Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION of xx 2014 repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of dicyandiamide originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009
Date: 2014-01-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, anti-dumping duty, chemical product, import (EU), originating product













EUR-Lex - 52014PC0003 - EN











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52014PC0003

Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION of xx 2014 repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of dicyandiamide originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 /* COM/2014/03 final - 2014/0001 (NLE) */









EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.           CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
Grounds for and objectives of the
proposal
This proposal concerns the application of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community ('the basic
Regulation') in the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of dicyandiamide
originating in the People's Republic of China.
General context
This proposal is made in the context of the
implementation of the basic Regulation and is the result of an investigation
which was carried out in line with the substantive and procedural requirements
laid out in the basic Regulation.
Existing provisions in the area of the
proposal
Definitive measures were imposed by Council
Regulation (EC) No 1331/2007 (OJ L 296, 15.11.2007, p. 1).
Consistency with other policies and
objectives of the Union
Not applicable.
2.           RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Consultation of interested parties
Interested parties concerned by the
proceeding have had the possibility to defend their interests during the
investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation.
Collection and use of expertise
There was no need for external expertise.
Impact assessment
This proposal is the result of the
implementation of the basic Regulation.
The basic Regulation does not contain
provisions for a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of
conditions that have to be assessed.
3.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE
PROPOSAL
Summary of the proposed action
On 15 November 2012 the Commission
initiated an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports
of dicyandiamide originating in the People’s Republic of China.
The attached proposal for a Council Regulation
is based on the findings which have confirmed the likelihood of continuation dumping
but no likelihood of recurrence of injury. 
It is therefore proposed that the Council
adopts the attached proposal for a Regulation repealing the measures which should
be published by 7 February 2014.
Legal basis
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30
November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members
of the European Community.
Subsidiarity principle
The proposal falls under the exclusive
competence of the European Union. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not
apply.
Proportionality principle
The proposal complies with the
proportionality principle for the following reasons:
The form of action is described in the
above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision.
Indication of how financial and
administrative burden falling upon the Union, national governments, regional
and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and
proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable.
Choice of instruments
Proposed instruments: Regulation.
Other means would not be adequate because
the basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options.
4.           BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
The proposal has no implication for the
Union budget.
2014/0001 (NLE)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION
of xx 2014
repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of dicyandiamide originating in the
People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2)
of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community[1]
(‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Articles 11(2), 11(6) and 9 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the
European Commission (‘the Commission’) after consulting the Advisory Committee,
Whereas:
1.           PROCEDURE
1.1.        Measures in force
(1)       The Council, following an
anti-dumping investigation (‘the original investigation’), imposed by
Regulation (EC) No 1331/2007[2]
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 1-cyanoguanidine (dicyandiamide)
originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘the country
concerned’) (‘the definitive anti-dumping measures’). The measures took the
form of an ad valorem duty at the level of 49,1 %.
1.2.        Request for an expiry
review
(2)       Following the publication
of a notice of impending expiry of the definitive anti-dumping measures in
force[3],
the Commission received on 14 August 2012 a request for the initiation of an
expiry review of these measures pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic
Regulation. The request was lodged by AlzChem AG (‘the applicant’),
representing 100 % of the total Union production of dicyandiamide.
(3)       The application submitted
was based on the grounds that the expiry of the definitive anti-dumping
measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of
injury to the Union industry.
1.3.        Initiation of an expiry
review
(4)       Having determined, after
consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence existed for the
initiation of an expiry review, the Commission announced on 15 November 2012,
by a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union[4]  (‘the Notice of
initiation’), the initiation of an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of
the basic Regulation.
1.4.        Investigation
1.4.1.     Review investigation period
and period considered
(5)       The
investigation of a continuation of dumping covered the period from 1 October
2011 to 30 September 2012 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The
examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of recurrence
of injury covered the period from 1 January 2009 to the end of the review
investigation period (‘the period considered’). 
(6)       After final disclosure,
the applicant argued that the period considered should have started in 2008 because
2009 would result in unrepresentative findings. It should firstly be noted that
the Commission enjoys a broad discretion when determining the period to be
taken into account for the purpose of verifying injury. Secondly, the applicant
has made this claim at a too late stage to change the period. The period
considered was announced early in the process, but the applicant did not
contest it then. The period cannot be changed at such a late stage of the
process for practical reasons and because a modification on the basis of the
collected evidence would be against the impartial conduct of an investigation. The
claim was, therefore, rejected. 
