COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Date: 2013-10-17
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: International Atomic Energy Agency, administrative transparency, health risk, ionising radiation, nuclear accident, nuclear power station, occupational safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste, safety standard













EUR-Lex - 52013SC0422 - EN











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52013SC0422

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations /* SWD/2013/0422 final */









COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the
nuclear safety of nuclear installations

1.           Introduction
Nuclear energy
currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about
two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. Nuclear
safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The costs of a
nuclear accident could be so large, that they are potentially ruinous to
national economies. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce
the risk of a nuclear accident in a Member State of the EU by applying high
nuclear safety standards and a high quality of regulatory oversight. The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 renewed political attention worldwide on the
measures needed to ensure robust levels of nuclear safety.
Based upon a mandate
from the European Council in March 2011[1],
the European Commission (EC), together with the European Nuclear Safety
Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety
assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The results identified differences
in nuclear safety approaches and industry practices in the participating
countries[2].

The mandate from the
European Council included the request to the EC to review the existing legal
and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations and to propose
any improvements that may be necessary. Any legislative proposals should take
into account the conclusions of the Stress Tests and the lessons learned from
the Fukushima nuclear accident, as well as the input from an open public
consultation and stakeholders' views. The consultation showed that a large
majority are in favour of reinforcing the EU legislative framework.
This Impact
Assessment takes into account the above-mentioned factors, describing the challenge
of ensuring sufficient levels of nuclear safety in the EU. It defines the general
and specific objectives for the enhanced prevention and mitigation of nuclear
accidents. A number of policy options are proposed and analysed, ranging from
maintaining the current situation to more profound reforms. Each option has
been assessed for its estimated safety, economic, environmental and social
impacts. 
The selected option
amends the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[3] ('Nuclear Safety Directive'),
by strengthening existing / introducing new general nuclear safety principles
and requirements, complemented by harmonised Euratom nuclear safety criteria
and procedures to verify their implementation at national level. It also
provides for greater independence of the regulators and increased public
transparency about the performance of the industry and the regulators. While
some of the underlying measures of the preferred option can be implemented
without delay, others require technical development work with input from Member
States. 
2.           Problem definition
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in
2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and
raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and
tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident
reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic
outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima accident reveals quite substantial, and
recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar
to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined
public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time
when use of nuclear power is being debated as possible option to meet global
energy demands in a sustainable manner. 
The EU has 132
operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear
power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three
to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were
continuously updated since then. In May 2011, the "stress-tests" were
launched to assess if current safety margins are sufficient to cover various
unexpected events. The results show various strengths and weaknesses across all
NPPs, including the clear need to implement for a number of plants measures to
increase the robustness against several types of internal and external hazards.
The tests also showed significant differences in national approaches to the
assessment of beyond-design basis accidents that make an adequate assessment of
current safety levels difficult or impossible. For example, in some cases
earthquake risk was not considered in the original design basis but only
introduced at a later stage, and/or underestimated. New approaches to seismic
hazard and risk assessment have since been developed, but not all operators
have reassessed site hazards and seismic risks with recent methodologies, data
and criteria. 
3.           Specific issues
to be addressed
Based
on various sources of expertise, such as corresponding initiatives by the IAEA
and WENRA as well as lessons learned from the EU Stress Tests and Fukushima accident investigations, key areas for improvement of nuclear safety have been
identified. These problem areas concern technical issues (in particular plant
siting and design), the regulatory oversight, aspects related to nuclear safety
governance (regulatory independence and transparency) as well as the issue of
emergency preparedness and response.
 •           Technical issues •           Regulatory oversight issues •           Regulatory independence issues •           Transparency issues •           Emergency preparedness and response issues 
The
main shortcomings identified include gaps in ensuring comprehensive and
transparent identification and management of key safety issues, failure to
implement important safety measures and the absence of a consistent approach
among Member States to the regulation of nuclear risks despite their
transboundary nature.
The
current Euratom nuclear safety legislation, in particular the Nuclear Safety
