute to
significant reductions in GHG emissions. 
Just as it is not possible to say exactly how much the ETS has
contributed to reductions in GHG emissions, attributing exact reductions to
specific renewable policies is not possible. The extent of the effect also
depends on the extent to which renewable policies impact more the ETS or the
non ETS sectors.
However, in general renewable energy substitutes other forms of
energy, including fossil fuels with considerable greenhouse gas emissions.
Model runs done by the IPCC indicate that each GJ of additional renewable
energy leads to a reduction in primary energy of 400 kg/GJ of CO2
(average for all forms of renewable energy)[207].

Estimates have been carried out of how much the 2020 renewable
target is expected to contribute to overall emission reductions by 2020. Over
the period between 2008 and 2020, Member States’ renewable energy development
programmes are expected to reduce gross emissions by 2 GtCO2[208], with over 80% of this amount from the electricity sector (Figure 19). This would represent 40% of the 5
GtCO2 reduction effort required from the ETS sectors between 2008 and 2020, as
established when the Climate & Energy package was drawn up or almost half
(-9.3%) of the total GHG emissions reductions required, which is considerable[209].
Figure 19 -
Annual CO2 emissions reductions caused by the RES Directive
Source: CDC Climate Research
The cost of reducing GHG emissions through specific renewables
measures can be substantially different than the marginal short term cost of
reducing emissions required to reach the cap in the ETS sector (reflected by
the ETS price) but at the same time is delivering additional benefits beyond
GHG reductions, and can improve long-term cost efficiency by encouraging the development
of new technologies.
5. Between 1990 and 2011, renewable energy production in the EU is
likely to have contributed to decreased import dependence, having grown by 90
mtoe per year during that period. Renewables production also helps to reduce
fuel costs.
Much increased renewable energy consumption in the EU has been
achieved through developments in EU renewable energy production, which has the
potential to contribute to lower energy import dependence and, therefore, a
lower energy import bill.
EU production in renewable energy has increased significantly in
recent years (by 231% between 1990 and 2011). At the same time, the production
of non-renewable energy sources has fallen (by -27%).
Over the same period (1990 to 2011), the EU's net energy imports
increased by 24%. Without the contribution of (increasing) domestically
produced renewable energy, the EU's net energy imports would have possibly
increased by more. While the exact contribution of renewables to reduced import
dependency cannot precisely be estimated, it should be noted that 90 Mtoe is
the difference between renewable energy produced domestically in the EU in 2011
and 1990. Increased renewable energy production may also have reduced energy
demand, and will to some extent also have displaced production of domestic
non-renewable sources.
Altogether, the avoided costs of imported fuel saved thanks to the
use of renewable energy are estimated to amount to around €30 billion in the EU
in 2010 compared to an external trade deficit in energy products that year of
€304 billion[210].
This estimate applies rather cautious assumptions and should be considered as a
low estimate.
Looking forward, it is expected that the avoided fuel costs will
rise in the coming years due to increasing production of renewable energy in
the EU and a projected increase in EU fossil import prices[211].
6. Renewable energy production in the EU has created or maintained
somewhere between 800,000 and 1.2 million gross jobs by 2011 
According to a report[212] commissioned by the
European Commission, energy supply sectors in the EU in 2010 employed 2,413,500
persons. Of that amount, it is estimated that the renewable energy sector
directly employed between 320,000 and 440,000 workers. Including indirect jobs,
it is estimated that the renewable energy sector sustained between 800,000 and
920,000 workers in 2010. This compares to an estimate of 1.2 million jobs in
2011 in an earlier report for the European Commission[213].
7. Increasing renewable energy in the
power generation mix has contributed to reduced wholesale power prices but its
support mechanisms have contributed to increased retail prices.
The increasing deployment of renewable energy sources − mainly solar
and wind power generation – has had a beneficial impact on the operational
costs of power generation costs, further weakening the link between power
prices and fossil fuels.
As the Figure below shows, parallel to increases in the share of
renewable energy in power generation, wholesale power prices have risen less
than the prices of oil and gas, and until recently coal, suggesting that the
increased share of renewable electricity may have contributed to lessening
increases in prices.
Figure 20: Comparison of European wholesale power,
oil, gas and coal prices. January 2002=100%
Sources: Platts, BAFA, ENTSO-E. 
Platts PEP: Pan European Power Index (in
€/MWh), Coal CIF ARA: Principal coal import price benchmark in North Western
Europe (in €/Mt)
DE gas border import price is the average
price of natural gas on the German border (in €/MWh)
In some markets where hydro generation is significant, the
combination of rainy weather and high levels of hydro generation can result in
very cheap wholesale power prices, as could be observed most recently in Spain
during March-April 2013 or in the Nordic market in the summer of 2012[214].
Increasing share of wind and solar power generation can also
contribute to the reduction in the difference between the baseload and peakload
period prices, especially when the peak of the variable power generation
coincides with peak power demand hours. In many markets, the daily average
peakload price is less than the daily baseload average price on many trading
days for this reason.
While there has been a positive impact on wholesale prices from
renewable energy, the costs of the renewables support mechanisms that have been
put in place throughout the EU have typically been passed through to final
consumers, as an additional component of the power price.
Renewable surcharges as a proportion of final household electricity
prices vary significantly in the EU, as can be seen in the Figure below. The
2011 average for the 18 Member States for which data is available is 5.6%. It
ranged from representing only 0.2% (Finland) to 15.9% (Czech Republic) of final
household electricity prices. Member States with a relatively low burden of
renewables surcharges relative to final electricity price (less than 5%)
include also Sweden, the UK, France and Romania. On the other hand, in Member
States such as Germany, Spain, Italy and Estonia, renewable surcharges represent
between 10% and 12.7% of the final household electricity price[215].
Figure 21: Renewable surcharges as a proportion of
household electricity price, 2011, in %
Source: CEER. 
8. While the financing costs of renewables remain high, in markets
in which predictable long-term policies are in place, the business case is
strong and there are many circumstances in which renewables can be competitive
In recent years, both high fossil fuel prices and a supportive
regulatory framework have provided support for low-carbon technology
investments. 
On the other hand, higher investment rates have tended to penalise
more heavily capital-intensive, low-carbon technologies such as nuclear,
renewables or coal with CC(S) due to their high upfront investment costs, and
comparatively favour fossil-fuel technologies with higher operating costs but
relatively lower investment costs, especially gas CCGT[216].
Recent estimates of long-term and current discount rates currently
employed for low-carbon power generation range from 9.1% - 9.6% for onshore
wind, 10 to 11% for nuclear and 10 to 15% for CCS[217] which reflect the
risks still associated with such investments.
At a recent IEA workshop specifically on RES financing[218], it was concluded
that technology risk is no longer seen as the main barrier to investment in
renewable energy technologies; it is rather policy uncertainty which is
perceived by developers and investors as the main risk that they are unable to
manage, and that markets in which predictable long-term policies are in place,
the business case is strong and there are many circumstances in which
renewables can be competitive. 
Market design is also highlighted as important, and markets based on
competition over long-term contracts are one way to ensure sustained investment
in capital-intensive low-carbon technologies[219].
A number of the IEA's reflections on RES financing in a selection of
EU countries are as follows:
·                        
France: In 2012, onshore wind and biomass energy
remained economically attractive. Onshore wind is competitive with newly built
natural gas power plants in many locations, though it remains more expensive
than wholesale power prices.
·                        
Germany: feed-in tariffs for onshore wind and
bioenergy are broadly in line with new-build gas and coal plants, an indicator
of competitiveness for these renewable options. Still, changes in coal and gas
prices as well as proposed changes to incentive schemes may alter this picture
over the medium term.
·                        
Italy: Despite some attractive project
economics, the availability and cost of finance for renewable deployment may
remain a significant constraint in Italy over the medium term. The challenging
macroeconomic situation has resulted in finance becoming increasingly scarce
and more expensive in general.
·                        
Spain: In 2011, wholesale electricity prices
increased, reaching on average EUR 50/MWh. However, they decreased in 2012,
averaging EUR 47/MWh. With a LCOE over EUR 80/MWh, this situation does not make
new wind projects economically attractive for investors. Some solar PV projects
for self-consumption can still be attractive over the medium term taking into
account increasing retail electricity prices, but this may depend on the
adoption of net metering. Still, financing is expected to remain a major
challenge to the deployment of renewables over the next few years.
9. Though essential to ensure uptake and long-term development,
support for renewables alongside an ETS, notably for renewable electricity, has
the potential to drive down the carbon price and in turn reduce the incentive
for investments in renewables. 
Measures to promote renewable energy (and energy efficiency) can lower the carbon price by weakening the demand for emission
allowances in the ETS. Recent econometric analysis has confirmed such an impact
of renewables on ETS carbon prices[220].
Furthermore, at very low levels of the carbon price,
short term emission reductions can be carried out cheaply via the purchase of
allowances. And any extra measures taken to reduce emissions further, be they
investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency measures in transport or
housing, will in relative terms be more costly. With a low carbon price,
investments in such measures are therefore difficult to justify for delivering
short term emissions reductions. 
Specifically with regard to the promotion of renewable power
generation (RES-E), such concerns have been raised by industry representatives[221] which are critical of the combination of such measures with a
volume cap on CO2 emissions. They consider that via such a combination,
renewable power has no incremental impact on emissions reduction, and that,
instead, overall carbon avoidance costs are increased by building expensive
RES-E technologies, while at the same time other low cost avoidance options
within the conventional power generation or industrial sectors are not used
since those market participants only receive the weak EU ETS price signal
diluted by the impact of RES-E promotion. 
It should be highlighted that the impact of the achievement of the
20% renewables target on the ETS and carbon prices was anticipated and taken
into account in the design of the climate and energy package[222].
Taking the emissions reduction benefits of renewables in isolation,
it could be considered that even if, historically, support for renewables has
achieved costly CO2 reductions relative to the carbon price, in due course,
falling technology costs will contribute to progressively cheaper renewables
options. Whether they become a relatively cheap means to decarbonise compared
to the carbon price will depend on both the evolution of the costs of
renewables and that of the carbon price. 
In addition, such arguments also fail to consider another crucial
aspect of the longer term perspective of GHG reductions, that of providing
investor certainty via policy stability. For instance, without the EU's
renewable energy policy, there would have likely been less investment in
certain renewable technologies such as solar PV, as the technology risk and the
sunk costs would have been too considerable. In this regard, the Renewable
Energy Directive has removed the first mover disadvantage by forcing the EU
collectively to support the development of renewable energy technologies,
ensuring that renewable energy does not only develop in some Member States and with
little effort sharing.  
10. One important challenge is the integration of more variable
renewable power generation in the electricity grid. It is clear that greater
market integration of renewables is necessary, together with adaptation and
modernisation of the electricity grid and market functioning to adapt to a
system of sustainable electricity production.
A key challenge of the increasing penetration of renewable energy in
the power grid is its integration into the EU's energy system. This constitutes
a particular challenge in the case of wind and solar power as these have
inherently different characteristics from conventional sources (e.g. in terms
of cost structure, availability and size) and do not always fit into existing
market structures and network infrastructures. 
One sign of the need for increased flexibility in the integration of
renewable energy in the power grid, is the occurrence of negative pricing on
European power markets at times of high levels of renewable powered generation[223]. Negative prices
occur when, despite excess supply of electricity, utilities with inflexible
generation capacity prefer to pay to sell the generated power, rather than ramp
down or close their power stations. Flexibility to adjust both supply and
demand for electricity, from demand side response (smart grids), flexible
generation capacity, more interconnections and energy storage will help in
solving this problem.
11. Renewable electricity generation (with low marginal costs) also
poses new challenges for the operation of traditional "energy only"
electricity markets
The low (close to zero) marginal cost of variable renewable
electricity has a similar impact to that of low marginal cost nuclear power
production, and also poses challenges for long term market design, as wind and
solar may face the dilemma that they have high up-front investment costs, but
on sunny and windy days the power price will approach zero, thus not reflecting
the long-term cost of electricity production.
Some stakeholders argue that the rapid deployment of variable
sources of renewable generation (rising from 2.2% in 2005 to 7% in 2011) has
affected the "energy only"  electricity markets' ability to provide
adequate revenue streams for appropriate investments and has to a varying extent
displaced flexible generation capacities (gas power). 
In this context, the question arises how the necessary investment
for system flexibility and back-up capacity can be maintained. The capacity
mechanisms considered by some Member States as alternatives to market-based
resource allocation could distort the internal market for electricity.
Moreover, large-scale electricity generation from renewable sources
of energy far from consumption centres – as planned by many Member States –
poses challenges in terms of electricity transport. With a grid network
designed for a different distribution of power generation and consumption, this
can create congestion within some Member States, sometimes also with
consequences for neighbouring countries. 
The implementation of Trans-European Energy Infrastructure
Guidelines will help to remedy this in the long term. Decentralised and smaller
scale renewables generation can also help to mitigate the problem. However,
system operators' fears for grid stability are likely to increase in the short
term if the development of wind and solar electricity generation continues more
rapidly than grid modernisation and expansion.
In this context, it is clear that adequate, integrated smart and
reliable energy networks are prerequisites for secure energy supplies to
households and business alike, in a 2020 perspective and beyond.
12. Support schemes for renewable energy need to be fit for purpose
and efficient. The costs of developing renewable
energy have been unnecessarily increased in some cases by poorly designed
support schemes.
The support schemes implemented by Member States have triggered
strong growth that has contributed to bringing down costs of different
technologies (as reported above). The broad approach to renewable energy technologies
have led to the development of a range of technologies, including those that
initially were much too expensive to be cost competitive.  
However, the rigidity of some support schemes means that support
levels have adapted only slowly to cost decreases or have not adapted to surges
of installation capacity, which has resulted in strong growth and significant
cost increases with resulting impacts on end-user prices of electricity or, in
some instances, on Member States' public budgets. In this context, it is
important to avoid overcompensation, to improve cost efficiency and to
gradually adjust supports schemes in order to allow for renewable generators to
respond to short term price signals and avoid subsidy dependence. 
To avoid distortions to the internal energy market it is also
important to improve the consistency of different national support measures and
to enhance the use of the cooperation mechanisms between Member States. The
national character of Member States support schemes has resulted in less
cost-efficient deployment of new renewables capacity and from many perspectives
work against market integration. With a future share of renewables in EU
electricity generation expected to be around 35% in 2020 and 43% in 2030 also
in the absence of new policies (EU reference scenario), a national approach to
renewables support (such as feed-in tariffs related to production capacity on
national territory rather than consumption) effectively cuts off a substantial
part of the electricity market from further integration.
13. While the promotion of conventional biofuels has been successful
in terms of quantities produced, it has been a costly way to achieve GHG
emission reductions and there are increasing concerns on their sustainability;
certainty about the long term perspectives of advanced sustainable biofuels is
necessary to ensure deployment, as biofuels can be important for energy
security, rural employment and renewable energy uptake in the transport sector. 
In the transport sector, Member States have generally been
successful in promoting the consumption of conventional biofuels produced from
agricultural crops, while the development of alternative sources of renewable
energy in transport such as advanced biofuels from waste, residues and algae is
still in its infancy. 
Biofuels were promoted in the beginning of the last decade, in a
world of increasing fossil fuel prices and low agricultural prices (the EU had
a set-aside policy to limit over-production). A 10% target for renewable energy
in transport, predominantly from biofuels, was politically agreed as part of
the renewable energy Directive and fuel quality Directive negotiations. 
However, as food prices increased and in some cases spiked, biofuels
became increasingly unpopular and the debate became highly polarised. The
public debate on the benefits of biofuels was heated, and progress in science,
while still yielding different results, lead to increasing concerns with
regards to the sustainability of conventional biofuels.  The truth about the benefits
and impacts of biofuels is as complex as the relationships between ecosystems
and climate for the entire agricultural and forestry sectors. A lesson to be
learnt is that policy stability can be more important than ambitious but
controversial targets.
The Commission's scrutiny of Member States' transposition of the
biofuel sustainability criteria shows that there are some gaps, and legal
proceedings have begun to ensure that effective sustainability regimes are in
place in all Member States. At the same time, 13 "voluntary schemes"
for certifying the sustainability of biofuels have been approved by the
Commission, enabling biofuel producers around the world to comply with high EU
standards. The Commission and Member States' monitoring of the need for specific
measures for air, soil and water protection generally find that all current EU
agricultural practices obligatory under EU Common Agricultural Policy and
environmental legislation apply to biofuel feedstock production. In fact, the
current sustainability regimes and voluntary schemes often include requirements
of good agricultural practice and so best agricultural practice for air, soil
and water protection is encouraged by the schemes. However, as pressure on
agricultural resources increases, it will be important to ensure protection
measures in place continue to be adequate, and so the Commission will continue
to monitor such impacts.
It is due to growing evidence about the indirect land use change
impacts associated with crop based biofuels that the Commission proposed
amendments to the Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives in October 2012.
Through limiting the incentives to food and feed based biofuels to current
consumption levels and increasing them for advanced biofuels, the EU expects to
improve the greenhouse gas emissions savings provided by the biofuels consumed
in 2020. 
Work carried out by the IEA (technology roadmap)[224] show that advanced
biofuels are likely to become cost-competitive with fossil fuels in the medium
term. Economic parity may be achieved even faster and earlier if externalities
such as GHG emissions are factored in. From an environmental and resource
efficiency perspective, advanced biofuels such as those made from waste and
residues are more sustainable since they do not compete with food and feed
production. From an economic perspective conventional biofuels are unlikely to
ever reach parity with fossil fuels, because their feedstocks - which determine
most of the variable costs and which are also serving the food and feed markets
- will always trade at a price premium to fossil fuels. This is a key concern
since for those sectors that are most reliant on renewable liquid fuels for
their decarbonisation, such as aviation, economic sustainability of alternative
fuels is key. Cost-competitiveness of capital-intensive advanced biofuels based
on low-value biomass, however, hinges on economies of scale depending on the
size of the investment to be made upfront. These economies of scale can only be
reaped if investors trust that the market volume will be large enough. 
Certainty about the long term perspectives of advanced biofuels is
necessary to ensure deployment, and rapid adoption of the proposal will help.
In this context, the Commission believes that only the consumption of advanced
biofuels should be incentivised post 2020.
Some stakeholders have raised the concern that a specific target for
renewables in the transport sector reduces Member State flexibility in meeting
their overall target, and that it could lead to more costly attainment of the
20% target as such. On the other hand, such a target has direct impacts on the
consumption of fossil fuel based transport fuels, and the EU's import
dependence of oil.

