Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India
Date: 2013-10-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: India, anti-dumping duty, import (EU), originating product, steel, wire













EUR-Lex - 52013PC0687 - EN











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52013PC0687

Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India /* COM/2013/0687 final - 2013/0328 (NLE) */









EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.           Context of the proposal
·      Grounds for and objectives of the proposal
This proposal concerns the application of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic
Regulation’) in the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain
stainless steel wires originating in India.
·      General context
This proposal is made in the context of the
implementation of the basic Regulation and is the result of an investigation
which was carried out in line with the substantive and procedural requirements
laid out in the basic Regulation.
·      Existing provisions in the area of the proposal
By Commission Regulation (EU) No 418/2013, the
European Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of
certain stainless steel wires originating in India.
·      Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union
Not applicable.
2.           Consultation of interested
parties and impact assessment
·      Consultation of interested parties
Interested parties concerned by the proceeding
have had the possibility to defend their interests during the investigation, in
line with the provisions of the basic Regulation.
·      Collection and use of expertise
There was no need for external expertise.
·      Impact assessment
This proposal is the result of the
implementation of the basic Regulation.
The basic Regulation does not contain
provisions for a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of
conditions that have to be assessed.
3.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE
PROPOSAL
·      Summary of the proposed action
The attached proposal for a Council Regulation
is based on the definitive findings on dumping, injury, causation and Union interest. It is therefore proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a
Council Regulation which should be published no later than 8 November 2013.
·      Legal basis
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30
November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members
of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’).
·      Subsidiarity principle
The proposal falls under the exclusive
competence of the European Union. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not
apply.
·      Proportionality principle
The proposal complies with the proportionality
principle for the following reasons:
The form of action is described in the
above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision.
Indication of how financial and administrative
burden falling upon the Union, national governments, regional and local
authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and proportionate to
the objective of the proposal is not applicable.
·      Choice of instruments
Proposed instruments: regulation.
Other means would not be adequate for the
following reason:
Other means would not be adequate because the
basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options.
4.           BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
The proposal has no implication for the Union
budget.
2013/0328 (NLE)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain
stainless steel wires originating in India
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’)[1], and in particular Article 9
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal submitted by
the European Commission (‘the Commission’) after having consulted the Advisory
Committee,
Whereas:
1.           PROCEDURE
1.1.        Provisional measures 
(1)       The Commission imposed a
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain stainless steel wires
originating in India by Regulation (EU) No 418/2013[2] ('the provisional Regulation').
(2)       The investigation was
initiated following a complaint lodged on 28 June 2012
by the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (Eurofer) ('the complainant')
on behalf of Union producers representing more than 50% of total Union
production of certain stainless steel wires. 
(3)       In
the parallel anti-subsidy investigation, the Commission
imposed a provisional countervailing duty on imports of certain stainless steel
wires originating in India by Regulation (EU) No 419/2013[3] and a definitive countervailing
duty by Regulation (EU) No 861/2013[4].

1.2.        Parties concerned by the
investigation 
(4)       At the provisional stage
of the investigation sampling was applied for the Indian exporting producers
and the Union producers. At the provisional stage, sampling was envisaged also
regarding unrelated importers. However, as two out of three importers chosen
for the sample did not submit questionnaire replies, sampling for importers
could not be applied. Therefore, all available information pertaining to all cooperating
importers was used to reach definitive findings; in particular as far the Union
interest is concerned. 
(5)       One exporting producer
alleged that since no sales from non-complainants were used for the
determination of the injury suffered by the Union industry, the selected sample
of Union producers could not be considered representative. This claim was
rejected because the sample was selected on the basis of the replies received
from all cooperating Union producers regardless their support or not for the
complaint at the stage of determination of standing, and was made on the basis
of production volumes.
(6)       One exporting producer,
related to a Union producer, opposed the complaint, and requested individual
examination, because it was not included in the sample of exporting producers,
based on its low export volumes. The Union producer itself was also not
included in the Union industry sample because of its low production volumes.
The individual examination was granted by the Commission, but the exporting
producer withdrew its request. 
(7)       Seven Indian exporting
producers outside the sample requested individual examination. Two of them
replied to the questionnaires and five did not. Out of the two which replied to
the questionnaire, one withdrew its individual examination request. As a
result, the Commission has examined the request of one Indian exporting
producer outside the sample:
– KEI Industries Limited, New Delhi (KEI).
(8)       At provisional stage none
of the initially sampled exporting producers was found to have submitted
sufficiently reliable information therefore Article 18 of the basic Regulation
was applied. The Commission decided to extend the sample with three companies,
based on their export volumes and their willingness to co-operate as expressed
following the initiation of the proceeding. As a result, the Commission has
examined the questionnaire replies and carried out verification visits at the
premises of the following Indian exporting producers:
- Garg Inox, Bahadurgarh, Haryana
- Macro Bars and Wires, Mumbai, Maharashtra
- Nevatia Steel & Alloys, Mumbai, Maharashtra
(9)       Apart from the above,
recitals (4) to (7) and (14) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
1.3.        Investigation period and
the period considered 
(10)     As set out in recital (20)
to the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered
the period from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012 ('investigation period’ or 'IP').