Directive, sets up a legally binding Euratom framework based upon
internationally recognised general principles and obligations. However, the
scope of this Directive being limited to these overall principles, its main
weakness is that it has no means to address at a sufficiently detailed level the
technical safety issues arising from the Fukushima nuclear accident and
identified in the course of the Stress Tests. Furthermore, the current
provisions of the Directive do not appear to be sufficient in the area of the
independence of national regulatory authorities. Moreover, the Stress Tests
show that cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having
responsibilities for nuclear safety, for example in the form of as peer
reviews, should be strengthened. The current provisions of the Directive
concerning transparency should also be further enhanced. In addition, the issue
of adequate on-site emergency preparedness and response should also be
considered.
Notwithstanding
the role of the Stress Tests in enhancing the safety of EU NPPs, their weakness
is related to their non-binding nature. As a voluntary,
one-time exercise they do not guarantee that the identified measures will be
fully implemented and regularly updated.
Through
the IAEA, safety principles, standards and international Conventions[4] governing nuclear safety have been developed and agreed. However,
these safety standards are not legally binding, while the international
Conventions are legally binding but not enforceable.
Euratom legislation benefits from clear and strong mechanisms for sanction for
its proper transposition and implementation. Following
the events at Fukushima, IAEA Member States generally acknowledge the need to
enhance the effectiveness, governance and enforceability of the international
legal framework for nuclear safety.
4.           Euratom competence, subsidiarity and
proportionality
Any
legislative revision should build upon and enhance the approach of the current
Nuclear Safety Directive. The legal basis remains Articles 31 and 32 of the
Euratom Treaty.
Any
revision proposal should aim at strengthening even further the role and
independence of the competent regulatory authorities as it is clear that only
strong regulators endowed with all the necessary powers and independence
guarantees can oversee and ensure the safe operation of nuclear installations
in the EU. Close cooperation and information-sharing between regulators, taking
into account the potential cross-border impacts of a nuclear accident, should
be encouraged. 
Given
the wide consequences of a nuclear incident and particularly the public need
for information in such a case, an EU wide approach on transparency issues is
essential. This can ensure that, irrespective of state borders, the public is
properly informed on all relevant nuclear safety matters to ensure uniform
level of transparency and information throughout the EU.
In
Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are not only continued
differences between the EU Member States in ensuring comprehensive and
transparent identification and management of key safety issues, but that also
significant gaps remain. Strengthened Euratom legislation could include a set
of technical provisions at an appropriate level of detail for a framework legal
instrument. These provisions should ensure a common EU approach to nuclear
safety.
The
experience from the Fukushima accident and the valuable insights coming from
the Stress Tests have clearly shown that a strong and transparent monitoring
system (including peer-reviews) is an essential element to ensure the effective
and continuous implementation of any safety regime. 
In accordance with
the proportionality principle, the envisaged revision
should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. Furthermore,
taking into account the different situations in the Member States, a flexible
and proportionate approach as regards the level of applicability should be
defined. A mechanism of developing EU-wide technical
criteria with special regard to the principle of proportionality should be
envisaged in which the knowledge and practical experience of the experts from
the Member States is fully used.
5.           Objectives
General objectives
·                        
To protect workers and the general public from
dangers arising from ionising radiations from nuclear installations, by
achieving proper operating conditions, preventing accidents and mitigating
accident consequences;
·                        
To maintain and promote the continuous
improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation at Euratom level; 
Specific
objectives 
·                        
To continuously improve the overall nuclear
safety architecture (e.g. by strengthening existing / introducing new general
nuclear safety Principles and Requirements).
·                        
To continuously improve the specific nuclear
safety architecture (e.g. by complementing the above-mentioned safety
principles and requirements by Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria).
·                        
To continuously improve the
nuclear safety assessment methodologies (e.g. by
encouraging the consistent and comprehensive use of risk-informed methods for
decision-making support);
·                        
To ensure cooperation and coordination between
all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety on technical matters,
including peer-reviews;
·                        
To strengthen the role of the national
regulatory authorities;
·                        
To strengthen the effective independence of the
national regulatory authorities;
·                        
To enhance nuclear safety transparency;
·                        
To reinforce on-site emergency preparedness and
response arrangements.
6.           Policy
options
POLICY OPTION 0 
·                        
Leaving the current Euratom framework Directive
(Nuclear Safety Directive) unchanged.
·                        
Using the existing mechanism of cooperation
between the EC and the Member States on the implementation of the measures
arising from the Stress Tests process through ENSREG.
POLICY OPTION 1 
·                        
Legislative action (legally binding act) at
Euratom level.
·                        
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing general Principles and Requirements (e.g. role &