7.4.4.          
The energy efficiency target and implementing
measures

1. Significant progress has been made towards meeting the 20% energy
efficiency target
Member States committed to achieving the 20% European energy
efficiency target at the March 2007 European Council[225] but the target was
legally defined and quantified as the ''Union's 2020 energy consumption of no
more than 1,474 Mtoe of primary energy or no more than 1,078 Mtoe of final
energy'' in the new Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)[226]. It is an EU
objective and Member States have to set themselves national indicative targets
and implement a number of policy measures following a set of European
Directives and Regulations. 
After years of growth, EU-27 primary energy consumption peaked in
2006 at 1,706 Mtoe and has been decreasing since then to reach 1,583 Mtoe in
2011. 
This shift in trend is partly due to the economic crisis and partly
due to the effectiveness of existing policies such as the Energy Performance in
Buildings Directive (EPBD)[227],
the Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Directives[228] and their
implementing regulations, and the Regulations setting emissions performance
standards for new passenger cars and for light commercial vehicles[229] regulations. It is
also due to the reduced energy intensity of the EU economy, which was at 144
toe/MEUR in 2011, down from 171 in 2000 and 165 in 2005.  
2. Going forward, the Energy Efficiency Directive will help to
ensure progress, but it is doubtful that the 2020 target will be met with
current policies (even if the gap is projected to be now only 3 percentage
points vs 11 percentage points projected in 2010).
The outlook for meeting the 2020 energy efficiency target was rather
negative in 2011 but the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) in
2012 and other measures – including implementation of measures contained in the
Transport White Paper, and further strengthening of the adopted Ecodesign and
Labelling measures – have helped provide a more positive outlook. 
Still the Commission's preliminary analysis based on energy
modelling and indicative national energy efficiency targets submitted by Member
States suggests that with current policies, primary energy consumption may be
around 17% lower in 2020 compared to projections. There are however some
grounds for expecting that a smaller gap between the target and the outcome
(than 3 percentage points) is possible given that neither the modelling nor the
targets submitted by Member States in 2013 assume a very ambitious application
of the provisions included in the Energy Efficiency Directive and the other
relevant legislation. On the other hand, unambitious implementation could also
lead to a higher gap.
Following the adoption of the EED, the Commission is required to
assess, by 30 June 2014, the progress made towards the 2020 target and, if
necessary, to accompany this assessment with proposals for further measures.
3. Challenges in maintaining progress in energy efficiency include
ensuring proper implementation and mobilising funds
A major challenge in ensuring progress so far has been to ensure
proper implementation of EU initiatives at the Member State level. Delays and
incompleteness of national measures implementing EU directives (e.g. some
provisions of the EPBD) risk undermining agreed objectives. 
Another major challenge has been to mobilise the funds needed to
ensure continued progress. Constrained public budgets have accentuated the
importance of leveraging public funds with private investment, in particular in
the building sector. The question therefore arises how to effectively leverage
public money with private investment.
The complete and timely implementation of EU legislation at the
national level – in particular the transposition and enforcement of the
provisions of the EED and EPBD, the Market surveillance mechanisms under the
Energy Labelling and Ecodesign Directives, the implementation of the measures
in the Transport White paper and the smart metering roll-out and smart grid
deployment with the resulting demand response – coupled with higher use of
cohesion funds and innovative financing mechanisms, will provide the necessary
instruments for this change. 
In addition, due to the long-lasting impact of energy efficiency
measures, the current approach of looking only as far as the 2020 horizon may
need to be reconsidered. 
4. The 2020 target for energy efficiency has been instrumental in
ensuring progress, although a relative target for some sectors might better
reflect the structural dynamics of the EU economy
The Commission's experience so far is that a quantified target for
energy efficiency has provided political momentum, guidance for investors and a
clear mandate for the Commission to come forward with proposals to ensure
progress, such as the EED. 
However, an absolute consumption target (as specified by the EED)
does not explicitly take changes of economic activity over time into account.
While an absolute target for 2020 better ensures meeting a certain ambition
level, a relative target (such as energy consumption relative to GDP, e.g.
energy intensity) would better reflect the structural dynamics of the EU economy.
A "mixed" target could also be an option (absolute for those sectors
where energy consumption is less dependent on economic activity, such as
buildings, and relative for those sectors, such as industry, where these two
elements are more closely correlated).
5. Energy efficiency measures are expected to contribute to some
reductions in GHG emissions by 2020, in particular in the non-ETS sectors.  
Measures to achieve the 20% energy efficiency target in 2020 are
intended to be complementary to, as well as to provide support for the
greenhouse gas reduction target, in particular in non-ETS sectors[230].
The Impact Assessment of the Energy Efficiency Directive concludes
that achieving the 20% energy saving target will result by 2020 in GHG emission
reductions compared to a 2009 (PRIMES) baseline ranging from -10% in the case
of the Baltics to -21% in the case of Mediterranean Member States (with the
Nordic countries, Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe all registering
GHG emission reductions within that range). 
According to estimates[231], the additional binding measures in the EED and the Transport White
paper would correspond to around 500 MtCO2 emissions' reduction by 2020 (see
Figure below), which represents 10% of the 5 GtCO2 emission reduction target envisaged
by the Climate & Energy Package. This corresponds to about a quarter of the
possible impact of the renewables target on consumption (of 2 GtCO2
corresponding to 40% of the reduction target). The extent of additional
emission reductions depend on the extent of the incidence of the efficiency
measures in ETS or non-ETS sectors.
Figure 22: EED and Transport White paper annual
reduction impact on CO2 emissions
Source: “Energy Efficiency, Renewable
Energy and CO2 Allowances in Europe: A Need for Coordination”, Climate Brief,
no. 18, CDC Climat Research, September 2012.
6. Some energy efficiency measures, notably those impacting
electricity consumption, have the potential to drive down the carbon price and
to make the achievement of GHG emissions reductions more costly than they would
otherwise be. However, the current surplus of allowances in the ETS is largely
driven by other factors.
Measures to promote energy efficiency (and renewable energy) can lower the carbon price by weakening the demand for emission
allowances in the ETS. Furthermore, at very low levels
of the carbon price, short term emission reductions can be carried out cheaply
via the purchase of allowances. And any extra measures taken to reduce
emissions further, be they investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency
measures in transport or housing, will in relative terms be more costly. With a
low carbon price, investments in such measures are therefore difficult to
justify for delivering short term emissions reductions. 
The authors of an EP study on energy efficiency and the ETS[232] highlight that covering the same activities by two instruments can
amount to double regulation, thereby blurring the carbon market signal, and
making the achievement of GHG emissions reductions more costly than they would
otherwise be "whilst under the ETS, firms can optimise their investment
over the longer term – they have a choice between investing and buying
allowances – under the EED they are forced to apply technological solutions to
comply with the regulation. This may be in conflict with the optimising
investment over the longer term".
Modelling exercises carried out in preparation of the Commission's
EED were not conclusive regarding possible impacts on the price of ETS allowances[233]. In terms of
additional costs to the total energy system, these were projected to rise by
between 2.6% and 4.7% compared to the reference scenario in a 2020 perspective.
In the longer term, these investments will reduce system costs due to the
corresponding reduction in fuel costs. Electricity price increases in the short
term directly resulting from increasing energy efficiency (due to the need to
finance the fixed costs of energy efficiency measures) were however projected
to be negligible. In conclusion, the additional costs of achieving the overall
20% target through the set of measures proposed were considered to be
proportionately small. 
This said, in the EED, the Commission committed itself to monitor
the impact of the new energy efficiency measures on Directive 2003/87/EC
establishing the EU's emissions trading directive (ETS) in order to maintain
the incentives in the emissions trading system rewarding low carbon
investments.  
There is thus recognition in the EED itself that energy efficiency
measures could have some impacts on the ETS price. According to the report
prepared for the European Parliament on interactions between the EU energy
efficiency policy and the ETS[234],
the impact very much depends both on the market fundamentals and the market
expectations, the latter being "particularly important in the EU ETS as
opposed to other markets as it is a market created by governments. As a result,
the market tends to react very strongly on actual or perceived government
policy changes". 
Thus the authors explain some of the sudden and significant changes
of the ETS price which have been witnessed in the past (such as a 20% fall in
June 2011) as resulting from market perceptions of how willing politicians and
regulators are to intervene in the market, rather than to the real effect of
interventions.
They however conclude that the ETS price is only to a limited extent
affected by actual or potential interactions between the EU energy efficiency
policy, including the EED, and ETS. The EU ETS covers around 40% of GHG
emissions (mainly electricity production and consumption and energy intensive
industry) while EU and Member State policies directed at energy efficiency in
principle aim to a significant extent at the other 60%, i.e. the ‘effort
sharing’ sectors buildings, land transport and small industry. Hence, the
interactions between the ETS and energy efficiency measures can be limited.
7. ... on the other hand, if cost‐effective
energy efficiency opportunities are not exploited, a higher carbon price is
needed to deliver the same level of emissions reductions...
On the other hand, the IEA[235] argue that if cost‐effective energy efficiency opportunities are not exploited, a
higher carbon price is needed to deliver the same level of emissions
reductions, increasing the cost of the policy response (in Figure 23 below, the carbon price required is
increased from P* to P if energy efficiency is left untapped).
Figure 23: Ignoring
energy efficiency potential can lead to higher carbon price
Source: IEA, 2011
The IEA considers that even if technology deployment policies
increase costs in the short- term, their purpose is to deliver significant
reductions in the cost of new technologies over the coming decades, with the
goal of significantly lowering the long‐term cost
of achieving deep emissions reductions. 
8. Specific efficiency measures are also necessary to
correct certain market and behavioural failures which a carbon price alone will
not correct
(See point 9 of Section 7.4.2 on the GHG target).
9. Energy efficiency measures can positively
contribute to energy security and competitiveness
An evaluation of the impact of the Energy Efficiency
Directive[236]
revealed that increased costs due to investments in energy efficiency of €24
billion annually would be offset by reduced costs in terms of investments in
energy generation and distribution amounting to an average of €6 billion
annually and reduced fuel expenditure amounting to an average of about €38
billion annually as a result of lower demand. Given the large amount of
imported fuels, this also reduces the import bill for fossil fuels and related
energy security issues considerably. 
The overall effect on the GDP compared to a baseline
scenario would be a gain of €34 billion and employment is projected to increase
by 400,000 jobs. These figures will need to be validated by ex-post assessments
once the policy framework is mature enough.
Figure 24: Estimates of direct and avoided costs
linked to the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive

7.5.                
Summary report on the analysis of the debate on
the green paper "A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies"

On 27 March 2013, the European Commission
adopted a Green Paper on "A 2030 framework for climate and energy
policies"[237].
This document launched a public consultation
that lasted until 2 July 2013, allowing Member States, other EU institutions
and stakeholders to express their views. The aim of the
Green Paper was to provide impetus to the on-going debate and to consult
stakeholders in order to obtain evidence and insights to support the
development of the 2030 framework for energy and climate policies. 
The Green Paper begins with an overview of
the current framework for climate and energy policies and what has been
achieved, followed by an outline of the issues where stakeholder input is
sought. The experience and views of stakeholders are important in the following
five areas: lessons learned from the current framework; targets; other policy
instruments; competiveness; and the different capacity of Member States and
consumer groups to contribute to the transition towards a competitive, secure
and sustainable low carbon energy system and economy. The 2030 framework must
draw on the lessons learned from the current framework, backed up where
possible with sound evidence, and identify where improvements can be made. The
22 questions of the green paper revolved accordingly around five main themes:
·                        
Which lessons from the 2020 framework and the
present state of the EU energy system are most important when designing
policies for 2030?
·                        
Which targets for 2030 would be most effective
in driving the objectives of climate and energy policy?
·                        
Are changes necessary to policy instruments and
how they interact with one another, including between the EU and national
levels?
·                        
Which elements of the framework for climate and
energy policies could be strengthened to better promote competitiveness and security
of supply?
·                        
How should the new framework ensure an equitable
distribution of effort among Member States?
The replies to this consultation will be an
essential part of the Impact Assessment for the Commission's preparations for
more concrete proposals for the 2030 framework by the end 2013.

7.5.1.          
Process and quantitative results of the Public
Consultation

Process of the
public consultation
The public consultation lasted from 27
March 2013 until 2 July 2013. A dedicated web page including the link to the
Green Paper was created.
The consultation process took place in parallel with discussions
with other EU institutions and public events organised during this period
through various forums. The following general groups responded to the
consultation:  Member States, national parliaments, citizens, companies,
various stakeholder groups, and representatives of civil society such as
non-governmental organisations, trade unions, and business and consumer
organisations.
The Commission participated in a number of events to promote the
consultation process. In addition, a High-Level Stakeholder Conference was
organised on 19 June 2013 in Brussels, with Commissioners Oettinger and
Hedegaard present. The results of all events at which the Green Paper and its
follow-up actions were discussed were taken into consideration in preparing
this report.
Box 3: High Level Stakeholder Conference: A 2030
framework for Climate & Energy Policies
 The Commission organised a full-day high-level conference to share opinions on the 2030 climate and energy framework with the stakeholder community. The agenda was defined in a way to encourage a constructive debate and multiple interactions between stakeholders and the public. Welcome and introductory speeches were given by DG ENER and DG CLIMA, the Irish Government and by the Chair of the EP Committee on industry, Research and Energy of the European Parliament. The first session was dedicated to the lessons learned in view of achieving 2020 targets and targets for 2030, chaired by the European Environment Agency. The panel was composed of representatives from Eurelectric; Climate Action Network Europe; the Institute for Structural Research (IBS), BusinessEurope and the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). The second session was dedicated to competitiveness and security of supply, chaired by DG ENER. The panel was composed of representatives from Dow Benelux B.V., Dong Energy, The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), the European Climate Foundation and the European Alliance to Save Energy (EU-ASE). The third session was dedicated to instruments and distributional aspects, chaired by DG CLIMA. The panel was composed of representatives from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), the French Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, the Italian Ministry of Economic Development and the Energy Ministry of Lithuania. Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action, and Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Energy drew the final conclusions. A video recording of the stakeholder conference is available at the following website:   https://scic.ec.europa.eu/streaming/index.php?es=2&sessionno=96b250a90d3cf0868c83f8c965142d2a 
This report summarises the responses to the
Green Paper. It is available, on the web page[238] of the Green Paper,
together with the contributions received.
Methodology
A thorough analysis of the contributions was carried
out, using an approach which allowed for a precise evaluation of the opinions
of contributors, as described below. 
The analysis was carried out separately on each of the
five main priority areas of the Green Paper and its respective questions. All
contributions were analysed in a large matrix subdivided into these priority
areas, and in turn, each question was analysed separately. Each contribution
was compared with the Green Paper text, noting positive or negative comments.
New ideas, which emerged and could help the Commission for further policy
design, were specifically highlighted. For clarity, this report has been
structured following the outline of the Green Paper.
Quantitative results of the consultation
In total 557 responses were received. The consultation registered a strong participation from industry
associations and private companies, with 41 % of overall replies from Industry
Associations. 10% of replies came from energy utilities, transmission system
operators and oil and gas companies, and another 8% from other private
companies, with a balanced representation between energy intensive and
non-energy intensive companies.
The
consultation also registered a strong participation from civil society: 8% of
overall replies came from NGOs, mostly European environmental
organizations, whereas trade unions accounted for 2% of
replies. Private citizens represented 11% of the received replies.
A number of public authorities have also responded to
the consultation. 15 Member States have submitted official statements[239]. Along with Member
State contributions, several national parliaments have reacted to the Green
Paper. Several regional and local authorities have also responded, representing
a significant share of overall respondents (4% of the total). Other national,
European and international institutions and public agencies represented 3% of
total replies. 
Figure 25: Stakeholders profiles – Based on 557
replies
Geographical
distribution
Regarding
the geographical distribution of replies, European umbrella associations and
institutions represent the highest share of responses (26% of all replies).
At the
Member State level, stakeholders from the biggest Member States are generally
well represented: Germany (12%), United Kingdom (8%), France (4%), Spain (4%),
Italy (4%), Poland (4%).
A relatively
strong participation can be noted from Austria (6%), Belgium (4%) and the
Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark and Sweden accounted for more than 9% of
overall replies) whereas Norway represents the highest participation among
non-European countries (2 % of overall replies).
Figure 26: Stakeholders geographical distribution
–Based on 557 replies

7.5.2.          
Qualitative assessment of the consultation and
main findings

From the public
consultation responses a number of general conclusions can be drawn.
Stability,
predictability and coherence
Stakeholders
are asking the EU to provide direction on what policies will follow the 2020
agenda for climate and energy. The definition of a new framework should reduce
uncertainty among investors, governments and citizens, further contributing
towards growth and jobs in Europe while promoting sustainability,
competitiveness and security of supply. It is frequently pointed out that the
EU needs to continue working on its longer term climate
objectives with a coherent set of instruments and needs
to secure greater commitment from other major emitters.
More Europe
Throughout the
consultation, there was a strong support for the development of a common
European energy policy. National energy and climate policies are often seen as
fragmenting the market and thus creating unfavourable conditions for companies
and investors, whereas common EU policies have the potential to create a level
playing field for companies and investors alike. The EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) and EU legislation on the Internal Energy Market are seen as two
central aspects for future EU climate and energy polices. From the consultation
there clearly emerges the role of a renewed EU energy infrastructure
to coordinate and optimise network development on a continental scale. An
integrated European infrastructure is perceived as a fundamental tool to
ensure that European citizens and businesses have access to affordable energy.
Decarbonisation
efforts and the ETS should remain at the centre of EU energy and climate policy
There is a very
broad consensus that climate change should remain at the core of EU policies
and the need for a 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target is
widely accepted. Almost all stakeholders agree that this target should remain
central in the 2030 framework. Most stakeholders also have the opinion that the
ETS should remain the major instrument for the transition to a low carbon
economy and in particular to reach the GHG emissions reduction target. Some
stakeholders also bring up the importance of strengthening the Effort Sharing
Decision[240].
Many stakeholders agree that additional policies and instruments can be
utilized to reduce emissions for non-ETS sectors, such as EU-wide product
performance standards for cars and appliances, or policy to lower emissions of
existing buildings, via increased energy efficiency. Overall, stakeholders note
that in order to decarbonize in the most cost-efficient way, a balance between
EU wide instruments and flexibility provided to Member States needs to be
reached.
More focus
on competitiveness and security of supply
Stakeholders
clearly emphasised the need for climate and energy policy to continue to take
into account the three common goals of security of supply, competitiveness and
sustainability. Many Member States and stakeholders stress that EU climate and
energy policy should give greater consideration to the consequences
of the on-going economic crisis and international
developments, in particular their potential adverse effects on competitiveness.
As Europe has a prominent industrial base and needs to strengthen it, the
energy system transition should avoid adverse impacts on competitiveness,
especially since energy remains an important cost factor for energy intensive
industries. At the same time, climate and energy policies could also give a
boost to economic growth by helping retain Europe's leadership position in
low-carbon industries such as renewables and efficient equipment providers and
by limiting energy costs via increased energy efficiency and reduced dependence
on imported fuels.
Adopt a
cost-effective approach
From the
consultation replies a general concern emerges about the increasing cost of
some climate and energy policies, in particular related to the support of
renewables from Member States and stakeholders alike. There is a general
consensus that many public support schemes have to be revised in order to be
more in line with changing costs of deploying renewables. Many contributions
also suggest that public support schemes should be revised in order to
establish a more technology neutral approach.
Security of
energy supply
Many
stakeholders agree that Europe should further diversify its energy supply
sources and routes, though there is no consensus on the sources with some
stakeholders focusing on shale gas, while others note that focus should be on
indigenous renewables resources and energy efficiency. The EU needs to take a
strong, effective and equitable position on the international stage to secure
the energy it needs, while promoting free and transparent energy markets and
contributing to greater security and sustainability in energy production and
use worldwide. Some stakeholders see climate and energy policy as key in
support the development of local renewable resources that would increase the
security of supply by reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.
The Internal
Energy Market
The benefits of
the internal energy market were broadly recognised. The completion of the
internal market for energy is seen as a key strategy for minimising the cost of
energy and securing supply. To tackle Europe's energy and climate challenges
and to ensure affordable and secure energy supplies to households and
businesses, the EU should ensure the competitive, integrated and liquid
functioning of the internal energy market, in order to provide a solid backbone
for electricity and gas flowing where it is needed. The vast majority of
stakeholders also stress that its completion through a higher rate of
interconnections, including smarter infrastructures, should be a
crucial aspect for EU climate and energy policies. Infrastructures fully
integrated in the energy system will reduce the costs of making the low-carbon
shift in particular through integrating renewable energy sources (RES), through
economies of scale for individual Member States, in addition to improving
security of supply and helping to stabilise consumer prices by ensuring the
distribution of electricity and gas throughout Europe.
Innovation
To support
European climate and energy policies, there is a common vision among
stakeholders that the EU’s energy technology and innovation policy needs to
deliver on reducing costs rapidly and speeding up the introduction of new
sustainable technologies to the market. There is a need to accelerate developments
in cutting-edge technology and innovation, as well as speeding up market
deployment. A greater focus on innovation is seen as essential to ensure the
flexibility and security of the European energy system and to further develop a
portfolio of cost-effective and sustainable energy options.
On the basis of
this summary of the main messages emerging from the consultation, the following
Sections focus on the detailed stakeholder
views for the specific issues raised by the Green Paper.

