REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL First Progress Report on the implementation by Russia of the Common Steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens under the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue
Date: 2013-12-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU visa policy, European citizenship, Russia, bilateral agreement, biometrics, free movement of persons, illegal migration, judicial cooperation, public safety













EUR-Lex - 52013DC0923 - EN











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52013DC0923

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL First Progress Report on the implementation by Russia of the Common Steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens under the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue /* COM/2013/0923 final */









REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
First Progress Report on the
implementation by Russia of the Common Steps towards visa free short-term
travel of Russian and EU citizens under the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue
I. Background
The EU-Russia Summit
in St Petersburg in May 2003 agreed that the Parties would start examining the
conditions for reciprocal visa-free travel as a long-term perspective which
laid down the basis for the visa free discussions between Russia and the EU. Consequently,
in spring 2007, the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue was launched. Similarly to the visa
dialogues with other third countries and based on the requirements of
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue was built around four
Blocks (document security including biometrics, illegal migration including
readmission, public order and security, and external relations).
Between December 2007
and March 2010 six expert meetings took place in Moscow in
order to explore the state of EU and Russian legislation and practice in all
fields under the four Blocks of the Visa Dialogue.
Based on the findings
of these expert meetings, the Commission proposed to the Council that, at the
May 2010 EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Justice, Freedom and Security
(JLS PPC), both sides should agree to start working towards a document on
"Common Steps towards visa-free travel" that would list technical
criteria and requirements for a visa free regime. The Council accepted that
approach.
On that basis, the May
2010 JLS PPC tasked the senior officials to discuss how to move to a practical
phase. On the proposal of the senior officials, who met several times in 2010,
the November 2010 EU-Russia JLS PPC endorsed formally the methodology of the
Common Steps and invited the senior officials to draft the document.
The first EU draft of
such a list was transmitted to Russia in March 2011 with a view to starting the
negotiations. The process lasted until the end of the year and the “Common
Steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens” were
officially agreed between the EU and Russia at the 15 December 2011 Summit. The
Summit also launched their implementation.
A dedicated kick-off
meeting between the EU and Russian experts took place in March 2012. During
that meeting both sides discussed and explained their understanding of each
Common Step and operational measure necessary to be addressed in order to fully
evaluate their proper implementation.
Russia and the EU
thereafter prepared their respective written reports on the state of
implementation of all the Common Steps. Russia transmitted its written report
on 13 April 2012 whereas the EU side did so on 31 May 2012. Further written
exchanges and replies to additional questions formulated by both sides were
carried out until September 2012.
On the basis of the
written exchanges both Parties organised experts’ field missions. Four missions
of EU experts to Russia (both Moscow and numerous regions) took place between
September 2012 and July 2013 (one mission per Block). Similarly, Russian
experts undertook four missions in the EU between December 2012 and October
2013 (in total 23 visits to particular Member States were organised).
The EU-Russia Visa
Dialogue is based on full reciprocity between the Parties. The way towards visa
liberalisation depends on the progress made in implementing the Common Steps
and there is no automaticity in the process. As the Common Steps specify in
their final provisions, only once the implementation of the Common Steps is completed,
the Parties will decide, in accordance with their respective internal
procedures, on starting negotiations on an EU-Russia visa waiver agreement. The
full implementation of the EU-Russia visa facilitation and readmission
agreements is very important for the Visa Dialogue.
Furthermore, while
considering the implementation of the Common Steps, the evolution and
assessment of other issues, as listed in the final provisions of the Common
Steps, will be also taken into account (links between the migratory flows and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; rate of visa applications
refusals, of readmission applications accepted and of effective returns; number
of return decisions, of refused entries at the border and of apprehensions of
respective citizens irregularly staying at each other’s territory as well as
border crossing time between the EU and Russia).
The Commission has
regularly reported both to the Council and to the European Parliament about all
developments under the Visa Dialogue. At the appropriate time, the Commission
will also present a comprehensive assessment of inter alia possible migratory,
border management and security impacts on the EU and on the regional coherence
of a future EU-Russia visa free regime.
This is the first progress
report presented by the Commission describing the state of play of the
implementation of the Common Steps by Russia, formulating issues of concern and
recommendations.
II. Assessment of the
implementation of the Common Steps under each Block
Block 1: Document security,
including biometrics
General assessment
During the last few
years, Russia has made a lot of progress in this area. This includes the
introduction of
the biometric passport in 2006 and its updates according to ICAO standards in
2010 and 2013. The production, issuance and personalisation of international
biometric passports are quite secure and follow the relevant practices and
standards of ICAO. Stolen and lost passports are reported to the centralised
Interpol database, albeit through a manual process. Breeder documents
(including internal passports — Russia’s main identity documents (IDs)) are
secure enough for their purpose and the personalisation as well as issuance
procedures reflect the current standards. Training programmes including
measures against corruption are provided, although their efficiency remains to
be analysed. It should also be noted that the liberal regulation concerning
change of name, coupled with the fact that there is no central civil registry,
might create potential for abuses.
Detailed comments

 Introduce
     ICAO-compliant biometric passports on the basis of a comprehensive and
     secure identity management, taking into account work carried out in the
     ICAO framework and adequate protection of personal data and ensure their
     authenticity, facilitate accurate verification of identity of their
     holders by relevant authorities of both Parties.

Following the
introduction of biometric passports in 2006, an updated version has been
issued since 1 March 2010. It is ICAO-compliant and includes enhanced security
features. Starting from 2013, a third generation of biometric passports
containing also information on fingerprints is being issued. Although the
demand for non-biometric passports is declining, it is still possible to obtain
them and there are no plans to end their issuance.
The main competences
for the production and issuance of both international passports and breeder
documents are held by: State Printing House Goznak; State Registry Office
(ZAGS) with its regional and local offices (responsible for issuance of source
certificates); the Federal Migration Service (FMS) with its regional and local
offices (responsible for issuance of international passports and Russian
internal passports).
The current generation
of biometric passports is well protected against forgery and meets ICAO
standards. The issuing process is reliable and quite secure, be it at the stage
of checking the identity of the applicant, printing and storing blank passports
or personalising them. The security of the information stored for this process
is governed by the Federal Law No 152-FZ of 27 July 2006 ‘On personal data’.
The breeder
documents (i.e. internal passports and source certificates) are technically
well protected against forgery. Furthermore, the new type of internal passport
(issued since January 2008) carries additional security features and its
content is machine-readable according to ICAO standards. Blanks are produced
(at central level) and stored in a secure and efficient way. Personalisation
and issuance of those documents take place at the regional level and the
relevant procedures reflect the current standards.
The visited central
and local premises of the relevant authorities handling both
international passports and breeder documents were well secured. The
administrative security procedures concerning access to and handling of
documents were in place.
There is no central registry.
The source certificates are handled regionally and each region has its own
registry and electronic database (at least in the offices visited by the EU
experts). Consultations between regions take place administratively in case of
any doubts (via official request sent by post). The Russian authorities
referred to plans to establish a new centralised electronic civil registry but
no firm date was provided. Some improvement in this regard might be a portal of
interconnection between various federal agencies and ministries (SMEV),
allowing for electronic handling of requests (reportedly already operational).
The rules for changing
one’s name appear to be quite liberal and remain a concern. In fact, there are
currently no restrictions on citizens who want to change their name. Moreover,
due to the lack of a centralised civil registry, name changes can only be
tracked at the regional level or after a formal request to another ZAGS
regional office, which requires time, thus creating scope for abuses.

 Ensure
     prompt and systematic reporting to the Interpol database on lost and
     stolen passports.

Information about lost
and stolen international passports is stored in the centralised database of the
FMS and then reported to the National Central Bureau (NCB) of Interpol (based
at the Ministry of the Interior, MoI) in order to be integrated through the
push-pull information system of Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents
(SLTD) database. Uploads to the Interpol database are done manually on a daily
basis.
The MoI has been
carrying out a development project in order to improve the information exchange
between the FMS and Interpol’s NCB aiming at automatic uploads to SLTD (to be
accomplished by 2013).
So far, Russia has
not integrated lost and stolen internal passports or breeder documents into
Interpol’s SLTD database because those documents cannot be used abroad.
Nonetheless, the possibility of including also such documents is being
considered by the Russian side.

 Maintain
     regular exchange of passport specimens and visa forms, information on
     false documents and cooperation on document security.

Passport specimens and visa forms
are regularly exchanged via diplomatic channels of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA). The FMS receives the specimens of foreign documents from the MoI
and sends them for information to the FMS’s territorial offices.

 Conduct
     training programs on the methods of the document protection, on the basis
     of ICAO standards, inter alia on introduction of biometric parameters, as
     well as exchange of information on the methods and respective possible
     scientific researches in the field.

Officers of ZAGS and
FMS are subject to initial trainings followed by regular updates. E-learning
programmes are also provided. The Consular Department of the MFA has
established a training centre offering courses on the issuance procedure and
security features of biometric passports.
The efficiency of the
training programmes is likely to vary according to the size of a particular
office, its (more or less) remote location and human resources available. The
officers who were met during the EU expert missions in all premises of the relevant
authorities were well aware of the relevant procedures, their duties and
competences.

 Undertake
     and if necessary improve anti-corruption measures, including ethical
     norms, targeting officials of any public authority that deals with
     comprehensive and secure identity management.

According to the
Russian authorities, anti-corruption issues are included in the general
trainings for the respective staff, and the anti-corruption content is updated
when new relevant legislation is approved. However, the experts’ mission could not
really check the content and quality of the training courses and curricula
requirements (in particular with regard to ZAGS).
As part of a general
anti-corruption policy, the FMS adopted the Code of Ethics and Conduct of State
Civil Servants
(the FMS
Order of 25 February 2011), which is being implemented with regard to all its
employees. Some of its provisions are explicitly incorporated in the FMS’s
employment contracts. The FMS has also established channels of communication
with citizens for the purpose of combating corruption (website, hotline, etc.)
and is putting preventive measures in place.
The importance of
anti-corruption measures in the field of document security is particularly
underlined by the fact that, even if the system for the issuance of documents
works well to prevent forgery, corruption may create more opportunities for
obtaining original documents illegally.
 Issues of concern and actions recommended to be followed up under Block 1: 
On the basis of the
above findings the Commission identified the following issues of concern
requiring further discussion with the Russian authorities:

 The rules regulating change
     of name in Russia are quite liberal and might open some scope for abuses
     and easy changes of identity. Those changes would not be easily detectable
     in particular by authorities of third countries including the EU Member
     States.
 Furthermore, the lack of
     information about the content and outcomes of trainings and curricula
     requirements of the FMS and ZAGS officials in particular with regard to
     anti-corruption measures did not allow the Commission to fully evaluate
     the progress in this area.
 Finally, the Commission will
     continue to exchange information with the Russian authorities with regard
     to further development of a centralised civil registry, the electronic
     system interlinking the federal agencies and Ministries (SMEV) and an
     automated system for the introduction of alerts into Interpol’s SLTD
     database.

Block 2: Illegal migration,
including readmission
General assessment
In
recent years, Russia’s migration policy has undergone significant changes. The new Migration
Policy Concept that was adopted in 2012 is a visible sign of that process.
In
fact, the Russian authorities have started a broader reflection on migration
that takes into account also the beneficial effects that migration flows can
bring in terms of economic development. Moreover, the Russian authorities have
acknowledged that bureaucracy and inefficiency of the migration procedures are
frequently the cause that turns many regular migrants into irregular ones and
have recognised the pressing need to integrate migrants into Russian society.
As regards visas and legal
migration channels, the FMS is the main authority managing migration in
Russia and ensuring coherence. A full and comprehensive system of rules is in
place. Some rules are still quite complex (e.g. quotas and work permits).
Certain amendments have already
been introduced to the Federal Law, in particular in the context of
implementation of the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA); improvement
of the situation of highly qualified specialists (HQSs); facilitation of
migration registration and visa procedures; and simplification of access to the
labour market (regarding the quota system and patents). Further changes,
in particular improving the legal migration procedures also for other groups of
migrants, are expected.
Irregular migration is a challenge of
which the responsible authorities are aware. Efforts are increasingly being
devoted to ensuring the effective return of irregular migrants that are
apprehended in Russian territory as well as to overall enforcement of the
migration rules. Proper cooperation with Belarus (due to the State Union and
absence of border controls) as well as the flows from CIS countries (including
proper passport controls) seems to pose a challenge. The return procedures are
in place and cooperation on returns with many countries of origin is being
developed. The EU-Russia readmission agreement functions satisfactorily.
Both for irregular migration and
border management, the information gathering system and in particular
the risk analysis, including at the regional level, were difficult to
evaluate. The collection of defined indicators (e.g. illegal border crossings, refusals
of entry, etc.) on new irregular migration channels, routes and cross-border
crime, provided it is made available to local units, could enhance the
effectiveness of border controls.
With
regard to asylum, the administrative structures and procedures are in
place, and the reception centres for asylum seekers that were visited by the EU
experts met the basic requirements and current standards. Provision of more
information at border crossing points (BCPs) for potential asylum seekers as
well as reinforced and structured cooperation between the FMS and Border Guard
Service (BGS) (a service of the Federal Security Service, FSB) could be
considered. Rules making the access to certain rights for recognised refugees
and asylum seekers subject to their registration as well as bringing the status
of temporary asylum (subsidiary protection) closer to that of refugee should be
considered. The new asylum law is expected to bring about some improvements in
this sense.
The border management system
and procedures at BCPs are of standard value even if some improvements
could contribute to their efficiency. Equipment at BCPs is regularly improved.
The BGS is a professional border management and law enforcement authority with
a well-established position among the agencies.
The BGS is in principle committed
to cooperation with the border authorities of the neighbouring countries and
Frontex. Some progress has been achieved also in regard to cooperation
between the BGS and third countries’ border management authorities, including
with EU Member States. The latter should now be deepened and more structural
information and data should be exchanged.
With regard to cooperation
with other relevant agencies in Russia, the BGS should deploy additional
efforts in order to render the scope of cooperation more concrete, in
particular with the FMS and Federal Customs Service (FCS).
Data gathering is done on a regular
basis and analysis units exist in the relevant agencies (at least in the BGS
and FMS). The data are still gathered separately by each agency, which leads to
fragmented statistics. The risk analysis is not shared and even if it is
prepared there is some doubt about its comprehensiveness and methodology.
According
to the Russian authorities, the training programmes including on document
security for border guards are well developed. The anti-corruption measures
form part of that and ethical codes exist. The content of those however was not
shared with the EU experts.
Detailed comments
2.1 Migration issues

 Conclude
     between Russia and all the relevant EU Member States the implementing
     protocols to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European
     Community on Readmission of 25 May 2006, while ensuring effective
     implementation of this Agreement.

The EU-Russia readmission
agreement entered into force on 1 June 2007. It is monitored regularly by the
Commission in cooperation with the EU Member States (for the EU) and by the FMS
(for Russia). The main platform for discussing any issues arising during the
implementation of the Agreement is the Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) which
so far has met twice per year (13 meetings organised until now in Moscow and
Brussels).
All readmission procedures under
the Agreement are operational. Overall evaluation of the Agreement is satisfactory.
All the technical points are addressed regularly at the JRC meetings. Given the
good cooperation achieved so far, during the last JRC meeting it was decided to
reduce the frequency of meetings to one per year.
The FMS is the main agency on the
Russian side responsible for the implementation of the Agreement, and it has a
special unit dealing with all related matters.
The BGS is responsible for the
accelerated readmission procedure at the BCPs. The BGS’s border delegates have
been appointed for the implementation of the border readmission procedure.
However, during meetings at some BCPs, the EU experts noticed that local BGS
representatives were not fully aware of the details of that procedure.
The implementing
protocols under the Agreement (between Russia and EU Member States) have
been almost concluded. Protocols have been signed with 23 EU Member States).
The Protocol with Greece has been signed and should be ratified in the near
future. Russia informed that it is open to negotiating further with Croatia.
During several JRC meetings Russia informed that it is ready to negotiate the
protocol with the UK. Ireland and Denmark are not bound by the Agreement. 

 Effectively
     implement the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European
     Community on the Facilitation of the Issuance of Visas to the Citizens of
     the Russian Federation and the European Union of 25 May 2006.

The EU-Russia visa
facilitation agreement (VFA) entered into force on 1 June 2007 (in parallel to
the readmission agreement). It is monitored regularly by the Commission in
cooperation with the EU Member States (for the EU) and by the MFA (for Russia).
The main platform for discussing any issues arising during the implementation
of the agreement is the Joint Visa Facilitation Committee, which meets
regularly at the request of one of the Parties, normally at least once a year (9
meetings organised until now in Moscow and Brussels).
In
order to ensure full, correct and harmonised implementation of the provisions
of the VFA by the Parties, the Joint Committee developed and adopted Guidelines
for the Implementation of the VFA. The meetings of the Joint Committee are
considered by both Parties as a platform for constructive cooperation and an
opportunity to discuss any technical issue arising in the context of the
application of the Agreement. The Agreement is being implemented
satisfactorily.
The
Commission does not have detailed statistics on visas delivered by Russia for
the period 2007-2011. The exact refusal rate for EU citizens is unknown but,
according to the Russian side’s estimation, would constitute approximately only
0.01-0.02 % (about 200-300 rejections a year). Approximately 1.25 million
visas are issued annually to EU citizens, of which about 45 % are
multiple-entry visas with a long-term validity.
Before
the final decision on its signature is taken, the upgraded VFA must be assessed
in the light of the overall EU-Russia relations.

