Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China
Date: 2013-11-04
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, anti-dumping legislation, import (EU), originating product, semi-metal, solar collector

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 4.11.2013  
COM(2013) 759 final 

2013/0369 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. 
cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 
30  November  2009  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not 
members  of  the  European  Community  ('the  basic  Regulation'),  and  in  particular 
Article  9  and  14(1)  thereof  on  imports  of  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules 
and  key  components  (i.e.  cells)  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the  People's 
Republic of China. 

General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation 
and is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive 
and procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

On  6  September  2012,  the  European  Commission  (‘the  Commission’)  initiated  an 
anti-dumping  proceeding  concerning  imports  of  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic 
modules  and  key  components  (i.e.  cells  and  wafers)  originating  in  the  People’s 
Republic of China. 

On 1 March 2013, the Commission adopted Regulation No 182/2013 making imports 
of  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules  and  key  components  (i.e.  cells  and 
wafers) originating in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China subject to 
registration. 

On  4  June  2013,  the  Commission  adopted  Regulation  No  513/2013  imposing  a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules 
and  key  components  (i.e.  cells  and  wafers)  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the 
People’s  Republic  of  China  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  182/2013  making 
these  imports  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
subject  to  registration.  This  Regulation  was  subsequently  amended  by  Commission 
Regulation No 748/2013 of 2 August 2013. 

By  Decision  2013/423/EU  of  2  August  2013,  the  Commission  accepted  an 
undertaking  offered  in  connection  with  the  anti-dumping  proceeding  concerning 
imports  of  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules  and  key  components  (i.e.  cells 
and wafers) originating in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China.  

Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND 
IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  had  the  possibility  to  defend 
their  interests  during  the  investigation,  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the  basic 
Regulation. 

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Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The basic Regulation does not provide for a general impact assessment but contains 
an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

Summary of the proposed action 

The Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of crystalline 
silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) originating 
in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China and subsequently accepted an 
undertaking offered in connection with these imports. 

The  attached  proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  is  based  on  the  definitive  findings 
which have confirmed the existence of dumping causing injury, and the fact that the 
imposition  of  measures  is  not  against  the  overall  Union  interest.  Although  the 
product  scope  has  been  amended  at  the  definitive  stage  (by  excluding  wafers  from 
the product scope) and the final duty rates have been slightly revised, the provisional 
findings  were  overall  confirmed.  The  undertaking  is  foreseen  to  apply  during  the 
period of validity of provisional and definitive measures. 

It  is  therefore  proposed  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a 
Regulation which should be published no later than 5 December 2013. 

Legal basis 

This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 
30  November  2009  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not 
members of the European Community. 

Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  European  Union.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. 

Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves 
no scope for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Union, 
national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens 
is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 

The basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options. 

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4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION  

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

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2013/0369 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. 
cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 (‘the basic 
Regulation’), and in particular Article 9(4) and 14(1) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  European  Commission,  after  consulting  the 
Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

2. 

(3) 

A. 

PROCEDURE 

Provisional Measures 
The  European  Commission  (‘the  Commission’)  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  513/20132 
(‘the provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules  and  key  components  (i.e.  cells  and  wafers) 
originating  in  or  consigned  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China  (‘the  PRC’  or  the 
‘country concerned’).  

The  investigation  was  initiated  following  a  complaint  lodged  on  25  July  2012  by 
EU ProSun (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of 
the total Union production of crystalline silicon photovoltaic ('PV') modules and key 
components.  The  complaint  contained  prima  facie  evidence  of  dumping  of  the  said 
product and of material injury resulting therefrom, which was considered sufficient to 
justify the initiation of an investigation. 

Registration 

As mentioned in recital (3) to the provisional Regulation, following a request by the 
complainant supported by the required evidence the Commission adopted on 1 March 
2013  Regulation  (EU)  No  182/20133  making  imports  of  crystalline  silicon  PV 
modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) originating in or consigned from 
the  People’s  Republic  of  China  subject  to  registration  as  of  6  March  2013.  The 
provisional Regulation ceased the registration of  imports for the  purpose of  the anti-
dumping investigation in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation since a 
provisional anti-dumping duty provided protection against dumped imports.  

1 
2 
3 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 
OJ L 513, 5.6.2013, p. 5 
OJ L 61, 5.3.2013, p.2 

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(4) 

3. 

(5) 

4. 

(6) 

Some  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  decision  for  registration  of  imports  was 
unfounded,  as  the  conditions  were  not  met  pursuant  to  Article  14(5)  of  the  basic 
Regulation.  However,  these  claims  were  not  substantiated  or  based  on  factual 
evidence. At the time the decision was taken to register imports the Commission had 
sufficient prima facie evidence justifying the need to register imports, in particular a 
sharp  increase  both  in  terms  of  absolute  imports  and  in  terms  of  market  share.  The 
claims in this regard had therefore to be rejected. 

Acceptance of an Undertaking with regards to provisional duties 
By  Commission  Decision  2013/423/EU  of  2  August  20134,  the  Commission  has 
accepted  an  undertaking  offered  by  exporting  producers  together  with  the  China 
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products 
('CCCME'). 

Subsequent Procedure 

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on  the  basis of 
which it was  decided to impose provisional anti-dumping  measures  (‘the  provisional 
disclosure’),  the  Government  of  China  ('GOC')  and  several  interested  parties  made 
written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties 
who  so  requested  were  granted  the  opportunity  to  be  heard.  The  Association  for 
Affordable  Solar  Energy  (‘AFASE’),  representing  importers,  downstream  and 
upstream  operators  and  one  importer  requested  and  were  afforded  hearings  in  the 
presence of the Hearing Officer of the Directorate-General for Trade. 

(7) 

The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary for 
its  definitive  findings.  The  oral  and  written  comments  submitted  by  the  interested 
parties  were  considered  and,  where  appropriate,  the  provisional  findings  were 
modified accordingly. 

(8) 

In  addition,  verification  visits  were  carried  out  at  the  premises  of  the  following 
companies: 

(i) Downstream operators 

– 

– 

Jayme de la Costa, Pedroso, Portugal  

Sunedison Spain Construction, Madrid, Spain 

(ii) Independent consultant 

– 

Europressedienst, Bonn, Germany 

(9) 

AFASE  questioned  the  legal  basis  for  the  visit  carried  out  at  the  premises  of 
Europressedienst, as it is not an interested party in this investigation and does therefore 
not  fall  under  Article  16  of  the  basic  Regulation.  Europressedienst,  as  mentioned  in 
recitals  (99)  and  (120)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  has  provided  information  on 
macroeconomic  indicators.  It  is  clarified  that  the  Commission  carried  out  an  on-the-
spot  verification  at  the  premises  of  Europressedienst  for  the  sake  of  the  principle  of 
good  administration  to  verify  the  reliability  and  correctness  of  data  on  which  the 
Commission based its findings.  

(10)  The GOC reiterated the claim that its rights of defence in relation to access to the files 
open  for  inspection  by  interested  parties  were  violated  because  (i)  information  was 

4 

OJ L 209, 3.8.2013, p. 26. 

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(11) 

(12) 

missing  from  the  non-confidential  files  without  “good  cause”  being  shown  or 
providing sufficiently detailed summaries, or exceptionally, the reasons for the failure 
to provide the non-confidential summary, (ii) the non-confidential version of an entire 
questionnaire response of a Union producer was missing and (iii) the delays to make 
non-confidential  versions  of  the  Union  producers’  questionnaire  responses  available 
for interested parties were excessive. 

(i) Regarding the claim that information was missing from the open file, the interested 
party  did  not  specify  to  which  information  it  was  referring  to.  (ii)  Its  claim  that  the 
non-confidential  version  of  an  entire  questionnaire  response  has  not  been  made 
available was incorrect. (iii) As to the delays in making available the non-confidential 
replies of the questionnaires of the sampled Union producers, it had been explained to 
the  party  concerned  that  the  questionnaires  were  only  added  to  the  non-confidential 
file  after  having  been  checked  as  to  their  completeness  and  reasonableness  of  the 
summaries.  In  order  to  ensure  the  Union  producers’  right  to  anonymity,  it  was  also 
ascertained  that  the  non-confidential  versions  of  the  questionnaires  did  indeed  not 
reveal  the  identity  of  the  Union  producer  concerned.  In  some  cases,  the  non-
confidential  versions  needed  therefore  to  be  corrected  accordingly  by  the  party 
submitting it before they could be made available for other interested parties.  

In any event, it is considered that this did in no way affect the interested parties’ rights 
of  defence.  The  Commission  has  given  all  the  interested  parties  the  opportunity  to 
respond to the information included in the file open for inspection in time so that their 
comments could be taken into consideration, when substantiated and warranted before 
any  conclusions  were  made  in  the  investigation.  The  interested  party  had  every 
opportunity  to  comment  on  the  questionnaires  from  sampled  Union  producers  also 
following  the  provisional  and  the  final  disclosure.  Therefore,  even  if  the  disclosures 
and  the  access  to  the  file  open  for  inspection  by  interested  parties  are  based  on 
different  legal  provisions,  it  should  be  noted  that  there  were  ample  opportunities  for 
the interested parties to comment on all information made available by any party to the 
investigation. Therefore, this claim had to be rejected.  

(13)  All  interested  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the 
basis  of  which  it  was  intended  to  recommend  the  imposition  of  a  definitive  anti-
dumping  duty  on  imports  of  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules  and  key 
components  (i.e.  cells)  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the  People's  Republic  of 
China and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of provisional duty 
(‘the  final  disclosure’).  All  parties  were  granted  a  period  within  which  they  could 
make comments on the final disclosure.  

(14)  The  comments  submitted  by  the  interested  parties  were  considered  and  taken  into 

account where appropriate.  

5. 

Acceptance of an undertaking in view of definitive duties 

(15)  Following  final  disclosure,  the  Commission  received  an  amended  offer  for  an 
undertaking by exporting producers together with the CCCME, which covers also the 
parallel  anti-subsidy  investigation.  By  Commission  Decision  2013/XXX/EU  of  XX 
December 2013, the Commission has confirmed the acceptance of that undertaking.  

6. 

Parties concerned by the proceeding 

(a)  Sampling of Union producers 

(16)  Following  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  some  interested  parties  reiterated 
the  argument  that  excessive  use  of  confidentiality  prevented  them  from  commenting 

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on the selection of the sample of Union producers and thus from the proper exercise of 
their rights of defence. The Commission already addressed this issue in recital (9) to 
the  provisional  Regulation.  As  no  new  information  was  provided  in  this  respect,  the 
conclusions in recital (9) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

(17)  The  GOC  reiterated  its  claim  that  the  use  of  confidentiality  of  the  names  of  the 
complainants  and  sampled  Union  producers  is  not  warranted.  As  already  stated  in 
recital  (9)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  the  Union  producers  requested  that  their 
names be kept confidential due to the risk of retaliation. The Commission considered 
that these requests were sufficiently substantiated to be granted. The information that 
has  been  provided  to  the  Commission  in  order  to  substantiate  the  risk  of  retaliation 
cannot be disclosed to third parties, as such disclosure would defeat the purpose of the 
request  for  confidentiality.  Moreover,  in  a  case,  where,  as  reported  by  the  GOC,  a 
Union  producer  re-evaluated  its  position  and  revealed  its  identity  by  filing  an 
application  for  a  Court  case  against  the  provisional  Regulation,  there  is  no  longer 
ground  to  disclose  information  on  the  basis  of  which  anonymity  was  granted,  as  the 
identity has been revealed.  

(18)  Further  to  the  provisional  disclosure,  one  interested  party  reiterated  that  the 
information on which the selection of the sample was based was not reliable, without, 
however, providing any new evidence in this regard. This claim was therefore rejected. 

(19)  Following the final disclosure, the CCCME reiterated the arguments about the method 
used  for  the  selection  of  the  provisional  sample  of  the  Union  producers.  It  claims  in 
particular  that  the  Institutions  have  not  taken  into  account  120  producers.  The 
Commission  already  addressed  this  issue  in  recital  (9)  to  the  provisional  Regulation. 
Moreover,  the  Institutions  have  verified  the  activities  of  the  companies  provided  on 
that  list.  It  turned  out  that  that  list  mostly  includes  installers,  distributors,  related 
importers and exporting producer in China, Taiwan, and India. It therefore was not apt 
to  demonstrate  that  the  Institutions  had  overlooked  a  significant  number  of  Union 
producers.  Moreover,  the  CCCME  has  not  contested  the  total  Union  production  by 
providing  alternative  figures,  nor  has  it  put  forward  any  evidence  that  the 
representativity  of  the  sample  could  have  been  affected,  as  none  of  the  alleged 
additional  Union  producers  would  have  been  selected  into  the  sample,  had  it  been 
known to the Commission. 

(20)  Following  the  exclusion  of  wafers  from the definition of the product concerned, and 
thus from the scope of this investigation as cited in recital (32) below, the final sample 
consisted  of  eight  Union  producers.  In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments  with 
regard  to  the  sampling  of  Union  producers,  the  findings  in  recitals  (7)  to  (10)  to  the 
provisional Regulation are herewith confirmed, as amended above. 

(b)  Sampling of unrelated importers  

(21)  Following the imposition of provisional measures, as mentioned in recital (12) to the 
provisional  Regulation,  the  Commission  contacted  additional  importers  that  had 
already  cooperated  in  the  investigation  at  the  initiation  stage  by  providing  basic 
information  on  their  activities  related  to  the  product  under  investigation  during  the 
investigation  period,  as  specified  in  the  Notice  of  Initiation.  The  purpose  was  to 
determine  whether  the  size  of  the  sample  of  unrelated  importers  could  be  increased. 
Six  companies,  qualifying  as  unrelated  importers  trading  the  product  concerned  (i.e. 
purchasing and reselling it), came forward and were willing to cooperate further in the 
investigation. Out of these six, five replied within the deadline. Out of the five replies 
received,  only  three  were  sufficiently  complete  and  allowed  for  a  meaningful 

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assessment.  On  this  basis,  the  sample  of  the  unrelated  importers  was  enlarged  and 
consisted  of  four  importers  for  modules,  representing  around  2  %  -  5  %  of  the  total 
imports  from  the  country  concerned.  Given  the  structure  of  the  unrelated  importers, 
which were mostly small and medium-sized companies, it was not possible to have a 
sample  representing  a  larger  share,  given  the  limited  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Institutions. 

(22) 

In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments  with  regard  to  the  sampling  of  unrelated 
importers, recitals (11) and (12) to the provisional Regulation, as amended above are 
confirmed. 

(c) 

Sampling of exporting producers 

(23)  Following the provisional disclosure, a number of non-sampled companies submitted 
comments arguing that their situation is different from the sampled companies. They 
argued  that,  as  a  consequence,  they  should  benefit  from  an  individual  duty  rate 
pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. However, due to the high number of 
co-operating  companies  (often  groups  of  companies),  it  was  not  possible  to 
individually  investigate  all  companies.  Therefore,  pursuant  to  Article  9(6),  these 
companies are subject to the weighted average duty of the sampled companies. 

(24) 

In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments  with  regard  to  the  sampling  of  exporting 
producers recitals (13) and (14) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

7. 

Investigation period and period considered  

(25)  As set out in recital (19) to the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping 
and  injury  covered  the  period  from  1  July  2011  to  30 June  2012  ('the  investigation 
period'  or  'IP').  The  examination  of  trends  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  injury 
covered  the  period  from  2009  to  the  end  of  the  investigation  period  ('the  period 
considered'). 

B. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

1. 

Introduction 

(26)  As set out in recitals (20) to (49) to the provisional Regulation, the product concerned 
as  provisionally  defined  is  crystalline  silicon  PV  modules  or  panels  and  cells  and 
wafers of the type used in crystalline silicon PV modules or panels, originating in or 
consigned  from  the  PRC.  The  cells  and  wafers  have  a  thickness  not  exceeding  400 
micrometers. This product is currently falling within CN codes ex 3818 00 10, ex 8501 
31 00, ex 8501 32 00, ex 8501 33 00, ex 8501 34 00, ex 8501 61 20, ex 8501 61 80, ex 
8501  62  00,  ex  8501  63  00,  ex  8501  64  00  and  ex  8541  40  90  (‘the  product 
concerned’). 

(27)  The  following  product  types  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of  the  product 

concerned: 

– 

– 

– 

solar  chargers  that  consist  of  less  than  six  cells,  are  portable  and  supply 
electricity to devices or charge batteries 

thin film PV products 

crystalline  silicon  PV  products  that  are  permanently  integrated  into  electrical 
goods,  where  the  function  of  the  electrical  goods  is  other  than  power 
generation, and where these electrical goods consume the electricity generated 
by the integrated crystalline silicon PV cell(s). 

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2. 

Claims regarding the product scope 

2.1. 

Exclusion of wafers 

(28)  Following the provisional disclosure, interested parties claimed that wafers should be 
removed  from  the  product  scope  since  wafers  do  not  share  the  same  basic  physical, 
chemical  and  technical  characteristics  as  cells  and  modules.  In  addition  to  the 
arguments  brought  forward  at  the  provisional  stage,  two  additional  arguments  were 
brought forward in this respect after the provisional disclosure. 

(29)  Firstly, interested parties claimed that wafers can be used for other purposes than for 
the production of cells, notably the production of integrated circuits  and  other  micro 
devices. In this respect, it is noted that not all wafers are included in the product scope 
of this investigation, which is limited to "wafers of the type used in crystalline silicon 
PV  modules  or  panels",  and  that  those  wafers  have  “a  thickness  not  exceeding  400 
micrometres". While wafers certainly do exist in other applications, the investigation 
never  covered  wafers  which  are  used  in  the  production  of  other  products  such  as 
integrated circuits. In addition, no producers, importers or users involved in the market 
for  these  other  types  of  wafers  came  forward  alleging  that  their  wafers  would  be 
subject to registration or provisional anti-dumping duties. It is therefore confirmed that 
these other types of wafers are not subject to the product scope of this investigation. At 
the same time, this shows that wafers do not necessarily have the same end use as cells 
and modules. 

(30)  Secondly,  interested  parties  claimed  that  unprocessed  wafers  possess  none  of  the 
essential  electric  properties  which  distinguish  solar  cells  and  modules  from  other 
products.  In  particular,  wafers  lack  the  ability  to  generate  electricity  from  sunlight, 
which is the key function of crystalline photovoltaic cells and modules. 

(31)  This  claim  can  be  accepted.  Indeed  after  further  verification  and  contrary  to  what  is 
stated in recital (36) to the provisional Regulation that "modules, cells and wafers have 
the  same  end  use,  converting  sunlight  into  electricity",  only  once  the  wafer  is 
transformed  into  a  cell,  does  it  obtain  the  functionality  to  generate  electricity  from 
sunlight. 

(32)  Due  to  the  different  basic  physical  and  technical  characteristics,  defined  during  the 
investigation  inter  alia  as  the  functionality  to  generate  electricity  from  sunlight,  it  is 
concluded  on  balance  that  wafers  should  be  excluded  from  the  definition  of  the 
product concerned, and thus from the scope of this investigation. 

2.2. 

(33) 

Separate investigations for cells and modules 

Interested parties reiterated that cells and modules are not a single product, and should 
therefore  be  assessed  separately,  mainly  repeating  arguments  already  addressed  in 
recitals (27) to (39) to the provisional Regulation. Unlike wafers, however, cells and 
modules do share the same basic property, i.e. the ability to generate electricity from 
sunlight. These arguments were therefore rejected. 

(34)  Following  final  disclosure,  one  exporter  argued  that  cells  by  themselves  cannot 
produce  electricity.  Allegedly,  they  need  to  be  integrated  into  modules  to  do  so. 
However,  each  cell  by  itself  has  a  capacity  to  generate  electricity  from  sunlight  of 
typically  around  4W.  While  this  power  may  be  insufficient  for  most  applications 
which  require  an  assembly  of  multiple  cells  into  modules,  this  does  not  mean  that  a 
cell by itself does not already have the capacity to generate electricity. 

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(35)  Following  final  disclosure,  one  exporter  argued  that  the  impossibility  to  establish  a 
Normal Value for modules on the basis of the Normal Value for cells, as described in 
recital  (100)  below,  demonstrates  that  modules  and  cells  should  not  be  considered  a 
single product. 

(36) 

(37) 

In this respect, it is noted that in the majority of anti-dumping investigations, including 
the  present  investigation,  a  comparison  between  Normal  Values  and  export  prices  is 
made  on  the  basis  of  product  types.  This  is  done  since  often  a  very  broad  range  of 
product types share the same basic physical, technical and/or chemical characteristics, 
which often leads to a situation where product types with substantially different costs 
and prices fall under the definition of the "product concerned". The mere fact that it is 
not possible to establish a Normal Value for a certain product type on the basis of the 
Normal Value of another product type does not in itself mean that these product types 
cannot  be  considered  a  single  product.  As  described  in  recital  (32)  above,  both  cells 
and modules do share the same basic physical and technical characteristics, inter alia 
the functionality to generate electricity from sunlight. 

It  is  further  argued  that  if  cells  and  modules  were  one  single  product  with  minor 
differences, adjusting the prices of cells to establish a price of modules should not be 
difficult.  In  this  respect  it  is  noted  that  there  is  no  requirement  that  there  are  only 
minor  differences  between  the  different  types  of  the  product  concerned.  To  the 
contrary,  it  is  sufficient  that  the  different  types  of  the  product  concerned  share  the 
same basic physical, technical and/or chemical characteristics. In the present case, this 
is  the  case  for  modules  and  cells,  inter  alia  the  functionality  to  generate  electricity 
from sunlight. 

(38)  The  same  party  further  argued  that  cells  are  not  just  another  type  of  module,  but  an 
entirely different product. In effect, a cell is the key component of a module. As a key 
component, a cell is  clearly  not "an entirely different product",  as modules and cells 
share  the  same  basic  characteristics  of  generating  electricity  from  sunlight,  as 
indicated in recital (32) above. 

(39)  The  same  party  argued  in  addition  that  when  the  samples  for  Union  producers  and 
Chinese exporters were selected, the difference between cells and modules was taken 
into  account.  Therefore,  different  duty  rates  for  modules  and  cells  should  have  been 
established.  In  this  respect,  it  is  confirmed  that  the  difference  between  modules  and 
cells  was  indeed  taken  into  account  when  sampling  Union  producers  and  Chinese 
exporters,  as  indicated  in  recitals  (10)  and  (14)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  This, 
however, was only done to ensure that the sample is representative and does as such 
not mean that cells and modules should not be considered a single product concerned, 
or that separate duty rates should be established for cells and modules. Indeed, in order 
to ensure that the sample was representative for all product types, it was important to 
distinguish  between  cells  and  modules  when  selecting  the  sample.  Furthermore,  as 
there  was  a  certain  degree  of  uncertainty  with  regards  to  the  question  as  to  whether 
cells and modules were to be regarded as one product or as two separate products, it 
was necessary to ensure representativity for both possible outcomes. 

(40) 

In  addition,  it  is  argued  that  recital  (100)  below  stating  that  the  processing  costs  for 
modules  are  significant  is  in  contradiction  with  recital  (32)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation, which states that the value added is not concentrated in a particular stage 
of the production process. In this respect, it is recalled that recital (100) also clarifies 
that the cost difference between cells and modules is 34%, which means that 66% of 

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the  value  of  a  modules  stems  from  the  cell.  It  is  therefore  concluded  that  the  value 
added is not concentrated in a particular stage of the production process.  

(41)  Exporting  producers  claimed  that  the  fact  that  the  undertaking  imposes  different 
minimum  import  prices  and  volumes  for  cells  and  modules  allegedly  confirms  that 
modules  and  cells  are  distinct  products  requiring  two  distinct  investigations.  The 
different  minimum  import  prices,  however,  are  merely  an  indication  that  cells  and 
modules  are  different  groups  of  product  types  which  are  sold  at  different  prices. 
Therefore, it is necessary to define different prices to make the minimum import prices 
meaningful. 

(42)  Also, the fact that cells and modules are distinct groups of product types is not as such 
relevant for the definition of the product concerned. For the definition of the product 
concerned, it is sufficient that the products share the same basic characteristics and end 
uses,  which  is  the  case  for  modules  and  cells  as  described  in  recitals  (32)  and  (48) 
respectively. 

(43)  The GOC argued that the assessment whether cells and modules are a single product 
concerned does not address a number of criteria defined by the Appelate Body in EC – 
Asbestos5. However, these criteria are used for the definition of the "like product", not 
the product concerned. In other words, these criteria have to be used to define the like 
product,  for  example  the  like  product  produced  by  Union  Industry,  which  is  then 
compared  with  the  product  concerned  exported  by  the  Chinese  exporting  producers. 
These criteria are not pertinent when defining the product concerned. In any event, the 
Institutions  observe  that  the  application  of  the  criteria  used  in  EC  –  Asbestos  to  the 
definition  of  the  product  concerned  in  the  present  case  would  not  lead  to  a  different 
outcome. The first and the second criteria (properties, nature and quality respectively 
end-uses) are identical to the criteria physical, chemical and technical properties and 
end-uses  used  in  the  preceeding  recitals.  The  third  criterion  (consumers  taste  and 
habits)  is  not  really  useful  for  the  present  case,  as  cells  are  the  key  component  of 
modules; as regards the fourth criterion, tariff classification, it is noted that both cells 
and  modules  can  be  declared  under  customs  heading  8541  40  90,  while  the  customs 
headings under heading 8501 are for electric generators in general and not in particular 
for solar products. 

(44)  Other interested parties argued that an objective application of the criteria developed 
by  the  Court  of  Justice  in  previous  cases6  allegedly  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
modules and cells are different products. In this respect, it is noted that the court only 
indicated a number of criteria which may be taken into account - there is no obligation 
to use all criteria in all cases, since not all of them may be relevant. These criteria were 
assessed in recitals (27) to (39) to the provisional Regulation, where it was found that 
a  number  of  criteria  are  not  relevant  in  the  present  case.  In  the  Brosmann  case  the 
assessment  whether  different  types  of  shoes  belong  to  the  "product  concerned"  was 
also made on the basis of only three criteria which were found to be relevant. As the 
interested  parties  did  not  provide  any  reasoning  why  an  objective  application  of  the 
criteria  leads  one  to  conclude  that  modules  and  cells  are  distinct  products,  the 
argument cannot be accepted. 

5 

6 

Appelate  Body  Report,  European  Communities  –  Measures  Affecting  Asbestos  and  Asbestos-
Containting Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001 
Case T-401/06 Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd and others vs Council; Case T-314/06 Whirlpool Europe 
vs Council 

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(45) 

In addition, it is recalled that cells and modules have the same basic end uses, i.e. they 
are  sold  for  integration  into  PV  solar  systems.  The  modules  performance  is  directly 
linked  to  the  performance  of  the  cells,  as  indicated  in  recital  (28)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation. 

(46)  One interested party argued that with the exclusion of wafers from the product scope, 
and  due  to  the  significant  processing  involved  to  make  modules  from  cells,  the 
argument that cells and modules have the same end uses also stands refuted. It is also 
argued that the assessment that modules and cells have the same end uses is based on 
the assumption that wafers, modules and cells have the same production process. 

(47)  Firstly, the conclusion that the assessment that modules and cells have the same end 
uses is based on the production process is wrong. While both statements are indeed in 
the  same  recital  (36)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  this  does  not  mean  that  one 
conclusion is based on the other assumption. The word "moreover" separating the two 
statements  makes  it  clear  that  the  second  statement  is  not  based  on  the  first.  In 
addition,  the  two  statements  are  made  to  address  separate  issues  under  the  heading 
"End  use  and  interchangeability".  The  first  statement  concerning  the  production 
process  addresses  interchangeability,  while  the  second  statement  addresses  end  use. 
The underlying assumption that the assessment that modules and cells have the same 
end  uses  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  wafers,  modules  and  cells  have  the  same 
production process is therefore incorrect. 

(48)  As to the actual end use of cells and modules, it is not disputed by interested parties 
that modules and cells are sold for integration into PV solar systems. The conclusion 
that modules and cells have the same end use is therefore confirmed. 

2.3. 

Mono and multi-crystalline cells 

(49)  One interested party claimed that there was no production of mono crystalline cells in 
the Union, and that their exports of mono crystalline cells were not competing with the 
Union  industry.  The  investigation  showed  however  that  there  was  indeed  production 
of  mono  crystalline  cells  in  the  Union.  This  argument  was  therefore rejected. In any 
event, the General Court held in Brosmann that the absence of Community production 
of a particular product type is not decisive. 

2.4. 

(50) 

"Consigned from" clause 

Interested  parties  argued  that  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  investigation  was  to 
products "consigned from" the PRC, while the investigation was initiated only against 
products originating in the PRC was unjustified. 

(51)  However, goods consigned from the PRC were already covered at the initiation stage. 
In  point  5  of  the  Notice  of  Initiation7  it  is  stated  that  "companies  which  ship  the 
product concerned from the People's Republic of China but consider that part or even 
all of those exports do not have their customs origin in the People's Republic of China 
are  invited  to  come  forward  in  the  investigation  and  to  furnish  all  relevant 
information". It is therefore clear that all companies consigning goods from the PRC 
had the opportunity to co-operate in this investigation. Furthermore, since the product 
under  investigation  frequently  incorporates  components  and  parts  from  different 
countries,  it  was  also  announced  in  point  5  of  the  Notice  of  Initiation  that  "special 
provisions may be adopted" to address this issue. 

7 

OJ C 269, 6.9.2012, p. 5. 

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(52) 

It is therefore considered that all economic operators affected were duly informed of 
the possibility that special provisions in respect of goods consigned from the PRC may 
be adopted, if appropriate, and were invited to co-operate in the investigation. Thus the 
scope  of  the  investigation  was  not  extended  to  products  "consigned  from  the  PRC", 
since these were covered from the outset. 

(53)  Following disclosure, interested parties argued that irrespective of the provisions in the 
Notice  of  Initiation  referred  to  in  recital  (51)  above,  the  investigation  was  limited  to 
goods originating in the PRC and did not assess the impact of goods consigned from 
the PRC. 

(54) 

In this respect, it is noted that the following steps were taken to ensure that all goods 
consigned  from  the  PRC  were  assessed  during  the  investigation,  and  not  only  goods 
originating in the PRC: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

All companies which ship the product concerned from the PRC were invited to 
come forward in the investigation irrespective of the origin of the goods. 

In  Annex  A  of  the  Notice  of  initiation,  exporters  were  asked  to  report 
information  for  all  products  manufactured  by  the  company.  This  information 
was not limited to goods originating in the PRC. 

On  the  basis  of  this  information,  which  contained  all  exports  to  the  EU 
irrespective of the origin of the goods, a representative sample was selected. 

The sampled producers received a questionnaire for "producers exporting to the 
European  Union",  and  the  PRC  was  referred  to  as  "country  concerned",  not 
country of origin. It was therefore clear that all goods irrespective of the origin 
of the goods were investigated. 

(55)  On this basis, it is concluded that the investigation covered all goods originating in or 
consigned from the PRC, and that the findings of the investigation, including dumping 
and injury, cover all goods originating in or consigned from the PRC. 

(56)  Following final disclosure, interested parites argued that the complaint contained only 
prima  facie  evidence  concerning  imports  of  solar  panels  originating  in  the  PRC,  not 
goods  consigned  from  the  PRC.  In  this  respect,  it  needs  to  be  clarified  that  the 
complaint  indeed  covered goods "from the PRC", which can be seen from the  cover 
page submitted by the applicant bearing the stamp. Before this page, there is another 
page on the file which indeed uses the wording "originating in the People's Republic 
of China". But this case was not part of the document submitted by the complainant, 
but  added  as  a  cover  page  by  the  Commission  Services,  using  the  name  of  the 
investigation rather than repeating the title of the complaint. It is therefore considered 
that the complaint covered all goods from the PRC, whether originating in the PRC or 
not. 