7.5.3.          
Which lessons from the 2020 framework and the
present state of the EU energy system are most important when designing
policies for 2030?

The various stakeholders draw different
conclusions on the lessons learned from the 2020 framework. There is an overall
agreement that a clear framework going forward is needed to give clarity to the
economic actors but nonetheless there are divergent views of changes that need
to be implemented based on past experience.
Competitiveness
From the consultation it emerges that many
stakeholders, including Member States, ask for increased focus on
competitiveness due to the economic crisis and changing international
circumstances such as shale gas development in the USA. Industrial
organizations, energy intensive representatives and oil and
gas companies as well as some citizens agree that there is need for
better coordination of the three energy policy objectives: security of supply,
competitiveness and sustainability to ensure that all are given equal
attention. 
Many business organizations and
energy intensive companies point out that the EU has not been successful in
securing an ambitious international climate agreement, which should be a
priority in the 2030 framework as unilateral actions would hurt European
competitiveness and would lead to export of jobs and growth abroad. Many of
these entities also underline the importance of ensuring competitively priced
energy in the EU. In part due to the fact that the EU represents a decreasing
part of global emissions and energy consumption, several Member States
note that it is crucial to secure comparable international commitments on
reducing emissions. 
NGOs, part of the academia and many non-energy intensive companies emphasize that the
2020 framework, with clear commitments, led to green growth and job creation in
Europe. NGOs point out that the renewable energy sector has been
resilient to the recession. Some non-energy intensive companies also
argue that progress was made in international commitments that would not have
occurred without European leadership.
GHG target and the ETS
There is an overall consensus among
stakeholders that the ETS should remain the central instrument of the 2030
framework, as it is market driven and the cost-efficient way to lower
emissions, although a number of stakeholders have emphasized the limits of the
current design of the ETS. The ETS is seen as a technology neutral EU
instrument that should give a credible signal for reducing emissions.
Many stakeholders note that the ETS has had
difficulties in giving a strong and clear price signal. In line with this view,
several think tanks argue that GHG reductions have been mostly driven by
the economic crisis and RES support schemes. NGOs insist that the 2020
framework should have been more ambitious for both the ETS and the non-ETS
sectors. They, together with many trade unions, call for the
cancellation of international credits under the ETS and the Effort Sharing
Decision (governing the non-ETS sectors) to instead focus on domestic action.
Even with a robust ETS, companies and organisations in the renewables
sector note that additional support will be needed to get pre-commercial
technologies to the market. 
On the other hand, industrial
organizations and energy intensive industries argue that the ETS is
functioning properly and the current low prices are the result of lower demand
resulting from the economic crisis, the growth in RES and use of international
offsets. Utilities stress that while the ETS has not been flexible in
responding to changing circumstances, it did create a liquid market for carbon.

Renewable Energy
Several stakeholders note that the
large deployment of RES has been costly and, in some cases, has led to market
distortions. Many stakeholders also bring up that insufficient interconnections
and grid reinforcement hindered RES integration.
The energy intensive representatives,
power sector representatives, some utilities and part of academia,
argue that the RES support schemes have distorted the energy market and led to
issues with integrating the variable renewables in the market. In their
opinion, a technology specific approach to RES is too costly as more
cost-efficient technologies to reduce carbon emissions from the energy sector
get displaced. In addition, many of these actors argue that RES policies
undermine the effectiveness of the ETS by depressing the carbon prices.
From a different perspective, some industrial
organizations as well as some think tanks acknowledge that Europe has
become a leader in low-carbon technologies. Renewable energy and non-energy
intensive companies and NGOs point that legally binding targets have
been successful in bringing the costs of renewable technologies down and in
overcoming administrative, economic and market barriers. They nonetheless
recognize there has been overcompensation in many national support schemes and
ask for this to be resolved through adapting the support schemes as
technologies become more mature. 
Energy Efficiency
As regards energy efficiency, a variety of
stakeholders, including industrial representatives and NGOs, note
that the 2020 framework did not manage to reduce energy consumption and GHG
emissions in the building sector despite the large potential. 
Several stakeholders, including NGOs,
green and non-intensive industries and trade unions
highlight the positive impact of energy efficiency in terms of security of
supply, competitiveness and growth. These nonetheless point that its
non-binding nature has reduced the chance to meet the energy savings target.
Some Member States note that the Energy
Efficiency Directive[241]
was established only in 2012 and that progress made will be assessed during the
2014 revision. From their perspective, it would be therefore be premature to
set new targets before that date, a view shared by some utilities as well.
Several Member States point out that there are some good policies
related to energy efficiency such as a wider use of EU-wide performance
standards that could help unlock energy efficiency potential. 
Industrial organizations and energy intensive companies stress that what they
consider an overlap between ETS and some energy efficiency policies is costly
for industries and should be removed. For non-ETS sectors, they propose a
bottom up approach in determining potential energy efficiency commitments.
Fragmentation and overlapping policies
General business organizations and energy intensive companies as well as utilities
note that what they consider being overlapping targets for energy efficiency,
RES and GHG has distorted the effectiveness of the policies, put additional
administrative burden on businesses and increased costs. A large part of these
stakeholders note that a single approach for the climate framework based on a
single target is needed. 
NGOs
typically argue that there is a certain lack of coherence due to overlooking
the interactions between the different policies; however they note that a
three-target approach is good as they complement each other and ensure broader
progress in the energy sector. Some non-energy intensive companies add
that a proper impact assessment of interactions between overlapping policies
could make them more coherent.
Many industrial stakeholders also
note that national policies on RES support and energy efficiency measures need
to be harmonized. Renewable energy companies support convergence of RES
support schemes but argue that Member States should retain some control to
adapt the instruments based on national circumstances. Industrial
stakeholders warn that national initiatives such as the introduction of
national carbon tax could further distort market signals and hinder
integration. On the other hand, Member States stress that it would be
crucial for them to retain the flexibility of achieving their reduction targets
outside the ETS in order to better adapt their policies to national
circumstances.

7.5.4.          
Targets for 2030

Which targets for 2030 would be most
effective in driving the objectives of climate and energy policy? At what level
should they apply (EU, Member States, or sectoral), and to what extent should
they be legally binding?
With few
exceptions, there is a consensus that a GHG emission reduction target should be
set within the 2030 framework. As far as other targets are concerned positions
voiced by stakeholders followed two main lines of thought. Some stakeholders ask for a revised approach to 2030, in particular with
regards to target-setting for RES and energy efficiency. On the other hand, others stress the
importance of setting clear targets in all areas of the long term framework in
order to ensure a stable investment environment in the energy sector, foster competitiveness in low carbon industries and keep the lead in the international negotiations.
Box 4: Main positions on targets among Member States having responded to
the consultation[242]
 All Member States that participated in the consultation are in favour of a GHG reduction target for 2030. Some Member States make such support conditional to a thorough analysis of impacts. Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and Spain are favourable to a binding target of 40%; Poland argues that the decision to adopt an objective for 2030 should be taken no earlier than in 2015; the Czech Republic would accept a more ambitious objective only in the case of a global agreement; Romania considers a 2030 target should be seen in the context of real climate action by third countries; Lithuania makes such support conditional to a thorough analysis of impacts and states that such a target should consider efforts by other major economies; Finland and the United Kingdom propose a dual emissions' reduction target for 2030 in the context of global negotiations with the UK proposing a 50% target in case of satisfactory international agreement; Cyprus supports less binding targets; Malta agrees with a GHG target in line with the 2050 roadmap, but also notes that international negotiations outcome should be considered. On Renewables, Denmark is in favour of a 2030 target; Lithuania  supports an RES target, set following a thorough assessment of impacts on industry sectors and individual Member States; Austria is strongly in favour provided the system security and social dimension is taken into account; Finland calls for an indicative or moderately binding target; France calls for a renewables target to be fixed at a later stage based on a partial harmonisation of support schemes and reflection on how to integrate renewables in the system; Portugal is open to a target, subject to more use of cooperation mechanisms; Estonia is ready to support a renewable target if the EU-level action provides substantial added value, following a cost-benefit analysis; Romania advocates a renewables' target set by the Member States; Malta proposes a RES investment target tied to GDP per capita; the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic are explicitly against setting targets for renewables. On Energy Efficiency, Denmark and Portugal are in favour of a 2030 target; Estonia is ready to support energy efficiency targets if the EU-level action provides substantial added value; Lithuania envisages a target for energy efficiency related to energy intensity subject to a thorough impact assessment; France is open to a European target as a complimentary addition and to be fixed at a later stage with a new definition of energy intensity; Finland is favourable to an indicative EU energy efficiency target; Romania would be open to an overall aspirational target; Malta does not explicitly address energy efficiency, but say that Member States should have flexibility to decide on the mix of how to reduce GHG emissions; Austria and Cyprus would prefer to postpone discussions on energy efficiency until after 2014; the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic are explicitly against a mandatory energy efficiency target. Other targets: Portugal advocates an intermediate target as regards the physical implementation of an Internal Energy Market (target for minimum interconnections between Member States) whereas Spain is proposing a binding interconnection target (10%). Romania advocates that targets should pursue also the objectives of security of supply and competitiveness. Lithuania asks for appropriate EU indicators for energy infrastructures' development, research and experimental development. 
Greenhouse
Gas Target
Whereas Member States are divided on the target
approach (as illustrated in Box 4.), there is a general agreement on the need to set a new EU-wide GHG
emissions reduction target. Further discussions will be necessary in order to
establish a common view among Member States on other targets for 2030.
NGOs specifically highlight the cost of non-action or delayed action and
the positive contribution of a low-carbon energy transition to future
sustainable economic growth. Therefore they are generally asking for a more ambitious
GHG target. They mostly suggest an ambitious target for
GHG reductions of 40-60% with some are proposing a
target for 2030 of up to 80% GHG reductions compared to 1990.
An
important share of European business organisations believes that Europe
has to put cost-competitiveness, security of supply and climate objectives on a
more equal footing. Whereas there is general consensus that the EU should set a
2030 emissions reduction target to incentivise investments in low-carbon and
energy-efficient technologies, there is no agreement on the other targets As regards GHG, parts
of European industry clearly advocate a 40% reduction target, whereas others
just indicate that, when deciding on the most appropriate level of ambition,
the EU should first discuss it with Member States and business stakeholders and
take into account the outcome of the international negotiations to avoid the
negative consequences of unilateral decisions.
Utilities and the power sector (in line with their respective business
organisations) are generally favourable to a single economy-wide EU GHG
emissions target in line with the 2050 Energy Roadmap[243]. In their
perspective, a target of 40% reduction against 1990 levels is generally
considered in line with the reductions needed to achieve an 80-95% reduction by
2050. They also note that the 2030 framework has to be decided as soon as
possible to provide regulatory certainty. In the same perspective, oil and gas companies generally
support a single GHG target, with gas companies mostly favoring an ambitious
target of 40%.
An important share of energy intensive industry associations also support this vision and are mostly only
favourable to a top-down climate target under the condition of the
establishment of a substantial global agreement with comparable burdens for
industry worldwide. An important part of the same industry fears that
legally binding targets would prevent the EU from adjusting its policy to
changing economic circumstances. Any agreement on GHG reduction targets for
2030 should be conditional on a global agreement. Part of the energy
intensive industry is rather asking for a relative/flexible target for
industry allowing for economic growth.
Non-energy
intensive companies and trade unions
advocate for an ambitious GHG target that would provide green stimulus to the
growth in the EU. Both stakeholders' groups are generally positively inclined
toward a 40% GHG emissions reduction target for 2030.
As far as
citizens are concerned, views are very mixed, and although they tend to be
divided on the need for further targets, there seems to be a general agreement
on at least a new GHG target.
Renewable
Energy Target
As mentioned
in the previous Section, there is no consensus among respondents on whether RES and energy efficiency
targets for 2030 should be established.
In addition
to the Member States' positions provided in the previous Section, it can
be noted that the renewables
industries, NGOs, local and regional authorities and trade unions are mostly in favour of an ambitious and more comprehensive
framework, irrespective of action in third countries. From their perspective
the EU should continue a multiple and mutually supportive targets approach,
which is seen as the most effective framework. Several NGOs
and RES representatives argue that the RES target should be set at 45%
for 2030.
Renewables
associations and non-energy
intensive companies are
generally supportive of three targets with a strong level of ambition
both concerning the renewable and the energy savings targets. In the same vein, NGOs generally
ask the EU to agree on a set of ambitious, legally binding targets that could
provide investment security for economic actors and reduce the costs of
financing. European trade unions, while emphasising the
importance of the social dimension of climate and energy policies, are
generally in favour of a strong legal framework with binding quantitative
targets for renewable energy, GHG emission reductions and energy efficiency,
also stressing the importance of the workplace as a potential driver for energy
efficiency. 
Some institutional
investors also emphasize the fact that an EU-wide approach and binding RES target would incentivise private
sector investments in low carbon technologies. 
On the other
hand, many other stakeholders and in particular industrial associations
believe that, due to their overlapping scope with the EU ETS, the EU targets
for energy efficiency and RES
should not be continued after 2020 or should be defined as second-level
targets. Some energy intensive industrial consumers are in favour of a
moderated combined RES-Carbon Capture and Storage target for 2030.
In the same
vein, some utilities and the power sector generally advocate against renewable
energy and energy efficiency targets and state they should not be considered on
an equal footing with the GHG target. From their perspective, if developed,
these dimensions should rather remain indicative and contribute to achieving
the overall objectives of emission reduction, security of supply and
competitiveness. Other utilities opine that
legally binding RES and energy efficiency targets should be set as they have
proven effective in promoting investments and enabled cost reductions through
the scaling of RES.
Energy
efficiency target
More
specifically on the question of having an energy efficiency target, some
companies fear that an absolute energy consumption cap would threaten growth
perspectives. Property owners are also particularly sceptical and some
of them advocate that the 2030 framework should include EU-wide benchmarks
rather than binding targets in order to leave significant flexibility to Member
States for an adaptation to the national context. A wide group of stakeholders,
including also some Member States, propose that the energy efficiency
target should be related to energy intensity rather than absolute energy
consumption.
Conversely, a majority of European NGOs
and non-energy intensive industries claim that the setting of an
ambitious, binding 2030 EU target for energy savings would send a clear signal
to investors and lower perceived risks, thereby reducing the costs of
financing, while providing flexibility to Member States for the development of
specific measures. NGOs propose targets between 30% and 50%.
Other
targets
During the
consultation a number of proposals on possible alternative targets emerged. 
Most of the proposals revolve around the objectives of competitiveness,
security of supply and physical infrastructure. 
A number of industry associations
are also asking for an introduction of sub-sectoral targets that will also be
illustrated in Section 7.5.4
which discusses the question '     Are targets for sub-sectors such as
transport, agriculture, industry appropriate and, if so, which ones? For
example, is a renewables target necessary for transport, given the targets for
CO2 reductions for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles?'.
At what level should the targets apply?
Stakeholder views on this question are
varied and mostly relate to the target or set of targets proposed. There is
consensus around the question of defining a GHG target at the EU level, broken
down into ETS and national non ETS targets (for a discussion on extending the
scope of the ETS, see first subsection in Section 7.5.5). As regards to the other two targets,
positions are very differentiated. Stakeholders that are in favour of RES and
energy efficiency targets are generally open to a dual level approach, with EU
and national targets, recognizing the importance of assuring a higher level of
flexibility to Member States; while those not in favour of such targets
generally do not indicate how they consider that such targets should be met,
were they to form part of the 2030 framework.
The RES
industry is generally in favour of EU level RES targets to be broken down
at national level as under the current framework. From their perspective a sole
EU target with an EU wide harmonised support mechanism, would limit Member
States' flexibility to meet their targets and would lead to the concentration
of RES in the most mature markets creating unbalanced costs and public
acceptance issues in these countries. Part of the same industry suggests that
EU RES target should be made binding upon effort sharing calculation taking into
account RES penetration levels and specific economic conditions.
Some other
stakeholders also stress that RES and energy efficiency targets should be
broken down at national level, based on indicative targets. Others argue for a
more Europeanised approach to meeting such targets that would be less
distortive to competition and market integration. Some further suggest that
Member States should prepare specific programs to increase their share of RES
and efforts on energy efficiency. From a different perspective, some
stakeholders, NGOs in particular, propose the introduction of
administrative penalties or economic sanctions for underachievement of targets.