 Amend
     the above-mentioned visa facilitation agreement in order to further
     simplify visa requirements for the short-term travels.

The text of the
upgraded VFA has been cleared and will contain, inter alia, a reciprocal visa
waiver for civilian air crew members and its provisional applicability as of
signature. This will put an end to the current unbalanced situation, in which
all EU Member States exempt Russian civilian air crew from the visa obligation,
while Russia still maintains a visa obligation for those Member States with
whom it does not have bilateral visa waiver agreements for this category of persons
(BE, CZ, EE, EL, FI, IE, LV, LX, PT, SI, SK).
One issue remains
open: the visa waiver for holders of biometric service passports as requested
by the Russian side. On the EU side the safeguards that are to accompany this
visa waiver are still being examined.

 Work
     to ensure facilitation, further simplification and transparent application
     of the respective rules on registration/listing of citizens legally
     staying on the other Party's territory, on issuance of permits to legally
     stay/reside and exercise labour activity, aiming to reduce in practice the
     length of administrative procedures and burden for citizens; and regularly
     exchange information on respective visa policies.

Russia has a comprehensive system
of legal migration rules which are laid down in several federal laws and
amendments thereto. The FMS is the main authority responsible for their
implementation.
Many changes have been introduced
with regard to the listing (recording) of foreigners, which is mandatory
at each place of stay in Russia. Currently, this obligation is imposed on each
foreigner (regardless of his/her length of stay) within seven working days at
the FMS regional office (previously three working days). This period can
be prolonged on the basis of bilateral agreements, as is the case, for
instance, for France (10 days) or Kazakhstan (30 days).
Furthermore, third-country
nationals (TCNs) residing as HQSs (see below) and their family members are
entitled to stay in Russia for up to 90 or 30 days (depending on the
circumstances) without migration recording.
The migration recording
procedures are to be carried out by the Host Party (the latter is clearly
defined by law) to the FMS. For tourists, this task should be performed by
hotels or the person inviting them to Russia. The TCN is not obliged to have,
at least directly, any specific contact with the FMS. The documents necessary
for the recording (including copies of passport and migration card) can be
submitted directly or by mail by the Host Party.
Furthermore, TCNs are no longer responsible
for non-compliance with the obligation of migration recording and
sanctions are only applicable to the Host Party (previously the responsibility
was also on the TCN).
Registration procedures are
applicable to TCNs legally residing in Russia for a longer period (work,
studies, etc.). Some improvements have also been introduced in that procedure,
in particular with regard to the ways of submitting the request. Having said
this, despite the fact that the procedure is declaratory in nature, the supporting
documentation required from the applicant is sometimes difficult to meet (e.g.
proof of ownership of the property or a statement by the owner). Given that
access to several social rights for migrants is dependent on valid
registration, the procedure could create a de facto hurdle to accessing those
rights.
The two main types
of permits issued for legal stay of TCNs are temporary and permanent
residence permits.
A TCN interested in
obtaining a temporary residence permit in Russia needs to apply to
the relevant territorial office of the FMS or to the relevant diplomatic
mission or consular office of Russia in the country of residence. If the
application is approved, a four-month visa valid for entry to Russia is issued.
The application can be submitted in person or in electronic format, together
with the requested supporting documents including a certificate confirming the
absence of HIV or addiction to drugs. The Russian authorities have six months
to decide on the request. The reasons for refusal are clearly specified by law.
It appears that TCNs
residing in Russia with a temporary residence permit are allowed to work only
in the region and on the position as authorised in the (usually one-year) work
permit. Furthermore, if their work permit is limited only to one region, their
business trips within Russia cannot be longer than 10 days. Those rules
seem to be quite restrictive.
The temporary
residence permit has a validity of three years and can be renewed at the TCN’s
request by providing the same set of documents (including those concerning HIV
and drug addiction), if the TCN had left the country and returned to Russia. If
he/she has stayed in Russia uninterruptedly for three years, the TCN can also
apply for a permanent residence permit (see below).
A privileged
status in the legislation on labour migration of Russia is held by HQSs.
To attract HQSs into the Russian labour market, the Russian authorities have
facilitated their employment and residence rules. HQSs are quota-exempt and,
together with their family members, entitled to receive multiple-entry visas
for the period of validity of their work contracts (up to three years) and
repeated extensions of their permits for up to three years each time. Moreover,
if they perform labour activity in two or more regions, the permit issued is
valid in those regions. In case of changed employer they have 30 working days
to search for a new one. HQSs are also entitled to apply for a permanent
residence permit without undergoing the procedure of a temporary residence
permit and, together with their family members, they enjoy broad socio-economic
rights.
A permanent
residence permit can be issued to a TCN, after he/she has been living in
the country on the basis of a temporary residence permit for at least one year.
The residence permit is issued for a period of up to five years and may be
renewed an unlimited number of times.
The TCN must submit an
application to the relevant FMS territorial office at least six months before
the expiry of the temporary residence permit. The application must be
accompanied by an extensive set of documents similar to those required
for a temporary residence permit. The grounds for refusal to issue a
permanent residence permit are similar to those for temporary residence
permits.
The legal status of a
foreign citizen in possession of a permanent residence permit is very close to
that of a Russian citizen, including exemption from quota and work permit
obligations.
Foreign nationals can perform
labour activity only on the basis of a work permit, unless they fall
under one of the exceptions that are listed in the Federal Law No 115-FZ of
2001.
In order to get a work
permit, the TCN has to apply to the territorial department of the FMS at the
place of stay and submit the application form and the requested supporting
documents. The work permit is issued within 10 working days after receipt of
the application. If the work permit is to be granted within 30 days, the TCN
has to submit medical documents (including confirmation of being HIV negative,
drug addiction free and not affected by serious infectious diseases), under the
threat of termination of the work contract. The medical tests are to be
undertaken only in designated (and a limited number of) places, which sometimes
creates practical difficulties.
The number of
work permits that may be issued to TCNs annually is limited by a quota
that is established by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection in
cooperation with the MFA and other institutions. The whole process is quite
complex, time-consuming and inflexible. Quotas are set for each region in
advance for the coming year on the basis of forecasts gathered from employers.
This approach might cause problems and delays and its efficiency is doubtful.
Russian authorities seem aware of this as they are considering a revision of
the quota rules.
In
parallel to the quota and work permits system, there is a ‘patent’ system which
is reserved for foreign citizens coming to Russia under a visa-free regime and
in particular from CIS countries (with the exception of Turkmenistan). A patent
is issued within 10 working days, upon a request made by a (hosting) Russia
citizen. It authorises the labour activity for personal, domestic or other
similar needs of an individual, on the basis of a labour agreement or civil
contract (for nannies, domestic help, etc.). A patent may be provided for a
period of one to three months and extended up to one year. After that
period a new patent may be issued. The number of issued patents is not limited.
Initially, Russia had
no integration policy for migrants. More recently however, after a
strong inflow of TCNs (in particular from CIS countries), this became a need
which was also recognised by the Migration Policy Concept (see below). Some
measures are being implemented including teaching of the Russian language,
history and cultural traditions; pre-departure courses organised in countries
of origin for prospective migrant workers going to Russia; vocational training
and lessons on Russian migration laws and language. Two pilot projects in this
field have been implemented in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the FMS
has reportedly established a special unit dealing with integration. A
comprehensive integration strategy is still not fully in place.
All visa-related
procedures are regulated by Government
Regulations which are also in conformity with the provisions of the EU-Russia
VFA.
In order to get
any type of visa, a foreign citizen should apply to the diplomatic mission or
consular office of Russia and submit the necessary (clearly specified and
rather standard) documents including an invitation. Some additional documents
might be necessary for long-stay visas. On that basis, a visa will be issued
according to the purpose of visit. The visa may be refused by the MFA on
the basis of reasons specified by law. There is no obligation to give
justification for such refusal.
Non-conformity of
the claimed purpose for entry with the actual one is considered a violation of
the entry or residence regime and punishable (fine, expulsion and/or re-entry
ban).
Visa holders are obliged to leave
Russian territory upon expiry of the authorised period of stay stated in
the visa. The total duration of stay of a foreign citizen in Russia on the
basis of a multiple-entry short-stay (business) visa cannot exceed 90 days
within each period of 180 days. Long-stay visas are issued specifically for the
length of the purpose of stay in Russia.
The visa policy of Russia relies
very much on specific bilateral agreements. Russia has concluded more than a
hundred agreements either on visa-free short-term travel (most significantly
with Israel and Turkey) or on visa facilitation (e.g. with the EU or the United
States).
Moreover, visa-free regimes apply to almost all CIS countries (apart from
Turkmenistan). According to the information provided by the Russian side, other
visa-free agreements might be signed with Japan, South Korea and India.

 Exchange
     information, including within the Russia-EU Dialogue on Migration, on a
     legal framework, as well as on administrative structures, including their
     respective competences and working methods, and on infrastructure
     (including detention centres) for effective general migration management,
     in particular for effective elaboration of methodology on inland detection
     and expulsion of illegal migrants, as well as the current flows,
     statistics and risk analysis of illegal migration and closely cooperate in
     the fight against crimes, connected to the illegal migration, and
     addressing possible deficiencies.