(57)  Chinese exporting producers further argued that exporting producers in third countries 
cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  have  known  that  their  products  could  also  be 
targeted by the investigation. In this respect it is noted that the measures do not apply 
to  goods  which  are  in  transit  in  the  sense  of  Article  V  GATT.  Therefore,  exporting 
producers  which  have  no  operations  in  the  PRC  are  not  affected  by  the  measures. 
Furthermore, no exporting producers in third countries came forward raising the issue 
that the products they export are subject to the anti-dumping duty. 

(58)  The same exporting producers argued that exporting producers in third countries were 
not asked to come forward, and not given the opportunity to show that their products 

EN 

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are not dumped. The Institutions consider that those exporting producers without any 
operations  in  the PRC  are not affected  by the measures, as their goods, if consigned 
from the PRC, will have been in transit. All other exporting producers were informed 
by the Notice of Initiation that their operations are part of the investigation. 

(59)  The GOC argued that while Article 1(3) of the basic Regulation allows deviating from 
the principle that the exporting country is the country of origin, this Article cannot be 
used in the present case. In support of this claim they argue that no complete analysis 
whether  the  exporting  country  may  be  an  intermediary  country.  The  Institutions 
disagree  with  this  interpretation  of  Article  1  (3)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  No  party 
contests that there is significant production in the PRC. Whether or not the PRC is the 
country  of  origin  of  the  finished  goods  depends  on  several  factors.  The  analysis  of 
dumping, injury, causation and Union interest carried out by the Institutions refers to 
that production, irrespective of the question whether the finished exported good has its 
customs  origin  in  the  PRC.  As  there  were  strong  indications  that  not  all  products 
which were at least partially produced in the PRC would be considered to have their 
customs origin in the PRC, the Institutions decided that it was necessary to cover also 
products for which the PRC is only an intermediary country. 

(60)  The GOC further argued that since no Chinese exporter has been granted MET, there 
is  no  comparable  price  for  solar  panels  in  ine  PRC,  and  as  a  consequence  the  PRC 
cannot be used as an intermediate country. However, in this respect it is noted that the 
three  conditions  of  Article  1(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  are  given  as  examples  only, 
and  not  all  conditions  may  be  relevant  in  all  cases.  In  the  present  case,  since  no 
Chinese exporter has been granted MET, the comparable price had to be established in 
the analogue country – and this comparable price is the same irrespective of whether 
The  PRC  is  considered  the  country  of  origin  or  the  intermediate  country.  Therefore, 
the issue whether there is a comparable price "in that country" is irrelevant, as in the 
present  case  the  comparable  price  is  not  established  "in  that  country",  but  in  the 
analogue country. 

2.5. 

Solar chargers 

(61)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  definition  of 
"solar  chargers  that  consist  of  less  than  six  cells"  is  too  narrow,  and  should  be 
extended to products with a similar function which are not covered by this definition 
such as products with a similar size using a larger number of smaller cells. 

(62) 

(63) 

In addition, interested parties claimed that the definition of "silicon PV products that 
are permanently integrated into electrical goods" is too narrow, as only the complete 
electrical good is excluded, while solar components for integration into the electrical 
goods are not necessarily excluded. 

Indeed, an analysis of the above arguments showed that it is more appropriate to add 
to  the  exclusion  of  such  products  a  criterion  on  the  basis  of  a  technical  standard.  In 
particular,  it  was  established  that  the  definitions  of  the  following  standard  more 
appropriately  define  the  products  which  should  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
measures: international Standard IEC 61730-1, Application Classes, Class C: Limited 
Voltage, limited power applications (p. 13)8. 

(64)  Following  definitive  disclosure,  comments  were  received  concerning  the  exclusion 
based  on  the  international  standard  mentioned  above.  It  was  argued  that  rather  than 

8 

Reference number CEI/IEC 61730-1:2004 

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referring to the standard, it would be more appropriate to define the exclusion on the 
basis of the output voltage and the power output as "modules or panels with a output 
voltage  not  exceeding  50  V  DC  and  a  power  output  not  exceeding  50  W  solely  for 
direct  use  as  battery  chargers  in  systems  with  the  same  voltage  and  power 
characteristics". This claim could be accepted, and the exclusion is finally determined 
according to this definition. 

2.6. 

Roof-integrated solar modules 

(65)  Another  interested  party  claimed  that  roof-integrated  solar  modules  should  be 
excluded  from  the  product  scope  of  the  investigation,  since  they  combine  the 
functionality of a solar module with that of a roof tile or slate. Therefore, they would 
not be directly interchangeable with a standard solar module. 

(66)  The  investigation,  however,  showed  that  both  standard  modules  and  the  roof-
integrated  solar  modules  have  to  comply  with  the  same  electrical  standards.  In 
addition  while  the  roof-integrated  solar  module  cannot  be  simply  replaced  with  a 
standard module, it can be replaced by a standard module plus roof tiles or slate. These 
products  therefore  have  the  same  basic  technical  property  of  generating  electricity 
from  sunlight.  The  added  functionality  (which  is  otherwise  provided  by  roofing 
material)  was  not  considered  substantial  and  does  not  warrant  an  exclusion  of  roof-
integrated solar modules from the product scope. 

(67)  Following  definitive  disclosure,  the  same  interested  party  argued  that  the  absence  of 
dual-interchangeability  between  roof-integrated  solar  modules  and  standard  solar 
modules is an indication that roof-integrated solar modules should  be excluded from 
the  scope  of  the  measures,  referring  to  the  footware9  case  in  general  and  special 
technology  athletics  footwear  'STAF'  in  particular.  However,  the  reasons  for  the 
exclusion  of  STAF  were  numerous,  and  the  absence  of  dual  interchangeability  by 
itself was not considered a sufficient ground by the General Court in the Brosmann10 
case, which confirmed that very different product such as city trotters and hiking boots 
can  indeed  be  considered  product  concerned  in  a  single  anti-dumping  investigation 
despite their differences. 

(68) 

In  addition,  the  interested  party  argued  that  due  to  the  absence  of  production  in  the 
Union  and  the  fact  that  the  interested  party  holds  intellectual  property  rights  is 
allegedly  a  confirmation  that  roof-integrated  solar  modules  are  innovative  and 
different  from  any  other  product.  However,  referring  again  to  the  footwear  case 
mentioned  by  the  interested  party,  the  General  Court  held  in  Brosmann  that  “the 
absence  of  Community  production  of  that  type  of  footwear  and  the  existence  of  a 
patent  are  not  conclusive."11.  As  a  result,  patented  technology  footwear  was 
considered product concerned in that case. 

(69)  The interested party also argued that roof-integrated solar modules should be excluded 
from the definition of the product concerned, since they are sold at substantially higher 
prices than standard modules. Also, in the footwear case STAF above a certain price 
were excluded from the definition of the product concerned. In this respect, it is noted 
that a roof-integrated solar module does combine the functionality of a solar module 

9 

10 
11 

Footwear  with  uppers  of  leather  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and  Vietnam, 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 553/2006 of 23 March 2006 (prov.); 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 (def.). 
Case T-401/06 , Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd. vs Council of the European Union, para 133. 
Case T-401/06 , Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd. vs Council of the European Union, para 135. 

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(70) 

and roof tile or slate, as indicated in recital (66) above. A direct comparison of prices 
is therefore not meaningful, as the added functionality naturally leads to higher prices. 

the  exclusion  from 

In  response  to  this  argument,  the  interested  party  argued  that  on  the  basis  of  this 
argumentation, it would be impossible to ever invoke price differences as an additional 
this 
indicator  warranting 
interpretation is too far-reaching. What is said in the previous recital is merely that in 
this particular case where the roof-integrated modules combine the functionality of the 
product  concerned  plus  another  product  (in  this  case  roof  tile  or  slate),  the  price  is 
naturally not meaningful. This in no way means that in other cases the price difference 
cannot  be  a  useful  indicator  to  establish  whether  a  product  should  be  excluded  from 
the definition of the product concerned. 

the  product  scope.  However, 

(71)  Lastly,  the  interested  party  argued  that  its  supplier  of  roof-integrated  solar  modules 
should be granted access to the minimum price undertaking. However, it appears that 
the Chinese exporter concerned did not co-operate in the investigation, and as a non-
cooperating  party  is  not  eligible  to  participate  in  the  undertaking.  These  request  can 
therefore not be accepted. 

3. 

(72) 

Conclusion 

In view of the above, the product scope is definitively defined as crystalline silicon PV 
modules  or  panels  and  cells  of  the  type  used  in  crystalline  silicon  PV  modules  or 
panels, originating in or consigned from the PRC unless they are in transit in the sense 
of Article V GATT. The cells have a thickness not exceeding 400 micrometres. This 
product is currently falling within CN codes ex 8501 31 00, ex 8501 32 00, ex 8501 33 
00, ex 8501 34 00, ex 8501 61 20, ex 8501 61 80, ex 8501 62 00, ex 8501 63 00, ex 
8501 64 00 and ex 8541 40 90. 

(73)  The  following  product  types  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of  the  product 

concerned: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

solar  chargers  that  consist  of  less  than  six  cells,  are  portable  and  supply 
electricity to devices or charge batteries, 

thin film photovoltaic products, 

crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  products  that  are  permanently  integrated  into 
electrical goods, where the function of the electrical goods is other than power 
generation, and where these electrical goods consume the electricity generated 
by the integrated crystalline silicon photovoltaic cell(s). 

modules or panels with a output voltage not exceeding 50 V DC and a power 
output not exceeding 50 W solely for direct use as battery chargers in systems 
with the same voltage and power characteristics.  

(74)  Following the exclusion of wafers, the analysis has been revised by excluding the data 
and  analysis  related  to  wafers,  unless  otherwise  indicated.  Given  that  wafers 
represented only a small percentage of imports of the product concerned in the Union 
(around 2 % in value) during the IP, the exclusion of wafers is considered to have a 
negligible impact if any on the findings. All comments by interested parties have been 
addressed  but  any  reference  to  wafers  even  if  raised  has  been  excluded.  As  a 
consequence all references and related data concerning wafers reported in the recitals 
to the provisional Regulation are no longer applicable, even when relevant recitals are 
confirmed by this Regulation. 

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(75)  Consequently,  the  provisional  conclusions,  modified  as  set  out  under  recitals  (26)  to 
(74)  above,  were  definitively  confirmed.  For  the  purposes  of  this  proceeding  and  in 
accordance  with  consistent  practice,  it  was  therefore  considered  that  all  types  of  the 
product concerned should be regarded as forming one single product. 

1. 

The PRC 

1.1. 

Market Economy Treatment (MET) 

C. 

DUMPING 

(77) 

(76)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  MET 
determination  was  made  out  of  time,  i.e.  after  the  three-month  period  laid  down  in 
Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation  and  that  the  investigation  therefore  should  be 
terminated without delay. 
In  this  respect,  these  parties  argued  that  the  amendment  of  the  basic  Regulation12 
purportedly  extending  the  deadline  to  make  the  MET  determination  to  eight  months 
only entered into force after the expiry of previously applicable three months deadline. 
The  amendment  would  apply  only  to  future  investigations  and  to  pending 
investigations  where  the  deadline  for  making  the  MET  determination  had  not  yet 
lapsed at that time. 

(78)  However, Article 2 of the amendment of the basic Regulation clearly states that "this 
Regulation  shall  apply  to  all  new  and  to  all  pending  investigations  as  from 
15 December  2012".  This  Article,  or  indeed  the  whole  Regulation,  does  not  contain 
any reference to the restriction "where the deadline for making the MET determination 
had not yet lapsed" claimed by the interested parties. Therefore, this argument cannot 
be accepted. 

(79)  Following final disclosure, several interested parties re-iterated their argument that the 
MET  determination  was  made  out  of  time,  without  challenging  the  fact  that  the 
amendment  of  the  basic  Regulation  referred  to  in  recital  (78)  above  applies  to  "all 
pending investigations", which includes the present investigation. It is therefore finally 
concluded that the MET determination was not made out of time. 

(80)  Following  final  disclosure,  one  exporter  claimed  that  MET  should  not  have  been 
denied  because  three  companies  which  ceased  operations  during  2011  did  not  have 
one clear set of basic accounting records. In particular, it was questioned pursuant to 
which  accounting  standard  a  company  which  ceased  operations  should  nevertheless 
prepare such accounting records. 

(81) 

In this respect it is noted that the accounting standards do not define which companies 
are  required  to  prepare  financial  statements  -  accounting  standards  define  how  these 
statements have to be prepared. In the case of The PRC, it is the "Accounting Standard 
for  Business  Enterprises:  Basic  Standard"  which  defines  in  its  Article  4  that  "an 
enterprise shall prepare financial reports". This is a mandatory obligation, and there is 
no exemption for companies which ceased operation. 

(82)  Furthermore,  even  though  these  companies  ceased  operation,  they  still  owned  assets 
(including land, buildings, machinery and stocks) and liabilities and did exist as legal 
entities at least until early 2013. It is therefore considered that these companies were 

12 

Regulation  (EU)  1168/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  December  2012, 
OJ L 344, 14.12.2012, p. 1. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

                                                 
obliged  to  publish  accounting  records  for  the  year  2011,  and  the  lack  of  these 
accounting records constitutes a violation of criterion 2. 

(83)  Following  final  disclosure,  exporters  also  claimed  that  the  benefits  received  from 
preferential tax regime(s) and grants do not represent a significant proportion of their 
turnover, which is allegedly confirmed by the parallel anti-subsidy investigation. 

(84) 

In this respect, it is recalled that this argument was already addressed in recital (65) to 
the provisional Regulation. It was stressed that in particular due to the nature of this 
advantage,  the  absolute  benefit  received  during  the  IP  is  irrelevant  for  assessing 
whether the distortion is 'significant'. This claim is therefore rejected. 

(85) 

In  the  absence  of  other  comments  regarding  the  Market  Economy  Treatment,  all 
determinations in recitals (50) to (69) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

1.2. 

Individual examination 

(86)  As  indicated  in  recital  (70)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  18  cooperating  exporting 
producers  or  groups  of  exporting  producers  not  selected  in  the  sample  submitted 
claims for individual examination pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. In 
the  present  case,  the  sample  already  consisted  of  seven  groups  of  companies,  which 
typically  consist  of  a  number  of  exporting  producers,  related  traders  and  related 
importers in the Union and third countries. An individual examination of 18 additional 
(groups  of)  exporting  producers,  in  addition  to  the  seven  groups  of  exporting 
producers  included  in  the  sample,  would  be  unduly  burdensome  and  would  prevent 
completion of the investigation in good time 

(87) 

1.3. 

(88) 

In the absence of other comments regarding individual examination, all determinations 
in recitals (70) to (71) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

Analogue Country 

Interested  parties  noted  that  India  is  not  a  suitable  analogue  country  due  to  local 
content  provisions  for  projects  of  the  "Jawaharlal  Nehru  National  Solar  Mission" 
('JNNSM'). One party alleged that a 75% local content is required, while another party 
alleged  that  Indian  producers  can  charge  higher  prices  for  100%  domestically 
produced modules. They further alleged that such requirements significantly increase 
prices  of  local  products.  In  support  of  this  claim,  an  Indian  press  article  was 
submitted13. However, this Article was published almost one year after the end of the 
IP, and no proof for its impact during the IP has been provided. 

(89)  However,  the  same  press  article  reported  that  the  Indian  solar  industry  faces  "stiff 
competition from western and Chinese manufacturers". This is supported by the steady 
increase of imports into India, as stated in recital (92) below. While the local content 
requirements may indeed have a certain impact on the Indian domestic market, a clear 
conclusion  can  nevertheless  be  drawn  that  the  Indian  market  is  a  competitive  one, 
where numerous Indian and foreign companies effectively compete with each other. 
In  addition,  according  to  information  published  by  the  JRC14,  the  majority  of  the 
JNNSM  projects  will  come  on-line  from  2015  onwards.  Indeed,  the  target  for  grid-
connected  PV  systems  under  the  JNNSM  for  2012  was  only  50  MW  compared  to  a 
total  grid-connected  capacity  in  India  exceeding  1 GW  already  in  June  2012.  This 
shows that during the IP the importance of the JNNSM on total solar installations in 

(90) 

13 
14 

Firstpost, 12 June 2013 
JRC Scientific and Policy Report, PV Status Report 2012, p. 14 

EN 

19 

   EN 

                                                 
India  was  below  5%  and  therefore  the  impact  of  the  JNNSM  and  its  local  content 
requirements, if they already existed during the IP, a fact that has not been established 
by  the  interested  parties,  was  at  best  very  limited.  The  majority  of  the  installations 
during the IP were in the state of Gujarat (about 65%), driven by state support policies. 

(91) 

Interested parties claimed that the Indian market was de facto protected during the IP 
from imports from a variety of sources, including the PRC, because the initiation of an 
anti-dumping  investigation  was  looming  since  the  beginning  of  2012.  Indeed,  India 
initiated an anti-dumping investigation against imports of solar cells and modules from 
the PRC, Malaysia, Taiwan and the USA on 23 November 2012, i.e. only almost five 
months after the end of the IP. 

(92)  However, this allegation is not supported by the development of imports of solar cells 

and modules reported by the Indian trade statistics15: 

Values 
in 
million USD  

PRC 

Index 

Total 

Index 

April 
2010 
March 
2011 

77,33 

100 

252,63 

100 

-

April 2011 -
March 2012 

April  2012  -
March 2013 

577,24 

746 

1 348,48 

534 

371,72 

481 

827,07 

327 

(93)  The table above shows that imports of solar cells and modules dramatically increased 
by more than 600 % for the PRC and more than 400 % overall between 2010/11 and 
2011/12.  Subsequently,  the  import  values  somewhat  decreased,  but  so  did  prices  for 
solar  cells  and  modules.  Indeed,  the  drop  in  import  values  between  2011/12  and 
2012/13 is in line with the price decrease reported by specialized consultancies such as 
pvXchange  for  the  same  period,  leading  to  the  conclusion  that  the  import  volumes 
remained rather stable between 2011/12 and 2012/13. It is therefore concluded that the 
Indian market was not de facto protected during the IP from imports from a variety of 
sources, including the PRC. 

(94)  Following  final  disclosure,  the  Government  of  China  argued  that  the  USA  have 
requested  consultations  with  India  under  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  procedures 
concerning  the  local  content  requirements  of  the  JNNSM  on  6 February  2013.  The 
effect of these local content rules, in combination with the anti-dumping investigation 
mentioned  in  (91)  above,  allegedly  led  to  a  decrease  of  38%  in  value  terms  in 
April 2012 – March 2013 compared to the previous year, in contrast to the increase in 
previous years. 

15 

Indian  Import  statistics,  Commodity  Code  8541  40  11  Solar  Cells/Photovoltaic  cells  whether  or  not 
assembles  in  module/panel.  The  values  are  given  for  the  Indian  business  year,  i.e.  April-March. 
Information on volumes is given in pieces, but cells and modules are reported together. Since the value 
of a module is typically around 100 times larger than the value of a cell, the information on volumes is 
not considered reliable. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(95) 

In this respect, it is noted that the decrease in value terms is due to a decrease in prices 
rather  than  import  volumes.  Following  definitive  disclosure,  an  interested  party 
provided information on the development of imports of solar cells and modules on the 
Indian market in terms of volume between 2010 and March 2013. This data shows a 
steady increase if imports of solar modules and cells into the Indian market in terms of 
volume. It is therefore concluded that the Indian market was not de facto protected due 
to a looming anti-dumping investigation, and the claimed, but not proven, in any event 
at  the  very  best  minor  effects  of  the  local  content  requirements  under  the  JNNSM 
mentioned in recital (90) above did not prevent a steady increase in imports in terms of 
volume. 

(96) 

In addition, it is pointed out that the period of April 2012 – March 2013 showing the 
alleged effects of the JNNSM on imports into India is predominantly after the IP. Any 
possible impact of this alleged decrease on the IP can therefore only be minor. 

(97)  One  interested  party  alleged  that  Tata  Power  Solar  ('Tata')  only  recently  entered  the 
market, and is therefore not a suitable analogue country producer. In this respect, it is 
noted that the company, previously "Tata BP Solar", is producing solar modules since 
1989  and  can  therefore  not  be  considered  having  entered  the  market  only  recently. 
Indeed, according to information provided by another interested party, Tata entered the 
market significantly earlier than the five largest sampled Chinese exporters. 

(98)  One interested party claimed that Taiwan would be a more suitable analogue country 
than India, since the size of the Taiwanese companies is more comparable to the size 
of  the  Chinese  exporters,  and  there  is  also  co-operation  from  Taiwanese  producers. 
Also,  other  interested  parties  questioned  whether  India  would  be  a  reasonable 
analogue country given the comparably small size of Tata without proposing a more 
suitable alternative. 

(99) 

Indeed,  Taiwanese  companies  co-operated.  One  company  fully  co-operated,  while 
another  company  only  co-operated  partially.  The  sole  fully  co-operating  Taiwanese 
company is however smaller than Tata, in particular in terms of sales and production 
of  modules  which  account  for  around  90%  of  the  sales  of  the  product  concerned, 
where  Tata  sells  substantially  more  than  the  Taiwanese  company  who  only  has 
insignificant  sales  in  this  respect,  as  mentioned  in  recital  (76)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation. Following definitive disclosure, one exporter asked whether the partially 
co-operating Taiwanese company was contacted to furnish the missing information. In 
this respect it is referred to recital (76) to the provisional Regulation, which clarifies 
that Taiwan could not be used as analogue country since the co-operating Taiwanese 
companies almost exclusively produced cells, while the Chinese exports are mainly in 
the form of modules. This also applies to the partly co-operating Taiwanese producer. 
Since  this  producer  was  already  considered  unsuitable  for  this  reason,  it  was  not 
considered appropriate to request additional information from this company. 

(100)  The same interested party claimed that the almost complete lack of sales of modules 
does not disqualify Taiwan as analogue country per se, since the processing costs from 
making  cells  into  modules  can  be  established  without  much  difficulty.  This  is, 
however,  not  supported  by  the  facts  of  the  investigation.  Producing  a  module  from 
cells requires multiple steps of production, during which a significant part of the value 
added  of  the  module  is  created.  As  indicated  in  recital  (137)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation, during the IP the average price difference between cells and modules was 
EUR 555,92  or  54%,  while  the  average  cost  difference  amounted  to  EUR  377,99  or 
34%. This would mean that a significant share of a possible Taiwanese Normal Value 

EN 

21 

   EN 

for modules would have to be based on adjustments for processing costs, which cannot 
be considered more reasonable than a country where the Normal Value can be based 
on domestic sales prices for most of the product concerned. It is therefore considered 
that  India  has  been  selected  as  analogue  country  in  a  reasonable  manner,  taking 
account of the available reliable information. 

(101)  Another  interested  party  argued  that  no  reasons  were  given  why  the  USA  was  not 
considered an appropriate analogue country. In this respect reference is made to recital 
(74) to the provisional Regulation, where it is clearly stated "that the USA would not 
be  a  suitable  analogue  country,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  US  market  was 
protected  from  Chinese  imports  during  part  of  the  IP  by  anti-dumping  and  anti-
subsidy  measures."  Since  no  comments  on  the  protection  of  the  US  market  as  such 
were received, the position in this respect remains unchanged. 

(102)  Interested parties argued that the result of the dumping calculation is distorted due to 
differences  in  economies  of  scale  between  the  Chinese  producers  and  the  Indian 
producer.  It  was  therefore  checked  whether  a  correlation  between  a  company's 
production volume and its dumping margin indeed exists. 

(103)  Of  the  seven  company  groups  included  in  the  sample,  there  are  two  medium  sized 
company  groups  (Jinzhou  Yangguang  and  Delsolar)  and  five  large  company  groups 
(JingAo, LDK, Suntech, Trina and Yingli). Of the medium sized companies, Jinzhou 
Yangguang  has  the  lowest  margin,  while  Delsolar  has  the  highest  margin.  The  five 
larger  companies  are  in-between.  This  clearly  demonstrates  the  absence  of  any 
correlation  between  economies  of  scale  and  dumping  margins.  Therefore,  it  is 
considered  that  the  dumping  calculation  is  not  distorted  due  to  differences  in 
economies of scale between the Chinese producers and the Indian producer. 

(104)  Following  definitive  disclosure,  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  absence  of  any 
correlation between economies of scale and dumping margins does not show that there 
is  no  impact  of  economies  of  scale  and  the  comparability  of  prices.  In  a  situation 
where the dumping margin is based on an identical Normal Value for all exporters as 
in  the  present  case,  the  dumping  margin  is  mainly  driven  by  the  export  prices.  The 
absence of any correlation between economies of scale and dumping margin therefore 
equally demonstrates the absence of any correlation between economies of scale and 
sales  prices.  It  is  therefore  concluded  that  differences  in  economies  of  scale  do  not 
affect the comparability of prices in the present case. 

(105)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the analogue  country  producer  had  extremely  high 
domestic sales prices, which allegedly are significantly higher than the sales prices of 
the Union industry, since the dumping margin significantly exceeds the undercutting 
margin.  This  claim  was  made  by  comparing  Indian  Normal  Values  with  the  sales 
prices  of  the  Union  industry.  This  comparison  is,  however,  flawed  since  the  Indian 
Normal Value is based on the profitable sales only. Especially in a situation where the 
Union industry is loss-making, it is not surprising that profitable prices in India exceed 
the  average  Union  industry  price.  Therefore,  the  fact  that  the  Indian  Normal  Value 
exceeds average Union industry prices does not demonstrate that the choice of India as 
analogue country is unreasonable. 

(106)  One interested party argued that Tata's prices are distorted, since it is related to Tata 
Power,  a  utility  company.  This  allegedly  allows  Tata  to  charge  higher  prices  in  the 
areas served by Tata Power. However, no supporting evidence was provided, and no 
quantification of this alleged effect was provided either. This claim could therefore not 
be accepted. 

EN 

22 

   EN 

(107)  Following  definitive  disclosure,  one  exporter  argued  that  Tata  is  an  uncompetitive 
company with high production costs and sales prices, which was allegedly the reason 
why BP Solar withdrew from the joint venture in December 2011. In support of this, a 
press  article  is  quoted,  stating  that  "BP's  exit  from  the  solar  industry  after  some  four 
decades  shows  how  competitive  and  crowded  the  solar  market  has  become."  However, 
this article did not single out Tata as an uncompetitive company, it addressed the situation 
on  the  market  for  solar  panels  in  general,  speaking  about  "cutthroat  competition  that 
marks an industry", and that "many companies worldwide have closed factories, laid off 
hundreds  of  workers  and  filed  for  bankruptcies".  This  press  article  can  therefore  not 
demonstrate that Tata is an uncompetitive company with high production costs and sales 
prices. 

(108)  Following  disclosure,  one  exporter  argued  that  Tata  was  not  included  as  part  of  the 
Indian domestic industry in the on-going Indian anti-dumping investigation mentioned 
in recital (91) above, due to its significant imports of cells. While it is confirmed that 
Tata  is  indeed  not  part  of  the  Indian  domestic  industry  in  the  on-going  Indian  anti-
dumping  investigation,  this  does  not  automatically  mean  than  Tata  is  not  a  suitable 
analogue  country  producer.  The  Normal  Value  was  based  exclusively  on  cells  and 
modules produced by Tata in India, and not on imported goods. The fact that imported 
components were used in the production of some of the products does not mean that 
the  resulting  Normal  Value  is  not  representative  for  India,  even  more  so  since  it  is 
predominantly based on sales prices and not on costs. 

(109)  The Government of China argued that Tata's sales of modules allegedly only represent 
only 0,3% of the Chinese exports to the EU and cannot be considered representative, 
referring to the Detlef Nölle16 judgment of the Court. In that case, the Court considered 
that when the total production in a country is only 1,25% of the export volume to the 
EU, this amounts to an indication that the market considered is not very representative. 
In the present case, the Government of China did not compare the total production in 
India with the total Chinese exports, but only the production of one Indian company 
with  the  total  exports  of  all  Chinese  exporters.  This  comparison  is  however  flawed, 
since in a competitive market with multiple players the quantities relating to only one 
producer  are  not  indicative  of  the  representativity  of  the  market  as  a  whole.  In 
addition,  it  is  not  the  comparison  which  was  made  in  the  Detlef  Nölle  case  either, 
where the total production of the country was compared with total exports. According 
to information provided by the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of 
Machinery ('CCCME'), production in India was forecasted to exceed 2 GW before the 
end of 2012, i.e. shortly after the end of the IP. Such a production would be equal to 
14% of Chinese exports to the EU, well above the 5% indicative threshold mentioned 
in the Detlef Nölle judgment. 

(110)  Following disclosure, one interested party referred to the fact that Tata lacks upstream 
integration  and  has  to  source  wafers  from  third  parties.  Allegedly,  this  lack  of 
upstream  vertical  integration  leads  to  an  increase  of  costs  compared  to  vertically 
integrated Chinese producers. This claim was however not substantiated. In particular, 
the  total  cost  of  Tata  would  only  be  higher  if  their  purchase  price  for  wafers  would 
exceed the cost of production of a wafer, which is uncertain since many companies in 
the  solar  business  have  been  loss-making  during  the  IP.  Furthermore,  even  large 
vertically  integrated  Chinese  producers  often  purchased  significant  quantities  of 
wafers  from  independent  suppliers,  which  supports  the  conclusion  that  the  lack  of 

16 

Case C-16/90, Detlef Nölle vs Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, ECR I-5163 

EN 

23 

   EN 

                                                 
vertical integration into wafers does not necessarily lead to higher costs for  modules 
and cells.  

(111)  One interested party argued that the analogue country is uncompetitive. This claim is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  the  production  of  solar  cells  in  India  is  at  a  5-year  low  in 
2013.  The  report  quoted  by  that  interested  party  however  showed  during  the  IP  the 
Indian  cell  production  was  still  at  a  high  level  close  to  the  peak  reported.  The 
significant decrease in production occurred after the IP, and therefore had no impact 
on the results of the investigation. 

(112)  Another  argument  brought  forward  to  support  the  claim  that  the  analogue  country  is 
uncompetitive is the anti-dumping investigation mentioned in recital (91) above. The 
Institutions  observe  that  that  investigation  is  still  on-going,  and  that  therefore,  no 
conclusions can be drawn from it. In general, anti-dumping investigations are not an 
indication  for a lack  of competitiveness, but  an  indication  that  the  domestic  industry 
considers that  it is subject  to  unfair trade  practices from competitors  located  in third 
countries. 

(113)  On balance, the Commission considers that the choice of India as an analogue country 

is not unreasonable. 

(114)  In the absence of other comments regarding the Analogue Country, all determinations 

in recitals (72) to (77) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

1.4. 

Normal Value 

(115)  Following the provisional disclosure, one interested party commented that the Indian 
companies mainly sold off-grid modules, which have higher prices and costs than the 
grid-connected modules sold by the Chinese exporters. It was further claimed that off-
grid modules typically have a lower power output than grid-connected modules. 

(116)  In this respect, it is noted that different Normal Values were established for "standard-
sized" modules with more than 36 cells which are typically grid connected and smaller 
modules  with  36  cells  or  less  which  are  typically  used  off-grid.  It  is  therefore 
considered  that  an  appropriate  Normal  Value  is  established  for  all  product  types, 
including off-grid modules and grid-connected modules. 

(117)  Another interested party stated that Tata is also active as a project developer, and the 
sales  of  this  company  are  therefore  not  comparable  with  sales  of  modules  only  by 
Chinese  exporting  producers.  In  this  respect  it  is  noted  that  the  comparison  between 
domestic Indian prices and Chinese export prices were exclusively made for sales of 
modules,  and  sales  of  complete  projects  or  integrated  solutions  were  not  used  to 
establish Normal Value as they were not considered to be comparable. 

(118)  In  the  absence  of  other  comments  regarding  Normal  Value,  all  determinations  in 

recitals (78) to (86) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

1.5. 

Export price 

(119)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  some  of  the  sampled  exporters  commented  on 
minor issues concerning the export price used to establish the dumping margin. Where 
warranted,  the  comments  were  taken  into  account  and  led  to  a  slight  revision  of  the 
dumping margin of the companies concerned. 