Local and regional authorities are calling for measures to be adopted at the most appropriate
level of government. From their perspective EU energy policy should incentivise
and support local sustainable energy production and distribution. Therefore a
number of them also claim the adoption of certain sub sectoral targets to be
implemented at the local level.
Have there been inconsistences in the
current 2020 targets and if so how can the coherence of potential 2030 targets
be better ensured? 
The stakeholders in general agree that the
three targets for GHG, RES and energy efficiency have interacted, but have
diverging views on whether this is problematic or not. 
Some of the Member States note that
the effectiveness of the 2020 framework is undermined due to the interactions
between the three targets. While some Member States propose to set a
single target, others call for further analysis and better coordination on how
to make the targets more coherent (see Box 4 above).
Several Member States note that a national impact assessment is needed
to better evaluate the interaction and consequences of potential 2030 targets
at their specific country level. Some Member States, in line with some industrial
organizations, also think that the climate and energy policies should be
better coordinated with the EU industrial policy.
Industrial organizations, energy
intensive industries, utilities and the
power sector generally stress that overlapping targets undermined the EU
ETS price signals. They point out that RES support schemes have promoted costly
technologies and a more market-based approach is needed. According to energy
intensive companies, the overlapping Energy Efficiency Directive and ETS
for energy intensive industries will lead to additional burdens and higher
costs, and they propose that the Energy Efficiency Directive exempts the ETS
sectors.
In a different perspective, renewable
companies, non-energy intensive equipment manufacturers and local
authorities state that the three targets are positively reinforcing each
other. They note that the EU ETS has not been undermined by the RES target, but
instead by the economic slowdown, decreased demand for allowances and
widespread use of international credits. RES companies and some NGOs then
note that the major inconsistency has been that the GHG target for 2020 was set
too low and the assessment of the interactions should be considered when
deciding on the 2030 framework. Many of these entities also underline that a
GHG target alone and the ETS currently provide no useful incentive for either
RES development or energy efficiency improvements.
Academia
also concludes that the three headline targets design can be better developed,
and point out the need to better examine the potential interactions while
others propose that a single, ambitious GHG target is needed that would provide
a clear and credible signal.
Are targets for
sub-sectors such as transport, agriculture, industry appropriate and, if so,
which ones? For example, is a renewables target necessary for transport, given
the targets for CO2 reductions for passenger cars and light commercial
vehicles?
Many stakeholders note that emissions
reductions in sub-sectors such as transport and buildings should contribute to
the decarbonisation efforts with the aid of various policies. Several Member
States, in line with some utilities, industrial organizations
and NGOs see a benefit of further developing efficiency standards for
buildings, EU-wide efficiency standards for appliances and vehicle CO2
efficiency standards. NGOs also point that F-gas regulations are
appropriate.
Nonetheless, Member States generally
ask to preserve a certain degree of flexibility at national level to ensure the
most cost-efficient decarbonisation path. Some of them do not favour specific
sectoral targets within the non-ETS sectors and, if these should be introduced,
they ask for careful consideration in setting them. Within a framework of three
targets, NGOs and representatives of the RES industry agree that
sub-sector targets are not necessary so as to preserve flexibility at Member
State level.
Utilities, energy
intensive companies and general business organizations note that
sectoral policies are needed to address the non-ETS sector, but do not
generally favour binding targets for specific sectors. Some utilities
note that indicative targets could be set for the heating, transport and
building sectors, while energy intensive companies argue that if targets
are to be set, this needs to be done through a bottom-up approach.
From another perspective, some non-energy
intensive companies think that binding GHG targets could be
beneficial to tap the potential for non-ETS sectors. This view is supported by financial
sector representatives that argue that binding targets would be useful to
provide certainty and guide investments. 
Transport Sector
Many stakeholders note that even if there
is no binding target for the transport sector, other EU policies need to
contribute to emissions reductions.
Several utilities and energy intensive companies suggest extending the ETS to
cover the transport sector. If this is not technically feasible, some suggest a
sub-sector target or a carbon tax for the transport sector. Utilities and
energy intensive companies also generally note that within the transport
sector, the focus should be on promoting electrification of the sector, promotion
of behavioural changes and continued use of CO2 standards for cars. Gas
companies add that fuel substitution in heavy duty vehicles and maritime
shipping should be addressed. Several Member States also note that
electrification of transport should be pursued.
NGOs believe
that the specific transport RES target has led to the unsustainable use of
biofuels. Therefore they call for transport policy that would focus on
efficiency improvements through shift in demand and vehicle efficiency. They
ask for new standards within the Fuel Quality Directive[244] to ensure reduction
in greenhouse intensity of fuels as well as for tightened CO2 standards for
cars. 
Few non-energy intensive companies
agree that the debate on indirect land use change related to biofuels needs to
be resolved but they see a benefit in having a binding target for the transport
sector. Several support 2nd and 3rd generation of
biofuels that do not compete with food and have proven lifecycle benefits. The agriculture sector also calls for the continuation of a
transport sector renewable target that would provide needed certainty for
continued investments.
Transport sector representatives generally note that technology and mode neutral policies are needed
to lower emissions and not one mode should be favoured over another.
Finally, RES companies generally
prefer an overall RES target, though they note that Member States might put
indicative targets in their National Renewable Energy Action Plans.
Buildings
Many stakeholders agree that improving the
energy performance of buildings needs to contribute to emission reductions with
various suggestions on the policy framework to support this.
Several utilities suggest that
EU-wide performance standards are needed, or alternatively, a few note that tax
on performance could be introduced. Energy intensive companies and gas
companies suggest that buildings should have higher performance standards
and financing support at EU level could be provided. They could be supplemented
with stricter standards on energy efficiency of appliances. NGOs agree
that building emission reductions could be addressed through building
renovation policies.
Non-energy intensive companies and building sector representatives note that a binding
energy efficiency target for buildings might be needed to boost activity and
create jobs. On the contrary, property owners bring up that they might
not be able to afford renovations and a lot of buildings will not comply with
overly strict regulations.
Agriculture
Most stakeholders do not address the
agriculture sector even though a few note difficulties in calculating carbon
flows and ascribing performance of reductions from land use, land use change,
forestry and other stores of carbon. Some NGOs
welcome specific agriculture policies such as sustainable programs to enable
non-ETS emission reductions.
Representatives of the agriculture
sector say that an indicative non-binding ambition could help to realize
the potential of multiple land-based RES to mitigate climate change and
diversify supply. They typically note that a binding target of emissions in the
agriculture sector is unfeasible.
How can targets reflect better the
economic viability and the changing degree of maturity of technologies in the
2030 framework?
There is a general
consensus from a wide range of stakeholders and Member States alike, that
future policy goals should give greater consideration to future technological
development. 
Some Member States have underlined that setting only the
emissions reduction target would leave them with the necessary flexibility to
react to changing technologies. From their perspective they should have the
freedom to shape the low-carbon energy mix.
A large number of
respondents focused their replies on the integration of RES in the new
framework. Many stakeholders opine that renewable electricity support schemes
should be progressively limited to non-mature technologies and, when still
needed, those schemes should avoid market distortions and promote fair
competition with other RES and conventional energy sources in a framework which
addresses existing market failures comprehensively.
Renewable
industry representatives generally consider that
targets should not be confused with support mechanisms. Although they agree
that there is a need to adapt support mechanisms, they point out that renewable
energy technologies used today are already becoming cost-competitive with
conventional power generation in many parts of Europe. More technologies would
be competitive before 2020, if given adequate support in the meantime. Some
stakeholders have asked for the introduction of sub-targets for technologies
under development to increase R&D and advance deployment of such
technologies. Others condemn sudden changes or retro-active cuts and favour the
promotion of flexible support mechanisms, which would respond to cost
reductions and market evolutions in order to avoid overcompensation.
In the same line of thought, NGOs also recognize that some support mechanisms should be adjusted and
propose that the rules for such adjustable support mechanism are clearly
defined in advance.
Some industry representatives are suggesting
the introduction of an EU-wide goal for immature or more precisely promising
non-competitive technologies, whereas others are in favour of interim milestones.
This would allow for an evaluation of the accuracy of the support schemes in
place and, if needed, timely revisions in order to accelerate or decelerate the
speed of deployment of certain technologies. Some regional and local
organizations are also underlining that technologies need to be adapted to
their environment, such as rural, mountainous or isolated areas.
Energy intensive industries generally
fear that such targets as proposed above could lead to increases in energy
costs. They are suggesting that targets should include a measure of the
economic cost and the impact of these technologies.
How should
progress be assessed for other aspects of EU energy policy, such as security of
supply, which may not be captured by the headline targets?
From the consultation it clearly emerges that the dimension
of competitiveness and security of supply would have to be better
integrated in the new framework. Several Member States are
stressing the need to monitor and eventually define clear indicators to support
the competitiveness of the EU and the security of energy supplies. 
Security of Supply
As regards security of supply, part of industry is
stressing that progress in physical market integration, security and
reliability of energy supply are crucial and thus propose the introduction of infrastructure
and/or energy independence targets. Some utilities in
particular are highlighting that a number of gas power stations are being
mothballed. Therefore a wide range of instruments are generally suggested, such
as benchmarks towards a minimum capacity of energy storage, minimum
compulsory interconnection exchange capacity targets or a new
target for cross-border transmission infrastructure development. 
The introduction of indicators for import independence (gas
and oil) and short-term electricity balancing for variable generation have also
been proposed. The industrial consumers are generally asking to
refocus EU and national policies so as to incorporate competitive prices and
security of supply. Measures proposed range from EU rating tools or monitoring
systems on generation adequacy and security of supply, energy prices and the
costs and impacts of climate and energy policy to the introduction of an
EU-wide security of supply minimum target in terms of indigenous fuel use
(in %).
Some Member
States also ask for the introduction of intermediate target for minimum
interconnections between Member States or a binding interconnection target
whereas others ask for appropriate EU indicators for energy infrastructure developments,
research and experimental development (see Box 4 above).
On the other side of the spectrum, NGOs
and part of the renewables industry are generally suggesting that
security of supply can be provided by a continuation of the three headline
targets for 2020. In particular energy efficiency and RES targets would
contribute to lower dependence on fossil fuel imports and increase security of
supply. Some of them propose the introduction of an annual comprehensive EC
progress report as a tool to monitor trends, identify the most effective
measures and provide much needed background information for EU decision-makers.

Some local and regional authorities propose
to assess the progress of EU energy policy by measuring the energy autonomy of
different levels of administration.
Competitiveness
Several
proposals were made to introduce indicators to assess energy competitiveness,
mostly by European business associations and energy intensive
companies. EU rating tools or monitoring systems on
energy prices and the costs and impacts of climate and energy policy were
proposed by industrial consumers. In this vein,
a target for addressing the energy price differential between the EU and major
competitors was proposed by some business representatives. It is
suggested that this new target should be based upon the analysis of multiple
energy prices (gas, electricity, solid fuels and oil) and the comparison with
major competitors – especially the USA.
Many
contributions of the energy intensive industry also propose to couple an intensity-based GHG target (relative to
economic activity rather than absolute target) with industrial targets
to be expressed as industry's share of GDP.

7.5.5.          
Instruments

Are changes
necessary to other policy instruments and how they interact with one another,
including between the EU and national levels? 
There is an overall agreement that the ETS
provides a single regulatory framework for the sectors covered by it and it
should remain the central instrument for the 2030 climate framework. It is seen
as cost-effective, compatible with the internal energy market and technology
neutral. There are nonetheless diverging views among stakeholders on whether
the ETS has to be reformed, what changes are necessary and what additional
policies should supplement it.
EU ETS Reform
The majority of Member States
support the ETS as the major instrument to achieve the EU climate and energy
policy goals. Whereas some Member States argue that the ETS should be
reformed to increase credibility, others note that it functions as expected and
thus are opposed to reforming it.
General business organizations and many energy intensive companies believe that no measure
is necessary for strengthening the EU ETS, as this would, from their
perspective, undermine its long-term market nature. Some energy intensive
companies further argue that current absolute cap on emissions would hamper
European growth. Hence, from their perspective the ETS
should be reformed to protect competitiveness by removing the absolute cap on
emissions. 
From a different perspective, utilities,
gas companies, academia and NGOs typically request that the ETS is
reformed in a timely manner so that it can drive investments in low carbon
technologies and the needed infrastructure. They, together with non-energy
intensive companies, generally support the temporary backloading of
allowances and note that structural changes are also needed.
Utilities and gas companies, non-energy
intensive companies and RES companies mostly favour
introducing a flexible supply mechanism, that adjusts the supply of the EU ETS
based on changing circumstances such as experienced in the recent economic
slowdown. Academia agrees that a supply mechanism should be introduced
with clearly defined rules of when an intervention would occur. Some general
business organizations say that if a supply mechanism is to be introduced,
it needs to be done after a very thorough impact assessment.
Another favoured reform is increasing the
linear reduction factor. Non-energy intensive companies call for
increasing the linear reduction factor. Some utilities and academia
agree that it needs to be adjusted before the end of Phase 3 of the EU ETS.
From another perspective, energy intensive companies note that the ETS linear reduction factor cannot be changed before
a comparable and ambitious international agreement. 
Less mentioned by the stakeholders is the
introduction of a carbon price floor. Still, a few utilities and think
tanks and some RES companies suggest that a price floor for carbon
allowances should be introduced to decrease the volatility of the price and
give certainty for investors. This view is not supported by general business
organizations that request that the ETS remains a market-driven mechanism.
There are diverging views on whether or not
international credits are to remain as part of the ETS. Typically general
business organizations and energy intensive companies argue that
international credits should remain part of the EU ETS as they would allow flexible
and cost-efficient solutions and would help to prevent the risk of carbon
leakage. On the other side, typically NGOs and trade unions call
for limiting and eliminating international credits. According to NGOs,
international credits led to dubious environmental impacts in developing
countries and prevented domestic action and had a negative impact on the carbon
price. Trade unions add that international credits should be removed
both from the ETS and the Effort Sharing Decision to incentivize emission reductions in the EU.
Extend the ETS
Extending the scope of the ETS is mostly
seen by the actors as ensuring more sectors contribute to the decarbonisation
as opposed to a reform related to the surplus of allowances on the market. Some
utilities, several gas companies and energy intensive companies point
out that the ETS should be extended to cover buildings and the transport sector
if it is technically feasible as they note that all sectors should contribute
to the low carbon transition. On the other side, a few NGOs are
sceptical with extending the ETS as in their view the instrument has not yet
proven to be effective in reducing emissions. They argue in favour of a binding
target for the non-ETS sector that could be supplemented with national and
EU-wide carbon tax.
RES support schemes
On renewable energy support mechanisms,
there is a general consensus that these should be designed and
implemented in a more cost-efficient way in order to avoid over-subsidisation and market distortions. Yet,
there are diverging views on the necessary changes.
Several Member States support the
thesis that RES subsidies should be more coherent and include stronger
elements of cooperation between Member States, and welcome the forthcoming
guidance from the European Commission on RES support mechanisms.
Typically energy intensive companies,
utilities and the power sector, and general business organizations call
for adoption of technology neutral policy for the transition to the low carbon
economy. Support provided should be limited, technology neutral, harmonized at
the EU level and temporary.  Several utilities bring up that further RES
support schemes are not cost-efficient and additional support such as priority
dispatching is distorting the market. They note that generous RES subsidies
might lead to RES technology penetration beyond the infrastructure adaptation
rate. Hence, they call for progressive phase-out of RES subsidies and removing
non-economic support. 
From a different perspective, non-energy intensive companies, RES
companies and NGOs argue that market distortions should be
eliminated, including removing subsidies for fossil fuels and nuclear energy.
Renewable, non-energy intensive
companies and NGOs acknowledge that RES support
schemes should be adapted to the technology maturity of the various
technologies, but note that continuing demand pull for RES is still needed. RES
companies add that flexibility should be introduced in the support schemes to
reflect their maturity and prevent retroactive changes in the support
mechanisms that were observed in some Member States. They also request better
coordination across the EU on support mechanisms. 
NGOs also
bring up the issue that only sustainable bioenergy should be counted towards
the RES targets to avoid unsustainable use of land to meet targets. Some Member
States also suggest that the EU should play a role in determining the
sustainability of bio energy, while others point out that this would lead to
additional administrative burdens.
Energy efficiency
For a discussion on energy efficiency
related policies, see Section 7.5.5 that discusses the question 'Which measures could be envisaged
to make further energy savings most cost-effectively?'.
GHG reductions in the non-ETS sectors
Many stakeholders underline that the
non-ETS sectors must continue to contribute to the decarbonisation efforts. Most Member States argue that they should retain flexibility
in addressing the non-ETS policies as they can adapt them to national
circumstances. A the same time many stakeholders such as some Member States,
utilities, NGOs, energy intensive companies and think tanks point
out that EU wide standards for buildings and product performance standards such
as efficiency standards for cars, vans and lorries and eco-design for
appliances should be continued for sectors outside the ETS.
NGOs argue
that the Effort Sharing Decision should be strengthened, including a
transposition placing duties on the national authorities. They note the Effort
Sharing Decision was not strong enough and international credits undermined
domestic action. They call for the setting of an ambitious legally binding
target for the Effort Sharing Decision and the provision of financing for
Member States less able to act. 
Some utilities suggest that for
sectors outside the ETS, command and control policies would work best while a
few add that a carbon tax might be introduced at EU level with a price signal
coherent with the ETS price signal. NGOs generally agree with some
adding that carbon tax can be introduced for the ETS sector as well.
State Aid
Several energy
intensive companies and general business organizations note that
state aid rules need to be amended to add competitiveness protection provision.
On the other side, they note that compensation for the risk of carbon leakage
due to indirect costs (CO2 costs passed through to electricity prices) should
not be through state aid as it would depend on Member State ability to pay.
Instead, free allowance allocation should be used as it is market based and
would harmonize support at EU level. Some utilities and think tanks
underline that harmonized state aid can be the mechanism to compensate for
indirect costs. 
How should specific measures at the EU
and national level best be defined to optimise cost-efficiency of meeting
climate and energy objectives?
NGOs, renewable
energy organizations and many non-energy intensive representatives
argue that a longer term legal framework is required to achieving a
cost-efficient decarbonisation path. RES companies in particular note
that a long term commitment is needed to target specific technologies and
retroactive changes to the support schemes should be avoided as these increase
artificially the cost of capital. 
Many stakeholders note the risk of market
fragmentation due to incoherence between national policies. Industrial
stakeholders call for better coordination and harmonization of national
policies. Many see the harmonization of RES support mechanism, or at least the
convergence, as an important step to more cost-efficient policies. General
business organizations note the risk of market fragmentation if national
policies such as a national carbon price tax are introduced. They also note
that better coordination needs to be achieved between energy policies. They ask
for establishing mandatory consultation procedures for energy policy decisions
that might affect other Member States. 
From a different perspective, Member
States advocate for retaining control over their energy policies. They stress that they need flexibility in order to achieve the
targets in the most cost-effective way and certain policies should remain under
national authority. Nonetheless, some Member States note it as important
to continue harmonization of policies and achieve the internal energy market in
order to have a cost-effective policy. Hence the EU can play a role to ensure
consistency of policies.
How can fragmentation of the
internal energy market best be avoided particularly in relation to the need to
encourage and mobilise investment?
There is a broad agreement between all stakeholder groups
that the completion of the internal market for energy is a key strategy
for minimising the cost of energy and securing supply. In this vein, the
consistent implementation of the Third Energy Package across Member
States is seen as a priority. The vast majority of stakeholders are aware that
its completion from a regulatory perspective but also through a higher rate
of interconnections, including smarter infrastructures, will be an
important step. 
Some major business
associations are calling for a better coordination of national policies and
cooperation to ensure the proper functioning of the future interconnected
energy market. From their perspective, non-harmonized instruments with purely a
national design such as RES-E promotion schemes and the current design of
capacity mechanisms will not help to realise the internal energy market. 
Utilities and the power sector
insist on the importance of the right legislative environment that can deliver
a transparent, liquid and well-functioning single European market in gas and
power, such as the gas target model[245], the security of supply regulation, and the
regulation on wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT). Transmission
System Operators underline that cooperation mechanisms
and demand-response measures could represent other important instruments to
cost-effectively deliver the goals of the 2030 framework. Furthermore, they
stress that distribution networks must be better linked across borders and
relevant infrastructure projects need to be coordinated between all countries
affected. Joint planning of networks, in particular of interconnections,
could play an important role to ensure the most cost-efficient and coherent
solutions for infrastructure networks. 
Several stakeholders are also asking the Commission to come
forward with a reflection on the existing energy market design which, as
it currently stands, makes it difficult to integrate a further increase of
electricity from RES. Renewables associations are generally asking for
the development of cross-border grid infrastructure and for the EU to harmonise
market design conditions (e.g. via harmonised network codes, integrated
intraday, balancing markets but also via the development of storage and
demand-response measures), increased flexibility from power generation capacity
and improved cooperation mechanisms.
To attract long-term investors (e.g. insurance
companies, pension funds), there is a general consensus that a strong and
stable EU policy is needed. Transparency on market rules, tax exemptions,
support grants and simplified administrative procedures are seen as some of
many possible tools to enhance private investments. More efforts are also
required to increase regulatory stability (permit granting) and public
acceptance. Hence, the adopted changes at national level to facilitate and
speed up investments need to be fully implemented (Energy Infrastructure
Package).
Part of the progressive community in favour of an energy
savings binding 2030 target underlines that this will encourage Member States
to improve implementation of the EU acquis for energy efficiency,
thereby contributing to the harmonisation of the regulatory environment. 
Capacity mechanisms
As regards capacity mechanisms, an important part of
stakeholders, including citizens, NGOs and industry voice
a sceptical view and are asking Member States to limit further fragmentation of
the energy market and the EU to strive for European solutions in the least discriminatory
and distortive manner. Some are
suggesting that violations of the EU rules on competition, state aid and the
internal market must be sanctioned. However the power sector
generally consider such instruments as fundamental to ensure the construction
of the necessary capacity based on the long term needs of the electricity
system.
Which measures could be envisaged to make further energy savings
most cost-effectively?
Renewables
associations and organisations representing
companies offering solutions to energy efficiency improvements generally
advocate long term targets for both RES and energy efficiency as the best tools
to stabilise the market and provide the sector with certainty, thereby
facilitating the achievement of both 2020 targets and long term ambitions. From
their perspective, having binding targets for energy savings would be the most
effective way to foster investments and decrease costs. The effective
implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive[246] would be of a paramount importance.
In line with these
views, several NGOs are also insisting that additional public funding
should be allocated to R&D in energy efficiency, in order to ensure the
widest range of technologies is available to deliver long-term energy savings
in the energy sector and the wider economy. They note that lack of financing
and split incentives are barriers for energy efficiency improvements. Horizon
2020[247]and
the SET plan[248]are
expected to contribute significantly to the achievement of energy and climate
targets. 
On the contrary, other industry
representatives generally believe that energy efficiency should be achieved
by voluntary initiatives, rather than by mandatory requirements which would
lead to new administrative burdens. 
Some industrial
stakeholders also underlined that the most cost-efficient way of making further
energy savings would be to improve the energy efficiency of existing buildings
by way of thermal renovation. In this respect, they note the European
Commission should ensure that both the recast Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive[249]and
the new Energy Efficiency Directive are properly implemented by the Member
States. Some industrial stakeholders also note that the lack of access
to financing needs to be addressed. Property owners fear that some existing
buildings in Europe may not be able to meet EU-imposed high energy efficiency
standards and this could result in many older properties needing to be
demolished.
Several stakeholders, such as, but not
limited to, consumer associations and Distribution System Operators
(DSO), have also highlighted the importance of raising citizen and
consumer awareness, for instance by introducing energy performance labels
for household appliances. Transparency of costs for consumers at all levels is
most likely to drive energy saving measures. When promoting the
construction of smart grids, consumer flexibilities should be used to
optimise the grid load. Real time monitoring and flexibilities provide new
business opportunities for energy service companies in promoting energy
efficiency.
Electrification of
heating, cooling and transport are also perceived by some stakeholders as
efficient tools to ensure cost-efficient energy savings. Finally, trade
unions generally stress the importance of the workplace as a potential
driver for energy efficiency and together with non-energy intensive
companies, ask the promotion of dedicated environmental trainings.
How can EU
research and innovation policies best support the achievement of the 2030
framework?
Research and innovation support is broadly
recognized as key in achieving the future objectives of the 2030 framework and
there is a strong overall agreement on the need for EU-level coordinated
research initiatives. Some stakeholders note that national support schemes for
R&D need to be better coordinated. Many stakeholders also recognize the
importance of private sector participation in innovation and call for a clear
and stable regulatory framework that would facilitate their participation.
From the consultation it emerges that the
different stakeholders generally consider that Horizon 2020 and the SET Plan
will play an instrumental role to support the EU innovation agenda. Several
stakeholders suggest that structural and cohesion funds should be utilized.
Several Member States propose that
high potential technologies should be prioritized within Horizon 2020. Utilities
note that research priorities should be better aligned with the energy agenda,
while general business organizations and energy intensive companies
argue that funding should be in line with the ambition levels of the climate
agenda. 
Utilities
suggest that Member States need to increase their cooperation on high cost
industrial technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and
infrastructure projects. Several utilities argue that R&D should
support the full value chain of all types of fuels, including conventional and
unconventional fuels, promising renewable technologies, smart grids,
infrastructure projects and energy storage. From a different perspective, NGOs
call for less focus on nuclear technologies and some point out that no further
support should be provided to CCS as it increases dependence on fossil fuels.
Energy intensive companies, utilities
and general business organizations argue that
projects should be supported through the demonstration phase. Deployment
support should be limited and these funds should instead be used for R&D on
lowering costs of promising technologies. In the same line of thought, oil and
gas companies note that support to pre-commercial technologies should be
provided, but commercial deployment should be incentivized through the ETS and
GHG intensity goals. Energy intensive industries generally request that
a focus also be given to R&D for industrial processes themselves and not
only for specific energy technologies. Oil and gas companies note that
the SET plan should be technology neutral and open to all promising
technologies. 
Non-energy intensive companies on the other hand argue that support should not only be focused on
R&D and demonstration but also on deployment. RES companies and NGOs
are of the same opinion, noting that demand pull and supply push are needed to
commercialize technologies. Non-energy intensive companies generally
call for further funding on RES, gas turbines, CCS, demand response, energy
storage, and smart grids. NGOs ask for increased focus on RES and energy
efficiency. RES companies request that the SET Plan is extended to cover
all RES technologies.
Some local authorities and trade unions bring up that the Intelligent Energy-Europe[250]should reinforced
within Horizon 2020 and help fill the gap between R&D and wide market
uptake of innovation. Local authorities also point that Horizon 2020 should
include non-technical innovations such as capacity building and new financing
instruments.
Many stakeholders approve NER 300[251]type instruments that
could help with innovation on the demonstration phase of various technologies. Energy
intensive companies bring up that NER 300 type support should be provided
to industrial processes as well. General business organizations and some
utilities call for continued support of CCS technologies under the NER 300.
NGOs also call for NER 300 for projects with EU-wide importance. RES
companies approve of the NER 300 so far with focus on innovative RES
technologies such as offshore wind. Some non-energy intensive companies
suggest the creation of a fund for clean energy that allocated funds after a
competitive process such as the NER 300.
Some stakeholders urge cooperation
within the SET Plan between academics, policy makers and the industry.