The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the
period from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2012 ('period considered').
1.4.        Subsequent procedure
(11)     Following the disclosure of
the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to
impose provisional anti-dumping measures ('provisional disclosure'), several
interested parties, namely the 3 sampled exporting producers, the one exporting
producer which withdrew its individual examination request, the complainant,
and 11 users submitted comments. The parties who so requested were granted a
hearing. The Commission continued to seek information it deemed necessary for
the definitive findings. All comments received were considered and taken into account,
where appropriate. 
(12)     The Commission informed the
interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of
which it intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duty
on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India and the
definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty
(‘final disclosure’). The parties were also granted a period within which they
could comment on the final disclosure. All comments received were considered
and taken into account, where appropriate.
(13)     Following the comments
received to the final disclosure, the Commission informed the interested
parties of changes in the findings concerning the level of dumping of certain
exporting producers. The parties were again granted a period within which they
could comment on the additional disclosure. All comments received were
considered and taken into account, where appropriate. One interested party, the
complainant, criticised the fact that the findings concerning the level of
dumping of certain exporting producers were altered on the basis of new data
and comments received after the provisional disclosure and at the definitive
stage of the investigation. It also alleged that its procedural rights were infringed.
(14)     The Commission however
considered that it must take into account the submissions received from the
interested parties and if necessary alter the findings when the comments are
justified. In none of these instances, new unverified data was used for the
dumping determination. Moreover, the procedural rights of all interested
parties were respected as they were duly and timely informed and given the same
deadlines to submit comments. 
2.           Product concerned and like
product
(15)     As
stated in recital (21) to the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is
defined as stainless steel wires containing by weight:
–              
2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or
more but not more than 22% of chromium, 
–              
less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00 19
and 7223 00 99, originating in India.
(16)     Some users expressed
concerns about the apparent lack of distinction between the various types of
the product concerned and the like product because a wide product mix exists
among all the product types. There was a particular concern as to how a fair
comparison among all types could be ensured in the investigation. As is the
case in most investigations, the definition of the product concerned covers a
wide variety of product types which share the same or similar basic physical
technical and chemical characteristics. The fact that
these characteristics can vary from product type to product type may indeed
lead to cover a wide range of types. This is the case in the current
investigation. The Commission took account of the differences among the product
types and ensured a fair comparison. A unique product control number (PCN) was
allocated to each product type, produced and sold by the Indian exporting
producers and to each one produced and sold by the Union industry. The number
depended on the main characteristics of the product, in this case, the steel
grade, the tensile strength, the coating, the surface, diameter, and the shape.
Therefore, the types of wires exported to the Union were compared on a PCN
basis with the products produced and sold by the Union industry that have the
same or similar characteristics. All these types fell within the definition of
the product concerned and the like product in the notice of initiation[5] and in the provisional Regulation.
(17)     One
party reiterated its claim that the so called “highly technical” product types
are different and not interchangeable with other types of the product
concerned. Hence, they should be excluded from the product definition.
According to the case-law, when determining whether products are alike so that
they form part of the same product, it needs to be assessed whether they share
the same technical and physical characteristics, and have the same basic end-uses and the same price-quality ratio. In that regard, the
interchangeability of, and competition between, those products should also be
assessed.[6] The investigation found that the “highly technical” product types
referred to by the party have the basic physical, chemical, and technical
characteristics as the other products subject to the investigation. They are
made from stainless steel and they are wires, and the production process is
similar, using similar machines, such that producers can switch between
different variants of the product, according to demand. Therefore, although different
types of wires are not directly interchangeable and do not directly compete,
producers are competing for contracts covering a broad range of stainless steel
wires. Moreover, these product types are produced and sold by both the Union
industry and the Indian exporting producers using a similar production method.
Therefore, the claim cannot be accepted.
(18)     In response to final
disclosure one party claimed that the analysis carried out by the Commission in
terms of establishing whether the so-called highly technical product types
should be included in the investigation was insufficient. This argument is
rejected. The investigation established that the highly technical product types
fall within the product definition as stated in recital (17) above. The party
wrongly assumes that all the criteria referred to in the case-law have to be
met at the same time; this is incorrect. According to the case-law[7], the Commission enjoys a wide
discretion when defining the product scope, and has to base this assessment on
the set of criteria developed by the Court. Often, as in the present case, some
criteria may point in one and some in the other direction; in such a situation,
the Commission needs to carry out a global assessment, as it has done in the
present case. It is therefore wrongly assumed by this interested party that
product types need to share all characteristics in order to fall in the same
product definition. 
(19)     Some
users claimed that the so-called stainless steel wires “series 200” should be
excluded from the product scope. In particular, they alleged this type was
hardly produced by the Union industry. However, this claim is unfounded. First,
the fact that a certain product type is not produced in by the Union industry
is not a sufficient reason to exclude it from the scope of the investigation,
where the production process is such that the Union producers could start
producing the product type in question. Second, as for highly technical wires,
it was found that these types of the product concerned have basic physical,
chemical, and technical characteristics identical or similar to other types of
the like product produced and sold by the Union industry. Therefore, the claim
cannot be accepted.
