COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Date: 2013-10-17
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: International Atomic Energy Agency, administrative transparency, health risk, ionising radiation, nuclear accident, nuclear power station, occupational safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste, safety standard













EUR-Lex - 52013SC0423 - EN











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52013SC0423

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations /* SWD/2013/0423 final */









COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the
nuclear safety of nuclear installations
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AC                               Alternating
current
AHGNS                       Ad-hoc
Group on Nuclear Security
BWR                           Boiling
Water Reactor
CNS                            Convention
on Nuclear Safety
DC                               Direct
current
ENSREG
                    European Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group
IAEA                           International Atomic Energy Agency
NPP                             Nuclear
Power Plant
SAM                            Severe Accident Management
SAMG                         Severe Accident Management Guidelines
SBO                            Station Black-Out
OSART                       Operational
Safety Review Team
PSA                             Probabilistic
Safety Assessment 
PSR                             Periodic Safety Reviews
TMI                             Three
Mile Island 
WANO                        World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA                      Western
European Nuclear Regulators' Association
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Section 1: Procedural issues and consultation
of interested parties.............................................. …8
Section 2: Problem definition....................................................................................................... 13
Section 3: Objectives.................................................................................................................. 29
Section 4: Overview of the policy options.................................................................................... 31
Section 5: Analysis of impacts of the policy
options...................................................................... 33
Section 6: Comparing the policy options...................................................................................... 43
Section 7: Monitoring and evaluation........................................................................................... 46
ANNEX I.................................................................................................................................. 48
Comprehensive risk and safety assessments
('Stress Tests') of nuclear power plants in the European Union         48
ANNEX II................................................................................................................................. 53
1.1........ Overview of the results of the
on-line public consultation on Areas of reinforcing the existing Euratom
nuclear safety legislative framework.................................................................................................... 53
1.2........ Overview of the contributions
received from various stakeholders in addition to the on-line public
consultation  68
ANNEX III................................................................................................................................ 72
Socio-Economic role of Nuclear Energy to
Growth and Jobs in the EU for time horizon 2020-2050 72
ANNEX IV................................................................................................................................ 83
Examples of measures responding to the
specific objectives......................................................... 83
ANNEX V................................................................................................................................. 89
Detailed description of the Policy Options
analysed in the IA........................................................ 89
ANNEX VI – Competitiveness Proofing Study ............................................... (Separate
document)
Introduction
On 11 March 2011, a
magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck some 80 km off Japan's Tohoku coast. The
ensuing tsunami set off by the earthquake devastated communities along the
Japanese coast, killing some 16000 people[1].
The natural disaster also triggered the shutdown and subsequent meltdown of
three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Some 100000
people had to be evacuated because of radioactive contamination[2], and the total costs of the
accident have been estimated as high as $250 billion[3]. 
While Fukushima is
not the world's worst nuclear accident[4],
history has shown that each major nuclear accident (Three Mile Island (TMI)
(USA, 1979), Chernobyl (Soviet Union, 1986)) has caused a re-examination of the
risks of nuclear power leading to more stringent safety requirements. In
Fukushima's aftermath came a vigorous reassessment of the safe use of nuclear
energy in Europe and worldwide, firstly because it is a severe accident, and
secondly because it occurred in a nation that was assumed to have a high
standard of safety and technical expertise. 
Although the
technical challenges are different with each accident, the analysis of the
Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial, well-known and
recurring technical issues[5]:
faulty design, insufficient backup systems, human error, inadequate
contingency plans, and poor communications.
Even more striking
are the persistent institutional failures revealed by a comparison
between the post-accident evaluations of 1979's TMI and 2011's Fukushima,
including failure of voluntary self-regulation, denial of the reality of
risk, lack of safety culture, lack of a comprehensive and consistent regulatory
framework, failure to resolve outstanding safety issues, failure to add safety
measures to existing reactors because of cost, and complexity and
confusion in the response to a severe accident.
Fukushima has shown
that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken
up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not sufficiently been enforced by regulators,
even in a nation that was previously assumed to have a high standard of safety.

Nuclear energy
currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about
two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity.  Nuclear
safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The costs of a
nuclear accident could be so large, that they are potentially ruinous to
national economies. It is therefore essential for society and the economy
to avoid the occurrence of any nuclear accident in a Member State of the
European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'Member State'), by ensuring the
highest possible quality of regulatory oversight and standards of nuclear
safety. The Fukushima nuclear accident has renewed political attention
on the measures needed to minimise risk and guarantee the most robust levels of
nuclear safety.
Based upon a clear mandate
from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[6], the European Commission,
together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched
an EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of NPPs (hereinafter
referred to as 'Stress Tests'). These tests identified a large number of
shortcomings in nuclear safety approaches and industry practices in the
participating countries[7].

In addition to the
Stress Tests process, the mandate from the European Council included the request
to the Commission to "review the existing legal and regulatory framework
for the safety of nuclear installations" and to "propose by the end
of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary". Initial views on
potential areas of legislative improvements have already been included in the Commission
Communication on the interim report on the comprehensive risk and safety
assessments ('stress tests') of nuclear power plants in the European Union[8] (hereinafter
referred to as 'Commission interim stress tests report'). Any
legislative proposals that could be put forward should take into account
various sources, inter alia the conclusions of the Stress Tests, any
lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident, initiatives from various
expert groups and international developments, as well as the results of the
open public consultation and the stakeholders' input. The areas identified for
revising the current Nuclear Safety Directive are described in more detail in
the Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments
("stress-tests") of nuclear power plants in the EU and related
activities[9] of 4 October 2012 (hereinafter referred to as 'Commission final stress
tests report').
This Impact
Assessment takes into account the above-mentioned factors. It defines in Section
2 the problems in ensuring sufficient levels of nuclear safety in the EU
and the need for EU action to meet the challenges. It articulates in Section
3 the general and specific objectives for the enhanced prevention and
mitigation of nuclear accidents. In Section 4 a number of policy options
progressing steadily from the current starting point to more profound reforms
are set out and analysed. Each option is assessed in Section 5 for its
estimated safety, economic, environmental and social impacts. This sets the
scene in Sections 6 and 7 for the selection of a preferred option to go
forward.
The selected option
amends the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[10]
(hereinafter referred to as 'Nuclear Safety Directive'), by
strengthening existing / introducing new general nuclear safety principles and
requirements, complemented by harmonised Euratom nuclear safety criteria and
procedures to verify their implementation at national level. It also provides
for greater independence of the regulators and increased public transparency
about the performance of the industry and the regulators. Based upon the
principle of risk-informed decision making support, it avoids wholly new or
unfamiliar approaches, and thereby avoids the risk of destabilising the
currently best performing national nuclear safety regimes. While some of the
underlying measures of the preferred option can be implemented without delay,
others require technical development work with input from Member States to
enable or complete their implementation. 
Section
1:  Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties
1.1.        Timing
and organisation
Timing
In the aftermath of the nuclear accident that occurred at the Fukushima NPP in Japan, the EU launched an immediate response. In addition to performing
the extensive Stress Tests (presented in Annex I of the IA), the
European Council also mandated the European Commission, in the Conclusions
of the meeting of 24-25 March 2011, to "review the existing legal and
regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and
"propose by the end of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary". In a first response to this mandate, the Commission included initial
views on potential areas of legislative improvement in the November 2011 Commission interim stress tests report. Next, the European Council called in the Conclusions of the
meeting of 9 December 2011[11]
that "continued priority to be given to the extensive review of nuclear
safety, taking account of the Commission communication of 23 November". The
areas which have been identified for revising the current Nuclear Safety Directive are described
in the aforementioned Commission final stress tests report.
The European Parliament has also called for a
review. In the Resolution of 5 July 2011 on energy infrastructure priorities
for 2020 and beyond[12],
it "considers that future legislative initiatives to set up a
common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously
improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the Resolution of
6 July 2011 on the Commission Work Programme 2012[13], it "calls for
an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its
strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests
implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". 
Organisation
For
the purpose of developing the current Impact Assessment (IA), a European
Commission inter-service Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was
established, led by DG ENER, and comprising representatives of other services
i.e. SG, SJ, DG CLIMA, DG
DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG ECFIN[14], DG EMPL, DG ENTR, DG ENV, DG HOME, DG JRC, DG RTD, DG SANCO.
The IASG met four times, on 9 February 2012, 11 May 2012, 13 July 2012 and 6
September 2012. 
The Impact Assessment Board
(IAB) assessed the draft IA submitted for its attention on 19 September 2012,
had its meeting on 17 October 2012 and issued an opinion on 19 October 2012.
In line with the opinion
delivered, this impact assessment has been revised, in order to:
·                   
Strengthen the problem definition, and in
particular explain the current architecture for the regulatory framework
governing nuclear safety in the EU, clarify the
current roles and competences of the various players at national and
international level and more clearly describe the various existing legal
requirements at national, EU and international (see sections 2.1. and
2.2.); 
·                   
Add information on the views
of various stakeholders (see sections 1.2.1.–1.2.3.,           2.2.2.-2.2.5.
and section 1.2. of Annex II);
·                   
Add information on the
specific weaknesses identified in the different Member States in the Stress
tests (see mainly section 2.2.); it is better explained how these weaknesses
are related to the deficiencies in the EU regulatory framework (see section
2.2.);
·                   
Further justify why
action is necessary at this stage (see
mainly sections 2.2., 2.2.3. and 2.2.4.);
·                   
Further develop the baseline
scenario in order to demonstrate what would happen in the event of no EU action
(see mainly section 2.5.);
·                   
Better explain the content
of the options (see sections 4., 5. and 5.4. as well as Annexes IV and V);
·                   
Better assess and compare
impacts (see section 6.).
·                   
Moreover, Section 7 of the IA on monitoring and evaluation has been further
developed.
1.2.        Consultation and expertise 
The input presented in Sections 1.2.1 – 1.2.3
below has been taken into account for the purposes of this IA.
1.2.1.     On-line
open public consultation
In
line with its general principles of consultation and dialogue[15], the Commission launched an on-line
public consultation (published
on the Europa website[16]),
seeking views on Areas of reinforcing the existing Euratom nuclear
safety legislative framework. The consultation was open during the period
21 December 2011 – 29 February 2012. 
In response, the Commission received 134 contributions from nuclear regulatory authorities, other
public authorities, companies, non-governmental organisations, as well as
individuals. This public consultation offers therefore insights into a large
range of stakeholder opinions. 
In addition to gauging
opinions in the frame of the review of the legal and regulatory framework for
the safety of nuclear installations, the consultation also covered a number of
other topics related to the use of nuclear power, i.e. enhancing emergency
preparedness and response, nuclear liability, improving the global legal
framework, and enhancing scientific and technological competence. 
In relation to the areas
of reinforcement of the existing Euratom nuclear safety legislative framework,
opinions were sought on: the importance of setting up common rules for all
Member States; the need to reinforce the existing legislation at Euratom level,
given the trans-frontier aspects of
radiological accidents; the preferred means for achieving this and the level of
prescription needed (e.g. defining Euratom-wide basic principles only or
complementing these with associated technical criteria); the need to bolster
provisions for independence and transparency; the opportunity of strengthening
the competencies of national regulators in the shaping and implementation of
Euratom nuclear safety legislation.
The broad outcome of this on-line public
consultation shows that more than 90% of respondents agree on the importance of
a Euratom nuclear safety framework, setting up common rules for EU Member
States, whilst 76% agree with the need to reinforce the existing safety
legislative framework. The nuclear industry (operators, suppliers,
associations) views as important the role of the Euratom nuclear safety
legislative framework, but has a more divided view on the need for reinforcing
the existing rules. Those favouring enhancement of the current rules prefer a
combined approach of binding and non-binding Euratom legislation, principally
in the areas of strengthening the role, competencies and independence of
national regulatory authorities, and increasing transparency. Some also support
the defining of EU-wide basic principles and requirements (with associated
technical criteria) on the siting, design, construction and operation of NPPs.
Many NGOs and interested citizens also consider the role of the Euratom
legislative framework as important and agree with the need to reinforce the
existing framework, mainly through strengthening and harmonizing national
approaches. The outcomes of this on-line public consultation are summarised in Annex
II (Section 1.1) of the IA.
1.2.2.     Contributions
from stakeholders
In
addition to the on-line public consultation, the Commission has received both
written and meeting-based contributions from various stakeholders, e.g. nuclear
regulatory authorities, other public authorities, individual companies,
industry associations and non-governmental organisations. 
The
European social partners from the Electricity Sectoral Social Dialogue
Committee have also been consulted, and expressed the view that the nuclear
industry needs to meet the highest levels of safety possible and consider that
a European approach in this area is needed[17].
The social partners will be further involved, through the consultation of the
European Economic and Social Committee, in the process of the preparation of
any legislative proposal based on Articles 31 and 32 Euratom Treaty.
A
summary and analysis of the inputs received from these stakeholders is included
in Annex II (Section 1.2) of the IA. 
In
addition, the Commission has organised with ENSREG several Conferences and
public debates in Brussels together with a wide range of stakeholders,
including NGOs, on the process, the intermediate and final results of as well
as the conclusions from the Stress Tests: the 1st European Nuclear
Safety Conference on 28-29 June 2011, a Stakeholders Conference on Peer Reviews
on 17 January 2012, and a Public Debate on Stress Tests and Peer Review Results
on 8 May 2012. This will be followed up by the 2nd European Nuclear
Safety Conference, scheduled for June 2013 in Brussels. 
1.2.3.     Main
information sources
·       
Information from the Member States based
on the Article 33 Euratom Treaty submissions
According to Article 33 Euratom Treaty,
Member States are bound to communicate to the
Commission their draft legislation in order to ensure its conformity with basic
standards. The Commission may make recommendations within a three-month period
from the communication of these drafts. 
The aim of the notification procedure laid
down in Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty is to ensure harmonisation of the
applicable provisions in the Member States. Thus, the submission of draft texts
under Article 33 Euratom Treaty allows the Commission to make appropriate
recommendations or remarks before the finalisation of the national procedure
for the adoption of transposition measures, so that possible instances of
non-compliance can be identified even before the texts are adopted.
In the framework of the Nuclear Safety
Directive, 21 Member States (AT, BE, CY, CZ, EE, FI, DE, EL, EE, IT, LV, LT,
LU, MT, NL, PT, PL, RO, SL, SK and SV) communicated draft transposing measures during
the transposition period. Although most of them aimed to transpose individual
Directive provisions and not the Directive as a whole, a large number of Member
States argued that they already had legislation in force that would transpose
important parts of the Directive.    
Based on the Commission's preliminary
assessment of the notified draft measures, it is concluded that, although they
don’t contain elements deviating from the main requirements set by the Directive,
the wide range of legal solutions, in particular to ensure the effective
independence of the national regulatory body and the adequacy of its legal
powers and its human and financial resources to the mission attributed by the
national legal framework and the Directive provisions, could prevent the realisation
of the Directive objectives in a harmonised way within the Community.
·       
Preliminary assessment of the Member
States' transposition measures of the Nuclear Safety Directive
The preliminary
assessment of the Member States' transposition measures of the Nuclear Safety
Directive, although indicating that these largely meet the main requirements
set by the Directive, has identified a number of areas where improvement would be
needed (effective independence of the national regulatory authority and
transparency).
·       
Results of the Stress Tests
An important input was
the findings of the Stress Tests, which involved a range of stakeholders across
the 15 Member States with NPPs in operation or being decommissioned (plus 2
neighbouring countries). In particular, the process involved the Commission and
ENSREG, who, with the expertise of the Western Nuclear Regulators' Association
(WENRA), developed the scope and modalities of the tests; the plant operators
who carried out the assessments; the national regulators in the 15 countries
who reviewed the reports; a team of 80 regulatory experts from 24 European
countries who carried out the peer review of the national reports. The results
and conclusions of the Stress Tests process therefore provide valuable input to
the present consideration of areas of improvement to the legislative and
regulatory framework.
·       
International dimension
In June 2011 a
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety was convened under the auspices of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for the process of learning and
acting upon lessons following the Fukushima accident in order to strengthen
nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and radiation protection of people and
the environment worldwide. The Ministerial Conference adopted a Ministerial
Declaration[18]
that, inter alia, requested the IAEA Director General to develop a draft Action
Plan on Nuclear Safety. Developed in intensive consultation with IAEA Member
States, the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the IAEA's Board of
Governors and subsequently unanimously endorsed by the IAEA General Conference
in September 2011[19].
The Ministerial Declaration and the subsequent Action Plan provide the
international dimension to the sources of information considered in this IA.
In addition, during the
5th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the
Contracting Parties in attendance agreed to hold an Extraordinary Meeting (EM)
of the CNS, which was held in Vienna from 27-31 August 2012. The meeting aimed
to enhance safety through reviewing and sharing lessons learned and actions
taken by Contracting Parties in response to events at Fukushima and to
reviewing the effectiveness and, if necessary, the continued suitability of the
provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
The six topical
discussions at the EM (External Events, Design Issues, Severe Accident
Management and Recovery (on-site), National Organizations, Emergency
Preparedness & Response and Post-accident Management (off-site), and
International Cooperation) were used to identify the key actions taken, the
challenges faced and the initial lessons learned by many Contracting Parties
from the Fukushima Daiichi accident which were summarised in its Final Summary
Report[20]
where the suggested steps to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention
were also included.
The other important
sources of information mentioned in this IA are the official investigation
reports into the Fukushima accident issued by the Japanese authorities. The
reports of the Japanese Government to the IAEA (June[21] and September 2011[22]) contain a detailed
description of the events in the accident sequence, accident response and
initial lessons learnt. Separately, investigations were launched by the
Governmental Cabinet Office ("Investigation Committee on the Accident at
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company", final
report July 2012[23])
and another by the National Diet of Japan ("The Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission", final report July 2012[24]). The latter two investigation
reports contain testimonies of a larger group of affected persons and also
contain a wider analysis of the accident causes and subsequent response.   
·       
Results of Eurobarometer surveys 
The Eurobarometer
surveys are major policy instrument that enable citizens’ views to be taken
into account in the framing of EU policies and initiatives. The Commission has taken into account the results of the latest Special
Eurobarometer survey "Europeans and Nuclear Safety"[25]. The survey was conducted in the 27 Member States between September
and October 2009 and the report was published in March 2010. Almost 26500
European citizens were interviewed face-to-face. The survey covers both the
wider theme of nuclear issues in general and the topic of nuclear safety in
particular.
Throughout the report,
the results have clearly shown that nuclear safety aspects are of crucial
importance against a background where the potential danger posed by nuclear
power appears to be one of the major drivers of reluctance regarding nuclear
energy. In this regard, one of the conclusions of the
survey is that "European citizens are extremely conscious of the
importance of safety and protection, as far as nuclear energy is concerned but
most feel ill-informed about nuclear safety issues related to nuclear power
plants". Furthermore, the survey seems to reveal
that European citizens trust the European legislation and recognize the
usefulness of a European framework. 
Section 2:  Problem
definition
2.1.        The
problem that requires action
The accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP has resulted in significant environmental, economic and
social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the
affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami
of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a
range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome.
In other words, although the tsunami was not an unforeseeable event (and thus
clearly within the realm of risk-informed, probabilistic assessment), strong
deficiencies of the plant’s design basis caused the accident. As the analysis
of the Fukushima accident reveals quite substantial, well-known and recurring technical
issues as well as persistent institutional failures that emerged to a large
degree already from the post-accident evaluations of 1979's TMI and 1986's
Chernobyl nuclear accidents, the attention of the public and policy makers
focused on the safety and security risks associated with the NPPs in their own
region. As with the TMI accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in 1986,
this latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the
safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the increased use
of nuclear power is being debated as possible option to meet global energy
demands whilst addressing greenhouse gas emissions in a sustainable manner. 
The EU has 132
operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear
power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three
to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were
continuously updated since then.   In May 2011, the Commission together with
ENSREG launched a comprehensive review of the NPPs in the EU and some
neighbouring countries to assess if current safety margins are sufficient to
cover various unexpected events. The results of these tests show various
strengths and weaknesses, including the clear need to implement for a number of
plants measures to increase the robustness against external hazards. The tests
also showed significant differences in national approaches to beyond-design
basis assessments that make an adequate assessment of current safety levels
difficult or impossible.  For example, in some cases earthquake risk was not
considered in the original design basis but only introduced at a later stage or
clearly underestimated. New methodologies in seismic hazard and risk assessment
have since been developed, but not all operators have reassessed site hazards
and seismic risks with recent methodologies. 
These
tests were organised taking due account of the distribution of current
responsibilities among the various stakeholders in the area of nuclear safety. According to article 6 of the Nuclear Safety Directive, the prime
responsibility for nuclear safety lies with the "licence holder"
(i.e. the plant operator) under the supervision of the national competent regulatory
authority. Member States are responsible for establishing and maintaining a
national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for nuclear
safety. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Commission can make legislative proposals
to create an EU legislative framework for nuclear safety, 
Severe accidents
leading to radioactive releases may result in the need for countermeasures such
as sheltering or evacuation of the affected population. Estimates show that the
number of people living close to NPPs in the EU vary significantly. However, as
many as 1.74 million people live, for example, within 30km of one of the larger
NPPs[26].
Thus the practicalities of such large scale countermeasures point to the key
importance of accident preventative measures.
The lessons from the
Fukushima disaster and the outcome of the Stress Tests have provided a strong
impetus for examining the factors shaping the technical safety and the safety
governance of nuclear power in the EU. It is opportune to ask whether existing
measures are sufficient; to what extent strengthened or additional requirements
could prevent a similar disaster occurring in the EU; and what type of
technical and organisational measures would be most effective.
2.2.      Specific problems to be
addressed
Based
on various sources of expertise, such as corresponding initiatives by the IAEA
and WENRA as well as lessons learned from the EU Stress Tests and Fukushima
accident investigations, as well as from the prima facie assessment of
the Member States' transposition measures of the Nuclear Safety Directive, key
areas for improvement of nuclear safety have been identified. These problem
areas are presented below under Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.5 and concern technical
issues (in particular plant siting and design), the regulatory oversight, aspects
related to nuclear safety governance (regulatory independence and transparency)
as well as the issue of emergency preparedness and response.
 •           Technical issues •           Regulatory oversight issues •           Regulatory independence issues •           Transparency issues •           Emergency preparedness and response issues 
It
is also explained below what are the main shortcomings identified in Member
States, such as gaps in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification
and management of key safety issues, failure to implement important safety
measures and last but not least the continued significant differences between
Member States resulting in the absence of a consistent approach to regulation
of nuclear safety despite its global nature.
Under
each identified problem area presented below, the weaknesses of the current
Euratom nuclear safety legislation, in particular of the Nuclear Safety
Directive, to address them, are highlighted. This Directive sets up a
legally binding Euratom framework based upon internationally recognised
principles and obligations, underlying a nuclear safety legislative,
administrative and organisational system[27].