7.5.6.          
Competitiveness and security of supply

Which
elements of the framework for climate and energy policies could be strengthened
to better promote job creation, growth and competitiveness?
NGOs and most of the renewable and non-energy intensive industrial
associations, trade unions and companies are stressing that
renewables and energy efficiency offer specific advantages in terms of job
creation, competitiveness and innovation. Europe’s competitiveness and its
capacity to create jobs in the climate and energy sector, depends on its
ability to drive innovation in sectors of the future. Therefore stable and
ambitious long-term market and legislative frameworks are key for
competitiveness, jobs and growth, whereas from their perspective a greenhouse
gas-only approach would not be sufficient to make the huge job potential in
renewable energy a reality. The development of RES and energy efficiency would
also reduce import dependency, easing pressure on national budgets and trade
deficits while freeing up financial resources for investment within the EU. In
the same line, some sectoral associations are also insisting that Energy
efficiency of buildings and in particular renovation of existing buildings as
well as the EU’s technological leadership in heating and cooling systems must
be strengthened to better promote local job creation and growth. Others
underline that other low carbon technologies, such as nuclear and CCS, could
promote competitiveness and that their potential contribution should be
recognised.
On the other side of
the spectrum, European industrial consumers and trade unions stress the need
for competitive energy prices and costs, security of supply and climate
policies that do not endanger industrial competitiveness. Some of these also
argue that ambitious climate and renewables objectives in particular could
endanger EU price competitiveness of energy (for this aspect, see Section 7.5.6 below discussing question 'What are
the specific drivers in observed trends in energy costs and to what extent can
the EU influence them?'). 
There is wide concern
among stakeholders from Central and Eastern European Countries, in particular Member
States and citizens, about the impact of European climate and energy
policy on European competitiveness. A wide number of stakeholders underline
that, if compared to the USA, the energy price differential is increasing,
causing a competitive disadvantage for energy-intensive industries in the EU.
As a result, this would jeopardise growth and employment in Europe. 
European industry
associations and energy intensive companies
also fear that a “green economy” dependent on subsidies, or on regulatory taxes
on consumers or industry, is unlikely to be economically sustainable. Trade
unions stress that training and education of our workforce are also
necessary to promote competitiveness and the modernisation of our energy
systems. As already discussed, European companies generally see the
modernisation of European energy infrastructure and the completion of the
single market as important steps to increase security of supply and enhance
competitiveness.
For issues relating to
carbon leakage and the design of climate policy to prevent it, see question below.
What evidence is
there for carbon leakage under the current framework and can this be
quantified? How could this problem be addressed in the 2030 framework? 
Whereas there is no consensus among
stakeholders on the existence of carbon leakage, the consultation registered a
concern from a large number of Member States, industries and
organizations on this issue.
Member States recognize that carbon leakage will be an increasingly important
issue within the 2030 framework, and call for a framework which ensures
European competitiveness. The vast majority supports, if no international
agreement is reached, the continuation of free allowance allocation to
industries that would be most affected, while ensuring that the carbon leakage
rules remain cost-effective.
The energy intensive industry and
general business organizations highlight how competitive pressures have
been increasing on EU industry mainly due to development in emerging economies
and recent shale gas exploitation in the US. They note that European industry
needs enhanced protection mechanisms. They state that allowance revenues should
be utilized to compensate the affected industries for cost increases in order
to avoid carbon leakage or to support low carbon technology investments. General
business organizations call for compensation for indirect pass-through
costs of increased electricity prices, and ask for harmonization of the
compensation across Member States, suggesting the development of an EU-wide
instrument to replace the national state aid mechanisms, as currently governed
by state aid guidelines. A few industrial stakeholders also propose to
consider a border carbon tax for imports to create a level playing field.
Utilities
generally note that there is limited evidence for carbon leakage at this stage.
They ask for careful re-examination of businesses which are at risk of carbon
leakage. In case there is no international agreement, they agree that free
allowances should be used to compensate businesses. Trade
unions note that the carbon leakage list needs to
be reviewed but energy intensive industries should be preserved in the EU.
From a different perspective, according to NGOs,
RES organizations, non-energy intensive companies and part of academia
there is little evidence for carbon leakage at this stage. From this
perspective, NGOs stress that free allowances are discouraging investments in
low carbon technologies. RES organizations, academia and non-energy
intensive companies generally note that other market factors, such as
labour costs have a more significant impact on investment decisions. They also
argue that most climate policy costs are passed to final consumers. In that
context, free allocation should be reduced to better reflect the lower carbon
costs that are currently on the market.
What are the specific drivers in observed trends in energy costs and
to what extent can the EU influence them? 
Although the
reasons for the current high energy costs in the EU are diverse and complex,
there is an overall agreement that fossil fuels price increases have
been one of the main drivers of energy price increases in the EU. From this
perspective, stakeholders stress that the European Union has little margin for
manoeuvre to influence world trends in energy costs. 
In addition,
taxes, tariffs and levies and the lack of competition due to a fragmented
internal energy market are commonly considered as other important drivers
having an impact on high energy prices. The completion of the internal
energy market – including increased cooperation and coordination between
Member States – is therefore seen by a majority of stakeholders as an important
step to mitigate the rise of energy costs in Europe.
A wide segment
of the industrial community and in particular energy intensive
associations and companies are underlining that the increase of the
relative price of energy in comparison to the USA results mainly from the shale
gas revolution. The same stakeholders are generally also blaming the expansion
of renewable energy and the related subsidies for the rising energy costs. From
their perspective, the diversification of gas sources - both through new
suppliers and routes as well as through the increased use of European
conventional and unconventional resources – would be particularly
important to reduce this differential. These stakeholders are calling for external
EU energy policies to play an important role in fostering relations with
major energy suppliers, to further diversify energy sources and to promote
competition, and as such to have a positive impact on energy costs. The
persistence of regulated prices in some Member States is another issue
generally raised by several industrial associations as having an impact on
competition and energy prices.
In contrast, a
vast majority of NGOs and the renewable industry
believe that RES could make the European Union much more resilient to
international energy prices fluctuations whereas renewable schemes would have
limited impacts on average retail electricity bills. These stakeholders
underline that several renewable technologies, such as wind and solar, could be
exploited at very low marginal costs. From their perspective, the completion of
the internal energy market and related infrastructure development would enable
much more efficient operation of the power system and cost-effective
integration of renewables (thereby reducing the need for back-up, storage etc.)
and decrease overall energy system costs.
Partially in
line with this view, institutional investors and a vast majority of utilities
and the power sector criticise the oligopolistic nature of electricity
and gas markets in many Member States and the corresponding insufficient levels
of competition. There is also concern about the rising need for costly
substitutions of old energy infrastructures as well as the increasing cost of
capital. 
A number of citizen
and consumer associations agree with this last concern and stress that
the investments for the expansion and modernisation of the energy
infrastructure have an impact on prices for consumers. From their perspective
attention should also be given to the protection of final consumers in order
for them to have access to affordable and efficient energy commodities.
Several NGOs,
trade unions and part of the industrial sector focus on the
importance of energy savings policies to contain the cost impact of
energy use, which would also decrease import dependence and the fossil fuel
import bill. Policies that reduce energy demand would also reduce pressure on
international fossil fuel prices, thereby having a positive effect on European
fossil fuel prices. 
Finally,
stakeholders from different backgrounds and academia in particular, ask
for more research and innovation to reduce overall cost and ease the
penetration of new technologies.
Relatively few
stakeholders have indicated that currently the EU ETS carbon price is an
important factor contributing to the increase of energy costs, whereas a high
number of industrial stakeholders are concerned how the ETS would impact
prices in the long term. 
How should uncertainty about efforts and
the level of commitments that other developed countries and economically
important developing nations will make in the on-going international
negotiations be taken into account? 
There is universal recognition that the EU
needs to engage the international community and reach an agreement consistent
with the internationally agreed target to limit
atmospheric warming to below 2°C, while protecting the
EU competitiveness. Yet, there are diverging views on how to solve the political
uncertainty linked to international negotiations within the 2030 framework.
For the views of different Member States,
see Box 4.
Energy intensive companies support the idea that the efforts and level of commitments cannot
be taken unilaterally. General business organizations oppose setting
targets before an international agreement, noting that only no-regrets options
can be implemented in the meantime. If targets are to be set beforehand, energy
intensive companies agree that they should incorporate a level of
flexibility to allow for adjustments based on the outcome of international
negotiations. These mechanisms
need to be clearly defined. Some citizens are
also concerned about European competitiveness and oppose unilateral EU action.
On the other side, many utilities argue
that the EU should take action as quickly as possible to trigger long-term
investments, while non-energy intensive companies also note that this
would allow the EU to retain its competitive advantage. These suggest that the
EU should establish dual targets – one unilateral and one more ambitious in
case an international agreement is reached in 2015, but both of these targets
should be decided upon as soon as possible to provide visibility to the
economic actors.
In the same political line, NGOs call
for action irrespective of actions from third countries since conditional
commitments by the EU did not achieve the necessary results. They point out
that other countries, such as China and the United States, are already making
commitments and the EU needs to act to keep its early mover advantage in
renewables and energy efficiency technologies. Trade unions and some
citizens are also in favour of an early and clear commitment to reduce
costs of decarbonisation and ensure job creation. 
How to increase regulatory certainty for
business while building in flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances (e.g.
progress in international climate negotiations and changes in energy markets)?
There is a
general consensus that regulatory certainty can be increased by creating a
stable long-term legal framework. Answers generally provided focus once again
on the trade–off between binding and flexible policies. 
An important
part of the business and investment community underlines that the
European Commission should communicate a clear policy framework. In this
respect, targets can help clarify what stakeholders are expected to deliver as
long as those are commonly agreed, credible in terms of delivery and adapted to
national circumstances. NGOs insist on stronger political line,
stressing the importance of an explicit political commitment regardless of
climate action in third countries whereas a number of Member States
argue that the future framework should also take into account national
specificities and to changing economic and political circumstances.
In order to
increase certainty for investors, renewable industry insists on the need
for a clear framework with a close monitoring system. Disruptive and
retroactive policy changes have to be avoided. Regarding climate policies, an
automatic downward adjustment mechanism is often proposed to increase
regulatory certainty while adapting to changing circumstances.
Industrial
consumers insist that planning and investment
security are crucial with regard to the needed investments in the EU energy
system. The new framework should therefore offer to the industry the required
certainty and flexibility while avoiding short term intervention. The
legislator should take greater account of the reality of the market and promote
regulatory simplification and transparency while political intervention should
be limited. The backloading proposal and recent proposal on biofuels (ILUC) are
seen by part of the European industry as causing uncertainty. 
Finally, Utilities,
while also condemning short-term selective measures intervening in the
market, are generally insisting that existing EU legislation should be
duly implemented in all Member States. Government and national authorities are playing
an important role to ensure a common level playing field while more
coordination could reduce negative effects of national policies through
cross-border impacts.
How can the EU increase the innovation
capacity of manufacturing industry? Is there a role for the revenues from the
auctioning of allowances?
Action to improve the innovation capacity
of the manufacturing industry is welcomed by the participating stakeholders.
Overall most stakeholders welcome the use of NER 300 type instruments at the EU
level, calling for continuation of the program as discussed in Section 7.5.5 discussing question 'How can EU
research and innovation policies best support the achievement of the 2030
framework?'.
Industrial organizations and energy-intensive industries request that funding should
be provided in proportion of the ambition level of the climate policy. Energy
intensive companies note the importance to support not only new
technologies but also process innovation. They note that some sectors would
require break through innovations to lower emissions such a glass and cement
hence sufficient support should be provided. They welcome the SPIRE partnership[252] to deliver solutions
for energy and resource efficiency for the industry. Some representatives of
the energy intensive industry note that auction revenues should be used
exclusively as protection against carbon leakage or as incentives for the
industries to develop low-carbon technologies.
Several Member States argue that the
allowance revenues should remain a national competence but overall agree that
at least partially these should be used to support low carbon transition of the
industry. 
Industries that provide solutions to the
sustainability challenge generally request that
100% of the allowance revenues should be spent to support low-carbon
technologies, up from the 50% that currently Member States are obliged to spend
on climate mitigation and adaptation. NGOs state for example that
allowance revenues should not only be used to support manufacturing industry
innovation but also contribute to leveraging private investments under the SET
Plan and the Green Fund within the UN to support developing countries. Trade
unions request that part of the allowance revenues be channelled to training
and re-qualification for workers in the transition to the low carbon economy.
Many stakeholders, including some Member
States, highlight the importance of mobilizing private investments to
increase innovation. Some NGOs propose the creation of industrial fund
to support innovation.
How can the EU best exploit the
development of indigenous conventional and unconventional energy sources within
the EU to contribute to reduced energy prices and import dependency?
Once again, on the
definition and development of indigenous energy sources the consultation
replies show that two general diverging outlooks exist in Europe.
Whereas Member
States and citizens are generally divided, a significant share of
the industry, the energy intensive industry and the power
sector believes that Europe has to diversify its energy supplies and be
more positive towards the development of alternative energy sources such as
shale gas. Unconventional energy sources are seen by part of the industry as a
possible means of keeping the price of EU energy competitive. In this respect,
they are calling for the EU to adopt a clear and stable regulatory framework
that could facilitate the safe exploitation of these resources.
At the same
time several NGOs and the renewable industry advocate that energy
savings and renewable energy are the EU's only significant and long-term
indigenous energy solutions. From their perspective, RES are the only
indigenous sources in which the EU has a competitive advantage.
Moreover,
several climate NGOs, local authorities, citizens but also
a minority of companies have some doubts on the potential for European
shale gas exploitation to contribute to reduced import dependency, as shale gas
reserves within the EU are not comparable to those of the U.S. Hydraulic fracturing
methods are associated with a range of environmental impacts and some of them
claim that the carbon “footprint” of shale gas may be significantly greater
than for conventional gas. In line with these positions, some citizens and
NGOs are also concerned about the potential implications for health and the
environment.
How can the EU
best improve security of energy supply internally by ensuring the full and
effective functioning of the internal energy market (e.g. through the
development of necessary interconnections), and externally by diversifying
energy supply routes?
Views are split
on which sources can guarantee greater security and should therefore be given
priority, often related to stakeholders' sectoral interests. Some argue that
RES bring instability to internal security of supply due to their intermittency
and tend to argue for a diverse portfolio of energy sources and suppliers as
the best way to ensure security of supply. Others argue that, along with the
necessary grid infrastructure developments, a focus on RES and energy
efficiency will ensure a diversified portfolio of technologies, hence offering
the best potential for sustainable energy independence in the long run. 
Industry widely supports the timely completion of the internal energy
market, the development of cross-border interconnections and better
coordination between national policies. Some stakeholders go further, for
example arguing for the removal of all remaining price controls. Externally,
the diversification of energy suppliers and routes is seen as crucial.
European
grid operators primarily argue for greater
coordination between the national-level security of supply policies of Member
States, as well as for the effective implementation of existing arrangements,
such as for example the Ten Year Network Development Plan[253].Similar to the above,
the completion of the pan-European electricity system is seen as key. 
Among Member
States there is a broad agreement on the importance of completing the
internal energy market and developing the necessary infrastructure. There is no
consensus on whether renewable energy sources should and can be a major factor
ensuring security of supply, with a widespread concern over the potential
instability that renewables could bring to the network unless the necessary
interconnecting infrastructure is in place. 
Civil
society and in particular NGOs also broadly
recognise the need for greater grid interconnections across Europe. Along with
the renewable industry they tend to support the increase of energy
efficiency and use of indigenous RES as the best way to improve security of
supply. They equally support the establishment of cross-border markets for
day-ahead and intra-day trading, as well as a greater flexibility of the
system. Furthermore, they advocate targeted support for electricity storage,
increased decentralisation of power generation and demand-side response
measures as areas with great potential that have so far largely remained
untapped. Those respondents addressing external supply diversification are
typically in favour of continued efforts in this regard.