The
new Migration Policy Concept (Concept) for the period 2012-2025 was
elaborated by the FMS and adopted by the President of the Russian Federation in
June 2012. It is the main policy document on migration in Russia. The Concept
aims to promote migration to Russia for some groups of TCNs, in particular HQSs
and large investors, students, compatriots and qualified workers (namely from
CIS countries), according to market needs. In this regard, it defines measures
for promoting migration, such as creating the conditions for family
reunification, gradually simplified procedures of entry and stay for business,
labour (improvement of the quota systems) and educational/scientific purposes,
procedures in respect of residential registration and medical care, development
of circular migration, etc. The Concept focuses on the positive effects of
regular migration, which is presented as a necessary response to demographic
decline. Implementing laws are being developed at the federal level. At the
same time the Concept puts emphasis on respect of the migration rules by TCNs
in Russia and on curbing irregular migration.
Most migration-related
competences in Russia belong to the FMS. Since 2012, the FMS is
subordinated directly to the Russian Government and its head has been recently
raised to the rank of a federal minister. The FMS is a leading federal
executive body comprising regional offices, inter-regional structures and
contact points located abroad. The FMS is responsible for drawing up and
implementing the federal migration policy and for the management of activities on both
regular and irregular migration.
Another actor involved in
migration management is the BGS, which is responsible for border
checks and border surveillance. Other ministries and agencies are also involved
in migration control and management according to their competences (Ministry of
Education and Science, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, MFA, etc.).
According to the Russian
authorities, although the FMS does not carry out controls in the border area,
it cooperates with the BGS on the basis of an Annual Cooperation Plan
and regional plans. Despite that information, the EU experts during their
mission could not confirm the FMS operational cooperation with the BGS. The FMS
is not present at the BCPs even if the communication channels between the BGS
and the regional FMS office are established.
Russia’s international
cooperation on migration matters involves mainly contacts between the FMS
and migration agencies from CIS countries on the basis of the 1992 Agreement,
which includes exchange of liaison officers. The activities focus on the fight
against irregular migration. Operative-preventive measures and special
operations against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings are
conducted reportedly also in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation, and, on the Russian side, they involve the FMS, MoI, FSB and
Rosfinmonitoring.
Further cooperation takes place
in the readmission area on the basis of bilateral agreements. In addition to the
EU, Russia has concluded such agreements inter alia with Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, Switzerland, China, Turkey, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan,
Uzbekistan, Moldova, Belarus and Vietnam. Readmission negotiations are carried
out inter alia with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, India, Belarus, Montenegro, Macedonia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Russian side has indicated that all agreements in force work in a
satisfactory manner.
The EU-Russia Migration
Dialogue was launched in 2011 and several sessions on both irregular and
legal migration have taken place. In particular, two sessions on irregular
migration and one on legal migration were organised in Bratislava, Kaliningrad
and Budapest (both sides exchanged in the field of legal migration statistics
on labour shortages, quotas and visas, as well as best practices on integration
policies; with regard to irregular migration, statistics on returns were
exchanged.). The Migration Dialogue provides a useful platform for discussion
and exchange of best practices on the respective migration policies.
The State Union between Russia
and Belarus and the lack of border controls between the countries require
reinforced contacts and cooperation between the relevant agencies. The two
countries do not have a common visa policy and entry to Russia does not mean
authorisation to enter Belarus and vice versa.
Both the Russian BGS and the FMS
reportedly cooperate with the Belarusian migration authorities in their border
area. Having said this, no tangible tools (databases, information exchanges) of
that cooperation seem to exist (apart from the mutual recognition of migration
cards).
The FMS has quite extensive and
detailed statistics on entries and stays of regular migrants in Russia
(in particular thanks to the established entry/exit database). Some of the most
significant figures show that annually 13-14 million TCNs enter Russia. The
majority (70 %) come mainly from CIS countries and only 10 % from the
EU. Less than 5 % of those who enter come to reside on a long-term basis.
The FMS is aware of the
composition of irregular migration flows to Russia but more detailed
statistics were not really provided. According to the available information,
irregular migration (evaluated at around 4 million persons) originates mainly
from CIS countries (80 %) and concerns originally regular migrants, who
then remain in Russian territory beyond the validity period of their permit.
There seem to be no common statistics on irregular migration between the FMS
and BGS and each agency collects its own data (the FMS on inland situation and
the BGS on apprehensions at the border). This does not contribute to
comprehensive knowledge on the irregular migration flows in Russia.
Consequently, no comprehensive and structured risk assessment is prepared by
either agency or at least was not provided to the EU experts during their
mission.
Irregular migration rules which are clearly
laid down in law have, according to the information provided by the FMS, been
evaluated and aim at increasing sanctions for the organisation of irregular
migration. Liability of carriers for bringing travellers without the necessary
authorisation to enter Russia is provided for in the Code of Administrative
Offences. The FMS further cooperates with railway carriers by giving them
access to the personal data database in order to detect people named on the
re-entry-ban list.
The FMS, being responsible for
detection of irregular migration within Russia but not being an enforcement
agency, conducts the checks in cooperation with police and other agencies if
necessary. The FMS clearly focuses on controls at workplaces. The regular
controls require prior planning (one year ahead) and publication. The
unexpected controls require prosecutor’s authorisation. 
An entry/exit database was
established by the FMS in cooperation with the BGS. It gathers data about the
entry, exit and stay of TCNs in Russia. Another system is being also developed
as a pilot exercise aiming at electronic filling of migration cards which need
to be submitted by each TCN entering Russia (apart from Belarusian nationals).
The system already functions at the Moscow airports and it should be extended
to all BCPs in the future (no specific dates have been provided though).
A person apprehended while
irregularly staying in Russia may be administratively fined and/or
issued with a removal order. In addition, a re-entry ban may be imposed on the
person, which for those who commit violations of migration rules several times
may be of unlimited duration. Information about persons with entry bans is
introduced into a special database.
If the person is apprehended for
the first time, the sole penalty seems to be in most cases an administrative
fine (with no removal order). This however leaves the person in an ambiguous situation
as regards his/her status in Russia. The persons apprehended are also
fingerprinted and their data are stored in a database.
Two types of return procedure
are in place: expulsion and deportation. The legal framework and the
procedure for both are regulated by the Federal Law No 115 FZ and an order by
the MoI.
Administrative expulsion may be voluntary or
involuntary and is ordered by a court. It is carried out by the Federal
Bailiff Service, or by the Police. Deportation concerns a
foreign citizen who has not left Russian territory as required by the migration
rules (e.g. termination or cancellation of a permit or of validity of the visa,
refusal of asylum application, etc.). The decision on the deportation is made
by the head of the FMS territorial unit or by the head of the FMS. The right to
appeal against both types of decisions can be filed by the person concerned
within ten days. 
For actual return, the person
will be subject to readmission if Russia has a readmission procedure
with the country of origin.
Two types of detention centres
exist: for persons subject to expulsion or deportation; or for persons whose
return to the country of origin is covered by a readmission agreement. The
latter are administered by the FMS. The former are administered by the MoI but
as of 2014 will also be managed by the FMS. The persons may be put in detention
on the basis of a court ruling, which can be appealed against within 10 days.
The Code on Administrative Offences does not stipulate a maximum detention
period.
Some of the centres for migrants
awaiting readmission have been built with the support of the EU project AENEAS
following the conclusion of the EU-Russia readmission agreement. The centres
for irregular migrants awaiting readmission that have been visited by the EU
experts (Moscow region, Rostov-on-Don and Pskov) have been found to be in line
with the general EU standards.
2.2
Asylum issues
·          
Establish
clear and transparent asylum procedures effectively accessible for persons
seeking asylum.
·          
Ensure
proper status, including rights and duties, for persons recognized to be in
need of international protection in accordance with the Parties’ obligations
under international law, including under the 1951 Convention relating to the
status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Russia acceded to both
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol in
1993, when the first law on refugees was also adopted. The law extends to
so-called temporary asylum (subsidiary protection). The legislation has since
been extensively amended. Moreover, an entirely new law on refugees is under
preparation, which should address many outstanding issues.
In principle, any asylum
application should be lodged at a BCP when entering Russian territory. In
practice however, such a request can also be initiated when the person
concerned has already entered Russian territory, either legally or irregularly.
Asylum applications are examined by the territorial offices of the FMS.
In this context, it should be
noted that the FMS is not present at the BCPs. This situation requires strong
cooperation between the BGS and FMS as well as adequate training of border
guards on international protection. The information on the relevant procedures
should be also available at BCPs.
During the visits at the BCPs by
the EU experts, very little information about international protection and
procedures was available for potential asylum seekers. The BGS pointed out that
the standard training of its border guards covers also international
protection. The FMS reported also that it organises some trainings for the BGS
on that topic. In practice, the cooperation between the BGS and FMS seems to be
on an ad hoc basis. This might lead in some situations to refusal of entry for a
person claiming asylum at a BCP. One of the aims of the new draft law on asylum
is indeed to revise border procedures.
Once submitted, the admissibility
of the application needs to be verified within five days. During that time
however, no document is issued to the applicant, which may lead to risk of refoulement
in some cases. According to the FMS, the admissibility is refused solely if the
applicant is subject to a criminal procedure, in which case the asylum
application may be only examined after that procedure is finalised. Reportedly,
only 1-2 % of cases are declared inadmissible. The decision on
inadmissibility may be contested at a court.
After a case is declared
admissible, a substantial review of the application is made by the
officers of the FMS territorial offices, who conduct interviews with the
applicants (the latter need to also fill in special questionnaires). Free of
charge interpretation is normally provided, although some problems might occur
with less common languages.
While assessing asylum
applications, the FMS uses various sources including its own and the MFA’s.
Reportedly, information is also gathered through requests that are regularly
addressed to the UNHCR and from NGOs specialised in human rights. However, the
FMS does not seem to have a tangible and structured Country of Origin
Information (COI) system which could contribute to a more systematic approach
in the evaluation of each case.
The decision on an application
should be issued within three months (the period may be extended by an
additional three months).
Any refusal of an asylum
application can be appealed at a court within one month. The appeal suspends
the return procedure. There is no designated board of appeal or court
specialised in asylum cases. The appeals are handled by the regular court
system. The FMS stated that it organises regular training for judges on
international protection. Having said this, it was not possible to ascertain
the efficiency of that training and the percentage of successful appeals as the
relevant authorities refused to meet the EU experts. According to
non-governmental sources, the number of court decisions quashing administrative
decisions in such appeals is close to zero. The person whose application has
been refused is obliged to leave Russian territory within three days of the
notification on the decision.
The persons recognised
as refugees receive their status for an indefinite period. This results
from a change in 2013; earlier, the status was granted for three years
renewable upon another application and evaluation. The Russian legislation
protects recognised refugees against refoulement. Persons recognised as
refugees are issued with biometric IDs (as of July 2013). They have the same
socio-economic rights as Russian citizens (including freedom of movement, work,
education, healthcare). However, the possibility to exercise those rights
depends heavily in practice on whether or not the person concerned has valid
registration at an address in Russia, which for some (especially those staying outside
the reception centres) may constitute an obstacle. Access to rights can be even
more complicated for recognised beneficiaries of so-called temporary asylum (a
form of subsidiary protection), since their status is less privileged than that
of refugees (the rights are the same as those of asylum seekers and the status
is granted for one year). The new draft law on international protection
equalises the status of refugees and beneficiaries of temporary asylum, which
is welcome.
Regarding the reception
conditions for asylum applicants, the FMS operates a number of reception
centres for asylum seekers, where they are allowed, but not obliged, to stay.
Apart from these centres, and if asylum seekers do not wish to stay there, no
further assistance such as pocket-money or food coupons is provided to them.
Asylum seekers during
the procedure are protected from refoulement. They are entitled to work
and have access to healthcare and education. The access to those rights is
dependent however on registration which may be difficult to obtain for those
who do not live in a reception centre. With regard to the statistics, the
recognition rate for asylum applicants appears to be relatively low. In the
period 2006-2011, out of some 13 000 applicants, only 7 % (9 %
in 2011) were recognised as refugees. However, 40 % of the applicants were
granted temporary asylum. Applicants originated mainly from Afghanistan,
Georgia and more recently Syria.
·          
Closely
cooperate, within the Russia-EU Dialogue on Migration, on the asylum related
issues.
On 14 December 2011,
an extended thematic session on international protection was held in the
framework of the EU-Russia Migration Dialogue in Moscow. During this session,
the Parties exchanged information, statistical data and experience on all
aspects of granting asylum, including international and national law, and
addressed opportunities for further development of cooperation between Russia
and the EU in this area. The next specialised
sessions on international protection should be organised under the Migration
Dialogue in December 2013 in Stockholm and 2014.
Furthermore, within
the Prague Process Targeted Initiative and its pilot project as well as within
the UNHCR Quality Initiative Eastern Europe Project — both supported by the
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and funded by the EU — several EASO
training modules have been translated into Russian (Inclusion, COI, Interview
Techniques, and Drafting and Decision-making). Russia was invited to
participate in both projects.
·          
Exchange
information on respective administrative structures competent for treatment of
asylum cases, including on reception facilities for asylum seekers, and
addressing possible deficiencies.
The FMS is the body responsible
for receiving and considering claims for international protection. According to
the information provided by the Russian side, the FMS territorial offices have
separate refugee departments dealing with asylum seekers, who receive ad hoc
training several times a year from the FMS and UNHCR experts.
The FMS cooperates
regularly with UNHCR in the field of asylum. A number of NGOs are active in
this field and work together with the FMS and UNHCR as well.
The EU experts visited
two reception centres for asylum seekers in Ochyor and Vishnyi Volochek,
and assessed them positively even if they were located in rather remote areas.
Neither was running at full capacity.
The two reception centres
visited had a ‘health point’ with at least two trained nurses on duty. One
centre also had a psychologist amongst its staff. The centres did not have
interpreters amongst their staff. If necessary, third party interpreting can be
hired.
There seems to be no particular training
for the centres’ staff for dealing with the specific needs of asylum seekers or
refugees, or vulnerable persons in particular. The authorities in both centres
stated to prefer applying an individual approach, whereby every resident
receives the care and attention he/she requires.
·          
Develop
a comprehensive exchange of information on their respective policies towards
integration and adaptation of recognized refugees and persons granted
international protection, and addressing possible deficiencies.
There seems to be no special
policy addressing the question of integration and adaptation of persons granted
international protection into Russian society. In practice, however, there are
some initiatives similar to those offered to other migrants. Most of them are
offered to refugees who choose to stay in one of the state-operated
accommodation centres. There are no specific integration programmes or
assistance offered to those who live outside the centres.
A certain level of integration is
ensured by the rights guaranteed to refugees including education or the
possibility to acquire Russian citizenship. Refugees formally have the right to
‘invite’ also their family members. The latter however need to go through the
same recognition procedure.
2.3
Border management issues
·          
Optimise
the appropriate working mechanism for closer cooperation and more intensive
contacts and information exchange between the Russian and EU Member States’
border services, in particular at state border crossing points and effectively
implement the working arrangement between the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the EU ("FRONTEX") and the Border Guards Service of the
Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
The BGS established
cooperation with Frontex in 2006 when a working arrangement was signed. Since
then, several action plans have been agreed for the gradual development of the
cooperation, and the last one, for the period 2013-2015, was agreed in October
2013. This cooperation covers the whole spectrum of activities of Frontex with
particular attention to operations and risk analysis. Some positive steps have
been achieved. In the area of exchange of information and analytical
activities, however, there is still room for improvement not only for the
agreed, defined and regular exchange of statistical data but also in the area
of joint analysis, which could contribute to a better understanding of the
situation regarding irregular migration in the region.
The cooperation
between the BGS and the border agencies of EU Member States bordering Russia is
satisfactory and established at central, regional and local levels. This
cooperation covers also the deployment of border delegates for direct contacts
on a daily basis. Furthermore, best practices are exchanged and common
trainings organised. Having said this, there is still limited information
exchange in particular about violation of green borders, false documents
detected at BCPs and queues at BCPs.
·          
Undertake
necessary steps in order to develop cooperation between the Federal Agency for
the Development of the State Border Facilities of the Russian Federation
(Rosgranitsa) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU
("FRONTEX").
Rosgranitsa is
involved in several multilateral international forums for cooperation. The
agency has also developed cooperation (within its competences) with the
neighbouring EU Member States and cooperation protocols to that effect exist
with Latvian and Estonian authorities.
During the experts’
mission, Rosgranitsa repeated its offer from 2010 to develop and sign a joint
memorandum/arrangement with Frontex in order to cooperate in the development of
BCPs, especially through the exchange of best practices. In the meantime
Rosgranitsa has participated in several events organised by Frontex, in
particular in the area of research and development linked to automatic border
control systems of the future.
·          
Deploy
appropriate staff, resources, technical equipment and infrastructure at the
relevant parts of the state border, as well as effectively implement border
control procedures and best practices at their common state border crossing
points to ensure secure environment for the movement across the borders between
the EU and the Russian Federation, while fighting cross-border crime, improve
efficiency of controls of that movement and make common border crossing less
strenuous and reduce the waiting time.
The EU experts’ Block
2 mission visited many BCPs at various parts of the Russian border i.e. the
border with Kazakhstan (Karaozek-Kotyayevka), Ukraine (Matveyev Kurgan,
Kuibyshev, Krasnodon, Belgorod, Naumovka, Nehotyeyevka and Troebortnoe),
Belarus (due to the lack of border controls no BCPs are there), Latvia
(Terehova-Burachki and Zilupe-Sebeza) and Estonia (Narva-Ivangorod and
Kunichina-Gora) as well as various airports (Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo,
Rostov-an-Don and Astrakhan) and seaports (St Petersburg and Astrakhan).
Rosgranitsa is the Russian agency
in charge of purchasing equipment and developing the infrastructure for BCPs.
The agency owns the basic equipment and infrastructure in the existing 372
international and 259 local BCPs along the whole Russian border. It is also
responsible for the development of those existing BCPs. A special financial
programme is devoted to the development of facilities and infrastructure at
BCPs in Russia managed by Rosgranitsa. The priorities of those improvements for
the moment are: Sochi area, sea borders and international train connections. It
is recommended that the EU-Russia border be part of those priorities.
The improvements and
changes of infrastructure at any BCP are agreed by special Coordination Boards
established for that purpose. They bring together the main actors at any BCP:
Rosgranitsa, BGS and FCS.
It is clear that many
efforts are devoted to improving the existing BCPs. Some of the visited
BCPs were very recent. At the same time, the old (still working) BCPs in those
places were very outdated — no real access to those facilities was granted to
the EU experts. Some of the new BCPs already provided the facilities necessary
to carry out joint border checks (e.g. at the border with Ukraine and
Kazakhstan).
Efforts are also being
made to limit the waiting time at the most crowded BCPs (in particular
with the EU). Rosgranitsa is well aware of the problem. Some terminals (e.g. at
BCPs with Latvia) were built in order to accelerate the lorry controls and
several other projects aim at boosting the capacity of other BCPs between
Russia and the EU Member States. Also some facilitating measures like websites
with web cameras providing information in real time at the BCPs are being
implemented. Here, some procedural improvements might be envisaged in
particular concerning the current strict division of tasks between the FCS
(controlling only goods) and the BGS (controlling only persons) and a very
formalistic approach to those procedures by each agency. On 12 September
2013, FCS classified consignments of goods coming from one EU Member State into
the highest risk profile, leading to 100% physical controls for lorries loaded
in that Member State. The lengthy controls involved the unloading of the entire
vehicle, a very costly and disruptive process. Neither the Commission nor that
Member State were notified in advance. This practice increased substantially
the waiting time at the relevant BCPs. The practice at those BCPs has been
restored to normal. The situation will continue to be closely monitored.
The legislation and
practices with regard to border checks are of applicable standards. The
procedures are quite unified across the country. The main concern seems to be
the approach to the border checking of persons. It seems that those checks are
primarily focused on checking the identity of the person. Virtually no
attention is paid to the purpose of the visit even if the law fully allows the
border guards to interview the travellers and refuse entry if there is doubt
about the good faith of a traveller. No profiling of travellers is used in the
person’s checks including at the big airports, where the design of booths
renders it impossible even to screen persons visually before their appearance
in front of the border guard.
The equipment in
BCPs is rather standard. Officers at the first-line checks have a passport
reader, a computer with access to at least the entry ban and wanted persons
database and a basic set of tools to check the authenticity of documents. This
may be considered sufficient. Second lines of document control were not shown
to the EU experts apart from Sheremetyevo airport and St Petersburg seaport.
Those second-line checks which were shown were of sufficient quality. For the
other places, one should assume that those second lines do not exist. This
situation seems to be confirmed by a practice according to which at the BCPs
with the EU Member States, the second-line checks are done by the EU border
guards. The above, combined with the fact that no database on forged documents
exists, nor is any other information on such documents accessible at the BCPs,
might limit the efficiency of border controls.
At some airports, the
preparation for the fully automatic checks (so-called ABC) has been done and
some gates are already installed (although not yet operational). The border
checks done in trains or on ships are undertaken with the use of mobile
equipment guaranteeing the same quality control as at the stationary BCPs.
The equipment for
control of goods at BCPs was also present (x-rays, sensors, etc.) but the EU
experts were refused to closely evaluate it. Obviously, due to the Customs
Union the BCPs with Kazakhstan are designed only to focus on the control of
persons.
Due to the State
Union with Belarus and the absence of border controls, no BCPs exist there.
This requires reinforced cooperation between the authorities which was not
really seen during the EU mission.
Another particularity is the access
of CIS nationals to Russia on the basis of only their internal passports
(IDs). This issue seems to have now been addressed with the recent requirement
for CIS nationals to hold an international passport when entering Russia, which
should come into force in 2015.
Visas are not delivered at the
border
apart from very exceptional situations. Having said this, border guards are
entitled to prolong the visa for up to three days on exit from Russia — this
happens mostly if someone has overstayed in Russia the validity of his/her visa
by up to three days.
With regard to the green and
blue borders surveillance, the EU experts were informed that appropriate
resources and equipment were in place. However, more detailed information was
refused by the Russian authorities. It is therefore not possible to make any
conclusions on that point.
·          
Exchange
information on their appropriate border-related administrative structures,
maintain cooperation between their border services, law enforcement and other
competent agencies and address possible deficiencies.
The BGS is the
authority responsible for border surveillance of all the land and maritime
external borders of Russia and for the border controls at all BCPs. The
agency’s activity is carried out at federal, regional and local/BCP level. The
BGS has been an integral part of the FSB since 2003, but it has its own budget.
Another agency involved in border management is Rosgranitsa, which is in charge
of the purchase and administration of the equipment for BCPs. Customs are also
present at each BCP for controls on goods.
The authorities
concerned affirmed that the operational cooperation between Russian
law enforcement agencies, i.e. BGS, FMS, Police/MoI, FCS, is working well.
The interinstitutional agreements are reportedly in place and meetings at
central, regional and local level are being held. This assessment could not be
verified by the EU experts, since they could not consult any written cooperation
agreement or protocol. The strict distinction of tasks and followed practice