(20)     Alternatively,
they claimed that wire rod should be included in the definition of the product
concerned. However, wire rod is the raw material used for the production of the
product concerned but can also be used for the production of different products
such as fasteners and nails. Therefore, contrary to the product concerned, it
does not constitute a finished steel product. Through cold forming production
process the wire rod amongst other product can be transformed into the product
concerned or the like product. On that basis, wire rod cannot be included in the
product scope within the meaning of the basic Regulation.
(21)     On the basis of the above, the definition of the product concerned and the
like product in recitals (21) to (24) to the provisional Regulation are hereby
confirmed. 
3.           DUMPING
3.1.        Introduction
(22)     During the verification
visits at the premises of the three originally sampled Indian exporting
producers and the subsequent analysis of the collected information, it was
found that these companies had submitted some information which could not be
considered reliable. The Commission continued its investigation, analysing all
information submitted in reaction to the provisional disclosure and in
subsequent hearings.
(23)     As indicated in recital
(26) of the provisional Regulation, in the case of one exporting producer, the
Commission had found that the costs reported in the questionnaire reply could
not be reconciled to the company’s internal cost reporting system. The company
had argued that the lack of reconciliation was caused by registration errors
and a valuation method of stocks that differed between the internal cost
reporting system and the data published in the annual accounts.
(24)     As explained in recital
(28) of the provisional Regulation, although the data contained in the internal
cost reporting system were consistent with the audited financial statements at
company-wide level, it was not possible to reconcile the data generated by the
internal cost reporting system for the wire division to the cost tables
specifically prepared by the company in reply to the investigation’s
questionnaire. Hence, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, it
was considered that the information found in the internal cost reporting system
should be used for the purpose of the anti-dumping investigation. 
(25)     For that reason, the
Commission provisionally adjusted the cost data provided by the exporting
producer in its questionnaire reply by using the facts available in the
internal cost reporting system.
(26)     As noted in recital (27) of
the provisional Regulation, the exporting producer argued that the data in the
internal cost reporting system were not reliable and should not be used for the
purpose of the investigation. The company pointed to several errors and
conceptual problems regarding the internally reported figures on which the
Commission had based its adjustment of the costs. The company claimed that the
Commission should have based its analysis on the costs reported in the
questionnaire reply. Additionally, at a later stage following the provisional
measures, the company provided a reconciliation between the internally reported
divisional cost figures and the questionnaire reply. On that basis, and having
regard to the evidence collected during the on-spot visit, certain manufacturing
costs originally reported by that company in its questionnaire reply could then
be accepted. 
(27)     However, on the basis of
the evidence at hand, the allocation of certain costs such as overheads and
finance costs reported by the company in its questionnaire reply could not be considered
as reliable for the purpose of the investigation. The Commission considered
that these costs should be allocated based on the total company turnover and
cost of goods sold in accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation. Based
on the above, most of the costs reported in the questionnaire reply could be
accepted and the turnover allocation was agreed by the company at the
definitive stage of the investigation. The level of the dumping margin
decreased following a revision of packing costs and certain overheads. It is
thus considered that Article 18 of the basic Regulation should no longer apply to
establish the dumping margin of this exporting producer. 
(28)     As set out in recital (30)
of the provisional Regulation, in the case of a second exporting producer, the
Commission found that the purchases and the consumption of raw materials
reported in the company’s questionnaire reply were not supported by the data
found in the producer’s inventory management system. In particular it appeared
that the distribution of steel grades was different in each of the sources. The
Commission established that the steel grade is a key factor in the
determination of the cost of the final product and that unreliable information
concerning the steel grade could seriously distort the determination of costs
and sales prices of individual product types and could therefore be misleading,
and made the exporting producer aware of this essential consideration at
various occasions.
(29)     As set out in recital (31)
of the provisional Regulation, the exporting producer claimed however that the
computer files containing the purchases of raw material collected by the
Commission during the verification visit were incomplete, because additional
purchases of raw material had been made by other units in the company, but had
not been reported and were not included in the computer files collected during
the verification visit and examined by the Commission. Furthermore, the
exporting producer claimed that the observed discrepancies in the quantities of
steel grades were due to the fact that some steel grades were partly
overlapping with each other and that some parts of the production process were
not traceable at the level of individual steel grades.
(30)     In recital (32) of the
provisional Regulation the Commission however noted that the above claims made
by the company relating to the additional purchases of raw material had not
been substantiated and in any event were not sufficient to explain the observed
discrepancies at the level of individual steel grades. The Commission also
noted that the company had alleged that it is not possible to make an exact
tracing by individual steel grades in all the stages of the production process.
This acknowledgment further undermined the reliability of the reporting system
of steel grades as a whole. The information provided concerning steel grades
was therefore provisionally considered misleading.
(31)     In recital (33) of the
provisional Regulation the Commission considered that the reported distribution
of raw material by steel grade is not reliable and should be provisionally
disregarded and that the determinations should be made on the basis of facts
available pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Due to the unreliability
of the reporting system as a whole, it was not possible to make the
determinations on the basis of any of the reported steel grades. Therefore the
total consumption of all raw materials taken as a whole, without considering
the distribution by steel grade, was used in calculating an overall dumping
margin for all products. 