(120)  In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  regarding  export  price,  all  determinations  in 

recitals (87) to (89) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

1.6. 

Comparison 

EN 

24 

   EN 

(121)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  some  of  the  sampled  exporters  commented  on 
minor  issues  concerning  the  allowances  used  to  compare  export  prices.  Where 
warranted,  the  comments  were  taken  into  account  and  led  to  a  slight  revision  of  the 
dumping margin of the companies concerned. 

(122)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  a  clerical  error  resulting  in  an  incorrect 
adjustment  to  Normal  Value  for  domestic  freight  was  discovered.  This  error  was 
corrected and led to a slight decrease in dumping margins. 

(123)  Following disclosure, one interested party claimed that an adjustment for level of trade 
may  be  warranted,  since  the  party  does  not  sell  directly  to  installers,  but  to  resellers 
and distributors. The party requested detailed information on the sales channels of the 
analogue  country  producer,  which  could  not  be  provided  to  protect  confidential 
information.  As  an  alternative,  the  customer  base  of  the  analogue  country  producer 
was  categorized  into  different  categories  according  to  sales  volume,  which  showed 
that a level of trade adjustment was not warranted. 

(124)  In  response  to  this  analysis,  the  interested  party  admitted  that  a  difference  in  sales 
quantities  would  result  in  price  differences,  but  maintained  their  argument  that  they 
would allegedly charge higher prices to installers than distributors/resellers even if the 
installer would buy a similar quantity than the distributor/reseller. However, this claim 
was not substantied and could therefore not be taken into account. 

(125)  In  the  absence  of  any  other  comment  regarding  export  price,  all  determinations  in 

recitals (90) to (92) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

1.7. 

Dumping margins 

(126)  One  sampled  exporting  producer  requested  a  full  disclosure  of  its  dumping 
calculations, claiming that it could otherwise not comment on the accuracy thereof. As 
this company was not granted MET, its normal value was based on data from India as 
analogue  country.  Given  that  only  one  producer  in  the  analogue  country  fully  co-
operated  in  the  investigation,  information  from  the  analogue  country  cannot  be 
disclosed  on  a  product  type  level  in  order  to  protect  confidential  information. 
Therefore, the claim needs to be rejected. 

(127)  For  the  sampled  companies,  the  weighted  average  normal  value  of  each  type  of  the 
like  product  established  for  the  analogue  country  was  compared  with  the  weighted 
average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, as provided 
for in Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. 

(128)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin  of  the  cooperating  exporting  producers  not 
included in the sample was calculated in accordance with the provisions of Article 9(6) 
of the basic Regulation. Accordingly, that margin was established on the basis of the 
margins established for the sampled exporting producers. 

(129)  On  that  basis,  the  definitive  dumping  margin  for  the  cooperating  companies  not 

included in the sample was established at 88,1 %. 

(130)  With  regard  to  all  other  exporting  producers  in  the  PRC,  the  dumping  margins  were 
established  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  available  in  accordance  with  Article  18  of  the 
basic  Regulation.  To  that  end  the  level  of  cooperation  was  first  established  by 
comparing the volume of exports to the Union reported by the cooperating exporting 
producers with the volume of Chinese exports, as established in recital (167). 

(131)  As  the  cooperation  accounted  for  more  than  80  %  of  total  Chinese  exports  to  the 
Union, the level of cooperation can be considered high. Since there was no reason to 

EN 

25 

   EN 

believe  that  any  exporting  producer  deliberately  abstained  from  cooperating,  the 
residual dumping margin was set at the level of the sampled company with the highest 
dumping margin. This was considered appropriate since there were no indications that 
the non- cooperating companies were dumping at a lower level, and in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of any measure. 

(132)  On  this  basis  the  definitive  dumping  margins  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  CIF 

Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: 

Company 

Trina 

Energy  Co. 

Changzhou 
Ltd
Solar 
Trina  Solar  (Changzhou)  Science  &  Technology  Co. 
Ltd 
Changzhou 
Trina 
Yancheng Trina Solar Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Co. 
(Shanghai)  Co. 

Technology 

Energy 

Ltd
Ltd

Youze 

Solar 

Delsolar (Wujiang) Ltd, 

LDK 

Jiangxi 
LDK 
LDK 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech (Suzhou) Co. Ltd 

Solar 
Solar  Hi-Tech 

Solar 
Hi-Tech 

Hi-Tech 
(Hefei) 

Ltd
Ltd
(Nanchang)  Co.  Ltd

Co. 
Co. 

JA 

Solar 
Solar 

Ltd
Ltd
Solar  Technology  Yangzhou  Co.  Ltd
Ltd

JingAo 
Shanghai 
JA 
Hefei 
Shanghai JA Solar PV Technology Co. Ltd 

Co. 
Technology  Co. 

Technology 

Solar 

Co. 

JA 

Energy 

Yangguang 

Jinzhou 
Ltd
Jinzhou  Huachang  Photovoltaic  Technology  Co.  Ltd
Jinzhou  Jinmao  Photovoltaic  Technology  Co.  Ltd
Silicon  Materials  Co.  Ltd
Jinzhou  Rixin 
Jinzhou Youhua Silicon Materials Co. Ltd 

Co. 

Co. 

Co. 

Power 

Power 

Suntech 

Sun-Shine 
Suntech 

Ltd
Wuxi 
Ltd
Suntech 
Ltd
Wuxi 
Luoyang 
Ltd
Zhenjiang  Ren  De  New  Energy  Science  Technology 
Co. 
Ltd
Zhenjiang  Rietech  New  Energy  Science  Technology 
Co. Ltd 

Power 
Power 

Co. 
Co. 

Energy 

(China) 

Yingli 
Ltd
Baoding  Tianwei  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co. 
Ltd 
Hainan  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co.  Ltd
Hengshui  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co.  Ltd

Co. 

Dumping 
Margin 

90,3 % 

111,5 % 

91,9 % 

97,5 % 

53,8 % 

73,2 % 

93,3 % 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tianjin  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co.  Ltd
Lixian  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co.  Ltd
Baoding  Jiasheng  Photovoltaic  Technology  Co.  Ltd
Beijing  Tianneng  Yingli  New  Energy  Resources  Co. 
Ltd 
Yingli Energy (Beijing) Co. Ltd 

Other cooperating companies (Annex I, Annex II) 

All other companies 

88,1 % 

111,5 % 

1. 

Definition of the Union industry and Union production  

D. 

INJURY 

(133)  The  like  product  was  manufactured  by  around  215  producers  in  the  Union.  The 
Institutions have verified claims by interested parties that there was a higher number; 
this  verification  has  revealed  that  the  alleged  additional  producers  were  in  reality 
mostly exporting producers, importers related to those, distributors and installers.  

(134)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  several  parties  contested  the  fact  that  data 
provided by Europressedienst, an independent consultancy firm ('the consultant'), were 
used to determine, inter alia, Union production, Union production capacity as well as 
other macroeconomic injury indicators concerning the Union industry and import data. 
These parties questioned the independence of the consultant alleging that it was linked 
to the complainant. They also requested clarifications on what basis the consultant was 
selected by the Commission and questioned its expertise in collecting economic data 
related  to  the  PV  sector.  In  this  regard,  it  was  claimed  that  the  Commission  should 
have  based  its  findings  on  data  from  other  available  sources,  in  particular  known 
research  institutes.  Lastly,  a  reference  to  Best  Practices  for  the  submission  of 
economic evidence and data collection in cases concerning the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU and in merger cases was made by AFASE to contest the reliability 
of the data submitted by the consultant. 

(135)  As regards the alleged links between the consultant and the complainant, the relevant 
interested  parties  did  not  submit  any  evidence  showing  the  existence  of  such  links. 
Likewise,  the  investigation  did  not  bring  into  light  any  evidence  of  a  relationship 
going beyond purely commercial character. Following final disclosure one interested 
party claimed that there were indications that the prima facie evidence provided by the 
complainant Union industry in the complaint were based on data provided by the same 
consultant.  Even  though  it  is  acknowledged  that  findings  for  some  indicators  were 
indeed  similar  to  the  evidence  provided  in  the  complaint  that  does  not  necessarily 
mean  that  they  were  established  on  the  basis  of  one  source  only.  In  this  regard,  the 
complaint provides the various sources used.  

(136)  As explained in recital (99) to the provisional Regulation, the Commission considered 
it appropriate to make use of this consultancy in the current investigation, due to the 
unavailability  from  other  public  sources  of  the  necessary  macro-economic  data 
covering  the  total  Union  market  as  well  as  import  data.  Prior  to  selecting 
Europressedienst the Commission assessed the methodology used by the consultant for 
the  collection  of  the  relevant  data  as  well  as  the  consultant’s  ability  to  provide  the 
necessary data separately for all product types and for the entire period considered.  

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(137)  Furthermore,  during  the  investigation,  data  provided  by  the  consultant  were  counter 
checked  when  possible  with  other  available  sources  and  were  confirmed.  In  this 
respect,  it  is  noted  that  several  research  companies  specialised  in  collecting  PV 
statistics exist on the market and the figures reported are almost never identical. This 
is due to the fact that precise figures are difficult to derive for any research  institute 
and  therefore  the  reported  PV  market  indicators  will  always  be  based  on  estimates, 
independently  of  the  provider  of  such  figure.  In  this  context,  the  cross-checking 
exercise carried out by the Commission consisted of comparing the trends of the data 
received  from  the  consultant  with  the  trends  of  the  same  data  published  by  other 
research companies, the Commission's Joint Research Center ('JRC') and the European 
Photovoltaic  Industry  Association  ('EPIA')  on  the  same  topics,  when  available.  No 
significant  differences  were  noticed  as  a  result  of  the  cross-checking  exercise  as  the 
trends  of  the  indicators  for  which  the  cross-checking  was  done  were  similar. 
Provisional  findings  were  therefore  not  solely  based  on  data  provided  by  the 
consultant but also on the Commission’s own analysis and assessment of these data. In 
addition,  as  mentioned  above  in  recital  (9),  after  the  imposition  of  provisional 
measures  a  verification  visit  took  place  at  the  premises  of  the  consultant.  The 
Commission  carried  out  the  on-the-spot  check  at  the  consultant’s  premises  to  verify 
the  reliability  of  the  methodology  and  data  supplied.  The  on-the-spot  check  was 
carried out as a follow-up of the cross-checking of the data by the Commission and to 
obtain  further  assurance  as  regards  the  reliability  and  quality  of  the  data  and  related 
methodology.  The  on-the-spot  verification  was  considered  appropriate  in  application 
of  the  principle  of  good  administration,  even  if  those  data  were  not  provided  by  an 
interested party but by a consultant. As a result, the Commission was further reassured 
of the reliability of the data provided by the consultant. 

(138)  One  party  claimed  that  the  methodology  of  cross  checking  used  by  the  Commission 
was not explained in sufficient detail and requested that the other sources used for the 
cross  checking  should  be  disclosed.  This  party  argued  further  that  the  methodology 
used  was  in  any  event  invalid  insofar  that  only  trends  of  various  sources  were 
compared and not absolut values.  

(139)  As far as the other sources used to cross check the data provided by the consultant are 
concerned, they were the reports published by the 'JRC and EPIA on the same topics. 
As for the comparison of data with other sources it is noted that they showed not only 
similar  trends  but  also  similar  magnitudes.  Therefore,  it  was  concluded  that  the 
methodology used was appropriate and the claims in this regard were rejected. 

(140)  As  to  expertise  of  the  consultant,  it  is  noted  that  its  main  activity  is  collecting  data 
linked to the PV sector and developing an up-to-date database of companies active in 
the  PV  market.  These  data  are  published  in  specialised  photovoltaic  magazines  and 
also  used  by  individual  companies  for  which  it  carries  out  specialised  research.  The 
database  developed  by  Europressedienst  is  regularly  up-dated  and  re-published.  In 
addition, the consultant has several years of experience in this sector. More precisely, 
the  methodology  of  the  consultant  is  to  collect,  cross-check  and  agglomerate 
information using various sources available in the market. To this end, it collects the 
data  via  standard  questionnaires  sent  to  the  companies  listed  in  the  database  or  via 
phone,  especially  from  the  Union  producers,  or  during  the  specialised  fairs,  notably 
from  producers  in  third  countries.  When  the  information  cannot  be  obtained  through 
the  channels  just  mentioned,  Europressedienst  checks  the  financial  reports  of 
companies  in  the  photovoltaic  sector  or  co-operates  on  a  freely  basis  with  other 
research institutes with a view to obtaining or cross-checking the data. It was verified 

EN 

28 

   EN 

and  indeed  confirmed  that  these  sources  were  used  by  the  consultant  in  its  daily 
activity.  In  the  light  of  the  above,  it  was  considered  appropriate  to  make  use  of 
Europressedienst’s services in the present investigation and the parties’ claims in this 
respect were therefore rejected. 

(141)  With regard to the Best Practices for the submission of economic evidence issued by 
the competent service of the Commission (‘the Best Practices’), the following remarks 
should be made. First of all, it is a document that cannot engage the Commission, as it 
has not been adopted by the College, but published by the competent service with the 
purpose  of  providing  recommendations  to  parties  as  to  how  to  present  economic 
evidence.  Secondly,  the  Best  Practices  concern  the  submission  of  economic  analysis 
and  data  used  in  some  competition  investigations,  pursuant  to  Article  101  and  102 
TFEU and in merger cases. The applicable rules, standards of proof and investigating 
powers  of  the  Commission  in  those  competition  cases  cannot  be  compared  to  trade 
defence investigations, to which an entirely different set of rules applies. 

(142)  After the provisional disclosure, several parties contested the methodology used by the 
consultant claiming that it would not reach recognised scientific standards. However, 
as mentioned above in recital (137), the methodology was assessed and the resulting 
data were cross-checked and verified and as a result were considered in line with other 
published  data  and  therefore  reasonably  reliable.  Specific  points  raised  by  the 
interested parties, mainly AFASE were clarified and made available in the open file of 
the investigation for inspection by interested parties. 

(143)  The CCCME argued that the methodology of data aggregation was not clarified. This 
claim  was  rejected  as  the  relevant  information  was  made  available  to  all  interested 
parties in the investigation file open for inspection by interested parties.  

(144)  After final disclosure, several parties reiterated their concerns on the selection of the 
consultant by the Commission and on the quality of the data supplied. In this respect it 
was  claimed  that  the  consultant’s  data  can  be  ordered  and  purchased  on  an  ad  hoc 
basis to meet the specifically identified requests of potential clients and may therefore 
not  be  objective.  In  addition,  CCCME  contested  that  the  data  collected  by  the 
consultant can be considered as positive evidence within the meaning of Article 3(2) 
of the basic Regulation since the data was to a large extent based on assumptions and 
estimations.  Furthermore,  it  was  claimed  that  the  data  supplied  were  not  sufficiently 
supported  by  evidence  in  the  file  and  that  they  were  not  of  an  affirmative,  objective 
and verifiable character. 

(145)  In respect of these claims, reference is made to the recitals (136) to (137) above where 
additional  information  was  provided  regarding  the  selection  of  the  consultant.  In 
addition, it is noted that the Commission hired the consultant on the basis of the best 
available  information  at  that  moment  in  time  and  in  full  compliance  with  the 
Commission  Financial  Regulation  applicable  to  the  procedure.  Furthermore,  it  is 
recalled that the consultant’s capacity to provide all the needed data in due time was of 
great  importance  since  the  Commission  was  bound  to  statutory  deadlines  for  the 
publication of the provisional findings in the on-going investigation.  

(146)  As regards the quality of the data supplied and whether it can be considered as positive 
evidence in accordance with Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation, as mentioned above 
in  recital  (137),  the  consultant’s  methodology  for  collecting  the  data  was  examined 
and it was assessed that it was of satisfactory quality. In addition, as also mentioned 
above in the same recital, the data supplied by the consultant were cross-checked when 
possible  with  other  sources  and  found  to  be  reasonably  accurate.  Finally,  it  is  noted 

EN 

29 

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that  the  consultant  has  one  database  which  is  up-dated  on  a  regular  basis, 
independently  of  the  clients’  needs  and  requests.  The  same  database  is  used  to 
aggregate and deliver PV statistics to various clients, and therefore the allegation that 
data were not objective had to be rejected.  

(147)  After  final  disclosure,  one  interested  party  claimed  that  the  Commission  had  not 
disclosed  the  sources,  the  methodology  used  and  the  companies  with  which  the 
consultant  co-operated  to  compile  the  macroeconomic  data  supplied.  Another 
interested  party  reiterated  that  the  methodology  applied  by  the  consultant  suggests 
inaccurate results. Several interested parties requested further information concerning 
the  methodology  used  by  the  consultant  such  as  the  average  response  rates  to  the 
questionnaires/interviews, the percentage of data collected through each channel, how 
these  were  verified,  the  approximations/assumptions  used  to  generate  the  data,  the 
number of companies for which approximations were made, and at least a range of the 
number of employees of the consultant. 

findings, 

interested  parties  with 

(148)  In  respect  of  these  claims,  it  is  noted  that  subsequently  to  the  imposition  of  the 
the 
provisional 
the  Commission  provided 
methodology and with the sources used by the consultant in aggregating the data and 
addressed  specific  questions  of  the  interested  parties  in  this  regard  following  the 
provisional disclosure. The additional requests for information of the interested parties 
concerned following final disclosure are considered to be covered by the information 
made  available  after  the  imposition  of  provisional  duties  to  the  extent  that  the 
confidentiality limitations allowed it. In addition, it is underlined that the Commission 
verified  on-the-spot  the  way  the  data  had  been  collected  and  aggregated  by  the 
consultant  and  the  relevant  underlying  assumptions  for  aggregating  the  data.  The 
results of the verification were satisfactory and the Commission was reassured of the 
reasonableness of the underlying assumptions and of the quality of the data supplied 
by the consultant. Furthermore, the parties did not contest the data as such.  

(149)  After final disclosure, another party requested clarifications with regard to the number 
of Union producers considered by the consultant in its data collection and the overlap 
between these and the around 215 Union producers known to the Commission. In this 
respect, it is clarified that the Union producers considered by the consultant are largely 
the  same  than  the  ones  known  to  represent  the  Union  industry  in  this  investigation 
mentioned in recital (133) above.  

(150)  After final disclosure, one party claimed that the Commission has conducted the injury 
analysis in an inconsistent manner since it was done separately for modules and cells 
while the injury and dumping margin calculations had been established as a weighted 
average for modules and cells together. In this respect, it is noted that while indicators 
were  shown  separately  for  each  product  type,  the  conclusions  reached  for  each 
indicator  refer  to  the  product  under  investigation  as  a  whole.  It  is  also  recalled  that 
modules and cells are one single product and therefore the dumping margins and the 
injury  elimination  level  were  established  on  this  basis.  Therefore,  the  claim  was 
rejected. 

(151)  Finally,  another  party  claimed  that  the  calculation  of  the  values  of  macroeconomic 
indicators during the IP was wrongly based on a simple average of the years 2011 and 
2012  as  such  methodology  would  not  be  objective  and  would  not  lead  to  results 
reflecting the reality during the IP. It is clarified that a simple average of the data was 
only  used  in  case  where  there  were  similar  trends  in  the  periods  concerned.  In  case 
trends  were  different,  the  methodology  was  adapted  accordingly  by  taking  into 

EN 

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consideration market reality. The party concerned did not develop to what extend the 
results of the methodology used would not reflect market reality. These claimes were 
therefore rejected. 

(152)  On the basis of the above, and in absence of any other comments in this respect, the 
findings in recitals (98) to (101) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

2. 

Determination of the relevant Union market 

(153)  Several  parties  argued  that  the  injury  should  have  been  assessed  separately  for  the 
captive  market  and  for  the  free  market.  One  party  argued  that  data  relating  to  cells 
destined for captive use should have been excluded from the injury assessment on the 
grounds that they were not affected by the dumped imports.  

(154)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (105)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  consumption,  sales 
volume,  production,  production  capacity,  capacity  utilisation,  growth,  investments, 
stocks,  employment,  productivity,  cash  flow,  return  on  investment,  ability  to  raise 
capital and magnitude of the dumping margin should be examined referring to the total 
activity of the Union industry, i.e. including captive use, as the production destined for 
the  captive  market  was  equally  affected  by  the  competition  of  imports  from  the 
country concerned.  

(155)  Thus,  the  investigation  has  shown  that  vertically  integrated  Union  producers  were 
forced to import dumped products (cells) and to cease production of these products at 
cost  above  the  import  price,  as  a  consequence  of  the  price  pressure  exerted  by  the 
dumped imports. Furthermore, the investigation also revealed that the free market and 
the  captive  market  displayed  similar  trends  in  prices,  which  also  showed  that  they 
were equally affected by the imports concerned.  

(156)  After final disclosure, several parties reiterated that the Commission failed to provide 
an  adequate  and  reasoned  analysis  of  the  captive  market  or  why  a  separate  analysis 
had not been carried out. One party claimed that no information was provided about 
the significance of the Union production destined for captive use. In addition, it was 
claimed  that  recital  (106)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  concluding  that  prices  in  the 
captive  market  did  not  always  reflect  market  prices,  contradicted  the  conclusions  set 
out  in  recital  (155)  above  that  the  free  market  and  captive  market  displayed  similar 
trends in prices. 

(157)  It is firstly noted that recital (105) to the provisional Regulation sets out the reasons as 
to  why  it  was  considered  appropriate  to  examine  injury  indicators  (except  for 
profitability) referring to the total activity of the Union industry including captive use. 
In this regard it is recalled, as set out in the same recital, that the investigation revealed 
that the production destined for captive use was equally affected by the competition of 
the imports from the PRC, which as such was not contested by the interested parties 
concerned. Therefore, the claim that no explanations were given as to why no separate 
analysis took place had to be rejected. Likewise, as it follows from this conclusion, it 
had also to be rejected that such separate analysis of the captive market should have 
taken place.  

(158)  Secondly,  while  on  the  basis  of  the  above  the  significance  of  the  Union  production 
destined  for  captive  use  was  not  considered  an  essential  element,  it  is  noted  that  the 
Union production of cells destined for captive use represented about half of the total 
production  in  the  IP.  Finally,  it  is  clarified  that  the  fact  that  prices  in  the  captive 
market do not reflect the prices in the free market is not necessarily contradicting the 
fact that both prices followed the same trends, as they may still be at different levels or 

EN 

31 

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price  movements  may  be  at  a  higher  or  lower  degree  and  thus  depicting  a  different 
picture.  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  the  claims  concerning  the  captive  market  were 
rejected. 

(159)  The parties concerned did not provide any information which could have devaluated 
the findings concerning the determination of the Union market. On these grounds, the 
claims in this respect were rejected and the findings as set out in recitals (102) to (106) 
to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3. 

Union consumption 

(160)  One  interested  party  argued  that  data  concerning  the  Union  consumption  of  the 
product  under  investigation  vary  significantly,  depending  on  the  source  used.  This 
party argued that reliable data can only be established on the basis of the information 
gathered from specialised institutions or research centres. In view of the explanations 
and conclusions reached in the recitals (134) to (152) above, concerning the reliability 
of  the  data  provided  by  the  consultant  used  in  the  investigation,  this  argument  was 
rejected.  

(161)  The same party argued that Union consumption should not  be established by  merely 
adding  up  available  module  production  capacities  in  the  Union  and  that  the  module 
consumption of the Union industry’s own projects should be deducted therefrom. This 
argument  was  rejected,  as  consumption  of  modules  was  established  on  the  basis  of 
newly installed capacities in the Union. This is a common practice for determining the 
module  consumption.  For  cells  the  consumption  was  determined  on  the  basis  of  the 
Union production of modules.  

(162)  Another party argued that that the methodology described by the consultant admits the 
difficulty  to  establish  reliable  consumption  figures.  It  was  further  argued  that  import 
data as well as export sales from the Union industry were either based on unverifiable 
estimations or incomplete data and that the cross checking of the Commission was not 
sufficient to allow the conclusion that those data were indeed reliable and accurate.  

(163)  As already mentioned above in rectials (136) and (137) above the quality of the data 
and the methodologies used to collect them were verified by the Commission during 
an on-spot visit on the basis of which it was considered that the methodologies used 
were  appropriate  and  the  results  accurate  and  reasonably  reliable.  This  claim  was 
therefore rejected.  

(164)  On  this  basis,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  with  respect  to  the  Union 
consumption, recitals (107) to (109) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

4. 

Imports from the country concerned 

4.1. 

Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned 

(165)  One interested party argued that data concerning import volumes of the product under 
investigation  vary  significantly,  depending  the  source  used.  This  party  argued  that 
reliable  data  can  only  be  established  on  the  basis  of  the  information  gathered  from 
specialised  institutions  or  research  centres.  In  view  of  the  explanations  and 
conclusions reached in the recitals (134) to (152) above, concerning the reliability of 
the  data  provided  by  the  consultant  used  in  the  investigation,  this  argument  was 
rejected. 

(166)  After final disclosure, one interested party contested the methodology to determine the 
total import value from the PRC claiming that it had been based on transactions made 
at  CIF  level  duty  unpaid  and  it  is  therefore  doubtful  whether  these  transactions  had 

EN 

32 

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been destined for Union consumption. In respect of this claim, it is clarified that the 
total  import  value from  PRC  as provided by the consultant had not been used in the 
provisional  and  definitive  findings  and  that  only  import  volumes  and  import  prices 
were  determined  during  the  investigation  as  shown  in  recitals  (110)  to  (113)  to  the 
provisional  Regulation.  As  the  methodology  to  determine  import  prices  was  not 
contested as such by the interested party concerned reference is made to the relevant 
findings  in  recital  (113)  to  (117)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  and  recitals  (168)  to 
(176) below. Therefore, the above claim was rejected.  

(167)  On this basis, and in the absence of any other comments with respect to imports of the 
product concerned from the PRC, recitals (110) to (112) to the provisional Regulation 
are confirmed. 

4.2. 

Prices of imports and price undercutting 

(168)  One  cooperating  unrelated  importer  claimed  that  import  prices  should  have  been 
established  on  the  basis  of  its  imports  of  the  product  concerned  in  the  Union. 
However, the data provided by this importer during the investigation only represented 
a  fraction  of  the  total  imports  in  the  Union  and  no  meaningful  conclusions  could  be 
drawn  as  to  the  average  import  price  of  all  imports  from  the  PRC  during  the  whole 
period under consideration covering several years. Therefore, this claim was rejected.  

(169)  Another  party  claimed  that  the  methodology  to  determine  the  prices  was  not 
explained,  in  particular  as  to  how  the  data  of  various  sources  had  been  merged  and 
reconciled. In addition it was argued that importation costs should have been based on 
the verified information collected during the investigation rather than on estimates.  

(170)  It  is  considered  that  the  methodology  made  available  to  interested  parties  is 
sufficiently  complete  to  understand  as  to  how  figures  were  established.  As  far  as 
‘importation’ cost is concerned, it is clarified that an adjustment was made to on-the-
spot-prices to arrive to CIF prices. The estimation made was confirmed with the data 
collected during the investigation. 

(171)  Following the provisional disclosure, several interested parties requested more details 
on  the  price  undercutting  calculations  than  those  already  provided  in  recital  (116)  to 
the provisional Regulation. Insofar as the sensitive nature of this information and the 
fact that the Union producers had been granted anonymity would allow it, additional 
information was provided in bilateral disclosures.  

(172)  In line with the decision to exclude wafers from the product scope (see recitals (28) to 
(32)  above),  these  products  were  also  excluded  from  the  calculation  of  the  price 
undercutting.  Moreover,  there  were  some  corrections  on  the  CIF  prices  provided  by 
the interested parties. As the sample of unrelated importers was revised for the reasons 
explained  in  recital  (21)  the  average  post-importation  costs  of  the  new  sample  of 
importers was used, when data was available and complete. 

(173)  The revised price comparison was made on a type-per-type basis for transactions at the 
same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and 
discounts.  The  result  of  the  comparison,  when  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the 
sampled  Union  producers’  turnover  during  the  IP  showed  weighted  average 
undercutting margins within the ranges of 19,8% - 32,1% for modules, 4% - 28,5% for 
cells and 8% - 29% in overall terms for the product concerned. 

(174)  It  should  be  noted  that  for  one  sampled  exporting  producer,  a  negative  price 
undercutting  for  cells  was  established.  However,  the  exported  quantities  were  not 
significant and can thus not be considered representative.  

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(175)  One  sampled  exporting  producer  contested  the  source  for  the  adjustment  for  mono 
cells  to  multi  cells,  without  however  substantiating  the  argument.  Indeed  no  new 
information or evidence was provided and this claim was therefore rejected.  

(176)  In the absence of any other comments with respect to the prices of imports from PRC 
and  on  the  price  undercutting  calculations,  recitals  (113)  to  (117)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation are confirmed as amended above. 

5. 

Economic situation of the Union industry 

5.1. 

General 

(177)  Some parties questioned the overall reliability of the macroeconomic injury indicators 
used  by  the  Commission  for  the  purpose  of  this  investigation.  They  argued  that  the 
trends  established  for  a  number  of  these  indicators  diverged  from  the  trends  for  the 
same indicators established for the sampled Union producers. Particular reference was 
made to Union production, productivity, sales, average labour costs and employment.  

(178)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (121)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  the  macroeconomic 
indicators were established in relation to all producers in the Union. In case the same 
data  are  compiled  in  relation  to  individual  Union  producers  or  a  group  of  Union 
producers (i.e. the sampled Union producers), the trends are not necessarily identical, 
as e.g. the weight of each company considered is not taken into consideration in such 
comparison.  Therefore,  the  results  of  the  exercise  of  comparing  the  macroeconomic 
indicators  for  all  Union  producers  and  those  for  sampled  Union  producers  are  not 
necessarily meaningful and do not allow for the conclusion that the one or the other set 
of data is unreliable. In any event, when comparing the trends of the macroeconomic 
indicators of the Union industry with the consolidated same indicators of the sampled 
Union producers, differences in trends can be noted for several indicators, such as the 
production,  production  capacity,  sales  volumes,  employment  and  productivity  of  the 
Union industry between 2011 and the IP. For all these indicators, the sampled Union 
producers performed better than the overall Union industry. The reason behind is that 
in the IP many Union producers, not included in the sample, stopped their production 
or  became  insolvent,  thus  having  a  negative  impact  on  the  macroeconomic  indicator 
calculated at the Union level. These claims were therefore rejected.  

(179)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the  conclusion  as  set  out  in  recital  (153)  to  the 
provisional Regulation that the analysis of the situation of the Union industry showed 
a  clear  downward  trend  of  all  main  injury indicators  was  based  on  data  provided  by 
the consultant. In this respect, it is clarified that, on the one hand, the macroeconomic 
indicators, as listed in Tables 4-a to 6-c to the provisional Regulation, were based on 
data  obtained  from  the  consultant  and  cross-checked  when  possible  with  other 
available  sources.  On  the  other  hand,  the  microeconomic  indicators,  as  listed  in  the 
Tables 7-a to 11-c to the provisional Regulation, were based on data collected from the 
sampled Union producers and verified on-the-spot by the Commission. It should also 
be noted that determinant factors for the injurious situation of the Union industry such 
as the profitability levels of the Union industry, the average sales price in the Union as 
well as price undercutting calculations were based on data collected from the sampled 
Union  producers  and  exporting  producers  as  verified  on-the-spot.  The  above  claim 
was therefore rejected. 

(180)  In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  regarding  the  general  methodology  of  the 
assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry, recitals (118) to (123) to 
the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

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5.2. 

Macroeconomic indicators 

5.2.1.  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation 

(181)  AFASE claimed that the production volume established for modules in recital (124) to 
the  provisional  Regulation  and  the  production  capacity  of  the  Union  industry 
established for modules and cells in the same recital were overestimated and provided 
data from other sources (i.e. EPIA, IMS and BNEF) showing lower volumes. 