1.4.2.     Parties concerned by the
investigation
(7)       The Commission officially
advised the applicant, exporting producers in the country concerned, unrelated
importers, users in the Union known to be concerned, and the representatives of
the exporting country of the initiation of the expiry review. Interested
parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to
request a hearing within the time limit set out in the Notice of initiation.
(8)       In view of the apparent
large number of exporting producers in the country concerned and unrelated
importers, it was considered appropriate, in accordance with Article 17 of the
basic Regulation, to examine whether sampling should be used. In order to
enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would be necessary and, if so,
to select a sample, those parties were requested, pursuant to Article 17 of the
basic Regulation, to make themselves known within 15 days of the initiation of
the review and to provide the Commission with the information requested in the
Notice of initiation.
(9)       Twelve
known exporting producers in China were contacted. As only one exporting producer from China came forward with the requested information it was not necessary to select a sample
of exporting producers.
(10)     With regard to importers, some
10 unrelated importers of dicyandiamide in the Union were identified and invited
to provide sampling information. Only two of them came forward and were willing
to cooperate in the current review. Consequently, no sampling was necessary for
unrelated importers.
(11)     The Commission sent
questionnaires to all parties known to be concerned and to those who made
themselves known within the deadlines set in the Notice of initiation. Replies
were received from the Union producer, the co-operating exporting producer in China, two unrelated importers and one user in the Union. 
(12)     Additional representations
were received from two unrelated importers/traders and three users in the Union. 
(13)     The Commission sought and
verified all the information it deemed necessary for a determination of the
likelihood of a continuation of dumping and likelihood of recurrence of injury
and of the Union interest. Verification visits were carried out at the premises
of the following interested parties:
a) Union producer:
–              
AlzChem AG, Trostberg, Germany
b) Exporting producer in China:
–              
Ningxia Jiafeng Chemicals Co., Ltd. Shizuishan,   China
c) Unrelated importer in the Union:
–              
Helm AG, Hamburg, Germany
d) User in the Union:
–              
Merck Santé S.A.S., Lyon, France
2.           PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE
PRODUCT
2.1.        Product concerned
(14)     The product concerned by
this review is the same as the one in the original investigation, i.e. 1-cyanoguanidine
(dicyandiamide) ('DCD') originating in the People’s Republic
of China (‘the product concerned’), currently falling within CN code 2926 20 00.
It is produced from quick lime and carbon black, and appears after several
production steps. It is a solid substance in the form of a fine, white,
crystalline powder, usually odourless.
(15)     DCD is usually used as an
intermediate to produce a broad range of other chemical intermediates, such as
pharmaceuticals, various industrial applications — water, pulp and paper,
textile, leather — and diverse fields of epoxy applications. It is a key
element of the nitrogen — carbon — nitrogen (NCN) chain, with niche end-products
such as guanidine nitrate and other NCN derivatives.
(16)     Most of the DCD sold on the
Union market is standard. Only a limited amount is of a smaller particle size (the
so-called micro DCD). The co-operating Chinese exporting producer provided data
for the standard type only.
2.2.        Like product
(17)     One user questioned whether
Union DCD and Chinese DCD were unlike products on the basis that the standard
type of DCD produced by the Union industry is, allegedly, of higher quality
than that produced by the Chinese exporting producers. In particular, this user
claimed that the water content of the Chinese DCD would be significantly higher
and more volatile compared to the water content of the DCD produced in the Union. Moreover, Chinese DCD would also have a higher content of impurities.
(18)     As in the original
investigation, the investigation showed, however, that while there may be
certain quality differences, these cannot be quantified and moreover, they do
not affect the basic chemical, physical and technical characteristics of DCD
produced and sold by the Union industry in the Union and the product concerned,
which were found to be the same and to have the same end-uses.
(19)     Another user argued that
micro DCD should be excluded from the product scope of the anti-dumping
measures due to the alleged differences in physical characteristics, end-uses
and prices from standard DCD. 
(20)     The investigation showed,
however, that both types share the basic chemical, physical and technical
characteristics. The further processing of standard DCD to produce micro DCD
involves a straightforward physical process (milling), but no chemical
processing. In addition, even though the prices of micro DCD are higher than
those of standard DCD, both types have the same basic end-uses and can normally
be interchanged.