(32)     Following the publication
of the provisional findings, the company has contested this provisional
approach in general terms but continued being unable to offer a one-to-one
matching at PCN level. However, the company offered later in the investigation a
sufficient degree of reconciliation when the raw material is grouped in the
main series of stainless steel grades according to their chemical composition
(the 200-, 300- and 400-series in the AISI classification). The company also
offered an alternative way of grouping in which the final end-use was included
as an additional grouping factor. However, as the final end-use cannot be
verified, the Commission recalculated the dumping margin on the basis of the steel
grades grouped based on the chemical composition as expressed in the series of
steel grades (the 200-, 300- and 400-series in the AISI classification). The
series of steel grades are a generally used, objective and verifiable criterion
whereas for this company the use of the PCN does
not allow for full reconciliation and therefore would not ensure a fair
comparison on the basis of reliable data within the meaning of the basic
Regulation. 
(33)     Since the additional
information submitted by the company did however not allow reconciling the data
at the sufficiently detailed level required for the investigation, the
provisional conclusion that the company’s tracing systems are not sufficiently
reliable is maintained and Article 18 of the basic Regulation is applied for
the definitive determination of cost of production and the dumping margin
calculation, which is therefore based on the approach referred to in the
previous recital.
(34)     As indicated in recital
(34) of the provisional Regulation, in the case of the third exporting
producer, the Commission found during the verification visit that the flows of
raw materials reported in the questionnaire reply were not consistent with the
data contained in the producer’s accounting system. It appeared that the
distribution per steel grades was different in each of the two sources. 
(35)     As indicated in recital
(35) of the provisional Regulation, the exporting producer, while admitting
some errors in its questionnaire reply, alleged that the differences in the
overall quantities of raw material could be reconciled by taking into account
the changes in inventories. However, the company also alleged that partly
overlapping steel grades made it impossible to make an exact reconciliation as
per each individual steel grade. In its comments following the provisional
findings, it also stated that occasionally the steel grade indicated on the
sales invoice does not correspond with the actual steel grade being exported.
Furthermore, the company argued that steel grades are not used in a precise
manner in the stainless steel industry, but instead there are variations
between the published chemical compositions of steel grades and the actual
products. The company argued that when taking into account these explanations,
the discrepancies identified by the Commission would concern only an
insignificant proportion of its exports.
(36)     The Commission considered that
the volume of the detected discrepancies could not be explained by occasional
imprecisions. On the contrary, the arguments being put forward contributed to
undermining the reliability of the company’s reporting system of steel grades
as a whole, especially in light of the decisive nature of steel grades in the
determination of the cost of the final product.
(37)     However, later in the
investigation the company claimed that if the Commission does not accept the
company’s initial reporting of steel grades, a more accurate result could be
obtained, if instead of merging together all PCNs as had been done at the
provisional stage, the Commission would group together only those specific
steel grades between which discrepancies had been identified, or alternatively
would group together the steel grades according to their chemical composition
expressed in the series of steel grades (the 200-, 300- and 400-series in the
AISI classification). The company also offered yet another method of further
grouping the steel grades in the 300-series into smaller sub-groups.
(38)     The Commission consequently
recalculated the dumping margin on the basis of the stainless steel groups
based on the chemical composition as expressed in the series of steel grades
(the 200-, 300- and 400-series in the AISI classification) so as to follow the
same method as described in recital (30) above. The series of steel grades are
a generally used, objective and verifiable criterion whereas
for this company the use of the PCN does not allow for full reconciliation and
therefore would not ensure a fair comparison on the basis of reliable data within
the meaning of the basic Regulation. 
(39)     Since the additional
information submitted by the company did however not allow reconciling the data
at the sufficiently detailed level required for the investigation, the
provisional conclusion that the company’s tracing systems are not sufficiently
reliable is maintained and Article 18 of the basic Regulation is applied for
the definitive determination of cost of production and the dumping margin
calculation, which is therefore based on the approach referred to in the
previous recital.
(40)     The complainant submitted
that the grouping of the product concerned into steel grades prevented the
Commission from performing a correct profitability test in order to determine
the normal values per PCN. 
(41)     The Commission performs its
analysis at a level that is consistent with the exporting and Union producers’
internal accounting systems, which allow for substantiation of the reported
figures. The claim is therefore rejected. 
(42)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (37) and (38) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
3.2.        Normal value
(43)     For one exporting producer
for which Article 18 of the basic Regulation is applied, the determination of
the normal value has been reviewed following the re-assessment of its cost of
production. In the definitive stage, the cost of production was determined
based on the reported manufacturing costs, to which selling, general and
administrative costs, inclusive of finance costs, were added using an
allocation method permitted by Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation. 
(44)     For the three newly sampled
exporting producers, and the exporting producer granted individual examination,
domestic sales volumes were found to be representative overall, representing at
least 5% of the total company’s export sales volume of the product concerned to
the Union. The same representativity test was also performed for each product
type sold by the newly sampled producers on their domestic markets and found to
be comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union, according to
Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. 
(45)     By establishing the
proportion of profitable sales to independent customers in the domestic market
during the IP, the Commission further examined whether the domestic sales of
each newly sampled exporting producer and the exporting producer granted
individual examination, could be considered as having been sold in the ordinary
course of trade, according to Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. 
(46)     In the case of one of the
newly sampled exporting producers, the cost allocation initially submitted by
the company was found to be inadequate since it disregarded the thickness of
the wire which is a significant cost driver. With the agreement of the company,
the cost allocation method was adjusted.