7.5.7.          
Capacity and distributional
aspects

How should
the new framework ensure an equitable distribution of effort among Member
States? What concrete steps can be taken to reflect their different abilities
to implement climate and energy measures?
Overall
stakeholders argue that it is important to consider several factors when
deciding on the distribution of effort among Member States. As regards GHG
emissions, it is generally acknowledged that the ETS has provisions to allow
for the fair distribution of efforts, so the focus should be on how to share
the efforts for the Effort Sharing Decision.
Member
States mostly agree that the distribution of
efforts should be decided based on national specificities and potential to
incorporate certain technologies, including financial capabilities. Some Member
States as well as some NGOs note that financing could be provided through
EU-wide instruments. Several Member States note that it would be
important also to consider past efforts to lower emissions. In order to define
the optimal division, several Member States and general business
organizations suggest that a thorough impact assessment per Member State
should be performed to evaluate the different starting points, potentials and
financial capabilities.
NGOs note
that the highest potential countries also often have the least ability to act,
hence the effort sharing should take into account ability to pay and low
marginal abatement costs.  In the same line of thought, utilities cite a
mix between financial and socio-economic capabilities that need to be
considered. A few utilities propose to distribute the efforts based on
the share of absolute emissions expected in 2030.
Some energy
intensive companies suggest that for the non-ETS sector, a bottom up
analysis could be done and cost-effective abatement potential across Member
States should be implemented. Oil and gas companies note that
negotiations should be carried out by Member States on how to distribute the
efforts. Some of these request transparency in the distribution of efforts.
Some non-energy intensive companies suggest distribution based on
natural resource endowments. Renewable energy companies note that the
national targets should allow for cooperation mechanisms such as statistical
transfers, joint projects and joint support for achieving related to the RES
target. Trade unions argue that capacity for action should be considered
including geographical differences and wealth. 
Some local authorities note that within the non-ETS, efforts should be based on the GDP of
the Member States but also consideration should be given to potential for
renewable resources and energy efficiency.
For distributional aspects relating to a
potential RES target for 2030, see question below.
What mechanisms can be envisaged to promote cooperation and a fair
effort sharing between Member States whilst seeking the most cost-effective
delivery of new climate and energy objectives?
The majority of
Member States are addressing this issue supporting the use of the ETS
auctioning revenues. Member States formulated also some opinion on suitable
mechanisms for effort sharing.  Some propose the introduction of flexibility
measures for GHG emission reduction in different sectors and the preparation of
regional plans based on economic development levels or energy market volumes.
Others note that trans-border collaboration projects should be better
supported, e.g. as regards renewables development but also in view of
developing large scale capital intensive technologies such the CCS. Member
States' climate change and energy efficiency plans could also be combined into
regions or sub-groups.
While the manufacturing
industry and in particular the energy intensive industries mainly
focus on the ETS as a suitable mechanism, the renewable industry and a
majority of NGOs, but also major players in the gas industry tend
to discuss the need for an increased use of cooperation mechanisms in other
fields, such as those proposed within the Renewable Energy Directive[254]in the form of
statistical transfers, joint projects and joint support mechanisms. It was
noted that progress with interconnections would encourage cooperation.
Furthermore, these groups argued for a target-sharing based on efforts by all
Member States and the consideration of national GDP as well as studies on RES
and energy efficiency potentials to help ensure a fair distribution of efforts.
Some NGOs specifically voiced the need for a reform of the Effort
Sharing Decision, as the current flexibilities provided too little pressure on
Member States to reduce emissions within their own borders.
Finally, trade
unions generally stated the need for a reinforced Effort Sharing Decision
as an integral part of efforts until 2030. In addition, a reinforcement of the
Renewables and Energy Efficiency Directives should be envisaged as well as new
binding national objectives.
Are new financing
instruments or arrangements required to support the new 2030 framework?
Stakeholders agree that the EU should
facilitate climate- and energy-related investments. While some stakeholder
request innovative financial instruments, others note that the existing ones
are sufficient. There is an overall agreement that it is key to leverage
private investments.
Several stakeholders note that financing
for less capable Member States should be provided. NGOs note the need to address investments in areas that have less
financial capabilities such as Central and Eastern Europe. Several Member
States acknowledge a gap in the cost of capital and support that this issue
should be addressed through EU-instruments. Some TSOs
suggest increasing the risk tolerance of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to
provide financing to riskier markets or through grouping projects in different
Member States together to ensure sufficient funding. Some trade unions
note that a regional development funds could be created under the European
Investment Fund. 
Many stakeholders argue
for the need to use public funds to leverage private investments. Several
stakeholders such as RES companies, utilities and general business
organizations note that pension funds and institutional investors funds
will be needed so investments from these need to be facilitated. General
business organizations point out that an increased access to venture
capital and private equity funds is needed. EIB could help with improving
access to capital and leveraging private funds. 
On infrastructure,
according to financial investors, government backed investment banks
could aid with the substantial investments. Some general business
organizations argue that joint planning for networks is essential to make
them cost efficient. They together some TSOs propose that project bonds could
be used for infrastructure across borders.  NGOs and some industrial
representatives note that the Connecting Europe Facility is crucial to
support cross border infrastructure projects. Finally, several stakeholders
propose that community funds could be used for Projects of Common Interest, as
well as for energy efficiency projects. 
Energy intensive industries have diverging views – some say that new financing instruments are
needed while others point out the focus should be on adjusting and improving
the existing ones. They bring up that these should support manufacturing
industry through demonstration and deployment and process improvements in
energy intensive sectors. Some point to cooperation programs with EIB, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank to help
them for high capital cost projects.
RES companies note that innovative instruments are needed to support RES
investments, citing for example offshore wind. They point that EIB could
provide loans and guarantees. They also argue that the EIB should stop
financing fossil fuel projects. 
NGOs generally say that innovative financial instruments are needed to
achieve the reduction potential under the Effort
Sharing Decision. Some suggest that the EIB introduces
an NER-300 type instrument for the Effort Sharing
Decision. For energy efficiency, they propose
aggregating investments to make them more attractive to investors. They also
support, together with non-energy intensive companies, the development
of risk-sharing facilities, equity, loans and project bonds.
Local authorities request for better information on how to combine various sources of
funding. 

7.6.                
Existing free allocation procedures in the EU
ETS

The volume of free allocation is in
principle fixed, based on historic production numbers and benchmarking rules,
with significant reductions in the amount of free allocation foreseen after
2020 for those sectors deemed exposed to carbon leakage that now still receive
full free allocation. 
But rules exist for addressing closures,
expansions and new entrants that clearly do result in an impact on allocation
when production changes. Commission Decision 2011/278/EU foresees adaptations
of the amount of free allocation for industrial installations in case of
significant capacity changes (reductions or increases), as well as in case of
partial or full cessation (closure). A sub-installation has a significant
capacity change if 'one or more physical changes led to an increase/decrease in
capacity of at least 10%' or to 'an increase/decrease in allocation to the
sub-installation of more than 50 000 allowances per year and the difference
represents more than 5% of the amount of allowances calculated irrespective of
the physical change.' In such case, the amount of free allocation is adapted to
reflect the new capacity of the installation. In case of partial cessation of
operations, an installation is considered to have partially ceased operations
if: “…one of its sub-installations has reduced its annual activity level in a
given calendar year by at least 50% compared to the [initial] activity
level...” and if this sub-installation contributes “…to at least to 30% of the
installation’s final annual amount of emission allowances allocated free of
charge OR - to more than 50 000 allowances [per year]...”. If the activity
level of the sub-installation is reduced by 50% to 75%, it receives 50% of the
initially allocated allowances; if it decreases by 75% to 90%, it receives 25%
and if it decreases beyond 90%, no free allocation is given. An operation is
deemed to have ceased operations when any of several substantial conditions are
met (expiration or withdrawal of GHG permit, operation of installation is
technically impossible, the installation is not operating and it is technically
impossible to resume operations or it cannot be established that the
installation will resume operations'. For more details, see Commission Decision
2011/278/EU and the Guidance Document[255].

7.7.                
Challenges relates to skills and training

Key employment challenges that can be
identified for implementing climate and energy policy are the pressure on
systems of skills formation to provide learners with portable skills,
signposting and support services to foster labour mobility and transfer of
existing skills to different sectors, locations and workplaces. This is
especially relevant in the context of enabling the smooth reallocation of
workers towards growth sectors. Other challenges include the increasing need
for new industrial alliances and governance structures; the uneven geographical
distribution of jobs and training offers; the increasing costs of technical
training offers and the increasing need for environmental awareness across all
occupations[256].
Targeted policy can address these
challenges and play an important role in helping to anticipate and manage the
impacts of low carbon transition on jobs and skills. This should be seen in the
context of the wider labour market, which is in a constant transition due to
technological progress and other economic factors[257]. 
The analysis shows that policies that
improve the general adaptive capacity of the labour markets while also
providing adequate social protection for workers are most effective in
assisting the restructuring of the economy and smooth job transitions due to
climate and energy policies[258]. For those workers at risk of redundancy,
active support to facilitate the search for alternative employment and maintain
attachment to the labour market for workers and jobseekers is important.
Particular focus on individual needs, and especially those associated with
vulnerable groups, merit specific attention.
Low levels of labour mobility in Europe –
between sectors, occupations and geographical areas – could lead to
unemployment and unfilled vacancies, especially in the short term. An
improvement of basic skills and hence mobility between jobs could play an
important role in facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy[259]. When considering the
skills aspect, priority should be given to improving science, technology,
engineering and maths (STEM) skills at all levels, as well as the broad range
of technical and managerial skills[260].
In the majority of cases, extensive reskilling is not required, rather the
upgrading of certain skills through structured training.
Given their role in skills formation and
development, and in supporting individuals’ transition to the labour market,
the effectiveness of vocational education and training (VET) systems and
employment services is therefore likely to play a key role. In particular,
greater coherence and coordination between education, training, employment and
low carbon policy will be needed to engender a job-rich, low-carbon transition[261]. Improving dialogue between policy makers
and industry to allow businesses to anticipate changes in future skills
requirements could also help for a smoother low-carbon transition[262]. 
There is a clear role for a broader range
of social policies to play as well, especially in supporting workers that can
be negatively affected due to the restructuring. 
There is a range of financial tools that
can support jobs promotion in the low-carbon economy, both at EU and Member
State levels. In the context of the 20% climate mainstreaming objective for the
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, the Structural Funds are expected to
contribute significantly to creating and safeguarding jobs across the economy. 
The European Social Fund (ESF) especially
can play a crucial role in supporting the labour force transition towards low
carbon skills, jobs and working methods, with a view to safeguarding,
transforming and creating jobs. Evidence from the 2007-2013 financial period
shows that the ESF has been successful in supporting the low-carbon transition
by promoting lifelong learning and enhancing access to employment[263]. For instance by facilitating access to
employment for job-seekers and inactive people[264], promoting self-employment, entrepreneurship
and business creation[265],
supporting the adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs to change[266],  enhancing equal access to lifelong
learning, upgrading the skills and competences of the workforce and increasing
the labour market relevance of education and training systems[267] and capacity building
for stakeholders delivering employment, education and social policies[268].
Also the European Globalisation Adjustment
Fund which provides one-off, time-limited individual support geared to helping
workers who have suffered redundancy as a result of globalisation can be a tool
to support employees who have lost their jobs due to changing global trade
patterns in climate related sectors. 

7.8.                
Extension of the scope of
the EU ETS to other sectors

This Annex reflects on
the feasibility and impacts of further extending the scope of the EU ETS to
include all energy related emissions, thus including for instance road
transport and the heating of buildings.
The EU ETS at present
includes typically large emitters such as power plants, as well as aviation
which is a sector where the amount of operators is relatively limited.
Expanding the scope of the ETS to include all energy related emissions, is an option
in the further development of the European carbon market recognised by the
Carbon Market Report, but still would require addressing a number of
administrative challenges. For instance, the large number of end consumers in
the energy sector, would make it difficult to regulate them directly through
the ETS. An upstream approach would be administratively less complex[269]. Such an approach could address fuel suppliers,
tax warehouse keepers or excise duty points, but would need to take into
account different practices in different Member States, which would make
implementation in the short term challenging. Also, further analysis is
required in order to consider if and how any such measures would result in
complementary incentives to existing taxation and excise schemes, including the
ongoing discussions related to the proposed review of the Energy Taxation
Directive; as well as the interaction with already existing measures addressing
CO2 emissions and energy consumption in sectors such as transport and the housing
segment. 
An efficient outcome of
a potentially enlarged scope would require existing market barriers and
imperfections to be addressed, such as lack of information, split incentives,
financing constraints and low price elasticity of demand, reasons which explain
why the ETS in itself cannot be the only driver for change in these sectors. A
price incentive through the ETS could therefore only be further considered if
it would be part of a package of complementary policies, which would require
further development of ambitious energy efficiency, renewables and other energy
policies. For these reasons, the EU has developed measures such as the Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive, the Eco-design and Labelling Directives, CO2&cars
and vans regulations and other transport measures, and the Energy Efficiency
Directive. These types of regulatory approaches, as well as policies for
R&D and innovation will need to be maintained to overcome such barriers.
Without these complementary policies, the lower price elasticity of energy
demand could lead to unnecessarily high carbon prices if these sectors would be
included in the ETS. This complexity of regulatory approach and the need to
avoid any elements of double regulation would have to be carefully analysed in
any future more detailed assessments in this regard.
Without prejudice to
such future dedicated assessments, if the scope of the ETS would be extended to
emissions related to fossil fuel combustion in the residential, services and
remaining transport sectors (road, rail and inland navigation) then the
projections resulting in 40% GHG reduction in 2030 as discussed in Section 5.1
show ETS reductions of around 37% compared to 2005 emissions (see Table 43). This target could be achieved by keeping the linear factor at the
existing level of 1.74%, but applying it also to all additional sectors
included in the ETS. 
Table 43: Reductions in 2030 in the ETS, depending
on sectoral coverage
 2030 reduction vs 2005 for different scenarios || ETS emissions present scope || Sectors to which scope expansion applies || Total emissions ETS after scope expansion 
 GHG -40% || -43% || -28% || -37% 
 GHG -40% +  EE || -38% || -36% || -37% 
 GHG 40% + RES 30% + EE || -40% || -36% || -38% 
To what extent the
inclusion of new sectors would affect scarcity, and thus price formation, will
depend on the overall cap under an enlarged scope, but an extension of the
scope in itself will not result in a rapid change in the surplus, but rather
like the change of linear factor for the existing sectors, lead to a more
gradual decrease of the surplus. 
If an extension of the
ETS would be considered appropriate after a future more detailed assessment, it
would have to be decided in a second step if auctioning or free allocation
would be the suitable approach, while considering the possible impacts of
windfall profits and costs for end consumers. For illustrative purposes, Table 44 provides an indication of the potential impact on revenues from the
ETS. 
Table 44: 2030 ETS auction revenue, depending on
sectoral coverage of ETS and degree of auctioning
 2030 auctioning revenue (billion €)* || Applied to the power sector and aviation || Applied to the power sector and aviation + extension of scope 
 Scenario GHG -40% || 26 || 72 
 Scenario GHG -40% +  EE || 16 || 38 
 Scenario GHG 40% + RES 30% + EE || 8 || 19 
 *estimates based on PRIMES-GAINS emission estimates per sector, covering only outgoing flights 
Any potential proposal
in this regard would necessitate more detailed assessment of all the relevant
impacts.
[1]               COM(2013)169
[2]               COM(2013)169
[3]               Carbon Leakage Evidence Project: Factsheets for
selected sectors, Ecorys, 2013.     
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/cl_evidence_factsheets_en.pdf
[4]               Forthcoming Publication: European Economy,
"Energy Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European
Commission.
[5]               Kyoto progress report 2013 and its Staff working
Document (COM(2013) 698 final, SWD(2013) 410 final). Emissions include
international aviation emissions as reported under the Common Reporting Format
to the UNFCCC.
[6]               Through Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC. Already
before these directives there were functioning internal markets for other
energy products such as coal and oil products.
[7]               See Commission Communication "Making the
internal energy market work", COM(2012) 663 final.
[8]               See e.g. European Commission, Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (2013), Member states' energy dependence:
an indicator-based assessment, available from
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op145_en.htm
[9]               COM(2011)112, COM(2011)885, COM(2011)144
[10]             European Parliament Resolution on a Roadmap for moving
to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 (2011/2095(INI)) 
[11]             The Climate and Energy Package included an
unconditional -20% GHG target by 2020 compared to 1990 and a -30% conditional
target in case of a sufficient ambitious comprehensive international climate
agreement. 
[12]             Including international aviation as reported under the
UNFCCC., see Staff Working Document accompanying the Kyoto Progress report 2013
(SWD(2013) 410 final)
[13]             According to national projections submitted under the
Monitoring Mechanism Decision in 2013, see Kyoto Progress report 2013
(COM(2013) 698 final)
[14]             See the Commission Renewables Progress Report.
[15]             Other reasons for concern include the failure to
address barriers to the uptake of renewable energy: administrative burdens and
delays still cause problems and raise project risk for renewable energy
projects; slow infrastructure development, delays in connection, and grid
operational rules that disadvantage renewable energy producers all continue and
all need to be addressed by Member States in the implementation of the
Renewable Energy Directive. Many Member States therefore need to make
additional efforts to meet their respective national targets under the
Renewable Energy Directive. More information in the Commission's
"Renewable energy progress report", COM(2013) 175 final
[16]             Primary energy consumption included non-energy uses
which are not considered in the energy savings target for 2020. The figure
excluding non-energy uses was 1706 Mtoe in 2006 and 1583 Mtoe in 2011.
[17]             COM(2012) 652
[18]             Carbon Leakage Evidence Project: Factsheets for
selected sectors, Ecorys, 23 September 2013.
                http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/cl_evidence_factsheets_en.pdf