between the BGS and FCS does not really confirm the cooperation between those
two agencies.
·          
Develop
a data gathering and analysing system allowing to carry out regular risk
analysis for border management.
The BGS (and FMS) has specialised
units and personnel for gathering comprehensive border-related information,
statistics and risk analysis at central and regional levels. Some doubts were
however raised with regard to the distribution of the gathered information
within the BGS (from headquarters to BCPs and vice versa). Moreover, the
exchange of information between the analytical units of different law
enforcement authorities should be enhanced. For the moment each of those
agencies develops their own statistics according to its own needs and
indicators — this results for example in lack of harmonised statistics for
irregular migration. On top of that, the statistical office (Rosstat) does not
have competence to gather irregular migration statistics.
Various databases are
developed both by the BGS and FMS which cover major needs. The
interconnectivity of some databases however could also be improved as some of
them may be consulted only through the respective regional branches of the
agencies or by official administrative requests (e.g. entry/exit system managed
by the FMS).
Furthermore, the
quality and methodology of risk analysis was impossible to evaluate. The
EU experts could not see any sample of risk analysis which reportedly is
prepared regularly on a monthly, quarterly and yearly basis.
The cooperation
with the neighbouring EU Member States for the collection and analysis of data
is in place. The information exchange under the working arrangement between the
BGS and Frontex has been described above.
Russia aims at gathering
data on passengers arriving to, departing from and transiting through its
territory by any means of transport (air, sea or land). The legislation is
being implemented gradually as of 1 December 2013 and obliges transport
operators to provide Advanced Passenger Information. The purpose of the measure
seems to be security rather than irregular migration. The Russian side has
confirmed that the scope of the legislation is limited to Advanced Passenger Information.
The relevant legislation has been amended. The intended collection of data for
overflights remains a significant concern for the EU. The situation will be
closely monitored.
·          
Pursue
set of measures for prevention and suppression of the document fraud and their
use for the border crossing, inter alia by training of law-enforcement, border
and customs agencies staff.
All the BCPs
visited were equipped with the basic material for detecting forged
documents. The personnel is trained to use the equipment through training
courses, seminars and workshops.
All first-line
border guards are trained on document security in one of the BGS training
centres. In addition, they have qualification-raising courses once every five
years. Heads of BCPs are responsible for additional training on the spot. The
BCP staff have to pass a test once a year. Refresher courses are usually
provided on an ad hoc basis.
Suspect documents are
investigated more thoroughly at second-line controls (if present at
particular BCPs — see also above for remarks on second-line document checks).
The officers for second lines do not have particular training but they are
recruited from the more experienced staff.
No database on
forged documents exists nor is any particular material with examples of forged
documents accessible at BCPs. The most common materials available at BCPs are
the specimens of international travel documents with description of their most
important security features. The novelties with regard to forgeries are
disseminated in an ad hoc way (e.g. at the beginning of the shift).
·          
Conduct training programmes and
implement anti-corruption measures, including ethical norms, specifically
targeting officials of state border-related structures, and addressing possible
deficiencies.
The EU experts visited the BGS academy
and one of the institutes for the training of officers. The officers’ training
system was positively assessed and is reportedly in line with the Bologna
process. Academic approach and scientific research are integral parts of
training. Measures against corruption and ethics belong to the basic education
of every officer.
The institute organises also
updating courses for BGS officers. These courses are mandatory for each officer
once every five years and they are of one or two months’ duration. However, the
training programmes of border guards and warrant officers were not presented to
the mission team.
Anti-corruption measures and
ethical norms
are reportedly included in the basic training of the BGS officers. The EU experts
were told that neither the FMS nor BGS provides additional courses on combating
corruption. The EU experts were not allowed to see the anti-corruption code of
the BGS. It was explained that different types of internal and external
controls including questionnaires addressed to travellers, hotlines and cameras
are available at the BCPs to detect and prevent attempts at corruption.
 Issues of concern and actions recommended to be followed up under Block 2: 
On the basis of the above
findings the Commission identified the following issues of concern requiring
further discussion with the Russian authorities:
·        
The
conditions of stay under a temporary residence permit and/or work permit in
particular with regard to length of business trips, registration procedure,
quota system, renewals procedure and linked health tests appear to be
unnecessarily complicated; 
·        
A
comprehensive integration strategy including for persons under international
protection is not fully in place, which limits the ability to effectively manage
the legal migration flows;
·        
The
decisions on granting international protection status do not seem to be based
on a coherent country of origin information system which could provide a solid
basis for authorities with regard to the real situation in the countries of
origin of applicants. This might impact on the consistency of those decisions;
·        
The
absence of border checks between Russia and Belarus allows free circulation
between the two countries (including possible secondary movements of
irregularly staying persons). In order to prevent possible abuses in an
efficient manner, tangible and structural cooperation between the FMS/BGS and
the relevant authorities in Belarus needs to be established; 
·        
Effective
migration management requires good cooperation between the authorities
controlling the border (i.e. BGS) and authorities tackling the situation inland
(FMS) e.g. through possible interconnection of databases, presence of FMS
officers at some BCPs and dissemination of information on asylum procedures. This
guarantees not only a good overview of the situation (e.g. statistics on
apprehensions of irregular migrants both inland and at the border) but also
proper access to international protection mechanisms at the border;
·        
In
some cases, the apprehended persons irregularly staying in Russia are not
issued with a removal order but are only administratively fined. This might
create legal limbos where the person is not entitled to stay in Russia but not
obliged to leave either; 
·        
Many
BCPs at the border with the EU do not have sufficient capacity to cope
effectively with the flow of persons, thus contributing to a long waiting time.
Furthermore, the infrastructure of some of the BCPs at the border with CIS
countries is outdated. This could be addressed both by the development of the
relevant BCPs and by improvement of procedures for checks at BCPs by various
authorities. In this context, one should also note that the authorities
virtually use no profiling or risk analysis during checks on persons at the
BCPs — doing this could further improve the efficiency of those checks.
The following actions
are recommended with a view to further improving the implementation of the
relevant Common Steps:
·        
Render
fully operational the accelerated procedure under the EU-Russia readmission
agreement by informing and training the border guards about their tasks in this
context;
·        
Adopt
the new draft law on asylum including covering the procedure at the border;
bringing the rights of persons under subsidiary protection closer to those of
refugees; access to rights regardless of registration; issuance of proper
documentation to asylum seekers also under the admissibility procedure;
·        
Given
the important number of asylum seekers in the EU originating from Russia,
organise information campaigns in mostly concerned regions about the rights and
obligations of persons under international protection or those applying for it
in the EU;
·        
Improve
the exchange of relevant, harmonised, indicator-based and regular statistical
information and the joint analytical work with Frontex under the working
arrangement concluded by BGS;
·        
Establish
second-line document checks at least at the busiest BCPs and provide the BCPs
with appropriate materials on possible forgery techniques so that they are
better equipped to detect falsified documents.
Given the lack of
sufficient information, the Commission was unable to fully evaluate the
progress with regard to the following issues relevant for Block 2:
·        
Green
and blue border surveillance strategy (equipment, techniques etc.);
·        
Training
content and ethical code of border guards;
·        
Efficiency
of judicial appeal system for asylum (statistics, trainings, etc.);
·        
The
possible risk analysis reports on irregular migration and border management;
·        
The
content of inter-institutional agreements between the BGS and other law
enforcement agencies on cooperation on border management.
Block
3: Public order, security and judicial cooperation
General assessment
With its fully-fledged
administrative structure and capacity of law enforcement agencies,
Russia has been active in the past years in tackling transnational crime,
terrorism and corruption. The multitude of agencies however has the
disadvantage of a potential overlapping of competences. The interconnection of
the relevant databases could also help in the contacts between the respective
agencies. Furthermore, although Russia is open to international cooperation and
has established various channels to that end in those areas, in practice the
process is very centralised and mainstreamed through the headquarters of the
relevant agencies. This results in long delays in the handling of third
countries’ requests. This cooperation could be further enhanced by the conclusion
of the operational agreement with Europol. The police reform
implemented over several years should be further improved as some of its
initial goals were apparently not reached.
Russia has developed a
comprehensive anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
system. The shortcomings identified by the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF) are being addressed by upcoming legislative amendments. The
Russian authorities are also pursuing a global anti-drug strategy,
aiming to suppress both supply and demand. On trafficking in human beings
(THB), Russia itself acknowledges that its data do not capture the extent of
the problem. Although the actions are undertaken in order to fight against the
criminal aspects of THB, a clear framework for comprehensive treatment
(including shelters) for victims is lacking. Russia also has a comprehensive counter-terrorism
strategy, in line with international practice, with a clear focus on the threat
originating from the Northern Caucasus region. Little effort, however, has been
made in the above areas in order to prepare risk analysis linked to the
establishment of the Customs Union (with Kazakhstan and Belarus) and a possible
visa free regime with the EU.
Russia has recently
undertaken many strategic and legislative efforts against corruption. It
has now ratified all major international conventions including those of the UN,
OECD and Council of Europe (CoE) and is consequently subject to their
monitoring mechanisms. Russia seems open to implementing the recommendations
formulated during those monitoring activities. There are undoubtedly still
several concerns here, including with regard to cooperation with civil society,
independence of the judiciary and public procurement.
For judicial
cooperation, Russia has ratified the two Hague Conventions relating to
Child Abduction and Child Protection. The implementation of the former (with
some minor possible improvements) is ready although the issue of the acceptance
of Russia’s accession by all EU Member States on behalf of the EU is still
pending. The latter Convention entered into force very recently and although
the Central Authority has been appointed, the implementing legislation is still
being prepared. On criminal matters, Russia is a party to the main CoE
Conventions providing the basis for efficient cooperation. Judicial cooperation
in criminal matters is however (similarly to the law enforcement area)
extremely centralised, which delays the responses to various requests.
Furthermore, some EU Member States encounter problems with their requests where
replies are not given within six months or not at all.
On data protection, Russia has ratified
the 1981 CoE Convention and it is implemented by means of several federal laws
and other implementing acts. The ratification of the additional Protocol
however is still pending and the Commission does not consider the designated
supervisory body (Roskomnadzor) to be independent.
Detailed comments
3.1 Fight against transnational
organised crime, terrorism and corruption
·          
Follow relevant international
standards in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, in
particular effectively fulfill relevant Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF) recommendations.
Russia has developed a
comprehensive AML/CFT system since the adoption of its first legislation in
2001. The main legal basis in this area is the
Federal Law No 115-FZ. Some provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code on
Administrative Violations are also applicable in this context. This legal
framework has been amended several times, mostly due to the necessity of
aligning it with the international standards.
The core agency in this respect
is the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) which
plays the role of Russian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). It was placed
under the direct authority of the President in May 2012.
Rosfinmonitoring is a professional, well-equipped and sufficiently
staffed agency (at its headquarters and regional offices).
Rosfinmonitoring leads the
national coordination mechanism against money laundering and takes part in the
national anti-terrorism mechanism. Furthermore, the agency was ordered in June
2013 to outline a National Strategy on AML and on 5 July 2013 presented
an action plan to enhance transparency and prevent misuse of companies and
other legal entities. In 2014, Rosfinmonitoring will produce the first ever
National Threat Assessment in the AML/CFT area as well. Rosfinmonitoring also
runs an International Training and Methodology Centre, which carries out
relevant trainings for 3 000 participants a year. Online courses are also
available for self-training. Criminal investigation
of AML cases reported by Rosfinmonitoring is carried out by
several law enforcement agencies, while CFT cases are investigated by
the FSB following the report by Rosfinmonitoring.
Rosfinmonitoring carries out
active international cooperation, in particular by providing the
secretariat of the Eurasian Group (EAG) and taking over the chairmanship of
FATF in July 2013. In 2011, there were 1 200 exchanges of information with
foreign FIUs.
The Russian system against money
laundering and terrorism financing has been thoroughly evaluated by
international actors (FATF and CoE/Moneyval) in recent years. In order
to respond to the recommendations formulated by FATF in its most recent report,
which was published in 2012, a bill containing a number of amendments to the
national legislation is pending in the State Duma. Once the bill has entered
into force, the main remaining issue should be the criminal liability of
legal entities, which is still absent under Russian law.
The mission found substantial
progress in line with other international actors’ evaluations. According to the
EU experts, the Russian institutional and legal framework is mostly in line
with the international standards. The statistics on activity provided
during the EU mission are included in the ‘Second Third Round Written Progress
Report’ submitted to Moneyval.
With regard to terrorist
financing, the Russian authorities have reported an increasing
interconnection between terrorism and organised crime, as well as the fact that
the proceeds of extortion, thefts and robberies are used to finance terrorist
activities. The authorities are well aware of the risks in this field.
Inter-agency cooperation between
Rosfinmonitoring and FSB seems to be well-established and functioning.
·          
Further enhance exchange of
information and cooperation between relevant agencies of both Parties to
effectively combat trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic
substances and their precursors, and effectively implement the working
arrangement between the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA) and relevant agencies of the Russian Federation.
The Strategy of the
State Anti-Drug Policy elaborated by the Federal Drug Control Service
(FDCS) of Russia was adopted in 2010 and is valid until 2020. Its focal points
are: reduction of demand, reduction of offer and international cooperation.
The main agency responsible for
combating drug-related crime, including the implementation of the strategy, is
the FDCS. In 2007, a central Anti-Narcotic Committee was established,
with regional committees across Russia to coordinate the work and actions in
this area. The committee is headed by the FDCS and reportedly involves other
law enforcement agencies.
As regards reduction of demand,
the emphasis is on young people who have not yet abused drugs. Treatment and
rehabilitation are offered, and cooperation exists with schools, parents and
NGOs. Investments are being made for the establishment of treatment centres
though they do not currently match the needs (e.g. lack of places for HIV
treatment). Treatment programmes seem to focus only on one disease per
programme, which does not allow for the holistic and comprehensive treatment of
persons.
Work on the supply side is carried out by
many law enforcement agencies. The central position is held by the FDCS.
Criminal investigations however may be carried out by Police, FDCS, FSB and
Investigative Committee (depending on the circumstances and facts of the case).
The number of law enforcement agencies (including the FCS for border checks) as
well as their competences calls for clarification and clearer division. This
situation also has an impact on the efficiency of international cooperation.
Furthermore, the designer drug problem and, in particular, the slowness in
putting new drug combinations on the list of banned substances is seen as a
shared concern.
Statistics about the narcotics
situation are being produced with data collected from the districts, while the
national committee is responsible for the overall implementation and reports to
the President. However, no analysis exists concerning the potential risks for
drug smuggling following the establishment of the Customs Union with Kazakhstan
and Belarus as well as the possible visa free regime with the EU.
Key partners in international
cooperation include the Central Asian countries. Other important partners
are Pakistan, Afghanistan, the USA and EU Member States (including on the basis
of international agreements). Russia is also active in international and
regional forums such as the Pompidou Group or the Council of Baltic Sea States
(CBSS). The main cooperation flow is centralised and requires contacts between
the headquarters for any cooperation request. This results in long delays in
getting responses. Although some mechanisms of direct cooperation in the field
were pointed out by the Russian authorities, the current practice should be
reinforced.
Cooperation between
the FDCS and the EMCDDA
is in place on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 26
October 2007. In this context, the EMCDDA and the FDCS have established a
stable and permanent communication channel allowing them to exchange
information on different topics of mutual interest. The FDCS and the EMCDDA
have also exchanged invitations for technical meetings and invitations to
expert meetings. The EMCDDA receives regular requests for information on
national and EU drug-related legislation.
The EU-Russia
agreement on the control of drug precursors was signed during the June 2013
Summit. The agreement should enter into force once ratification procedures are
completed on both sides.
·          
Exchange information on
respective strategies and laws to fight trafficking in human beings including to
protect its victims, in accordance with the Parties’ obligations under the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol on
Trafficking in Human Beings and addressing possible deficiencies.
Penalties
for THB in Russia were stipulated for the first time by the Federal Law No
162-FZ of 2003 amending the Russian Criminal Code. Russia also ratified
both the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol
on THB in 2004.
Russia is
a country of origin, transit and destination of THB. The main aims are sexual
and labour exploitation. Although the official (rather basic) statistics
indicate that human trafficking offences constitute only 0.1 % of all
offences, even the authorities themselves say that the real number is much
higher (ca. 8 %). The main regions of origin of the
victims are Central Asia and the South Caucasus States. No specific statistics on THB
victims were available.
The authority
with the main responsibility for investigation of THB is the MoI, which has a
dedicated department for these issues. The FSB handles criminal offences
involving a national threat and large-scale organised activities through
irregular immigration. The Investigative Committee, on the other hand, conducts
criminal investigations in cases involving minors or officials. Although the
FMS is not competent to investigate those cases, it is responsible for the
situation of any irregular migrant and will at least interact with the THB
victims. Similarly to other areas, the overlapping competences may still cause
problems in this field. The Government does not have a body to monitor its
anti-trafficking activities and make periodic assessments measuring its
performance. The MoI issued a roadmap for its
reform, which included the formation of an Interagency Anti-Trafficking
Commission with representation of the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO), the
MFA, the FMS, the FSB, the Investigative Committee, and other agencies.
Russia does not have a
dedicated action plan against THB addressing the phenomenon coherently.
THB is still tackled mainly from the crime angle, i.e. fighting against
networks organising it. From that perspective no particular comments are
required except for the issue of overlapping competences mentioned above.
Having said this, no specific legislation on the protection of victims of THB
exists and the only applicable rules seem to be the ones on the protection
programme for victims and witnesses of any offences. This approach should be
improved given the particular situation of THB victims which might not be
covered by general schemes. Shelters for victims are usually managed by
NGOs or international organisations, e.g. the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), the Red Cross or churches. Some funding/support is provided by
the state (the FMS) or municipalities on an ad hoc basis. The IOM plays an
important role in assisting victims, and cooperation with such actors as the
MoI and FMS is established. The IOM is also providing a shelter in St
Petersburg and carries out regional programmes in the Republic of Karelia and
other regions. The shelter visited in the Moscow region arranged by the Church
hosted several Vietnamese THB victims awaiting return. They had access to the
basic needs including health care. Having said this, clearly the centre was
arranged on a very provisory basis. More structural solutions should be aimed
for.
On the basis of
available information, there have been no nationwide campaigns to raise
awareness of THB in Russia. In 2012 the MoI published and distributed an
informational brochure warning of the dangers of becoming a victim of
trafficking. In some parts of the country, the MoI teamed up with community
councils to distribute the pamphlets in public places, such as educational
centres. The MoI conducted regular training in 2012 designed to guide its
officers in handling trafficking cases.
International cooperation was evaluated as
effective in practice by the Russian authorities, with joint operations with
Ukraine, Spain, Finland and Uzbekistan.
·          
Ensure exchange of information
and cooperation between relevant agencies of both Parties to effectively combat
terrorism and trafficking in firearms and other serious transnational crimes,
in accordance with applicable international law and legislation of the Parties.
Russia has a rather
comprehensive counter-terrorism (CT) system, based upon the Federal Law
No 35-FZ of 2006 and its subsequent amendments. Russia is also a party to all
major UN and CoE conventions related to CT, ratification of which has required
also additional legislative changes.
The leading agency
in this respect is the FSB, while policy measures are dealt with by the
National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NATC) and its regional branches. The NATC is
an interministerial body, which is chaired and supported by the FSB.
The Russian CT policy is
comprehensive and in line with relevant international practice (e.g. the UN
Global CT Strategy), also covering issues of countering radicalisation and
dealing with the victims of terrorism. Legislation and practical arrangements
seem to be under constant development, e.g. a three-level national alert
system, a new CT inter-agency intelligence database. A national mechanism to
freeze terrorist assets by court order is in place.
The Russian
authorities clearly consider the threat posed by terrorism originating from the
Northern Caucasus region to be a priority.
The Russian authorities claim
that terrorist threats other than those posed by religious extremism, albeit
present in their country, are kept under control and so far they have not
reached the level that could result in actual acts of terrorism.
As regards inter-agency
cooperation in the prosecution of terrorism, the FSB is both a security
service and a law enforcement agency which has a mandate to carry out
CT-related criminal investigations as well. The Investigative Committee pointed
out however that most of the criminal investigations in terrorism-related cases
are carried out by them, following preparatory work by the FSB. The MoI has
also a department for the fight against extremism. Finally, specialized and
trained CT units exist both at central and territorial level of the GPO. The
competences as regards the fight against terrorism and extremism seem to be
legally regulated. Nevertheless, the EU experts had the impression that the
practical work of the MoI on extremism is overlapping with the CT work done by
the FSB within its exclusive competence.
CT aspects are dealt with both in
the general and specific training for law enforcement personnel. The visit
to the Academy of Management of the MoI in Domodedovo demonstrated that Russia
has satisfactory capacities in this respect.
The Russian
authorities are very well aware of the significance of international
cooperation as regards the prevention of and fight against terrorism.
Russia is an active partner playing a key role within many international
forums, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and cooperates with the EU
Counter-terrorism Coordinator.
With regard to trafficking of
firearms, the EU experts had the impression that the phenomenon was not
being sufficiently tackled by the majority of the visited agencies. The rules
for legal possession of guns are reportedly very strict in Russia. The EU
experts however assessed the need for increased knowledge about current trends
in trafficking of firearms (including so-called piece-by-piece smuggling) by
the competent Russian agencies (including the FCS). Similarly to the anti-drugs
area, no risk assessment is prepared analysing the impact on firearms trafficking
of a possible visa free regime between the EU and Russia as well as the Customs
Union.
·          
Exchange information on
respective strategies and laws to fight and to prevent corruption, including
within the public sector, and address possible deficiencies.
In terms of policy and
legislation, Russia has recently undertaken many efforts. The main piece of
legislation is the Federal Law ‘On Countering Corruption’. It is further
complemented by many provisions in other acts including Criminal Code and
Administrative Offences Code. Further provisions are also laid down in numerous
decrees. The main basis for the anti-corruption policy in Russia is the 2010
National Anti-Corruption Strategy, complemented by National Anti-Corruption
Plans (currently for 2012-2013). This framework (covering inter alia relevant
administrative framework, definition of corruption, access to information,
conflict of interest, rules for declaration of assets, etc.) provides a
comprehensive structure for the fight against corruption in Russia. Further
improvements are however needed and various legislative initiatives are also
ongoing (e.g. the most recent introduction of whistleblowers’ protection into
Russian law).
Russia has further ratified all
major international conventions in the area, including the ones of UN,
OECD and CoE. Following those ratifications, Russia is also subject to the monitoring
mechanisms that are provided for in those instruments. In this context,
Phase 1 evaluation by OECD as well as three evaluation rounds by GRECO were
undertaken by March 2012. One UNCAC evaluation also
took place at the beginning of 2013. All those processes resulted in
recommendations, which should now be fully implemented. Russia also endeavours
to follow relevant recommendations of FATF, of which it assumed the