(47)     In the case of a second
newly sampled exporting producer, a clerical error in the determination of the
dumping margin was corrected. Furthermore the producer requested the Commission
to make additional adjustments in the profitability test and price allowances.
These claims were not found to be warranted.
(48)     In the case of the
exporting producer granted individual examination, a clerical error in the
calculations was corrected. The same exporting producer made further claims on
the Commission’s determination of the level of the selling, general and
administrative costs and the domestic transport costs and requested an
adjustment for physical differences of the product concerned between the
domestic and export markets. These adjustments requested by the exporting
producer were rejected, because the calculations were based on the cost data
submitted by the company that had been verified during the verification visit
and because the claim regarding physical differences was not substantiated. 
(49)     As a consequence, the
methodology for determining normal value as described in recitals (39) to (48) to
the provisional Regulation is confirmed and was applied to the three newly
sampled exporting producers and the exporting producer granted individual
examination. 
3.3.        Export price
(50)     For one exporting producer,
following its claims, certain clerical errors were rectified, relating to the
occasional use of a wrong exchange rate and the inclusion by mistake of certain
intragroup sales in the dumping calculation. 
(51)     For a second exporting
producer, sales via a related company in the Union were included in the dumping
calculation.
(52)     One newly sampled exporting
producer claimed that the benefits it had received under the DEPB and DDS
subsidy schemes needed to be added to the export prices. 
(53)     Another newly sampled
exporting producer reported the benefits it received under the DDS subsidy
scheme as negative price allowances, artificially increasing the export prices.

(54)     The Commission analysed the
price behaviour of both companies on the Union market and arrived at its
findings, which result from the application of Article 2(8) of the basic
Regulation and therefore do not require further adjustment. The former
company’s claim was therefore rejected and the latter company’s reported
allowance disregarded. 
(55)     One newly sampled exporting
producer claimed that its export prices should be corrected upward in order to
bring them in line with its domestic prices because the domestic sales were
made under an own brand name, attracting higher prices. The company could
however not substantiate that the invoices for which it made the claim were
indeed referring to branded sales and, consequently, the claim was rejected. 
(56)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (50) to (52) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
3.4.        Comparison
(57)     One exporting producer
claimed that, since collapsing of all PCN’s took place for the determination of
its cost of production, export prices should be treated in the same way and a
single export price should have been used for the comparison to the normal
value. 
(58)     The Commission in its
investigation aimed at obtaining cost and export price data on a PCN basis,
but, however, did not obtain from the company concerned the necessary
reconciliations that would have allowed identifying reliable costs of
production on a PCN basis. The investigation found however no deficiency with
the export price levels reported by PCN, and it would therefore not have been
appropriate applying Article 18 of the basic Regulation to the determination of
the actual export prices. As the Commission does not consider reducing the
level of detail of reported prices to be appropriate compared to the standards
of the investigation in order to make a fair comparison, the claim was
therefore rejected. 
(59)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (53) to (55) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
3.5.        Dumping margins 
(60)     As provided by Article
2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation, for each sampled company the weighted
average normal value established for the like product was compared with the
weighted average export price of the product concerned. 
(61)     In
line with the provisions of Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation, due to the
application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation to two of the three initially
sampled exporting producers, the dumping margin of the cooperating exporting
producers not included in the sample is established on the basis of the average
dumping margin of the one originally sampled exporting producer for which Article
18 of the basic Regulation is no longer applied and the two newly sampled
companies with dumping margins that are not de minimis. On this basis,
the dumping margin calculated for the cooperating companies not included in the
sample was established at 8.4%.
(62)     With regard to all other
exporting producers in India, the Commission first established the level of
cooperation. To this end, a comparison was made between the total export
quantities indicated in the sampling replies and the total imports from India as derived from the Eurostat import statistics. Since the level of cooperation was
high, the residual dumping margin was set at the level of the highest dumping margin established for the sampled exporting
producers. On this basis, the
country-wide level of dumping was established at 16.2%.
(63)     On this basis, the weighted
average dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier
price, duty unpaid, are as follows: 
 Company || Definitive dumping margin 
 GARG Inox || 11.8% 
 KEI Industries || 7.7% 
 Macro Bars and Wires || 0.0% 
 Nevatia Steel & Alloys || 4.1% 
 Raajratna Metal Industries || 16.2% 
 Venus Group || 11.6 % 
 Viraj Profiles || 6.8 % 
 Cooperating non-sampled companies || 8.4% 
 All other companies || 16.2% 
4.           Union industry
4.1.        Union industry 
(64)     Some users questioned the
number of Union producers as stated in recital (63) to the provisional
Regulation. They claim that the number of producers was wrongly assessed and in
reality there are fewer producers present on the Union market. 
(65)     The Commission points out
that the above claim was not substantiated by any evidence. The Commission has
verified the number of Union producers stated in the complaint when verifying
the standing and also during the investigation. The Commission contacted all 27
known Union producers in this respect. The investigation confirmed that 27
Union producers were manufacturing the like product in the Union during the IP.
The claim is therefore rejected and recital (63) to the provisional Regulation
is confirmed. 