(21)     The investigation confirmed
that, as in the original investigation, the product concerned and the products
manufactured and sold on the domestic market in China, as well as those
manufactured and sold in the Union by the Union producer, have the same basic
physical and technical characteristics as well as the same uses and are,
therefore, considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of
the basic Regulation.
3.           Likelihood of continuation
of dumping
3.1.        Preliminary remarks
(22)     In accordance with Article
11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether the expiry of the
existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation of dumping.
(23)     As mentioned in recital (9),
due to the fact that only one company co-operated, it was not necessary to
select a sample of exporting producers in China. This company covered more than
35 % of the imports of product concerned from China to the Union during the RIP.
This company did not export during the IP of the original investigation and
therefore did not co-operate in the original investigation.
3.2.        Dumping
of imports during the RIP
3.2.1.     Analogue country
(24)     In accordance with the
provisions of Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, normal value had to be
determined on the basis of the prices or constructed value in an appropriate market
economy third country (the “analogue country”), or the price from such a third
country to other countries, including the Union, or, where those are not
possible, on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or
payable in the Union for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to
include a reasonable profit margin.
(25)     In the absence of
production of the product concerned outside the Union and China, the Commission indicated in the Notice of initiation its intention to base the normal value,
on the prices actually paid or payable in the Union for the like product, as it
was also done in the original investigation. 
(26)     The like product was sold
by the Union industry in representative quantities. However, the Union
industry's domestic sales were loss-making, albeit close to break even.
Therefore, the normal value was based on the Union industry's manufacturing
costs plus a reasonable amount for selling, general and administrative costs (SGA)
and profit. SGA and profit were determined using the same method as in the
original investigation. Pursuant to Article 11(9), adjustments were made on the
Union industry's manufacturing costs so as to offset the additional transport
costs due to the physical separation between production units, no direct access
to raw materials, which must be transported from remote production sites and
disposal of the by-product (black lime). These adjustments were also made in
the original investigation. 
3.2.2.     Export price
(27)     All export sales of the
cooperating exporting producer to the Union were made directly to independent
customers established in the Union. In accordance with Article 2(8) of the
basic Regulation the export price was established on the basis of the prices
actually paid or payable.
3.2.3.     Comparison 
(28)     The comparison between
normal value and export price was made on an ex-works basis.
(29)     For the purpose of ensuring
a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price of the
cooperating exporting producer, and in accordance with Article 2(10) of the
basic Regulation, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made with regard
to differences in transport, insurance, taxes and credit costs which affected
prices and price comparability.
3.2.4.     Dumping margin
(30)     As provided for under
Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, the dumping margin was established on
the basis of a comparison of the weighted average normal value with the
weighted average export price.
(31)     For the cooperating
exporting producer this comparison showed the existence of dumping although significantly
lower than the level of dumping established in the original investigation. 
3.3.        Development of imports
should measures be repealed
3.3.1.     Preliminary remark
(32)      Further to the finding of
the existence of dumping during the RIP, the likelihood of continuation of
dumping should measures be repealed was investigated and the following elements
were analysed: production capacity and spare capacity in China;  volume and
prices of dumped imports from China; the attractiveness of the Union market in
relation to imports from China. 
(33)     In this regard, it should
be noted that the cooperating exporting producer represented more than 30 % of
the total production of China during the RIP.  
3.3.2.     Production capacity and spare
capacity of the Chinese producers
(34)     Since
little public information is available about the Chinese DCD industry, conclusions
in relation to spare capacity relied mainly on the information contained in the
request for review and on information obtained from the single co-operating
producer, cross-checked where possible against publicly available information.
(35)     On this basis, it is
assumed that total installed capacity in China increased between 2007 and 2012.
Actual production during the RIP was however limited to 80 000 tonnes,
indicating that some spare capacity may be available. The Chinese installed
capacity during the RIP represents more than the global demand for DCD and
spare capacity may represent more than the total Union consumption during the
RIP while the domestic Chinese consumption during the RIP amounted only to 40 000
tonnes, i.e. half of actual Chinese production.
(36)     In relation to spare
capacity, the information gathered on spot during the investigation shows that
the single co-operating producer, representing more than 20 % of the total installed
capacity of China in 2012, has been granted approval to expand its capacity by
50 % in 2014. It is expected that this new capacity will, inter alia,
further serve this producer’s own production processes (captive use of DCD) and
the Chinese domestic market, which during the RIP absorbed around half of the
DCD production of the single co-operating producer. Information obtained from the
single co-operating producer showed that future investments in capacity will be
used to supply, inter alia, the Chinese domestic market which is large
and rapidly growing. 