chairmanship in summer 2013.
The two main authorities
responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption policies in Russia are
the Presidential Administration (policy side) and the GPO
(operational and incriminations side).
A supreme body at the political
(but also partially at executive) level is the Presidential Anti-Corruption
Council (PACC) chaired by the President and bringing together the heads of
relevant agencies and ministries. It coordinates activities, formulates proposals
to the President and monitors the implementation of anti-corruption
legislation, according to the National Anti-Corruption Plan. A Presidium
acting under the PACC and chaired by the Head of the Presidential
Administration is in charge of more operational tasks in cooperation with the
specialised department within the Presidential Administration. In particular,
the Presidium checks the declarations of assets submitted by the senior
officials of all agencies and deals with cases of conflict of interest concerning
the said senior officials as well.
The GPO coordinates all
the executive agencies in the implementation of the anti-corruption laws and
strategy. The GPO has a specialised unit at the central and regional levels
recruited with specially trained prosecutors aiming at managing the
anti-corruption cases.
The investigations by the GPO
rely on operational support from the FSB and the MoI. Certain
investigative competences in corruption cases belong also to the Investigative
Committee. The EU experts were informed that specialised units for
anti-corruption cases exist also in those agencies at least at the central
level while at the regional level particular officials are specialised in such
cases. Similarly to the law enforcement remarks, the division of competences
among those authorities is unclear. Cooperation between agencies seems to exist
but the rules and standards underpinning it do not seem to be very well
defined.
On top of the above framework,
the law requires that all federal agencies establish special committees
for internal investigations on the conduct of the agency’s officials and on
conflicts of interest. Also, all those agencies have to establish a separate
unit (within their human resources department) for conducting in
particular checks on the declarations of assets of the agency’s officials.
In similar vein, a model Code
of Ethics for state officials was prepared and approved by the Presidium of
the PACC. The model contains references to the most relevant legal provisions
as well as to the ethical norms of conduct to be followed by each official. On
that basis each agency in Russia should develop its own internal code of
conduct. Unfortunately, none of this code was shared with the EU experts.
With regard to training of
the most relevant agencies fighting against corruption, the GPO has developed a
specialised programme both for its own officials and for other agencies.
Furthermore, the prosecutors of the specialised anti-corruption units undergo
further training focused on their work. Other agencies provided only very
general information on anti-corruption training of their officers. It seems
that this training is just a part of their regular training programmes. No more
specific information on the content of that training was provided.
According to the information
provided by the GPO during the EU mission, the number of registered
corruption crimes reached 49 513 in 2012, which is 22.5 % more
than the number of crimes registered in 2011 (40 407). Charges were
brought against more than 13 500 people. According to public official
information, around 9.5 thousand corrupt officials of different levels have
already been convicted in Russia. The greatest number of corruption crimes
involve fraud, embezzlement and the illegal use of property and funds.
According to the same information, corruption is widespread in the field of
budgetary appropriations for state contracts, transactions involving federal
and municipal property and business activity control.
In recent years, the rules on declarations
of assets were revised and improved several times. The scope of persons
concerned was extended — a larger group of senior officials as well as family
members are now subject to the declarations (including managers of state owned
companies). No property or other financial assets may be held abroad by those
persons. The declarations need to cover both income and expenditures. Failure
to provide the declaration and its wrong completion bear the consequence of
dismissal from office.
The procedures for checks on
asset declarations submitted are laid down in legislation and very
detailed. As for the practical methodology, very little information was
provided. The agencies met by the EU experts informed only that all
declarations are checked and may be further cross examined with the help of
banks and tax authorities. The EU experts were denied a meeting with the
officials carrying out checks in the agencies’ specialised units.
Little information was provided
to the EU experts on risk assessment prepared in the context of asset
disclosures and evaluation. Only the GPO prepares such a risk assessment, which
focuses on legal provisions and posts in the public administration that are
particularly vulnerable to corruption. No more detailed or focused analysis is
prepared and other agencies do not seem to prepare such documents at all. This
should be improved.
In parallel, the rules on confiscation
of assets were developed. Most recently the applicability of those rules
was extended in order to cover also the abuse of official competences.
While providing statistics on
asset disclosures, Russian authorities informed that in 2012, 211 000
declarations from the 1.3 million submitted were checked by the relevant
bodies. Overall around the country, the checks revealed 16 000 cases of
violations in submitting information, and the sanctions applied against civil
servants, due to the frauds discovered after checks on the asset declarations,
resulted in the dismissal of 322 civil servants in 2012.
The most recent change in the
legislation concerns the protection of whistleblowers. Under the
provisions, such a person cannot be the subject of any disciplinary sanctions
unless it is decided by a special commission established in the agency in
question. Furthermore, the person in question is provided with legal advice
free of charge. The provisions were signed by the President in April 2013 and
their practical use should be closely monitored.
Some efforts are being made to cooperate
with civil society. In 2012, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) finalised the
draft of the Master Plan for cooperation between public authorities, local
governments and social institutions in combating corruption, which should be
implemented by 2014. Currently however, this cooperation still needs to be
improved. Above all, the current overall environment of the NGOs functioning in
Russia (in particular the so-called ‘foreign agents law’) does not contribute
to stable and independent functioning of any NGOs. Furthermore, in the
anti-corruption area, more structured cooperation against corruption is limited
to the business organisations. For other NGOs and civil society, despite the
openness for all possible contacts with citizens declared by all agencies,
structured cooperation is very limited and done on an ad hoc basis.
Horizontal and detailed rules
regulating access to information on the activities of the public
authorities are laid down. Each agency is obliged to set up its own website and
publish regularly specific information on anti-corruption activities. The Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection as well as prosecutors are charged with the
monitoring and control of the proper implementation of that law. Non-compliance
may trigger administrative and disciplinary sanctions.
The reform of the judiciary
is crucial in the field of anti-corruption policy. There are nevertheless
concerns as to the independence of the judiciary in Russia that are affecting
the overall credibility of anti-corruption efforts (including a strong position
of each court’s president especially with regard to the assignment of cases).
Some steps are being taken to publish judgments. Although, reportedly,
virtually all courts have established their official websites, all commercial
courts’ judgments are available online while the general jurisdiction judgments
are still only partially available there.
The rules governing public
procurement are still being revised. It seems that many efforts have been
made in order to render the bidding process as transparent as possible.
However, some lack of transparency both for the pre-bidding phase and the
implementation of the contract itself might be of concern.
·          
Cooperate under the 1994
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on the prevention of
corruption.
In the framework of
the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and EU-Russia Partnership
for Modernisation, several EU-funded rule of law projects aim to support
anti-corruption activities. Furthermore TAIEX seminars, study visits and expert
seminars concerning police cooperation have been organised for various law
enforcement agencies.
The Commission, in
cooperation with the EEAS, attempts to engage in a structured dialogue on
combating corruption with the Russian authorities. However, only one meeting
has been organised so far (in December 2011) in Moscow. It is expected that the
next one will take place in Brussels by the end of 2013 with the participation
of civil society.
·          
Follow relevant recommendations
of Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO).
Russia ratified the
CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2006. Russia signed the Additional
Protocol to that Convention in 2007 but no ratification has taken place yet.
Russia joined GRECO in 2007 and is subject to its standard evaluation mechanism
since that time. The first and second evaluation rounds’ reports were published
in 2008. The most recent, third Evaluation Round’s Report of GRECO, was published
in March 2012. Russia appears to attach a lot of importance to meeting its
international commitments in this regard, while indicating however that on some
issues it does not share the point of view of evaluators.
The GRECO evaluation
team formulated recommendations concerning incrimination of corruption
including on certain features of bribery in the public sector, in particular regarding
the offer, promise and acceptance of an advantage; other, non-material
advantages should be included in a larger concept of ‘bribe’; the range of
persons subject to incrimination should also be extended. On the Russian side,
the EU experts were informed about the preparation of draft amendments to the
Criminal Code that are aimed at broadening the scope of its bribery provisions
to ensure that they cover clearly any form of (undue) advantage, including any
non-material advantages. The Investigative Committee has provided information
about a draft amendment to the Criminal Code introducing criminal
responsibility for legal entities. The EU experts were informed that in order
to increase the transparency of party funding, the MoJ had put forward
some draft amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Political Parties’ No information
about timing of the adoption of those changes was provided.
The GPO stated that,
following some previous GRECO recommendations, the criteria for recruitment of
its own personnel had been improved. They cover now the conditions of higher
education of the candidates and a selection procedure for them, including fair
competition, transparency and avoidance of conflicts of interest.
As is the standard
practice, after the third evaluation round’s report, the compliance report
is due in October 2013. The EU experts were informed that it would be delivered
by Russia on time.
3.2
Law-enforcement cooperation
·          
Undertake necessary steps for
the conclusion and effective implementation of a strategic and operational
cooperation agreement between Europol and the Russian Federation.
Following four rounds of
negotiations (as well as the experts’ meetings), the draft agreement was
finalised by the parties. The text was submitted to the Management Board of
Europol in May 2013, which transmitted it to the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB)
for its opinion. After the JSB has expressed its opinion, the Management Board
will decide whether the agreement can be forwarded to Council with a view to
authorising the Director to sign the agreement.
·          
Exchange information on
relevant reforms of the law enforcement agencies to ensure their high level of
capacity in, and enhance cooperation of the Parties aimed at, prevention,
detection, suppression and solution of crimes, including in fight against
transnational organized crime, and address possible deficiencies.
The most important law
enforcement agencies in Russia include the MoI (police), the FSB,
the FDCS, the Investigative Committee and the FCS. The
duties of these actors in combating crimes are defined in the criminal
procedure law, and while effective in principle, they overlap to some extent,
which can sometimes cause operational problems.
As regards cooperation
and division of tasks during investigations, criminal investigations are
preceded by so-called operative investigations that are carried out by agents
of the same investigative body. Operative investigations are subject to
specific legislation and their purpose is to collect documents and evidence in
order to initiate the actual criminal investigation. On the basis of the
collected evidence, the criminal investigator, together with the Prosecutor,
estimates if there are sufficient grounds for initiating a criminal
investigation or whether the case should be referred back to operative
investigation.
The investigating
agency is determined pursuant to Article 151 of the Criminal Code. In
principle it is for the GPO to settle any conflicts of competences between the
agencies at that stage by taking a case from one agency and assigning it to
another. It is also for the Prosecutor to coordinate investigations where more
than one agency is involved. There are however exceptions to that rule: the
Investigative Committee is authorised to bring to a conclusion a criminal case
which was initiated by the Committee.
The FDCS is not
competent to proceed to operative or criminal investigations; it focuses on the
administrative ones. If the results of an administrative investigation point to
a criminal offence, the case is referred to a different authority through the
Prosecutor.
Some of the Russian
authorities hinted that the problems caused by overlapping competencies among
the law enforcement agencies might be improved by a planned new law which would
increase considerably the responsibility of the Investigative Committee with
regard to criminal investigations. No further details were provided on that
draft law however.
On 7 February 2011,
the reform of the police force was launched through the adoption and
amendment of several laws, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.
As a result of that reform, the Russian police was made a federal agency funded
exclusively through the federal budget. The number of police officers was
reduced by 20 % by 2012. Having said this, most of these cuts came in the
ranks of policemen on the ground, while the administrative staff, especially in
the regions, has been left virtually untouched. These measures have been judged
as ineffective by many experts. In response, more reforms will reportedly be
carried out in the future.
The police manage the
most extensive data systems, through which other authorities can request
information. The database does not seem to be interconnected with other
databases administered by other law enforcement agencies.
·          
Strengthen bilateral and
multilateral operational cooperation between law enforcement agencies and
judicial authorities of EU Member States and Russia in order to fight
transnational organized crime.
·          
Conduct joint operations and
use other operational means and methods of cross-border law enforcement
cooperation between Russia, EU and its relevant agencies and interested Member
States for relevant cases.
International
cooperation and exchanges of information for Russian law enforcement agencies
take place mainly through Interpol, through regional international agreements
or bilaterally. On that basis, liaison officers are posted abroad. The
agreement with Europol, once concluded, will further improve cooperation and
exchange of information with the EU, especially regarding monitoring and
combating of transnational organised crime.
The law enforcement
agencies in Russia have experience of cooperation and carried out various joint
operations including with EU Member States. The results of this cooperation
have been judged satisfactory by the parties concerned.
The FCS also
plays an important role in combating transnational crime at border crossing
points and it engages in quite extensive international cooperation. A key role
in this respect is played by cooperation within the World Customs Organisation
(WCO). The FCS has also signed bilateral agreements on customs cooperation,
including combating of crime, with 48 countries. Russia also works
together with the EU within the framework of the Regional Intelligence Liaison
Offices (RILO).
The Investigative Committee’s
representatives reported that they are engaged in positive and effective
cooperation with their neighbouring countries and Interpol. Among the EU
countries, the Investigative Committee has bilateral cooperation agreements
with Finland, France and Germany. Other agreements have been concluded with the
United States, Israel, Norway and Kazakhstan.
The MoI is the central point for
Russia with regard to Interpol cooperation. It has also reportedly signed Memoranda
of Understanding with almost all of the neighbouring countries and CIS
countries. The BGS (under the FSB) cooperates also with third countries’
agencies for border management purposes (see more under Block 2).
The Russian law enforcement
authorities (MoI, FDCS, FCS, FSB) also engage in cross-border partnerships
within the framework of the CBSS.
During the meetings with the EU
experts, Russian agencies underlined that cooperation in its current form is
considered effective and adequate. Having said this, it is clear that
international cooperation with Russian agencies is very often channelled
through the headquarters. Few contacts at regional level are possible. This
results in unnecessary delays in exchanging information.
3.3 Judicial
cooperation
·          
Undertake necessary steps for
the conclusion and effective implementation of a cooperation agreement between
Eurojust and the Russian Federation.
Negotiations were launched
between Eurojust and Russia in October 2006. The latest round took place in
March 2011. There were further contacts in December 2012 and also after
Eurojust had been informed about Russia’s ratification of the 1981 CoE Data
Protection Convention. Following Eurojust’s suggestion, the Eurojust Data
Protection Officer visited Russia in September 2013 and received extensive
information from the Russian Data Protection Authority, though some issues
remained to be clarified and discussed. The visit was one of the conditions for
the continuation of the negotiations. The next round of negotiations is still
pending the fulfilment of some formal steps as agreed between the parties.
·          
Accede to and implement the
1980 Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the 1996
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibilities and Measures for the
Protection of Children.
Russia has ratified
the 1980 Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
which entered into force on 1 October 2011 for Russia. However, the accession
only has effect in relation to an ‘old’ Contracting State once that State has
accepted the accession of Russia. For the EU, acceptance of Russia’s accession
is also a matter of internal division of competence between the EU and the EU
Member States, upon which clarification by the Court of Justice of the European
Union is still pending.
The Ministry of Education and
Science has been designated as the Central Authority for that
Convention. The relevant unit of the Ministry is currently being reorganised.
It seems that one person has been assigned full-time to handle the incoming
applications. The Central Authority has received 16 cases so far and there
have been no return applications that would clearly fall under the scope of the
Convention. Nonetheless, Russia is reportedly ready to apply the Convention on
an administrative basis. It might be helpful for the Central Authority to have
its relevant competence regulated by a federal law, given the duty to
coordinate other authorities, which is usually a challenge in Russia.
Regarding the implementation
of the Convention, the Central Authority will be responsible for examining
applications, assignment of the competent court and advising the applicant to
start proceedings. Two other agencies playing an important role (apart from the
Central Authority itself) are the MoI and the Federal Bailiffs Service. Both
authorities will be responsible for the search for the child. The relevant
amendments to the federal law have been prepared and should be adopted soon.
There are no plans to regulate the application and return procedure in more
detail even if some clearer provisions about the return procedure or on the
definition of the competent courts might be advisable (the latter is done
merely by the 1996 Resolution of the Supreme Court).
Russia has also
ratified the 1996 Hague Convention on Protection of Children. It entered
into force on 1 June 2013. The Ministry of Education and Science was appointed
as the Central Authority. The practical work for implementing the
Convention is still ongoing. The relevant legislative amendments are being
prepared and should be adopted in 2014.
Given the possible
increase in cases after the visa free regime is introduced between the EU and
Russia, the EU experts also discussed two other Hague conventions that
might be of relevance for judicial cooperation (although not explicitly
included in the list of Common Steps) namely the Hague Convention on Service of
Documents (1965) and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence (1970). As
regards the former, the current substantial workload is already recognised. The
long delays in the procedure could only be shortened by withdrawing Russia’s
objection to Article 10(a), thus allowing for direct postal delivery of the request
to the addressee. As for the latter, the designation of the Russian Central
Authority was recommended (and is long awaited, given that Russia acceded to
the Convention in 2001) in order to avoid the need to use diplomatic channels
for all exchanges, which causes delays.
·          
Exchange relevant information on implementation and effectiveness of extradition
procedures, mutual legal assistance requests, execution of foreign courts
decisions, transfer of sentenced persons, including statistics, strengthen
cooperation and address possible deficiencies.
Besides bilateral and regional
(e.g. CIS) treaties as well as inter-departmental programmes of cooperation,
Russia is party to several CoE conventions in the field of judicial cooperation
in criminal matters: Convention on Extradition (1957); Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959) and Convention on the Transfer of
Sentenced Persons (1983).
Despite the fact that
at the time of its accession to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, Russia designated several authorities for communication
with other Contracting Parties, in practice all cases involving legal
assistance are forwarded to the GPO for examination and further follow-up. Only
in urgent cases may requests be addressed by the judicial authorities of the
requesting State directly to the judicial authorities of Russia. This causes
delays and backlogs in the treatment of cases.
In general, the GPO is the
Central Authority for the majority of judicial cooperation cases. For mutual legal
assistance at pre-trial phase and in extradition cases, all requests are sent
via and received by the GPO. The MoJ, however, is the Central Authority for
transfers of sentenced persons. The centralised system of handling requests and
their execution is quite slow.
According to the statistics
provided by the GPO, about 3 000 requests for judicial assistance are
received every year. About 1 000 of them come from the EU Member
States. On average, it usually takes from 2-3 up to 6 months to execute a request,
depending on its type and scope. The MoJ informed that it receives about
30 000 requests annually for legal assistance but relatively few
concerning criminal cases. The Ministry aims at executing requests within four
months. Having said this, some EU Member States experience regular difficulties
in their judicial cooperation in criminal matters with Russia, with their
requests being executed beyond six months or not at all.
Decentralised cooperation,
organised directly between local or regional levels could accelerate that
process and render it more efficient. Russia is also encouraged to sign and
ratify the Second Additional Protocol (2001) to the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
Another issue in the
field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters concerns the refusal by the
Russian side to provide for hearings of Russian citizens as suspects,
once they are in Russia after having committed a crime abroad. Instead, the
Russian authorities propose that the requesting state transfer the case to
Russia, which is often impossible for practical reasons. This approach delays
or obstructs some cases from being pursued.
The GPO’s Academy
provides training in all fields of prosecution. A handbook about
judicial assistance was published in 2012. The Academy of Judges
organises comprehensive training programmes for judges. International issues
form part of the programmes but are not specifically highlighted.
3.4 Personal Data
·          
Accede to and implement the
1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention No. 108) and its 2001
Additional Protocol regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data
flows.
Russia ratified the 1981 CoE
Convention on Personal Data on 15 May
2013. The Convention entered into force in Russia on 1
September 2013 and is implemented by means of several federal laws and other
implementing acts.
There are certain pending issues
that need to be addressed, notably the independence of the data protection
authority and the application of data protection rights to ‘state secret data’.
One of the main issues is the extent to which the federal data protection law
is applicable to state secret data (the relevant reservation was made during the
ratification of the Convention). It seems that most of the law enforcement and
state security area files and databases are covered by the exception without
being justified on the grounds of proportionality and necessity. Having said
this, the data processed during border controls reportedly falls under the
standard data protection rules.
Although no clear indication was
given concerning Russia’s intentions towards its accession to the Additional
Protocol to the Convention, Russian authorities insisted in their
explanations that the current legislation and the position of the Russian
Supervisory Body is in full conformity with that Protocol.
The Supervisory Body
(within the meaning of the Protocol), which is in charge of control and
supervision over the compliance of personal data processing with the
requirements of the Russian legislation, is Roskomnadzor — an agency which
falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Communications and Mass
Media. The status of the agency, its composition and appointing rules of its
head and deputies are spelled out in the 2009 Government Ordinance No 228.
The mere fact of the oversight by the Ministry and the status of the head and
the deputies of Roskomnadzor, who are appointed and dismissed by the Minister
is a proof of the lack of independence. In addition, Roskomnadzor’s status as
the Supervisory Body is not confirmed in the federal law, where there is only a
generic mention to such a body. The Russian side stated that this solution was
common in Russia for similar agencies and no change of Roskomnadzor’s
competences could be achieved without scrutiny of the Duma.
Information on the financial and
human resources as well as the administrative structure of Roskomnadzor was
provided and described as sufficient by the Russian side.
Roskomnadzor is mainly competent
to monitor the substance of personal data processing, including complaints,
registry of controllers, investigations, etc. Unlike other federal services, it
also has competence to develop policy and make legislative proposals relating
to data protection. Having said this, Roskomnadzor does not have the competence
to control the information security aspects of personal data processing. For
the public sector, this control is done by the FSB (mainly encryption systems)
and Federal Service for Technical Export Control (agency under the Ministry of
Defence with wider competences in that field, the extent of which however was
not clarified by the Russian side). There seems to be no control of information
security for private data controllers.
The relevant training
and dedicated seminars were organised for Roskomnadzor staff. The agency
organised also several awareness-raising campaigns.
 Issues of concern and actions recommended to be followed up under Block 3: 
On the basis of the
above findings the Commission identified the following issues of concern
requiring further discussion with the Russian authorities:
·        
It
seems that no comprehensive analysis of the impact of a possible visa free
regime with the EU as well as of the establishment of the Customs Union on the
fight against organised crime, THB, smuggling of illicit goods etc. has been
prepared or is planned. Such analysis might help the law enforcement agencies
to cope better with new challenges of enhanced movement of persons and goods
under both the Customs Union and a possible EU-Russia visa free regime.
·        
The
competences of various law enforcement agencies seem to overlap in relevant
areas. This may lead to deficiencies in investigations as well as contributes
to unclear schemes of cooperation among those agencies (including lack of
shared databases, etc.).