Firstly,
taking into account that the scope of this Directive is limited to overall
principles, it can by no means address the technical issues identified as key
risk contributors in the Fukushima nuclear accident and the Stress Tests, nor
take account of initiatives from various expert groups and international
developments in this area, as those matters are simply not covered by the scope
of the current Directive. Examples are the methods and criteria used to assess
the adequacy of existing safety margins of plant-specific safety functions
against the various possible impacts from both internal and external hazards,
the minimum provisions that need to be incorporated in the design of NPPs in
order to achieve sufficient levels of safety, the minimum severe accident
management provisions to be in place, etc. A detailed summary of the safety
issues and good practices specific to each Member State and each NPP are
described in the Staff Working Document[28]
accompanying the Commission Communication on the Stress Tests[29]. 
In
the following text, it is explained that notwithstanding the role of the Stress
Tests in enhancing the safety of EU NPPs, the weakness of this exercise is
related to its non-binding nature. Indeed, the Stress
Tests are only a voluntary exercise which does not guarantee that the
recommended improvements will be (fully) implemented. Another weakness of the
Stress Tests is that they are only a one-time, ad-hoc exercise. It does not
guarantee that the identified measures will be regularly updated and
implemented also in the future, where appropriate. Further, as the EU Stress Tests
were developed in the light of the events which occurred at the Fukushima NPP in
March 2011, they represent targeted reassessments of the safety margins of NPPs
against impacts from a limited range of extreme external initiating events.
Therefore, various important aspects of nuclear safety have not explicitly been
treated, such as ageing of structures and components, human and organisational
factors or independence of the regulator vis-à-vis the licensee. 
Secondly, as
explained below, the current provisions of the Directive concerning regulatory
independence do not appear to be sufficient anymore in the light of the
Fukushima nuclear accident, which showed the paramount importance of the
independence of national regulatory authorities and the consequences of the
lack of such independence. The preliminary assessment of the transposing
measures in Member States has also identified the regulatory independence as an
area where improvement would clearly be needed.
Moreover,
the Stress Tests show that cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all
parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews,
should be strengthened beyond the current requirements of the Directive.
Thirdly, the
lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident, as well as the outcome of
a prima facie check of the transposition measures of the existing requirements
at Member State level suggest that the current provisions of the Directive
concerning transparency should be further enhanced.
 In addition,
in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests,
demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and
response arrangements. In this context, the area of on-site emergency
preparedness and response should be considered.
Following
the events at Fukushima, IAEA Member States generally acknowledge the need to
enhance the effectiveness, governance and enforceability of the international
legal framework for nuclear safety. At international level, safety principles
and standards governing nuclear safety have been developed and agreed. Through
the IAEA, the main instruments governing nuclear safety are recommended IAEA safety
"standards"[30]
and international Conventions[31].
However, these safety "standards" are legally non-binding, while the
international Conventions are legally binding but not enforceable. Thus, for
example, the CNS does not provide sanctions, penalties or other types of
coercive implementation mechanisms in case the Contracting Parties do not
comply with its requirements. The CNS provides for a dispute-settlement mechanism
which relies solely on consultations between Contracting Parties in case of a
disagreement on the interpretation or application of the Convention. On the
other hand, the Euratom legislation benefits from clear
and strong mechanisms for sanction for its proper transposition and
implementation, 
Any revision of the international Conventions can be expected to take
considerably longer than the possible Euratom legislative amendment process,
due to the complex procedures in place, requiring consensus or the condition of
attaining a certain quorum of the Contracting Parties' votes.
Moreover,
the rules agreed at international level have a more general character, as they
need to be applied worldwide, while Euratom legislation would be tailored to
the specific needs and situations existing in the Member States. 
2.2.1.   Technical issues 
Ø     
Observations from the Fukushima nuclear
accident 
·     
Plant Siting and Design: One lesson learned from Fukushima seems to be that the tsunami
hazard was underestimated and thus not adequately reflected in the plant design,
mostly due to systemic and organisational factors. A single external event (the
tsunami) disabled all but one emergency diesel generators at the plant
simultaneously, shutting down all safety systems of Units 1-4. Due to the
multi-unit site layout, problems at one Unit created negative safety-related
situations at adjacent Units. For example, the hydrogen explosion at Unit 3
disabled some fire pumps used for seawater injection at Unit 2. Units 5-6,
which are far from Units 1-4, were unaffected by the hydrogen explosions at
Units 1 and 3. Thus, Fukushima showed both the need for continuously updating a
site's hazard profile with follow-ups, e.g. in the periodic safety reviews
(PSR) (rather than in a one-shot exercise at the initial licensing stage), as
well as for implementing – and for verifying implementation – of adequate risk
reduction measures. This applies to possible impacts
from seismic hazards, flooding and other external natural hazards, such as
severe weather conditions or man-made external hazards[32], including combined hazards
and multi-unit events and collocated nuclear and industrial facilities.
Corresponding design-basis protection should be re-evaluated.
·     
Emergency Power following Beyond-Design-Basis
Events: The loss of offsite power due to the
earthquake and onsite AC power due to the tsunami, combined with rapid
discharge of DC batteries led to a complete Station Blackout (SBO), which in
turn led to fuel overheating and damage with consequent radiological
implications.
·     
Reactor Containment and Hydrogen Management: SBO resulted in complete loss of the heat removal function.
Deficient fuel cooling resulted in overheating of the fuel, enabling rapid
oxidation of fuel cladding thus generating large amounts of hydrogen. The
operators had to vent the containment manually to prevent containment
over-pressurisation. Some vented gases leaked into the reactor building, which
had no ventilation (again due to SBO), resulting in hydrogen accumulation and
ultimately explosion of or damage within the reactor buildings at Units 1-4.
·     
Spent Fuel Pools:
Design and location of the spent fuel pools in the upper part of the reactor
buildings exposed them to damage from hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings
at Units 1, 3 and possibly 4. The loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to SBO,
and the large amount of debris accumulated in the spent fuel pools as a result
of structural damage of the upper part of the reactor building affected the
heat removal process. This concern led to one-week-long unconventional cooling
efforts (e.g. helicopters, water cannons). 
Ø     
Lessons learned from the Stress Tests
·     
The type of accident that occurred at Fukushima
is well known in nuclear safety as the SBO scenario. Since decades, SBO
has been one of the great concerns and been subject to detailed analysis and
development of improvement measures[33].
As dramatically proven in Fukushima and as confirmed also by the Stress Tests[34], SBO is the limiting case for many NPP Units, leading to fast
reactor core heat-up if no counter-measures are implemented[35]. However, despite being known
since decades as limiting case, there is still need, also in a number of
European NPPs, to implement effective preventive or mitigative measures[36]. 
·     
Fukushima highlighted once again the key
importance of the containment function, which is critical as the last
barrier to protect people and environment against radioactive releases
resulting from an accident. Following the accidents at TMI and Chernobyl,
urgent implementation of recognized measures to protect containment integrity
was already considered crucial. The Stress Tests proved that even today,
decades after TMI and Chernobyl, their implementation is still pending in some
Member States. 
·     
The Stress Tests identified a significant lack
of consistency with respect to assessing and managing external hazards
to plant safety. Already the national Stress Tests and
their topical peer review (see Annex I) showed that there is no consistency in
the handling of important safety margins against internal and external hazards
across NPPs in Europe. This was then confirmed in the course of the
country-specific peer reviews. Significant differences
exist in national approaches and strong difficulties were encountered with
corresponding beyond design basis margins and cliff-edge effects assessments,
leaving the interpretation that what is considered a sufficient margin of
safety is often left to expert judgment only. As an example, IAEA guidance
suggests that minimum 0.1g horizontal peak ground acceleration should be
adopted for seismic loading, where a national approach to seismic hazard
assessment may indicate a lower level for design or reassessment. As shown in
the Stress Tests, this minimum level has not yet been fully adopted in a number
of Member States. 
·     
As it is essential to ensure that severe
accidents, should they occur, can be managed and mitigated properly,
international standards require since some time Severe
Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) to be available in all NPPs. Despite
forming the organisational
basis to successfully mitigate accidents once steps to prevent fuel damage have
failed, the Stress Tests have shown that SAMGs are still lacking
implementation, full scope application or even basic development in a large
number of Member States.
Ø     
Provisions in the current Nuclear
Safety Directive
At
Euratom level, the current Nuclear Safety Directive defines the term
"licence" as "any legal document granted under the jurisdiction
of a Member State to confer responsibility for the siting, design,
construction, commissioning and operation or decommissioning of a nuclear
installation" [Article 3(4)]. It includes a general requirement that
license holders, under the supervision of the regulatory authority, should
regularly assess and verify, and continuously improve, as far as reasonably
achievable, the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations in a systematic
and verifiable manner [Article 6(2)]. This assessment must include verification
that measures are in place for prevention of accidents and mitigation of
consequences of accidents, including verification of the physical barriers and
licence holder's administrative procedures of protection that would have to
fail before workers and the general public would be significantly affected by
ionising radiations [Article 6(3)].
However,
the Directive does not include specific Euratom nuclear safety requirements or
technical criteria on the siting, design & construction and operation of
nuclear installations. Therefore, the risks from none of the above-described
issues are managed by the provisions of the current Directive at the level of
detail considered necessary. 
2.2.2.   Regulatory oversight issues
Ø     
Observations from the Fukushima nuclear
accident 
·     
The initial lessons from
the Fukushima accident clearly indicated a serious failure in implementing
requirements and recommended actions for protecting the plant against external
hazards. 
·     
One of the key findings of the 26 December 2011 Interim
Report of the Investigation Committee on the
Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (ICANPS)[37] 
was that operators and the authorities had become
complacent about nuclear safety standards in Japan, and a radical review is
required. The official report of the Japanese parliament, National Diet of
Japan, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission[38] (July 2012) referring to
regulatory inadequacies notes that "The regulators
did not monitor or supervise nuclear safety. The lack of expertise resulted in
“regulatory capture,” and the postponement of the implementation of relevant
regulations." It adds "Autonomy and transparency must be built into
the new regulatory organizations to be created. They must have significant
powers of oversight in order to properly monitor the operators of nuclear power
plants."
Ø  
International developments
·     
The importance of
"further strengthening the authority, competence and resources of national
regulatory authorities" has been highlighted in the Declaration by the
IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety[39]
and reiterated in the subsequent Action Plan on Nuclear Safety[40].
·     
In the Final Summary Report of the 2nd
Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the CNS (Annex containing action-oriented
objectives for strengthening nuclear safety), one of the items included therein
is to "Ensure the effectiveness of its regulatory body by providing for
adequate legal authority, sufficient human and financial resources, staff
competence, access to necessary external expertise for its decision-making
based on adequate scientific and technical knowledge, access to international
cooperation, and other matters needed for fulfilling its responsibilities for
the safety of nuclear installations."
Ø     
Lessons learned from the Stress Tests
·     
In the course of the Stress Tests, tangible
safety improvements have been identified in all the participating countries,
based on the lessons learned from Fukushima. The expenses for implementing
these upgrading measures on a plant-specific basis are likely to be
significant. However, the main weakness of the Stress Tests is the difficulty
of giving a relative priority in terms of risk reduction to the hundreds of
improvement measures identified. To be able to judge the importance of the
different proposed measures, to prioritize between them and to allocate funding
to those areas which would bring the greatest safety benefits, sufficiently
consistent and comprehensive risk-informed methods and related criteria would
need to be implemented in a consistent manner across the entire nuclear sector,
in response to the urgent need to efficiently reinforce nuclear installation
safety based on risk assessment conclusions. The Stress Tests have shown that
operators and regulators in many Member States make already some use of risk-informed
methods[41]
to help support regulatory oversight and decision-making when identifying
weaknesses and prioritizing safety improvements. Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA) forms an essential part of these decision-making processes[42]. However, as also shown by the
Stress Tests, the scope and depth of these analyses significantly differ and in
some Member States there is an urgent need to bring them up to accepted
international standards. Fukushima reiterated the importance of harmonization of
PSA and the urgent need to efficiently reinforce nuclear installation safety
based on risk-informed conclusions[43].