4.2.        Union production and
Sampling of Union producers
(66)     In the absence of comments,
recitals (64) to (67) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
5.           INJURY
5.1.        Union consumption 
(67)     Some users claimed that the
injury analysis should have disregarded the data relating to 2009 because the
financial crisis which occurred that year had distorting effects in particular
on the Union consumption. However, even if 2009 was excluded from the analysis,
there would still be a growing trend for consumption (+5%) which is an
indication of an improving market. Moreover, the negative effects of the
financial crises are recognised in recital (68) to the provisional Regulation.
In absence of other comments, recital (68) to the provisional Regulation is
confirmed. 
5.2.        Imports into the Union from the country concerned 
(68)     The dumping margin
established for Macro Bars and Wires is below de minimis threshold
foreseen in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, it is deemed that
this exporting producer has not dumped in the meaning of Article 1(2) of the
basic Regulation during the investigation period. As a result, its import
volumes were excluded from the volume of provisionally established dumped
imports from India. One exporting producer, namely the Venus group submitted
that certain transactions were mistakenly double counted. The Commission agreed
with the exporting producer, and adjusted the total volume of dumped imports by
eliminating these transactions.
(69)     Accordingly the volume, market
share and the average price of the dumped imports were revised.
(70)     Volume and market share of
the dumped imports:
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Volume || 15 826 || 27 291 || 34 494 || 33 252 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 172 || 218 || 210 
 Market share || 12.0% || 14.6% || 17.6% || 16.9% 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 121 || 146 || 140 
 Source: Eurostat and questionnaire replies 
(71)     Macro Bars and Wires
exported limited quantities of the product concerned during the IP and the
transactions of the Venus group mentioned above also constituted limited
quantities, therefore the deduction of these import volumes from the total
volume of dumped imports from India does not result in significant changes
concerning the trends as described in recitals (69) and (71) to the provisional
Regulation. Thus these recitals to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
(72)     Average price of the dumped
imports:
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Average price || 2380 || 2811 || 3259 || 3207 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 118 || 137 || 135 
 Source: Eurostat and questionnaire replies 
(73)     The adjustment of the
volume of dumped imports does not result in any significant change of the
average prices of the dumped Indian imports or the undercutting margin calculations.
The weighted average undercutting margin is 15%, which confirms the finding in
the provisional Regulation. 
(74)     An Indian exporting
producer claimed that the Union sales prices seemed highly implausible and
likely to be distorted. It is, however, underlined that the prices used in the
undercutting calculations were the result of information collected and verified
during on-spot investigations at the premises of the sampled Union producers.
(75)     The conclusions drawn from
the findings described in recitals (75) to (77) to the provisional Regulation
are confirmed. 
5.3.        Economic Situation of the
Union industry
(76)     Some
parties claimed that the results obtained by the Union industry should be
considered as reasonably positive in the context of the global economic crisis
and that with the exception of one injury indicator namely, market share, all
other indicators did not point toward the existence of injury. 
(77)     One
party claimed that the average selling prices of the Union industry increased
by around 34% far more than its cost of production which increased by 13% over the
same period. In this respect it needs to be noted that at the beginning of the
period considered, namely in 2009, the Union industry was selling below cost of
production, and only managed to sell above cost of production from 2011
onwards. 
(78)     The investigation showed
that although some injury indicators such as production volumes and capacity
utilisation followed a positive trend, or remained stable such as employment, a
number of other indicators relating to the financial situation of the Union industry,
namely profitability, cash flow, investment and return on investment did not
follow a satisfactory trend during the period considered. While the indicator
relating to investments improved in 2010, it dropped below 2009 figures in 2011
and the IP. Although it is true that return on investments improved from 2009
until 2011 reaching 6.7%, it dropped again to 0.8% in the IP. Similarly
indicators relating to profitability and cash flow improved until 2011 and they
started again to deteriorate in the IP. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
Union industry started to improve after 2009, but its recovery was slowed down
by the dumped imports from India subsequently. 
(79)     On a request by an
interested party it is confirmed that the stock levels established in recital
(100) to the provisional Regulation concerned the activity of the sampled Union
companies.
(80)     The Union industry argued
that the target profit margin of 5% set at the provisional stage was too low.
The party did not substantiate its claim sufficiently. Recital (95) to the
provisional Regulation explains the reasons behind the choice of this profit
margin and the investigation did not reveal any other reasons to change it.
Therefore, the target profit of 5% is maintained for the purpose of the definitive
findings.
(81)     One exporting producer
argued that the Union industry’s difficulties are largely due to structural
problems and that, therefore, the target profit margin of 5% was unrealistic. 
(82)     It is recalled that
according to the case law[8],
the Institutions need to establish the profit margin which the Union industry
could reasonably count on under normal conditions of competition, in the
absence of the dumped imports. In 2007, the profit margin was 3.7%; as of 2008,
due to the financial and economic crisis, it became negative. The complaint
argued, and the investigation established, that dumped imports started to
arrive on the Union market as of 2007, when the volume of imports increased
from 17727 tons in 2006 to 24811 tons. Therefore, it was not possible to establish
the target profit margin based on the profit which could reasonably be counted
on by the Union producers of the like product. Consequently, as explained in
recital (95) to the provisional Regulation, the Commission considered it
appropriate using the profit margin of 5% on the basis of the real profits observed
in other parts of the steel industry, which have not suffered from dumped and
subsidized imports, as has been done in other recent investigations into
similar product in the same sector.[9]
Additionally, it should be noted that the 3,7% profit margin observed in 2007
is considered in any case too low because of the presence and increase of
dumped imports. Therefore, the target profit of 5% is maintained for the
purpose of the definitive findings.