(37)     China is thus in a position to produce large
quantities for export, in particular because there are no indications that the
domestic market could absorb all the spare capacity.  
3.3.3.     Volume and prices of dumped
imports from China
(38)     According to Eurostat and
verified import data, the volume of imports from China sharply decreased when
the measures were introduced in 2007 and started increasing again slightly between
2009 and the end of the RIP, but never reached the level of 2007. This is also
reflected in the market share of the Chinese imports which dropped from 40-45 %
in 2007 to 10-15 % in 2009 and reached again a level of 15-20% at the end of
the RIP, despite the increase in Chinese prices by 73 %. 
3.3.4.     Attractiveness of the Union
market
(39)      The
Union market is a relatively large market reaching around 18% of the world
consumption of DCD but it is not necessarily the most attractive or the only
attractive market in terms of sale segments and prices (see recital (74). Indeed,
the information available suggests that Chinese producers anticipate a growing
demand from the pharmaceutical industry, e.g. in India, that uses DCD for instance as an input for
the production of a diabetes medicine (metformin). Therefore, this new demand
will potentially be able to absorb a large part of Chinese spare capacity. Based on the above, it is considered that the Union market is not
the only attractive market for Chinese exporters.
3.3.5.     Conclusion of the likelihood
of continuation of dumping
(40)     The investigation has
confirmed that Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped
prices during the RIP. Given the continued dumping, the fact that the Union
market is a large market which was quite interesting for the Chinese exporters in
the past, as well as the spare capacities available in China, going beyond the total Union consumption, it can be concluded there is a likelihood
of continuation of dumping should measures be removed. It should however be
noted that the current level of dumping is significantly lower than the one
established in the original investigation. 
4.           SITUATION iN THE UNION
MARKET
4.1.        Preliminary remark
(41)     As the analysis concerns
only one company, for reasons of confidentiality most indicators are given in
indexed form or ranges.
4.2.        Union industry
(42)     The production of the Union
producer AlzChem AG represents 100 % of the DCD produced in the Union. It is therefore considered that AlzChem AG constitutes the Union industry within the
meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.
4.3.        Consumption in the Union
market
(43)     Union consumption was
established on the basis of the non-captive sales volumes of the Union industry
on the Union market and import data from Eurostat, cross-checked with other
statistical sources. Over the period considered it developed as follows: 
Table 1
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Union consumption (tonnes) || 11 042 || 13 712 || 14 338 || 14 146 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 124 || 130 || 128 
(44)     Apart from the free market
consumption presented above, it is noted that over the period considered the
captive use of DCD by the Union industry ranged between 10 and 20% of the Union
production and developed as follows: 
Table 2
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Captive use - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 123 || 124 || 127 
4.4.        Imports into the Union from
  China
(45)     Bearing in mind that only
one exporter cooperated with the investigation, it was found that the Eurostat
data was the best information source for import volumes and prices. The
Eurostat data refers to EU27 and was cross-checked to other sources such as Chinese
exports statistics, Article 14(6) database and co-operating importer/user data.

(46)     Deliveries of DCD from China were imported under two customs regimes. Under the normal regime both the normal
customs tariff and the anti-dumping duty were payable. Under the inward
processing regime none of these duties were payable because the material was
used in the production of downstream products that were exported outside the Union. As shown in the table below, the inward processing regime covered around two thirds
of imports in the RIP.
4.4.1.     Volume and market share
(47)     Following the imposition of
the anti-dumping measures in 2007, the volume of Chinese imports decreased
significantly. Their overall market share was some 15-20 % during the RIP.
Notwithstanding this, over the period considered the volume of imports under the
normal customs regime originating in China fluctuated, whereas Chinese imports
carried out under the inward processing relief more than doubled. Taking both
regimes into account, import volumes increased over the period but they are
well below the levels seen prior to the imposition of measures (over 6 000
tonnes).