·     
Individual Member States may implement all or
some of the measures that were identified in the course of the Stress Tests,
intensify regulation and oversight, but – considering the sobering experience
from the aftermath of the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl decades ago (see
above) – it is probable that this will concern particularly only those
countries where the level of safety is already above average. Follow-up visits
to the Stress Tests to verify plant-specific implementation of proposed
improvement measures will not be sufficient as such an "ad-hoc
approach" neither improves the underlying safety requirements and criteria
used as a basis for regulatory decision-making in a sustainable manner nor does
it strengthen the independent role of the regulator to control risks. What is
currently missing is a coordinated European approach for cooperation between
various competent regulatory authorities and international peer reviews.
·     
As a basis for efficient safety improvements,
the Stress Tests confirmed the need for adequate staff training,
including for extreme situations, as well as adequate human resources and
expertise. Such requirements concerning training
and expertise should apply to direct employees of the licence holder as well as
to subcontractors working on the NPP sites.
·      The using of subcontractors must not impair the organisational
capacity of the licence holder who should preserve his full control and
responsibility over the safety of the nuclear installation. Moreover, the
licence holder must maintain his own internal competence in particular
as regards the full control of the planning and quality of interventions.
Ø     
Provisions in the current Nuclear
Safety Directive
At
Euratom level, the current Nuclear Safety Directive obliges Member
States to establish a competent regulatory, which is equipped with the required
legal power, human and financial resources. It also enumerates in a general manner the main competencies of the national
regulatory authorities [Article 5(3)]. 
However,
the existing catalogue of regulatory competencies is not complete and could be
strengthened. This reinforces the fundamental principle that only strong
regulatory oversight can guarantee the safe operation of nuclear installations
in the EU.
2.2.3.   Regulatory independence issues
Ø     
Observations from the Fukushima nuclear
accident
·       
One of the key lessons learned from the
Fukushima accident is that the effective independence of the national
regulatory authorities must be ensured. A culture where ties between the
regulator and operator are too close, may lead to situations where recommended
or even required actions are not properly implemented in the absence of control
mechanisms and sanctions. There should be provisions de facto and de
jure which allow an independent regulatory judgement and an effective
enforcement. 
·       
In the Additional Report of Japanese
Government to IAEA - Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations[44](September
2011), it is mentioned that "Due to the unification of administrative
organizations over the utilization and regulation of nuclear power and the
non-centralized administrative organizations for ensuring nuclear safety, it
was unclear until recently which organization has primary responsibility for
disaster prevention and the protection of public safety. Reviews of such bodies
and the enhancement of nuclear regulatory bodies need to be done
promptly". The above-mentioned Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (July 2012) report notes the lack of independence of the
regulators in the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), noting
"…the problem was the fact that NISA was created as part of the Ministry
of Economy, Trade & Industry (METI), an organization that has been actively
promoting nuclear power."
·       
The IAEA Mission Report of the IAEA
fact-finding expert mission of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident following
the great East Japan earthquake and tsunami (24 May – 2 June 2011)[45], mentions among the
lessons learned that "Nuclear regulatory systems should ensure that
regulatory independence and clarity of roles are preserved in all circumstances
in line with IAEA safety standards". 
Ø            
International developments
·       
The commitment of
continuously ensuring the effective independence of the national regulatory
authorities has been also affirmed in the Declaration by the IAEA
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and reiterated in the subsequent Action
Plan on Nuclear Safety.
·       
Also, in the Final Summary Report of the 2nd
Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the CNS (Annex
containing action-oriented objectives for strengthening nuclear safety), one of
the items included therein is to "Ensure that its regulatory body is
effectively independent in making regulatory judgments based on scientific and
technological grounds and taking enforcement actions and that it has functional
separation from entities having responsibilities or interests, such as the
promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy (including electricity production),
that could conflict with safety or other important regulatory objectives or
otherwise unduly influence the decision making of the regulatory body."
Ø       
Provisions in the current Nuclear
Safety Directive and preliminary assessment of transposition measures
·       
The effective independence of the national
regulatory authority is one of the issues arising from a prima facie
check of the transposition measures of the existing requirements at Member
State level. This preliminary assessment shows that although the Nuclear
Safety Directive contains minimal provisions underlying the independence of
the national regulatory authorities (Article 5(2)), the existing requirements
do not define benchmark criteria for ensuring their effective independence,
thus not allowing for a consistent interpretation of the concept of
"effective independence" throughout the Community. For instance,
based on information available to the Commission from various sources, the
current provisions of the Directive are not sufficient for avoiding or
improving existing situations where, in some Member States, the regulatory
responsibility is still split between several entities or is included directly
in Ministries (Economy, Environment, etc.). 
·       
Finally, it should be acknowledged that, since
the adoption of the current Directive, the provisions therein on regulatory
independence fall short of international requirements (e.g. Governmental, Legal
and Regulatory Framework for Safety GSR part1, IAEA, 2010). 
2.2.4.   Transparency issues
Ø     
Observations from the Fukushima nuclear
accident
·       
Another key lesson learned from Fukushima is the
importance of enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters. 
·                   
In the Additional Report of Japanese
Government to IAEA it is mentioned that "In the initial stages of the
accident, communication and cooperation between the central and local
governments as well as between various relevant organizations were not achieved
to a sufficient degree, due to the difficulty in securing means of
communication and also due to the fact that the roles and responsibilities of
each side were not always clearly defined." Furthermore, it is mentioned
that "Especially immediately after this accident, actions were not
sufficiently taken to provide local residents with information or
easily-understood explanations about radiation, radioactive materials, or
information on future outlooks on risk factors". The Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission report, commenting on
the lack of openness of the operator even after the accident says that it:
"… continued to avoid transparency in disclosing information. It limited
disclosure to confirmed facts, and failed to disclose information that it felt
was uncertain or inconvenient."
Ø       
International developments
·       
The Declaration by
the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety
emphasised "the responsibility of the nuclear industry and operators in
the implementation of nuclear safety measures and call upon them and their
associations to fully support and actively contribute to international efforts
to enhance nuclear safety by, inter alia, furthering transparency and
prioritizing safety considerations". A number of measures aiming at
enhancing transparency are included in the subsequent Action Plan on Nuclear
Safety.
·       
In the Final Summary Report of the 2nd
Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the CNS (Annex containing action-oriented
objectives for strengthening nuclear safety), one of the items included therein
is to "Ensure that its regulatory body operates in a transparent and open
manner, taking into account legitimate concerns over security and other
sensitive interests that might be adversely affected by the public disclosure
of particular information."
Ø     
Lessons learned from the  Stress Tests
·     
The transparent process of the Stress Tests, the
public availability of documents, the involvement of safety authorities not
operating nuclear installations have allowed interested parties to observe the
progress of the work. For example, licensee reports, national reports and
peer-review reports of the Member States have been made available on the ENSREG
website. This openness has greatly added value to the exercise.
Ø     
Provisions in the current Nuclear
Safety Directive and preliminary assessment of transposition measures
·       
Transparency is one of the issues arising from a
prima facie check of the transposition measures of the existing
requirements at Member State level. The existing provisions of the Nuclear
Safety Directive contain indeed only generic requirements on public
information (Article 8), without offering concrete guidance on implementation.
For instance, the current Directive does not impose
transparency obligations on the licence holders (who have the prime
responsibility for nuclear safety). Moreover, it does not offer more specific
indications on the types of information that should be provided, as a minimum,
to the public by the competent regulatory authority. 
Ø   Expert groups' guidance
·       
Finally, it should be noted that ENSREG has already
developed useful guidance on transparency matters (e.g. Guidance for National
Regulatory Organisations, Principles for Openness and Transparency,
HLG_p(2011-14)_57). 
2.2.5.   Emergency preparedness and response issues
Ø     
Observations from the Fukushima nuclear
accident 
·       
In the light of the
Fukushima accident, the importance of improving emergency preparedness and
response arrangements is clearly acknowledged. Apart
from lack of sufficient severe accident prevention and mitigation measures, a
major shortcoming of the safety of both the Fukushima plant and the surrounding
communities was that the accident had not been assumed to occur as a complex
disaster. 
·       
In the Additional Report of Japanese
Government to IAEA, it is mentioned that "Shortly after the accident,
under the damage conditions caused by the earthquake and tsunamis, the securing
of emergency response equipment and the mobilization of rescue teams to support
accident control activities were not performed sufficiently". The Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission report mentions the
problematic coordination of the emergency response, saying that "The
Commission concludes that the situation continued to deteriorate because the
crisis management system … did not function correctly. The boundaries defining
the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved were problematic, due to
their ambiguity."
Ø       
International developments
·       
In the Declaration by the IAEA Ministerial
Conference on Nuclear Safety, the ministers emphasised "the need to
improve national, regional and international emergency preparedness and
response to nuclear accidents, including through the possible creation of rapid
reaction capacity and the development of training in the field of crisis management
at the regional and international levels, as well as to strengthen cooperation
among national authorities, technical safety organizations, operators and among
relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations". A number
of measures aiming at strengthening emergency preparedness and response are
included in the subsequent Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.
Ø     
Lessons learned from the Stress Tests
·       
In the EU, specific actions and decisions in the
area of preparedness and response in case of a nuclear emergency are taken
mainly at national level. Following Fukushima, some Member States and
neighbouring countries have now started to evaluate their emergency management
provisions also under "beyond design-basis" accident conditions (i.e.
accidents which are possible, but were not fully considered in the design
because they were judged to be too unlikely) and identified possible
improvements, as shown by the Stress Tests. However, the final report of ENSREG
on the peer reviews of the EU Stress Tests summarises that[46]: "One of the important
results of the public interaction is a strong demand for a European initiative
on off-site emergency preparedness". 
Ø     
Provisions and mechanisms at EU and
Euratom level  
In the EU, specific
actions and decisions in the area of emergency preparedness and response in
case of nuclear and radiological emergences are taken mainly at national level.
A range of relevant EU and Euratom legislative instruments are also in place[47], as well as several mechanisms[48]
which could be activated in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
The Community Mechanism for Civil
Protection[49]
facilitates co-operation between the Member States in civil protection
assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies taking place both
inside and outside the Union for any type of disasters, including radiological
and nuclear accidents (e.g. assistance through the Mechanism has been provided
to Japan following the Fukushima accident). In addition, a number of activities
are undertaken at EU level to promote prevention/risk management and enhance
the level of preparedness through risk assessments, establishment of modules
(including CBRN), training and exercises for large-scale disasters, scenario
development and contingency planning. 
Off-site emergency preparedness and response
For the purpose of this IA, a distinction is made between the
off-site emergency preparedness and response on the one hand and the on-site
emergency preparedness and response on the other.
Given
the wide range of the off-site emergency preparedness and response
responsibilities, this area is outside the scope of the current IA and will be
treated in a separate process[50].
The rest of this document only considers the on-site aspects.
On-site emergency preparedness and response
Further
improvements in preparing and responding to a serious
nuclear or radiological emergency could be made more effective, by
strengthening on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements.
The regulatory body
and licence holder should have appropriate arrangements in place for emergency
preparedness and response. The current Nuclear Safety Directive does not
include provisions regarding on-site emergency preparedness and response, nor
does it offer more specific indications on the types of measures and equipment
that should be kept, as a minimum, by the licence holder. 
2.3.        Underlying
drivers of the problem
2.4.        Who
is affected, in what ways, and to what extent?
Nuclear safety
regulation affects:
·       
Workers who are exposed to ionising radiation;
·       
EU citizens, who, according to the conclusions
of the latest 2010 Eurobarometer Europeans and Nuclear Safety, are extremely conscious of the importance of safety and protection,
as far as nuclear energy is concerned;
·       
Industrial and private consumers, who pay the
price of electricity; 
·       
National regulatory authorities who have the
responsibility for ensuring a high level of nuclear safety compliance;
·       
Operators and licence holders, who have the
prime responsibility for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations; 
·       
Research and technical support organisations,
expert groups who provide the needed scientific and technical support, such as developing harmonised nuclear safety criteria.
·       
Member States, who are responsible for
formulating national policies for nuclear safety.
2.5.   Evolution
of the problem all things being equal 
Nuclear energy
currently generates ~30% of the electricity consumed in the EU via operation of
NPPs in 14 different Member States[51],
9 of which depend on more than 30% of their electricity generation on nuclear[52]. This electricity is mainly
stable and reliable base load, secure from a supply perspective, CO2
free, and competitive/affordable. As a result, nuclear energy is a significant
positive contributor to the EU economy, growth and jobs. The nuclear sector
employs today ~500000 persons in the EU, directly and indirectly. One might also
count additional "induced" jobs – which then leads to a grand total
of around 900000 persons employed. The corresponding total "valued
added" for the European economy can be estimated to ~70 Billion Euros
per year. Despite the key contribution of nuclear energy to the competitiveness
of the EU economy, the Commission remains committed to ensuring that the
continued commercial use of nuclear power must not be undertaken in the form of
a low-cost approach to nuclear safety. Currently,
without uniform EU-wide standards, there remains a risk that operators could
build NPPs in Member States with lower nuclear safety requirements. This is also
important for fair competition in a liberalised electricity market.
Throughout the
world, the accident at the Fukushima NPP has re-launched the public debate on
the use of nuclear energy. Both in Europe and worldwide, countries re-examined
their plans to introduce nuclear programmes, to construct new NPPs and to
extend the operating life of existing plants. Some European countries, such as
Germany, Belgium and Switzerland opted in the immediate wake of Fukushima for
an early phase-out of their NPPs, while Italy voted in a public referendum
against a return to generating nuclear electricity domestically. 
It is obvious that a
sudden phase-out of this technology due to another severe accident,
particularly one in Europe, would result in severe difficulties to ensure the
EU's continued energy security, affordability and achievement of its ambitious
climate protection goals[53].
Therefore,
strengthening the EU nuclear sector's capability to ensure that a severe
accident will never occur at one of its NPPs is of vital interest for the
European society as a whole[54].

Despite having set
in 2009 the first steps towards a common Euratom nuclear safety legal framework
via the Nuclear Safety Directive, based upon overall
principles to which all national approaches have to commit, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are not only continued
significant differences between Member States, but that also significant gaps
remain in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management
of key safety issues. Measures of crucial importance that have been identified
decades ago as urgent for implementation still remain unaddressed in some
Member States. Therefore, it can be assumed that baseline evolution will not
lead to major reduction of the risks of NPPs in Europe.
As explained in
Section 2.2., the scope of the Nuclear Safety Directive is limited to some
important overall safety principles, without however addressing technical
aspects. Therefore, this Directive does not respond to the needs stemming from
the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident
and the Stress Tests, nor take account of initiatives
from various expert groups and international developments in the nuclear safety
area.
As regards the
Stress Tests exercise, due to the fact that it was a one-off, voluntary
exercise, there is no obligation to be continued on a regular basis also in the
future.  As the Stress Tests were developed in the wake of the Fukushima
nuclear accident, their scope is essentially limited to assessing the adequacy
of existing safety margins against impacts from extreme
external initiating events. Being an exceptional exercise, the Stress Tests do
not deal with the appropriateness of the existing periodic safety assessments
and inspection activities.
As regards coordinated Member States
approaches, such as the WENRA Reference Levels[55],
it should be noted that they might have an impact in the sense of guiding the
regulatory national approaches. However, even if the WENRA Reference Levels
have been established since 2006, they were not effectively transposed in the
Member States' national regulatory frameworks EU-wide. 
The nuclear safety international regime has
an incentive, non-enforceable character, and does not assure the implementation
of the relevant safety requirements set up therein.
In addition, as explained earlier in the
document, the preliminary assessment of the Member States' transposition
measures of the Nuclear Safety Directive has identified
areas of improvement in terms of effective independence of the national
regulatory authority and transparency.
Without new or revised Euratom legislation, the problem areas
described in Section 2.2 will continue to exist and will show little prospect
of improvement. This can particularly be expected
in the case of countries where the level of safety is currently below average.
Some improvements may occur in the area of international standards and
Conventions but this is likely to be slow and less effective than common
Euratom rules at sufficiently detailed levels. 
2.6.        Euratom
competence,  principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
The
competence of Euratom to regulate in the field of the health protection against
ionising radiation is explicitly recognised by the Euratom Treaty. In the
Treaty's Preamble, the Member States declare themselves "anxious to
create conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and
health of the public". Pursuant to Article 2(b) of the Treaty, the
Community is mandated to "establish uniform safety standards to protect
the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are
applied." Title II, Chapter 3 "Health and Safety", sets up a
number of detailed provisions intended to establish, give effect and apply the
basic safety standards mentioned in Article 2(b) of the Euratom Treaty. Article
30(1) of the Euratom Treaty establishes that "basic standards shall be
laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and
the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations."

Article
31 sets out the procedure for establishing the basic standards, while Article
32 provides that the basic standards may be revised or supplemented. The ruling
of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Case C29/99[56] acknowledged that "it
is not appropriate, in order to define the Community's competences, to draw an
artificial distinction between the protection of the health of the general
public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation". The basic
safety standards aiming mainly at the protection of the health of the workers
and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation can
be thus "supplemented", in the sense of the Euratom Treaty, with
safety requirements. Consequently, the legal basis for regulating nuclear
safety on Community level is defined by Articles 31 and 32 Euratom Treaty.
Therefore the Nuclear Safety Directive is legally based on Articles 31
and 32 Euratom Treaty. For this reason, any legislative amendment of the Safety
Directive in the scope of the "basic standards" as defined in Article
30 Euratom Treaty has to be based on the same Treaty provisions.
The
legislative revision should build upon and enhance the approach of the current
Nuclear Safety Directive.
As
regards the competent regulatory authorities, any revision proposal should
enhance the existing provisions, but aim at strengthening even further the role
and independence of the regulators, as it is clear that only strong regulators
endowed with all the necessary powers and independence guarantees can oversee
and ensure the safe operation of nuclear installations in the EU. For this
purpose, benchmark criteria could be defined for allowing for a consistent
interpretation of the concept of "effective independence" throughout
the Community. Close cooperation and information-sharing between regulators,
taking into account the potential cross-border impacts of a nuclear accident,
should be encouraged. 
Given
the cross-border consequences of a nuclear incident and particularly the public
need for information, an EU wide approach on transparency issues is essential.
This can ensure that, irrespective of state borders, the public is properly
informed on all relevant nuclear safety matters to ensure uniform level of
transparency and information throughout the EU. 
It is evident that
the effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at state borders and can entail
potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also
wide-ranging economic implications. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed
that there are not only continued differences between the EU Member States in
ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key
safety issues, but that also significant gaps remain. Therefore, a strengthened
Euratom legislation could include a set of technical provisions at an
appropriate level of detail for a framework legal instrument. These provisions
should ensure a common EU approach to nuclear safety, taking into account the
progress towards harmonisation reflecting the consensus reached by the
Member States in fora such as the IAEA or WENRA. 
The
experience from the Fukushima accident and the valuable insights coming from
the Stress Tests have clearly shown that a strong and transparent monitoring
system (including peer-reviews) is an essential element to ensure the effective
and continuous implementation of any safety regime. Lessons learned from past
major accidents have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and
have not sufficiently been applied by regulators. Consequently, the envisaged
revision of the Euratom nuclear safety legislation should ensure the effective
implementation of the required nuclear safety measures throughout the EU.
At
the international level, through the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the
main instruments governing nuclear safety are the
recommended safety "standards" and international Conventions.
However, these safety "standards" are legally non-binding, while the
international Conventions are legally binding but not enforceable. On the other
hand, the Euratom legislation benefits from clear and strong mechanisms for
sanction for its proper transposition and implementation.
In accordance with
the proportionality principle, the envisaged revision
should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives as defined
under Section 3. Furthermore, taking into account the different situations in
the Member States, a flexible and proportional approach as regards the level of
applicability of the provisions of the Nuclear Safety Directive was already acknowledged in recital (10) of the current Directive's
Preamble, which provides that national circumstances will be taken into account
when developing the appropriate national framework. A
possible revision of the Directive should reflect this requirement. For this
purpose, a proportionate approach
would have to be applied for those Member States
without any nuclear installations or with minor ones falling under the scope of
the Nuclear Safety Directive. For instance, the duties of the regulatory
authority should reflect the scale and nature of their nuclear industry.
However, clear regulatory responsibilities for aspects such as emergency
preparedness and response, regular training programmes, availability of public
information should be foreseen. When proposing new
requirements, no unnecessary administrative burdens should be imposed on the
Member States.
A flexible mechanism
of developing EU-wide technical criteria with special regard to the principle
of proportionality should be envisaged in which the knowledge and practical
experience of the experts from the Member States is fully used.
Section
3:  Objectives
3.1.        General objectives
·       
To protect workers and the
general public from dangers arising from ionising radiations from nuclear
installations, by achieving proper operating conditions, preventing accidents
and mitigating accident consequences;
·       
To maintain and promote the
continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation at Euratom level; 
·       
To ensure that Member States
provide for appropriate national arrangements to meet these objectives.
3.2.      Specific objectives 
In order to meet the general objectives, a
number of specific objectives are identified below:
A)
Continuously improving the overall nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by strengthening
existing / introducing new general nuclear safety Principles and Requirements).
B)
Continuously improving the specific nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by complementing
the above-mentioned safety principles and requirements by Euratom Nuclear
Safety Criteria).
C) Continuously improving the nuclear safety assessment
methodologies (e.g. by encouraging the consistent and comprehensive use
of risk-informed methods for decision-making support);
D)
Ensuring cooperation and coordination between all parties having
responsibilities for nuclear safety on technical matters, including
peer-reviews;
E)
Strengthening the role of the national regulatory authorities;
F)
Strengthening the effective independence of the national regulatory authorities;
G)
Enhancing nuclear safety transparency;
H)
Reinforcing on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements.
Examples of measures
which could potentially respond to the specific objectives are presented in Annex
IV to the IA.
3.3.        The
consistency of these objectives with other EU policies
Nuclear
safety is a key area, supporting one of the main priorities of the current
2010-2014 Commission, i.e. building a Union of sustainable growth and
solidarity. The Commission Communication of the Commission Work Programme
2012 – Delivering European renewal[57]
mentions under this heading that "a proposal to
enhance the framework for nuclear safety will integrate lessons from the stress
tests of EU nuclear power plants, technical progress and international regulatory
developments".
The specified
objectives, due to the fact that they ultimately aim at ensuring the protection
of the workers and the general public against the dangers of ionising radiation
(Article 31 Euratom Treaty), are in line with those of the Euratom radiation
protection acquis, whose main pillar is the Basic Safety Standards
Directive[58].
It is not possible to achieve the protection of workers[59] and the general public from
the dangers of ionising radiation without controlling the potentially harmful
sources of that radiation.
In addition, the
objectives do not cover aspects falling under the general EU acquis in
the field of health and safety of workers at work. The 'Framework' Directive
89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 saw the introduction of measures to encourage
improvements in the safety and health of workers[60] at work[61]. It establishes general
principles for the prevention of occupational risks, requiring the employer to
evaluate all risks relating to the health and safety of workers, to put
in place preventative measures and to provide appropriate protection. In
addition a number of individual Directives[62]
related to different aspects of workers health and safety have also been
issued. These Directives establish minimum requirements for safety and health
which shall be transposed by Member States into their national law. Member
States are allowed to maintain or introduce more stringent protective measures
compatible with the Treaties. Increasing the level of on-site nuclear safety
would also contribute to a higher protection of the population and the
environment by preventing and managing the risks of nuclear accidents. Thus,
the objectives of the revision are consistent and complementary to the EU civil
protection policy[63] which sets the framework at EU level for the prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery form all types of natural and man-made
disasters, including nuclear accidents.  
The
objectives would also have potential beneficial impact on fundamental rights,
as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in
particular those related to fair and just working conditions, health care and
environmental protection.
Section
4:  Overview of the policy options
A number of Policy
Options is analysed under this IA, as summarised below. The detailed
description of the Policy Options is presented in Annex V of the IA.
Concrete examples of possible measures is provided in Annex IV of the IA
POLICY OPTION
0 
Description: Consists
in leaving the current situation unchanged (Business as usual).
·       
No new legislative action at Euratom level.
·       
Not amending the current Euratom framework
Directive (Nuclear Safety Directive).
·       
 At the same time, use the existing mechanism of
cooperation between the European Commission and the Member States on the
implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests process through
ENSREG.
POLICY OPTION
1 
Description: Proposing
new Euratom legislation by strengthening existing / adding new general
nuclear safety Principles and Requirements.
·       
Legislative action (legally binding act) at
Euratom level.
·       
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing general Principles and Requirements (e.g. role &
independence of the national regulatory authorities; transparency) and adding
new general Principles and Requirements [e.g. on-site emergency preparedness
and response; siting, design & construction, and operation (e.g. periodic
safety assessments) of nuclear installations]. 
·       
At the same time, use the existing mechanism of
cooperation between the European Commission and the Member States on the
implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests process through
ENSREG.
POLICY OPTION
2 
Description: Proposing
new Euratom legislation by strengthening existing / adding new general nuclear
safety Principles and Requirements complemented by Euratom  Nuclear Safety
Criteria[64].
SUB-OPTION 2.1
·       
Legislative action (combination of legally
binding & specifying legally non-binding acts) at Euratom level.
·       
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements
(Policy Option 1) + Introducing in the Directive the mandate for the European
Commission to to support a consistent implementation of the general Principles and Requirements, by developing legally non-binding
Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission Recommendations). 
·       
These Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria would be
developed in close cooperation with experts from the Member States. One option
might be that the existing mechanism of cooperation between the European
Commission and the Member States through ENSREG and WENRA, could be used and
further enhanced for this purpose.
SUB-OPTION 2.2
·       
Legislative action (combination of a legally
binding act & specifying legally binding acts) at Euratom level
·       
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements
(Policy Option 1) + Introducing in the Directive the mandate for the European
Commission to to support a consistent and verifiable implementation
of the general Principles and Requirements, by
developing legally binding Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission
Regulations). 
·       
In the first step, the nuclear safety criteria
would be developed in close cooperation between expert working groups such as
ENSREG and WENRA, and Commission experts. Subsequently, the nuclear safety
criteria would be adopted as the Commission's "implementing acts"
according to Article 291 TFEU and using the relevant "comitology"
procedure laid down in Regulation 182/2011. For this purpose, a "comitology" committee, composed of representatives of
all Member States, would be created by the legislative proposal to assist the
Commission.
POLICY OPTION
3
Description: Proposing
new Euratom legislation including the setting up of a Euratom nuclear safety
regulatory Agency.
·       
 Legislative
action (legally binding act) at Euratom level
·       
Establishing a Euratom Nuclear Safety Regulatory
Agency[65]
to administrate and further develop the Euratom nuclear safety acquis,
as developed under Policy Option 2, under the supervision of the European
Commission.
·       
With the mission to promote the highest common
standards for safe generation of nuclear power in the EU. 
·       
With the tasks: 
·  To assist
the European Commission to develop harmonised technical nuclear safety requirements / standards / criteria, which
would be incorporated in proposals for new Euratom nuclear safety legislation; 
·     
To conduct inspections in order to monitor the
correct implementation by national regulators and
licence holders of this legislation and report back to
the Commission;
·     
To develop an Euratom certification system of
standard designs of nuclear facilities;
·     
To elaborate a uniform license content
(including a minimum set of requirements for the applicants) & licensing
procedure, as well as detailed guidance for its application;
·     
To intervene in case of nuclear accidents or
incidents (e.g. sending its experts on site);
·     
To formulate opinions and recommendations to the
Commission on nuclear safety matters;
·     
To collect and analyse data to further improve
nuclear safety.
Table 1 – Policy Options according to type of
Commission legislative action
   || TYPE OF COMMISSION LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 Not proposing new Euratom legislation || Proposing new Euratom legislative action 
 Legally binding act || Legally non-binding act 
 Policy Option 0 || ü ||   ||   
 Policy Option 1 ||   || ü ||   
 Policy Option 2 (Sub-option 2.1.) ||   || ü || ü 
 Policy Option 2 (Sub-option 2.2.) ||   || ü ||   
 Policy Option 3 ||   || ü ||   
Table 2 – Policy Options according to level of
detail of the Commission legislative action
   || LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE COMMISSION LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 General Principles and Requirements || Basic Principles and Requirements complemented by Euratom minimum nuclear safety criteria || Euratom Regulatory Nuclear Safety Agency 
 Policy Option 0 || (current ones only) ||   ||   
 Policy Option 1 || ü ||   ||   
 Policy Option 2 (Sub-option 2.1.) || ü || ü ||   
 Policy Option 2 (Sub-option 2.2.) || ü || ü ||   
 Policy Option 3 || ü || ü || ü 
Section 5:  Analysis
of impacts of the policy options
In this section, each of the policy options outlined
in Section 4 is assessed on the basis of its most important and relevant likely
impacts with regard to the effectiveness of the individual measures
foreseen within the context of these options, i.e. with regard to: 
·       
The extent to which they mitigate the risk of nuclear
accidents (safety impact), 
·       
Regulatory and compliance costs on Member
States, industry and the Commission (economic impact),
·       
Environmental and
social impacts. 
The effectiveness of
the proposed policy options in delivering the objectives set out in Section 3
and thus in reducing the probability and the consequences of accidents in
nuclear installations is expressed largely qualitatively in terms of the extent
to which the aim of the measure is likely to be attained. Estimating this
effectiveness is a difficult task and can only be made by qualitative judgment
based on the currently best available information.  
·     
First, in line
with the basic principle to give due priority to nuclear safety[66], the main objective of any
policy action in the field of nuclear safety is to reduce the risk of accidents
(i.e. in terms of both probability of occurrence and extent of consequences)
and thereby to avoid human, environmental and economic losses. Therefore, the
first criterion to be evaluated is the proposed policy's impact on
mitigating the risk of nuclear accidents. 
·     
Secondly, the
additional financial and administrative costs of implementing the proposed
policies to Member States, to NPP operators and to the Commission will be
highlighted and to the possible extent quantified: 
·      
These economic costs
can be roughly divided into regulatory costs (the costs incurred by
public authorities in providing the oversight necessary to effectively
implement the policies, i.e. labor costs and other expenses (missions, studies,
etc.) for developing new regulations, labor costs and other expenses (missions,
studies, etc.) for performing plant-specific inspections and evaluating the
results, financing of topical studies, general administrative costs) and compliance
costs (the costs incurred by industry, i.e. labor costs and equipment costs
(purchase, installation, testing, operation, maintenance) for implementing new
regulations, financing of topical studies, general administrative costs). 
·      
Regarding regulatory
costs, the cost to the regulator of enforcing regulations is primarily the cost
of the time taken to enforce and provide support to the operators as required. 
·     
Finally, a
section for each option summarizes other relevant environmental and social
impacts associated with the policy option. 
In the following Sections
5.1 - 5.4, safety benefits, costs, environmental and social impacts are
presented for each individual policy option. As the policy options constitute a
phased approach not only with regard to increasing scope and level of detail in
the Commission's legislative action to deal with safety in a consistent and
comprehensive EU-wide manner but also with regard to the time until the option
could actually be implemented on national level, the benefits and costs will
accrue with the execution of each policy option. 
Section 6 then shows the incremental (aggregated) benefits and costs for all
the policy options. 
5.1. Policy Option 0
Policy Option 0 is the baseline option which leaves
the status quo evolve. We describe this situation in more detail in Section 2
and in particular in Section 2.5. concerning "Evolution of the problem all things being
equal".
·     
Safety Impact 
Despite having
achieved in 2009 to set-up for the first time the basics of a common Euratom
nuclear safety legal framework by means of the current Nuclear Safety
Directive, making the EU the first major regional nuclear actor to provide
legally binding and enforceable rules to the main international nuclear safety
standards[67],
the scope of the existing Directive is limited to these overall principles.
Though mandatory, their practical interpretation and transformation into more
detailed safety requirements and criteria as well as their concrete
implementation at national levels is difficult to monitor on the basis of the
current Directive. To compensate for the absence of any European standards, the
existing IAEA standards and recommendations, as well as WENRA reference levels
or even requirements from the reactor vendor's country are currently used by
Member States as guidance when establishing national requirements and criteria
for nuclear safety. 
The March 2011
nuclear accident at the Fukushima NPP and the consequential Stress Tests of
nuclear installations in 15 Member States and 2 neighboring countries have
shown that this current approach is no longer sufficient: 
·       
As recognized by all European regulators at the
end of the Stress Tests[68],
the depth and detail of safety requirements as well as the way how regulations
are implemented differ significantly between the countries. Whereas some
countries are very specific in their requirements, others only define general
safety goals. 
·       
The Stress Tests have confirmed that there are
not only continued significant differences between Member States, but that also
significant gaps remain in ensuring comprehensive and transparent
identification and management of key safety issues. Measures of crucial
importance that have been identified decades ago as urgent for implementation
remain still unaddressed in some Member States. 
Moreover, we explain
in more detail in Section 2 above that the current Stress Tests exercise, due
in particular to its voluntary and ad-hoc nature, does not guarantee that the
identified measures to improve safety of EU NPPs will be (fully) implemented
and, where appropriate, also regularly updated in the future. We also recall
above that the instruments existing at international level, i.e. the IAEA
safety standards and Conventions cannot provide a solution to the identified
problem areas mainly because they are not binding and/or enforceable. It also
results from the detailed analysis conducted under Section 2 that the current
Euratom nuclear safety provisions are no longer sufficient and that without new or revised Euratom legislation, the problem areas described
in Section 2.2 will continue to exist and will show little prospects of
improvement. 
In view of the
above, the baseline evolution with regard to safety could be summarized thus:
substantial and transparent improvements to the overall level of risk and risk
control in the EU as a whole by operators and regulatory authorities are not
considered likely without an EU policy stimulus which goes substantially beyond
the scope of the current Directive. Therefore, Policy Option 0 is very
unlikely to reduce the current risks related to NPPs in Europe. 
·       
Economic impact: 
Compliance costs
for operators: 
Costs for NPP
operators related to this policy option consist of their ongoing costs of
implementing the provisions of their national safety requirements and criteria
based upon the general principles included in the current Directive and their
costs of implementing the national Stress Tests results. 
Regarding the costs
of implementing the current Directive, it has to be kept in mind that the
current Directive was adopted only in 2009 and gave the Member States time
until 22 July 2011 to comply with it. In some cases, this process is not yet
finalized even in 2012. For these reasons, there is a lack of data currently
available on the costs of implementing the current Directive for both operators
and Member States. 
Regarding costs for
implementing the results of the Stress Tests, according to first estimates by
the French regulator ASN (01/2012)[69],
the additional expenses for the French fleet for implementing the Stress Tests
related upgrades are likely to cost "several billion Euros". This
order of magnitude estimate was confirmed in the course of the peer reviews of
the Stress Tests where the costs of additional safety improvement measures
were estimated in the range from €30 million per reactor unit (e.g.
Switzerland) to €200 million (e.g. Slovenia)[70]. Assuming a similar range of
costs for most NPPs in Europe, an average of €100 million per reactor unit
could be realistic, totaling ~€10 billion for all NPP units in the EU[71] over the coming, say 5-10,
years[72]. 
The distribution of
this cost range across the different NPPs in the different Member States can
only be assessed on the basis of the National Action Plans, which will describe
the implementation of the recommendations from the stress tests peer review
process at national level and which are expected to be submitted to the
Commission by the end of 2012 (to be peer reviewed in early 2013). However,
considering that the stress test peer reviews showed that (1) improvement
measures are required at all NPP sites, (2) for many reactor units only
relatively minor improvement measures need to be implemented, and (3) for only
a few reactor units ones more effort might be necessary not only for
implementation of available solutions but also for their development, the
resulting cost distribution for all NPPs could have quite a positive skew with
a weighted average of around ~€100 million per reactor unit (over 5-10 years). 
This estimate of
~€10 million per reactor unit per year due to improvement measures originating
from the Stress Tests is also confirmed by an on-going OECD-NEA study on the
economics of long-term operation of NPPs[73]
which collected specific investment figures for post-Fukushima costs of
compliance with national safety requirements in different OECD member
countries. The resulting range for European countries is ~€400 - €800 per kWe
nuclear generation capacity, i.e. up to ~€100 million per reactor unit, i.e.
~€10 million per reactor unit per year over the next ~5-10 years, ~10% of which
is due to post Stress Tests improvements. 
Regulatory costs and
administrative burden for Member States: 
Costs for Member States
related to this policy option consist of their ongoing costs of enforcing their
national regulations (based upon the general principles included in the current
Directive and including Stress Tests follow-up). 
This is assessed by
using current figures of the costs of regulating the French nuclear fleet,
taken from the 2012 Cour des comptes report on the past and current
costs of the French nuclear program[74].
As the French report is the only one currently available from Member States on
the total costs of their national nuclear programs, and considering the large
experience of the French regulator, this information is used to estimate a
(conservative) EU average figure for the regulatory costs and administrative
burden of Member States in the order of ~€3 million per reactor unit per
year. The range of this figure across Europe could be from €1 million
(UK (conservative estimate)) to €4 million (Switzerland) per reactor unit per
year[75].
Regarding costs for carrying out the Stress
Tests, in terms of man
hours, reference to an overall estimate of ''roughly 500 man-years devoted to
completing the stress tests and peer reviews'', covering the effort of both
operators and regulators, was made at the second public meeting on the
Post-Fukushima stress tests peer reviews, which took place in Brussels, on 8
May 2012[76].