5.4.        Conclusion on injury 
(83)     The Commission therefore
concludes that the Union industry has suffered material injury within the
meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. In the absence of other
comments, recitals (78) to (105) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
6.           Causation
6.1.        Effect of dumped imports 
(84)     One exporting producer
claimed that the provisional Regulation ignored that the Union industry was
able to benefit from the increase in consumption since 2009 and that the
Commission cannot assume that the Union industry will be able to maintain its
market share indefinitely. 
(85)     In response to these
arguments it needs to be noted that the investigation revealed the market share
of the dumped Indian imports grew with a higher pace than the consumption in
the Union market. The volume of Indian dumped imports increased by 110% while
the consumption increased by 50% over the same period. Furthermore the
investigation also showed that the average Indian price was constantly below
the average price of the Union industry during the same period and undercut the
Union industry average price by 15% during the IP. As a result, while the Union
industry indeed benefited from the increased consumption to a certain extent and
it also could increase its sales volumes by 40%, it could not maintain its
market share as it could be expected under improving market conditions and
given the Union industry’s free production capacity. 
6.2.        Effect of other factors
6.2.1.     Non-dumped imports
(86)     Over the period considered,
the development of non-dumped imports and prices is comparable to the evolution
of dumped imports and prices. Moreover, prices of dumped imports were
fundamentally at the same level as the prices of the non-dumped imports, in
that average non-dumped import prices were lower by 0.4%. In addition, the
volume of non-dumped imports is less than six per cent of total imports from India and slightly more than one percent of market share. Therefore, the Commission
considers that the injury caused by non-dumped imports from India does not break the causal link between the dumped imports, from India and the material injury suffered by the Union industry during the IP. 
6.2.2.     Imports from third countries
(87)     Two Indian exporting
producers and the Government of India reiterated the claim that imports of
stainless steel wire originating in the People’s Republic of China should have been included in the investigation and that the impact the imports from the
People’s Republic of China had on the Union market and the Union industry was
underestimated. 
(88)     As mentioned in recital (115)
to the provisional Regulation, since the initiation stage up to now no evidence
of dumping causing injury to the Union industry has been presented which may
have justified the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on imports
originating in People’s Republic of China. The claim that People’s Republic of China should have been included in the
scope of the investigation is therefore rejected as unfounded. 
(89)     However, the imports from
the People’s Republic of China showed an increasing trend during the period
considered and reached a market share of 8.3% in the IP as stated in recital (113)
to the provisional Regulation. In addition, the Chinese import prices were
lower than the prices of the Union industry and those of the Indian exporting
producers in the Union market. It was, therefore, further investigated whether
the imports from People’s Republic of China could have contributed to the
injury suffered by the Union industry and broken the causal link between that
injury and the Indian dumped imports. 
(90)     The information available
at provisional stage suggested that the product mix represented by the Chinese
imports was different and that the ranges where the Chinese products were
present were different compared to the products sold by the Union industry or
even those of Indian origin products sold in the Union market.
(91)     After publication of the
provisional measure the Commission received several claims pointing to the
possibility that Chinese low-priced imports during the IP would break the
causal link between dumped Indian imports and material injury suffered by the
Union industry.
(92)     Analysis made on the basis
of the import statistics concerning the two CN codes under investigation showed
that 29% of Chinese imports were made on the lower end of the market (under CN
code 7223 00 99). This partly explains why Chinese prices on average are lower
than those of the Union industry and the Indian exporting producers’. The
statistics for CN code 7223 00 99 also showed that the customers of the Chinese
producers were concentrated in the United Kingdom where the Union industry was
basically not producing. 
 Average price (euro/MT) || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 7223 00 19 || 2 974 || 3 286 || 3 436 || 2 995 
 7223 00 99 || 765 || 1 458 || 1 472 || 1 320 
 Source: Eurostat 
(93)     As concern CN code 7223 00
19 the analyses carried out on PCN basis showed that both the Union industry
and Indian producers were mainly competing in the higher end of the market
where prices could be up to four times higher than prices in the lower end
within the same CN.[10]
The investigation also showed that in general price variations are linked to
the product type and the nickel content. 
(94)     As concerns the price level
of imports from the People’s Republic of China, it needs to be pointed out that
from 2009 until the IP the average price of Chinese imports remained above the
price of the dumped exports of the product concerned from India, as can be seen
from the following table showing the average price of dumped Indian exports
falling under CN code 7223 00 19. 
             Average price (euro/MT) ||             2009 ||             2010 ||             2011 ||             IP ||             IP+1 
             7223 00 19 ||             2974 ||             3286 ||             3436 ||             2995 ||             3093 
             Source: Eurostat 
(95)     In the IP for the first
time the average Chinese import price dropped below that of the Indian import
price of dumped imports. However, this observation was found to be of a
temporary nature since the Chinese price level in the year after the IP
increased and was again higher than the Indian prices. 