 Russia
     has been implementing police reforms which however render confusing
     results and according to many sources should be reviewed in the future.
     The role and efficiency of the police are crucial for many areas of the
     Visa Dialogue.

·        
The
current practical cooperation between the Russian and EU Member States’ law
enforcement and judicial authorities remains very much centralised and requires
contacts only through the respective headquarters. This contributes to delays
in respective reactions of the authorities. 
·        
The
anti-corruption policy is an issue of particular horizontal importance not only
for Block 3 but also for other blocks of the Visa Dialogue. One of the crucial
elements here is the independence of judiciary, which remains a concern in
Russia. In this context one should note that not all court judgments are
published. Furthermore, there seem to be very limited channels of cooperation
with and participation of civil society in design and implementation of the
anti-corruption policy. This, coupled with the overall unfavourable climate of
civil society functioning, may lead to anti-corruption policy which does not
address the core roots of the phenomenon. The transparency of the public
procurement process (including in the post-bid phase) is also unclear and might
lead to abuses.
·        
The
lack of an independent data protection authority is a concern and should be
addressed. The relevance of the new data protection law needs to be clarified
with regard to the law enforcement and state security area.    
The
following actions are recommended with a view to further improving the
implementation of the relevant Common Steps:

 Introduce
     the criminal liability of legal entities into the Russian AML/CFT and
     anti-corruption systems in order to reinforce the efficiency of actions
     with regard to legal entities and not only physical persons.
 Adopt
     the draft law addressing the concerns from the 2012 FATF review in order
     to bring internal legislation closer to the international standards.
 Both
     Russia and the EU are committed to the fight against THB. It is however
     impossible to do so effectively without comprehensive rules tackling all
     aspects of that phenomenon. It is therefore recommended to adopt a
     comprehensive legal and political framework to tackle comprehensively THB
     including with regard to the protection of victims of THB. 
 In
     order to bring the internal policy and law closer to international
     standards in the anti-corruption area, implement recommendations
     formulated in the evaluation process undertaken by GRECO, OECD and UNCAC
     (including a more inclusive definition of bribery, covering by legislation
     the offers and promises of bribes as well as cases of non-pecuniary
     benefits).

·        
After
having ratified both the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1996
Hague Child Protection Convention, it is crucial for their proper practical
functioning to adopt the necessary implementation legislation (including
clarification of the return of the child and competences of the respective
Central Authorities).
·        
Efficient
and swift legal assistance between the EU and Russian authorities is crucial in
order to face the enhanced flows of persons under a possible visa free regime
and all resulting consequences. It is therefore necessary to improve
cooperation with EU Member States by timely replying to legal assistance
requests, including with regard to providing for hearings of Russian citizens
as suspects for offences committed in the EU Member States and making
appropriate amendments to the relevant laws where necessary. In this context,
ratification of the Second Additional Protocol of the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959) could also be considered.

 Given
     the horizontal importance of the respect of data protection rules, ratify
     the Additional Protocol to the 1980 CoE Convention on Personal Data and in
     this context ensure the independence of the Data Protection authority.
     This should inter alia lead to a possible swift conclusion of the
     cooperation agreement with Eurojust, provided that data protection
     concerns are met.