[19]             http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012XC0605(01):EN:NOT
[20]             See Commission Impact Assessment SWD(2013)430 final 
[21]             See Decision No 377/2013/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council
[22]             Directive 2009/30/EC
[23]             The change of government in September 2013 has led to
uncertainty with regard to continuation.
[24]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission. Possible
other drivers behind this divergence between wholesale and retail prices are
being analysed in the forthcoming Communication (or CSWD) on energy prices,
competitiveness and social cohesion.
[25]             See e.g. Large-scale wind power integration and
wholesale electricity trading benefit: Estimation via an ex post approach,
available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511009657#
[26]             Another report by the Council of European Energy
Regulators estimated that the support for renewable  electricity produced in 18
European countries reached €25 billion in 2010, which was the equivalent of €9
per MWh of total final electricity consumption in these countries
[27]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[28]             Communication 'Delivering the internal electricity
market and making the most of public intervention', C(2013) 7243 final
[29]             Ibid.
[30]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[31]             As regards transport, the avoided costs of imported
fuels, replaced by biofuels, are estimated to amount to EUR 7.6 billion in
2010. European Commission - Forthcoming Publication: European Economy,
"Energy Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European
Commission.
[32]             This holds in particular if ILUC effects are also taken
into account, see. e.g. the overview in Schroten, A., et al. (2012) Cost
effectiveness of policies and options for decarbonising transport. Task 8 paper
produced as part of a contract between European Commission Directorate-General
Climate Action and AEA Technology plc;, www.eutransportghg2050.eu
[33]             Proposal for a directive amending Directive 98/70/EC
relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive
2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable source,
COM(2012)595
[34]             Commission own calculations on the basis of data from
National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs), Eurostat and IEA 2010 (Global
Wood Pellet Industry Market and Trade Study)
[35]             International Energy Agency, Quarterly Statistics, 2nd
quarter 2012. US prices not including tax.
[36]             IEA: index 2005 = 100, Energy prices and taxes,
Quarterly Statistics, 4th quarter 2012. European data relates to OECD members
only
[37]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[38]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[39]             Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[40]             These projections exclude emissions and absorptions
from Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry.
[41]             SEC(2011)288, Section 5.2.4
[42]             In constant €2010 prices.
[43]             It should be noted that this ratio to GDP is not a
share in GDP, since large parts of the numerator (energy imports are not part
of the denominator (GDP). Total system costs for the entire energy system
include capital costs (for energy installations such as power plants and energy
infrastructure, energy using equipment, appliances and vehicles), energy
purchase costs (fuels + electricity + steam) and direct efficiency investment
costs, the latter being also expenditures of capital nature. Capital costs are
expressed in annuity payments. Direct efficiency investment costs include costs
for house insulation, double/triple glazing, control systems, energy management
and for efficiency enhancing changes in production processes not accounted for under
energy capital and fuel/electricity purchase costs. They do not include any
disutility costs associated with changed behaviour, nor the cost related to
auctioning of allowances.
[44]             Diesel prices for private transport users increase 20 %
from 2010 to 2020 and rise thereafter almost 4% per decade up to 2050; mainly
driven by increasing oil import prices. Oil and gas prices for heating increase
by 38% respectively 47% from 2010 to 2020. Heating oil prices continue to rise
significantly thereafter (over 5% per decade up to 2050), while gas prices for
households remain more or less at 2020 levels, mainly driven by the trends in
oil and gas import prices, which see a decoupling of both prices only in the
longer term..
[45]             Average price over all consumer types, including final
consumers and energy branch.
[46]             The Reference Scenario considers Member States'
National Renewable Action Plans which in some cases in 2020 go beyond what
would be necessary to comply with EU energy and climate policy.
[47]             See also IEA WEO 2012.
[48]             While these sectors will be more affected by the
specific policies put in place than the overall setting of 2030 targets, the
general framework has a significant indirect impact as it sets the relative
share of GHG emission reductions to be achieved by each major sector of the
economy.
[49]             The assessment of the Energy Roadmap assumed global
climate action and thus decreasing fossil fuel prices   in-line with this
action.
[50]             The Commission proposal on Indirect Land Use Change
(ILUC, COM (2012) 595 final) is not reflected in the scenarios and subsequent
analysis.
[51]             No specific option for a renewables target below 30%
has been defined, but a renewables target could in principle be set at a lower
level, for instance by formalising the renewables share that is projected to
result from a 2030 framework driven by a sole GHG target.
[52]             "®" indicates that the scenario does not
include "enabling conditions". Moreover, "EE" indicates the
presence of explicit energy efficiency policies (at various levels of ambition)
in the scenario, whereas the absence of EE means that the scenario does not
include such energy efficiency policies but are based on "carbon
values" providing a price signal driving GHG reductions (also achieving
higher levels of energy efficiency improvements or RES deployment than
Reference).
[53]             Evaluated against the 2007 Baseline projections for
2030
[54]             Energy Efficiency Values (EEVs) are modelling variables
similar to carbon values, but placing a shadow value on energy and are used in
two ways in the PRIMES model: (a) reflecting certain concrete energy efficiency
policies, e.g. as the shadow prices of the energy efficiency obligation,
thermal integrity of buildings obligation, etc. (b) after 2030 the carbon value
in GHG only scenarios triggers also increases in energy efficiency.
[55]             This is consistent with a linear reduction factor from
2021 onwards equal to -2.4% applied to all ETS sectors so as to meet in 2050 an
ETS cap of -90% compared to 2005 (which was the reduction projected for the
Roadmap for moving towards a competitive low carbon economy in 2050). 
[56]             In the Reference scenario the average renovation rate
is 1.18%.
[57]             See footnote 57.
[58]             RES values are modelling variables similar to carbon
values used in the PRIMES model to representing unidentified policies related
to RES, necessary to achieve the RES target.
[59]             See footnote 57.
[60]             Pending until the 2014 review stipulated by the Energy
Efficiency Directive.
[61]             IPCC, 4th Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007:
Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change, chapter 13.3.3 Proposals for
climate change agreements, box 13.7.
[62]             SEC(2011) 288 final
[63]             Or a carbon tax in the non-ETS sector that would
exactly mimic the price movements of the ETS. Contrary to the carbon value
though, a carbon tax would act on the consumer's budget.
[64]             For example requirements for the extension of the scope
of the EU ETS to other sectors can be found in Annex 7.8.
[65]             The PRIMES model simulates emission reductions in ETS
sectors as a response to current and future ETS prices, by performing an
inter-temporal equilibrium in ETS market, taking into account risk-averse
behaviour of market agents which leads to the banking of allowances; perfect
foresight of the carbon price progression in the period 2020-50 and that no
borrowing from the future is permitted.
[66]             These models reduce GHG emissions on the basis of
carbon price constraints. This allows assessing different carbon pricing tools
such as emission trading with free allocation or auctioning or simply a carbon
tax, and assess the effects of how revenues are used. The tools are less well
equipped to assess a whole set of specific energy efficiency policies and have
less detail regarding the options for renewables penetration than for instance
an energy focussed model like PRIMES, which explains why such aspects were not
modelled in GEM-E3 and the E3MG.
[67]             Compared to the scenarios made for the 2050 Low Carbon
Economy roadmap, this is a range of reductions in the ETS that is broader and
has a lower end (-43 to -48% in the Low carbon Roadmap), while the range of
reductions for the non- ETS is a bit smaller and start at higher levels (-27 to
-36% in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap). The different lower ends are mainly
due to the inclusion of more energy efficiency policies in all 40% scenarios,
but also by higher projected oil and gas import prices as in the roadmap, which
foster non-ETS emission reductions.
[68]             GHG40EE uses the same RES value as in the reference
scenario.
[69]             Typical means to reduce non CO2 emissions are farm
scale anaerobic digestion, diet changes for animals and selective breeding to
control methane emissions of cows, doubling of control frequency of gas
distribution networks and the use of alternatives for F-gases in various
applications (foams and fire extinguishers e.g.).
[70]             SWD(2012) 364
[71]             See O'Mara et. al. (2007) Climate Change – Estimation
of emissions from greenhouse gas from agriculture and strategies for their
reduction, synthesis report. Environmental Protection Agency, Wexford, Ireland,
p.8. and O' Mara (2013) Mitigating farm livestock greenhouse gas emissions in
the EU (i.e. p 18), 
http://unfccc.int/files/methods_and_science/mitigation/application/pdf/eu_omara.pdf

[72]             A recent study on behavioural mitigation options has
shown that relevant behavioural mitigation potentials exist in the food domain,
e.g. shifts to a more healthy diet or reduced animal protein intake (Faber et
al. 2012, see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/roadmap/docs/main_report_en.pdf).
However, there are a number of barriers to realise these potentials with
specific policies, including limited EU competences. The additional potential
which could be addressed by specific policies in the EU is estimated at 40 Mt
CO2eq. 
[73]             A scenario with 45% GHG reductions and moderate RES and
efficiency policies shows larger non-energy related CO2 emission of 9% compared
to Reference and 22% compared to 2005,  
[74]             Including energy industries, such as refineries and
coke production.
[75]             The tertiary sector includes the small energy-related
emissions from agriculture.
[76]             The range results from the use of a high and low
valuation of mortality (value of life year lost), also used for the Thematic
Strategy on Air Pollution.
[77]             Gross Inland Consumption according to Eurostat
convention
[78]             The development of RES is measured with RES share in
final energy consumption – in line with the 2020 RES target. 
[79]             Due to higher efficiency levels, the difference between
primary and final energy consumption of (non-thermal) RES is smaller compared
with e.g. fossil fuel based energy consumption. This means that for any given
final energy consumption, higher shares of RES means lower primary energy
consumption, which is the denominator in the import dependency ratio. This
ratio of import dependency also considers some replacement of nuclear with RES,
and nuclear energy generated on EU soil is considered domestic irrespectively
of the origin of Uranium etc.
[80]             Measured as energy consumption / value added
[81]             Measured as energy consumption / private income
[82]             Measured as energy consumption / value added
[83]             Measured as energy consumption / GDP
[84]             Share of RES in gross final energy consumption
according to 2009 RES Directive.
[85]             Contribution of RES in gross final energy consumption
of electricity and heating & cooling, based on the individual calculations
of the RES according to 2009 RES Directive.
[86]             The amount of CO2 emitted per unit of energy consumed
or produced.
[87]             Due to changing behaviour that results in less
consumption of energy services compared to Reference there are associated
disutility costs.
[88]             A discarded scenario (see Section4.1.2.3) resulting in 40% GHG reductions in
2030 based on very high ambition level of both RES and EE but no changes to the
ETS reduction factor (not shown in Table 2) would result in even higher system
costs, as many abatement and efficiency options in the ETS sectors with
relatively low cost would not be taken advantage of.
[89]             BIO Intelligence Service. 2013. Energy performance
certificates in buildings in their impact on transaction prices and rents in
selected EU countries. Cited at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/buildings/doc/20130619-energy_performance_certificates_in_buildings.pdf
[90]             Total system costs for the entire energy system include
capital costs (for energy installations such as power plants and energy
infrastructure, energy using equipment, appliances and vehicles), energy
purchase costs (fuels + electricity + steam) and direct efficiency investment
costs, the latter being also expenditures of capital nature. Capital costs are
expressed in annuity payments. Direct efficiency investment costs include costs
for house insulation, double/triple glazing, control systems, energy management
and for efficiency enhancing changes in production processes not accounted for
under energy capital and fuel/electricity purchase costs. They do not include
any disutility costs associated with changed behaviour, nor the cost related to
auctioning.
[91]             Including disutility costs, cost over the period
2010-2030 are higher than in Reference, due to changing behaviour that results
in less consumption of energy services compared to Reference.
[92]             Investments expenditures include total purchases of
transport equipment for households and businesses (including road and non-road
transport), but not infrastructure costs. 
[93]             In Constant €2010.
[94]             Fossil fuel prices do not depend on the policies
quantitatively assessed by the modelling and are therefore exogenous in the
modelling.
[95]             Reflecting both efficiency gains in power generation
and the impacts from lower demand.
[96]             E.g. backup-capacity to variable generation, smarter
grids accommodating decentralised generation, storage needs etc.
[97]             Average Price of Electricity in Final demand sectors
(€/MWh) constant 2010 Euros. For reference scenario, corresponding value was
134 €/MWh in 2010.
[98]             Percentage of energy costs excl. auction payments /
value added in energy intensive industries in PRIMES. For Reference Scenario
corresponding value was 38.2% in 2010.
[99]             Section 5.3 gives additional information on GDP
impacts of a GHG reduction up to 50%, but this in the context of international
action.
[100]            In order to be able to reflect impacts of targets other
than only GHG reductions, but without losing the benefits of macro-economic
modelling across sectors, the E3ME model was adapted. Firstly the power
generation mix was treated as exogenous in E3ME and adapted to the results of
the PRIMES Reference scenario, two 40% GHG reduction scenarios (with moderate
energy efficiency and renewables policies as well with ambitious energy
efficiency and renewables policies achieving 30% RES) as well as the 45% GHG
with ambitious EE and renewables policies achieving 45% RES. Secondly also the
increased energy efficiency investments generated by the PRIMES model for the
different projections are introduced in E3ME, and matched by a resulting
reduction in energy savings in those sectors. Thirdly, the model still
optimises GHG reductions across sectors, taking into account that with higher
EE and RES penetration, carbon prices can change, impacting revenue recycling.
[101]            GEM E3, E3MG and E3ME are macro-economic modelling
tools. GEM E3 is a general equilibrium model, E3MG and E3ME are econometric
models. GEME3 and E3MG scope is global, whereas E3ME is focussed on the EU
only.
[102]            COM(2011) 169/3, Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the
taxation of energy products and electricity
[103]            See for instance the Impact Assessment accompanying A
Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, SEC(2011) 288 final.
[104]            In the policy scenarios, the energy mix in the power
sector is fixed and based on the power sector energy mix of the PRIMES scenario
for a 40% GHG reduction. Additional emission reductions in the power sector
need to come from reductions in demand for electricity.
[105]            OECD, 2012, The Jobs Potential of a Shift Towards a
Low-carbon Economy, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/50503551.pdf
[106]            The results in Table 23
for employment are from the same scenarios projections as presented in Table 16
(which shows GDP impacts). Similarly the results in scenario 2 and 4 are from
the same projections as scenarios 1 and 3 presented in Table 20.
[107]            It does not include impact on operational expenditure in
the power sector and the resulting job changes. 
[108]            The methodology applied includes the following steps: 1)
A breakdown is made along the value chain of capital investments according to
supply sector. For instance, when investing 1 million € in a wind plant, x%
goes to engineering, y% to turbine manufacturers, z% to grid connection, etc.
2) For each part of this value chain the resulting labour impact in the supply
sector is identified. For instance, a million spend on engineering services
generates x man years of work for the engineering firm. 3) Based on (2) and (3)
direct jobs generated per million € of capital investment in wind, coal, etc.
are estimated. 4) Using the capital investment data from PRIMES, total jobs due
to capital investment in the power sector and for energy efficiency are
estimated. This is done for the Reference and two policy options, i.e. the -40%
GHG target with moderate energy efficiency and renewables policies and the one
with ambitious energy efficiency and renewables policies achieving 30% RES. 
[109]            “An economic assessment of low-carbon vehicles” by
Cambridge Econometrics and Ricardo-AEA, March 2013,
http://www.ricardo-aea.com/cms/assets/MediaRelease/Economic-Assessment-Vehicles-FINAL2.pdf
[110]            In the scenarios analysed, energy excise tax rates (EU
minimal rates or higher national ones) are kept constant in real term. For the
scenarios under Reference settings, the minimum rates relate to the Energy
Taxation Directive of 2003, whereas for the scenarios with ambitious and very
ambitious energy efficiency policies minimum excise rates according to the
Commission's proposal for a revised Energy Taxation Directive have been
assumed. Again existing higher national rates are used where applicable; all
rates rise with inflation, i.e. are kept constant in real terms.
[111]            For example also in the EU climate and energy package,
it was recognised that attributing the 2020 targets according to cost
efficiency, would not result in a fair treatment amongst EU Member States.
[112]            This is a simplified target that is based around a
simple linear trajectory, starting in 2020 at a -30% target (the conditional
target that the EU put forward in 2009 as its proposal for 2020 in the context
of a global agreement) gradually decreasing to reach by 2050 90%, at the higher
end of the range from 80% to 95% of reduction targets for developed countries
in line with the below 2°C objective in the IPCC's 4th Assessment Report for 2050.
[113]            The modelling assumes for there is only auctioning for
the power sector in the EU, that any revenues from auctioning is distributed in
a lump sum to consumers and that companies fully include opportunity costs of
free allowances in their price setting (this latter is also assumed for third
countries). As such the results of a scenario with 40% GHG reductions in the EU
and no additional action in third countries are very similar to those presented
in scenario 1 of Table 20. 
[114]            Global emission targets in GEM E3 modelled for 2030
equal to around 10% below 2010 levels. OECD members (those individually
represented in the model) have on average a target of around -45% below 2010
levels. Other countries aggregate target requires peaking of emissions before
2030.
[115]            Global emission targets in PACE modelled for 2030 equal
to around 12.5% below 2010 levels.
[116]            The impact assessment accompanying A Roadmap for moving
to a competitive low carbon economy (SEC(2011) 288 final) assessed the impact
on production for energy intensive industries of a 40% GHG reduction with a
Reference scenario where the EU achieves its 20% GHG reduction target by 2020
internally, and keeps this level of emissions constant up to 2030.
[117]            Up to 2012, historic data is used. From 2013 GHG
emissions are extrapolated based on the Reference projections (see Annex 7.1) and adapted to include only intra EU
flights in 2012 and international flights from 2013 onwards. Allocation for EU
28 during Phase 3 (2013-2020) and Phase 4 (2021-2028) is based on data used for
the Commission Decision concerning national implementation measures for the
transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances. Total
amount of JI and CDM credits up to 2020 is assumed to be 1600 million credits,
while still excluding any inflow of JI and CDM credits through aviation in the
ETS.
[118]            COM(2013) 722 final
[119]            The change in coverage would apply from the beginning of
2014 with a view on the implementation from 2020 onwards of a global market
based mechanism, currently discussed in ICAO. The change of coverage is
expected to lower net demand for allowances from the aviation sector in the ETS,
thus resulting in an increase in the surplus. This potential increase is not
assessed in this impact assessment. It will depend on the final agreement in
Council and Parliament on how to implement this and on the impact of any final
agreement regarding market based mechanisms for aviation under ICAO. But
assuming continued application up to 2030 of the coverage in the proposed
revision by the Commission, first estimates put the maximum impact at a
reduction by up to 50% for the net demand from this sector. Assuming the
emission profile of aviation as modelled by the PRIMES model, this would
increase the surplus by around 300 million by 2030.
[120]            COM(2012) 652 final
[121]            To determine 2013 allocation, the linear factor is
applied starting from 2010 onwards.
[122]            This linear reduction factor would not decrease the ETS
cap by 2050 to -90% compared to 2005 but rather to -84%. A 90% reduction was
the average reduction projected for the Roadmap for moving towards a
competitive low carbon economy in 2050. In order to set the cap equal to this
level in 2050 the linear reduction factor in the ETS would need to further
increase to -2.4% until 2050. 
[123]            http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/docs/rice_regulation_20131107_en.pdf
[124]            Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2013): "Phase III
imports set to a minimum", Carbon markets global analyst reaction. 
[125]            Other factors behind the increased use notably in 2012
was the uncertainty surrounding the future eligibility of certain ERUs and the
phase-out of certain industrial gas credits as eligible credits for compliance
after 2012.
[126]            For more information, see also Commission Staff Working
Document Accompanying the Commission decision on applying use restrictions on
international credits (from HFC-23 and N2O projects) pursuant to Article 11a(9)
of Directive 2009/29/EC
[127]            E.g. New Zealand, Canada (Quebec), Korea, Australia,
Switzerland, Turkey, Mexico and Chile, China, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Costa
Rica. 
[128]            The LRF would have to be changed more in this example,
if the potential increasing impact on the surplus of the proposed change of the
coverage of aviation under the ETS is taken into account.
[129]            See recital 24 of the ETS Directive: […] an increase
in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry would not be
subject to comparable carbon constraints (carbon leakage).
[130]            Carbon Leakage Evidence Project: Factsheets for selected
sectors, Ecorys, 23 September 2013. The study produced set of factsheets for a
selection of sectors. The factsheets present historical data and assess the degree
to which carbon leakage may have occurred in the sector. They were assembled
using publicly available data, draft versions were commented by European
industry representatives.
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/cl_evidence_factsheets_en.pdf
[131]            See for instance Table 7, Proportionate Impact
Assessment Accompanying the proposed Commission Regulation amending Regulation
(EU) No 1031/2010 in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas
emission allowances to be auctioned in 2013-2020.
[132]            Ferrous metals, Non-ferrous metals, Chemical Products
and Non-metallic minerals.
[133]            The Effort Sharing Decision defines the national GHG
reduction targets for the so called Non ETS sector, i.e. those sectors not
included in the EU ETS
[134]            For instance a decision to move from livestock
production on grassland to energy crop production could imply a reduction of
methane emissions from livestock and increase renewable energy production, but
would also increase emissions from the soil.
[135]            DK, FR and HU chose annual compliance for LULUCF sector
in CP1.
[136]            Reflecting existing policies and assumed future policies
of the Member States already reflected in the   Reference Scenario.
[137]            COM(2013) 150 final
[138]            By 2020, the national targets under the Effort Sharing
Decision will collectively deliver a reduction of around 10% in total EU
emissions from the sectors covered compared with 2005 levels. But individual
Member State targets range from a 20% emissions reduction by 2020 (from 2005
levels) for the richest Member States to a 20% increase for the least wealthy
one.
[139]            Share of RES in gross final energy consumption according
to 2009 RES Directive.
[140]            Contribution of RES in gross final energy consumption of
electricity and heating & cooling, based on the individual calculations of
the RES according to 2009 RES Directive.
[141]            Energy Savings evaluated against the 2007 Baseline
projections for 2030.
[142]            Reduction of health damage costs due to reduced air
pollution compared to the reference (€bn/yr). Valuation uses value of life year
lost used for the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution, ranging €57000 to €133000
per life year lost.
[143]            Primary energy to GDP.
[144]            Share of RES in gross final energy consumption according
to 2009 RES Directive.
[145]            Investments expenditures include total purchases of
transport equipment for households and businesses (including road and non-road
transport), but not infrastructure costs. 
[146]            Average Price of Electricity in Final demand sectors
(€/MWh) constant 2010 Euros. For reference scenario, corresponding value was
134 €/MWh in 2010.
[147]            Percentage of energy costs excl. auction payments /
value added in energy intensive industries in PRIMES. For Reference Scenario
corresponding value was 38.2% in 2010.
[148]            Calculated as share of energy related expenditures of
households (referring to stationary uses) in average household expenditure. For
Reference Scenario corresponding value was 7.5% in 2010. 
[149]            Depends on if and how carbon pricing used, with best
result with auctioning in all ETS sectors and CO2 taxation in the non ETS,
while using the revenues to lower labour costs.
[150]            Highest result takes into account the impact of energy
efficiency investments.
[151]            Depends on if and how carbon pricing used, with best
result with auctioning in all ETS sectors and CO2 taxation in the non ETS,
while using the revenues to lower labour costs.
[152]            Highest result takes into account the impact of
ambitious energy efficiency policies and renewables targets.
[153]            E.g. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/trends_2030/index_en.htm.