(182)  The  production  volume  established  in  recital  (124)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  is 
based  on  information  covering  both  publicly  listed  companies  and  non-listed 
companies. The development of the Union production as established in recital (124) to 
the  provisional  Regulation  is  in  line  with  the  development  of  Union  consumption 
established  in  recital  (108)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  To  the  contrary  the  data 
provided  by  AFASE  on  production  volumes  showed  different  trends  with  the  Union 
consumption as established in recital (108) to the provisional Regulation and with the 
statistics of Union consumption published by the EPIA.  

(183)  As far as production capacity is concerned, the investigation revealed that the findings 
as  set  out  in  recital  (124)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  included  the  production 
capacities of companies that filed for insolvency or stopped production during the IP, 
while they had not sold their production plants and machinery and thus were able to 
resume  production  very  quickly.  Likewise,  as  mentioned  above  in  recital  (182),  the 
figures  in  recital  (124)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  included  data  from  non-listed 
companies.  

(184)  Finally,  as  mentioned  above  in  recital  (137)  above,  the  data  provided  by  the 
independent  consultant  were  verified  and  found  to  be  reasonably  accurate.  On  the 
basis of the above, the data provided by AFASE based on other available sources were 
not found to be necessarily in contradiction with the provisional findings.  

(185)  In any event, accepting the figures provided by AFASE would not have an impact on 
the  overall  finding  that  the  Union  industry  suffered  material  injury  as  the  negative 
trend of these indicators, i.e. Union production and Union production capacity would 
be even more pronounced. 

(186)  One  cooperating  unrelated  importer  argued  that  production  volume,  production 
capacity and capacity utilisation should have been established on the basis of the data 
of the sampled Union producers only. However as these are macroeconomic indicators 
they  should  be  established  at  the  level  of  all  Union  producers  in  order  to  establish  a 
meaningful and complete picture of the situation of the Union industry. This claim was 
therefore rejected. 

(187)  After final disclosure, one party requested the Commission to clarify how the annual 
Union production had been calculated by the consultant. Another party requested the 
Commission to give further explanations concerning the reconciliation of the different 
data available related to the total Union production capacity. Another party suggested 
that  the  total  Union  production  and  production  capacity  should  have  been  obtained 
from  the  Union  producers  selected  in  the  sample  as  this  would  have  given  a  more 
reliable result. In this regard, it was alleged that publicly available data were imprecise 
due  to  the  confidential  character  of  these  data  and  that  any  research  centre  or 
consultant had to base its analysis on a number of estimations and assumptions. 

(188)  It  is  clarified  that  the  annual  Union  production  was  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the 
figures reported by the Union producers to the consultant. When the annual production 
of  a  certain  Union  producer  could  not  be  obtained  for  a  specific  year,  this  was 

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estimated by applying the capacity utilisation rate from the previous year to the new 
production  capacity  of  that  year.  The  Institutions  have  also  compared  the  figure 
obtained  by  the  consultant  with  the  figures  reported  in  the  replies  of  the  Union 
industry to the standing questionnaires prior to initiation. Both figures are similar. 

(189)  As regards the request to provide further explanations concerning the reconciliation of 
the  different  data  available  for  Union  production  capacity,  it  is  noted  that  this 
information  had  already  been  provided  in  the  open  file  open  for  inspection  to  the 
interested parties. Therefore, this request was rejected. 

(190)  Finally, the Union production and production capacity are macroeconomic indicators 
and  therefore  have  to  be  established  at  the  level  of  the  entire  Union  industry  rather 
than on the level of the sampled Union producers.  

(191)  After  final  disclosure,  one  party  argued  that  the  methodology  used  to  collect 
production  data  (mainly  interviews  and  visits  of  production  sites)  did  not  allow  for 
reliable results due to the confidential character of these data and as a consequence the 
reluctance  of  companies  to  disclose  them.  Such  methodology  cannot  therefore  be 
considered as adequate. This was allegedly confirmed by the fact that although a much 
higher number of Union producers was used by the consultant than the one taken into 
account by the Commission during the examination of standing at intiation stage, the 
total  production  volume  established  by  the  consultant  is  lower  than  the  total 
production volume established by the Commission for the purpose of the examination 
of the standing. This party further claimed that consequently the information related to 
this  injury  idicator  cannot  be  considered  as  positive  evidence  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.  

(192)  It  is  first  clarified  that  the  number  of  producers  taken  into  consideration  by  the 
consultant  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Commission  on  the  other  hand  was  largely  the 
same and that the argument that results were inconsisntent had therefore to be rejected. 
It is further recalled that the data collected by the consultant were cross checked with 
other sources wherever possible and it was found that the estimations were sufficiently 
reliable. It is therefore confirmed that the information on production data provided by 
the consultant was considered as positive evidence within the meaning of Article 3(2) 
of the basic Regulation.  

(193)  In the absence of any other comments regarding production, production capacity and 
capacity utilisation, recitals (124) to (128) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

5.2.2.  Sales volumes and market share  

(194)  One interested party claimed that the market share of the Union industry for modules 
was already only 19% in 2009 and that a decrease by 6 percentage points during the 
period considered cannot be considered as injury.  

(195)  The decrease in market share by 6 percentage points over the period considered has to 
be seen against the background of an increase of the Union consumption for modules 
by  over  200%  over  the  same  period.  The  Union  industry  could  not  benefit  from  the 
increased  consumption;  to  the  contrary,  even  under  the  scenario  of  an  increased 
consumption it could not increase its sales volume accordingly and suffered losses in 
market share. This argument had therefore to be rejected. 

(196)  One  party  argued  that  the  methodology  used  to  collect  sales  data  (mainly  interviews 
and visits of production sites) did not allow for reliable results due to the confidential 
character of these data and as a consequence the reluctance of companies to disclose 
them.  Such  methodology  cannot  therefore  be  considered as adequate. Likewise, they 

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cannot  be  considered  as  positive  evidence  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3(2)  of  the 
basic Regulation. As mentioned above in recital (137) above the data collected by the 
consultant were cross checked with other sources wherever possible and it was found 
that  the  estimations  were  sufficiently  reliable.  It  is  therefore  confirmed  that  the 
information  on  sales  data  provided  by  the  consultant  was  considered  as  positive 
evidence within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation. 

(197)  In the absence of other comments on the Union industry’s sales volume and its market 

shares, recitals (129) to (131) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

5.2.3.  Employment and productivity  

(198)  Following  final  disclosure,  one  party  claimed  that  the  methodology  to  establish  total 
employment  in  the  Union  during  the  period  considered  was  incorrect.  This  party 
alleged  that  wherever  the  employment  rate  of  a  specific  Union  producer  was  not 
available,  the  average  employment  of  those  Union  producers  for  which  this 
information was available was taken into consideration instead. This had to be rejected 
as  the  methodology  to  establish  total  employment  was  different,  i.e.  in  case 
employment  data  for  a  certain  Union  producer  was  not  available,  this  figure  was 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  data  of  that  same  company  from  the  previous  year(s).  As 
mentioned above in recital (137) this methodology was verified and found reasonable. 
Therefore, the claim was rejected. 

(199)  In the absence of any comments concerning the level of Union industry’s employment 

and productivity, recitals (132) to (134) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

5.2.4.  Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping 

(200)  In  the  absence  of  any  comments  in  this  respect,  recitals  (135)  to  (136)  to  the 

provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

5.3. 

Microeconomic indicators 

5.3.1.  Prices and factors affecting prices 

(201)  One interested party contested the findings that the decrease of the average sales prices 
had a devastating effect on the profitability of the Union industry. It claimed that the 
average cost of the Union industry decreased equally and that therefore a decrease in 
price is natural. However, as described in recital (138) to the provisional Regulation, 
the investigation established that the Union industry sales price decreased even more 
than  its  average  cost  of  production  and  therefore  such  decrease  in  costs  was  not 
reflected in the Union industry’ profitability. It is therefore confirmed that the decrease 
in sales price of the Union industry had a devastating effect on the profitability of the 
Union industry and the claims in this regard were rejected.  

(202)  Another party contested the conclusion in recital (138) to the  provisional Regulation 
that  prices  were  at  unsustainable  levels  in  the  IP,  claiming  that  this  would  be  for 
market  forces  to  decide.  The  same  party  also  objected  to  the  conclusion  in  the  same 
recital that the Union industry was not able to benefit from cost decreases due to the 
price  pressure  of  the  dumped  imports.  In  this  regard,  the  Institutions  observe  the 
following: "unsustainable level" refers to the fact that the Union industry was selling at 
loss, and therefore could not survive in the long term. The question whether the price 
level is sustainable is therefore only a question of the relationship between production 
costs and prices. By "not being able to benefit from cost decreases", it is referred to the 
fact that costs fell less quickly than prices. Both those statements are backed up with 

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evidence in recital (138) to the provisional Regulation. Therefore, this argument had to 
be rejected. 

(203)  In  absence  of  any  further  comments  concerning  the  Union  industry’s  average  sales 

prices recitals (137) and (138) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

5.3.2.  Labour costs 

(204)  The same interested party claimed that in contrast to what is stated in recital (140) to 
the  provisional  Regulation,  there  has  not  been  any  inflation  during  the  period 
considered and that therefore the overall increase of labour costs could not have been 
caused by this factor.  

(205)  In contrast to what was claimed by the party concerned, the investigation revealed that 
there  has  been  inflation  during  the  period  considered  and  that  the  increase  in  labour 
cost, limited to modules, can be explained by inflation and increase in productivity.  

(206)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the  injurious  situation  of  the  Union  industry  was 
caused  by  the  increase  in  labour  costs  and  the  parallel  decrease  in  productivity. 
However,  first  it  should  be  noted  that  labour  cost  remained  stable  in  case  of  cells, 
while productivity increased both for cells and modules. Therefore, the increase of the 
latter  can  be  explained  by  increased  productivity.  Moreover  the  investigation  has 
shown that labour costs do not represent a significant part of the cost of production, as 
already  cited  in  recital  (203)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  Therefore,  this  argument 
had to be rejected.  

(207)  On this basis, the findings in recitals (139) and (140) to the provisional Regulation are 

confirmed.  

5.3.3. 

Inventories 

(208)  One  interested  party  claimed  that,  the  increase  in  stock  levels  over  the  period 
considered,  when  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  total  production,  would  be 
insignificant  and  cannot  therefore  be  seen  as  evidence  for  injury.  This  party  argued 
further  that  the  presentation  of  the  stock  values  in  recital  (141)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation is misleading as stocks were expressed in kW rather than MW unlike the 
Union industry’s production volume.  

(209)  In  this  respect,  it  is  noted  that  recital  (143)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  shall  be 
amended and should read ‘… the increase in stocks for the like product over the period 
considered  is  not  a  relevant  factor  in  establishing  if  the  Union  industry  suffered 
material  injury’.  The  existence  of  a  clerical  error  becomes  clear  from  the  preceding 
sentence which concludes that the Union producers tend to hold limited stocks as their 
production is based on orders.  

(210)  Finally,  whether  stocks  are  expressed  in  kW  or  in  MW  as  such  was  considered 
irrelevant  in  the  determination  whether  or  not  the  Union  industry  suffered  material 
injury.  

(211)  After final disclosure, several parties claimed that stocks should have been determined 
for the whole Union industry and that the figures of only ten Union producers were not 
representative.  It  is  clarified  that  the  stocks  were  considered  as  a  microeconomic 
indicator and should therefore be established on the basis of the information collected 
on a per company basis, in this case from the sample of Union producers considered as 
representative for the whole Union industry. The above claim was therefore rejected. 

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(212)  In absence of any other comments concerning inventories, recitals (141) to (143) to the 

provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

5.3.4.  Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments, ability to raise capital 

(213)  Following a comment by an interested party it is clarified that the statement that cash 
flows  followed  a  “progressively  negative  trend”  between  2009  and  the  IP  in  recital 
(148)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  was  wrong  as  cash  flows  for  modules,  while 
decreasing  between  2009  and  2010,  were  in  fact  increasing  in  2011  and  decreasing 
again in the IP.  

(214)  The  same  party  alleged  that  investment  figures  as  shown  in  recital  (149)  to  the 
provisional Regulation were too low when compared to the production capacity of the 
Union industry as shown in recital (124) to the provisional Regulation. In support of 
this  claim  the  party  submitted  to  be  aware  of  the  investment  made  by  one  Union 
producer in capacity increases which was at a much higher cost. The party concerned 
concluded  that  therefore  the  established  production  capacity  of  the  Union  industry 
must  have  been  overestimated.  It  is  noted  that  this  claim  was  not  supported  by  any 
evidence,  in  particular  as  regards  the  investment  made  by  the  Union  producer  in 
question. In contrast, the investment figures in the provisional Regulation were based 
on  actual  and  verified  information  from  the  sampled  Union  producers.  It  should  be 
noted that this claim was also based on the comparison between the total investments 
of the sampled Union producers and the total production capacity of the whole Union 
industry,  which  cannot  be  considered  an  appropriate  basis  for  comparison  as  not  the 
total  investments  of  the  whole  Union  industry  were  taken  into  consideration. 
Therefore, this argument had to be rejected.  

(215)  In absence of any other comments concerning profitability, cash flow, investments and 
return on investments, ability to raise capital recitals (144) to (152) to the provisional 
Regulation are confirmed. 

5.4. 

Conclusions 

(216)  In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  the  conclusions  set  out  in  recitals  (153)  to  (158)  to  the 
provisional Regulation, i.e. that the Union industry suffered material injury within the 
meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, are confirmed.  

1. 

Introduction 

E. 

CAUSATION 

(217)  After  the  provisional  disclosure,  several  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  causation 
analysis  conducted  did  not  separate,  distinguish  and  quantify  the  injurious  effects  of 
the dumped imports from the effects of other known factors which at the same time are 
injuring the Union industry. Moreover, it was claimed that the Commission failed to 
undertake a collective analysis of these other known factors.  

(218)  In  reply  to  this  claim  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Commission,  as  per  established 
practice, first examined whether there is a causal link between the dumped imports and 
the injury suffered by the Union industry and secondly examined whether any of the 
other known factors had broken the causal link established between the material injury 
suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports. In this analysis, the effects of 
the  other  known  factors  on  the  situation  of  the  Union  industry  were  assessed, 
distinguished and separated from the injurious effects of the dumped imports to ensure 
that injuries caused by these factors were not attributed to the dumped imports. It was 
found  that  none  of  them  had  a  significant  impact,  if  any,  on  the  situation  of  the 

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industry that could reverse the fact that the material injury assessed must be attributed 
to the dumped imports. On these grounds the argument was dismissed.  

(219)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  several  interested  parties  reiterated  the  above 
arguments.  In  this  regard  it  was  claimed  that  the  Commission  should  establish 
explicitly,  through  a  reasoned  and  adequate  explanation,  that  the  injury  caused  by 
factors other than the dumped imports is not attributed to these imports.  

(220)  In this investigation, it was concluded, after examining all the facts, that the dumped 
imports  taken  in  isolation  have  caused  material  injury  to  the  Union  industry.  In  this 
respect, quantifying the effects of other known factors was not possible and therefore a 
qualitative  assessment  was  carried  out  as  set  out  in  recitals  (164)  to  (222)  to  the 
provisional Regulation. In conclusion, it was confirmed that the material injury of the 
Union industry was caused by the dumped imports. Indeed the effects of other factors 
on  the  Union’s  industry’s  negative  development  were  considered  to  be  limited.  It 
should be noted that, under Article 3(6) and (7) of the basic Regulation, no obligation 
is imposed as to the form of the attribution and non attribution analyses which should 
be  carried  out.  On  the  contrary,  under  Article  3(6)  and  (7)  of  the  basic  Regulation, 
those analyses must be carried out in such a way as to enable the injurious effects of 
the  dumped  imports  to  be  separated  and  distinguished  from  the  injurious  effects 
caused  by  other  factors.  The  investigation  did  not  reveal  any  evidence  that  all  other 
known  factors  which  may  have  contributed  to  the  injury  suffered,  together  or  in 
isolation,  broke  the  causal  link  between  the  dumped  imports  and  the  material  injury 
suffered by the Union industry. Given the above analysis, it was confirmed that other 
known factors were not such as to reverse the finding that the material injury suffered 
by  the  Union  industry  must  be  attributed  to  the  dumped  imports.  On  these  grounds 
these arguments were dismissed.  

(221)  After  the  provisional  disclosure  some  interested  parties  objected  to  the  finding  in 
recital  (160)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  They  reiterated  that  market  conditions  of 
the  product  under  investigation  differ  per  Member  State  and  that  therefore  the 
causation  analysis  should  be  made  at  the  level  of  each  Member  State  separately.  In 
addition, these parties argued that the national support schemes, the sun exposure and 
the electricity prices (including regulatory charges) differ per Member State and that 
furthermore  there  are  different  market  segments  in  each  market  (the  residential- 
installations of less than 40  kW, commercial  and  industrial- installations between 40 
kW  and  1MW  and  the  utility  market  segment-  installations  between  1  MW  and  10 
MW).  In  view  of  this  they  claimed  that  the  causation  analysis  should  be  conducted 
separately  for  each  Member  State  on  the  one  hand  and  for  the  large-scale  and  the 
residential segments on the other hand. 

(222)  After  the  final  disclosure  some  interested  parties  reiterated  their  claim  that  the 
causation analysis should be conducted on a per Member State basis, without however 
providing further arguments or new evidence in this respect.  

(223)  The investigation has shown that sales and import prices are similar across the Union. 
It  can  therefore  be  considered  that  there  is  indeed  one  market  for  the  product  under 
investigation.  The  investigation  did  also  not  reveal  that  producers  in  each  Member 
State or region concentrated their activities in this specific market or that the dumped 
imports concentrated in one Member State or region. Moreover, none of the interested 
parties  argued  that  dumping  and  injury  should  be  analysed  on  a  per  Member  States 
basis  which  would  however  be  a  pre-condition  for  conducting  a  separate  causation 
analysis  per  Member  State.  The  investigation  did  not  reveal  any  evidence  that  this 

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would have been an appropriate approach, in particular given that there were similar 
prices across the Union of the product under consideration at Union level. Moreover, it 
is noted that the sun exposure can be different in different regions of the same Member 
States, e.g. Southern France has more sun exposure than Northern France, or different 
regions  within one Member State can have different  support  schemes (e.g.  Belgium) 
and that therefore the impact of these factors on the demand may vary from one region 
to another within the same Member State. However, the differences in the regulatory 
framework of each Member State and/or region and the differences in conditions such 
as sun exposure do not warrant a separate causation analysis, and thus separate injury 
and dumping analysis. Therefore, these arguments had to be rejected.  

(224)  Another  interested  party  argued  that  while  other  factors  are  relevant,  the  national 
support  schemes  remain  the  main  factor  in  determining  the  demand.  The  same  party 
also  contested  that  grid  parity  was  already  reached  in  some  locations  arguing  that 
prices of modules increased since the IP while electricity prices decreased. It further 
argued that, in any event, at least in certain Member States, the regulatory, economic 
and  technical  conditions  do  not  allow  for  the  connection  to  the  grid  and  for  those 
Member States it was therefore irrelevant whether or not grid parity was reached. This 
party  however  did  not  provide  any  supporting  evidence  for  the  above  allegations.  In 
any  event  the  above  arguments  confirm  that  the  situation  with  regard  to  national 
support  schemes  as  well  as  grid  parity  may  be  different  to  a  certain  extent  between 
Member States. However, none of the information submitted was of such a nature as 
to show that an analysis separately per Member State would be warranted. 

(225)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  the  same  interested  party  reiterated  the  claim  and 
provided  some  information  allegedly  showing  the  different  market  conditions  per 
Member  State  and  per  segment.  However,  the  information  submitted  could  not  be 
considered  as  conclusive  as  it  consisted  of  a  power  point  presentation  without  any 
supporting  evidence,  and  therefore,  did  not  show  that  an  analysis  separately  per 
Member State would be warranted. The claim of this party was therefore rejected. 

(226)  On  this  basis,  it  was  concluded  that  an  analysis  of  the  causation  per  Member  State 
and/or region and per segment would not correspond to market reality. In absence of 
any other comment in this regard the findings made in recitals (159) and (160) to the 
provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

(227)  The  GOC  claimed  that  the  Commission  has  conducted  the  causation  analysis  in  an 
inconsistent manner as the injury analysis was done separately for modules and cells, 
while the causation analysis did not separate between product types. In this respect, it 
is noted that while the injury indicators were indeed shown separately for each product 
type,  the  conclusions  reached  for  each  indicator  refer  to  the  product  under 
investigation  as  a  whole.  It  is  also  recalled  that  modules  and  cells  are  one  single 
product  and  therefore  the  causation  analysis  was  conducted  on  this  basis.  Therefore, 
the claim was rejected. 

2. 

Effect of dumped imports  

(228)  One  interested  party  contested  that  there  was  a  sufficient  correlation  between  the 
dumped  imports  of  the  product  concerned  from  the  PRC  and  the  material  injury 
suffered by the Union industry. It was argued that this would be supported, on the one 
hand, by the fact that from 2009 to 2010 the Union industry’s profit margin for cells 
significantly increased (from loss making to 12% profit) while Chinese imports were 
36% lower priced than Union industry’s prices and doubled their market share during 
the  same  period.  On  the  other  hand,  between  2010  and  2011  Chinese  imports  only 

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gained 6 percentage points of market share, even though consumption increased much 
more during the same period, while the Union industry realised nonetheless a loss of 
36%. This party argued further that as regards the IP, imports of cells from other third 
countries  were  at  the  same  price  level  as  Chinese  imports  but  gained  more  market 
share corresponding to the loss of market share of the Union industry.  

(229)  The investigation showed that there was a constant increase of Chinese market share 
for all product types over the period considered (17 percentage points for modules, 17 
percentage  points  for  cells).  Dumped  imports  from  the  PRC  increased  by  more  than 
300 % for modules and by 482 % for cells. At the same time there was a considerable 
and constant decrease of the Chinese import prices (64 % for modules and, 42 % for 
cells during the period considered) and in the IP they were significantly undercutting 
the Union industry’s prices. In parallel, the Union industry lost market share over the 
period  considered  and  as  described  in  recitals  (153)  and  (154)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation  all  main  injury  indicators  showed  a  negative  trend.  Therefore  it  is 
confirmed  that  there  is  a  clear  coincidence  in  time  between  the  increase  in  dumped 
imports and the loss of market share of the Union industry.  

(230)  As shown in recitals (161) and (162) to the provisional Regulation, this correlation in 
time was established for all  product types separately. In addition, the analysis of the 
impact of the imports on the Union industry’s profit margin separately for each year of 
the period considered does not lead to meaningful results as the existence of dumping 
and  material  injury  as  well  as  a  causal  link  between  them  does  not  need  to  be 
established for each year separately. The correlation between the dumped imports and 
the material injury is sufficiently demonstrated when analysing the developments over 
the whole period considered.  

(231)  It  is  also  noted  that  the  profitability  of  the  Union  industry  is  one  of  the  factors 
mentioned in Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation which should be investigated when 
examining  the  impact  of  the  dumped  imports  on  the  Union  industry’s  situation.  The 
fact  alone  that  the  Union  industry  was  profitable  during  a  specific  year  does  not 
necessarily mean that it  did not suffer any material injury. Moreover, the loss of the 
market share of the Union industry does not need to correspond exactly to the increase 
of the market share of the dumped imports in order to establish a causal link between 
the injury  and  the  dumped imports.  Finally, other factors  (e.g.  imports  of other  third 
countries or development of the consumption) which could have had an impact on the 
injurious  situation  of  the  Union  industry  were  examined  and  addressed  separately  in 
recitals (164) to (224) to the provisional Regulation.  

(232)  The coincidence in time of increasing dumped imports in significant quantities, which 
undercut prices of the Union industry and the increasingly precarious situation of the 
Union  industry  is  a  clear  indicator  of  causation  in  the  present  case,  as  established  in 
recitals (161) to (163) to the provisional Regulation. The claims with regard to the lack 
of any correlation between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the 
Union industry were therefore rejected.  

(233)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  the  same  interested  party  continued  to  contest  the 
causation  analysis  as  the  profitability  of  the  Union  industry  was  not  analysed 
specifically  in  relation  to  certain  years  (in  particular  2010),  but  for  the  whole  period 
considered.  

(234)  In this regard, it should be noted that no valid conclusions can be drawn concerning 
causality  by  isolating  one  specific  year  of  the  period  considered  while  ignoring  the 
development  of  the  Union  industry  during  the  entire  period  considered  and  its 

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correlations with the development of the dumped imports. Such analysis can only lead 
to  a  partial  picture  and  no  sound  conclusions  can  be  drawn  therefrom.  Thus,  the 
profitability  rates  that  drove  also  other  financial  indicators  that  the  Union  industry 
achieved  during  2010,  was  high  because  of  the  particularly  strong  jump  in  Union 
consumption, driven by very generous support schemes, that allowed Union industry 
to  have  their  strongest  sales  improvement  that  same  year,  but  only  of  a  temporary 
nature  and  in  any  event  not  sustainable  for  this  type  of  industry.  Therefore,  this 
argument had to be rejected. 

(235)  In  the  absence  of  further  comments  concerning  the  effect  of  dumped  imports,  the 
findings in recitals (159) to (163) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

3. 

Effect of other factors  

3.1. 

Imports from other third countries  

(236)  Several  interested  parties  made  comments  following  the  provisional  disclosure  with 
regard  to  the  findings  concerning  imports  from  other  third  countries  and  reiterated 
them  following  the  final  disclosure.  However,  these  parties  did  not  bring  into  light 
new  information  and  supporting  evidence  which  could  have  altered  the  relevant 
provisional findings.  

(237)  Those  parties  underlined  in  particular  the  volume  of  imports  of  cells  from  Taiwan. 
However,  the  absolute  volume  of  imports  of  the  product  concerned  from  Taiwan 
(1132  MW)  represents  only  a  very  small  share  (less  than  5%)  of  the  overall  Union 
consumption  (21559  MW)  and  compared  to  imports  from  the  PRC  (15005  MW). 
Therefore, imports from Taiwan have, if at all, only marginally contributed to injury of 
the Union industry, and not broken the causal link. 

(238)  In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  with  regard  to  imports  from  other  third 
countries,  the  findings  in  recital  (164)  to  (167)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
confirmed.  

3.2. 

Development of the Union consumption  

(239)  One interested party claimed that the Commission failed to analyse the impact of the 
development  in  consumption.  In  this  regard,  it  was  argued  that  the  imports  from  the 
PRC did not capture the entire increase in consumption and that, while in the case of 
modules the Union industry lost market share between 2009 and 2010, it still increased 
its profitability during the same period. Furthermore, it was argued that in 2009 when 
imports of cells from PRC had only 8% market share, the Union industry still suffered 
8% loss.  

(240)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (168)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  despite  the  decrease  in 
Union  consumption  in  the  IP,  the  dumped  imports  from  the  PRC  either  maintained 
their  market  share  (modules)  or  increased  it  (cells)  to  the  detriment  of  the  Union 
industry  over  the  period  considered.  Therefore,  it  cannot  be  concluded  that  the 
decrease  in  consumption  was  such  as  to  break  the  causal  link  between  the  dumped 
imports  and  the  injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry.  Moreover,  the  investigation 
showed that as the capacity of the Union industry was in any event much lower than 
the levels of consumption, the shrinking consumption in the IP could not have had an 
impact  on  the  injurious  situation  of  the  Union  industry.  Therefore,  this  claim  was 
rejected.  

(241)  Another interested party contested that the demand in the Union will continue to exist 
even in the absence of the national support schemes. This party argued that there is a 

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correlation  between  demand  and  support  schemes  and  that  in  the  absence  of  such 
schemes projects in the PV sector would not be profitable anymore and therefore the 
demand for solar panels will disappear as well. 

(242)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (169)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  during  the  investigation 
some indications were collected that even in the absence of support schemes demand 
still  existed  and  will  continue  to  exist  in  the  Union.  The  party  did  not  provide  any 
evidence  which  could  have  devaluated  these  findings.  In  the  absence  of  any  new 
information  in  this  regard,  the  findings  set  out  in  recital  (169)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation are confirmed and the claim made in this regard was rejected. 

(243)  Following  final  disclosure,  the  GOC  argued  that  the  fact  that  the  Union  industry’s 
capacity  did  in  any  event  not  meet  the  Union  demand  is  irrelevant  since  the  sales 
volume  of  modules  of  the  Union  industry  decreased  in  line  with  the  decrease  in 
consumption and reiterated that the decrease in consumption between 2011 and the IP 
caused the material injury suffered by the Union industry. While indeed between 2011 
and  the  IP  the  Union  consumption  decrease  and  the  sales  volume  of  modules 
decreased with a similar trend, this has to be seen in relation to the development of the 
Chinese  dumped  prices,  significantly  undercutting  the  Union  industry  prices,  thus 
forcing the Union industry selling at losses. In this regard it is recalled, as mentioned 
in recital (111) to the provisional Regulation, that the dumped imports from the PRC 
either  maintained  their  market  share  (modules)  or  increased  it  (cells)  when  the 
consumption  was  decreasing.  At  the  same  time  Chinese  import  prices  decreased 
significantly  and  substantially  undercut  the  Union  industry’s  sales  prices.  Therefore, 
this claim was rejected. 

(244)  In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  with  regard  to  the  development  of  Union 
consumption, the findings in recitals (168) and (169) to the provisional Regulation are 
confirmed. 

3.3. 

Feed-in-tariffs ('FITs') as the main example of support schemes 

(245)  Following the provisional disclosure several parties reiterated that the injury suffered 
by the Union industry was caused by the development of the feed-in-tariffs (‘FITs’). 
They  claimed  that  the  FIT  developments  exercised  a  strong  downward  pressure  on 
prices  and  therefore  on  the  profitability  of  the  Union  industry.  One  interested  party 
claimed  that  only  the  impact  of  the  development  of  FITs  on  the  demand  was 
examined,  while  the  impact  on  prices  should  also  have  been  analysed.  In  the  same 
context, several interested parties argued that most of the Member States implemented 
major  cutbacks  already  in  2010  thus  putting  a  downward  pressure  on  the  module 
prices. 

(246)  In  respect  of  this  claim  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Member  States  implemented  FIT 
cutbacks  at  different  moments  in  time  and  at  different  speeds  and  that  drawing  a 
general picture for the entire Union is rather difficult. Irrespective of the moment when 
the FIT rates reached very low levels, the significant decrease in the Union prices and 
profitability during the period considered cannot be solely or mainly explained by the 
reduction  of  FITs.  First,  on  the  basis  of  the  information  collected  for  Germany  and 
Italy that represented together around 75% of the Union market in 2011, the drop in 
the average sales price was more pronounced than the decrease in the FIT rates during 
the  IP.  Second,  the  evidence  collected  shows  that,  for  some  countries  such  as  Italy, 
even  in  the  context  of  very  generous  FIT  rates,  the  Union  industry  had  to  decrease 
significantly  their  prices.  Finally,  during  the  IP,  the  Union  producers  had  to  sell  at 
prices below their cost of production, which was mainly a consequence of the fact that 

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the Chinese exporting producers had 80% of the Union market and therefore the power 
to influence the price-setting mechanism.  

(247)  The investigation further established that up to 2011 the higher FIT rates together with 
the decrease in the prices of modules in the Union rendered the investments in solar 
energy  extremely  attractive  as  investors  were  earning  very  high  rates  on  return. 
Therefore,  this  resulted  in  a  high  number  of  investments  and  consequently  high 
demand of solar panels. As a consequence of the increased demand, the total amount 
of FITs paid increased significantly and most Member States revised the existing FIT 
schemes downwards to avoid inter alia an increase of electricity costs. This shows that 
FIT cutbacks may also have been the result of the decreasing prices and not vice versa. 