Costs for
Commission: 
Costs for Commission
related to this policy option correspond to the effort currently spent (=e0).

Costs for
Electricity Consumers: 
Costs for
electricity consumers related to this policy option correspond to the current
costs for nuclear generated electricity (=f0). 
Table 3 – Summary of the Economic impact of Policy Option 0
 Policy Option || Costs for Operators (per reactor unit) || Costs for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Costs for Commission || Costs for Electricity Consumers 
 0 || Range: ~€30-200 million || ~€3 million Range: ~€1-4 million || e0 || f0 
·       
Environmental impact: 
During normal
operation, there is no difference in the environmental impact between the
different policy options presented in this document. Only during accident
conditions, the different policy options chosen are likely to result in
different environmental impacts. As an increase in plant safety is, however,
always correlated to corresponding decreases in (potentially harmful)
environmental impacts, the environmental impact category is thus considered to
be covered by the safety impact category. 
·       
Social impact: 
Europe's nuclear
sector currently employs ~500000 people[77],
including those in the associated supply chain[78].
In France ~100000 people are employed in the nuclear sector. In the UK the
figure is ~85000 of which 45000 work at the power plants and 40000 in the
supply chain. In Finland, ~6000 people work at the 5 nuclear reactors. The jobs
are well-paid and attract qualified people with a broad range of skills such as
engineers, physicists, chemists, IT specialists, administrative and security
staff. Because the average operational duration of a NPP is up to 60 years,
jobs in the industry are typically secure and long-term. 
The social impact
related to this policy option is continuation of current figures on
employment and current relatively high levels of affordability of energy (e.g.
w.r.t. dependency on fuel imports and stability of electricity prices). 
Table 4 – Summary of the Social impact of Policy Option 0
 Policy Option || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector (all MS) || Affordability of Energy (all MS) 
 0 || ~500000 persons || High 
5.2. Policy Option 1
·       
Safety impact: 
The Fukushima
nuclear accident has shown that the assumed compliance with general nuclear
safety principles, as defined e.g. in the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, is
not a sufficient guarantee that these principles are correctly interpreted,
implemented and reviewed at national and plant-specific levels. Therefore, by
merely adding additional general principles to the current Framework Directive,
only some gains in safety as compared to policy option 0 can be expected. 
·       
Economic impact: 
Compliance costs
for operators: 
Fulfillment of
additional general principles, e.g. in relation to technical safety issues, transparency
improvements, emergency preparedness & response improvements, requires the
operator essentially to a re-adjustment and re-interpretation of some of its
current practices, as defined by the national regulator. This limited effort
can be expected to put no additional significant burden to the operators
compared to policy option 0. 
Regulatory costs and
administrative burden for Member States:
Costs for Member
States related to this policy option consist of their administrative costs of
implementing the national Stress Tests results and the costs of implementing a
Directive with additional Principles. As the additional principles would relate
also to strengthening the role & independence of the national regulator,
transparency improvements and emergency preparedness and response improvements,
the corresponding administrative costs would certainly be somewhat higher than
in policy option 0. However, as Member States are confronted with the need of
an extension of ongoing activities rather than a complete revision of their
current work, certainly not more than a doubling of expenses compared to policy
option 0 can be expected, say £€5 million per reactor unit per year. 
Costs for
Commission: 
Same as for policy
option 0, i.e. e1=e0. 
Costs for
Electricity Consumers: 
Same as for policy
option 0, i.e. f1=f0.
Table 5 – Summary of the Economic impact of Policy Option 1
 Policy Option || Costs for Operators (per reactor unit) || Costs for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Costs for Commission || Costs for Electricity Consumers 
 1 || Range: ~€30-200 million || £€5 million || e0 || f0 
·       
Environmental impact: 
Same as for policy
option 0.
·       
Social impact: 
Apart from a few
hundreds more specialists in certain areas (communication, emergency planning),
no changes compared to policy option 0 can be expected. 
Table 6 – Summary of the Social impact of Policy Option 1
 Option || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector (all MS) || Affordability of Energy (all MS) 
 1 || ~500000 + ~500 || High 
              5.3.  Policy
Option 2
Note: Two sub-options have been designed for policy option 2, as
presented in Section 4 above. As there are no differences in the technical
contents of these two sub-options, the economic, safety, environmental and
social impacts can be considered similar.
·       
Safety impact: 
Extending the
legislative action to the level of Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria opens the
way for an "objective" (i.e. more quantitative) review of
plant-specific safety improvement measures against corresponding acceptance
thresholds. Therefore, as correct interpretation and implementation of safety
improvement measures can now be verified on a much more quantitative basis,
significant further improvements to safety vis-à-vis policy options 0 and 1
can, at least for some NPPs in some Member States, be expected. 
·       
Economic impact: 
Compliance costs
for operators: 
Same as for policy
option 0, plus the costs for implementing the requirements resulting from the
updated Directive's safety criteria. Together with other sources, these safety
criteria would largely be based on the lessons learned from the Stress Tests.
As the related scope of safety assessment and upgrading work can, at least for
some NPPs, be expected to be larger than past modernization programs, the
higher end of the range of cost estimates from different countries as reported
in the course of the Stress Tests (see Section 5.1) can be considered as lower
bound value applicable for this particular policy option, i.e. €200 million per
reactor unit or more, at least for some NPPs in some Member States.  
Regulatory costs and
administrative burden for Member States:
Costs for Member
States related to this policy option correspond to about the same as for policy
option 1. As each national regulator is already expected to have sufficient
expertise to deal with all issues addressed in the current (detailed) national
and in the current Framework legislation, an extended Euratom legislation
addressing and providing for harmonisation of key safety criteria is not
expected to result in the need for significant additional staffing. 
Costs for
Commission: 
If the development
work of detailed criteria is performed by Member States experts, assembled in
Commission-coordinated EU Working Groups (e.g. ENSREG), very little additional
costs for the Commission are expected, as compared to policy option 0.
Costs for
Electricity Consumers: 
The additional costs
for safety will at least partly be shifted to the end-consumers, thus an
increase in electricity prices due to safety upgrades can be expected: f2>f0.
Due to the complexity of liberalized energy markets, it is, however, impossible
to further quantify this impact. However, considering that nuclear operators in
Europe are typically part of larger electricity generating companies with a
broad portfolio of different generation sources, it can be expected that these
additional expenses will internally be distributed in a way that does not
endanger the overall market competitiveness of nuclear, which would lead to a
minimal cost increase (see also Annex VI on the competiveness proofing study). 
Table 7 – Summary of the Economic impact of Policy Option 2
 Policy Option || Costs for Operators (per reactor unit) || Costs for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Costs for Commission || Costs for Electricity Consumers 
 2 || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || e0 || >f0 
·       
Environmental impact: 
At least as beneficial as for policy option
1.
·       
Social impact: 
A few hundreds more specialists in sectors
supporting national regulators (TSOs, research/academia) can be expected
vis-à-vis policy option 1.
Table 8 – Summary of the Social impact of Policy Option 2
  Option || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector (all MS) || Affordability of Energy (all MS) 
 2 || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 || ~High (i.e. possibly lower in the short-term compared to options 0 and 1 due to investments needed over a few years for further safety improvements, but assumed to return to previous high levels afterwards as nuclear can then show its full competitiveness when public acceptance is improved and regulatory (and thus investment) risks become consequently reduced. 
5.4. Policy
Option 3
·       
Safety impact: 
While similar
significant gains in safety can be expected for Policy Option 3, one advantage
of this option compared to Policy Option 2 would be that the existence of a
central European Regulator, provided it could be established, is likely to
speed-up the process of developing harmonized criteria. 
The idea of setting
up an Agency has been discussed since a long time. For instance, the European
Parliament's Committee on Industry, External
Trade, Research and Energy published in 2002 a report on the 'Commission report
to the European Parliament and the Council: Operation of the Euratom Safeguards
Office 1999-2000', with Paul Rübig as a rapporteur[79]. In this report, it
is mentioned that "Moreover the possibility of creating an independent
Agency at Community level should be considered, in charge to directly supervise
and carry out all nuclear Safety and Security controls in the member states, in
close collaboration with IAEA."
·         
Economic impact: 
Compliance costs
for operators:
Same as for policy option
2. 
Regulatory costs and
administrative burden for Member States:
Same as for policy
option 2. 
Costs for
Commission: 
Considering the
tasks of a Euratom nuclear safety regulatory agency as specified in Annex V,
staff is required for both development (harmonization)/communication and for
inspection tasks. Considering that ~150 nuclear installations need to be covered
by e.g. annual installation-specific inspections and further technical work on
nuclear safety harmonization and safety communication needs to be performed, a
staff of ~250 persons (technical + non-technical) is required. Taking the mix
between fixed and temporary positions as well as the figure on total staff
expenses from another EU agency (e.g. from EASA, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (http://www.easa.europa.eu)), ~€25 million per year would be needed for staff expenses of a Euratom safety
agency. In addition, the necessary annual budget allocation for inspection
activities (excl. staff costs) is ~€20 million[80]. Together with some additional budget for the performance of the
mentioned development/communication activities, say ~€5 million (excl. staff costs), a total required budget of ~€50 million
per year in addition to current expenses seems a
reasonable overall estimate. 
Costs for
Electricity Consumers: 
Same as for policy
option 2, i.e. f3=f2.
Table 9 – Summary of the Economic impact of Policy Option 3
 Policy Option || Costs for Operators (per reactor unit) || Costs for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Costs for Commission (per year) || Costs for Electricity Consumers 
 3 || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || e0 + €50 million || >f0 
·       
Environmental impact: 
At least as beneficial as for policy option 1.
·       
Social impact: 
Additional ~250 Agency staff vis-à-vis policy option 2. 
Table 10 – Summary of the Social impact of Policy Option 3
 Option || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector (all MS) || Affordability of Energy (all MS) 
 3 || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 + ~250 || ~High 
Section 6:  Comparing
the policy options
Table 11 – Comparison of the Policy Options in
terms of their impacts
 Policy Option || Safety Impact || Compliance costs for operators (per reactor unit) || Regulatory costs and administrative burden for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Costs for EC (per year) || Costs for Electricity Consumers || Environmental Impact || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector   || Affordability of Energy   
 0 || Very unlikely to reduce risks || Range: ~€30-200 million || ~€3 million Range: ~€1-4 million || e0 || f0 || Very unlikely to reduce risks || ~500000 persons || High 
 1 || Only some gains in safety || Range: ~€30-200 million || £€5 million || e0 || f0 || No significant risk reduction || ~500000 + ~500 || High 
 2 || Significant gains in safety at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || e0 || >f0 || Significant improvements at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 || ~High 
 3 || Significant gains in safety at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || e0 + ~€50 million || >f0 || Significant improvements at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 + ~250 || ~High 
Table 12 – Comparison of the Policy Options in
terms of their effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of responding to the
specific objectives
 Specific objectives || Policy option 0 || Policy option 1 || Policy option 2 || Policy option 3 
 Continuously improving the overall nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by strengthening existing / introducing new general nuclear safety Principles and Requirements). ||   || + || + || + 
 Continuously improving the specific nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by complementing the above-mentioned safety principles and requirements by Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria). ||   ||   || + || + 
 Continuously improving the nuclear safety assessment methodologies (e.g. by encouraging the consistent and comprehensive use of risk-informed methods for decision-making support). ||   || + || + || + 
 Ensuring cooperation and coordination between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety on technical matters, including peer-reviews. ||   || + || + || + 
 Strengthening the role of the national regulatory authorities. ||   || + || + || Non-applicable 
 Strengthening the effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. ||   || + || + || Non-applicable 
 Enhancing nuclear safety transparency. ||   || + || + || + 
 Reinforcing on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements. ||   || + || + || + 
Clearly Policy
option 1 produces some beneficial effects on nuclear
safety, due to the inclusion of additional legally binding and enforceable
rules (even if these are only at the level of general principles and
requirements). On the other hand, Policy Options 2 and 3 are likely to result in significantly further
improvements to the safety of EU NPPs through the adoption of Euratom Nuclear
Safety Criteria, which would provide for objective, verifiable safety
benchmarks. Compared to Policy Options 0 and 1, the
additional costs of Policy Options 2 and 3 of at least ~€200 million per
reactor unit over the next ~5-10 years seem acceptable, in view of the progress
made in nuclear safety area, especially when compared to the costs of a nuclear
accident. 
Policy
option 3, which goes beyond Policy Option 2, is different from the other
options, as it requires significant changes in the organisational setup of the
Commission and in the current Euratom safety architecture. Therefore, as it
requires a main change of the safety culture and architecture of the Member
States, at this time, it cannot be considered as a realistic option to achieve
immediate benefits for nuclear safety.  
As regards Policy Option 2, both Sub-options 2.1 and 2.2 address the same objective to specify
the legally binding and enforceable general principles and requirements, as
provided for in Policy Option 1. In addition, both Sub-options provide for the
development of Euratom nuclear safety criteria to support consistent
implementation of those general principles and requirements.  
Sub-option 2.1 provides for the European
Commission to specify the general principles and requirements by developing
legally non-binding Euratom nuclear safety criteria in the form of Commission
recommendations whilst Sub-option 2.2 would make these criteria legally binding
and enforceable.
A fully binding approach, as in Sub-option
2.2, would result in high level compliance with such criteria and thus in
uniform and verifiable implementation of the new general principles and
requirements across the EU. These criteria would be adopted as the Commission's
"implementing acts" according to Article 291 TFEU (for instance
Commission Regulations), and using the relevant "comitology"
procedure. In principle, the use of "comitology" would allow for a swift
adoption of any new criteria as well as their adaptation in the future, if
necessary. 
This has to be compared with Sub-option
2.1 which asks for the implementation of the same general principles and
requirements, while offering a more flexible approach for the Member States with
regard to the application of the recommended, and therefore legally non-binding,
Euratom nuclear safety criteria. In particular, the advantage of this
Sub-option would be that it would allow for most recent developments to be
taken into account in a dynamic and innovative way. This option would allow for
an even swifter adoption of the criteria and their update in the future. 
To summarise, both sub-options allow for
experience to be gained on how these criteria are applied in practice. Overall,
the Sub-option 2.2 would be more effective as it would lead to a uniform and
verifiable implementation of the new general principles and requirements throughout
the EU. On the other hand, the advantage of Sub-option 2.1 is that it requires
the implementation of these general principles and requirements, while offering
a more flexible approach for the Member States to comply with the recommended
Euratom nuclear safety criteria and make it possible to respond more quickly to
new technical developments. Following a step-wise approach, it would also be possible, learning
from the experience gained from the application of such criteria, to make them
subsequently legally binding ones or subject to reporting should they remain
only recommendations.
In conclusion, it is recommended to consider both Policy Option 2.1 and Policy Option
2.2. 
The socio-economic
part of the IA analysis is consistent with the results of a competitiveness
proofing study performed in line with the Commission operational guidance on
sectorial competitiveness (see Annex VI). This study shows that the
likely impact of a proposed legislative revision of the Euratom nuclear safety
legislation on the sector's cost and price competitiveness, on the sector's
capacity to innovate and the sector's international competitiveness is mostly
either neutral or even positive, both under mid- and longer-term perspectives. 
Section 7:  Monitoring
and evaluation
The indicators of progress
towards meeting the objectives are:
7.1. Status of
the transposition of the new Euratom requirements into the national law of the
Member States 
The
timely and correct transposition of the new requirements in national law will
be a key indicator for their success.
The
obligation of the Member States to "bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive" is already provided in Article 10 of the Nuclear Safety Directive, 
The
final transposition by the Member States of the new requirements needs to be
accomplished by the prescribed transposition deadline.
7.2. Status of
the practical implementation of the new Euratom requirements in the Member
States 
The effective implementation of the new
requirements on the ground is another important progress indicator. The
combination of the existing and of the new provisions concerning monitoring,
verification and reporting allow for a thorough assessment of the status of the
practical implementation.
7.2.1
Monitoring obligations and verification
Firstly, the Commission as "Guardian
of the Treaties" has the right and the obligation to monitor the
practical implementation of the Euratom provisions. Should the Commission come
to the conclusion that the new provisions are not correctly applied in a Member
State, it can intervene in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Euratom Treaty.  
Secondly, the
current provisions of the Nuclear Safety Directive on monitoring (to be found
under the heading "reporting") are two-fold: they include a
requirement for periodic self-assessment which is combined with the obligation
to invite an international peer-review. This monitoring should be extended to
areas other than the review of the national legislative, regulatory and
organisational framework, i.e. to design and operational safety performance of
each nuclear power plant. 
Finally, it could be
also considered to set up a verification scheme empowering the Commission to
carry out, under certain, clearly defined, conditions, a verification mission
in case of serious concerns about the full and effective implementation of the new
obligations. 
7.2.2 Reporting
obligations 
In line with Article
9(1) of the current Nuclear Safety Directive, the Member States should
periodically submit a Report to the Commission on the implementation of the
Directive, taking into account the timing for reporting and regular review
meetings under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. On the basis of the Member
States′ reports, the Commission shall submit a report to the Council and
the European Parliament on the progress made with the implementation of this
Directive. These reporting obligations should remain unchanged. 
Moreover, in
line with Article 9(3) of the current Nuclear Safety Directive, the
Member States should report the outcomes of the international peer-reviews that
they have the obligation to periodically invite, when such results are
available, to the Member States and to the Commission.
7.3. Evaluation
Evaluation is also
to be carried out in line with practical guide for Evaluation of the Commission
services (i.e. ex-ante, mid-term, ex-post)[81].
ANNEX
I
Comprehensive
risk and safety assessments ('stress tests') of nuclear power plants in the
European Union
1.1.      Background
The
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan following the earthquake and
tsunami of 11 March 2011 resulted in unprecedented efforts to review the safety
of nuclear installations in Europe and in many other countries. In the EU, the
European Council at its meeting of 24 – 25 March 2011 mandated the Commission
together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group (ENSREG) to define
and carry out comprehensive risk and safety assessments of NPPs ("stress
tests"). In addition, it asked
the Commission to invite EU
neighbouring countries to take part in the stress test process and to
"review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of
nuclear installations" and to "propose by the end of 2011 any
improvements that may be necessary".
The scope and
modalities of these safety evaluation tests were developed in a coordinated
framework making full use of available expertise (notably from the Western
European Nuclear Regulators Association, WENRA). The European Commission and
ENSREG reached an agreement on the criteria, methodology and timeframe for the
assessments on 25 May 2011. 
Specifications on
the safety track of the stress tests defined three main areas to be assessed:
extreme natural events (earthquake, flooding, extreme weather conditions),
response of the plants to prolonged loss of electric power and/or loss of the
ultimate heat sink (irrespective of the initiating cause) and severe accident
management.
The Stress Tests
were conducted according to a common methodology along two parallel tracks:
•                    
A Safety Track to assess how individual
NPPs can withstand the consequences of various unexpected events, ranging from
natural disasters to human error or technical failure and other accidental
impacts. 
•                    
A Security Track to analyse security
threats and a methodology for the prevention of, and response to, incidents due
to malevolent or terrorist acts. For the assessments under this second track,
the Council set up the Ad-hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS). 
The stress tests of
all operating NPPs in the EU were carried out in all 14 Member States that
operate NPPs (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom) and Lithuania, which is decommissioning its nuclear power
producing units, agreed to participate in these voluntary tests. From neighbouring
countries, Switzerland and Ukraine also participated in the process.
1.2.      Safety track
The safety track of
the Stress Test process was organised in three phases: 
•        
Self-assessments by nuclear operators. Nuclear
Licensees were asked to produce reports to national regulators by 31 October
2011;
•        
Review of the self-assessments by national
regulators. National regulators reviewed the information supplied by Licensees
and prepared national reports by 31 December 2011;
•                    
Peer reviews of the national reports, conducted
by national and European Commission experts in the period January – April 2012.
All national reports
were submitted to the Commission within the agreed deadline.
The peer
review process
In order to provide
an objective assessment of the work done at national level and to maximise
coherence and comparability, the national reports were subjected to a peer
review process, organised in three phases:
·              
A desktop review phase where the 17 national
reports were analysed by all the peer reviewers, who posed more than 2 000
written questions on the reports. The Stress Tests secretariat run by the Joint
Research Centre of the Commission opened a dedicated website to gather
questions from the public for the peer reviews.
·              
A peer review related to horizontal topics,
comparing the consistency of the national approaches and findings in three key
areas: extreme natural events, loss of safety functions and severe accident
management. The topical review meetings were organised at the Commission
premises in February 2012, and involved around 90 experts. National teams were
called in and asked to answer the questions posed in the desktop review phase.
The result is summarised in 3 topical reports and 17 draft country reports for
each participating country, with a list of remaining open questions for the
ensuing country peer reviews. 
·              
A vertical, individual review of each of the 17
country reports. The country peer reviews took place in March 2012 and included
NPP site visits. As a result, the country reports were finalised, providing the
basis – together with the topical reports – for the overall peer review Board
report. ENSREG and the European Commission adopted on 26 April 2012 the report
on the results of the Stress Tests on European NPPs[82].
The peer review
teams were composed of nuclear safety experts from Member States, Switzerland,
Ukraine and from the Commission, with observers from third countries (Croatia,
USA, Japan) and the IAEA.
All reports,
including the licensee reports have been made available on the ENSREG website.
Main findings
from the Stress Tests
In all the reviewed
countries, the stress tests have identified strong features, weaknesses and
indicated measures to increase plant robustness in light of the preliminary
lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster. They include provisions of
additional mobile equipment to prevent or mitigate severe accidents,
installation of hardened fixed equipment, and the improvement of severe
accident management, together with appropriate staff training measures.
In the course of the
Stress Tests, EU-wide issues were identified through topical reviews. The peer
review Board report identified four main areas for further improvement:
·         
Developing European guidance on the assessment
of natural hazards and safety margins, to increase consistency between Member
States;
·         
Using Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs), at least
every 10 years, to maintain and improve the safety and robustness of plants;
·         
Implementation of recognised measures to protect
containment integrity as the last barrier to protect the people and the
environment against radioactive releases;
·         
Preventing accidents resulting from natural
hazards and limiting their consequences.
On a more technical
detailed level, key findings for areas of improvements are:
Initiating
events:
– External hazards
(e.g. earthquake, flooding, extreme weather and accidents) and robustness of
the plants against them should be reassessed as often as appropriate but at
least every 10 years.
– Setting up an
international benchmark exercise to evaluate the relative strengths and
weaknesses of probabilistic and deterministic hazard assessment methods for
external events is recommended.
– The evaluation of
beyond design basis margins is not consistent in all participating countries.
Technical work to develop guidance at European level on natural hazard
assessments and on the assessment of safety margins beyond the design basis and
cliff-edge effects needs to be developed. 
– On-site seismic
instrumentation should be in operation at each NPP. A study to investigate the
overall cost-benefit and usefulness of automatic reactor shutdown induced by
seismic instrumentation is recommended. 
– The use of a ‘hardened
core’ of safety-related systems, structures and components capable of
withstanding earthquakes and flooding significantly beyond design basis has to
be considered. 
Loss of safety
functions
– All countries
assessed the cliff-edge effects related to various combinations of losses of
electrical power and/or cooling water, and the time available before safety functions
need to be restored. In terms of safety margins, Station Black-Out (SBO, i.e.
total loss of AC power) is the limiting case for most reactors. For most
reactor designs, SBO would typically lead to core heat-up after around 1-10
hours if no countermeasures were implemented. For some Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) designs SBO leads to core heat-up within 30-40 minutes, if no
countermeasures are adopted.
– Availability of a
variety of mobile devices should be guaranteed (such as mobile generators,
mobile pumps, mobile battery chargers or mobile DC power sources, fire-fighting
equipment, emergency lightning, etc.). Equipment should be stored in locations
that are safe even in the event of general devastation caused by events
significantly beyond the design basis. 
– To increase the
robustness of the ultimate heat sink function, it is strongly recommended to
identify and implement also alternative means of cooling, e.g. by using
alternative sources of water supply; 
– For multi-unit
sites, robustness could be enhanced if additional equipment and trained staff
are available to effectively deal with events affecting all the units on one
site. 
Severe accident
management
– Recognised
existing measures to protect containment integrity should be urgently implemented
where necessary (e.g. means to effectively depressurize the primary circuit, to
prevent hydrogen explosions or to prevent containment overpressure, such as
filtered venting).
– Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (SAMGs) are mostly only developed for power operation and
only in a few cases are there SAMGs for shutdown conditions, spent fuel pools
or multi-unit events. SAMGs should be developed for all plant conditions,
accidents in the spent fuel pools and long-duration events. Periodic validation
of SAMGs, at least in the course of the PSRs, is also essential for ensuring
their practicability, robustness and reliability and should form an intrinsic
part of their implementation process.
– The methods and
tools for SAM training and exercises are to be further enhanced, e.g. by
including periodic exercises on severe accidents in very harsh conditions.
– Equipment needed
for SAM, including instrumentation and communication means, needs to be
resistant to external hazards and to severe accident conditions. 
– On-site emergency
centres should be available and designed against impacts from extreme natural
and technological hazards. 
– Radiation
protection of all staff involved in severe accident management and emergency
response should be assessed and ensured by, among other, guaranteed
habitability of the facilities needed for accident control, and suitable
availability of protective equipment and training. 
– In some countries,
centralised storage of emergency equipment has been set-up, shared among
several NPP sites. It is important that such equipment is stored in locations
that are safe even in the event of general devastation, and that it can be
quickly supplied to the relevant NPP site.
Stress Tests
Follow-up
In line with a Joint
Declaration by the Commission and the ENSREG on 25 April 2012, ENSREG agreed in
July 2012 on an Action Plan, which aims at ensuring that the recommendations
from the peer review process will be implemented in a consistent and
transparent manner. National action plans are to be submitted to the Commission
by the end of 2012 and should be peer reviewed in early 2013. Further reporting
should be established at regular intervals.
              1.3.    Security
track
The Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) of the Council
of the EU was specifically established in July 2011 to deal with the
assessment of nuclear security in the EU after the Fukushima accident of March
2011. 
With a term of office being set at 12 months, the AHGNS
work programme was articulated in three stages:
-        
Collecting information from
Member States, 
-        
Processing information,
-        
Preparing an interim report
for the 2011 December European Council and the final report for the 2012 June
European Council.
The interim report of the AHGNS which was submitted to the
2011 December European Council identified 32 elements of good practices which
contribute to ensuring the highest possible level of nuclear security in the EU
and which derive in several cases from Member States experience in implementing
international guidance. 
The interim report confirmed Member States commitment to
the strengthening of nuclear security. The close link between the nuclear
safety and security dimensions was emphasised, as well as the interfaces
between nuclear security and counterterrorism strategies. The report also
highlighted the need to enhance international cooperation including
international peer review missions for verifying the level and efficiency of
physical protection measures for NPPs and showed that there is a common
understanding concerning the importance of developing and implementing adequate
processes for risk management and the need to bridge the gaps between the
relevant expert communities. 
In the course of 2012, the Group has continued to work on
encouraging exchange of existing practices and identifying possible
improvements, with a view to focus primarily on good practices not currently
elaborated upon in the existing IAEA guidance. The AHGNS held thematic
discussions on concrete themes such as computer and cyber security of NPPs, the
value of IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)
Missions, intentional aircraft crashes on nuclear facilities, nuclear
contingency plans and exercises and trainings.
 The final report of the Group as of 31.5.2012
presents conclusions on the five themes selected for detailed discussions,
namely physical protection, malevolent aircraft crashes, cyber-attacks, nuclear
emergency planning, and exercises and training. It also contains several
recommendations to the Member States in order to strengthen nuclear security in
the EU.
              ANNEX II
              1.1.
Overview of the results of the On-line public consultation on Areas of
reinforcing the existing Euratom nuclear safety legislative framework
1.1.1. Executive
summary
An overwhelming
majority of respondents to the public questionnaire (93%) considers itself as
"very well" or "fairly well" informed about nuclear safety
matters.
A. In the field of areas
of reinforcing the existing Euratom nuclear safety legislative framework:
Referring to the general suggestions:
–       
There was broad agreement in
acknowledging the importance of an Euratom nuclear safety legislative
framework, setting up common rules for EU 27 (almost 92% of the respondents
considered that this is "important" or "very important"). 
Almost 76% of the respondents agree with the need to reinforce the
existing safety legislative framework. 
Referring to the detailed
suggestions:
–       
As concerns defining Euratom basic nuclear
safety principles and requirements (complemented by associated technical
criteria and/or procedures, as appropriate) on the siting, design &
construction and operation of nuclear installations, a wide majority of
contributions considers as necessary to set up a set of Euratom basic
nuclear safety principles and requirements in these technical areas.
–       
Different views were expressed in the question
of possible strengthening of the competencies of national regulatory
authorities. A slight majority of stakeholders considers the existing
core competencies of the regulators (as for example to require the licence
holder to comply with the national nuclear safety requirements and the terms of
the relevant licence; to require demonstration of this compliance; to verify
this compliance through regulatory assessments and inspections and to carry out
regulatory enforcement actions) as sufficient, whereas almost the
same amount of respondents have the opposite opinion. More than 10%
of the respondents have no firm views on this issue. 
–       
Exactly the same evaluation can be made for the
aspect of strengthening the independence of the national regulatory
authorities. Half of the contributors is of the opinion that the existing
criteria to assure the independence are sufficient; whereas the
other half would prefer to strengthen certain requirements as the requirement
of functional separation of the regulatory authority from anybody or
organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy.
–       
When it comes to increasing transparency,
which includes inter alia the obligation that Member States shall ensure that
information in relation to the regulation of nuclear safety is made available
to the workers and the general public and information shall be made available
to the public in accordance with national legislation and international
obligations, the views are again divided. A slight majority of respondents
would like to have transparency increased, whereas almost the half of
the respondents considers the existing provisions as satisfactory. 
B. In the area of enhancing
emergency preparedness and response, the following responses were
received:
–       
In the field of usefulness to further
reinforce the cross-border cooperation mechanisms between Member States, or
between Member States and other neighbouring countries (non EU Member States)
for ensuring the management of accidents and mitigation of accident
consequences, broad agreement exists on the necessity of further
reinforcement of these principles. 
C. Concerning nuclear
liability:
–       
For a wide majority of stakeholders the
role of a Euratom nuclear liability legislative framework setting up common
rules for all the 27 Member States, is important or very important.
–       
At the same time, there is a division in
opinions regarding the necessity to introduce an Euratom nuclear liability
legislative framework; a slight majority is against this proposal.
D. In the field of enhancing
scientific and technological competence:
–       
A majority of respondents considers that
scientific and technological competence is of foremost importance to ensure
nuclear safety at all levels from design to construction, operation and
decommissioning of nuclear facilities and therefore this technological
leadership should be maintained, also in the framework of the Euratom
Research Framework Programme. Nevertheless it should be stated that 30% of the
contributors don’t agree with this approach. 
–       
The same division of opinion can be stated as
for the question if the Euratom Research Framework Programme should be enhanced
in this context.
E. The last set of
questions referred to the area of improving the global legal framework:
–       
In this context, The Convention
on Nuclear Safety (CNS) is one of the cornerstones of the
international legal regime of ensuring nuclear safety.  An Extraordinary
Meeting to analyse the relevant issues arising from the accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP and to review the effectiveness of the CNS provisions has
been convened in August 2012. In responding to the question if EURATOM
as a party to the Convention should support a change to the CNS, almost half
of the stakeholders responded positively; whereas almost one third of
contributors replied with no answer (which might be due to a lack of
information on this specific issue). 
–       
Concerning the question if Euratom as a Party to
the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident should play a
leading role in submitting proposals to supplement the Convention in order to
eliminate possible gaps in case of a review meeting in 2012, there is a balance
in responses in favour of and against this proposal. 
1.1.2. Detailed
results to the questions
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS
This Section includes questions about the background of the
respondents. Please note that this consultation is subject to a Data Privacy Statement.
A.2. Are you
responding to this questionnaire on behalf of /as: -single choice reply- (compulsory) 
A.3. Please indicate your
country  -single choice reply- (compulsory) 
A.4. From which perspective are
you interested in nuclear safety? -single choice reply- (compulsory) 
A.5.
How well informed do you consider you are about the nuclear safety of nuclear
installations? -single choice reply- (compulsory) 
A.6. How would you prefer your contribution to be published on
the Commission website, if at all? -single choice reply- (compulsory) 
B. GENERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR AREAS OF REINFORCING THE EXISTING
EURATOM NUCLEAR SAFETY LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
B.1. In your
opinion, the role of an Euratom nuclear safety legislative framework, setting
up common rules for all the 27 EU Member States, is… -single choice reply- (optional) 
B.2. The consequences of nuclear and radiological accidents do
not stop at national or regional borders ("an accident anywhere is an
accident everywhere"). The Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted the need
to consider new challenges and underlined the paramount importance of nuclear
safety in the use of nuclear energy. In this context, do you consider
necessary to reinforce the existing Euratom nuclear safety legislative
framework? -single choice reply- (optional) 
 