[154]            http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/2012-ageing-report_en.htm
[155]            The Reference Scenario also sees lower GDP growth and
stronger increase of oil and gas prices than assumed in the previous exercises
before the adoption of the climate/energy package. 
[156]            This modelling does not assume additional global action
on climate change beyond Reference. If such global action would materialise,
world fossil fuel prices would decrease, reducing costs related to fuel prices
in the EU in general.
[157]            Eurostat: in 2011 the 10 most energy inefficient Member
States were EU12, of which 8 had an energy intensity of GDP at least twice the
EU average.
[158]            In all decarbonisation scenarios with enabling
conditions therefore in the modelling the same post 2030 values for CO2
standards for cars (60g CO2/km in 2035; 35g in 2040 and 25g in 2050) and LDVs
(90 g CO2/km in 2035, 70 g in 2040 and 60g in 2050) are applied. 
[159]            National policies have a slightly earlier cut-off date
in early spring 2012.
[160]            E.g. regarding grid expansion
according to the ENTSO-E Ten Years Network Development Plan, on which delivery 
has still to be ensured
[161]            The additional energy efficiency effect of these
assumptions and those on technology uptake (next bullet point) is modest when
compared to ambitious EU wide energy efficiency policies post 2020 (see below);
[162]            Cost effective renovation is
characterized by achieving significant savings on variable cost to recover the
initial capital investment taking into account cash flow issues. The
cost-effective potential was estimated by undertaking a number of sensitivity
cases with different amounts of assumed energy savings. The direct efficiency
investments were compared with to the annual variable cost reduction in all
these cases, retaining such renovation levels where the ensuing recovery time
at an acceptable internal rate of return (from literature some 9 %) suggests
such renovation  to be cost-effective. A similar approach has been followed for
selected case studies in the Ecofys, Politecnico di Milano/eERG, University of
Wuppertal study “Towards nearly zero-energy buildings”(February 2013, see:    
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/buildings/implementation_en.htm). 
The modelling represents the various synergies among
different policy measures that can bring about strong EE progress and
estimating their cost-effective potential. In that sense the modelling is less
detailed than analysis of case studies but has the merit to be comprehensive,
to avoid double counting and to include rebound effects.
[163]            These post 2030 values for CO2
standards for cars and LDVs and the assumed CO2 standards for motorcycles do
not only foster energy efficiency, particularly through increased fuel
efficiency up to 2030, but also drive electrification in the PRIMES modelling
tool after 2030. They are therefore also applied in the scenarios with GHG
targets as the driver for electrification post 2030.
[164]            Proposal for a Directive on new EU rules for safer and
more environmental lorries, adopted in April 2013.
[165]            These infrastructure measures serve three objectives:
diversification of transport fuels, energy efficiency and decarbonisation; the
latter area they improve the effectiveness of other measures, such as CO2
standards, allowing for more cost-effective decarbonisation helping to exploit
possible synergies in a long term decarbonisation strategy. They are therefore
mostly already included under enabling settings (see Annex 7.2).
[166]            Measures in some of these areas have been recently
adopted by the European Commission (i.e. Clean Power for Transport package,
adopted in January 2013; Forth railways package, adopted in January 2013; New
EU rules for safer and more environmental lorries, adopted in April 2013;
Single European Sky (SES2+), adopted in June 2013).
[167]            For further details, see the Report on PROGRESS TOWARDS
ACHIEVING THE KYOTO AND EU 2020 OBJECTIVES (COM(2013)698).
[168]            COM(2013)698 and EEA: Trends and projections in Europe
2013 – Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets until
2020.
[169]            According to national projections submitted under the
Monitoring Mechanism Decision in 2013, quality checked and aggregated by the
European Environmental Agency. For further details see COM(2013)698. 
[170]            Carbon Market Report COM(2012) 652 and SWD(2012) 234.
[171]            European Commission, 2012, the State of the EU Carbon
Market in 2012
[172]            European
Commission, 2013, EU ETS Factsheet 2013
[173]            Conclusion from survey conducted in 2012 by Thomson
Reuters Point Carbon of 363 EU ETS operators.
[174]            Annual natural gas consumption in 2012 was 4% lower than
in 2011. In contrast, EU consumption of coal has remained relatively stable over
2012, while imports of hard coal went up by approximately 8% in 2012 compared
to 2011. 
[175]            See
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/docs/swd_2012_xx2_en.pdf.
[176]            See
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/docs/swd_2012_xx2_en.pdf
[177]            See "The case for carbon pricing", Grantham
Research Institute, 2011
[178]            Climate Policy Initiative, 2011, Carbon pricing for
low-carbon investment 
[179]            E.g. Rogge K.S., Schneider, M. Hoffmann, V.H. (2011):
The innovation impact of the EU Emission Trading System — Findings of company
case studies in the German power sector. Ecological Economics, Vol. 70, pp
513–523; Calel, R., Dechezlepretre, A. (2012): Environmental Policy and
Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the European carbon market.
[180]            ISI Fraunhofer, 2011, Relative Importance of Different
Climate Policy Elements for Corporate Climate Innovation. Activities: Findings
for the Power Sector
[181]            Poyry and Thema consulting group, 2011, Carbon Price
Transfer in Norway. The Effect of the EU-ETS on Norwegian Power Prices, Poyry
and Thema consulting group
[182]            Eurostat numbers for the second semester of 2012 for the
middle industrial consumption band (Ic: 500 MWh < Consumption < 2 000
MWh). The average is a simple, non-weighted, mean average.
[183]            Poyry and Thema consulting group, 2011, Carbon Price
Transfer in Norway. The Effect of the EU-ETS on Norwegian Power Prices
[184]            Poyry and Thema consulting group, 2011, Carbon Price
Transfer in Norway. The Effect of the EU-ETS on Norwegian Power Prices
[185]            Frontier Economics report prepared for Business Europe,
May 2013, Lessons learnt from the current energy and climate framework
[186]            The calculation assumes a gas price of €26 per MWh
(thermal). Other assumptions are a plant efficiency of 58% and cost of capital
of 8% (real, weighted average cost of capital consisting of debt and equity).
[187]            Carbon Leakage Evidence Project: Factsheets for selected
sectors, Ecorys, 23 September 2013.  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/cl_evidence_factsheets_en.pdf
[188]            This includes: Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of
the use of energy from renewable sources (which divides the 20% renewables
target by 2020 into targets per Member State); Decision No406/2009/EC on the
effort of Member States to reduce GHG emissions (which defines targets per
Member State for sectors not included in the ETS. Together with the emissions
cap in the ETS directive this results in a 20% GHG reduction in 2020 compared
to 1990); Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 on emission performance standards for new
passenger cars (which regulates average levels of CO2 emissions of newly sold
cars in the EU); Directive 2009/30/EC (Fuel Quality Directive) to reduce the
carbon content of fuels sold in the EU over their life cycle; Directive
2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide to create an enabling
framework for carbon capture and storage.
[189]            IEA, 2011, Summing up the parts: Combining Policy
Instruments for Least-Cost Climate Mitigation Strategies
[190]            The extent to which a change in final energy prices will
lead to a change in energy consumption is measured by the price elasticity of
energy demand. The higher the elasticity, the more energy users will react to
changes in price. 
[191]            IEA, 2009, Gadgets and Gigawatts: Policies for Energy
Efficient Electronics 
[192]            McKinsey Global Institute, 2007, Curbing Global Energy
Demand Growth: The Energy Productivity Opportunity, McKinsey Global Institute,
San Francisco; IEA, 2011, Summing up the parts: Combining Policy Instruments
for Least-Cost Climate Mitigation Strategies
[193]            McKinsey Global Institute, 2007, Curbing Global Energy
Demand Growth: The Energy Productivity Opportunity, McKinsey Global Institute,
San Francisco.
[194]            .E.g. P. Geilenkirchen, K. Geurs (PBL); H.P. van Essen, A.
Schroten, B. Boon (CE Delft): Effecten van prijsbeleid in verkeer en vervoer.
Bilthoven ; Delft : Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving (PBL) ; CE Delft, 2010;
Reinhard Madlener, Ronald Bernstein, Miguel Ángel Alva González (2011)
Econometric Estimation of Energy Demand Elasticities. E.ON
Energy Research Center Series. Volume 3, Issue 8, October 2011.
[195]            See e.g. Scholl, G. et al. (2010): Policies to promote
sustainable consumption,  Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 34, pp 39-50 
[196]            IEA, 2011, Summing up the parts: Combining Policy
Instruments for Least-Cost Climate Mitigation Strategies
[197]            European Parliament, 2013, Energy Efficiency and the
ETS.
[198]            European Parliament, 2013, Energy Efficiency and the
ETS.
[199]            SWD (2012)5
[200]            Directive 2009/30/EC
[201]            Directive 28/2009/EC.
[202]            See the Commission Renewables Progress Report.
[203]            See IEA, 2013, Medium Term Market report on Renewable
Energy.
[204]            The levelised cost approach is a financial model used
for the analysis of generation costs. It focuses on estimating the average
levelised costs of generating electricity over the entire operating life of the
power plants for a given technology, taking into account main cost components,
namely capital costs, fuel costs and operations and maintenance (O&M)
costs. This analytical framework is flexible and allows specific cost factors
(e.g. contingency, decommissioning, carbon prices) to be considered. The LCOE
is equal to the present value of the sum of discounted direct costs divided by
the total production of the generating unit (IEA).
[205]            See IEA, 2013, Medium Term Market report on Renewable
Energy.
[206] Http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1912/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Unternehmen_Institutionen/ErneuerbareEnergien/Photovoltaik/DatenMeldgn_EEG-VergSaetze/DatenMeldgn_EEG-VergSaetze_node.html#doc405794bodyText4
[207]            IPCC – Special report on renewable energy (2012):
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de
[208]            This estimate, calculated by CDC Climate Research, was
obtained by multiplying the additional amounts of renewable energy provided for
in national action plans for 2008 and for the period between 2011 and 2020 by
the emission factor of alternative energies used by Member States in their
report to the Commission.
[209]            “Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy and CO2 Allowances
in Europe: A Need for Coordination”, Climate Brief, no. 18, CDC Climat
Research, September 2012.
[210]            Report on economic aspects of energy and climate
policies, 2013, European Commission, DG ECFIN
[211]            Report on economic aspects of energy and climate
policies, 2013, European Commission, DG ECFIN
[212]            Employment Effects of selected scenarios from the Energy
roadmap 2050, COWI, Forthcoming.
[213]            Eurobserver and Commission Communication "Towards a
job-rich recovery" COM(2012) 173 final"
[214]            See second quarter 2013 issue of the Quarterly Report on
European Electricity Markets, European Commission.
[215]            Data from the Council Of European Energy Regulators,
2012 Report on Renewable Energy Support in Europe
[216]            IEA–NEA "Projected costs of generating
electricity",  2010
[217]            "Technology supply curves for low-carbon power
generation", Poyry, June 2013
[218]            Conclusions of workshop which took place on the 9th of
April 2013, organised by the IEA Renewable Energy Working Party and with the
participation of members of its Renewable Industry Advisory Board and an
audience of 140 senior decision makers from the key players worldwide.
[219]            Conclusions of workshop which took place on the 9th of
April 2013, organised by the IEA Renewable Energy Working Party and with the
participation of members of its Renewable Industry Advisory Board and an
audience of 140 senior decision makers from the key players worldwide.
[220]            Forthcoming Publication: European Economy, "Energy
Economic Developments in Europe". DG ECFIN, European Commission.
[221]            See e.g. Lessons learnt from the current energy and
climate framework, Frontier Economics report prepared for Business Europe, May
2013
[222]            SEC(2008)
85;
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/docs/climate_package_ia_Annex_en.pdf
[223]            Recent examples in Germany include: on the 16th of June
2013, on a Sunday afternoon, when the combined share of wind and solar assured more
than 60% of power generation, reaching an all-time high in the country. This
resulted in several hours of negative power prices (falling below -100 €/MWh in
Germany and Belgium); on the 24th of March 2013, for the first time in the
German EPEX market history, there were four hours of negative hourly prices
during the afternoon hours, a phenomenon which has only occurred during night
hours in the past. This was also the result of the simultaneously high level of
wind and solar power generation that day.
[224]            http://www.iea.org/roadmaps/
[225]            7224/1/07, REV 1.
[226]            Directive 2012/27/EU. With the accession of Croatia the
target was revised to "1 483 Mtoe primary energy or no more than 1 086
Mtoe of final energy'' in Directive 2013/12/EU
[227]            Directive 2010/31/EU
[228]            Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU
[229]            Regulations 443/2009 and  510/2011 
[230]            IA EED, SEC/2011/779
[231]            “Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy and CO2 Allowances
in Europe: A Need for Coordination”, Climate Brief, no. 18, CDC Climat
Research, September 2012.
[232]            Energy Efficiency and the ETS, European Parliament, 2013
[233]            The E3ME model run projects a drop to zero of the ETS
price in 2020 whereas the PRIMES scenarios project a much lower impact (a
reduction from €16.5/t to €14.2/t in 2020). This lower ETS price impact until
2020 in PRIMES is explained among other things by a higher share of modelled
measures with GHG reductions materialising in non-ETS sectors, and the
assumption of full market foresight and an unlimited ETS banking flexibility
until 2050.
[234]            Energy Efficiency and the ETS, European Parliament, 2013
[235]            Summing up the parts: Combining Policy Instruments for
Least-Cost Climate Mitigation Strategies, IEA, 2011
[236]            Non-paper of the Services of the European Commission on
the Energy Efficiency Directive, Informal Energy Council, 19-20 April 2012. The
estimates were performed using the E3ME and PRIMES models.
[237]            COM/2013/0169
final, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green_paper_2030_en.htm 
[238]            http://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/20130702_green_paper_2030_en.htm

[239]            This analysis considers as Member States official
replies statements expressed either by central Governments or sent by single
national Ministries. Some Member States also underlined that their submission
may not fully reflect the final position of their Government.
[240]            The Effort Sharing Decision establishes binding annual
GHG emission targets for Member States for the period 2013–2020. These targets
concern emissions from sectors not included in the EU Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS), such as transport (except aviation), buildings, agriculture and
waste.
[241]            Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, amending
Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and
2006/32/EC.
[242]            These contributions can be found under "public
authorities" on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/20130702_green_paper_2030_en.htm.
[243]            Communication "Energy Roadmap 2050"
COM/2011/885
[244]            Directive 2009/30/EC amending Directive 98/70/EC as
regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a
mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council
Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland
waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC
[245]            Related to gas, a vision for a gas target model was
presented by CEER at the end of the year 2011 and endorsed by the Madrid Forum
in its 21st meeting in March 2012. The target model, proposed by the energy
regulators is based on hub-to-hub trading through the establishment of a number
of well-functioning market areas and trading regions, which would be closely linked
through cross-border interconnections, with market based allocation mechanisms
and an efficient use of capacity through appropriate congestion management
measures. 
[246]            Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, amending
Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and
2006/32/EC.
[247]            http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm 
[248]            The SET-Plan establishes an energy technology policy for
Europe. It's a strategic plan to accelerate the development and deployment of
cost-effective low carbon technologies. The plan comprises measures relating to
planning, implementation, resources and international cooperation in the field
of energy technology. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/set_plan_en.htm

[249]            Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings.
[250]            Intelligent Energy – Europe (IEE) offers a helping hand
to organisations willing to improve energy sustainability. Launched in 2003 by
the European Commission, the programme is part of a broad push to create an
energy-intelligent future for us all. It supports EU energy efficiency and
renewable energy policies, with a view to reaching the EU 2020 targets (20% cut
in GHG emissions, 20% improvement in energy efficiency and 20% of renewables in
EU energy consumption). 
[251]            NER 300 is one of the world's largest funding programmes
for innovative low-carbon energy demonstration projects. The programme is
conceived as a catalyst for the demonstration of environmentally safe CCS and
innovative RES technologies on a commercial scale within the European Union.
Funding comes from the auctioning of allowances in the ETS.
[252]            Sustainable Process Industry through Resource and Energy
Efficiency (SPIRE) is a public-private partnership to be launched as part of
the Horizon2020 framework programme.
[253]            The 3rd Energy Package mandated ENTSO-E to publish a
biannual, non-binding, Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). The TYNDP is
designed to increase information and transparency regarding the investments in
electricity transmission systems which are required on a pan-European basis and
to support decision-making processes at regional and European level. 
[254]            Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion
of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC
[255]            http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011D0278:EN:NOT 
7
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/gd7_new_entrants_and_closures_en.pdf

[256]            Cedefop, 2013
[257]            Eurofound, 2012
[258]            OECD 2011 study, p.10 & Employment effects of
selected scenarios from the Energy Roadmap 2050, p. 61
[259]            Employment effects of selected scenarios from the Energy
Roadmap 2050, Executive summary
[260]            Employment study ENER, p. 61; OECD, 2011; Cedefop, 2010
[261]            Cedefop, 2013
[262]            Eurofound study, 2012
[263]            Ecorys, 2013 and Metis, 2012
[264]            Skills for sustainable energy and new technology (UK) 
[265]            Skills for climate change (UK)
[266]            Clear about carbon (UK)
[267]            ECO+ (BE), EmpleaVerde Green Jobs (ES)
[268]            Green Ways to Work (UK)
[269]            Other ETS systems developed include small scale sources.
California's cap-and-trade programme will in the future include transport fuels
through fuel distributors. The Australian emissions trading system has foreseen
to include suppliers of natural gas for heating houses and buildings