Table 3
 Imports from China || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Volume of imports – normal regime (tonnes) || 881 || 1 251 || 1 781 || 730 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 142 || 202 || 83 
 Market share ||  5-10% ||  5-10% ||  10-15% || 5-10% 
 Average import price – normal regime (EUR/tonne) || 1 218 || 1 267 || 1 826 || 2 101 
 Average import price – inward processing (EUR/tonne) || 1 677 || 1 463 || 1 674 || 2 069 
 Volume of imports – inward processing (tonnes) || 676 || 984 || 654 || 1 467 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 146 || 97 || 217 
 Market share – all regimes || 10-15% || 15-20% || 15-20% || 15-20% 
4.4.2.     Price
(48)     As reflected in the table
above, over the period considered the prices of Chinese imports increased
substantially. 
(49)     The Union industry claimed
that the price development cannot be explained by the development of prices of
the main cost drivers, i.e. raw materials and energy costs. However, it did not
provide any alternative explanation or conclusive evidence to support the
claim.  
4.4.3.     Price undercutting
(50)     For
the purpose of analysing price undercutting, the weighted average sales prices
of the Union industry to unrelated customers on the Union market were compared
to the corresponding weighted average CIF prices of imports from China (standard DCD only). The sales prices of the
Union industry were adjusted in particular for delivery costs and commissions
to an ex-works level. The CIF prices of the exports from China were obtained from Eurostat and cross-checked with the Article 14(6) database and
they excluded those imports which were subject to inward processing. These CIF
prices were adjusted to cover costs related to customs clearance, namely
customs tariff and post-importation costs. Undercutting
in respect of imports which were subject to inward processing is analysed in
recital (83).
(51)     The
comparison showed that during the RIP the imports of the product concerned did
not undercut the Union industry’s prices. 
4.5.        Imports into the Union from other third countries
(52)     There were no major imports
from other third countries.
(53)     Over the period considered
the volume of imports from the USA never held a market share of more than 2%. The
investigation revealed that in fact these imports were of standard DCD which
had originally been produced in China and then micronised in the USA.
Table 4
 Imports from the USA || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Volume of imports (tonnes) || 192 || 237 || 282 || 255 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 123 || 147 || 133 
 Market share ||  0-2% ||  0-2% ||  0-2% ||  0-2% 
4.6.        Economic situation of the
Union industry
(54)     Pursuant to Article 3(5) of
the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on
the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period
considered.
4.6.1.     Production, production capacity
and capacity utilisation
(55)     The
Union industry operated an integrated production chain incorporating not only
DCD but upstream and downstream products. Since 2009 the Union production capacity
of DCD did not change. Over the period considered, the Union producer increased
production largely because of increased demand on the Union market as
demonstrated at Table 1 above.  Since 2010 the Union producer has operated rather
at full capacity. This was less the case in 2009 when production and sales were
affected by the financial crisis.
Table 5
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Production - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 115 || 113 || 109 
 Production capacity - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 100 || 100 || 100 
 Capacity utilisation || 86,9 % || 100,2 % || 98,2 % || 95,2 % 
4.6.2.     Stocks
(56)      The Union producer
maintained a small stock throughout the period considered and this was not
considered to be an important factor in the assessment of the situation of the
Union industry. 
Table 6
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Stocks - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 73 || 88 || 49 
4.6.3.     Sales volume, market shares
and average unit prices in the Union
(57)     The sales by the Union
industry on the Union market to unrelated customers increased by 26 % during
the period considered, whereas its sales prices went up by 7 %. 
(58)     The Union industry managed
to increase its EU sales due to the increase in consumption shown above in
Table 1. The Union industry maintained a very large share  of the Union market.

Table 7
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Sales volume - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 121 || 125 || 126 
 Market share || 80-85% || 80-85% ||  80-85% || 80-85% 
 Sales price - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 95 || 98 || 107 
4.6.4.     Profitability and cash flow
(59)     During
the period considered the profitability of the Union industry improved
significantly as it could increase its sales volume and its sales price on the
Union market to unrelated customers. The strong
improvement in profitability is even more pronounced if compared with the
industry’s heavy loss making situation in the original IP (-20 to -30%).
Table 8
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Profitability || -10 % to 0 % || -10 % to 0 % || -10 % to 0 % || -5 % to 0 % 
(60)     The profitability of the
captive transactions was comparatively good.
(61)     During the period
considered the cash flow was always negative with the exception of the RIP, in
line with the development of the overall profitability.
Table 9
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Cash flow  - Index (2009=-100) || -100 || -84 || -229 || 174 
4.6.5.     Investment, return on
investments and ability to raise capital
(62)     During the period
considered the Union industry made investments for the maintenance of and optimisation
of the existing production machinery. In 2009 it made a significant new
investment linked to micro DCD.