 B.2.1. Which
would be your preferred instrument of legislative intervention? -single choice
reply- (optional) 
B.2.2. Which would be your
preferred areas of additional intervention? -multiple
choices reply- (optional)
C. DETAILED
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AREAS PRESENTED IN QUESTION B.2.2.
C.1. Defining
EU-wide basic principles and requirements (complemented by associated minimum
technical criteria and/or procedures, as appropriate) on the siting, design
& construction and operation of nuclear installations
In the judgement in the Case C-29/99, the Court of Justice of the
EU acknowledged that Euratom possesses (shared) competencies under the Euratom
Treaty in the fields relating to the siting, design & construction and
operation of nuclear installations.
C.1.1. Do
you consider that it is necessary to set up, in the Euratom nuclear safety
legislative framework, a set of EU-wide basic principles and requirements
(complemented by associated minimum criteria and/or procedures, as appropriate)
in these technical areas? -single choice reply- (optional) 
C.1.1.1. Do you consider that the
provisions of Articles 17 (Siting), Article 18 (Design and construction) and
Article 19 (Operation) of the IAEA Convention
on Nuclear Safety could represent a basis for
these new Euratom legislative provisions? -single
choice reply- (optional) 
C.2. Strengthening the competencies of the national regulatory
authorities  
Currently, at Euratom level, the Nuclear
Safety Directive [Article 5(3)] enumerates a number
of core competencies of the national regulatory authorities (to require the
licence holder to comply with the national nuclear safety requirements and the
terms of the relevant licence; to require demonstration of this compliance; to
verify this compliance through regulatory assessments and inspections and to
carry out regulatory enforcement actions, including suspending the operation of
nuclear installations).
C.2.1. Do you
consider that this enumeration is sufficient to properly reflect the various
competencies of the national regulatory authorities? -single choice reply- (optional) 
C.3.
Strengthening the independence of the national regulatory authorities
Currently, at Euratom level, the Nuclear
Safety Directive [Article 5(2) and (3)] contains a
number of provisions underlying the independence of the national regulatory
authorities (requirement of functional separation of the regulatory authority
from any body or organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation of
nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure effective
independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision-making;
requirement that the regulatory authority is given the legal powers and human
and financial resources necessary to fulfil its obligations in connection to
the national framework).
C.3.1. Do you
consider that these criteria are sufficient to guarantee the effective
independence of the national regulatory authorities? -single choice reply- (optional) 
C.4.
Increasing transparency
Currently, at Euratom level, the Nuclear
Safety Directive [Article 8] contains requirements on
public information (requirement that the EU Member States shall ensure that
information in relation to the regulation of nuclear safety is made available
to the workers and the general public; this obligation includes ensuring that
the competent regulatory authority informs the public in the fields of its competence;
information shall be made available to the public in accordance with national
legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not
jeopardise other interests such as, inter alia, security, recognised in
national legislation or international obligations).
C.4.1. Do you
consider that these provisions are satisfactory to provide you sufficient
information on nuclear safety matters? -single choice reply- (optional) 
C.5. Better
defining / strengthening the role of the national regulatory authorities in the
shaping and implementation of Euratom nuclear safety legislation and policies
The national regulatory authorities are reunited in the High
Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management (later renamed European
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group – ENSREG), whose role is to advise and assist
the European Commission in progressively developing common understanding and
eventually additional European rules in the fields of the safety of nuclear
installations and the safety of the management of spent fuel and radioactive
waste.
In the area of nuclear safety, to date, ENSREG
provided an important contribution to the elaboration of the Nuclear Safety
Directive (e.g. by providing expert input), as well as to its implementation
(e.g. by developing guidelines on reporting under the Directive, by
establishing a first ten-years plan for the Member States' periodic
international peer reviews). In addition, the Commission and ENSREG reached
agreement on the criteria, methodology and timeframe for the EU comprehensive
risk and safety assessments ('stress tests') triggered by the Fukushima nuclear
accident and are cooperating closely in the various steps of this ongoing process.
D. QUESTIONS ON RELATED AREAS
D.1. ENHANCING
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Actions to prevent, prepare for and deal with nuclear and
radiological emergencies are often taken at national level. However, at EU
level, there is a range of legislative instruments and mechanisms and special
provisions relating to nuclear accidents, which can be activated in such events
(including Basic Safety Standards Directive, the Public Information Directive,
the ECURIE Decision, the Civil Protection Mechanism legislation, as well as the
foodstuffs and feeding stuffs regulations). 
More information on the Euratom radiation protection
legislation
More information on the Euratom emergency preparedness
and response mechanisms
More information on the Civil Protection Mechanism
D.1.1. Do you
consider that it is useful to further reinforce the cross-border cooperation
mechanisms between EU Member States, or between EU Member States and other
neighbouring countries (non EU Member States) for ensuring the management of
accidents and mitigation of accident consequences? -single choice reply- (optional) 
D.2.
CLARIFYING QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR LIABILITY
D.2.1. In your
opinion, the role of a Euratom nuclear liability legislative framework setting
up common rules for all the 27 EU Member States, is… -single choice reply- (optional) 
D.2.2. The
consequences of nuclear and radiological accidents do not stop at national or
regional borders ("an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere").
The Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted the need to consider new challenges
and underlined the paramount importance of nuclear safety in the use of nuclear
energy.
In this context, do you consider necessary to introduce, bearing
in mind the existing international conventions (Paris Convention, Vienna Convention, Brussels Convention),
a Euratom nuclear liability legislative framework? -single choice reply- (optional) 
D.2.2.1.  Which would be your preferred instrument of
Euratom legislative intervention? -single choice reply- (optional) 
D.2.2.2. Which would be your preferred areas of Euratom
legislative intervention? -multiple choices reply- (optional) 
 D.2.2.1.  Which would be your preferred instrument of
Euratom legislative intervention? -single choice reply- (optional) 
D.3. ENHANCING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE
D.3.1.
Scientific and technological competence is of foremost importance to ensure
nuclear safety at all levels from design to construction, operation and
decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It applies to nuclear power plants but
also all other nuclear facilities. Nuclear research and development,
innovation, education and training are therefore making an important chapter of
the Euratom Treaty. Over the last decades, the Euratom Research Framework Programme
has contributed to enhance the nuclear scientific and technological competence
in the EU, making it a leading region in this field.

Do you consider that this scientific and technological leadership should be
maintained?
-single choice reply- (optional) 
D.3.2. Do you
consider that the Euratom Research Framework Programme should be enhanced to
keep this scientific and technological leadership?
-single choice reply- (optional) 
D.4. IMPROVING
THE GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
D.4.1. The Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS) is one of the cornerstones of the international legal regime of ensuring
nuclear safety.  An Extraordinary Meeting to analyse the relevant issues
arising from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and to
review the effectiveness of the CNS provisions has been convened in August
2012. 
Do you consider that Euratom, as a Party to the Convention,
should support a change to the CNS with a view to enhance the international nuclear
safety regime?
-single choice reply- (optional) 
D.4.2. The
accident the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has revealed possible
deficiencies in the international legal regime of ensuring prompt provision of
information on nuclear accidents, regulated primarily by the Convention on Early Notification of
a Nuclear Accident. 
Do you consider that Euratom, as a Party to the Convention,
should play a leading role submitting proposals to supplement the Convention in
order to eliminate these possible gaps in case of a review meeting for the
Early Notification Convention is convened in 2012?
-single choice reply- (optional) 
              