(248)  After  final  disclosure  one  party  claimed  that  there  was  a  contradiction  between  the 
recital  (246)  above,  that  an  assessment  of  the  demand  for  the  Union  as  a  whole  is 
difficult, and the recital (223) above stating that a causation analysis per Member State 
would  not  lead  to  meaningful  results.  In  this  respect,  it  is  clarified  that  in  the 
assessment made in recital (246) above, reference is made to the difficulty to draw a 
general  picture  of  the  FIT  developments  for  the  entire  Union  and  not  to  the  Union 
demand  as  claimed  by  the  interested  party.  As  a  consequence,  it  follows  that  no 
contradiction exists between the two recitals and therefore the claim was rejected. 

(249)  After final disclosure, one party claimed that even in the context of high FIT rates, the 
module price may decrease significantly due to technological development, economies 
of  scale,  cost  reductions  and  growing  global  production  capacity.  In  respect  of  this 
claim,  it  is  noted  that  the  evidence  collected  shows  that  the  Italian  producers  had  to 
reduce their prices below the cost of production even when FIT rates were high. While 
the factors mentioned above may indeed have had an impact on the average costs they 
cannot  explain  why  Union  producers  had  to  reduce  their  prices  below  their  cost  of 
production. Therefore, it is concluded that it was mainly the dumped imports from the 
PRC that pushed the prices to unsustainable levels and this claim was rejected. 

(250)  After  final  disclosure,  one  party  claimed  that  the  conclusion  drawn  in  recital  (247) 
above,  that  FIT  cutbacks  may  have  also  been  the  result  of  the  decreasing  prices  and 
not vice versa, is not supported by any evidence. 

(251)  It  is  noted  that  the  conclusions  drawn  in  recital  (247)  above  were  based  on  the 
information available during the investigation and the scenario described was indeed 
considered  as  reasonable  given  the  circumstances  in  this  specific  market.  Therefore, 
this argument was rejected. 

(252)  After final disclosure, one party reiterated that it disagreed with the conclusion that the 
downward  price  pressure  on  Union  producers  was  mainly  exerted  by  the  dumped 
imports  and  claimed  that,  to  the  contrary,  it  was  the  FIT  cutbacks  that  forced  the 
Union producers to reduce their prices. The same party reiterated that when FITs were 
reduced, the PV system prices decreased in line with the decrease in FITs so that costs 
for project developers do not increase, which ultimately caused the price pressure on 
the Union producers.  

(253)  Since no conclusive evidence was brought in support of these claims, the Commission 
maintained its analysis and conclusions as stated in recitals (246) to (247) above.  

(254)  The  same  party  claimed  that  markets  are  driven  by  the  development  of  FITs  and 
provided information showing the number of PV installations for the years 2012 and 
2013 in the UK. The information provided by this party was a publication of the UK 
government based on the weekly registrations in the UK Central FiT Register (CFR). 

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It is noted that this information related mostly to a period outside the IP and referred 
only to one Member State, while the current investigation focused on the situation of 
the Union market as a whole. In any event, it is not contested that FIT levels influence 
demand,  as  the  profitability  of  investments  in  locations  with  less  solar  radiation 
depends on the FIT level. However, in order to show that the level at which FIT were 
set during the IP has caused the injury, interested parties would have had to show that 
a price increase of the Union producers to the non-injurious level would have meant 
that  the  Union  producers  would  not  have  been  able  to  sell  the  product  concerned 
because investments into PV systems would not have been viable at those price levels. 
No such evidence has been provided. This argument was therefore rejected. 

(255)  Therefore, the argument that the reductions in FITs broke the causal link between the 

dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry was rejected.  

(256)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure  one  party  reiterated  that  FIT  developments 
rendered the solar investment opportunities unattractive for investors and thus lowered 
the demand for the product. Another party claimed that the findings set out in recital 
(173)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  that  investments  are  still  being  made  in  Spain 
despite the suspension of the FIT schemes was incorrect.  

(257)  The  impact  of  FITs  on  demand  was  addressed  in  recital  (173)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation.  As  no  new  arguments  were  brought  forward  in  this  respect,  the  above 
claim that demand decreased due to the FIT developments was rejected. Regarding the 
investments in Spain, it is clarified that the findings in recital (177) to the provisional 
Regulation  are  based  on  information  obtained  during  the  investigation  and  verified 
during  an  on-spot  investigation.  As  the  party  concerned  did  not  provide  any  new 
information or evidence in this respect, this claim had to be rejected. 

(258)  Following the provisional disclosure several parties claimed that in the context of the 
low  FIT  rates,  investments  in  PV  projects  were  economically  viable  only  when 
supplied with the lower priced solar panels imported from the PRC. Therefore, it was 
argued that the FIT cutbacks caused the material injury to the Union industry. Another 
party argued that the level of the FIT rate influences the price setting mechanism for 
modules. 

(259)  It  should  be  noted  that  the  cost  of  a  module  at  which  a  project  would  still  be 
economically  viable  varies  by  Member  State  or  by  region  in  function  of  numerous 
factors  such  as  FITs,  other  regulatory  incentives,  solar  exposure,  conventional 
electricity prices, etc.  

(260)  In addition, the investigation showed that current installations depend less and less on 
the  FITs  as  PV  grid  parity  is  likely  to  have  been  reached  for  certain  types  of 
installations  in  several  regions  in  Europe,  such  as  a  large  portion  of  Italy,  Spain, 
Portugal, southern France and Greece. 

(261)  On the above grounds, the claims made in this regard were rejected. 

(262)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the  Commission  did  not  investigate  whether  the 
Union  industry  failed  to  anticipate  that  government  support  schemes  would  be 
abruptly withdrawn or decreased. No arguments were brought in support of this claim. 
However,  it  should  be  noted  that,  based  on  the  evidence  collected,  there  is  no 
information  indicating  that  the  Union  industry  responded  to  the  market  signals  (i.e. 
development  in  consumption)  and  other  available  information  (i.e.  reduction  in 
support schemes) in an unreasonable way. Therefore, this claim was rejected.  

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(263)  One  interested  party  argued  that  the  FIT  cutbacks  caused  the  Union  industry’s  sales 
decline because investments had been viable only at the affordable Chinese prices. The 
evidence  collected  in  fact  shows  only  a  slight  decrease  in  the  sales  of  the  Union 
industry during  the IP, in contrast  to  what it  would  be expected had the  PV projects 
been feasible only with Chinese modules. On the contrary, the sales of modules of the 
Union  industry  increased  until  2011  and  then  slightly  decreased  in  the  IP,  following 
the same trend as of the consumption. Therefore, this claim was rejected. 

(264)  Another interested party argued that the findings as set out in recitals (174) and (175) 
to the provisional Regulation that the FIT changes did not break the causal link has no 
factual  or  legal  basis  and  is  inconsistent  with  Article  3(7)  of  the  basic  Regulation 
because  the  Commission  failed  to  assess  the  level  of  injury  caused  by  the  FIT 
reductions and because it considered that the significant drop in the Union industry’s 
price  had  been  a  consequence  only  of  the  dumped  Chinese  imports.  The  same  party 
argued  that  the  decrease  in  the  price  of  modules,  cells  and  wafers  was  a  global 
phenomenon and not due to the pressure of the Chinese imports. 

(265)  In respect of the claim that the Commission failed to assess the level of injury caused 
by  the  FIT  cutbacks,  reference  is  made  to  recitals  (174),  (175)  and  (182)  to  the 
provisional  Regulation  and  recitals  (245)  to  (263)  above,  where  the  Commission 
concluded that neither the decrease in demand nor the impact of FITs on Union prices 
were  as  such  as  to  break  the  causal  link  between  the  injury  suffered  by  the  Union 
industry and the dumped imports from the PRC, irrespective of whether and to which 
extent  they  were  possibly  caused  by  the  FIT  cutbacks.  Therefore,  the  claim  that  the 
Commission’s  findings  have  no factual basis was rejected. As regards the claim that 
the decrease in the price of modules and cells was a global phenomenon, reference is 
made to the recitals (164) to (167) to the provisional Regulation where import volumes 
and  prices  from  other  countries  than  the  PRC  into  the  Union  are  assessed.  While 
indeed  there  was  a  global  downward  trend  in  the  prices  of  modules  and  cells,  the 
dumped  import  prices  from  the  PRC  have  exacerbated  the  downward  trend  to  loss 
making levels. On the basis of the above, this claim was rejected. 

3.4. 

Other financial support granted to the Union industry 

(266)  In the absence of any comments concerning other financial support schemes granted to 
the  Union  industry,  the  findings  in  recitals  (184)  and  (185)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation are confirmed. 

3.5. 

Overcapacity 

(267)  One interested party reiterated the claim that the overcapacity in the global as well as 
in the Union market caused the material injury rather than the imports from the PRC. 
In  this  regard  it  was  argued  that  the  Union  industry  over-expanded  its  capacities  as 
evidenced by the low capacity utilisation rate and that therefore any injury was self-
inflicted.  The  alleged  impact  of  the  overcapacity  in  the  Union  and  world-wide  was 
already addressed in recitals (185) to (190) to the provisional Regulation and therefore 
in the absence of any new element the claim had to be rejected. 

(268)  Another interested party claimed that the overcapacity led to price  rationalization. In 
this regard, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the overcapacity led in fact to a 
‘race  to  the  bottom’  and  the  suppression  of  the  prices  of  Union  industry,  which  on 
average  exceeded  the  reduction  of  the  costs  of  production.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
outlined  in  recital  (186)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  the  capacity  increases  by  the 
Union  industry  followed  the  market  developments  and  were  considered  reasonable. 

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Moreover,  the  increase  in  production  capacity  of  cells  was  at  a  lower  level  than 
modules. The party concerned did not submit any new information or evidence in this 
respect and the claims in this regard had therefore to be rejected.  

(269)  Another interested party claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry is due 
to the Union industry’s focus only on specialized investments and its failure to make 
the  necessary  investments  in  capacity  additions  and  cost  reductions.  Likewise,  this 
claim could not be confirmed by the findings of the investigation which showed that 
the Union industry increased its production capacity and efficiency during the period 
considered  (recitals  (124)  and  (187)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  This  claim  was 
therefore rejected. 

(270)  Moreover, an interested party claimed that the Union industry increased its production 
capacity in spite of already low capacity utilisation rates, thus resulting in self-inflicted 
injury. This claim was based on the comparison between the trend of investments of 
the  sampled  Union  producers  and  the  trend  of  the  capacity  utilisation  of  the  whole 
Union  industry,  which  is  not  an  appropriate  basis  for  comparison.  Furthermore,  the 
investigation  showed  that  the  Union  industry  had  not  expanded  its  production 
capacities  on  a  scale  which  exceeded  the  development  of  Union  consumption, 
therefore this argument was rejected.  

(271)  Moreover,  the  evidence  collected  indicates  that  through  investments  in  new 
machinery, the Union industry could reduce its cost of production and become more 
cost competitive. Therefore, this argument had to be rejected.  

(272)  One  interested  party  alleged  that  the  conclusions  in  recital  (189)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation  contradicted  the  findings  made  in  recitals  (124)  and  (186)  to  the 
provisional Regulation without however giving any further explanations specifying the 
nature or extend of the alleged contradictions. This claim had therefore to be rejected. 

(273)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  some  interested  parties  contested  that  the  capacity 
additions  of  the  Union  industry  were  reasonable  and  followed  market  developments 
and  in  particular  the  development  of  the  Union  consumption.  However,  as  far  as 
modules  are  concerned  the  production  capacity  increased  by  106%,  while  the  Union 
consumption  increased  by  221%  over  the  period  considered,  i.e.  more  than  double. 
Likewise,  as  far  as  cells  are  concerned,  the  production  capacity  increased  by  39%, 
while  the  Union  consumption  increased  by  87%  during  the  period  considered.  This 
shows  that  the  increase  in  capacity  was  substantially  below  the  increase  in 
consumption  and  can  therefore  not  be  considered  as  unreasonable  given  that  there 
never  was  overcapacity  in  the  Union.  Moreover,  the  analysis  whether  the  capacity 
additions were reasonable should not be based on a year to year analysis, but should 
take  into  consideration  the  trend  during  the  whole  period  considered.  Thus,  capacity 
additions  will  typically  only  become  fully  operational  after  a  certain  period  of  time 
after the investment made and the isolated analysis of one year may lead to a distorted 
picture. This argument was therefore rejected. 

(274)  In  absence  of  any  other  comments  regarding  the  Union’s  industry  overcapacity,  the 
findings in recitals (185) to (190) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3.6. 

Impact of raw material prices  

(275)  Some interested parties reiterated that the Union industry or at least part of it could not 
benefit from the decrease in prices of polysilicon, during the IP, because of long term 
contracts  for  raw  material.  With  reference  to  the  findings  in  recital  (193)  to  the 
provisional Regulation stating that the Union industry was able to renegotiate its long 

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term  contracts  with  its  suppliers  (including  wafers  producers)  and  therefore  could 
benefit from lower prices, these parties claimed that the renegotiations or termination 
of  long  term  contracts  of  polysilicon  and/or  wafers  resulted  in  penalties.  To  support 
this  argument,  these  parties  provided  press  articles  reporting  that  some  Union 
producers  were  facing  litigation  or  that  they  terminated  their  contracts.  Some  parties 
provided  information  allegedly  confirming  that  the  long  term  contracts  could  not  be 
re-negotiated.  

(276)  Polysilicon  is  the  main  raw  material  for  the  wafers  producers.  The  investigation 
revealed  that  polysilicon  prices  increased  in  2008  when  they  reached  their  peak  at 
around 500$/kg, but decreased again in 2009 reaching about 50-55 $/kg at the end of 
2009  with  only  a  slight  upwards  trend  in  2010  and  early  2011.  Prices  dropped 
significantly during the IP resulting in the 30$/kg (JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, 
PV Status Report 2012). It should be noted that the impact of polysilicon prices on the 
Union industry could only be rather marginal as any effect on the cost of production of 
cells  and  modules  was  diluted  through  the  value  chain.  Moreover,  the  above 
mentioned  press  articles  referred  to  post-IP  developments,  which  did  not  affect  the 
situation  of  the  Union  producers  concerned  during  the  IP,  and  cannot  therefore  be 
taken  into  account.  This  matter  was  further  investigated  after  the  imposition  of 
provisional measures and, as a result, it can be confirmed that the Union industry was 
indeed able to renegotiate not only the prices of the long-term contracts but also any 
contractual penalties relating to these long-term contracts.  

(277)  One of the above interested parties argued further that it is sufficient that only some 
Union producers have been affected by the long term contracts and that the situation of 
the overall Union industry is irrelevant. It claimed that higher costs do not necessarily 
have  to  affect  all  operators  in  the  same  way.  This  argument  ignores  the  finding  that 
overall, for the Union industry, the average polysilicon prices were in many cases not 
found to be higher than the market prices or than the spot prices and that therefore the 
issue  whether  higher  costs  affect  all  or  only  few  operators  was  not  considered 
pertinent. This argument was therefore rejected. 

(278)  Another  interested  party  requested  that  the  Commission  separate,  distinguish  and 
quantify  the  effects  of  each  factor  having  an  impact  on  the  situation  of  the  Union 
industry; in particular the effect of the significant drop in polysilicon prices should be 
considered  separately.  In  this  regard,  it  was  argued  that  it  was  the  decrease  in  the 
polysilicon prices rather than the price pressure from the Chinese imports that caused 
the  decrease  in  sales  prices.  As  far  as  the  Union  industry  is  concerned  it  should  be 
noted that the average selling prices decreased much further than the decrease of the 
average cost of production, on which the decline of raw material prices could have an 
impact. This argument was therefore rejected. 

(279)  Following the final disclosure, some interested parties reiterated that the impact of the 
decrease of polysilicon prices on the Union industry’s cost was not limited or diluted 
through  the  value  chain  as  concluded  in  the  investigation.  However,  as  already 
mentioned  in  recital  (276)  above,  polysilicon  is  the  main  raw  material  for  wafers 
producers, thus any impact on the production cost of cells or modules was found to be 
diluted in the value chain. The interested parties did not provide any evidence which 
could  have  devaluated  this  finding.  Moreover,  the  investigation  showed  that  the 
decrease of polysilicon prices over the period considered was reflected in the average 
cost  of  production  of  cells  and  modules  of  the  sampled  Union  industry  which 
decreased  to  a  similar  degree  than  the  polysilicon  prices.  One  interested  party 
questioned the impact of  alleged  penalties that the Union industry had to pay due to 

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the re-negotiation of the supplier contracts. In this regard, it cannot be excluded that a 
limited  number  of  producers  may  have  had  to  pay  penalties  for  the  cancellation  of 
wafers supply contracts during the period considered. However, the Commission did 
not find any evidence that these penalties could have had an effect on the situation of 
the Union industry as a whole or would be representative. Such evidence was also not 
provided by the interested party in question. While it can therefore not be completely 
excluded that penalties could have had a certain negative impact on a limited number 
of Union producers, the overall impact on the Union industry is at best marginal and 
hence  could  not  break  the  causal  link  between  the  dumped  imports  and  the  material 
injury  suffered  by  the  whole  Union  industry.  Therefore,  these  arguments  had  to  be 
rejected. 

 Another interested party claimed that the decrease of sales prices of the product under 
investigation  in  the  Union  is  partly  due  to  the  reduction  in  the  price  of  polysilicon. 
However,  in  this  regard,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  investigation  showed  that  the 
imports  from  the  PRC  were  dumped  and  substantially  undercutting  the  prices  of  the 
Union industry. The price decrease therefore goes beyond the reduction in production 
costs  that  can  be  explained  by  the  decrease  in  the  raw  material  prices.  If  the  price 
decrease was  merely the  effect of the decrease  of the raw  material  prices, the Union 
industry would not have been forced to decrease their sales prices below their cost of 
production. Therefore, this claim has to be rejected.  

(280) 

(281) 

 Another interested party reiterated that the litigation of one Union producer after the 
IP may has affected the situation of at least this Union producer already during the IP. 
This party did not explain however how and to what extend such event that occurred 
after the IP could indeed have had an effect on this producer’s situation during the IP. 
Likewise,  the  investigation  did  not  reveal  any  evidence  showing  such  effects. 
Therefore this claim had to be rejected. 

(282)  Moreover,  the  same  interested  party  questioned  the  above  mentioned  findings,  as 
allegedly  no  evidence  was  shown.  However,  the  findings  of  the  investigation  were 
based  on  facts  and  positive  evidence,  non-confidential  versions  of  which  were 
available to all interested parties.  

(283)  In absence of any other comments with regard to the impact of the raw material prices, 

the findings in recitals (191) to (194) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3.7. 

Self-inflicted  injury:  impact  of  automation,  size,  economies  of  scale,  consolidation, 
innovation, cost efficiency, imports of the Union industry 

(284)  Following the provisional disclosure, certain interested parties reiterated the claim that 
the  injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry  was  due  to  the  Union  industry’s  lack  of 
sufficient  economies  of  scale.  It  was  reiterated  that  small-scale  producers  had  a 
disadvantage  compared  to  larger  vertically  integrated  producers  and  therefore  any 
injury suffered by small scale producers cannot be attributed to the dumped imports. 
Another interested party argued that the automation of the production process is costly 
and  that  therefore  economies  of  scale  are  even  more  important  to  reduce  the  cost  of 
production. 

(285)  The  investigation  showed  that  the  Union  industry,  even  the  larger  and  vertically 
integrated ones, due to the dumped imports, could not fully benefit from high capacity 
utilization rates to achieve economies of scale. In any event, the investigation did not 
reveal  any  correlation  between  size,  vertical integration  and  better  profitability  rates, 
as  the  high  price  pressure  from  dumped  imports  has  altered  this  correlation.  The 

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investigation has showed that the benefit of economies of scale no longer existed in a 
market  where  the  utilization  rates  were  low,  which  was  also  true  for  the  Chinese 
producers. Therefore, these arguments were rejected.  

(286)  Furthermore, one interested party claimed that investors and banks would not finance 
projects  if  the  module  manufacturer  is  too  small,  as  larger  producers  provide  better 
guarantees and are more ‘bankable’. In other terms, investors and banks are reluctant 
to  finance  PV  related  projects  using  modules  produced  in  the  Union.  However,  the 
investigation  showed  that  any  possible  preference  of  investors  and  banks  to  finance 
Chinese  producers  which  have  larger  production  capacities  is  the  result  of  the 
distortion  that  dumped  imports  have  created  on  the  Union  market.  As  mentioned 
above in recital (285), the size of the production lines does not play a role if utilisation 
rates remain low. Therefore, this argument was dismissed. 

(287)  One  interested  party  reiterated  that  the  Union  industry  had  an  unfavourable  cost 
structure  compared  to  its  Chinese  competitors,  as  the  latter  enjoyed  lower  labour, 
electricity and depreciation cost, and in addition had the newest equipment. However, 
the  party  concerned  was  unable  to  provide  new  information  or  supporting  evidence 
that  could  reverse  the  findings  of  this  investigation  in  this  regard.  In  particular,  the 
claim that the Chinese producers were using the newest equipment was addressed in 
recital (203) to the provisional Regulation, stating that the exporting producers in the 
PRC  did  not  enjoy  any  comparative  advantage,  in  particular  because  machinery  and 
equipment was imported from the European Union. The above claims were therefore 
rejected. 

(288)  Another party claimed that the Chinese enjoyed a comparative advantage with regard 
to  polysilicon  prices  and  to  economies  of  scales  which  resulted  in  lower  cost  of  the 
machinery. This party did not provide any new information or supporting evidence in 
this regard that could reverse the findings as set out in recitals (195) and (196) as well 
as  (203)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  The  claim  of  this  party  had  therefore  to  be 
rejected.  

(289)  It  is  recalled  that  as  set  out  in  recital  (203)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  and 
mentioned also in recital (287) above the exporting producers in the PRC do not enjoy 
any  comparative  advantage  with  regard  to  raw  materials  and  the  machinery  used  as 
both were mostly imported from the Union. One interested party contested the above, 
without  however  providing  any  evidence.  As  far  as  labour  and  overhead  costs, 
including depreciation costs are concerned, they represented on average less than 10 % 
of  the  total  cost  of  a  module  in  the  IP  and  are  not  considered  to  have  played  any 
significant role. As far as electricity costs are concerned, they represented on average 
less  than  1  %  of  the  total  cost  of  a  module  in  the  IP  and  are  not  considered  to  have 
played  any  significant  role.  Moreover,  the  claim  that  the  Chinese  were  using  the 
newest equipment was not substantiated. 

(290)  Moreover,  one  interested  party  reiterated  that  some  Union  producers  sourced  cells 
and/or modules from the country concerned, and re-sold those products on the Union 
market  as  their  own.  It  requested  that  injury  resulting  from  these  transactions  is  not 
attributed  to  the  dumped  imports.  However,  the  investigation  revealed  that  imports 
from  the  Union  industry  of  the  product  concerned  were  complementary  in  nature  as 
well as limited in terms of volume when compared to the total Union production and 
therefore their effect, if any, would only be marginal and could not be considered as 
breaking  the  causal  link  between  the  dumped  imports  and  the  injury  suffered  by  the 
Union industry.  

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(291)  One  unrelated  importer  argued  that  the  fact  that  the  number  of  employees  increased 
over  the  period  considered  was  not  sufficiently  addressed  in  the  provisional 
Regulation.  In  respect  of  this  claim,  it  is  noted  that  employment  increased  between 
2009  and  2011  for  modules  and  then  decreased  during  the  IP.  For  cells,  the 
employment increased until 2010 and then decreased in 2011 and further decreased in 
the  IP.  It  is  noted  that  for  modules,  employment  followed  the  trend  of  the  Union 
production. For cells, as the Chinese imports increased their market share during the 
entire  period  the  Union  industry  could  not  benefit  from  the  growing  consumption  as 
expected.  Therefore,  the  employment  decrease  in  2011  and  in  the  IP  corresponds  to 
companies that either had become insolvent or stopped their cell production. 

(292)  Following the final disclosure one interested party reiterated that the injury suffered by 
the Union industry was due to the small scale and the lack of economies of scale. As 
already  explained  in  the  recital  (285)  above  and  in  recitals  (195)  and  (196)  to  the 
provisional Regulation, even in the global market, the size and therefore the benefit of 
economies of scale cannot longer exist where the utilization rates were generally low, 
and where enormous overcapacities existed world-wide. Therefore this claim had to be 
rejected.  

(293)  Moreover, the same party reiterated that the injury suffered by the Union industry was 
due  to  the  inability  of  the  Union  industry  to  realize  any  cost  advantage.  This  party 
claimed that this was in particular due the fact that most of the Union producers were 
vertically  integrated.  However,  this  party  did  not  provide  any  further  information  to 
what extend the fact that producers are vertically integrated could have had a negative 
impact on their cost structure. Therefore this claim had to be rejected. 

(294)  In  absence  of  any  other  comments  in  this  regard  recitals  (195)  to  (206)  to  the 

provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3.8. 

Competition from thin film PV products and other PV technologies 

(295)  Following the provisional disclosure, one interested party reiterated the claim that the 
injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry  was  caused  by  the  competition  from  thin  film 
PV  products  and  other  PV  technologies,  as  these  technologies  were  competing  with 
the 
and 
commercial/industrial rooftop systems, which constitute a substantial part of the total 
Union PV market.  

ground-mounted 

investigation 

especially 

product 

under 

for 

(296)  The investigation showed that although thin film PV products are less expensive than 
the product under investigation, they only capture a limited market share of the total 
Union  solar  market  as  they  have  much  lower  conversion  efficiencies  and  a  lower 
wattage  output  than  crystalline  silicon  modules.  According  to  the  information 
available, the market share of thin film products was not significant comparing to the 
total Union solar market during the IP. Therefore, the findings in recital (208) to the 
provisional Regulation, that although there may be some competition between the thin 
film products and the product under consideration, this competition is considered to be 
marginal,  are  confirmed.  On  these  grounds,  the  arguments  brought  forward  in  this 
regard had to be rejected.  

(297)  Following the final disclosure, one interested party reiterated that the competition from 
thin film products likely caused the material injury suffered by the Union industry. In 
this regard, the party submitted that in Germany the market share of thin film products 
in  the  total  solar  market  was  substantial  during  most  of  the  IP  and  only  declined 
towards the beginning of 2012. 

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(298)  The investigation showed indeed that the average prices of thin film products were at 

lower levels than the average price levels of the product under investigation.  

(299)  However,  as  set  out  in  recital  (296)  above  thin  film  products  have  much  lower 
conversion  efficiencies  and  a  lower  wattage  output  than  crystalline  silicon  modules 
and  therefore  competition  between  these  product,  if  any,  could  not  contribute  to  the 
injury  of  the  Union  industry,  as  crystalline  silicon  modules  are  the  dominant 
technology in the Union solar market. The JRC PV Status Report 2012 states that as a 
consequence  of  the  drop  in  polysilicon  prices,  thin  film  has  in  the  last  years  lost 
market share to crystalline silicon modules.  

(300)  In absence of any other comments in this regard, the findings of recitals (207) to (210) 

to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3.9. 

Financial crisis and its effects on access to finance 

(301)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure  it  was  claimed  that  the  injurious  effects  of  the 
financial  crisis  and  of  its  effects  on  access  to  finance  should  be  separated  and 
distinguished and not attributed to the dumped imports.  

(302)  In  this  regard  reference  is  made  to  recital  (212)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  where 
the  effects  of  the  financial  crisis  and  the  economic  recession  on  the  situation  of  the 
Union industry were specifically addressed. This recital sets out in detail the reasoning 
behind  the  finding  that  the  financial  crisis,  although  having  had  an  impact  on  the 
situation  of  the  Union  industry,  did  not  break  the  causal  link  between  the  dumped 
imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. This specific reasoning 
has  not  been  contested  by  the  interested  parties  nor  did  they  provide  any  new 
information  or  evidence  which  could  have  devaluated  the  findings  set  out  in  this 
recital. The claims made in this regard were therefore rejected.  

(303)  Moreover it was claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to the 
Union’s industry failure to seek appropriate financing and that the Commission should 
investigate whether the Union industry requested financing while they were profitable. 
The  investigation  in  fact  showed  that  in  2010,  when  Union  industry  was  still 
profitable, the level of investment increased for modules and for cells respectively by 
315%  and  10%  as  compared  to  2009.  As  the  PV  industry  is  capital  intensive,  it  is 
expected  that  the  Union  industry  is  continuously  seeking  appropriate  financing  in 
order  to  improve  its  cost  efficiency  and  compete  with  the  unfair  dumped  imports. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the lack of access to finance was a result of the distorted 
situation caused by dumped imports and not its cause. The above claim was therefore 
rejected.  

(304)  Following the final disclosure, one interested party reiterated that the injurious effects 
of the financial crisis should be separated and distinguished and not be attributed to the 
dumped imports. This party referred to publicly available information indicating that 
at  least  one  Union  producer  perceived  the  financial  crisis  as  the  main  cause  for  its 
injurious  situation.  The  current  investigation  based  its  findings  on  specific  company 
data  which  go  significantly  beyond  publicly  available  statements  of  specific 
companies.  Therefore,  the  publicly  available  statement  to  which  reference  was  made 
cannot  devaluate  the  findings  made  in  recital  (212)  to  the  provisional  Regulation, 
where  it  was  concluded  that  while  the  financial  crisis  had  a  certain  impact  on  the 
situation of the Union industry, it could not break the causal link between the dumped 
imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. Therefore, this claim 
had to be rejected. 

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(305)  Another  interested  party  claimed  that  the  different  access  to  financing  between  the 
Union industry as compared to the Chinese exporting producers should be taken into 
consideration. This party claimed that this was one of the main factors which caused 
the  material  injury  to  the  Union  industry  and  not  the  dumped  imports.  However,  the 
preferential access to financing of a number of Chinese exporting producers has been 
found to distort the market and may well be one of the main reasons allowing Chinese 
exporting producers to export the product concerned at dumped prices. This factor can 
therefore not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury 
suffered by the Union industry. This claim was therefore rejected. 

(306)  In  absence  of  any  other  comments  regarding  the  effects  of  the  financial  crisis,  the 
findings of recitals (211) and (212) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.  

3.10. 

Export performance of the Union industry 

(307)  In  absence  of  any  comments  brought  forward  to  reconsider  the  findings  set  out  in 

recitals (213) and (215) to the provisional Regulation, they are confirmed.  

3.11. 

The discovery of shale gas deposits in the Union 

(308)  In  absence  of  any  comments  brought  forward  to  reconsider  the  findings  set  out  in 

recitals (215) to (217) to the provisional Regulation, they are confirmed. 

3.12. 

The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 

(309)  In  absence  of  any  comments  brought  forward  to  reconsider  the  findings  set  out  in 

recitals (218) and (219) to the provisional Regulation, they are confirmed.  

3.13.  Management decisions 

(310)  Some interested parties reiterated the claim raised in the recital (220) to the provisional 
Regulation that the material injury suffered by at least one of the Union producers was 
caused by wrong management decisions. These parties provided further information in 
the  form  of  a  press  article.  However,  the  information  provided  could  not  be  verified 
and could not reverse the findings of this investigation that the management decisions 
of  the  company  concerned  were  normal  and  prudent  or  had  no  impact  on  the  entire 
Union industry. Therefore, the above claims were rejected.  

(311)  In the absence of any other arguments in this respect, the findings as set out in recitals 

(220) and (221) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

3.14.  Other government policies 

(312)  In absence of any comments to reconsider the findings set out in recital (222) to the 

provisional Regulation, they are confirmed. 

3.15.  Other arguments 

(313)  One interested party claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to 
the  forerunner  disadvantage  and  the  lack  of  political  support  from  the  European 
Commission  in  previous  years.  This  party  also  claimed  that  apart  from  the  national 
support  schemes,  also  population,  GDP,  electricity  consumption, 
financing 
opportunities  and  connectability  to  the  grid  are  important  factors  in  each  market. 
However, the above party was not able to substantiate its claims which were therefore 
rejected.  

(314)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  the  same  interested  party  reiterated  that  the  injury 
suffered by the Union industry was due to the forerunner disadvantage. However, the 
claim was neither analysed nor substantiated; therefore it had to be rejected. 

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4. 