Table 10
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Investments  - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 50 || 65 || 37 
(63)     The return on investments
during the period considered remained negative, in line with the
above-mentioned profitability. 
Table 11
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Return on investments  - Index (2009=100) || -100 || -63 || -62 || -10 
(64)     The Union industry did not
claim to have encountered any difficulty to raise capital during the period
considered.
4.6.6.     Employment, productivity,
growth and wages
(65)     The investments made during
the period considered contributed to increase the number of qualified employees.
The average wage levels increased by 15 % over the period considered. 
(66)     The increase in employment
and productivity reflect the increased production in 2010.
Table 12
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Number of employees - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 107 || 104 || 105 
 Productivity (tons per employee) - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 108 || 108 || 105 
 Labour costs per employee - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 112 || 113 || 115 
4.6.7.     Magnitude of dumping and
recovery from past dumping
(67)     Dumping continued during
the RIP, as explained under the point 3.2 above.
(68)     The impact of the magnitude
of the actual dumping margin on the Union industry, given the volume of the
dumped imports from China, cannot be deemed that high. As compared to the
original investigation, the situation of the Union industry improved
significantly - it was well on track of recovery from past dumping in
particular in terms of profitability, sales and market share.
4.6.8.     Conclusion 
(69)     Even if some positive
developments referred to above are relatively recent, it is considered that the
situation of the Union industry improved significantly in the period considered.
All the financial indicators were positive or close to positive by the end of
the RIP. 
(70)     The imposition of the anti-dumping
measures in 2007 allowed the Union industry to steadily recover from the
injurious effects of the dumping, further exploiting its potential onto the
Union market and non-EU countries. The fact that the Union industry benefited
from the measures is mostly illustrated by its high production levels, capacity
utilisation and increased EU sales prices and profitability. During the RIP, no
material injury resulting from Chinese imports was taking place anymore. 
(71)     Following disclosure, the
applicant argued that the fact that in the framework of the original
investigation certain injury indicators showed a positive trend did not prevent
the Commission from confirming the existence of material injury at the time.
The claim must be rejected. Regulation (EC) No 1331/2007 was a response to
different circumstances with namely a less profitable Union industry. Moreover,
an expiry review completely differs from an investigation under Art. 5 basic
Regulation. Whereas the latter focuses on whether the dumping causes injury to
the domestic industry, the former is a forward-looking exercise analysing what
is likely to occur should the measures lapse. 
5.           Likelihood of Recurrence
of Injury
(72)     As demonstrated above, the
Union industry did not suffer material injury during the RIP. In accordance
with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was therefore examined whether the
expiry of the measures in force would be likely to result in a recurrence of
injury.
5.1.        Impact of the spare
capacity in China 
(73)     The investigation has
revealed that there are large production capacities in China (see recitals (34) to (37)). However, there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the
spare capacities in question are likely to lead to significant imports into the
 Union.  
(74)     The
Union is one of many
markets where the Chinese exporting producers sell. In terms of prices, data
from the Union industry, the co-operating Chinese exporting producer and from
the Chinese export statistics confirm that several non-EU markets are at least
as attractive as the Union one.
(75)     As concerns the Union
industry export sales, these were often made at higher prices than those in the
 Union. Subsequent to disclosure, the applicant argued that its higher export
prices had nothing to do with the relative attractiveness of such markets but
should rather be explained by the fact that these sales concerned small volumes
sales only. This argument should be rejected as the EU industry’s overall sales
volumes to export markets were still significant in the RIP (between 20 and 30%
of the Union industry’s production). It was also not substantiated that sales
transactions to customers were in significant lower volumes.  
(76)     Also
statistical data on Chinese export prices of DCD to the different markets do
not point at a distinguishing attractiveness of the EU market as compared to
other export markets. Substantial spare capacity existed already during the RIP
but did not translate into an injurious pricing behaviour by the Chinese
exporters. The fact that spare capacity will further increase is not in this
case an indication of a likelihood of recurring injury. India is, by far, the world’s biggest market of
DCD. Chinese export statistics show that Chinese sales volumes to the EU
represented only around 10% of the sales volumes made to India and that Chinese average EU sale prices per tonne were rather equivalent to Chinese sales
prices to India. In other words, the prevailing market prices in the important
Indian market (which have increased over the period considered by 65% on
average) are equally interesting to the DCD producers. There is no indication
that spare capacities in China will translate into huge imports into the Union. For the time being it can be expected that at least part of such spare capacities
will not be used in the near future. This conclusion is based on the past
developments since data submitted by the applicant suggest that whereas between
2008 and the RIP China increased its capacity by some 50%, it increased its
overall production by some 20% only. Projections made by the applicant up to
2016 demonstrate that Chinese capacities will be well in excess of global
demand and, therefore, will remain idle for the time being. The country-wide excess
capacity would be less if projections are made on the basis of sales data from the
co-operating Chinese exporting producer. In any case, the fact that, different
from the EU production, (see recital (55) above) Chinese DCD production is not part
of a fully integrated production chain means that it is less costly to leave
capacities unused. 