              1.2.    Overview
of the contributions received from various stakeholders in addition to the
on-line public consultation. 
Several contributions from different
stakeholders have been received by the Commission outside the on-line public consultation.
Meeting based contributions have been received from non-governmental
organisations such as Greenpeace[83].
The analysis of the contributions shows that most of the stakeholders having
submitted contributions see scope for reinforcement of the current Euratom
nuclear safety framework and present various proposals for legislative
improvements and harmonisation measures. Slightly fewer respondents though
believe that instead of adopting new legislative provisions, the focus should
be at this moment towards improving the implementation of existing mechanisms
both at EU and international level. There is a general view that WENRA and
ENSREG have so far been effective to enhance and harmonise nuclear safety and
should be further involved. Several stakeholders also called for reinforced
cooperation/coordination among and between Member States and enhanced peer
review processes, including a suggestion for international inspections.
In the following
text, a summary is provided of the contributions received.
VIEWS FROM ELECTRIC
UTILITY COMPANIES
From the side of
electric utility companies, the opinion was mentioned that, as for the
reinforcement of legislation, the Commission should improve the implementation
of existing provisions and promote harmonization measures taking into account
the results of the on–going peer reviews and the work done by consolidated
bodies like WENRA and ENSREG. 
It was also claimed
that there is no need to modify or improve the existing legislation in order to
strengthen the concept of independence and to add further regulatory
competencies to the nuclear regulatory body. The governments should have the
freedom to detect the most suitable measures in order to give effect to the
independence principle. As for the possible reinforcement of the principle of
transparency, high levels of public information and transparency on nuclear
safety matters are said to have been achieved and competent authorities provide
public information via a number of tools.
It was recommended
that any further harmonisation measures should be implemented through a
bottom-up approach and not directly by the Commission with the adoption of
binding legislation (i.e. top down approach).
In
this respect, fields of further harmonization/coordination under ENSREG current
scope of work could be the following:
-
Design standardization: it is necessary to create at least homogeneous minimum
safety levels in the whole European territory and a fair level playing field
where no advantages are given to countries that use inadequate technologies;
-
Licensing procedures for new plants:  licensing procedures for new NPPs need to
be made at least compatible, in order to minimise licensing risks among
countries and to facilitate the development of licensing documents;
-
Site safety and site hazard evaluation: it should be harmonized at the European
level, through the definition of common hazard parameters, external event
scenarios, assessment methodologies. Criteria for site exclusion and evaluation
should be identified and applied in consistent way throughout Europe. Site
safety assessment criteria should be adopted as a basis for uniform risk
evaluation;
-
Management of nuclear emergencies; etc.
On the other hand,
from the perspective of an utility operating an important number of NPPs, a less
favourable view to new harmonisation measures has been put forward: while there
may be scope for improvements in legislation, the focus should now be on the
effective implementation of the EU existing rules. The current nuclear safety
legislation should be reviewed in the light of the Stress Tests and the
experience of its implementation by Member States. New legislation should not
be brought forward until there is a demonstrable need that cannot be satisfied
adequately by existing mechanisms.
As for the question
of further regulation of peer reviews and their scope, this more prudent
opinion was that such reviews should not be overly prescribed by the
legislation as this would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the process. An
opinion was also expressed that the approach where these peer reviews might in
future examine design as well as operational safety issues would be difficult
to apply. It was also suggested that any move in this direction needs to be
taken cautiously.
Finally, under this
more cautious approach, the suggestion to specify minimum technical criteria
relating to safety in areas covering siting, design, construction, and
operation seems to risk challenging the primacy of the national safety
regulator in these areas and could call into question the authority of the
national safety regulator. 
VIEWS FROM THE VENDOR'S SIDE
A contribution
received form vendor specialized in nuclear reactor design and construction,
and related services suggested that lessons to be drawn at the European level
from the Fukushima accident and the stress tests mainly concern national safety
organisation and allocation of responsibilities as well as emergency
preparedness and response. A possibility was seen to reinforce the Euratom
nuclear safety framework suggesting that the Euratom could adopt a
comprehensive “nuclear safety partnership programme” covering the following
issues: encouraging cooperation among safety authorities, promoting highest
level safety standards for new builds, modernizing nuclear emergency tools,
promoting transparency, developing education and training in nuclear safety and
extending financing for R&D on nuclear safety.
Furthermore, it was
recommended incorporating WENRA safety objectives in the Euratom framework by:
- Adding to the
current recital of the 2009 Safety Directive referring to WENRA reference
levels for existing NPPs, a new recital referring to the WENRA safety
objectives for new build.
- Introducing a new
article in the revised directive requesting Member States to enhance
cooperation among their national safety authorities in order to define and
implement common safety objectives and standards for new reactors.
- Complementing the
new provisions of a revised directive with a non-binding document which could
cite, in extenso, the seven WENRA safety objectives for new builds.
Finally, it was
proposed that harmonisation of nuclear safety in Europe should be achieved
through enhanced cooperation among European regulators gathered within WENRA
and ENSREG aiming at:
- Safety objectives
and standards: Cooperation should aim at systematically implementing the WENRA
safety objectives for new projects in Europe and at further detailing these
objectives (e.g. WENRA position papers)
- Harmonisation of
licensing through progressive cross-recognition of assessments: aiming at the
mutual recognition of analysis and assessments undertaken by national
regulators; safety authorities could either define common methods, or recognize
each other’s methods and analysis.
The safety
authorities could therefore be tasked by Euratom to define a roadmap in these
two domains: (1) European standard definition and implementation for new
reactors, (2) harmonisation of licensing through progressive cross recognition
of safety assessments.
Lastly, the opinion
was brought forward that the scope of peer reviews could be extended to cover
operational safety of nuclear power plants. Some elements of the design could
be considered in the scope of these peer reviews.
VIEWS FROM A
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY FORUM
A body, involving
for example nuclear site licensees and other players who carry the
responsibility for nuclear safety is of the view that there is no clear
evidence at this moment for reinforcing the legislation as the peer reviews of
the stress test results at European level are not yet complete and the full
impact of the Nuclear Safety Directive implemented only last year is not yet
known. It highlights that the authority and independence of the National Safety
Regulator is essential to maintain and improve Nuclear Safety standards and
that more prescription at the European level should not undermine this
authority and independence.
VIEWS FROM NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITIES
Both less and more
favourable approaches as to the possible reinforcement of Euratom nuclear
safety legislative framework have been identified in the contributions received
from national nuclear safety authorities.
In this context, one
opinion suggested that currently it is not yet possible to make the judgement
as to whether a change is needed to the current European legal framework,
including European legislation on technical measures for nuclear safety. The
root lessons from the Fukushima accident should be considered to be more
institutional and cultural than technical. However, it was recommended to take
forward any initiatives to improve nuclear safety, in particular by taking into
account amongst other aspects: the need to engender a culture of continuous
improvement; clarity on the respective roles and responsibilities of governments,
independent regulators and utilities; the need to enhance the independence and
capabilities of nuclear regulators; and to have effective peer and periodic
reviews. From this, it would therefore be sensible to consider such root
lessons and whether change might best be achieved by ensuring the full
implementation of the existing Directive, improving the implementation of
existing mechanisms, enhancing peer review processes and amending guidance.
Conversely, other
public authorities of some non-nuclear Member States were clearly in favour of
some new legislative measures making some concrete proposals, such as:
·       
A list of concrete safety objectives should be
included into a directive. These objectives should be the same for existing
NPPs as for new builds. Since however not all objectives can be implemented in
the existing NPPs appropriate compensatory measures should be permitted during
a defined transition time.
·       
The legal powers of the competent authorities
for nuclear safety in Member States that operate nuclear installations or that
decide to build such installations should be further extended and those
authorities should by  fully independent from external influences.
·       
An obligation of organizing international
inspections in the nuclear installations should be introduced. This could
include OSART missions, but also cross inspections from inspectorates of one
Member State in another Member State.
·       
It should be considered to permit national
stakeholders and members of the competent authorities of neighbouring countries
having nuclear installations close to their borders to take a part into the
national consultation process concerning important decisions in the Member
States with nuclear installations, such as the review of the legislative
framework, relevant licensing procedures (new discharge limits, new builds,
prolongations of lifetime) and important safety reviews (ex: stress test, PSA)
·       
Legislative initiative should be aiming at
reinforcing the cooperation mechanisms between neighbouring countries (either Member
States, or non-Member States) for ensuring the management of accident and
mitigation of accident consequences.
VIEWS FROM EUROPEAN SOCIAL PARTNERS FOR THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
In
its response (Eurelectric for the employers and EPSU/Industri-All-Europe for
the trade unions) the European Social Partners for the Electricity Industry
considers very important the role of a Euratom nuclear safety legislative
framework in setting up common rules for Member States. It favours additional
intervention in defining Euratom-wide basic principles and requirements,
complemented by associated technical criteria – but cautions that this should
not imply reduction of standards through meeting just minimum levels. Better
defining, and strengthening the role and competencies of national regulatory
authorities in shaping and implementing nuclear safety legislation and policies
are necessary. Applying the highest levels of health and safety, provisions for
training, ensuring the qualified staff are available, and checking their skills
and competencies are important issues for the workforce and particularly for
sub-contractors. The lessons learnt from the stress-tests should be applied;
the improvements identified in national action plans to should be made
mandatory. Nuclear safety would benefit from regular international peer
reviews, with more frequent peer reviews for older facilities. Off-site
emergency preparedness in the event of a severe accident which has radiological
consequences in nearby European countries is an important issue. In the area of
effective regulatory independence, transparency and accountability are
considered absolute necessities. Obligatory consultation of workers'
representatives and trade unions by nuclear safety regulatory bodies would
improve accountability.
              ANNEX III
The
purpose of this paper is to present the results of an analysis of the impact
that the contribution of nuclear energy to the low carbon energy mix will have
in terms of job creation and growth (value added to the economy through
investments in Billion Euros per year). The time horizon is 2020, 2030 and
2050. 
The
analysis is based on the scenario "Delayed CCS" of the EU Energy
Roadmap 2050 – where nuclear is shown to contribute nearly 20% electricity
in 2050. 
The
analysis is defining the "additional" jobs and value added to the
economy coming from Lifetime Extension (LTO – Long Term Operation), New
Built, Decommissioning and Geological Disposal programmes – over and above the
jobs and economic benefits of the "regular operation" of the nuclear
plants (900 000 jobs and 70 Billion Euros/year). 
Key
outcomes
 Timeframe || Activity || JOBS || VALUE CREATED 
   ||   ||   ||   
 2012-2050   || Regular Operation || 900 000 || 70 BEuros/y 
   ||   ||   ||   
 2012-2020   || Stress Test (ST) || 10 000 || 1 BEuros/y 
   ||   ||   ||   
 2012-2030 || LTO (including ST) || 50 000 || 4,5 BEuros/y 
 Decommissioning || 7 000 || 1 BEuros/y 
 Waste Mgt || 10000 || 2 BEuros/y 
   ||   ||   ||   
 2030-2050 || New Built || 250 000 || 25 BEuros/y 
 Decommissioning || 20 000 || 2,5 BEuros/y 
 Waste Mgt || 10 000 || 2,5 BEuros/y 
1. Background
and Scenario Assumptions
Nuclear
Energy is today providing slightly less than 30% of the electricity consumed in
the EU. This electricity is mainly stable and reliable base load, secure from a
supply perspective, CO2 free, and competitive/affordable. As a result, nuclear
energy is today already a positive contributor to the EU economy, growth and
jobs. A standard figure indicates that the nuclear sector employs today
500 000 people[84]
in the EU, directly and indirectly. One might also count additional "induced"
jobs – which then leads to a grand total of around 900 000 persons
employed. The corresponding total "valued added" for the European
economy can be estimated to 70 Billion Euros per year, extrapolating from the
same source under footnote 1. 
The
Energy Roadmap 2050 provides mainly 2 types of decarbonisation scenarios
for the EU when looking at it from the nuclear perspectives: 2 scenarios going
to nuclear phase out in 2050, and 3 scenarios leading to a fraction between 15
and 20% of electricity produced by nuclear energy. For this paper we
take the 20% figure. This figure is lower than the projections by industry
(Eurelectric Power Choices Scenario 2010 leading to 28% of nuclear electricity
in 2050).
A
global overall look at the impact in terms of global investment needs and jobs
is summarized at the end.
2. Nuclear
Power Plants (Long Term) Operation and New Built
2.1 Storyboard:
timelines for LTO and new built
Today
over the total of about 150 plants of the EU, 135 (rounded number) are in
operation. Their average age is nearly 30 years (see figure 1). Some Member
States (MS) have taken the decision to close their plants: Germany's last unit
will be stopped in 2022, Belgium plans are to close all its units between 2015
and 2025 and the UK will close all AGRs in the coming years. In other MS, long
term operation (plant lifetime extension) of existing plants will most probably
occur on economic grounds, even considering important investments for plants
upgrades, including for safety concerns (ia outcomes of the post Fukushima
Stress Tests). 
A higher end estimation of the
investment cost for LTO[85]
(including safety) upgrades is of the order of 900 Million Euros[86]
per unit.
The estimation of investment for a new
built (EPR Olkiluoto) of the order of 5 Billion Euros[87] for a plant
expected to operate for 60 years.
Therefore,
the investments in LTO make economic sense if it allows lifetime extension
between 10 and 20 years – leading to a total lifetime of plants between 50
and 60 years – which are figures which seem reasonable today considering the
safety issues at stake. The average lifetime of operating plants in the EU in
2020 will be around 40 years, 50 years in 2030 and 60 years in 2040 (see figure
1). This means that nearly all existing operating plants in the EU will be
shutdown between 2020 and 2050, after respectively 40, 50 or 60 years of
operation depending on the final decisions in terms of LTO (see figure 2).  
From
this information and the objective of 140 GWe nuclear electricity in 2050,
as defined above, it is easy to derive that about 100 to 120 new nuclear power
units will have to be built between now and 2050 – the more precise number
being function of the rated power output of the individual units. We assume a
round number of 100 new units in the rest of the paper. Figure 3 shows
the new built under construction, approved and planned as of today. It shows
the gap towards the objective of 140 GWe.
It
is most probable that in MS who will continue to rely on nuclear energy for
their mix, most plants will enter into LTO programmes and lifetime extensions
between 50 and 60 years. The LTO programmes will be realised between roughly
2015 and 2035 and most existing operating plants will be shutdown between
2030 and 2050 – and new plants will have to be connected to the grid in the
same period. Assuming a construction time of 7 years, the bulk of the construction
of new plants will take place between 2025 and 2045 (anticipation is
expected in the UK to replace the fleet of AGRs). 
How can this "scenario" now be translated in investment
needs (and so a contribution to the EU economy and growth) and jobs?
2.2 Impact of LTO and new built on jobs and investments 
For
investment one can use the rough figure of 900 MEuros per plant for LTO
programmes (to be multiplied by roughly 100 units – the 135 in operation
minus DE, BE and UK AGRs). For new built the 5 Billion Euros of EPR Olkiluoto
gives a estimation which might be too high due the FOAK[88] nature of the
project but can be used as a first evaluation based on a real case. And
about 100 new units will have to be built between now and 2050. 
For defining jobs, the "regular functioning" of the
nuclear plants will see a roughly constant manpower need over time from now
until 2050 and beyond – the personnel needs of
existing old plants being taken over by the personnel needs of the new built
once in operation. So we do not count any additional jobs over time for the
"regular operation of plants.
The
additional manpower needs for LTO and new built programmes needs to
integrate the manpower for supplementary design and licensing efforts, and the
manpower for suppliers and the works on the sites. And all this can be refined
into direct, indirect and "induced" jobs.  
For
the construction phase of new built, a rough estimation of personnel
directly employed during construction of a single unit is 2700 people[89].
If construction of the 100 new units takes place over the 20 years period
2025-2045, and the construction takes 7 years, it means that about 30 units
will be, on average, under construction in parallel in the EU during that
period, leading to a manpower of around 90 000 direct jobs over the whole
period. Considering the indirect jobs one would reach 150 000 jobs for the
construction of new built over a period of 20 years – 2025/2045. The grand
total including the "induced jobs" would reach around 250 000 jobs.  
For
the LTO, considering that LTO activities are closer to new built than
standard maintenance and operation, a first evaluation of supplementary jobs
might perhaps best be estimated by taking the ratio of investments for LTO
versus new built (1 to 5) – leading to   30 000 direct and indirect jobs over
the period 2015-2035, and a grand total of 50 000 jobs including the
"induced jobs". 
Under
LTO we have included the specific aspects of Stress Tests upgrades which might
be somewhat anticipated in time versus LTO programmes per se.  To refine, one
might consider a rough estimation of 100 Million Euros per unit for post Stress
Test specific safety upgrades, leading to 10 Billion in total for the 100 NPP
who will undergo LTO. This would correspond in jobs, using the same rule as
above to roughly 10 000 jobs (for period 2012-2020)
Conclusion for 100 plant undergoing LTO programmes and 100 new built
(140 GWe) – in period between now until 2050: 
ü      Total additional investment needs 
(Beyond the
standard value added of operation of nuclear plants)
 Activity || Timeframe || Investment 
 LTO (for extension 10 to 20 y) || 2015-2035 || 90 Billion Euros (incl 10 Billion for post ST safety upgrades) 
 New Built (for 60 y lifetime): || 2025-2045 || 500 Billion Euros 
ü      Additional jobs 
(Manpower needs in addition to "BAU[90]" plants
operation at large = 900 000 jobs in total)
 Activity || Timeframe || Jobs 
 LTO (for extension 10 to 20 y) || 2015-2035 || 50 000 jobs (18 000 + 12 000 + 20 000) – of which 10 000 for post ST upgrades until 2020 
 New Built (for 60 y lifetime): || 2025-2045 || 250 000 jobs (90 000 + 60 000 + 100 000) 
Jobs created: 300 000 jobs for duration
of 20 years for an investment of 600 Billion Euros, corresponding to "100
000 Euros per job and year" including all equipment and material costs[91].
3. Impact
of Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants on jobs and investments
In
the above illustrated scenario of replacing closed down nuclear power plants by
the construction of new reactors to maintain 20% of nuclear energy production
capacity, the assumption is made that the operating staff would be re-deployed
to operate the new facilities (no jobs lost due to final shut down of the
nuclear power plant units). Although in reality, in the order of 10 to 20% of
the staff will remain at the site and will become involved in the
decommissioning of the nuclear power plant this scenario can be considered
reasonable for an overall assessment of growth.
In
terms of financing, EU regulations require that adequate funding provisions are
being made during the operational lifetime of the facility and to be available
when needed. Decommissioning is cash negative, with the investment being made
to restore the environment rather than to generate new incomes. Nevertheless,
the available decommissioning funding provisions will generate business in the
decommissioning sector during the decommissioning phase.
The
following figures provide a first very rough estimation to quantify available
investments and jobs related to decommissioning:
   || Until 2025 || 2025 - 2050 
 Available funds for investments in decommissioning (billion Euro) || 17 || 50 
 Jobs required for decommissioning || 7000 || 20 000 
4. Impact
of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and Geological Disposal on jobs
and investments
The responsible use
of nuclear technologies includes the responsible and safe management of the
resulting waste materials. In 2011, binding rules have been defined in a
dedicated Directive[92]
(hereinafter referred to as "Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
Directive"). In line with similar EU legislation and international
principles the Directive prescribes that waste generators are responsible for
the complete financing of waste management up to and including disposal.
Therefore EU funding is not applicable in this case. Nevertheless, the
Directive requires Member States to ensure the safe management of spent fuel
and radioactive waste without undue delays and to set up comprehensive national
programmes until 2015 which is expected to speed up activities in this area and
to lead to the creation of new jobs and investments up to 2050.
There are no
statistics as to the number of jobs and planned/required investment cost in the
EU. Therefore, a simplified estimate was done based on mean values and current
assumptions for activities and needs in Member States. In particular it was
assumed that Member States with less advanced programmes for developing
disposal solutions will speed up their programmes in accordance with the
requirements of the Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Directive. Assuming in an
optimistic manner that construction of deep geological repositories will start
in each Member State with NPP by 2050 at the latest, the estimate arrives at
the following results which should be understood as indications rather than a
detailed analysis. 
 JOBS || 2020 || 2030 || 2050 
 Jobs required || 36000 || 34000 || 35000 
 Of those already in place in 2012 Sub-set for Reprocessing and waste from Decommissioning || 29000 20000 || 28000 20000 || 26000 20000 
 Jobs required in addition to those already existing in 2012 (not to be cumulated!) || 7000 || 6000 || 9000   
 Sub-set triggered by Waste Directive || 3500 || 3500 || 5000 
 INVESTMENTS Million Euros || Until 2020 || 2021-30 || 2030-50 
 Required investments || 25000 || 19000 || 53000 
 Of those already firmly planned || 20000 || 10000 || 4000 
 Additional investments beyond those already firmly planned, triggered by Waste Directive || 5000 || 9000 || 49000 
5. Additional
elements
Benefits of nuclear
energy cannot simply be expressed in terms of jobs and investment or value
created. Indeed the quality level of the jobs and the nature of the investments
have also to be considered. 
Jobs in the nuclear
area cover a wide range of scientific and industrial disciplines and secure a 
large number of highly skilled people in the European Union, not only on the
sites of the nuclear plants but also in the supply industry, the authorities,
etc. Even more a large community of scientists and researchers are in place in
the EU and provide the needed scientific research base to underpin the top
level quality of the industrial nuclear sector in the EU. 
LTO and new built
programmes will greatly help maintain these jobs and skills inside the EU. It
will also help recreate the large supply industry base which was used in the
1970-1990 when the Generation II fleet was built in the EU. 
One should also
consider the developments in the nuclear power sector outside the EU. The
European Industry, by maintaining important home based activities, will be
stronger to implement the nuclear technologies abroad, promoting at the same
time the highest nuclear safety standards. 
Finally, the key
contribution of nuclear energy to the European economy is the provision of
highly reliable low carbon electricity with a high social value as being
affordable for the consumers, either individual or industrial. 
6.
Conclusions 
From where do we start?
Nuclear Energy in
the EU in 2012
-        
135 operating nuclear units
-        
a bit less than 30% electricity from nuclear
-        
jobs (extrapolated from PWC for FR): 900 000
Jobs = Direct 250 000 + Indirect     250 000 + Induced 400 000
-        
direct value generated (extrapolated from PWC
for FR): 28 Billion Euros per year
-        
total value generated in the economy at large
(Direct + Indirect + Induced): 70 Billion Euros per year
Where do we go?
Nuclear Energy in
the EU in 2050
-        
20 % electricity by nuclear in 2050,
What does it mean in terms of additional
Jobs and Investments?
Considering that
more or less the same number of nuclear units, or capacity, will be shutdown
and constructed between now and 2050, we consider that the number of jobs and
the "economic value" associated to the operation of the units will
stay constant over time. We can now look at the "additional" number
of jobs and additional "economic value" coming from the LTO, new
built, decommissioning and ultimate waste disposal programmes. 
See the following table
 Conclusions || Figures 
 Between now and 2020, most activities will be dedicated to the safety upgrades resulting from the post-Fukushima ST and the launch of the studies and first implementations of the LTO Programmes. Impact on jobs and value creation will be rather limited: 10 000 Jobs and 1 Billion Euros per year. || Period 2012-2020: Stress Tests Upgrades ü      10 Billion Euros (100 Million per unit) ü      10 000 jobs over the period   
 Most LTO Programmes will be mainly implemented between 2015 and 2035, leading to total job creation of the order of  50 000 jobs and value created of the order of 4.5 Billion Euros per year.   || Period 2015-2035: LTO Programmes (100 units) ü      90 Billion Euros (including the 10 Billion ST) ü      50 000 jobs (Direct 18 000 + Indirect 12 000 + Induced 20 000) 
 New Built Programmes will be mainly implemented between 2025 and 2045, leading to total job creation of the order of 250 000 jobs and value created of the order of 25 Billion Euros per year.   || Period 2025-2045: New Built Programmes (100 units) ü      500 Billion Euros (5 Billion per unit) ü      250 000 jobs (Direct 90 000 + Indirect 60 000 + Induced 100 000) 
 To this figures one can add jobs and value created by decommissioning and waste management activities: in total 20 000 jobs and 3 Billion Euros per year until 2030, and 30 000 jobs and 5 Billion Euros per year after 2030   || Rounded numbers for Additional Jobs required for Decommissioning (135 NPPs) and Waste Management (including Geological Disposal) for Period 2020-2050 - Decommissioning: ü      from 7000 jobs until 2025 to 20 000 jobs until 2050 ü      17 Billion until 2025 and 50 Billion after till 2050 - Waste Management and GD: ü      10 000 jobs (adding to the 25 000 already today) ü      25 Billion + 19 Billion + 53 Billion (cumulative till 2020/2030/2050 respectively) 
FIGURES
              ANNEX IV
              Examples of measures responding to the
Specific Objectives
 Specific objective || Example of measures 