independence of the national regulatory authorities; transparency) and adding
new ones (e.g. on-site emergency preparedness and response; siting, design
& construction, and operation of nuclear installations. 
·                        
Using the existing mechanism of cooperation
between the EC and the Member States on the implementation of the measures
arising from the Stress Tests process through ENSREG.
POLICY OPTION 2 
SUB-OPTION 2.1
·                        
Legislative action (combination of legally
binding & specifying legally non-binding acts) at Euratom level.
·                        
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements
(as Policy Option 1) + introducing in the Directive the mandate for the EC to support
these general Principles and Requirements, by developing legally non-binding
Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission Recommendations). 
·                        
These Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria would be
developed in close cooperation with experts from the Member States. 
SUB-OPTION 2.2
·                        
Legislative action (combination of a legally
binding act & specifying legally binding acts) at Euratom level
·                        
Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by
strengthening existing / introducing new general Principles and Requirements
(as Policy Option 1) + introducing in the Directive the mandate for the EC to
specify the general Principles and Requirements, by developing legally binding
Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria (Commission Regulations). 
·                        
These Nuclear Safety Criteria would be developed
in close cooperation between expert working groups such as ENSREG and WENRA and
EC experts. Subsequently, they would be adopted using a "comitology"
procedure requiring the input of all Member States.
POLICY OPTION 3 
·                        
Legislative action (legally binding act) at
Euratom level
·                        
Establishing a Euratom Nuclear Safety Regulatory
Agency to administrate and further develop the Euratom nuclear safety acquis,
as developed under Policy Option 2, under the supervision of the EC, with the
mission to:
-Promote the highest
common standards for safe generation of nuclear power in the EU. 
-To assist the EC to develop harmonised technical nuclear safety
requirements / standards / criteria, which would be incorporated in proposals
for new Euratom nuclear safety legislation; to conduct inspections in order to
monitor the correct implementation of legislation; to develop a Euratom
certification system of standard designs of nuclear facilities; to elaborate a
uniform licence content & licencing procedure, to intervene in case of
nuclear accidents or incidents; to formulate opinions and recommendations to
the Commission on nuclear safety matters; to collect and analyse data to
further improve nuclear safety.
7.           Assessment
of impacts
Table 1 – Comparison of the Policy Options in
terms of their impacts (summary)
 Policy Option || Safety Impact || Compliance costs for operators (per reactor unit) || Regulatory costs and administrative burden for Member States (per reactor unit per year) || Environmental Impact || Employment in Europe's nuclear sector   || Affordability of Energy   
 0 || Very unlikely to reduce risks || Range: ~€30-200 million || ~€3 million Range: ~€1-4 million || Very unlikely to reduce risks || ~500000 persons || High 
 1 || Only some gains in safety || Range: ~€30-200 million || £€5 million || No significant risk reduction || ~500000 + ~500 || High 
 2 || Significant gains in safety at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || Significant improvements at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 || ~High 
 3 || Significant gains in safety at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ≥€200 million || £€5 million || Significant improvements at least for some NPPs in some Member States || ~500000 + ~500 + ~500 + ~250 || ~High 
8.           Comparison
of options
Policy option 1 produces some beneficial effects on nuclear safety, due to the
inclusion of additional legally binding and enforceable rules (even if these
are only at the level of general principles and requirements). On the other
hand, Policy Options 2 and 3 are likely to result in
significantly further improvements to the safety of EU NPPs through the
adoption of Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria, which would provide for objective,
verifiable safety benchmarks. Compared to Policy Options 0 and 1, the additional
costs of Policy Options 2 and 3 of at least ~€200 million per reactor unit over
the next ~5-10 years seem acceptable, especially when compared to the costs of
a nuclear accident. 
Policy option 3, which goes further,
requires significant changes in the organisational setup of the Commission and
in the current Euratom safety architecture. As it requires major changes of the
safety culture and architecture of the Member States, at this time, it cannot
be considered as a realistic option to achieve immediate benefits for nuclear
safety. 
As regards Policy Option 2, both Sub-options 2.1 and 2.2 fully address the objectives outlined
in section 5. A fully binding approach, as in Sub-option 2.2, would be the most
effective. However, the advantage of Sub-option 2.1 is that whilst it requires
the implementation of these general principles and requirements, it offers a
more flexible approach for the Member States to comply with the recommended
Euratom Nuclear Safety criteria. It would allow for experience to be gained on
how these criteria are applied in practice and make it possible to respond more
quickly to new technical developments. Moreover, following a step-wise approach, it would also be possible,
learning from this experience, to transform the recommended criteria into
legally binding ones at a later stage. In conclusion,
it is recommended to consider either Policy Option 2.1
or 2.2. 
[1]               European Council, EUCO 10/1/ 11 
[2]               Peer Review Report – Stress
Tests performed on European nuclear power plants, 25 April 2012
(http://www.ensreg.eu/node/407)
[3]               OJ L 172, 2.7.2009
[4]               In particular the Convention
on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449
of 5 July 1994)