(77)     Moreover, certain growing demand
in particular for the pharmaceutical industry in countries such as India (see recital (39)) will probably be able to absorb a further part of Chinese
overcapacity. Furthermore, the investigation concluded that AlzChem’s DCD
products were considered more attractive to EU users due to inter alia
geographical location and reliability of supply. This gives a certain advantage
over Chinese producers in respect of key users in the EU which purchase
significant amounts of DCD. Therefore, in view of this context, the large
production capacities in China are not as such a reason to conclude that there
is a likelihood of recurrence of injury. The mere fact
that the Union industry has lost share in terms of global production capacity cannot
overturn such conclusion.
5.2.        Impact of the projected market
growth 
(78)     Several parties mentioned
the expected significant growth of the DCD market worldwide, mainly driven by
well-established applications in the pharmaceutical and agricultural industry. This
is because of the increase in production of anti-diabetes medicine
predominantly in India. This growth is already announced by the increase in EU
consumption in Table 1 above.
(79)     In respect of the EU
market, further growth is also expected but to a more limited degree. This is
because a large pharmaceutical producer selling worldwide is located in the Union.
(80)     Following disclosure, the
applicant contested the extent of the growth. However, it is noted that its
representations are contradictory in this respect and that several sources
point at solid EU demand and a significant worldwide growth. Sales data from the
co-operating Chinese exporting producer point at a rapidly increasing
consumption in the Chinese domestic market. Therefore, nothing on file could
back that, as ultimately alleged by the applicant, demand is or will be flat.
(81)     Subsequent to disclosure,
the applicant also emphasized that is had lost sales volumes and market share
on non-EU markets. In this respect, it should be noted that the EU industry has
worked at almost full capacity with negligible stocks, while the EU consumption
of DCD continued growing. Therefore, it is rather because of the fact that the
EU industry had decided to focus more on the EU market without substantially
increasing its production capacity that it could not take full advantage of the
growth in the other markets. This situation could change, however, if its
expansion plans materialise. It is therefore expected that even if import volumes
of Chinese DCD into the Union increase in the near future, this would not automatically
result in a recurrence of injury. The Union industry will, like Chinese
producers, benefit from an increase in worldwide demand.
(82)     In this respect, as
mentioned above the Union producer is very well rated in the market and appears
to be the preferred supplier to several key customers, at least for certain DCD
applications. The quality and reliability of its DCD products in the Union means
that it is able to secure large contracts with key EU customers and this
situation is expected to continue regardless of whether the measures are
repealed or not. Post disclosure, a significant EU user stated that it would
continue to source the product covered by the proceeding from the Union
industry even if measures were repealed.
5.3.        Other considerations 
(83)     As
explained at recitals (50) to (51) the Chinese import prices did not undercut
the prices of the Union industry during the RIP. Undercutting was not present
in respect of the normal regime (around one third of import volumes). A very
low level of undercutting existed when the inward processing regime was also
taken into account (the other two thirds of imports during the RIP). This
situation differed from the substantial undercutting found in the original
investigation and resulted from an overall gradual increase in import prices
since measures were imposed, although this increase did not occur steadily.  In
fact, the CIF EU border price of Chinese imports rose by 73% during the period
2009 up to the end of the RIP. 
(84)     The EU industry has shown
that it remains competitive even in the absence of measures given its substantial
exports (between 20 and 30% of production during the RIP) to non-EU countries
where no measures are in force and where it has faced the Chinese competition
without the support of anti-dumping measures. The decreasing export volume
depicted below has to be seen in conjunction with the increasing sales volume
into the Union and unchanged production capacity of the Union industry which
has in principle been fully utilized.