 Continuously improving the overall nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by strengthening existing / introducing new general nuclear safety Principles and Requirements). Continuously improving the specific nuclear safety architecture (e.g. by complementing the above-mentioned safety principles and requirements by Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria). Continuously improving the nuclear safety assessment methodologies (e.g. by encouraging the consistent and comprehensive use of risk-informed methods for decision-making support);           || From Section 2.2 it follows that Fukushima and the Stress Tests highlighted the need to base decisions on the appropriateness of a site on a consistent, risk-informed set of principles and requirements, taking fully into account all possible site-related hazards, continuously update them and verify their proper implementation: Examples of principles related to the siting of nuclear installations: –      Evaluation of all relevant site-related hazards likely to affect the safety of a proposed nuclear installation during its lifetime. –      Evaluation of the likely impact of a proposed nuclear installation at a specific site on human health and the environment during normal operation. –      Re-evaluation as necessary of all relevant hazards linked to possible emergency situations and to the availability of staff and resources to adequately address such situations. Next, it follows the need to incorporate best technology available and continuously reduce vulnerabilities of a nuclear installation to both internal and external hazards, taking into account dependency effects, e.g. common cause failures due to multi-unit designs. This applies to both design and construction phases: Examples of principles related to the design and construction: –      Requirement that the design of each new nuclear installation should be based on best technology available at the market when the plant is licensed such as to achieve a minimisation of risks. –      Reliable technologies incorporated in the design, manufacturing and construction of a nuclear installation are proven either in operation or by a test program or analysis consistent with internationally recognised quality, safety principles reflecting corresponding goals of the regulator, before operation begins. –      The design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, with specific consideration of adequate protection against accident, common cause failures and erroneous human intervention, as well as adequate provisions to address emergency requirements. Examples of two (qualitative) safety criteria to implement requirements concerning design and construction of nuclear installations are:  ·         In the event of a leak in the fuel storage pool system, a refilling of the pool following isolation and sealing of the leak in the affected train must be possible. ·        A limited refilling of the pool coupled with a restart of the pool cooling with at least one train must be possible even if the leak has not been sealed. The effectiveness of these provisions has to be such that: the stored fuel elements are still covered by water and no unacceptable pool temperatures are encountered. Further, it follows the need to revise, throughout the operation of a nuclear installation, the conditions for safe operation on the basis of the results of plant-specific inspections or the analysis of operating experience from similar plants: Examples of principles related to the operation of nuclear installations: –      The implementation of adequate accident prevention and mitigation measures should be further specified in the technical safety requirements. All these measures should be systemised together with other severe accident and emergency preparedness measures in the form of a site-specific Safety Management System (SMS) as essential part of the obligations of the license holder (see also Article 6(4) of the current Nuclear Safety Directive). These requirements should also be subject to periodic reviews, at least as part of the PSR, and be part of the scope of the international peer review (see also Article 9 of the current Directive). –      Operational limits and conditions derived from the installation-specific safety analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation. –      Operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with approved procedures. –      The ageing and degradation of the plant structures, systems and components should be effectively managed through engineering, operations and maintenance actions to control within acceptable limits –      Procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents. –      Necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation. –      Incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the regulatory authority. –      Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and existing mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies and with other operating organizations and regulatory authorities. The main findings and recommendations from the Stress Tests peer review process, as summarised in the April 2012 ENSREG Peer Review Report, confirm the importance of establishing common principles and requirements with a view to increase consistency between Member States in order to maintain and improve the safety and robustness of plants. Examples of two (quantitative) safety criteria to implement requirements concerning operation of nuclear installations are:  ·         The Core Damage Frequency (CDF), which is calculated with independently verified and validated complete model of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), which represent the real and updated current state of the plant before the change and which is based on consideration of the applicable PSA standard, does not exceed significantly the value of 10-4 per reactor-year. ·        The change of CDF due to the proposed change does not exceed 1% of the CDF and also, it does not exceed the value of 10-6 per reactor-year. 
 Ensuring further cooperation and coordination between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety on technical matters.   || Complementing the existing international peer-review requirements: The existing requirements of Article 9.3 of the Nuclear Safety Directive could be complemented by requiring the Member States to periodically invite international peer-review missions for the area of NPPs design and operational safety performance (e.g. the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team – OSART, the peer-review missions of the World Association of Nuclear Operators - WANO). The peer-reviews are good means of building confidence, with the aim of developing and exchanging experience and ensuring the common application of high nuclear safety standards. 
 Strengthening the role of the national regulatory authorities.   || From Section 2.2 it follows that establishing a reference catalogue of fundamental regulatory competencies is an objective that could be attained at Euratom level. Such a set of competencies could reflect recognised international safety standards, such as the IAEA Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety[93]. Examples of additional regulatory tasks: –      To provide guidance to the licence holder on adequately developing nuclear installation-specific safety assessments and presenting corresponding information to stakeholders as appropriate, to set minimum standards on adequately developing nuclear-specific safety assessment. –   To periodically confirm the competence of the personnel both at its level, as well as at the licence holder level. As regards examples of practical implementation, the regulatory authority should ensure that its staff has good academic qualifications, adequate work experience, necessary technical qualifications for performing regulatory functions, should establish a training policy, a training plan tailored for each employee, procedures for periodic review and updating of the training programme, should provide for budgetary provisions for training, etc. The training programme should also cover exercises which would allow practising real time emergencies and thus increase the level of preparedness. The regulatory authority should also make sure that such staffing criteria are in place at the level of the licence holder as well. –      As a technical basis for its decision making, to establish or adopt regulations and guides specifying the principles, requirements and associated criteria for safety upon which regulatory judgements, decisions and actions are based, taking into account international recommendations and state-of-the-art accreditation systems. 
 Strengthening the effective independence of the national regulatory authorities.   || From Section 2.2 it follows that one of the key lessons learnt from Fukushima is that the independence of the national regulatory authorities must be ensured in an effective and verifiable manner. Examples of strengthening the effective independence of national regulators: –         Introducing the requirement of designating a single regulatory authority at national level: Procedures and platforms should be established for cooperation and coordination with other concerned authorities such as public health, environment protection, civil protection etc. –         Examples of additional criteria: –      The regulatory authority should be legally distinct from any other public or private entity. –      The regulatory authority should ensure that its staff and the persons responsible for its management act independently and do not seek or take direct instructions from any government or other public or private entity when carrying out the regulatory tasks. –      The regulatory authority should exercise its powers impartially, based on nuclear safety objectives, clearly defined procedures, science, proven technology and relevant experience. –      The regulatory authority should have separate annual budget allocations, with autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget. The autonomy requirement means that only the regulatory authority can decide on how the allocated budget is spent. It may neither seek nor receive any instruction on its budget spending. –      Independence in regulatory decision making should not obviate the need for an appeal process under which the license holders and other stakeholders are given the legal right to challenge regulatory decisions by means of appropriate legal procedures.   
 Enhancing nuclear safety transparency.   || From Section 2.2 it follows that one of the key lessons learnt from Fukushima accident is to ensure appropriate transparency. Examples of concrete measures applicable for the operators of a nuclear installation: –           Regular information on the operation of a nuclear installation, scheduled maintenance, investments projects, information of safety relevant events, like releases of radioactivity, incidents and accidents, as well as their rating according to international schemes should be available on the website of the operator on a timely basis. This regular information could be also part of a public register maintained by the competent regulatory authority for all nuclear installations in the territory of the Member State. This register can also contain information for nuclear risks coming from neighbouring countries which could have cross border impacts. –         Active and continuously updated public availability of preparatory information to local residents for emergency situations, effective communications to broadcast alerts, practicalities of evacuation of large populations, guidance in the use of stable iodine tablets, availability of detection equipment for large numbers of dose evaluations, common standards and criteria for countermeasures, arrangements to meet public and international demands for information, manpower and resources needed for environmental monitoring. The active and continuously updated preparatory information could be made public not only to the local population, but in the public register proposed above and thus become public nation-wide. The national regulatory authority can also provide guidance on raising the awareness of the citizens and increasing their overall level of preparedness. –         Local information meetings and visits to the installations should be organised regularly. Examples of concrete measures applicable for the national regulatory authorities: -         National authorities should develop communication mechanisms to inform workers and the public about their activities, including regulatory decisions and justifications. They should have arrangements to provide information in case of emergencies.  Safety events including their severity rating, should be publicised promptly and in an easily accessible manner. The public should also be given the possibility to express their views on the planning and siting of new installations. -        Member States with nuclear installations should be obliged to consult with neighbouring Member States on procedures adopted for hazard assessment and on the safety of proposed nuclear installations. 
 Reinforcing on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements.   || Examples of concrete measures: –           For each reactor unit in a Member State, if additional on-site capabilities are not sufficient, plant-external seismic- and flood-proof storage facilities for emergency equipment such as diesel generators, pumps, etc. should be put in place. These resources should be capable and sufficient to ensure each unit's continued core cooling, containment integrity and spent fuel pool cooling. Provisions for the quick transport of such equipment, e.g. by helicopter, should be made. –           On-site emergency preparedness & response should be reflected in the scope of future periodic safety reviews. SAMGs and the potential hardware modifications needed should not only be implemented at all NPPs and spent fuel storages (SFS) but also validated taking into account of the potential long duration of an accident, the degraded NPP/SFS and the surrounding conditions. Radiation protection of all staff involved in severe accident management and emergency response should be assessed and then ensured by, among other, guaranteed habitability of the facilities needed for accident control, and suitable availability of protective and mitigative equipment, and corresponding training. Such equipment shall be adequately qualified and stored, easily accessible and well-protected against external hazards or secondary effects of a severe accident. 
              ANNEX V
              Detailed description of the Policy
Options analysed under the IA
Policy
Option 0 (Business as usual)
 Euratom level || Member States level || Specific nuclear safety objectives attained (see Sub-section 3.2 of the IA) 
 → No new legislative action at Euratom level ·       Not amending the current Euratom framework Directive (Nuclear Safety Directive).   ||   ·  Completing the transposition of the Nuclear Safety Directive (*for those MS which have not yet fulfilled this obligation). ·  Continuing the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Directive. ·  Implementing in parallel the measures arising from the Stress Tests process (i.e. national Stress Tests results and specific recommendations of the peer-review teams). || -   
 ● At the same time, use the existing mechanism of cooperation between the European Commission and the Member States on the implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests' process, through ENSREG. 
Policy Option 1 (General Principles and Requirements)
 Euratom level || Member States level || Specific nuclear safety objectives attained(see Sub-section 3.2 of the IA) 
 → Legislative action (legally binding act) at Euratom level ·     Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing general Principles and Requirements (e.g. role & independence of the national regulatory authorities; transparency) and adding new general Principles and Requirements [e.g. on-site emergency preparedness and response; siting, design & construction, and operation (e.g. periodic safety assessments) of nuclear installations].   ||     ·    Transposing the amendments to the Nuclear Safety Directive. ·    Implementing the amended Nuclear Safety Directive. ·    Implementing in parallel the measures arising from the Stress Tests process (i.e. national Stress Tests results and specific recommendations of the peer-review teams). || A), C), D), E), F), G), H) 
 ● At the same time, use the existing mechanism of cooperation between the European Commission and the Member States on the implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests process, through ENSREG. 
Policy
Option 2 (General Principles and Requirements
+ Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria)
 SUB-OPTION 2.1 
 Euratom level || Member States level || Specific nuclear safety objectives attained(see Sub-section 3.2 of the IA) 
 → Legislative action (combination of legally binding & specifying legally non-binding acts) at Euratom level. ·       Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements (Policy Option 1) + Introducing in the Directive the mandate for the European Commission to specify the general Principles and Requirements, by developing legally non-binding Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission Recommendations).   ||     ·     Transposing the amendments to the Nuclear Safety Directive. ·     Implementing the amended Nuclear Safety Directive. ·     Following the technical guidance provided in the Recommendations. ·     Implementing in parallel the measures arising from the Stress Tests process (i.e. national Stress Tests results and specific recommendations of the peer-review teams). || A), B), C), D), E), F), G), H) 
 ● These Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria would be developed in close cooperation with experts from the Member States. One option might be that the existing mechanism of cooperation between the European Commission and the Member States through ENSREG, could be used and further enhanced for this purpose. 
 SUB-OPTION 2.2 
 Euratom level || Member States level || Specific nuclear safety objectives attained(see Sub-section 3.2 of the IA) 
 → Legislative action (combination of a legally binding act & specifying legally binding acts) at Euratom level ·       Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements (Policy Option 1) + Introducing in the Directive the mandate for the European Commission to specify the general Principles and Requirements, by developing legally binding Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission Regulations).   ||     ·     Transposing the amendments to the Nuclear Safety Directive. ·     Implementing the amended Nuclear Safety Directive. ·     Implementing in parallel the measures arising from the Stress Tests process (i.e. national Stress Tests results and specific recommendations of the peer-review teams). || A), B), C), D), E), F), G), H) 
 ·                     In the first step, the nuclear safety criteria would be developed in close cooperation between expert working groups such as ENSREG and WENRA, and Commission experts. Subsequently, the nuclear safety criteria would be adopted as the Commission's "implementing acts" according to Article 291 TFEU and using the relevant "comitology" procedure laid down in Regulation 182/2011. For this purpose, a "comitology" committee, composed of representatives of all Member States, would be created by the legislative proposal to assist the Commission.   
Policy Option 3 (Setting up an Euratom nuclear safety regulatory Agency)
 Euratom level || Member States level || Specific nuclear safety objectives attained(see Sub-section 3.2 of the IA) 
 → Legislative action (legally binding act) at Euratom level ·      Establishing a Euratom Nuclear Safety Regulatory Agency to administrate and further develop the Euratom nuclear safety acquis, as developed under Policy Option 2, under the supervision of the European Commission ·      With the mission to promote the highest common standards for safe generation of nuclear power in the EU, ·      With the tasks: ·      To assist the European Commission to develop harmonised technical nuclear safety requirements / standards / criteria, which would be incorporated in proposals for new Euratom nuclear safety legislation; ·      To conduct inspections in order to monitor the correct implementation by national regulators and licence holders of this legislation and report back to the Commission; ·      To develop an Euratom certification system of standard designs of nuclear facilities; ·      To elaborate a uniform license content (including a minimum set of requirements for the applicants) & licensing procedure, as well as detailed guidance for its application; ·      To intervene in case of nuclear accidents or incidents (e.g. sending its experts on site); ·      To formulate opinions and recommendations to the Commission on nuclear safety matters; ·      To collect and analyse data to further improve nuclear safety. o     Organized in a way to ensure that decisions on safety issues are free from all political interference; - therefore, safety decisions are taken by the Agency's Executive Director and since these decisions directly affect people and organizations, an independent Board of Appeal has the role to check that the Executive Director has correctly applied Euratom legislation in this field. The Executive Director is appointed by the Agency's Management Board. The Board, which brings together representatives of the Member States and the Commission, is responsible for the definition of the Agency's priorities, budget establishment and for monitoring the Agency's operation. An Advisory Board, comprising organisations representing NPP vendors, operators, trade unions, technical support organisations, training organisations, as well as NGOs, assists the Management Board in its work. ||   ·     Member States' authorities cooperate permanently with the Agency & provide access to information / facilities. ·     National regulatory authorities maintain existing inspection powers. ·     Member States' authorities remain responsible for the overall licensing process.     || A), B), C), D), G), H) 
              ANNEX VI
COMPETITIVENESS PROOFING STUDY (see
separate document attached)
[1]              National Police Agency of Japan (August 8, 2012) - http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf
[2]               The Economist, March 10th
2012, Special Report Nuclear Energy
[3]               News on Japan. Com, “Fukushima clean-up could cost up
to $250 billion,” 1 June 2011
[4]               In the course of the Chernobyl accident about 10
times more radioactive material leaked into the environment than during
Fukushima.
[5]               M. Cooper, Nuclear Safety and
Nuclear Economics, Vermont Law School, December 2011
[6]               EUCO 10 1/11 
[7]               Peer review Report – Stress
Tests performed on European nuclear power plants, 25 April 2012 (http://www.ensreg.eu/node/407)
[8]               COM(2011)
784 final
[9]               COM (2012) 571.
[10]             OJ L 172, 2.7.2009
[11]             EUCO 139 / 11 
[12]             P7_TA(2011)0318
[13]             P7_TA(2011)0327 
[14]             Invited to the IASG work, no nomination received, 
[15]             ‘Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and
dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for consultation of
interested parties by the Commission’ (COM(2002) 704 final).
[16]             http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/consultations/20120229_euratom_en.htm
[17]             http://www.eurelectric.org/media/26840/joint_position_securitysafety_nuclear_industry-final-06122011-2011-530-0008-01-e.pdf
[18]             INFCIRC/821 of 20 June 2011
[19]             GOV/2011-59-GC(55)14 of 5 September 2011
[20]             CNS/ExM/2012/04/Rev.2
[21]             http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report/
[22]             http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/
[23]             http://icanps. go.jp/.
[24]             http://www.naiic.jp/en/2012/
[25]             Special Eurobarometer 324, published in March 2010.
Although conducted before the Fukushima accident in 2011, the findings mentioned
here are still relevant and even likely to be reinforced
[26]             Nature.com, 21 April 2011, "Reactors, residents,
risks"
[27]         The deadline by when the EU Member States had the
obligation to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions to comply with the Directive and communicate them to the Commission
elapsed on 22 July 2011.
[28]             Commission Staff Working Document: Technical summary on
the implementation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear
power plants in the European Union, SWD(2012) 287 final, Brussels, 4.10.2012.
[29]             Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments
("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European Union and
related activities, COM(2012) 571 final, Brussels, 4.10.2012.
[30]             The
IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a
high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful
effects of ionizing radiation. See the IAEA web-site
for the status of these standards http://www-ns.iaea.org/committees/files/CSS/205/status.pdf
- updated November 2012
[31]             In particular the Convention
on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449
of 5 July 1994)
[32]             E.g. external fires, explosions, chemical
releases after transport accidents, pipeline accidents, or industrial accidents.
[33]             Scientific American, 14 March 2011. 
[34]             See reference in footnote 7 and 9
[35]             For a large Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) at power
before the initiating event, SBO would typically lead to core heat-up after
around 1-4 hours. However, for some Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) designs SBO
leads to core heat-up even within 30-40 minutes.
[36]             e.g. regarding emergency power supply, ventilation,
feed and bleed, use of condensate storage tanks.
[37]             See
reference in footnote 23
[38]             See
reference in footnote 24
[39]             See
reference in footnote 18
[40]             See reference in footnote 19
[41]             Risk-informed methods examine both the probability of
an event and its possible consequences in order to understand its importance
(risk). In other words, three questions are asked and responded in an
integrated manner: what can go wrong, how likely is it, and what might be its
consequences. The answers guide requirements and regulatory attention to the
issues where the largest benefit for the safety of a nuclear installation can
be obtained.
[42]             PSA is the only available comprehensive and consistent method
to evaluate in absolute quantitative terms the current safety or risk level of
a nuclear installation as well as the relative changes in safety or risk due
to, for example, implementation of plant-specific safety improvement measures.
[43]             E. Raimond (IRSN, Nuclear
Safety Division, France), Efforts to Progress in the Harmonization of L2 PSA
Development and Their Applications in Europe - Status of Activities and
Perspectives after the Fukushima accident, Nuclear Engineering and Technology,
2012. 
[44]             See
reference in footnote 22
[45]             http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf
[46]             http://www.ensreg.eu/node/407
[47]          Basic
Safety Standards Directive (Council Directive 96/29/Euratom, under a recast
procedure), the Public Information Directive (Council Directive
89/618/Euratom), the ECURIE Decision (Council Decision 87/600/Euratom), the
Civil Protection Mechanism legislation (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom;
Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom; Commission Decision 2007/606/EC,
Euratom; Commission Decision 2008/73/EC, Euratom; Commission Decision
2010/481/EU, Euratom) as well as the foodstuffs and feeding stuffs regulations
following the Chernobyl accident (Council Regulation 733/2008/EC with the
subsequent amendments) and special provisions in case of a future accident
(Council Regulation 3954/87/Euratom with the subsequent amendments; Commission Implementing Regulation No 297/2011/EU
with the subsequent amendments). 
[48]             European Community Urgent
Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), EUropean Radiological Data Exchange
Platform (EURDEP), Reconciliating
National Forecasts of Atmospheric Dispersion (ENSEMBLE),
Radioactivity Environmental Monitoring (REM), the Community
Civil Protection Mechanism in particular through its Monitoring and Information
Centre (MIC) etc.
                In particular, it
should be mentioned the ECURIE system, which is the
technical implementation of the Council Decision 87/600/Euratom on Community
arrangements for the early notification and exchange of information in the
event of a radiological or nuclear emergency. All the 27 EU Member States as
well as Switzerland, Croatia and FYROM have signed the ECURIE agreement.
[49]             Council
Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection
Mechanism (recast) with a proposal for a
new Union Civil Protection Mechanism COM(2011) 934 final
under negotiation in the Council and the Parliament.
[50]          The Joint Statement of ENSREG and the
Commission on the Stress Tests and peer-review process of 26 April 2012
mentions that "ENSREG and the European Commission share the understanding
that work may be required in other areas than nuclear safety – such as off-site
emergency preparedness and response". Further, a Commission Communication
on nuclear emergency preparedness and response is part of the proposed
Commission work programme for 2013. A corresponding survey study with an
external contractor will be launched at the end of 2012, lasting for 1 year,
and being supported by a Commission Task Force comprising several DGs and a Group
of Stakeholders.
[51]             Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom.
[52]             France, Slovak Republic, Belgium, Hungary, Sweden,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Finland.
[53]             As an example, Germany's sudden exit from nuclear in
the days after Fukushima could cost the country as much as €1.7 trillion by
2030, or two thirds of the country's GDP in 2011, not including the effects on
at least some of its neighbouring countries. 
[54]             The results of an analysis of the impact that the
contribution of nuclear energy to the low carbon energy mix will have in terms
of job creation and growth are presented in a DG ENER paper entitled
"Socio-Economic role of Nuclear Energy to the Growth and Jobs in the EU
for the time horizon 2020-2050", enclosed in Annex III of this IA.
[55]             http://www.wenra.org/publications/
[56]             Judgement of 10 December 2002 in the Case C-29/99
[57]             COM(2011) 777 final
[58]             Council Directive 96/29/Euratom laying down basic
safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general
public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation
[59]             Independently of their
employment status (e.g. sub-contractors)
[60]             See footnote 61
[61]             OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1–8
[62]             At present, 19 individual Directives are in force, some
of them being of particular importance, for instance, Directive 89/654
(Workplace), Directive 2009/104 (Work equipment), Directive 89/656 (Personal
protective equipment), Directive 92/57 (Construction sites), Directive 98/24
(Chemical agents at work), Directive 1999/92 (Explosive atmospheres), Directive
2004/37 (Carcinogens and mutagens at work) or Directives dealing with physical
agents at work, i.e. Directives 2002/44 (Vibration), 2003/10 (Noise), 2004/40
(Electromagnetic fields) and 2006/25 (Artificial optical radiation).
[63]             Council
Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection
Mechanism (recast) with a proposal for a new Union Civil Protection
Mechanism COM(2011) 934 final
under negotiation in the Council and the Parliament.
[64]             "Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria" shall be
understood here as specified (qualitative and/or quantitative) acceptance bounds
on the value of a functional indicator or condition indicator used to assess
the ability of a structure, system or component to meet its design and safety
requirements. 
[65]             On the
general issue of regulatory agencies, see the doc. COM(2008)135 fin.
"Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council "European Agencies – The way forward"  SEC(2008)323).
[66]          see
Nuclear Safety Directive
[67]             Namely
the Fundamental Safety Principles established by the IAEA and the obligations
emanating from the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).
[68]             ENSREG Peer Review report – Stress Tests performed on
European nuclear power plants, ENSREG, April 2011. 
[69]             http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Nuclear_watchdog_urges_French_plants_to_boost_safety_999.html
[70]             Estimates as reported informally by respective national
regulator and/or utility in the course of the Stress Test Peer Reviews. This
range is supported by a recent US publication, stating that averaging out at
USD 230 million per reactor, applied to the 104 reactors in the US, the final
bill of the post-Fukushima safety improvements could be USD 23.5 billion (www.nuclearenergyinsider.com (082012). 
[71]             As of 01/2012, there are 134 reactor units in operation
in the EU Member States.
[72]             As many NPPs have a periodic safety review of 10 years, this is supposed to represent a realistic maximum period
for complete implementation of all Stress Tests related recommendations. 
[73]             NDC Study on Economics of NPP LTO, OECD-NEA, Paris,
2012 (on-going). 
[74]
            Cour des comptes, Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire, Paris,
janvier 2012
[75]
            See e.g. UK's Operating Reactors Programme in "Office for
Nuclear Regulation – Corporate Plan 2011-15", ONR (2010), and Swiss "Aufsichtsbericht
2010 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen", ENSI
(2010). 
[76]            http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/15-Summary.pdf.
[77]             The Socio-Economic Benefits of Nuclear Energy, Foratom
Fact Sheet, Brussels, March 2010. 
[78]             On average for every job at a nuclear power plant there
are three jobs in the supply chain. The latter includes specialised workers
like electricians, mechanics, cleaning and maintenance staff, transporters,
etc. For specific events at a power plant, such as outages for safety controls
and refuelling, additional external staff is employed on limited contracts to
work alongside permanent staff.
[79]             A5-0196/2002  
[80]             This figure corresponds to the annual Euratom
safeguards budget which is defined as the sum of two types of budget
appropriations: (1) A general "functioning" appropriation involving
the costs of Euratom Safeguards overheads such as general IT equipment,
telecommunications etc., as well as a specific appropriation for the medical
survey and the radiation protection of the inspectors. (2) Specific
"operational" appropriations allocated for expenditure which is,
directly related to nuclear safeguards such as mission costs, rental of offices
on site, purchase of technical equipment, training, etc., necessary for Euratom
Safeguards activities. The number of nuclear installations to be covered and
the time effort to be spent for installation-specific inspections can be
considered about the same for both Euratom safeguards and safety inspections
(see e.g. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,de&lng2=da,de,el,en,es,fi,fr,it,nl,pt,sv,&val=278960:cs&page=). 