Cumulative assessment of those other factors that have been found to contribute to 
injury 

(315)  The investigation has shown that the following other factors may have contributed to 
injury: Imports of the product concerned from Taiwan; Reduction in the level of FIT; 
Long-term  polysilicon  contracts  of  limited  number  of  Union  producers;  the  financial 
and economic crisis. 

(316)  As has been shown above in sections 3.1 respectively 3.6, the possible contribution of 
imports  from  Taiwan  and  of  long-term  polysilicon  contracts  of  a  limited  number  of 
Union producers are, at best, marginal, because any impact was further diluted through 
the value chain.  

(317)  With regards to the economic and financial crisis, the investigation has shown that the 
main reason for difficulties of the Union industry in accessing the capital needed for 
investments  were  the  dumped  imports,  which  prevented  the  Union  industry  from 
selling its products at profitable prices when the Union market showed strong growth 
rates (2009-2011). 

(318)  With  regards  to  FIT,  third  parties  have  not  been  able  to  demonstrate  that  FIT  levels 
during  the  IP  would  have  been  so  low  that  they  would  have  prevented  Union 
producers from selling the product concerned at non-injurious prices. The Institutions 
take  the  view  that  reductions  in  FIT  levels  may  explain  reduced  demand,  as 
investments  in  certain  locations  were  no  longer  viable.  They  cannot,  however,  break 
the  causal  link,  even  taken  together  with  the  other  factors  that  have  been  found  to 
contribute  to  injury,  because  they  were  still  at  a  level  at  which,  absent  the  dumped 
imports, the Union producers could have sold their products at non-injurious prices. 

(319)  Therefore, even if the cumulative effect of the four other factors possibly contributing 
to injury is assessed, the causal link between dumping and injury is not broken.  

5. 

Conclusion on causation  

(320)  All  the  effects  of  the  injury  factors  other  than  the  dumped  imports  have  been 
individually  and  collectively  analysed.  Therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  collective 
assessment of all the factors that may have had an impact on the injurious situation of 
the Union industry (i.e. imports of third countries, FITs, impact of raw material prices, 
financial crisis) collectively fail to explain the injury suffered by the Union industry in 
particular  in  terms  of  low  prices  and  financial  losses  due  to  the  penetration  of  low 
priced imports in significant quantities of the product concerned from the PRC. Based 
on  the  above,  the  provisional  findings  as  set  out  in  recitals  (223)  to  (224)  to  the 
provisional Regulation that the dumped imports from the PRC caused material injury 
to  the  Union  industry  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3  (6)  of  the  basic  Regulation  is 
confirmed.  

1. 

Preliminary remarks  

F. 

UNION INTEREST 

(321)  Following the provisional disclosure, one interested party claimed that the assessment 

of the Union interest was not based on a representative number of operators.  

(322)  The Commission has contacted the different operators in the following manner. 

(323)  Unrelated  importers:  as  mentioned  in  recital  (12)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  the 
Commission  contacted  all  the  250  unrelated  importers  made  known  by  the 
complainant  and  selected  a  provisional  sample  in  accordance  with  Article  17  of  the 

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basic  Regulation  to  cover  the  largest  representative  volume  of  imports  which  can 
reasonably be investigated within the time available. However, as set out in recital (12) 
and  (232)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  only  one  of  the  companies  provisionally 
selected  was  indeed,  after  verification,  confirmed  to  be  an  unrelated  importer.  After 
publication  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  fifteen  further  unrelated  importers,  which 
had  initially  submitted  a  sampling  form  at  the  initiation  stage  but  were  not  sampled, 
were  invited  to  cooperate  further  with  the  investigation.  Six  of  them  agreed  and 
received  a  questionnaire,  and  five  submitted  a  reply  out  of  which  three  were 
considered  to  be  sufficiently  complete.  The  definitive  sample  of  unrelated  importers 
therefore comprises four unrelated importers, representing a range of 2 % to 5 % of the 
imports  of  the  product  concerned.  With  regards  to  that  low  percentage,  it  has  to  be 
kept in mind that the majority of imports of the product concerned into the Union does 
not  take  place  via  unrelated  importers,  as  explained  in  recital  (12)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation.  

(324)  Operators  other  than  unrelated  importers  (upstream  and  downstream  operators):  as 
mentioned  in  recital  (226)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  the  Commission  also  sent 
specific questionnaires to about 150 operators including those unrelated importers that 
had  come  forward  after  the  initiation  of  the  investigation,  which  had  therefore  the 
opportunity  to  provide  the  relevant  data  to  the  Commission.  Moreover,  not  only  the 
replies to the questionnaires but also verifiable and duly substantiated comments and 
submissions  provided  by  interested  parties  within  the  deadlines  were  taken  into 
consideration  in  the  investigation,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  these  parties  had 
replied to the questionnaire. In particular, AFASE has transmitted to the Commission 
comments on behalf of its members - PV operators that were also analysed. 

(325)  In  the  light  of  the  above,  sufficient  elements  were  gathered  allowing  a  meaningful 
assessment of the Union interest. On these grounds, the argument was rejected.  

(326)  One  interested  party  requested  the  Commission  to  clarify  how  the  Commission 
handled  the  importers  questionnaires  which  it  considered  to  have  been  submitted  by 
downstream operators.  

(327)  In reply to this request, it is clarified that the 36 replies indicated in recital (241) to the 
provisional  Regulation  concerned  replies  to  the  Annex  B  of  the  Notice  of  initiation, 
the purpose of which was to sample unrelated importers if appropriate.  

(328)  Concerning  the  replies  to  the  questionnaires  of  the  two  operators  indicated  in  recital 
(12) to the provisional Regulation one was taken into account in the relevant analysis 
of  the  downstream  operators.  The  second  operator  submitted  additional  information 
which  revealed  that,  contrary  to  what  was  stated  in  recital  (12)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation,  it  was  indeed  an  importer  of  modules  but  not  an  importer  of  cells. 
Nevertheless,  the  information  provided  in  its  reply  to  the  questionnaire  was  not 
sufficient  to  include  it  in  the  analysis  of  unrelated  importers  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
replies provided were incomplete. 

(329)  After  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  further  verification  visits  were  carried 
out at the premises of to two project developers (see above recital (8). In addition, the 
six  replies  to  the  specific  questionnaires  (see  recital  (324)  by  service  providers  also 
active in the PV sector (logistics, transport, public relations, etc.), which were deemed 
initially to be insufficiently complete (see recital (241) to the provisional Regulation) 
were analysed and taken into account for the purpose of this investigation (see recitals 
(369) to (371) below).  

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(330)  To  sum  up,  for  the  analysis  of  Union  interest,  the  following  information  has  been 

relied on:  

– 

– 

– 

the  questionnaire  replies  received  from  eight  sampled  Union  producers  and 
four  sampled  unrelated  importers  as  well  as  the  replies  to  the  specific 
questionnaire received from eight upstream and thirteen downstream operators 
(seven project developers/installers; six service providers also active in the PV 
sector)  out  of  150  operators  that  had  come  forward  after  the  initiation  and 
received the specific questionnaires;  

the data verified during the on-site verifications at the premises of eight Union 
producers,  one  unrelated  importer,  two  upstream  operators,  four  downstream 
operators (project developers/installers) and one association (see recital (17) to 
the provisional Regulation and recital (8) above) 

the  data  on  Union  interest  submitted  by  other  interested  parties,  including 
associations,  as  well  as  publicly  available  data  on  the  evolution  of  the  PV 
in  particular:  EPIA’s  Global  Market  Outlook  for 
market 
Photovoltaics 2013-2017 

in  Europe, 

2. 

Interest of the Union industry 

(331)  Some  interested  parties  contested  that  the  Union  industry  would  be  able  to  benefit 
from  any  measures  arguing  that  (i)  the  measures  will  lower  the  demand  for  PV 
products  in  the  Union  and  therefore  the  Union  industry  will  not  be  able  to  increase 
their sales, (ii) the Union industry has small production facilities and is therefore not 
able to meet the demand of certain types of installations such as commercial rooftop 
and large ground-mounted installations, (iii) the Union producers are not ‘bankable’’ 
(iv) the imposition of duties on cells will de facto increase the cost of production of the 
Union producers of modules and make them less attractive for consumers, (v) in case 
of  significant  drop  of  Chinese  imports,  the  producers  from  other  third  countries  will 
most likely take advantage of the fewer imports from the PRC. 

(332)  Concerning  the  claim  that  measures  will  lower  the  demand  for  PV  products  in  the 
Union  and  therefore  the  Union  industry  will  not  be  able  to  increase  their  sales,  it  is 
noted that the parties were unable to provide any verifiable evidence of the existence 
of a direct link between the imposition of measures and the decrease in demand for PV 
products which proved to be influenced over the years by several factors.  

(333)  In  reply  to  the  claim  that  the  Union  industry  has  small  production  facilities  and  is 
therefore  not  able  to  meet  the  demand  of  certain  types  of  installations  such  as 
commercial rooftop and large ground-mounted installations, it should be noted that the 
investigation has showed that the Union industry has the capacity to supply both the 
commercial  and  industrial  installations  (between  40  KW  and  1MW)  and  the  utility 
market segment installations (1 MW and 10 MW). Moreover, the investigation did not 
reveal  any  evidence  that  products  supplied  by  different  manufacturers  could  not  be 
used in the same project. This claim was therefore rejected.  

(334)  The  argument  that  the  Union  industry  would  not  benefit  from  the  measures  because 
Union  producers  are  not  ‘bankable’  and  that  investments  funds  would  not  accept  to 
finance  projects  using  EU-made  modules  was  not  substantiated.  In  any  event,  it  is 
expected  that  the  imposition  of  measures  will  restore  fair  market  conditions  which 
should reassure investors, including from the banking sector, as to the ability of Union 
producers to develop viable projects. On these grounds, this argument was rejected.  

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(335)  With reference to the claim that the imposition of duties on cells will de facto increase 
the  cost  of  production  of  the  Union  producers  of  modules  and  make  them  less 
attractive for consumers, while it is not excluded that a certain increase in prices could 
occur  further  to  the  imposition  of  duties,  it  should  also  be  considered  that  public 
available sources indicate that the price trend of modules and cells is downward. Thus, 
even if the cost of cells might increase as a result of measures, the overall decreasing 
trend of prices should result in decreasing costs of modules. The producers in question 
may  also  decide  to  source  their  cells  in  the  Union,  and  no  longer  from  the  PRC. 
Finally,  it  is  expected  that  the  imposition  of  measures  will  increase  the  capacity 
utilization of cells producers in the Union thus increasing their economy of scale and 
as a consequence reduce costs. This claim was therefore rejected.  

(336)  The  argument  that  in  case  of  a  significant  drop  of  Chinese  imports  further  to  the 
imposition  of  measures,  the  other  third  countries  will  most  likely  take  advantage  of 
this  rather  than  the  Union  industry  was  not  confirmed  by  the  investigation.  The 
investigation did not reveal any clear indications that the other third countries would 
direct their exports massively to the Union market, in particular taking into account the 
likely  expansion  of  other  third  country  markets,  notably  in  Asia,  as  forecasted  by 
publicly  available  sources.  Finally,  there  is  no  indication  that  even  if  imports  from 
other third countries would increase as a result of a drop of Chinese imports, the Union 
industry will not be able to compete with imports from these countries. 

(337)  In reply to the final disclosure some parties argued that it is unrealistic to expect the 
emergence of a sustainable Union industry manufacturing modules and cells because 
there  is  no  rational  investor  that  would  invest  in  the  Union  producers  that  allegedly 
suffer  from  an  unfavourable  cost  structure  and  can  therefore  not  produce  at 
competitive  prices.  The  investigation  did  not  confirm  that  the  Union  industry  is 
suffering from an unfavourable costs structure, as explained in recitals (202) and (203) 
to  the  provisional  Regulation.  Therefore,  absent  dumped  imports  and  utilising  the 
production capacities to a larger extent should bring economies of scale and allow for 
the emergence of a sustainable Union industry. In view of the above the argument was 
rejected.  

(338)  One party argued that the demand in the Union is driven by the development of FITs 
and the expected return on investment by the investors is linked to this development. 
In particular, it claimed that, if prices increase in the Union, as a consequence of the 
duties, and FITs do not follow this increase accordingly, demand will decrease and the 
Union industry will not benefit from the duties imposed.  

(339)  In reply to the above claim, it is noted that despite the correlation between the level of 
FITs  and  the  demand  for  PV  installations,  the  evidence  collected  during  the 
investigation indicates that future demand will be less and less dependent on FITs and 
other support schemes as PV grid parity is likely to have been reached by certain types 
of  installations  in  several  places  in  the  Union  (see  recital  (260)above).  Furthermore, 
the  expected  return  on  investment  should  be  based  on  fair  market  prices.  Finally  as 
mentioned  in  recital  (335)  above,  while  it  is  not  excluded  that  a  certain  increase  in 
prices may occur further to the imposition of measures, it should be noted that public 
available sources indicate that the overall price trend is downward. The argument was 
therefore rejected. 

(340)  Interested parties have pointed out that because demand for solar panels is driven by 
support schemes, in particular FIT, and by the level of electricity prices for the final 
consumer (which determine grid parity), price elasticity of demand can be very high. 

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Whereas  it  is  correct  that  an  important  increase  in  prices  may  lead  to  an  important 
reduction  of  demand  because  of  the  particular  nature  of  the  market  pointed  out  by 
those interested parties, the argument has to be rejected because it is very unlikely that 
price  increases  caused  by  the  measures  will  be  important,  for  the  following  reasons. 
First of all, all available sources confirm that the important decrease in prices for the 
product  concerned  throughout  the  IP  and  since  the  IP  until  today  will  continue. 
Secondly,  the  economic  effect  of  the  undertaking  that  has  been  accepted  by  the 
Commission is that Chinese exporting producers will supply the product concerned at 
a minimum import price of less than 60 c/W, which is far below the price that has been 
observed during the IP, at a volume that corresponds roughly to their current market 
share. At this price level, demand is very unlikely to drop in a significant manner, as 
that  price  level  ensures  sufficient  demand  both  under  the  current  level  of  support 
provided by support schemes and under the current levels of grid parity. Furthermore, 
the price of electricity for final consumers is expected to increase, whereas the price of 
the  product  concerned  is  expected  to  decrease.  Through  an  indexation  formula,  the 
undertaking  ensures  that  further  price  decreases  of  the  product  concerned  are  taken 
into  account  for  the  minimum  import  price.  Therefore,  those  arguments  have  to  be 
rejected. 

(341)  Several  interested  parties  reiterated  the  allegation  that  the  interest  of  the  Union 
industry  is  not  significant  since  the  value  added  created  by  the  upstream  and 
downstream  industries  is  far  more  significant  than  the  value  added  created  by  the 
Union industry in the PV value chain. The argument that the various segments in the 
PV sector have a different added value is not disputed. As mentioned in recital (228) 
to the provisional Regulation, the investigation established that the Union industry has 
suffered  material  injury  caused  by  unfair  trade  practices.  Indeed  some  Union 
producers have already been forced to close down and in the absence of measures, a 
further  deterioration  appears  certain.  As  all  segments  in  the  PV  sector  are  closely 
interrelated,  the  disappearance  of  the  Union  production  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
whole PV sector making it fully dependent on outsourced supply. Therefore, also for 
reasons of security of supply, the argument was therefore rejected. 

(342)  In reply to the final disclosure, one interested party reiterated the claim that the higher 
value-added  created  by  the  upstream  and  downstream  industry,  as  compared  to  the 
Union  industry  of  the  product  concerned,  is  relevant  to  whether  anti-dumping  duties 
should be imposed. In this respect, it is confirmed that in assessing the Union interest 
the  Institutions  did  balance  the  positive  and  negative  consequences  the  duties  may 
have  on  the  various  economic  operators.  Whereas  the  impact  on  the  upstream  and 
downstream  industry  is  limited,  the  measures  will  afford  the  Union  industry  the 
possibility to recover from injurious dumping. 

(343)  One  party  contested  the  number  of  jobs  that  would  be  secured  by  the  imposition  of 
measures. It claimed that the Union industry employs about 6 000 people, and not 25 
000 as reported in recital (229) to the provisional Regulation.  

(344)  No  evidence  was  however  provided  to  support  the  above  claim  and  therefore  it  was 
dismissed.  It  is  clarified  that  in  view  of  the  exclusion  of  wafers  from  the  product 
scope, the employment in the Union industry amounted to around 21 000 employees 
during  the  IP.  Interested  parties  did  not  provide  any  proof  that  the  number  of 
employees in the Union industry has changed significantly post-IP. 

(345)  In conclusion, the investigation proved that the Union industry suffered material injury 
from  the  dumped  imports  from  the  PRC,  being  unable  to  recoup  the  investment 

EN 

59 

   EN 

through profitable sales. It is expected that the imposition of measures will restore fair 
trade  conditions  on  the  Union  market,  allowing  the  Union  industry  to  compete  on 
equal footing. The likely decrease in imports from the PRC should enable the Union 
industry  to  increase  their  sales  in  the  Union  and  thus  better  utilise  the  available 
production  capacities  in  the  short  term.  This  in  turn  may  bring  economies  of  scale. 
While  it  is  possible  that  the  prices  of  the  like  product  will  raise  in  a  short  period  of 
time due to the measures, the overall descending price trend is likely to be maintained 
also  thanks,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  further  decrease  of  cost  of  production  of  the 
product under investigation, and, on the other hand, the competitive pressure from the 
third countries' producers, which would also compete in the Union market. 

(346)  In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments,  recitals  (227)  and  (231)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation,  with  the  exception  of  the  employment  figure  referred  to  in  recital  (344) 
above,are confirmed. 

3. 

Interest of unrelated importers 

(347)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  the  unrelated  importer  which  provided  a 
questionnaire  reply  prior  to  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures  and  had  been 
considered  to  constitute  the  provisional  sample  claimed  that  the  conclusions  with 
regard to the impact of the measures on unrelated importers was only based on its own 
questionnaire reply which could therefore not be considered as representative.  

(348)  The  provisional  Regulation  based  its  findings  with  regard  to  unrelated  importers  on 
one company given that as explained in recital (232) to the provisional Regulation the 
major activity of only one out of the three provisionally sampled importers consisted 
in trading of the product concerned. As stated above in recital (21) subsequent to the 
imposition  of  provisional  measures,  the  sample  was  enlarged,  more  unrelated 
importers were contacted and out of the five additional questionnaire replies received 
only  three  were  sufficiently  complete  and  allowed  for  meaningful  assessment.  At 
definitive  stage,  the  sample  for  unrelated  imports  was  therefore  expanded  to  include 
four  importers.  Overall,  during  the  IP,  the  activity  of  the  four  sampled  cooperating 
unrelated importers related to the product concerned varied between 60% and 100% of 
their total business. In addition, the four cooperating unrelated importers sourced from 
the PRC between 16% to 100% of their total imports of modules, only one sourcing 
exclusively  from  the  country  concerned.  The  profitability  of  the  four  sampled 
cooperating unrelated importers related to the product concerned was on average 2.3% 
in the IP.  

(349)  One  interested  party  argued  that  the  impact  of  the  duties  on  the  unrelated  importers 
was underestimated as there are no immediate alternative sources of supply that could 
replace the Chinese imports of the product concerned if the duties were imposed and 
that  changing  a  source  of  supply  is  difficult  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  major 
production is based in the PRC and this would entail additional significant costs.  

(350)  In  this  respect,  it  is  recalled  that  the  imposition  of  measures  should  not  result  in  the 
disappearance  of  the  imports  of  the  product  concerned  from  the  PRC.  The 
investigation indicated that the possible decrease of imports from the PRC will impact 
in  particular  those  importers  that  source  the  product  concerned  exclusively  from  the 
PRC, which is the case only for one out of the four cooperating unrelated importers. 
Concerning  the  impact  of  measures  on  the  unrelated  importers'  financial  situation,  it 
was  not  excluded  that  it  can  be  negative,  but  it  has  been  concluded  that  this  will 
largely depend on their capacity to switch sources of supply or to pass at least part of 
the possible price increase on to their customers. For operators importing the product 

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60 

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also from other sources than the PRC or importing also other products than the product 
concerned  the  negative  impact  will  be  further  limited.  The  Commission  therefore 
considers that although there is likely to be a negative impact on the importers of the 
product concerned, this impact will, on average, remain limited. 

(351)  One  unrelated  importer  argued  that  it  needs  significant  working  time  and  financial 
investment before accepting the products of a new supplier. In this respect a claim was 
made  in  reply  to  the  final  disclosure  that  relevant  evidence  was  provided  to  the 
verification  team  at  the  time  of  the  on-the-spot  visit  on  the  long  testing  requirement 
that  an  importer  must  do  before  taking  the  decision  to  supply  from  a  particular 
exporter. 

(352)  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  setting  of  a  new  relationship  between  an  importer  and  a 
supplier may entail additional costs and time investment (e.g. in testing the product). 
At  the  same  time,  changing  suppliers  seems  to  be  a  normal  risk  calculated  in  an 
importers' professional activity and is related to the fact that the PV market is maturing 
and  thus  undergoes  constant  changes  (e.g.  bankruptcies,  consolidations)  requiring 
switching  to  new  suppliers.  Moreover,  it  can  be  assumed  that  new  types  of  modules 
that  reach  the  market  on  a  constant  basis  (containing  e.g.  new  efficiency 
characteristics) also require testing. In this respect, testing of a new product (even from 
the  same  supplier)  appears  to  be  a  standard  rather  than  an  unusual  activity.  The 
argument is therefore rejected.  

(353)  In reply to the final disclosure two parties reiterated the claim that the interest of the 
unrelated  importers  was  not  properly  considered.  One  party  claimed  that  the  lack  of 
the  non-confidential  version  of  the  replies  to  the  questionnaires  by  the  additional 
cooperating importers did not allow a proper assessment by the parties. It questioned 
the Commission's assessment regarding the possibility that other third country imports 
in  the  Union  would  increase  thus  allowing  the  importers  to  switch  their  supplies,  on 
the basis of the allegation that other third markets are booming. To this end, the party 
claimed that such assumption is in contradiction with the conclusions in recital (336), 
which argued that imports from other third countries would not be massive. Another 
the  principle  of  non-
party  questioned  whether 
discrimination  as  the  Union  producers  were  given  more  prominence  in  the 
Commission's assessment than the other operators. 

the  Commission  respected 

(354)  First,  it  is  confirmed  that  the  non-confidential  version  of  the  replies  to  the 
questionnaires  received  after  publication  of  the  provisional  Regulation  by  the 
additional cooperating importers was included in the file for consultation by interested 
parties.  Secondly,  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  assumption  that  the  imports 
from other third countries can increase in response to lower imports from the PRC and 
that  such  increase  should  not  be  massive  in  view  of  the  growing  demand  for  PV 
installations world-wide. At the same time, as the Union industry is expected to retake 
a certain part of the market share that was previously held by products from the PRC, 
a  certain  loss  in  business  for  unrelated  importers  cannot  be  excluded.  However,  it  is 
observed that the overall size of the PV market is expected to continue to grow in the 
long term, as grid parity is reached in more and more locations. Finally, it is clarified 
that,  as  in  all  trade  defence  investigations,  while  the  situation  of  the  Union  industry 
was  assessed  in  order  to  establish  if  it  suffered  material  injury  due  to  the  dumped 
imports, in the context of the Union interest analysis the interest of the Union industry 
was  assessed  on  an  equal  basis  to  the  other  economic  operators,  including  the 
unrelated importers. It is also clarified that the investigation whether or not the Union 
industry suffered material injury is governed in particular by Article 3(5) to the basic 

EN 

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Regulation which set the minimum standards of such investigation. The Union interest 
is  only  analysed  once  a  positive  determination  of  injurious  dumping  was  made  in 
accordance with the standards set out in Article 21 to the basic Regulation. As a result 
it was considered that the likely negative impact of the measures on certain importers, 
in particular those sourcing exclusively from the PRC, did not outweigh the benefits of 
the measures for the Union industry and the mid- and long term benefits to the Union 
PV market resulting from fair competition 

(355)  In the absence of any further comments, on the basis of the information covering the 
four  sampled  importers,  recitals  (233)  and  (234)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  were 
confirmed. 

4. 

Interest of upstream operators 

(356)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  several  parties  reiterated  the  claim  that  a 
majority  of  inputs  in  the  PV  value  chain  comes  from  the  Union  and  that  such 
advantageous  situation  may  cease  should  the  duties  be  imposed  as  production  in  the 
PRC of the product concerned will decrease as a consequence of the duty. In reply to 
the  final  disclosure  one  party  pointed  out  that  the  measures  in  this  case  may  trigger 
other measures, which the PRC may impose on the Union products.  

(357)  In  this  respect,  as  mentioned  in  recital  (239)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  Chinese 
imports are expected to continue to supply the Union market even with duties in place. 
In addition, various publicly available sources in the PV sector, such as EPIA’s Global 
Market Outlook for Photovoltaics 2013-2017, forecast that the possible contraction in 
demand  in  the  Union  should  be  only  in  the  short-term  (in  2013  and  2014)  since 
consumption in the Union will increase further in the following years. Furthermore, as 
concluded  in  recital  (239)  to  the  provisional  Regulation,  addressing  unfair  trade 
practises is likely to allow building a sustainable growth in the PV market in the Union 
in  the  mid  and  long-term,  from  which  all  operators  in  the  Union  should  benefit. 
Finally, as regards the argument on the possible retaliation of the PRC in reply to the 
measures in this case, it is recalled that the PRC as any other WTO member, may have 
a recourse to trade defence investigations only in justified circumstances and any such 
investigation  has  to  comply  with  strict  WTO  rules.  The  Commission  monitors  any 
such  investigation  to  ensure  that  the  WTO  rules  are  respected.  The  argument  was 
therefore rejected. 

(358)  Some  parties  contested  the  conclusion  in  recital  (239)  to  the  provisional  Regulation 
that the decreased exports of the Union PV upstream operators to the PRC might be 
compensated  by  exports  to  other  markets  arguing  that  the  duties  will  decrease  the 
world-wide demand for the product.  

(359)  In  this  respect,  it  is  firstly  noted  that  Chinese  imports  are  not  expected  to  cease 
completely as a result of the duties. In addition, the information collected in the course 
of the investigation did not establish any direct correlation between the development 
of  the  imports  from  the  PRC  in  the  Union  market  and  the  exports  from  the  PRC  to 
other  markets.  Moreover,  publicly  available  sources,  such  as  EPIA’s  Global  Market 
Outlook  for  Photovoltaics  2013-2017,  forecast  that  the  PV  market  world-wide  will 
grow in the next years. As far as the Chinese market is concerned, there are indications 
that the domestic consumption in the PRC will increase substantially (e.g. as indicated 
by  EPIA).  In  view  of  the  above,  the  exports  of  the  Union  upstream  operators  to  the 
PRC  are  not  expected  to  drop  significantly  as  a  consequence  of  the  imposition  of 
measures.  

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(360)  It should also be noted that the contraction of demand in the Union in 2013 and 2014 
mentioned  in  recital  (357)  above  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  upstream 
operators. This however cannot be linked, at least not for its major part, to the duties 
as  it  was  foreseen  well  before  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures.  Moreover, 
concerning the Union producers of machinery for the PV industry, as also mentioned 
in in recital (239) to the provisional Regulation, due to the existing substantial spare 
capacity  in  the  PRC,  it  is  unlikely  that  their  exports  to  the  PRC  can  significantly 
increase even under the scenario that the Chinese producers increase their production 
volume.  Finally,  the  information  gathered  during  the  investigation  indicated  that  the 
machinery  producers  may  also  be  impacted  by  the  Chinese  12th  five-year  plan  for 
Solar  Photovoltaic  Industry  which  foresees  that  by  2015  80%  of  the  manufacturing 
equipment for cells should come from the PRC. As long as this change is achieved in 
compliance  with  WTO  rules,  this  may  also  further  limit  the  possibility  of 
manufacturers  of  machinery  in  the  Union  to  compete  in  the  Chinese  market.  The 
above argument was therefore rejected.  

(361)  In  reply  to  the  final  disclosure  the  GOC  argued  that  the  12th  five-year  plan  for  the 
Solar  Photovoltaic  Industry  offers  only  some  general  guiding  principles  that  are  not 
binding as there are no enforcement powers foreseen, and that therefore it should not 
be considered as an indication that the possibility of manufacturers of machinery in the 
Union to compete in the Chinese market will be limited. In this respect it is noted that 
the  GOC  included  the  PV  industry  amongst  strategic  industries  in  the  12th  five-year 
plan and also issued a specific plan for the solar photovoltaic industry. In this plan the 
GOC  expressed  its  support  for  “superior  enterprises”  and  “key  enterprises”, 
committed  itself  to  “promote  the  implementation  of  various  photovoltaic  support 
policies”,  and  “formulate  overall  preparation  of  supporting  policies  on  industry, 
finance,  taxation  …”.  Furthermore,  as  the  plan  contains  essential  directives  to  be 
achieved by the Chinese industry during the period of five years it has a deep impact 
on the business landscape, both within the PRC and in countries that do business with 
the PRC. Considering the above, there are clear indications that the freedom of choice 
of  the  Chinese  manufacturers  of  cells  and  the  competitive  pressure  of  the  Union 
producers  of  the  manufacturing  equipment  exporting  to  the  Chinese  market  is 
restricted by the plan. Therefore this argument was rejected. 

(362)  One  cooperating  raw  material  producer  contested  the  prospect  of  other  markets 
compensation  for  the  decreased  production  on  the  Chinese  market,  in  view  of  the 
substantial  installed  production  capacity  in  the  PRC,  which  could  not  be  easily  built 
elsewhere.  

(363)  In view of the conclusions in recital (359) above this argument is dismissed since there 
are no indications of the alleged decreased production on the Chinese market. 

(364)  One interested party contested the number of employees in the upstream sector quoted 

in recital (236) to the provisional Regulation. 

(365)  It  is  clarified  that  the  number  of  4  200  employees  reported  in  the  provisional 
Regulation  only  referred  to  the  cooperating  upstream  operators,  such  as  equipment 
manufacturers and polysilicon supplier, based on their questionnaire replies, and not to 
the whole sector.  

(366)  Following the exclusion of wafers from the product scope, the producers in the Union 
of  this  product  should  nevertheless  benefit  from  the  imposition  of  duties,  since  the 
Union industry is expected to increase its production of cells and modules. 

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(367)  In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments,  recitals  (235)  and  (240)  to  the  provisional 

Regulation are confirmed. 

5. 

Interest of downstream operators 

(368)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (329)  above,  after  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures 

further verification visits were carried out to two project developers.  

(369)  In addition to seven questionnaire replies of the downstream operators whose activity 
is directly related to the like product (namely the project developers and installers), the 
analysis of which constituted the basis for the assessment of the downstream operators 
in  the  provisional  Regulation,  six  additional  replies  to  questionnaires  submitted  at 
provisional  stage  and  considered  not  to  be  sufficiently  complete  (see  recital  (241)  to 
the provisional Regulation) were further analysed as they provided indications on the 
relative importance of their PV related activity as compared to their total activity. 

(370)  The  six  additional  operators  concerned  were  service  providers  in  the  PV  sector 
(logistics, transport, public relations, etc.) thus operators whose activity is not directly 
related  to  the  product  under  investigation.  Despite  certain  deficiencies  in  the  replies, 
the  data  in  the  questionnaires  showed  that  the  PV  related  activity  of  these  operators 
was marginal as compared to their total activity. Indeed, during the IP the PV related 
activity  represented  on  average  only  around  5  %  of  their  total  turnover  and  8  %  of 
their total employment. Profitability was on average around 7 %. However, it is noted 
that data concerning profitability were not complete, as not all operators reported on 
this item.  

(371)  On  the  basis  of  the  further  analysis,  it  was  concluded  that  in  the  light  of  the  data 
provided, any possible impact of the measures on the economic situation of the service 
providers in the PV sector is unlikely to be significant.  