Given
the lack of sufficient information, the Commission was unable to fully evaluate
the progress with regard to the following issues relevant for Block 3:
·        
Practical
methodology of checks on assets declarations, anti-corruption risk assessment
elaborated by the relevant agencies, the content of anti-corruption ethical
codes of the most important law enforcement agencies (FSB, FCS, Police,
Investigative Committee), content of anti-corruption training and its methods
in the relevant agencies;
·        
The
extent to which the data protection legislation is applicable to personal data
processed in the law enforcement area, in particular with regard to classified
information.
Block
4: External relations
General assessment
Russia has developed
an extensive regulatory framework governing the freedom of movement of
both Russian nationals and foreign citizens. Serious efforts are undertaken in
order to provide a legal basis and ensure legitimacy of actions by law
enforcement agencies in relation to person’s rights to enter, leave and move
freely within the territory of Russia. Difficulties with practical
implementation of those regulations can lead to situations where the
legislation is not being applied in a uniform way, especially due to big
differences of conditions in different parts of Russia.
A number of restrictions
to freedom of movement exist and are regulated by specific legislation
aiming to control access to particular areas where restricted access exists
both for Russian nationals and foreign nationals due to considerations of
national security or public safety. Access to identity and travel documents,
including for particular groups, such as internally displaced persons,
refugees, non-citizens and stateless persons, and persons belonging to
minorities, is well controlled although proper issuance of certain documents
and residence registration remains problematic for certain groups. Some
positive steps have been taken to facilitate access to citizenship and hence –
proper documents - of persons in irregular situation (former USSR citizens) in
line with recommendations by the relevant international bodies. Policies to
increase transparency and accessibility of public services related to delivery
of identity and travel documents, and accountability of law enforcement
agencies, including those involved in regulating and monitoring freedom of
movement, have been put in place. However it remains to be seen how effective
they are in terms of reducing any eventual discriminatory practices, including
towards persons belonging to minorities or certain ethnic background. Some
sources such as European Committee against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in its
2013 report continue to highlight persistent problems with residence
registration procedure for some groups.
 As regards training
programmes for law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges and other
practitioners in the areas covered by Block 4, the Russian authorities stated
that the system of public service included a strong component to control
professional qualifications and there was also obligatory training to update
professional skills. Such training programmes do contain elements of human
rights, although it was not possible to ascertain the proportion of specific
and targeted training dedicated to human rights pertinent to the context of
freedom of movement. Russian authorities are well aware of relevant
recommendations by UN bodies, OSCE and Council of Europe in the area of
freedom of movement and facilitation of people to people contacts, and are
ready to discuss the need for further efforts of cooperation in the above
areas. Authorities assert that they dedicate serious attention to specific
recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE, the Council of Europe and international
human rights organisations in implementing anti-discrimination policies,
protecting persons belonging to minorities and combating hate crimes, as
many of these areas are sensitive and present serious difficulties due to their
complexity.
As regards fight
against discrimination and hate crimes, relevant Russian agencies/line
ministries are aware of the complexity of issues related to phenomena of ethnic
and religious intolerance, and deploy efforts to put in place inter-agency
coordination and consultations. However, discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation is not recognised as a problematic issue. At expert level,
genuine interest in tackling negative phenomena and finding solutions to ensure
effective functioning of law enforcement can be noted. In practice,
deficiencies can occur both with implementation of relevant regulations and
legislative acts, with efficiency of inter-agency cooperation and with the
cooperation with NGOs who have in the recent past in particular experienced
difficulties in carrying out their work as a result of the anti-extremism law
and the law on foreign agents. In general, on-going efforts to ensure
transparency of law enforcement agencies are considered by the Russian
authorities as a sufficient anti-discriminatory measure. Efforts are being
undertaken to ensure that detention and deportation of irregular migrants or
persons having violated the regulations on entry and residence in Russia would
correspond to international standards. While legislative developments and
general approach of FMS go into the direction of stricter controls, better
compliance with international standards and higher efficiency, in practice,
there have been reports on cases of massive and targeted detentions of persons
from specific ethnic backgrounds, or on detention conditions that do not
correspond to the standards required by the relevant legislation.
The main bodies
dedicated to addressing human rights issues and to serving as instruments of
remedy – Ombudsman’s Office and Presidential Council for Development of Civil
Society and Human Rights – take a dynamic and pro-active approach, but seem to
function with limited resources and strive to achieve significant or visible
results which often are delivered on ad hoc basis, due to personal intervention
of either Ombudsman or the Chair of the above Presidential Council. However,
even on that level there is little acknowledgment by authorities of the fact
that discriminatory or xenophobic practices may exist. Mostly, cases that
contain elements of a discriminatory or xenophobic character are perceived as
having occurred on social, economic or criminal grounds (for instance, the
incidents in Pugachyov town in summer 2013 and in Biryulovo in October 2013
linked to alleged corrupt practices by and inefficiency of police).
Nevertheless, awareness among relevant Russian authorities of a particularly
sensitive situation in relation to a high concentration of migrants, legal or
irregular, in urban areas, and most notably in Moscow, is high, and they
acknowledge that this issue needs to be followed closely. Political sensitivity
(management of migration flows in Moscow was one of the main topic of municipal
elections, and remains high on political agenda) and sporadic incidents against
persons originating from Caucasus or Central Asia that occur from time to time
prove that further efforts based on a comprehensive approach going beyond the
question of technical management of migration are necessary. In this context
the lack of authorities’ monitoring of hate speech by politicians and public
discourse is a concern.
As regards prevention
of ill-treatment by law enforcement agencies, the internal
mechanisms to tackle such cases are set up, and some high profile cases (e.g.,
highly mediatised case of mistreatment of detainees by police officers in 2012
in Kazan) have been followed up. Russian authorities tend to deny existence of
any problems or deficiencies with law enforcement or freedom of movement in the
North Caucasus, even if this is contradictory to reporting from other sources
(e.g. report of the 2011 Committee on Prevention of Torture (CPT) visit to the
region) and reality on the ground (for instance, Ombudsman’s report for 2012
notes difficulties in investigating cases of ill-treatment and torture by law
enforcement in the North Caucasus; and an EU expert visit to Chechnya witnessed
the presence of checkpoints blocking roads in Chechnya). As regards the implementation
of the judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the areas
covered by Block 4, relevant Russian authorities display commitment to
enforcing judgments, however, in a number of particular cases related to
freedom of movement, response action was limited to addressing a particular
case or issuing instructions to improve procedural or general court practice,
without addressing the issue at systemic level.
Detailed comments
·          
Ensure that all Russian and EU
citizens and legally residing persons (regardless of the length of their authorised
stay) can travel on equal basis with the Parties’ own citizens within their
respective territories, subject to their internal rules and regulations
concerning national security.
According to the
Russian Constitution every citizen enjoys the right to freedom of movement, the
right to choice of place of stay and residence within Russia. Rights and
liberties of an individual and a citizen can be limited by the federal law only
to the extent necessary for protection of the foundations of the constitutional
system, morality, wellbeing, rights and legitimate interests of other
individuals, national defence and state security. Further regulations
are established by further federal laws and regulations according to which a
Russian citizen can stay at a place different from their registered place of
stay up to 90 days without registration.
Legislation on legal
status of foreign nationals is regulated by the Federal Law No 115-FZ of 25
July 2002 and other federal laws. Foreign nationals have the rights and responsibilities
equal to those of Russian citizens, except for the cases provided for by the
federal law.
There are complaints
mechanisms: the applicant may turn to the supervisor of the official in
charge of issuing the relevant document, or to the head of the (local)
authority. The authority has ten days to reply to a complaint. A complaint can
also be sent to the Federal Office of FMS, which has to reply within a month’s
time. A special department of the FMS is dedicated to such complaints.
Launching a complaint is cost free. As a non-administrative way the court, the
prosecutor or the ombudsman can be approached as well.
The list of grounds
for possible restrictions to the freedom of movement, the choice of a
place of stay or residence within Russia is defined in the Federal Law 5242-1
and is exhaustive. It relates to the border areas, closed military cantonments,
closed administrative-territorial formations (ZATOs) as well as zones of
special regimes declared due to various emergency circumstances. The legislation
currently in force gives no other grounds for restricting the freedom of
citizens’ movement (not counting the procedure of registration itself).
Access to zones with
restricted access
is regulated by a Government decree and lists 11 types of closed areas. The
list of other areas in Russia restricted to visit by foreign citizens (only) is
published and accessible in a public network, visalink-russia.com.
The legislation does
not require that in principle the areas with restricted access should have an official
geographical name and be properly marked on maps. Foreigners require a special
entry permit for certain territories; the Federal Security Bureau is
responsible for delivery of such permits. The rules for access to the ZATOs
differ according to the category of ZATO and in principle are the same for
Russians and foreign nationals; however, it is not possible for foreigners to
become residents of ZATOs.
As regards cases/difficulties
with specific groups (e.g. legally residing foreigners, refugees, stateless
persons), both in their written report and during the EU expert mission hardly
any difficulties nor problems in relation to their freedom of movement were
reported by the Russian authorities. This refers also to cases of
discrimination with regard to people of any specific ethnic origin, including
Roma. It was mentioned that Roma population was not keen on registering in
general, reportedly because of traditional lifestyle. In January 2013, a Roma
Action Plan was developed to improve the integration of Roma persons in Russia.
While this Action Plan is quite recent and its implementation is foreseen in
2013-14, no experience regarding the implementation is yet available. The
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its report of 20 June
2013, recommends that the authorities establish simplified and accessible
procedures for Roma to regularise their legal status.
·          
Ensure full-fledged and
effective issuance of travel and identity documents, including with regard to
their price and deadlines of procedures, to all categories of persons for
example to all citizens, internally displaced persons, refugees, non-citizens
and stateless persons including to persons belonging to minorities.
Currently, Russia
differentiates two categories of forcibly displaced persons: ‘internally
displaced persons’ and ‘forced migrants.’ The term ‘internally displaced
persons’ is used exclusively with reference to Russian citizens who temporarily
abandoned (for the duration of the crisis) their permanent residence in the
Chechen Republic, are located at a temporary residence on the territory of
Russia and plan (generally) to return to their former residence. According to
the FMS, as of 1 April 2009 all citizens who had been forced to leave their
permanent residence in the Chechen Republic and had been registered under the
designated procedure at the territorial bodies of the FMS, were deregistered on
the basis of the expression of their will to return to their former permanent
residence. In this way, as of 1 April 2009 there are no citizens registered as
‘internally displaced persons’. On 1 July 2013, 7 894 persons were
registered as forced migrants (being Russian citizens). According to the FMS,
only a few foreign nationals were registered as forced migrants.
Administrative
expulsion or deportation might occur if a foreign citizen or a stateless person
is staying illegally in Russia. On the issue of deportation and appeal
mechanisms, the Ombudsman (Moscow) stated that there are no further
legislative acts necessary but the practice has to be improved. The FMS also
admitted that sometimes (especially with regard to persons from Central Asia)
the period of examining cases of deportation is longer than provided by the
law, due to difficulty to ascertain the citizenship of the person in question,
due to lack of ID documents, or due to absence of timely reaction/confirmation
by the state that the person is expected to be deported to. There are cases
when, due to practical reasons or lack of facilities, legislation is not being
enforced, even if authorities are aware of legal requirements and regret the
situation. During the EU expert mission to Kazan, the local Ombusman’s Office
and Ministry of Interior (MoI) admitted that due to lack of facilities, persons
under deportation procedure were kept in MoI facilities together with persons
detained for administrative violations, rather than specialised detention
centres, in contradiction to the relevant legislation. It was noted that this
situation is being addressed by construction of a new specialised detention
centre.
During the EU expert
mission, concerns were raised by the NGOs that their activities related to
assisting citizens – and more precisely vulnerable groups – in accessing
documents and passports, monitoring of detention centres or providing legal
assistance, may be hindered by the new Law on NGOs, so called ‘foreign agents’
law, as many of such NGOs receive foreign funds.
As regards efforts
to ratify relevant international instruments on statelessness (e.g. UN
Convention relating to status of stateless persons, UN Convention on the
reduction of statelessness), Russian authorities consider that the problem of
statelessness is being effectively resolved in the frames of existing laws.
Therefore, Russia is not aiming at ratifying the abovementioned international
instruments on statelessness. Despite the lack of efforts of ratification,
other programs to reduce statelessness are being carried out, such as adoption
on 12 November 2012 of the Federal Law No 182-FZ on changes to the Federal Law
on the citizenship. The modifications enabled stateless persons with the right
to acquire the citizenship via a simplified procedure or obtain a residence
permit. It is expected that this law will be instrumental in addressing the
problem of hundreds of thousands former USSR citizens who had been living in
Russia in an irregular situation.
·          
Conduct training programs for
law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges and other practitioners in the
areas covered by the present Block, and address possible deficiencies.
There exists a system
for providing regular professional training for investigators and inquiry
officers, judges, prosecutors and officials of the law enforcement agencies.
Mandatory core training is based on international law, including human rights,
and encompasses equality and non-discrimination provisions.
The FMS is one of the
primary agencies in the field of freedom of movement, responsible for
immigration procedures. There is no specialised institution within the
structure of the FMS dedicated for trainings but it cooperates on a regular
basis with universities and international agencies like UNHCR, IOM, ILO and Red
Cross, in providing trainings for its officers. Moreover, there are obligatory
training programs for civil servants working within the FMS structures which
are held once per 3 years. Some particular short term courses are organised for
officers like e.g. 72-hour course on the granting of asylum which is mandatory
for field officers who are responsible for granting documents on refugees.
Training programs,
including on human rights issues, for policemen are carried out mainly in
cooperation with Moscow University and other national and international
institutions. During the higher education (5 years of studies) there is
one-year course of administrative law which covers the issues of migration
procedures and punishment for violation of migration rules. Human rights issues
are included in the general studies and courses. There are no specialised
trainings devoted to non-discrimination measures, protecting national
minorities and hate crimes prevention.
There are several
institutions responsible for trainings for judges and prosecutors which conduct
special training programmes on case-law of the ECtHR, including relevant
case-law on practice of Russian law enforcement agencies. Courses of studying
specific judgments of the ECtHR, including on cases related to allegations of
torture and other types of ill-treatment, are included into the curricula
developed for different kinds of audience.
Moreover, different
seminars are organised by the Academy of Justice in cooperation with the UNCHR
Office in Russia, e.g. for the last three years, twice-a-year 3-day seminars
were organised for judges and practitioners. Specialised trainings and
improving of staff qualifications in such an area of freedom of movement like
anti-discrimination issues, problems of specific groups, protection of
minorities or combat against hate crimes are not singled out separately but
rather are part of a general course on human rights.
Training for
professional advancement of Investigative Committee personnel takes place under
the auspices of an Institute of Advanced Training, which has six branches in
Russia. It was reported that all courses touch on human rights issues and
cases, while basic core modules are devoted to specific issues such as
anti-discrimination or combating hate crimes and extremism. Investigators
specialise and are trained in tackling certain types of crimes and cooperate
with other agencies in these areas. Monitoring of the impact of training is
built into the system, including assessment at the end of training and periodic
assessment of trainees to check that they are implementing what they have
learned. This is also linked to performance review and bonuses. The FMS
training for civilian and attested personnel similarly covers sensitisation on
anti-discrimination, hate crimes and relevant judgments of the ECtHR.
·          
Discuss and cooperate on
relevant recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE, the Council of Europe and
international human rights organizations in the areas of the freedom of
movement and facilitation of people-to-people contacts.
Simplification of
procedures for citizenship acquisition: In 2013, the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) welcomed the adoption of Federal
Law No 182-FZ of 12 November 2012, which introduced amendments to the 2002
Federal Law on Citizenship, aimed at simplifying the process of acquiring
Russian citizenship for former citizens of the USSR. In addition, in their
written answers the Russian authorities reported that a package of bills is at
the stage of preparations within various State Duma’s Committees with the main
aim of significant simplification of the Russian citizenship acquisition
procedure. As of March 2013, 4 500 applications have been received.
Certain communities have previously been identified by monitoring bodies as
vulnerable to problems acquiring citizenship due to complex legislation
governing naturalisation and obstacles posed by strict residence registration
requirements. In this respect, it is reported that as of February 2013, 71 500
out of 72 500 Meskhetian Turks in the North Caucasus and Southern Federal
Districts are now citizens. Despite these positive developments, continued
follow-up to the situation of the above mentioned groups is necessary to ensure
that this new remedy is effectively used to the fullest extent possible.
Registration
infringements:
In 2013, CERD recommended that Russia ensures that the residence registration
system is implemented ‘in a transparent manner without bias and in ways that
guarantees the rights of those seeking registration.’
According to the
Russian authorities, registration is declaratory and available to all. Under
current regulations the onus is on the owner of the property in which an
individual is staying to ensure compliance with registration procedures. In
this respect, NGOs have reported pressure on those who register individuals
from the Caucasus region, making it difficult for the latter to find
accommodation. In January 2013, new legislation was proposed which would forbid
someone who does not intend living in a property from registering themselves
there, and also banning the registration of more residents in a property than
permitted under housing regulations. Such amendments would address the
phenomenon whereby hundreds of individuals (often migrants) may be registered
at a single address but not actually live there. The law would allow for a five
year prison sentence or fine of up to 500 000 roubles for those in breach.
There are concerns that criminalising failure to comply with procedures would
effectively mean a return to the ‘propiska’ system that existed in Soviet
times. Some civil society actors have also raised concerns that new laws would
increase the influence of law enforcement officials, including possibly
contribute to increased corruption, and could potentially be used as a tool to
target migrants and other vulnerable groups found in breach of registration procedures
(even though responsibility for compliance lies with the property owner).
The right of migrant
workers and their families to protection and assistance: In November 2008,
Russia signed the CIS Convention on Legal Status of Migrant Workers and their family
members, which outlines cooperation in the field of labour migration and
protection of migrant workers’ rights. Russia has not ratified the UN
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families.
The rights of migrant
workers are protected by law, but are reportedly sometimes violated by
exploitative employers. Migrants can also experience problems in accessing
services. In this connection the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) has recommended that Russia increases the flexibility of access
of migrant workers to the system of social benefits of the State party. In
Tatarstan, the Ombudsman reported on amendments to laws to improve the
situation of migrants. For example, while in the past some migrants have
experienced problems with respect to health protection, housing and accessing
education, the right to send their children to school is apparently now
guaranteed. According to NGOs in Kazan the whole system of access to services
is imperfect, but this problem is not limited to migrants or foreigners. NGOs
also reported on problems faced by HIV positive migrants who have come to live
and have Russian families but cannot access citizenship because of their
condition. Without citizenship, access to the medical care needed is also
impeded.
In 2013, the UN CESCR
remained concerned that irregular labour migration was widespread, which meant
that a large number of people work without legal and social protection. The
Committee encouraged Russia to continue its efforts to protect the Covenant
rights of workers in the informal labour market and to regularise the situation
of irregular immigrants and reduce the number of workers outside the formal
economy, in order to limit the gaps in the protection accorded to them.
Protection of the
rights of irregular migrants: It was acknowledged by a number of interlocutors
during the EU expert mission, including the Ombudsman Office, that irregular
migrants and other groups without personal identity documents such as Roma tend
not wish to draw attention to themselves because of their status. Consequently,
they are often reluctant to address authorities with claims of mistreatment at
the hands of State agents or private parties. It was acknowledged by the Russian
authorities that irregular migrants can sometimes experience problems in
accessing services for themselves and their families. In Kazan, for example,
irregular migrants have received the help of the Ombudsman’s Office in ensuring
they are able to access services while also being supported in the process of
acquiring documentation.
Prevention and
sanction of abuse or power:
Provisions of Russian legislation expressly forbid torture, violence and other
types of severe or humiliating treatment, including in case of detention, and
are aimed at ensuring legal safeguards for consolidation of legality in police
activity. A series of general measures have also been undertaken by the Russian
authorities aimed at changing the existing state of affairs and preventing
further convention violations detected by the ECtHR in judgments on the
Mikheyev group of cases. A series of amendments were introduced into the
Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural Code. The Prosecutor General’s
Office, the Investigative Committee, the MoI, and the Federal Penitentiary
Service (FSIN) issued new and updated existing departmental instructions,
orders and guidelines regulating procedures for the restraint of deprivation of
freedom for persons that have committed administrative violations or offences,
providing guarantees, and exercising control over compliance. In terms of
institutional competence, the MoI’s Department of State Security monitors
application of the law by the police and special significance is reportedly now
attached to individuals’ complaints, which are reviewed within 1-2 months. A
special division of the Investigative Committee is devoted to investigating
such crimes, while the Prosecutor’s Office provides oversight of legitimacy
within law enforcement agencies. Inter-ministerial cooperation is on-going with
the UN CAT on a bi-annual basis, including with regard to the ratification of
the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
There are challenges
with respect to Public Oversight Commissions (POCs) to ensure public control
over observance of human rights at detention facilities. Recommendations for
improving the legal framework, efficiency and performance of POCs developed
further to a special meeting of the Presidential Council for Human Rights held
on 13 February 2012 have been ‘studied carefully by internal affairs bodies of
Russia and are presently taken into account in practical activity.’ It is also
reported that territorial bodies of the MoI show a positive tendency towards
expanding forms of cooperation with POCs in terms of observance of human
rights. Meetings of the collegium, joint conferences, and workshops are held
together with the members of regional POCs in order to work out measures aimed
at tightening control over observance of rights of citizens kept at detention
facilities of internal affairs bodies. However, as observed by the Chair of the
Presidential Council for Human Rights, implementation throughout the
penitentiary system is variable and support is required to allow the POCs to
operate as intended. A draft law on the Foundation for Public Oversight
currently under development by the Presidential Council for Human Rights would,
if adopted apparently create quite a different atmosphere with civil society by
strengthening its role with regard to the above-mentioned issues (notably the
public control over observance of human rights at detention facilities).
As regards the North
Caucasus: In 2012 the CAT was concerned about ‘numerous, ongoing and consistent
reports of serious human rights abuses inflicted by or at the instigation or
with the consent or acquiescence of public officials or other persons acting in
official capacities in the northern Caucasus, including the Chechen Republic,
including torture and ill-treatment, abductions, enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings.’ The Committee was further concerned at the State
party’s failure to investigate and punish the perpetrators of such abuses,
despite the establishment of Agency No 2 of the Chechen Republic investigation
department for particularly important cases. The Russian authorities have
provided extensive written information concerning measures aimed at elimination
and further prevention of violations with regard to the judgments of the ECtHR
in the Khashiyev group of cases concerning investigations into and sanctions
for human rights abuses in the North Caucasus region. Efforts to carry out
effective investigations reportedly continue in the face of acknowledged
obstacles including in accessing archive documents related to the investigation
of remote events. However, EU experts were informed by the Investigative
Committee and MoI in Grozny that there are currently no cases of torture or
other abuse of power by law enforcement officers under investigation. This
contradicts also to various reports from the ground (e.g. Joint Mobile Group
composed of representatives of various Russian human rights NGOs working in
Chechnya). Also, Ombudsman’s report on 2012 does mention difficulties in
obtaining information or lack of cooperation by relevant local agencies in
cases related to alleged ill-treatment and killings by persons acting in
official capacity in the North Caucasus region.
·          
Discuss and cooperate on
specific recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE, the Council of Europe and
international human rights organizations in implementing anti-discrimination
policies, protecting persons belonging to minorities and combating hate crimes.
Russian law prohibits
restrictions of any kind on citizens’ rights on grounds of social, racial,
sexual, ethnic, linguistic, religious or any other affiliation. According to
the Russian authorities ‘it is thus impossible for a policy of discrimination
against individual groups of citizens to emerge. There are administrative and
criminal penalties for discrimination.’ However, there appears to be no general
anti-discrimination law and most of the guarantees come from the Constitution.
However, in 2013 CERD
expressed concern that equality guarantees in a number of federal and
regional legislative acts covers only limited spheres of life, and may apply to
citizens only. Furthermore, CERD and other treaty bodies, as well as NGOs, have
recommended strengthening of the legislative framework in the area of non-discrimination
with special attention to gender, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples and
migrants, specifically by: adopting comprehensive anti-discrimination
legislation covering all spheres of life; and adopting a clear and
comprehensive definition of direct and indirect forms of racial discrimination,
including multiple forms of discrimination, that covers all fields of law,
private and public life. Monitoring bodies and NGOs also recommend
establishment of an independent and specialised body dealing solely with the
issue of discrimination to conduct monitoring of the situation in the area of
discrimination and to raise awareness of discrimination-related problems in
society. The view of Russian authorities, echoed by the Ombudsman, is that such
a new office is not needed as relevant functions and competences are already
covered by other institutions.
As noted by some
interlocutors during the EU expert mission (including the Ombudsman), there is
a discrepancy between the principles and provisions of the Constitution and
legislation, on the one hand, and their implementation in practice, on the
other. Implementation can be more effective in the regions where the issue of
anti-discrimination is less politicised. This gap is apparent with respect to
some of the issues discussed in this report e.g. concerning delays or
prevention of registration (discussed below).
According to the FMS, anti-discrimination
legislation is in place and there is no discrimination in registration in
practice. The FMS has established a functional complaints mechanism. If the
official review finds a criminal act has taken place, then a criminal case is
conducted. No complaints of discrimination have been received. However, because
there is no breakdown of complaints by ethnicity, it is not possible to
determine whether persons belonging to some groups bring more complaints than
others. It was suggested that instances of checks and fines being imposed on
those without documents (including minorities and migrants) are more likely to
be due to corruption than discrimination. In Kazan, for example, problems have
reportedly occasionally arisen with FMS officers demanding bribes, but this is
not racially motivated.
All relevant
authorities reported on the legal basis, mechanisms and processes for the
sanction, including immediate dismissal and prosecution of personnel who
violate the principles of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms.
The practice of ethnic/racial profiling by law enforcement officers was
not acknowledged. The authorities reported that there have been no cases of
detention of visible minorities wishing to register. However, international
monitoring bodies (CERD, CoE, AC-FC) have raised concerns with this regard.
As to the situation of
nomadic groups facing specific difficulties in registering, a federal
law establishes the registration procedure at the place of living of Russian
citizens belonging to indigenous peoples leading a nomadic or semi-nomadic life
and not having a place where they permanently or predominantly live. Written
answers to additional EU questions state that this law ‘applies only to small
indigenous groups of the Far North, the Gypsies do not fall into the category’.
However, as stated in the 2010 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous
peoples, the rights of ethnically distinct indigenous groups that do not meet
the legislative criteria for designation as ‘small-numbered indigenous
peoples’, but that nonetheless have characteristics similar to those within
this category, should also be protected. According to the Ministry of Regional
Development, access to registration is not a problem for other indigenous
groups not recognised as ‘small-numbered indigenous groups’ but who share
similar (semi)nomadic lifestyle and lack of permanent or principal residence.
In 2012, the CoE
Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (AC-FC) welcomed action to prevent racist crime, both at
federal and regional level, notably amongst young people, as well as more
resolute measures to investigate and prosecute offences committed by far-right
and neo-Nazi groups. However, the Committee was concerned that the number of
racially-motivated offences remains very high and persisting manifestations of
hostility against persons belonging to some groups (especially those from
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Africa or Asia, as well as Roma) continue to be
frequently reported. Despite the higher rates of prosecution of
racially-motivated crime, the Committee was informed that courts often tend to
give suspended sentences in cases of racially-motivated offences, which can
generate a feeling of impunity. It should be noted that hate crimes and
extremism tend to be treated together when discussing these issues with the
Russian authorities, as both fall (partially) under the broad scope of the 2002
Federal Law No 114-FZ on counteraction of extremist activities. Under this law,
extremism encompasses inter alia: incitement to racial hatred with violence or
calls to violence; creation of mass disturbances or vandalism for reasons of
hatred or hostility to any social group; and dissemination of the idea of
racial superiority. The MoI has a strong focus on combating hate crimes and
anti-extremism and has worked in cooperation with the Civic Chamber of the
Russian Federation and civil society organisations such as Memorial. Regular
meetings are held in the regions with community leaders to try and identify and
defuse potential hotspots. Such crimes are also a focus for the Investigative
Committee, which has a special control and analytical group and permanent
investigative operational units dealing with these kinds of cases at federal
and regional levels. As noted above, combating hate crimes is also a specific
area of training for the Committee.
According to annual
summaries of work produced by the Investigative Committee, the trend is
reportedly for an increase in hate and extremist crimes, which is related to
the proliferation of racist/extremist material and its dissemination on the
Internet. All criminal cases are monitored by the Committee, which allows for
follow-up with the local authorities in the forms of reports and
recommendations to help them address the environment within which such crimes
take place. Reports are sent to the appropriate local body responsible for
monitoring, which must report within one month. This is mandatory. Where
experts are brought in to examine whether direct incitement to racial hatred
has taken place (as prohibited under the anti-extremism law) these have to be
independent.
Law enforcement bodies
have also reportedly been more active since 2010. Police are part of the
operational units already mentioned. According to some NGOs, however, the
police do not always protect targets of racist violence and do not always act
in full objectivity toward migrants.
The main competence
for preventing and combatting extremist activities lies collectively
with the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, MoI, FSB, Prosecutor General and
the Investigative Committee. Recent developments in the institutional framework
to counter extremism include the setting up of an inter-agency commission to
counter extremism, comprising representatives of the 16 Russian agencies. In
addition to law enforcement authorities (MoI, Investigative Committee, and
FSB), it includes the Ministers of Culture, Education, Tourism, and
Communications, as well as heads of the federal intelligence, customs, and tax
services. Chaired by the MoI, the Commission is charged with the duty to
propose anti-extremism policies, develop relevant concepts and strategies,
evaluate current activities, review measures undertaken and legislation
adopted, and prepare annual reports for the President. The Commission is unique
in that it can issue directives to other Ministries and make direct proposals
to the President. Standing interdepartmental counter-extremism coordination and
analysis units are also operational in the Russian regions. Crime-fighting
units have drawn up plans to prevent extremism and xenophobia and are
taking action to cut off sources of finance for extremism. Cooperation also
takes place with the EU in combating common extremist threats.
Safeguards against
anti-extremism measures UN
treaty bodies have noted with concern that the definition of extremist activity
in the Law on Counteraction of Extremist Activities is vague, allowing for
arbitrariness in its application, and that amendments have made certain forms
of defamation of public officials an act of extremism. Civil society
organisations working on the issue have for a long time pointed out to the
misuse of the law on extremism. In 2013, CERD recommended that the Russia amend
the definition of extremism in the Law to ensure its clarity and precision,
covering only acts of violence, incitement to such acts, and participation in
organisations that promote and incite racial discrimination. The European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) has similarly
recommended amending the list of extremist activities to exclude actions that
contain no element of violence or the incitement thereof. The Commission also
stated that organisers of peaceful protests should not carry the burden of
responsibility for extremist acts committed by individual participants. NGOs
have also raised concerns that the law is increasingly used to censor religious
scriptures and to target minority faiths under the pretext of ‘religious
extremism’. For example, in a submission under the second Human Rights Council
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), it was stated that once religious materials
were included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials, the Government opened
investigations, raided homes and churches, seized the works and prosecuted and
convicted individuals. The position of the authorities is that the current
federal law on terrorism and extremism is in keeping with the Constitution and
international obligations of Russia and requires no radical review. Maintenance
of lists of organisations and materials is a widely accepted international
practice and such lists are compiled by a complex inter-agency process
(involving the MoI, FSB, Ministry of Justice, etc.) based on court judgements.
The list of extremist organisations is published on the website of the Supreme
Court.
Notwithstanding the
positive attention paid to integration issues (such as establishment of a
Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, development of a draft of the
State Ethnic Policy Strategy, creation of an inter-departmental working group
on inter-ethnic relations, adoption of ‘a comprehensive plan for the
socio-economic and ethnic cultural development of gypsies over the period
2012-2013), NGOs noted that officials at high levels sometimes send mixed
messages regarding integration, which is used as a political tool to mobilise
public support. This observation is in line with deep concerns expressed by the
CoE, AC-FC and CERD regarding increasing use of xenophobic and racist rhetoric
by politicians and the role of the media in disseminating further prejudices on
some minority groups, which triggers intolerance against them. Association of
certain groups, including Roma and Chechens, with criminality is particularly
pernicious in this respect.
It must be noted that
efforts by the authorities to take a comprehensive approach are not matched
with appropriate acknowledgement of the problem of intolerance and xenophobic
feelings in the society. Such events as massive rallies targeting the entire
Chechen population in the small town of Pugachyov (in the Saratov region) in
July 2013 after a local resident was stabbed to death by a Chechen teenager or
12-13 October 2013 rallies in Biryulovo near Moscow in retaliation against
fatal stabbing of a 25 year old man by a person of Caucasian origin are
interpreted by authorities as expression of population anger against alleged
‘corruption and inaction of police’. However, clearly xenophobic and
nationalist rhetoric of the slogans, as well as retaliatory actions targeting
specific ethnic groups that sometimes accompany such incidents show that
comprehensive approach is needed also in analysis of such incidents, and
response to them should go beyond measures curbing migration. Response measures
by law enforcement and notably using the FMS to target persons of Caucasian or
Central Asian origin (for example, raids on irregular migrants in the market
places in the aftermath of incidents) do not contribute to dispel the
xenophobic rhetoric.
Lack of clarity over
implementation of some laws governing politically and socially sensitive
issues, and non-uniform application of legal norms by courts can also encourage
increase of intolerance in the society, as it can give impression that
targeting of particular groups of population is excused by law. This is
relevant not only in case of ethnic targeting, but also targeting of other
minorities, for instance LGBT individuals. In the last week of July 2013, five
Dutch citizens were expelled from Russia due to their participation at a
workshop on human rights including LGBT rights in Murmansk. This case
highlights the impact of the recently adopted Law against propaganda of
non-traditional sexual relations on the freedom of movement of foreign
citizens, and the existing discrimination of LGBT individuals or people who
defend their rights. It would be useful to have a clear understanding on how
this law is and will be applied so that individuals who define themselves as
LGBT or who defend their rights could travel to and inside Russia while
enjoying full respect of their rights.
·          
Discuss and cooperate on the
applicable Council of Europe conventions, including the 1950 Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in the areas covered by
the Common Steps.
The relevant Russian
authorities underlined Russia’s commitment to the ECHR. In this context, MoJ
explained in great detail measures taken in order to disseminate the pertinent
case-law, to raise awareness by the judges of judgments by the ECtHR, to
improve the efficiency of courts and to implement the said judgments. The
position of Russia is that it spends considerable resources and pays great
attention to implementation of the ECtHR judgments, on which it reports
regularly to the CoE’s Council of Ministers.
As regards individual
cases related to freedom of movement, in order to implement the general
measures of the ECtHR’s case Karpatchev and Karpatcheva vs. Russia where it was
found a violation of ECHR by Russian authorities, the interdepartmental working
group for the preparation of amendments to the regulations on the protection of
state secrets was created. However, no further information on its work and
related outcomes were clarified. In its judgment ‘Kiyutin vs. Russia’, the
ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 and 14 of the Convention by the Russian
authorities by rejecting application of Kiyutin for residence permit on the
Russian territory on the account of his state of health (HIV-infected).
Notwithstanding the ruling, Russia claimed that Federal Law No 115 does not
rule out the possibility of allowing entry and stay in the Russian territory of
foreigners who suffer from HIV disease with regard to their marital status,
clinical stage of disease and other exceptional circumstances. After the
Constitutional Court confirmed the above mentioned interpretation of the
federal law (May 12, 2006), competent governmental bodies concluded that there
was no need to update the current legislation in order to implement the
mentioned ruling. Russia considered that in this case, establishing procedures
of enhanced control over the executive bodies and courts was more pertinent.
The ECtHR highlighted
that presently Russia is the only Convention member state which still has
preserved restrictions against individuals who used to have access to data
constituting state secrets and now are willing to travel abroad for private purposes
(Soltysiak vs. Russia). The ECtHR reiterated that in order for those
restrictions of rights to be in compliance with ECHR, they should be prescribed
by the law, pursue one or several legitimate aims specified Protocol No 4 to
the ECHR. At the same time the Court notes that in Opinion No 193 (1996) on
Russia’s request for membership of the CoE adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly on January 25, 1996, due consideration was given to the fact that
Russia intended to cease to restrict – with immediate effect – international
travel of individuals aware of data constituting state secrets, with the
exception of those restrictions which are generally accepted in CoE member
states. The ECtHR ruling with respect to the Soltysiak case has not been
implemented as the general measures are concerned.
 Issues of concern and actions recommended to be followed up under Block 4: 
On the basis of the
above findings the Commission identified the following issues of concern
requiring further discussion with the Russian authorities:

 Both
     initial and in-service training of law enforcement and other relevant
     agencies does not seem to address comprehensively minority
     issues and inter-ethnic relations (including anti-discrimination and
     hate crimes prevention). This could lead to inadequate response to the
     sensitivities of all communities, including minorities and migrants.
 Discrimination,
     intolerance and xenophobia (including hate speech and incitement to racial
     and ethnic hatred)
     may impact considerably the way in which the possible visa free regime
     will be implemented in practice. The issue however does not seem to
     be tackled in a proactive and comprehensive way by the authorities. Very
     little acknowledgement of the existence of impediments to implementation
     of anti-discrimination legislation and the need to address them may be
     heard (e.g. ‘zero tolerance policy’). Furthermore, there is no clearly
     defined independent body dealing with racism and discrimination and aiming
     to increase efficiency of anti-discrimination policy. The on-going
     international exchange to focus on specific challenges such as the
     establishment of effective mechanisms to combat dissemination of hate
     speech on the Internet is a positive development and its continuation will
     surely contribute to improvements in that area.
 Comprehensive
     policy with regard to irregular migration encompasses access to justice
     and effective redress by irregular migrants in cases where their
     rights have been violated. Further measures to encourage irregular
     migrants to come forward and to support them in bringing claims to courts
     would be helpful in this regard.
 Important
     element of the proper monitoring and effective antidiscrimination policy
     is an unimpeded activity of civil society and NGOs. There are
     several civil society groups and NGOs involved in providing legal
     assistance (including enhancing the access to justice and effective
     redress) to vulnerable/specific groups including migrants and asylum
     seekers. The current legal framework of functioning and funding of those
     organisations may create some potential for artificial limitations of
     their activities.

·        
As
shown by some concrete recent examples, the lack of legal framework on
protection from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation as well as the
legislation prohibiting the propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations
may generate certain barriers to freedom of movement of LGBT individuals or
persons defending their rights travelling within and to Russia.
The following actions are
recommended with a view to further improving the implementation of the relevant
Common Steps:

 Ensure effective
     application of regulations on access to identity and travel documents,
     with particular focus on facilitation of such access for specific groups
     (such as migrants, stateless persons, or minorities). In this regard,
     enforce specific anti-corruption measures and monitoring with regard to
     authorities responsible for registration and delivery of identity and
     travel documents. Ensure that current regulations and potential amendments
     to tighten registration procedures apply equally to all within the
     jurisdiction of Russia and are not enforced to the disadvantage of
     specific groups (such as migrants, stateless persons, or minorities) and
     that effective safeguards are in place against arbitrary actions on the
     part of the authorities.
 Ensure that
     allegations of misconduct and ill-treatment by law enforcement
     officials towards members of vulnerable groups are thoroughly
     investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. Continue the
     cooperation with the UN CAT and other monitoring bodies, as well as
     international human rights organisations in addressing cases of reported
     abuse, ill-treatment and torture by law enforcement officials, in
     particularly in the North Caucasus, and preventing further violations.
     Continue the practice of publishing CoE CPT visits reports and take follow
     up actions.
 Refine the definition
     of discrimination in law as the basis for potential future
     comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. Consider adopting a
     separate piece of legislation ensuring a comprehensive approach to
     anti-discrimination and setting up an independent body against racism and
     discrimination in order to increase efficiency of anti-discrimination
     policy.
 Implement
     recommendations for legislative reform to refine the definition of
     extremism. Continue to review and update lists and ensure that a
     process for judicial review is available to those listed.
 Ensure
     appropriate resources and strengthen the role of instruments for
     addressing citizens’ claims on violations of their rights, notably the
     Ombudsman and Presidential Council for Development of Civil Society and
     Human Rights. The capacity of these instruments should match the existing
     needs (e.g. budgetary and staffing needs corresponding to work-load, ability
     to take effective action within the administrative framework).
 Step up efforts on
     implementation of relevant ECtHR judgments by addressing systemic
     shortcomings and improving application of relevant legislation in
     practice, including by courts and the proactive involvement of the
     national parliament, which should be informed as well as be granted a
     supervisory function on the effectiveness of the execution of judgments.
     In this regard, improve dissemination of translations of the ECtHR
     judgments as well as ensure targeted training of judges and prosecutors.

III. Conclusions and next steps
Following the EU-Russia Summit on
15 December 2011, the two sides have started the implementation of the Common
Steps, in accordance with the provisions contained in the adopted document.
Since then, an in-depth gathering of information has taken place through
exchange of written reports and numerous field missions, with the participation
of EU Member States’ experts. Moreover, additional information exchanges and
continuous monitoring have taken place in the context of the Joint Readmission
and Visa Facilitation Committees as well as the EU-Russia Migration Dialogue.
Information and reports from the external actors and organisations (e.g. CoE,
NGOs, etc.) were also taken into account. On that basis, the Commission, in
close cooperation with the European External Action Service, has carefully
examined such information and made the assessments contained in the present
report.
The Commission considers that
Russia has made progress in the implementation of the Common Steps, many of
which can be considered as fulfilled. The assessment carried out has however
showed that further work is necessary to consider that all elements contained
in the Common Steps have been fully implemented. Specific issues of concern and
further recommended actions have been identified and made to this end in the
report.
The
Commission will continue to work in close contact with the Russian authorities
to swiftly and adequately address the issues of concern and actions identified
above, with a view to further reporting to the European Parliament and the
Council.