[81]          http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/eval_activities_en.pdf
[82]             See
reference in footnote 7
[83]         Critical
Review of the EU Stress Test performed on Nuclear Power Plants Study
commissioned by Greenpeace Antonia Wenisch, Oda Becker Wien, Hannover, May 2012.
[84]             The figure of  500 000 Jobs (Direct + Indirect) in the
EU is in line with the figure given for FR in the PWC Report. If one might
assume a serie effect in FR, leading to a more effective use of labour force on
sites of NPPs for maintenance, the front-end and back-end nuclear industry in
FR is, on the other side probably providing more jobs  than in other EU
countries. The extrapolation could  therefore be considered as acceptable.
[85]             Long Term Operation
[86]             Figures coming from FR sources indicate an expected
increase from 40 BEuros to 50 BEuros for the LTO and Stress Tests adaptation
programme for the French Gen II Fleet – going from 40 to 60 years. Another
source was quoting 55 BEuros for the whole programme. For 58 units in operation
it corresponds to around  900 Meuros per unit in the FR case.  In the case of
BE, GDFSUEZ has proposed an LTO programme of 1 Billion Euros for the 3 oldest units,
which might be somewhat increased for additional post Stress Tests measures. 
[87]             Figure used  in the PWC Report.
[88]             First of a kind
[89]             PWC report mentioning 2700 Direct Jobs, 1900 Indirect
Jobs and 3750 Additional Jobs. In total 8350 Jobs.  
[90]             Business as usual
[91]             This fits with the PWC report value of 3 direct jobs
per Million Euros invested, or 10 global jobs. 
[92]         Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011
establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of
spent fuel and radioactive waste ( OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 48–56)