(372)  Following  the  provisional  and  final  disclosure,  several  parties  contested  the 
representativity  of  the  data  concerning  the  downstream  operators  on  turnover, 
profitability  and  employment  derived  by  the  Commission  from  the  replies  to  the 
questionnaires  by  seven  downstream  operators.  AFASE  submitted  a  ‘survey’ 
conducted  amongst  its  members  (installers)  to  illustrate  that  for  the  majority  of  the 
installers  the  PV  business  constitutes  a  primary  source  of  income.  AFASE  further 
alleged  that  the  downstream  operators,  in  particular  installers,  in  contrast  to  the 
findings set out in recital (242) to the provisional Regulation would only realise one-
digit profit margins which do not allow for absorption of any duties.  

(373)  As  regards  the  representativity  of  the  data  used  in  the  provisional  Regulation  the 
Commission has used all the data provided by those downstream operators that have 
filled in the specific questionnaire, as well as the submissions provided by AFASE, as 
explained in recital (330) above.  

(374)  As regards the claim that the PV business constitutes a primary source of income for 
installers,  further  analysis  of  the  questionnaire  replies  submitted  by  the  seven 
downstream  operators  (installers  and  project  developers)  confirmed  that  the  activity 
directly related to the like product under investigation represented on average around 
42 % of the total activity of these operators and the profitability equalled on average 
11 %. However, when taking into account also their activities (not directly related to 
the  product  under  investigation),  their  overall  importance  increases  substantially  for 
three out of the seven operators. As a result, the corresponding ratio would range from 
around 45 % to 100 % during the IP. In addition, for the seven operators (installers and 
project  developers)  the  profitability  of  the  PV  activity  including  the  activities  not 

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directly  linked  to  the  product  under  investigation  would  amount  to  9%  on  average. 
Employment-wise,  the  PV  activity  including  the  activities  not  directly  linked  to  the 
product under  investigation would amount to around 660 full-time jobs in the IP for 
the seven operators. Apart from PV projects and installations these operators were also 
active in wind energy installations and production of electrical equipment. 

(375)  It  is  considered  that  any  impact  of  measures  on  the  downstream  operators  has  to  be 
primarily assessed on their activity directly related to the product under investigation 
which  in  the  IP  reached  a  profitability  of  11  %  on  average.  However,  even  if  it  is 
assessed  on  the  basis  of  the  overall  PV  activity  not  directly  related  to  the  product 
under  investigation  the  conclusions  would  be  similar  to  the  one  made  at  provisional 
stage  since,  overall,  the  various  factors  taken  into  account,  namely  profitability  and 
possibility  to  absorb  part  of  the  duty,  do  not  vary  significantly  (the  profitability 
decreases from 11 % on average to 9 % on average). In reply to the final disclosure 
one  party  on  which  premises  the  Commission  had  carried  out  a  verification  visit 
contested  the  representativity  of  the  conclusion  on  profitability  of  the  installers  and 
developers, which, as far as it is concerned, would allegedly be based only on a single 
transaction. This argument is dismissed as the Commission calculated the profitability 
of  the  downstream  operators,  on  the  basis  of  all  data  submitted  by  the  downstream 
operators in their questionnaire replies.  

(376)  Regarding  the  survey  conducted  by  AFASE  amongst  its  members,  it  is  firstly  noted 
that  all  operators  had  the  opportunity  to  come  forward  at  the  initiation  of  the 
investigation  and  to  reply  to  the  specific  questionnaire  designed  for  downstream 
operators  requesting  the  necessary  information  for  the  assessment  of  the  impact  of 
duties on these operators. Secondly, the identity of the installers was not provided in 
the survey which did not allow for a verification of e.g. the relevance and reliability of 
the data provided. Thirdly, while a number of questions asked in this survey concerned 
the installers' capacity to absorb the possible duties, the survey lacked any reference to 
the profit achieved by these installers in the IP, thus missing an important element for 
the  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  measures.  As  a  consequence  no  meaningful 
conclusions could be drawn from the survey provided. 

(377)  A  number  of  parties  contested  the  conclusions  in  recitals  (247)  and  (250)  to  the 
provisional  Regulation  that  the  jobs  in  the  downstream  segment  will  be  negatively 
impacted in the short term and that the overall impact will be negative but only to a 
limited extent in view of the fact that the PV market in the Union is forecasted to grow 
in  the  mid-  and  long-term.  Some  parties  further  claimed  that  in  particular  installers, 
who are dependent on the PV installations, will suffer from the decline in demand.  

(378)  The  possible  job  losses  resulting  from  the  imposition  of  the  duties  was  further 
analysed.  In  general  terms,  the  information  gathered  during  the  investigation 
confirmed that the downstream sector has been experiencing job losses as a result of 
the  contraction  of  the  demand  for  PV  installations  in  the  Union  of  about  5  GW 
between  2011  and  2012,  as  already  stated  in  recital  (246)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation.  These  job  losses  cannot  be  linked  to  the  measures  as  they  reflected  a 
market evolution. Moreover, a further contraction of demand is foreseen in 2013 and 
2014 and will most likely result in further job losses in the PV sector. Similarly, such 
evolution of the demand was forecasted by major research centres such as EPIA before 
the initiation of the investigation and therefore such job losses cannot be attributed to 
the imposition of measures. 

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(379)  The  Union  industry  submitted  a  study  by  a  consultant  PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
('PWC') on the possible impact of measure on PV related jobs. The PWC study refers 
to an earlier study by another consultant Prognos, which envisaged high job losses in 
the  PV  market  resulting  from  the  imposition  of  measures,  which  was  submitted  by 
AFASE  prior  to  the  imposition  of  provisional  duties  and  which  was  addressed  in 
recitals  (243)  to  (246)  to  the  provisional  Regulation.  The  PWC  study  criticised  the 
study  by  Prognos  pointing  to  the  fact  that  the  total  job  losses  estimated  by  Prognos 
exceeded  in  fact  the  total  number  of  existing  PV  jobs  in  the  Union.  Regarding  the 
impact  of  duties  in  the  Union  market,  PWC  reached  opposite  conclusions  than 
Prognos, forecasting a net positive impact on jobs in the Union and that the benefits 
outweigh the possible negative effects of the duties (e.g. on demand). In view of the 
absence of new substantiated arguments on the impact of measures on the employment 
in the downstream sector, the conclusions in recitals (247) to (250) to the provisional 
Regulation are confirmed.  

(380)  AFASE argued that the Commission did not disclose the source of the margin of error 
of  20  %  for  the  direct  PV  jobs  calculated  for  2011  mentioned  in  recital  (245)  to  the 
provisional Regulation.  

(381)  This margin of error of 20%, which may apply upward or downward, became apparent 
during the verification visit at EPIA. It shows the difficulty to assess precise figures on 
employment in the downstream sector as there are few sources, often contradictory, of 
data collection.  

(382)  In  reply  to  the  final  disclosure  some  parties  claimed  that  the  Commission's  analysis 
was silent about the fact that the duties will only add to the loss of jobs resulting from 
the smaller number of PV installations after 2011. It was argued that such job losses, 
in  particular  in  the  downstream  sector,  are  closely  linked  to  the  fact  that  the  PV 
installers  are  dependent  on  the  solar  installations.  In  addition,  AFASE  criticised  the 
Commission  for  not  having  properly  considered  the  survey  it  conducted  amongst  its 
members  and  a  similar  survey  conducted  by  a  UK  Solar  Trade  Association,  which 
allegedly illustrated such dependence.  

(383)  As regards the alleged silence of the Commission concerning the impact of the duties 
on  jobs,  reference  is  made  to  recitals  (377)  and  (379)  above,  where  the  claims 
concerning  the  impact  of  the  measures  on  jobs  in  the  PV  sector  are  addressed  and 
where  it  is  acknowledged  that  indeed  the  jobs  in  the  downstream  sector  might  be 
affected in the short term due to the measures.  

(384)  With regard to the survey conducted by AFASE and the UK Solar Trade Association, 
in  response  to  the  final  disclosure  the  identity  of  the  companies  participating  in  the 
interview  was  provided.  The  surveys  remained  however  deficient,  since  for  example 
certain  replies  were  incomplete.  The  analysis  of  the  surveys  showed  the  following. 
Concerning  the  survey  by  AFASE,  it  is  firstly  noted  that  the  majority  of  the  50 
installers  who  replied  to  the  interview  declared  to  be  exclusively  active  in  the  PV 
market.  15  out  of  50  installers  declared  to  be  also  active  in  other  non-PV  activities 
such  heating,  electrical  installations,  and  wind  to  a  certain  extent.  In  case  of  the  UK 
survey, 21 out of 31 UK companies who replied to the interview had also other than 
PV  activities.  This  result  shows  that  with  regards  to  a  nearly  a  half  of  the  project 
developers  and  installers,  the  finding  set  out  in  recital  (247)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation  on  the  ability  to  perform  other  activities  such  as  electrical  and  heating 
installations, plumbing and other green energies installations, is correct. It is, however, 
recognized that this ability may exist to a lesser extent than assumed in the provisional 

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Regulation.  Its  mitigating  impact  on  job  losses  may  therefore  be  less  important  than 
initially  assumed.  Secondly,  some  of  the  operators  surveyed  by  AFASE  and  the  UK 
Solar  Trade  Association  have  been  using  products  produced  in  the  Union  and  some 
foresee buying non-Chinese products following the measures to avoid a price increase. 
Thus,  their  dependence  on  the  Chinese  imports  and  the  impact  of  the  measures  is 
expected to be reduced as they can access products produced in the Union. Thirdly, the 
estimation of the impact of the measures on the businesses of all surveyed operators’ 
did  not  allow  for  firm  conclusions  as  their  assessment  was  very  diverse.  Some 
companies were even unable to assess such impact. Fourthly, also the answers to the 
question  about  the  number  of  the  PV  projects  that  risk  cancelling  in  case  of  duties 
ranged from 'not many' to 'all projects' in the UK survey. Some operators were unable 
to make an estimation. Finally, both surveys lacked the question about the profitability 
of  the  economic  operators  interviewed,  which  is  important  for  the  assessment  of  the 
possible absorption of the price increase, if any, resulting from the duty. 

(385)  Other parties claimed that installers cannot easily change their activities or switch to 
other green energy installations because of the very different technologies and know-
how involved. Therefore, should the duties be imposed, they would go out of business. 
After  final  disclosure,  this  claim  was  reiterated  by  one  interested  party,  arguing  that 
installers  have  invested  substantial  resources  in  PV  specialisation,  such  a  specific 
training,  which  would  show  that  their  main  focus  is  on  the  PV  sector  and  that  they 
would not be able to switch easily to other activities. 

(386)  This argument was insufficiently substantiated as it was not demonstrated what precise 
knowledge an installer would need to acquire and how difficult and expensive it is to 
obtain  it.  Irrespectively,  the  institutions  acknowledge  that  installers  have  developed 
know-how  specific  to  the  installation  of  PV  modules.  However,  the  development  of 
this know-how  is relatively recent and adds to the primary expertise of the installers 
being electrical and heating installations, plumbing etc. It also developed in response 
to  an  unfair  practice  namely  the  massive  inflow  of  dumped  imports  from  the  PRC. 
Independently  from  the  specialised  skills  of  the  employees  of  the  installers,  the 
argument has to be considered in parallel with the analysis made in recitals (378) and 
(382) above on the employment situation in the downstream sector which in the short 
term might be negatively impacted but which, thanks to sustainable trade, would lead 
to an increase in the employment of installers in the mid- to long term. Therefore, the 
argument was rejected. 

(387)  Several  parties  contested  the  argument  regarding  the  ability  of  the  downstream 
operators to absorb partly the possible price increase mentioned in recital (247) to the 
provisional  Regulation.  Also  this  argument  was  insufficiently  substantiated  thus 
preventing from assessing to which extent this allegation was accurate. As mentioned 
in  recital  (374)  above,  profitability  of  the  downstream  cooperating  operators  related 
directly  to  the  product  concerned  was  assessed  at  around  11  %  on  average  which 
leaves to the operators in question the possibility to absorb at least partially some price 
increase if any. In this context, it is recalled as mentioned in recital (335) above that 
the overall trend of prices is downward. The argument is therefore rejected. 

(388)  In reply to the final disclosure some parties reiterated the claim of the serious risk of 
contraction  of  demand  for  solar  products  in  the  Union  as  a  result  of  the  measures, 
which  according  to  these  parties  speaks  against  the  measures.  One  party  argued  that 
the  solar  energy  currently  has  a  high  price  elasticity  of  demand  and  even  a  limited 
increase in the price of solar products would result in a severe contraction of demand. 
This  party  estimated  that  an  anti-dumping  duty  in  the  range  of  30  %  may  further 

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contract demand by 8 GW whereas a duty of 50 % would contract demand by 10 GW. 
In  the  same  tone,  AFASE  referred  to  a  study  made  by  a  market  analyst,  which  also 
foresees a contraction of demand of up to 2GW in 2013 as a result of a duty of 50 %, 
thus a contraction of a much smaller magnitude.  

(389)  Although  different  contraction  scenarios  were  submitted  by  parties  during  the 
investigation in addition to the ones referred to above, they did not contain comparable 
results.  While  it  cannot  be  excluded  that  the  duties  might  result  in  a  contraction  of 
demand for PV installations, the quantification of such effect is difficult to establish in 
view of the various elements that influence the attractiveness of the PV installations in 
the  Union  (see  for  instance  recital  (258)  to  the  provisional  Regulation).  In  addition, 
even if such contraction were to take place in the short-term, the mid- and long-term 
benefits  resulting  from  fair  trade  are  expected  to  outweigh  the  short  term  negative 
impact.  Finally,  AFASE  itself  recognised  that  the  assessment  of  the  direct  link 
between the demand and the duties would only be available once duties are in place. 
Therefore, this argument was rejected.  

(390)  In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments,  recitals  (243)  and  (250)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation are confirmed. The findings on the six service providers for which the PV 
related activity constitutes only a small fraction of their broader activities (see recital 
(370) above) do not change the conclusion contained in recital (250) to the provisional 
Regulation  nor  does  the  distinction  of  the  PV  activity  not  directly  related  to  the 
product  concerned  of  the  seven  project  developers/installers  referred  to  in  recital 
(374). 

6. 

Interest of the end-users/consumers 

(391)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  some  parties  reiterated  the  argument  that  the 
duties would increase the price of the product concerned. Consequently, there would 
be  a  decline  in  demand  for  PV  installations  as  they  would  be  too  expensive  for 
consumers and not attractive enough for the other investors. 

(392)  As  already  mentioned  in  recital  (335)  above,  even  if  a  temporary  increase  of  prices 
may  happen  as  a  result  of  the  imposition  of  measures,  the  overall  trend  of  prices  is 
downward as confirmed by several public sources. While it is difficult to quantify the 
exact  possible  price  increase  resulting  from  the  measures  and  a  consequent  possible 
contraction  of  the  demand,  several  elements  are  recalled.  Firstly,  the  product  under 
investigation constitutes up to 50% of the total cost of a PV installation and therefore 
the  duty  may  be  at  least  partly  absorbed.  Secondly,  the  competition  of  the  Union 
industry  with  the  third  countries'  producers,  already  present  on  the  Union  market,  is 
likely to keep the prices down. At the same time the Union industry should be able to 
achieve  better  financial  results  thanks  to  the  economies  of  scales  resulting  from  a 
better utilisation of the production plants and reduced cost of production. Thirdly, the 
demand for PV installations is correlated not only with the price levels of the product 
under investigation but also with the level of FITs. At present low levels of demand, as 
compared to those achieved in 2011 and the IP, it is expected that the FITs should not 
decrease as quickly as in the period considered, allowing for continuous investment in 
PV projects. The argument was therefore dismissed. 

(393)  In reply to the final disclosure one party contested the above reasoning. It claimed that 
the downward price trend cannot be maintained after the imposition of the measures. 
The  party  recalled  that  the  measures  represent  a  very  significant  cost  increase  that 
cannot  be  fully  offset  by  cost  decreases  and  or  imports  from  the  third  countries.  In 
addition,  it  was  reiterated  that  the  Union  industry  will  not  be  able  to  undertake  new 

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investments in plants and machinery and the downstream operators can absorb a little 
if  their  profit  is  11  %.  Finally  there  is  no  evidence  that  suggests  that  FITs  might 
compensate the price increase. 

(394)  It  is  recalled  that  contrary  to  this  claim  it  is  not  expected  that  the  price  increase 
resulting from the measures may be fully offset but rather that a temporary increase in 
prices  following  the  measures  is  possible  (see  recital  (247)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation). Indeed, such price increase may result from the difference in price levels 
between  the  Chinese  dumped  prices  and  the  non-Chinese  products.  Yet,  the 
information gathered during the investigation allows claiming that the eventual price 
increase may be partly absorbed by a number of factors in view of the profits in the 
downstream sector at the level of 11 %. Finally, regarding the claim that there  is  no 
evidence that suggests that FITs might compensate the price increase, it is reasonable 
to assume that FITs will be adjusted over time in line with the development of prices 
for projects. 

(395)  One party claimed that in fact since March 2013 modules prices increased by 20% in 
Europe  and  that  there  is  a  severe  lack  of  stock  since  2013.  The  argument  was  not 
substantiated  and  to  the  contrary,  the  public  information  sources  confirm  a  relative 
stability of prices in the second quarter of 2013. Even if that information was correct, 
it  would  only  reflect  the  fact  that  following  registration  of  imports,  the  risk  of  a 
possible anti-dumping duty has been priced in. The argument was therefore rejected.  

(396)  Another party claimed that the PV projects would not generate a return for an investor 
if  the  fall  in  FITs  is  not  correlated  with  falling  project  costs,  including  the  price  of 
modules,  as  they  represent  a  significant  part  of  the  costs  in  a  given  project.  To  this 
end,  it  was  claimed  that  the  duties  would  put  in  question  the  viability  of  many  PV 
projects as they increase the price.  

(397)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (335)  above,  the  overall  trend  of  prices  of  the  cells  and 
modules is downward. Furthermore, the importance of FIT with regard to the market 
is  decreasing  as  grid  parity  is  likely  to  be  achieved  in  several  regions.  On  these 
grounds the argument that the price of PV modules could have a negative impact on 
PV projects including the question of their viability was rejected.  

(398)  One interested party provided an internal modelling to prove that the viability of many 

PV projects was endangered if duties were applied.  

(399)  This  modelling  did  not  allow  for  a  proper  quantification  as  to  what  extent  the 
attractiveness  of  the  investment  in  the  PV  installations  (e.g.  return  on  investment) 
could decline in the event of increased prices of the cells and modules. Nevertheless, 
the assumption that any duty would be entirely passed on to end-users or consumers, 
used  in  the  said  modelling,  is  unlikely  in  view  of  the  existing  profit  margins  of  the 
downstream  operators.  Moreover,  an  investment  decision  is  not  only  based  on  the 
price  of  modules  but  also  depends  on  many  other  factors  including  inter  alia  the 
existence of a general  favourable framework for PV installations in a given country, 
the level of support respectively the electricity price (for grid parity). Therefore, this 
argument has to be rejected. 

(400)  In  the  absence  of  any  further  comments,  recitals  (252)  and  (254)  to  the  provisional 

Regulation are confirmed. 

7. 

Other arguments 

EN 

69 

   EN 

(401)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  the  argument  that  the  Union  industry  is  not 
capable of supplying the Union market and that only the PRC possesses the capacity to 
supply the Union market was reiterated.  

(402)  The claim was addressed in recital (256) to the provisional Regulation. Even if a more 
conservative assumption on the Union production capacity was made (see recital (183) 
above),  the  joint  Union  and  third  countries  spare  capacity  would  be  sufficient  to 
complement  in  the  short-term  the  potential  decrease  of  Chinese  imports.  Also  in  the 
medium-term  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Union  industry  will  expand  its 
production  capacity  to  cover  demand  which  will  allow  it  to  achieve  economies  of 
scale, which in turn would allow for further price reduction. Therefore, this argument 
was rejected.  

(403)  Some  parties  reiterated  the  argument  regarding  the  difficulty  in  achieving  the 
Commission's  green  energy  2020  goals  if  duties  are  imposed.  This  argument  has 
already been addressed in the provisional Regulation recitals (257) to (259), therefore, 
in  the  absence  of  any  further  elements,  recitals  (257)  and  (259)  to  the  provisional 
Regulation are confirmed. 

8. 

Conclusion on Union interest 

(404)  In  view  of  the  above,  the  assessment  in  recitals  (260)  to  (261)  to  the  provisional 

Regulation is confirmed.  

(405)  Therefore,  there  are  no  compelling  reasons  against  the  imposition  of  definitive 

measures on imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC. 

G. 

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

(406)  In  view  of  the  conclusions  reached  with  regard  to  dumping,  injury,  causation  and 
Union  interest,  definitive  anti-dumping  measures  should  be  imposed  in  order  to 
prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports. 

1. 

Injury elimination level 

(407)  For the purpose of determining the level of these measures, account was taken of the 
dumping  margins  found  and  the  amount  of  duty  necessary  to  eliminate  the  injury 
sustained by the Union producers, without exceeding the dumping margins found.  

(408)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure  one  interested  party  contested  the  10%  profit 
margin used to calculate the injury elimination level claiming that this level was too 
high  for  this  industry  in  the  current  market  circumstances  and  it  was  used  both  for 
modules and cells. It is noted that the legal benchmark to determine the profit before 
tax  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the  injury  elimination  level  is  whether  such  profit 
could be reasonably achieved by the industry under normal conditions of competition, 
i.e.  in  the  absence  of  dumping.  In  line  with  the  jurisprudence  of  the  General  Court, 
such profit is the one realised at the beginning of the period considered, i.e. before the 
increase  in  dumped  imports.  Therefore  the  target  profit  was  adjusted  at  8%  on  the 
basis of the weighted average profit realised by the Union industry in 2009 and 2010 
for modules and cells when profitable.  

(409)  Following the final disclosure, the Union industry claimed that the profitability of the 
year  2010  should  be  used  as  the  level  of  profitability  that  Union  industry  could 
reasonably  achieve  in  the  absence  of  dumped  imports  rather  than  the  average  profit 
margin of the years 2009 and 2010. In this respect, it was argued that, the profitability 
in 2009 was insufficient and the circumstances in the two years were clearly distinct 
given  in  particular  the  development  in  consumption  in  2010  which  alleviated  the 

EN 

70 

   EN 

effects of dumping in that year. In this regard, it should be noted that it is not relevant 
whether  the  average  profit  margin  realised  by  the  Union  industry  was  ‘sufficient’ 
when determining the injury elimination level. As already stated in recital (264) to the 
provisional Regulation the injury elimination level should be based on the profit which 
can be reasonably achieved in the absence of dumped imports. It is the Investigating 
Authorities’  practice  to  consider  that  this level  had  been  reached  at  the  beginning  of 
the period considered. As in this case the Union industry realised losses with regard to 
the sales of cells at the beginning of the period considered in 2009, this methodology 
was unsuitable and it was deemed more reliable to base the determination of the injury 
elimination level on the average profit margin of the first and the second year of the 
period  considered.  In  this  regard  it  was  also  considered  that  it  is  irrelevant  that 
circumstances were different in these two years. 

(410)  Another  party  reiterated  that  the  different  target  profits  should  be  established  for 
modules and cells, as the profitability of these product types showed different trends 
during the period considered. While indicators were shown separately for each product 
type,  the  conclusions  reached  for  each  indicator  refer  to  the  product  under 
investigation  as  a  whole.  It  is  also  recalled  that  modules  and  cells  are  one  single 
product  and  therefore  the  dumping  margins  and  the  injury  elimination  level  were 
established on this basis. 

(411)  Moreover, the revised sample of unrelated importers post-importation costs (modified 
for  the  reasons  explained  in  recital  (21)  )  had  an  impact  on  the  injury  margins 
calculated.  Finally,  all  underselling  margins  were  affected  by  the  correction  of  CIF 
prices, the exclusion of wafers and the new target profit.  

(412)  One party argued that sales of the sampled Union producers focused on the high-end 
market,  such  as  the  residential/small  commercial  sector,  which  attracted  higher  FITs 
and  suggested  that  the  Union  industry’s  sales  price  should  therefore  be  adjusted 
accordingly.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  claim  should  not  be  decisive  for  the 
calculation of the injury margin, since the investigation showed that Union producers 
were not profitable. 

(413)  In  the  absence  of  other  comments  concerning  the  injury  elimination  level,  the 
methodology  described  in  recitals  (263)  to  (266)  to  the  provisional  Regulation  is 
confirmed.  

2. 

Definitive measures 

(414)  In  view  of  the  conclusions  reached  with  regard  to  dumping,  injury,  causation  and 
Union  interest  and  in  accordance  with  Article  9(4)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  is 
considered  that  definitive  anti-dumping  measures  should  be  imposed  on  imports  of 
crystalline  silicon  PV  modules  or  panels  and  cells  of  the  type  used  in  crystalline 
silicon PV modules or panels, originating in or consigned from the PRC at the level of 
the lower of the dumping and the injury margins found, in accordance with the lesser 
duty rule. In this case, the duty rate should accordingly be set at the level of the injury 
margins found. 

(415)  It is noted that an anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with the anti-
dumping investigation. In view of the use of the lesser duty rule and the fact that the 
definitive subsidy margins are lower than the injury elimination level, it is considered 
appropriate  to  impose  a  definitive  countervailing  duty  at  the  level  of  the  established 
definitive  subsidy  margins  and  then  impose  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  up  to  the 

EN 

71 

   EN 

relevant  injury  elimination  level.  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  the  rate  at  which  such 
duties will be imposed are set as follows: 

Company 

Subsidy 
margin  

Dumping 
margin 

Injury 
elimination 
level 

Countervai
ling duty 

Anti-
dumping 
duty 

Changzhou Trina Solar 
Energy Co. Ltd; 
Trina Solar 
(Changzhou) Science & 
Technology Co. Ltd; 
Changzhou Youze 
Technology Co. Ltd; 
Trina Solar Energy 
(Shanghai) Co. Ltd; 
Yancheng Trina Solar 
Energy Technology Co. 
Ltd 

3,5 % 

90,3 % 

48,2 % 

3,5 % 

44,7 % 

Delsolar (Wujiang) Ltd 

de minimis 

111,5 % 

64,9 % 

0,0 % 

64,9 % 

Jiangxi LDK Solar Hi-
Tech Co. Ltd 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech 
(Hefei) Co. Ltd 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech 
(Nanchang) Co. Ltd 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech 
(Suzhou) Co. Ltd 

JingAo Solar Co. Ltd 
Shanghai JA Solar 
Technology Co. Ltd 
JA Solar Technology 
Yangzhou Co. Ltd 
Hefei JA Solar 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Shanghai JA Solar PV 
Technology Co. Ltd 

Jinko Solar Co. Ltd 
Jinko Solar Import and 
Export Co. Ltd 
ZHEJIANG JINKO 
SOLAR CO. LTD 
ZHEJIANG JINKO 
SOLAR TRADING 
CO. LTD 

Jinzhou Yangguang 
Energy Co. Ltd 

11,5 % 

91,9 % 

58,2 % 

11,5 % 

46,7 % 

5,0 % 

97,5 % 

56,5 % 

5,0 % 

51,5 % 

6,5 % 

88,1 % 

47,7 % 

6,5 % 

41,2 % 

6,4 % 

53,8 % 

33,7 % 

6,4 % 

27,3 % 

EN 

72 

   EN 

Jinzhou Huachang 
Photovoltaic 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Jinmao 
Photovoltaic 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Rixin Silicon 
Materials Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Youhua Silicon 
Materials Co. Ltd 

RENESOLA 
ZHEJIANG LTD 
RENESOLA JIANGSU 
LTD 

Wuxi Suntech Power 
Co. Ltd 
Suntech Power Co. Ltd 
Wuxi Sun-Shine Power 
Co. Ltd 
Luoyang Suntech 
Power Co. Ltd 
Zhenjiang Ren De New 
Energy Science 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Zhenjiang Rietech New 
Energy Science 
Technology Co. Ltd 

Yingli Energy (China) 
Co. Ltd 
Baoding Tianwei Yingli 
New Energy Resources 
Co. Ltd 
Hainan Yingli New 
Energy Resources Co. 
Ltd 
Hengshui Yingli New 
Energy Resources Co. 
Ltd 
Tianjin Yingli New 
Energy Resources Co. 
Ltd 
Lixian Yingli New 
Energy Resources Co. 
Ltd 
Baoding Jiasheng 
Photovoltaic 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Beijing Tianneng 
Yingli New Energy 

4,6 % 

88,1 % 

47,7 % 

4,6 % 

43,1 % 

4,9 % 

73,2 % 

46,3 % 

4,9 % 

41,4 % 

6,3 % 

93,3 % 

41,8 % 

6,3 % 

35,5 % 

EN 

73 

   EN 

Resources Co. Ltd 
Yingli Energy (Beijing) 
Co. Ltd 

Other co-operating 
companies in the anti-
dumping investigation 
(with the exception of 
the companies subject 
to the residual duty in 
the parallel anti- 
subsidy Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 
XXX/2013) 17 (Annex 
I)  

Other co-operating 
companies in the anti-
dumping investigation, 
subject to the residual 
duty in the parallel anti- 
subsidy Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 
XXX/2013) (Annex II) 

6,4 % 

88,1 % 

47,7 % 

6,4 % 

41,3 % 

11,5 % 

88,1 % 

47,7 % 

11,5 % 

36,2 % 

All other companies 

11,5 % 

111,5 % 

64,9 % 

11,5 % 

53,4 % 

(416)  The  individual  company  anti-dumping  duty  rates  specified  in  this  Regulation  were 
established  on  the  basis  of  the  findings  of  the  present  investigation.  Therefore,  they 
reflect  the  situation  found  during  that  investigation  in  respect  to  these  companies. 
These  duty  rates  (as  opposed  to  the  countrywide  duty  applicable  to  ‘all  other 
companies’) are  thus exclusively applicable to imports of the products originating in 
the  PRC  and  produced  by  the  companies  and  thus  by  the  specific  legal  entities 
mentioned. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not 
specifically  mentioned  in  the  operative  part  of  this  Regulation  with  its  name  and 
address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from 
these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.  

(417)  Following  disclosure,  the  GOC  argued  that  the  weighted  average  duty  rate  for  the 
companies listed in Annex I and Annex II is in violation of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, since it is allegedly based on the weighted average of the duties calculated 
separately for the sampled exporting producers of cells and modules. This assessment 
is, however, incorrect.  For the  sampled  exporting producers, a  uniform  duty  rate  has 
been  calculated  for  all  their  exports  of  the  product  concerned  –  and  the  majority  of 
exporting  producers  did  export  cells  and  modules.  The  assessment  that  duties  were 
separately  calculated  for  exporting  producers  of  cells  and  modules  is  therefore 
incorrect, and the argument can therefore not be accepted. 

17 

See page XX of this Official Journal 

EN 

74 

   EN 

                                                 
(418)  Should  the  exports  by  one  of  the  companies  benefiting  from  lower  individual  duty 
rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, 
such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the 
pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) 
of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an 
anti-circumvention  investigation  may  be  initiated.  This  investigation  may,  inter  alia, 
examine  the  need  for  the  removal  of  individual  duty  rates  and  the  consequent 
imposition of a country-wide duty. 

(419)  Any  claim  requesting  the  application  of  an  individual  anti-dumping  duty  rate  (e.g. 
following  a  change  in  the  name  of  the  entity  or  following  the  setting  up  of  new 
production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission forthwith with all 
relevant information, in particular any modification in the company’s activities linked 
to  production,  domestic  and  export  sales  associated  with,  for  instance,  that  name 
change  or  that  change  in  the  production  and  sales  entities.  If  appropriate,  this 
Regulation  will  then  be  amended  accordingly  by  updating  the  list  of  companies 
benefiting from individual anti-dumping duty rates. 

(420)  In  order  to  ensure  equal  treatment  between  any  new  exporters  and  the  cooperating 
companies  not  included  in  the  sample,  mentioned  in  Annex  I  and  Annex  II  to  this 
Regulation, provision should be made for the weighted average duty imposed on the 
latter companies to be applied to any new exporters which would otherwise be entitled 
to a review pursuant to Article 11(4) of the basic Regulation. 