Table 13
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || RIP 
 Export volume - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 105 || 80 || 77 
 Export price (unrelated) - Index (2009=100) || 100 || 100 || 109 || 125 
(85)     Prices of Chinese imports
during the 8 months following the RIP were also analysed in view of a
submission made by the Union industry. The Union industry had submitted that severe
price pressure caused by Chinese imports had recommenced shortly after the RIP.
Based on Article 6(1) in conjunction with Article 11(5) of the basic
Regulation, information relating to a period subsequent to the RIP shall
normally not be taken into account. However, even if this information was to be
taken into account, at this stage no conclusions could be drawn from it as It is
not clear whether these changed prices, if confirmed, are of a lasting nature. For
instance although prices fell from the end of the RIP to May 2013 in June they
rose again by 10%.  Given that these post RIP prices were still considerably
higher than those observed in the original investigation, the prospects that in
the nearer future they can significantly undermine the current situation of the
Union industry, which is not suffering from material injury, do not reach the
likelihood threshold. 
(86)     Finally, there is no
indication that a repeal of the measures would have an impact on market prices in
the short-medium term. It should be noted that a big share of the DCD sold in
the Union is subject to contracts running for several years and for the user
industry a reliable and steady supply from a trusted producer seems to be of
high importance. Moreover, two thirds of imports during the RIP were made under
the inward processing regime whereby no import or anti-dumping duties are
payable. In summary, while it cannot be ruled out that some contracts will be
renegotiated and landed import prices may decrease, it is not likely that this
will occur to injurious levels if duties are repealed. 
5.4.        Conclusion on likelihood a recurrence
of injury
(87)     In view of the foregoing,
it is not likely that the Union industry, if measures were repealed, would have
to decrease its sales and production volumes and/or prices of DCD to an extent
such that its profitability and overall position would be materially affected. 
(88)     On the contrary, in view of
the world-wide growth in consumption, the Chinese import volumes and prices
during the RIP and the prices on other markets, it is expected that, in the absence
of measures, the Union industry’s DCD sales will continue to remain strong and
also to contribute positively to its DCD-chain and NCN-chain of activities.
(89)     The Union industry is
expected to remain at full capacity whether the measures are repealed or not.
Moreover, the Union industry completed the preliminary work for an expansion
programme this year. In autumn 2013 it agreed in principle to substantially
increase its DCD production capacity. The market, including important EU-based
customers, welcomed this expansion plan[5].
The expansion plan suggests that the Union industry believes worldwide demand
to be strong and that AlzChem should be benefitting from this growth.
(90)     Even if the Union industry is
subject to some price pressure from Chinese imports in the near future, the
effects in terms of prices and profitability are not expected to be major given
that the Union industry has a large market share, advantages in terms of
quality and reliability of supply and the capability of securing large
contracts. They would therefore not meet a "likelihood of injury"
threshold within the meaning of Article 11.2 of the basic Regulation.
(91)     The Commission concludes
that there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury to the Union industry were
the existing measures to be repealed. 
6.           UNION INTEREST
(92)     As it has been concluded
that there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury, no findings on Union
interest are necessary.
7.           REPEAL OF ANTI-DUMPING
MEASURES
(93)     All parties were informed
of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended
to recommend that the existing measures be repealed. They were also granted a
period to submit comments subsequent to that disclosure. The submissions and
comments were, where warranted, duly taken into consideration, but none could
alter the conclusions set out above.
(94)     It follows from the above
that, as provided for by Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the
anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of DCD originating in the China should be repealed and the proceeding terminated.
(95)     Given certain circumstances
described above, namely the existence of spare capacity in China and the possible existence of undercutting post RIP, the Commission will monitor the imports
of the product concerned with a view to facilitating swift appropriate action
should the situation so require. The monitoring will be limited to a period of
2 years after the publication of this Regulation,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
The anti-dumping duty on imports of 1-cyanoguanidine
(dicyandiamide), currently falling within CN code 2926 20 00 and originating in
the People’s Republic of China is hereby repealed and the proceeding concerning
these imports is terminated.
Article 2
This Regulation shall enter into force on
the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President
[1]               OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 
[2]               OJ L 296, 15.11.2007, p. 1. 
[3]               OJ C 116, 20.4.2012, p. 3. 
[4]               OJ C 349, 15.11.2012, p. 10. 
[5]               Following disclosure, the Union industry said that
“the decision to expand capacity would need to be cancelled if AlzChem’s
profitability is expected to drop”.