(421)  Measures  are  imposed  to  allow  the  producers  in  the  Union  to  recover  from  the 
injurious  effect  of  dumping.  To  the  extent  that  there  would  be  any  initial  imbalance 
between  the  potential  benefit  for  producers  in  the  Union  and  the  cost  for  other 
economic operators in the Union, this imbalance could be offset by an increase and/or 
restart of the production in the Union. 

(422)  However, the envisaged scenario of increased production in the Union may not be in 
line with the market development in this volatile market. As indicated in recital (108) 
to  the  provisional  Regulation,  Union  consumption  of  modules  increased  by  264  % 
between 2009 and 2011, only to decrease by 43 percentage points during the 6 month 
period between 2011 and the IP. The volatility is even more impressive when looking 
at the period of 2006-2011, where the Union consumption of modules increased from 
less than 1 GW to almost 20 GW or an increase of around 2000% in just five years. 
This  volatility  is  expected  to  continue,  and  forecasts  published  by  business 
associations show differences of 100% and more between the different scenarios even 
for the medium term period of 2014-2015. 

(423)  For  these  reasons,  it  is considered  appropriate,  in  such  exceptional  circumstances,  to 

limit the duration of measures to a period of two years only. 

(424)  This period should be enough for the producers in the Union to increase and/or restart 
their  production,  while  at  the  same  time  not  significantly  endanger  the  situation  of 
other  economic  operators  in  the  Union.  It  is  considered  that  the  period  of  two  years 
will be the most appropriate to analyse whether the imposition of measures had indeed 
the  effect  of  increasing  European  production  and  thereby  balancing  the  negative 
effects on other economic operators in the Union. 

(425)  Following  final  disclosure,  one  Union  producer  raised  the  argument  that  the  limited 
duration of 2 years is too short to recover from the injury suffered. In addition it was 
argued  that  a  duration  of  2  years  would  not  allow  Union  producers  to  file  business 

EN 

75 

   EN 

plans for the current and the coming business year. In this respect, it is noted that the 
duration of the measures until December 2015, which should be sufficient for Union 
producers to file business plans until 2015. 

(426)  Furthermore,  the  Union  producer  did  not  contest  the  reasons  for  which  the  duration 
was  limited  to  two  years,  notably  the  volatility  of  the  market.  The  producer  even 
explicitly  appreciated  a  review  in  case  the  measures  need  to  be  changed  due  to 
changed  market  situation.  Since  the  likelihood  of  a  change  in  market  circumstances 
within two years is indeed high in this volatile market, it is considered appropriate to 
limit the measures to two years from the outset. 

(427)  Following  final  disclosure,  the  complainant  argued  that  two  years  are  insufficient  to 
invest in production, referring to recital (424) above. However, due to the substantial 
spare capacity of the Union industry, an increase in production can be done through a 
better  utilisation  of  the  existing  production  capacities,  which  should  be  feasible 
without significant additional investments. 

(428)  The  complainant  further  argued  that  an  imposition  of  definitive  anti-dumping  duties 
for  a  period  of  two  years  is  insufficient  for  the  Union  Industry  to  recover  from  the 
injurious  effects  of  past  dumping.  However,  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties 
cannot only look at the interests of the Union Industry alone, but needs to balance the 
potential benefit for producers in the Union and the cost for other economic operators 
in the Union. On this basis, the decision to limit measures to two years is maintained. 

(429)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on  imports  of  crystalline  silicon  PV  modules  or  panels  and  cells  of  the  type  used  in 
crystalline  silicon  PV  modules  or  panels,  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the  PRC 
and  the  definitive  collection  of  the  amounts  secured  by  way  to  the  provisional  duty 
(final  disclosure).  All  parties  were  granted  a  period  within  which  they  could  make 
comments on the final disclosure. 

(430)  The  oral  and  written  comments  submitted  by  the  interested  parties  were  considered 

and taken into account where appropriate. 

3. 

Retroactivity 

(431)  As concerns a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping  measures,  the  criteria 
set  out  in  Article  10(4)  of  the  basic  Regulation  have  to  be  evaluated.  Pursuant  to 
Article 10(4)(b), one key criterion which needs to be fulfilled is that there is "a further 
substantial  rise  in  imports"  "in  addition  to  the  level  of  imports  which  caused  injury 
during the investigation period". 

(432)  A  comparison  of  monthly  average  imports18  of  modules  and  cells  with  monthly 
average imports for the period under registration (March 2013 - June 2013) shows a 
sharp decrease of import volumes after the IP. Indeed, as stated in recital (110) to the 
provisional Regulation, the monthly average import quantity of Chinese modules and 
cells  amounted  to  1 250  MW19  during  the  IP.  For  comparison,  during  the  period  of 
registration  the  monthly  average  import  volume  of  Chinese  modules  and  cells  was 
only around half as high. 

18 

19 

Since the period under registration is significantly shorter than the IP, a comparison of monthly average 
values is more useful than a comparison of total volumes of the two respective periods. 
13 986 MW of modules + 1 019 MW of cells allocated to 12 months 

EN 

76 

   EN 

                                                 
(433)  Alternatively,  given  the  volatile  nature  of  the  market,  the  further  substantial  rise  in 
imports  could  be  assessed  in  relative  rather  than  absolute  terms.  To  assess  whether 
there is a further substantial rise in imports in relative terms, it is necessary to compare 
the import volumes with the consumption on the Union market, i.e. the consumption 
would  have  to  decrease  at  a  substantially  higher  rate  than  the  decrease  in  Chinese 
imports. Since the import volume of Chinese modules and cells during the period of 
registration was only half as high as during the IP, this decrease in consumption would 
need to be substantially higher than 50%. While no precise information concerning the 
consumption during the period under registration is available, there are no indications 
that the consumption decreased by more than 50%. 

(434)  For  the  reasons  stated  above,  the  criterion  concerning  a  further  substantial  rise  in 
imports is therefore not met. As a consequence, it is concluded that the definitive anti-
dumping  duty  shall  not  be  levied  retroactively  prior  to  the  date  of  application  of 
provisional measures.  

EN 

77 

   EN 

H. FORM OF THE MEASURES 

(435)  Subsequent  to  the  adoption  of  the  provisional  anti-dumping  measures,  a  group  of 
cooperating exporting producers, including their related companies in the PRC and in 
the European Union, and together with the CCCME offered a joint price undertaking 
in  accordance  with  Article  8(1)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  The  undertaking  offer  was 
also supported by the Chinese authorities.  

(436)  The  Commission  examined  the  offer,  and  by  Decision  2013/423/EU20  accepted  this 
undertaking offer. As already indicated in recitals (3), (4) and (7) of this Decision, in 
order to assess whether the price undertaking removes the injurious effect of dumping, 
the  Commission  has  analysed  any  changed  market  circumstances  of  a  lasting  nature 
concerning, inter alia, the current export prices and the injury elimination level which 
was found lower than the level of dumping. 

(437)  Subsequent to Decision 2013/423/EU, the exporting producers together with CCCME 
submitted  a  notification  to  amend  their  initial  undertaking  offer.  They  requested  to 
revise  the  undertaking  to  take  account  of  the  exclusion  of  wafers  from  the  product 
scope  as  described  in  recitals  (31)  and  (72).  In  addition,  a  number  of  additional 
exporters,  within  the  deadline  stipulated  in  Article  8(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation, 
requested to be included in the undertaking. 

(438)  By  Decision  2013/XXX/EU,21  the  Commission  confirmed  the  acceptance  of  the 
undertaking offered by exporters listed in the Annex to that Decision with regards to 
the definitive duties. 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

1. 

Article 1 

A  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  is  hereby  imposed  on  imports  of  crystalline  silicon 
photovoltaic  modules  or  panels  and  cells  of  the  type  used  in  crystalline  silicon 
photovoltaic  modules  or  panels  (the  cells  have  a  thickness  not  exceeding  400 
micrometres), currently falling within CN codes  ex 8501 31 00, ex 8501 32 00, ex 
8501 33 00, ex 8501 34 00, ex 8501 61 20, ex 8501 61 80, ex 8501 62 00, ex 8501 63 
00, ex 8501 64 00 and ex 8541 40 90 (TARIC codes 8501 31 00 81, 8501 31 00 89, 
8501 32 00 41, 8501 32 00 49, 8501 33 00 61, 8501 33 00 69, 8501 34 00 41, 8501 
34 00 49, 8501 61 20 41, 8501 61 20 49, 8501 61 80 41, 8501 61 80 49, 8501 62 00 
61, 8501 62 00 69, 8501 63 00 41, 8501 63 00 49, 8501 64 00 41, 8501 64 00 49, 
8541 40 90 21, 8541 40 90 29, 8541 40 90 31 and 8541 40 90 39) and originating in 
or  consigned  from  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  unless  they  are  in  transit  in  the 
sense of Article V GATT. 

The  following  product  types  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of  the  product 
concerned: 

– 

– 

solar  chargers  that  consist  of  less  than  six  cells,  are  portable  and  supply 
electricity to devices or charge batteries, 

thin film photovoltaic products, 

20 
21 

OJ L 209, 3.8.2013, p. 26. 
See page XXX of this Official Journal. 

EN 

78 

   EN 

                                                 
– 

– 

crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  products  that  are  permanently  integrated  into 
electrical goods, where the function of the electrical goods is other than power 
generation, and where these electrical goods consume the electricity generated 
by the integrated crystalline silicon photovoltaic cell(s), 

modules or panels with a output voltage not exceeding 50 V DC and a power 
output not exceeding 50 W solely for direct use as battery chargers in systems 
with the same voltage and power characteristics.  

2. 

The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net,  free-at-Union-
frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and produced by 
the companies listed below shall be as follows: 

Company 

Duty rate 

TARIC additional code 

Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. Ltd; 
Trina Solar (Changzhou) Science & 
Technology Co. Ltd; 
Changzhou Youze Technology Co. Ltd; 
Trina Solar Energy (Shanghai) Co. Ltd; 
Yancheng Trina Solar Energy 
Technology Co. Ltd 

Delsolar (Wujiang) Ltd 

Jiangxi LDK Solar Hi-Tech Co. Ltd 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech (Nanchang) Co. Ltd 
LDK Solar Hi-Tech (Suzhou) Co. Ltd 

44,7 % 

B791 

64,9 % 

46,7 % 

B792 

B793 

B927 

LDK Solar Hi-Tech (Hefei) Co. Ltd 

46,7 % 

JingAo Solar Co. Ltd 
Shanghai JA Solar Technology Co. Ltd 
JA Solar Technology Yangzhou Co. Ltd 
Hefei JA Solar Technology Co. Ltd 
Shanghai JA Solar PV Technology Co. 
Ltd 

Jinko Solar Co.Ltd 
Jinko Solar Import and Export Co. Ltd 
ZHEJIANG JINKO SOLAR CO. LTD 
ZHEJIANG JINKO SOLAR TRADING 
CO. LTD 

Jinzhou Yangguang Energy Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Huachang Photovoltaic 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Jinmao Photovoltaic Technology 
Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Rixin Silicon Materials Co. Ltd 
Jinzhou Youhua Silicon Materials Co. 
Ltd 

51,5 % 

B794 

41,2 % 

B845 

27,3 % 

B795 

EN 

79 

   EN 

RENESOLA ZHEJIANG LTD 
RENESOLA JIANGSU LTD 

Wuxi Suntech Power Co. Ltd 
Suntech Power Co. Ltd 
Wuxi Sunshine Power Co. Ltd 
Luoyang Suntech Power Co. Ltd 
Zhenjiang Ren De New Energy Science 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Zhenjiang Rietech New Energy Science 
Technology Co. Ltd 

Yingli Energy (China) Co. Ltd 
Baoding Tianwei Yingli New Energy 
Resources Co. Ltd 
Hainan Yingli New Energy Resources 
Co. Ltd 
Hengshui Yingli New Energy Resources 
Co. Ltd 
Tianjin Yingli New Energy Resources 
Co. Ltd 
Lixian Yingli New Energy Resources Co. 
Ltd 
Baoding Jiasheng Photovoltaic 
Technology Co. Ltd 
Beijing Tianneng Yingli New Energy 
Resources Co. Ltd 
Yingli Energy (Beijing) Co. Ltd 

Other co-operating companies in the anti-
dumping investigation (with the 
exception of the companies subject to the 
residual duty in the parallel anti- subsidy 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
XXX/2013)22 (Annex I)  

Other co-operating companies in the anti-
dumping investigation, subject to the 
residual duty in the parallel anti- subsidy 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
XXX/2013) (Annex II) 

43,1 % 

B921 

41,4 % 

B796 

35,5 % 

B797 

41,3 % 

36,2 % 

All other companies 

53,4 % 

B999 

3. 

4. 

22 

Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  provisions  in  force  concerning  customs  duties  shall 
apply. 

Where  any  new  exporting  producer  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  provides 
sufficient evidence to the Commission that: 

See page XX of this Official Journal 

EN 

80 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
– 

– 

– 

it did not export to the Union the product described in paragraph 1 in the period 
between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2012 (investigation period), 

it is not related to any exporter or producer in the People's Republic of China 
which is subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by this Regulation, 

it  has  actually  exported  to  the  Union  the  product  concerned  after  the 
investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an 
irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union, 

the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal submitted by the Commission 
after consulting the Advisory Committee, may amend paragraph 2 by adding the new 
exporting producer to the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus 
subject to the weighted average duty of 41,3 %. 

Article 2 

The  amounts  secured  by  way  of  the  provisional  anti-  dumping  duty  pursuant  to 
Regulation (EU) No 513/2013 on imports of wafers (the wafers have a thickness not 
exceeding  400  micrometers)  and  modules  or  panels  with  a  output  voltage  not 
exceeding 50 V DC and a power output not exceeding 50 W solely for direct use as 
battery  chargers  in  systems  with  the  same  voltage  and  power  characteristics 
originating in or consigned from the PRC shall be released.  

The  amounts  secured  by  way  of  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  pursuant  to 
Regulation (EU) No 513/2013 on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules 
or  panels  and  cells  of  the  type  used  in  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  modules  or 
panels (the cells have a thickness not exceeding 400 micrometres), currently falling 
within CN codes ex 8501 31 00, ex 8501 32 00, ex 8501 33 00, ex 8501 34 00, ex 
8501  61  20,  ex  8501  61  80,  ex  8501  62  00,  ex  8501  63  00,  ex  8501  64  00  and  ex 
8541 40 90 (TARIC codes 8501 31 00 81, 8501 31 00 89, 8501 32 00 41, 8501 32 00 
49, 8501 33 00 61, 8501 33 00 69, 8501 34 00 41, 8501 34 00 49, 8501 61 20 41, 
8501 61 20 49, 8501 61 80 41, 8501 61 80 49, 8501 62 00 61, 8501 62 00 69, 8501 
63 00 41, 8501 63 00 49, 8501 64 00 41, 8501 64 00 49, 8541 40 90 21, 8541 40 90 
29,  8541  40  90  31  and  8541  40  90  39)  and  originating  in  or  consigned  from  the 
People’s  Republic  of  China,  unless  they  are  in  transit  in  the  sense  of  Article  V 
GATT,  shall  be  definitively  collected.  The  amounts  secured  in  excess  of  the 
definitive rate of anti-dumping duties shall be released. 

Article 3 

Imports declared for release into free circulation for products currently falling within 
CN code ex 8541 40 90 (TARIC codes 8541 40 90 21, 8541 40 90 29, 8541 40 90 31 
and 8541 40 90 39) which are invoiced by companies from which undertakings are 
accepted by the Commission and whose names are listed in the Annex of Decision 
2013/XXX/EU23, shall be exempt from the anti-dumping duty imposed by Article 1, 
on condition that: 

(a) 

a  company  listed  in  the  Annex  of  Decision  2013/XXX/EU  manufactured, 
shipped and invoiced directly the products referred to above or via its related 
company  also  listed  in  the  Annex  of  Decision  2013/XXX/EU  either  to  their 

1. 

2. 

1. 

23 

See page XXX of this Official Journal. 

EN 

81 

   EN 

                                                 
related companies in the Union acting as an importer and clearing the goods for 
free circulation in the Union or to the first independent customer acting as an 
importer and clearing the goods for free circulation in the Union; and 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

such  imports  are  accompanied  by  an  undertaking  invoice  which  is  a 
commercial  invoice  containing  at  least  the  elements  and  the  declaration 
stipulated in Annex III of this Regulation 

such imports are accompanied by an Export Undertaking Certificate according 
to Annex IV of this Regulation 

the  goods  declared  and  presented  to  customs  correspond  precisely  to  the 
description on the undertaking invoice. 

2. 

A  customs  debt  shall  be  incurred  at  the  time  of  acceptance  of  the  declaration  for 
release into free circulation: 

(a)  whenever it is established, in respect of imports described in paragraph 1, that 
one or more of the conditions listed in that paragraph are not fulfilled; or 

(b)  when the Commission withdraws its acceptance of the undertaking pursuant to 
Article 8(9)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  in  a  Regulation  or  Decision 
which  refers  to  particular  transactions  and  declares  the  relevant  undertaking 
invoices as invalid. 

Article 4  

The companies from which undertakings are accepted by the Commission and whose names 
are listed in the Annex of Decision 2013/XXX/EU and subject to certain conditions specified 
therein,  will  also  issue  an  invoice  for  transactions  which  are  not  exempted  from  the  anti-
dumping  duties.  This  invoice  is  a  commercial  invoice  containing  at  least  the  elements 
stipulated in Annex V of this Regulation. 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. It shall be in force for a period of 2 years. 

Article5 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

EN 

82 

   EN 

 
 
ANNEX I 

TARIC 
additional code 

Name of the Company 

Anhui Schutten Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

Quanjiao Jingkun Trade Co. Ltd 

Anji DaSol Solar Energy Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Canadian Solar Manufacturing (Changshu) Inc. 

Canadian Solar Manufacturing (Luoyang) Inc. 

CSI Cells Co. Ltd 

CSI Solar Power (China) Inc. 

Changzhou Shangyou Lianyi Electronic Co. Ltd 

CHINALAND SOLAR ENERGY CO. LTD 

CEEG Nanjing Renewable Energy Co. Ltd 

CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science Technology Co. Ltd 

China Sunergy (Nanjing) Co. Ltd 

China Sunergy (Shanghai) Co. Ltd 

China Sunergy (Yangzhou) Co. Ltd 

Chint Solar (Zhejiang) Co. Ltd 

ChangZhou EGing Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

ANHUI RINENG ZHONGTIAN SEMICONDUCTOR 
DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 

CIXI CITY RIXING ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 

HUOSHAN KEBO ENERGY & TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD. 

CNPV Dongying Solar Power Co. Ltd 

CSG PVtech Co. Ltd 

DCWATT POWER Co. Ltd 

B801 

B802 

B805 

B807 

B808 

B809 

B810 

B811 

B812 

B813 

B814 

B815 

Dongfang Electric (Yixing) MAGI Solar Power Technology Co. Ltd  B816 

EOPLLY New Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

B817 

SHANGHAI EBEST SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD 

EN 

83 

   EN 

 
 
 
JIANGSU EOPLLY IMPORT & EXPORT CO. LTD 

Era Solar Co. Ltd 

ET Energy Co. Ltd 

ET Solar Industry Limited 

GD Solar Co. Ltd 

Guodian Jintech Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

Hangzhou Bluesun New Material Co. Ltd 

Hangzhou  Zhejiang  University  Sunny  Energy  Science  and 
Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Jinbest Energy Science and Technology Co. Ltd 

Hanwha SolarOne Co. Ltd  

Hanwha SolarOne (Qidong) Co. Ltd 

Hengdian Group DMEGC Magnetics Co. Ltd 

HENGJI PV-TECH ENERGY CO. LTD. 

Himin Clean Energy Holdings Co. Ltd 

Jetion Solar (China) Co. Ltd 

Junfeng Solar (Jiangsu) Co. Ltd 

Jetion Solar (Jiangyin) Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Green Power PV Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Hosun Solar Power Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Jiasheng Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Runda PV Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Sainty Machinery Imp. And Exp. Corp. Ltd 

Jiangsu Sainty Photovoltaic Systems Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System Co. Ltd 

Changzhou Shunfeng Photovoltaic Materials Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Shunfeng Photovoltaic Electronic Power Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Shunfeng Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

B818 

B819 

B820 

B822 

B824 

B825 

B929 

B826 

B827 

B828 

B829 

B830 

B831 

B832 

B833 

B834 

B835 

B836 

B837 

EN 

84 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Jiangsu Sinski PV Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Sunlink PV Technology Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Zhongchao Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Jiangxi Risun Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

Jiangyin Hareon Power Co. Ltd 

Taicang Hareon Solar Co. Ltd 

Hareon Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Hefei Hareon Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Jiangyin Xinhui Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

Altusvia Energy (Taicang) Co, Ltd 

Jinggong P-D Shaoxing Solar Energy Tech Co. Ltd  

Juli New Energy Co. Ltd 

Jumao Photonic (Xiamen) Co. Ltd 

Kinve Solar Power Co. Ltd (Maanshan) 

GCL SOLAR POWER (SUZHOU) LIMITED 

GCL-Poly Solar Power System Integration (Taicang) Co. Ltd 

GCL Solar System (Suzhou) Limited 

GCL-Poly (Suzhou) Energy Limited 

Jiangsu GCL Silicon Material Technology Development Co. Ltd 

Jiangsu Zhongneng Polysilicon Technology Development Co. Ltd 

Konca Solar Cell Co. Ltd 

Suzhou GCL Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

Lightway Green New Energy Co. Ltd 

Lightway Green New Energy (Zhuozhou) Co. Ltd 

Motech (Suzhou) Renewable Energy Co. Ltd 

Nanjing Daqo New Energy Co. Ltd 

B838 

B839 

B840 

B841 

B842 

B844 

B846 

B847 

B849 

B850  

B851 

B852 

B853 

EN 

85 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEVO SOLAR TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD 

NICE SUN PV CO. LTD 

Ningbo Jinshi Solar Electrical Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Komaes Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Osda Solar Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Qixin Solar Electrical Appliance Co. Ltd 

Ningbo South New Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Sunbe Electric Ind Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Ulica Solar Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Perfectenergy (Shanghai) Co. Ltd 

Perlight Solar Co. Ltd 

Phono Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Sumec Hardware & Tools Co. Ltd 

RISEN ENERGY CO. LTD 

SHANDONG LINUO PHOTOVOLTAIC HI-TECH CO. LTD 

SHANGHAI ALEX NEW ENERGY CO. LTD 

SHANGHAI  ALEX 
TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD 

SOLAR 

ENERGY 

SCIENCE  & 

BYD(Shangluo)Industrial Co.Ltd 

Shanghai BYD Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Chaori International Trading Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Propsolar (Zhejiang) New Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Propsolar New Energy Co. Ltd 

Lianyungang Shenzhou New Energy Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Shenzhou New Energy Development Co. Ltd 

SHANGHAI SOLAR ENERGY S&T CO. LTD 

B854 

B857 

B858 

B859 

B860 

B861 

B862 

B863 

B864 

B865 

B866 

B868 

B869 

B870 

B871 

B872 

B873 

B875 

EN 

86 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jiangsu ST-Solar Co. Ltd 

Shanghai ST-Solar Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Topsolar Green Energy Co. Ltd 

Shenzhen Sacred Industry Co. Ltd 

Leshan Topray Cell Co. Ltd 

Shanxi Topray Solar Co. Ltd 

Shenzhen Topray Solar Co. Ltd 

Shanghai Sopray New Energy Co. Ltd 

Sopray Energy Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Sun Earth Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

NINGBO SUN EARTH SOLAR POWER CO. LTD 

SUN EARTH SOLAR POWER CO. LTD 

TDG Holding Co. Ltd 

Tianwei New Energy (Chengdu) PV Module Co. Ltd 

Tianwei New Energy Holdings Co. Ltd 

Tianwei New Energy (Yangzhou) Co. Ltd 

Wenzhou Jingri Electrical and Mechanical Co. Ltd 

Winsun New Energy Co. Ltd 

Wuhu Zhongfu PV Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Saijing Solar Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Solar Innova PV Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Taichang Electronic Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Taichen Machinery & Equipment Co. Ltd 

B876 

B877 

B878 

B880 

B881 

B882 

B884 

B885 

B886 

B887 

B889 

B890 

B892 

B893 

Shanghai Huanghe Fengjia Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

B896 

State-run  Huanghe  Machine-Building  Factory  Import  and  Export 
Corporation 

Xi’an Huanghe Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

EN 

87 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wuxi LONGi Silicon Materials Co. Ltd 

Xi’an LONGi Silicon Materials Corp. 

Years Solar Co. Ltd 

Yuhuan BLD Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang BLD Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Yuhuan Sinosola Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Yunnan Tianda Photovoltaic Co. Ltd 

Zhangjiagang City SEG PV Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Global Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Heda Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Jiutai New Energy Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Kingdom Solar Energy Technic Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Koly Energy Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Longbai Photovoltaic Tech Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Mega Solar Energy Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Fortune Photovoltaic Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Shuqimeng Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Shinew Photoelectronic Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang SOCO Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang  Sunflower  Light  Energy  Science  &  Technology  Limited 
Liability Company 

Zhejiang Yauchong Light Energy Science & Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Tianming Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Trunsun Solar Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Beyondsun PV Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Wanxiang Solar Co. Ltd 

B897 

B898 

B899 

B900 

B901 

B902 

B904 

B905 

B906 

B907 

B908 

B909 

B910 

B911 

B912 

B913 

B914 

B916 

B917 

B918 

EN 

88 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
WANXIANG IMPORT & EXPORT CO LTD 

Zhejiang Xiongtai Photovoltaic Technology Co. Ltd 

ZHEJIANG YUANZHONG SOLAR CO. LTD 

Zhongli Talesun Solar Co. Ltd 

ZNSHINE PV-TECH CO. LTD 

Zytech Engineering Technology Co. Ltd 

B919 

B920 

B922 

B923 

B924 

EN 

89 

   EN 

ANNEX II 

Name of the Company 

TARIC 
additional code 

Jiangsu Aide Solar Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Alternative Energy (AE) Solar Co. Ltd 

Anhui Chaoqun Power Co. Ltd 

Anhui Titan PV Co. Ltd 

TBEA SOLAR CO. LTD 

Xi’an SunOasis (Prime) Company Limited 

XINJIANG SANG’O SOLAR EQUIPMENT 

Changzhou NESL Solartech Co. Ltd 

Dotec Electric Co. Ltd 

Greenway Solar-Tech (Shanghai) Co. Ltd 

Greenway Solar-Tech (Huaian) Co. Ltd. 

GS PV Holdings Group 

Jiangyin Shine Science and Technology Co. Ltd 

King-PV Technology Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Best Solar Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Ningbo Huashun Solar Energy Technology Co. Ltd 

Qingdao Jiao Yang Lamping Co. Ltd 

B798 

B799 

B800 

B803 

B804 

B806 

B928 

B821 

B823 

B843 

B848 

B855 

B856 

B867 

SHANGHAI SHANGHONG ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD  B874 

Shenzhen Sungold Solar Co. Ltd 

SUZHOU SHENGLONG PV-TECH CO. LTD 

Worldwide Energy and Manufacturing USA Co. Ltd 

Wuxi Shangpin Solar Energy Science and Technology Co. Ltd 

Wuxi UT Solar Technology Co. Ltd 

Xiamen Sona Energy Co. Ltd 

B879 

B883 

B888 

B891 

B894 

B895 

EN 

90 

   EN 

 
Zhejiang Fengsheng Electrical Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Yutai Photovoltaic Material Co. Ltd 

Zhejiang Sunrupu New Energy Co. Ltd 

B903 

B930 

B915 

ANNEX III 

The  following  elements  shall  be  indicated  in  the  Commercial  Invoice  accompanying  the 
Company's sales to the European Union of goods which are subject to the Undertaking: 

The  heading  "COMMERCIAL  INVOICE  ACCOMPANYING  GOODS  SUBJECT 

1. 
TO AN UNDERTAKING". 

2. 

3. 

4. 

The name of the Company issuing the Commercial Invoice. 

The Commercial Invoice number. 

The date of issue of the Commercial Invoice. 

The TARIC additional code under which the goods on the invoice are to be customs-

5. 
cleared at the European Union frontier.  

6. 

The exact plain language description of the goods and: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

the product code number (PCN), 

technical specifications of the PCN, 

the company product code number (CPC), 

CN code, 

quantity (to be given in units expressed in Watt). 

7. 

The description of the terms of the sale, including: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

price per unit (Watt), 

the applicable payment terms, 

the applicable delivery terms, 

total discounts and rebates. 

Name of the Company acting as an importer to which the invoice is issued directly by 

8. 
the Company. 

The name of the official of the Company that has issued the Commercial Invoice and 

9 
the following signed declaration: 

"I, the undersigned, certify that the sale for direct export to the European Union of the goods 
covered  by  this  invoice  is  being  made  within  the  scope  and  under  the  terms  of  the 
Undertaking  offered  by  [COMPANY],  and  accepted  by  the  European  Commission  through 
Commission Decision 2013/XX/EU. I declare that the information provided on this invoice is 
complete and correct." 

ANNEX IV 

EXPORT UNDERTAKING CERTIFICATE 

EN 

91 

   EN 

The following elements shall be indicated in the Export Undertaking Certificate to be issued 
by CCCME for each Commercial Invoice accompanying the Company's sales to the European 
Union of goods which are subject to the Undertaking: 

The name, address, fax and telephone number of the China Chamber of Commerce for 

1. 
Import & Export of Machinery & Electronic Products (CCCME). 

The  name  of  the  company  mentioned  in  the  Annex  of  Commission  Decision 

2. 
2013/XX/EU issuing the Commercial Invoice. 

3. 

4. 

The Commercial Invoice number. 

The date of issue of the Commercial Invoice. 

The TARIC additional code under which the goods on the invoice are to be customs 

5. 
cleared at the European Union frontier. 

6. 

The exact description of the goods, including: 

• 

• 

• 

the product code number (PCN), 

the  technical  specification  of  the  goods,  the  company  product  code  number 
(CPC) (if applicable), 

CN code, 

7. 

8. 

The precise quantity in units exported expressed in Watt. 

The number and expiry date (three months after issuance) of the certificate. 

The name of the official of CCCME that has issued the certificate and the following 

9. 
signed declaration: 

“I,  the  undersigned,  certify  that  this  certificate  is  given  for  direct  exports  to  the  European 
Union of the goods covered by the Commercial Invoice accompanying sales made subject to 
the undertaking and that the certificate is issued within the scope and under the terms of the 
undertaking  offered  by  [company]  and  accepted  by  the  European  Commission  through 
Commission Decision 2013/XX/EU. I declare that the information provided in this certificate 
is correct and that the quantity covered by this certificate is not exceeding the threshold of the 
undertaking. 

10. Date. 

11. The signature and seal of CCCME. 

ANNEX V 

The  following  elements  shall  be  indicated  in  the  Commercial  Invoice  accompanying  the 
Company's  sales  to  the  European  Union  of  goods  which  are  subject  to  the  anti-dumping 
duties: 

The  heading  "COMMERCIAL  INVOICE  ACCOMPANYING  GOODS  SUBJECT 

1. 
TO ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES". 

2. 

3. 

4. 

The name of the Company issuing the Commercial Invoice. 

The Commercial Invoice number. 

The date of issue of the Commercial Invoice. 

The TARIC additional code under which the goods on the invoice are to be customs-

5. 
cleared at the European Union frontier.  

EN 

92 

   EN 

 
 
6. 

The exact plain language description of the goods and: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

the product code number (PCN), 

technical specifications of the PCN, 

the company product code number (CPC), 

CN code, 

quantity (to be given in units expressed in Watt). 

7. 

The description of the terms of the sale, including: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

price per unit (Watt), 

the applicable payment terms, 

the applicable delivery terms, 

total discounts and rebates. 

The name and signature of the official of the Company that has issued the Commercial 

8. 
Invoice.’  

EN 

93 

   EN