(96)     Furthermore, the comparison
between the import volumes from India and People’s Republic of China showed that at any point during the period considered and particularly in the IP, imports from
People’s Republic of China were at much lower levels than the imports from India. The import volumes for People’s Republic of China amounted to basically less than
half of the total imports from India. 
(97)     Therefore, even if the
imports from the People’s Republic of China contributed to the injury suffered
by the Union industry they could not have affected the situation of the Union
industry to the extent to break the causal link between the dumped imports from
  India and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Therefore, recital (113)
to the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
6.2.3.     Competition from other
producers in the Union
(98)     One party argued that the
Union producers’ poor financial performance might have been caused by
competition from other Union producers which were not complainants or did not
express their support to the investigation at the initiation of the case. 
(99)     The market share of other
producers in the Union developed as follows: 
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Union sales of other producers in the Union (MT) || 34 926 || 55 740 || 55 124 || 55 124 
 Index (2009= 100) || 100 || 160 || 158 || 158 
 Market share of other producers in the Union || 26.6% || 29.8% || 28.1% || 27.9% 
 Source: complaint and standing replies 
(100)   The Union producers which
were not complainants and which did not specifically express support to the investigation
accounted for 44% of total Union sales reported in Recital (86) to the
provisional Regulation. Their sales volume increased by 58% from an estimated
34926 tons in 2009 to 55124 tons during the period considered. However, such
growth is relatively modest if compared to the growth of the dumped imports
from India in the same period (+110%). Furthermore, the market share of those
Union producers remained relatively stable during the period considered and no
indication was found that their prices were lower than those of the sampled
Union producers. It is therefore concluded that their sales on the Union market
did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry. 
6.3.        Conclusion on causation 
(101)   In the absence of comments,
recitals (121) to (124) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.           Union interest
7.1.        General considerations 
(102)   In the absence of comments,
recital (125) to the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
7.2.        Interest of the Union
industry
(103)   In the absence of comments,
recitals (126) to (133) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.3.        Interest of unrelated
importers
(104)   In the absence of comments,
recitals (142) to (144) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.4.        Interest of users 
(105)   Following the imposition of
the provisional measures, seven users and one users’ association contacted the
Commission and showed interest to cooperate in the investigation. Following
their request, questionnaires were sent to them in April 2013. However, only
two users submitted a full questionnaire reply and overall the cooperating
users represented 12% of total imports from India during the IP and 2.5% of the
total Union consumption, while employing 32 persons involved in manufacturing
finished products incorporating the product concerned. The economic impact of
the measures on users was reassessed on the basis of the new data available in
the questionnaire replies and two users were visited to verify the information
provided. 
(106)   Users claimed that the level
of profitability of 9%, stated in recital (136) to the provisional Regulation
was too high and was not representative for the users’ industry. Following the
receipt of the additional questionnaire replies the average profitability of
all cooperating users was recalculated and established at 2% on turnover. 
(107)   It was also found that on
average concerning the cooperating users, purchases from India constituted 44% of the total purchases of the product concerned, and that India represented the exclusive source of supply for two cooperating users. During the IP,
the turnover of the product incorporating the product concerned represented on
average 14% of total turnover of the cooperating users. 
(108)   Assuming the worst case
scenario for the Union market, i.e. that no potential price increase could be
passed on to the distribution chain and that the users would continue
purchasing from India in previous volumes, the impact of the duty on the users’
profitability achieved from activities using or incorporating the product
concerned would mean a decrease to the point where users would become loss
making, reaching a (negative) profitability of -0.6%.
(109)   The Commission acknowledges that the impact in
the short and medium term will be more important, on an individual level, for
those users which source their entire imports from India. However, these are
relatively few in numbers (two of the cooperating users). Furthermore, they
have the possibility, provided that their Indian producer cooperates, to
request the refund of the duties pursuant to Article 11 of the Basic
Regulation, if all conditions for such a refund are met.
(110)   Some users reiterated the
concern that measures would hit certain type of wires not produced in Europe,
namely types included in the so-called series 200 as described in recital (139)
to the provisional Regulation. According to the users, the absence of
production in the Union is due to the limited demand and to the specificity of
the production process. 
(111)   However, the investigation
showed that such type of stainless steel wires are produced by the Union
industry and that they represent a limited share of the Union market. For
users, there are also alternative sources of supply available from countries
not subject to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures. Furthermore, other
product types of stainless steel wires can be used for the same purposes.
Therefore, the imposition of the measures cannot have a significant impact on
the Union market and on these users. This claim is therefore rejected.
(112)   Some users pointed out the
longer delivery time for the like product by the Union producers compared to
the delivery time of the product concerned from India. However, the possibility
of merchants and traders of stocking the products and of having them swiftly
available does not undermine the factual evidence of the negative effects of
the dumped imports. Therefore, this argument has to be rejected. 
(113)   Taking the above into
consideration, even if some users are likely to be negatively affected by the
measures on imports from India more than others, it is considered that in
balance the Union market will benefit from the imposition of the measures. In
particular, it is considered that restoring fair trade conditions on the Union
market would allow the Union industry to align its prices with cost of
production; to keep production and employment; to regain the market share
previously lost and to benefit from increased economies of scale. This should
allow the industry to reach reasonable profit margins that will permit it to
operate efficiently in the medium and long term. In parallel the industry will
improve its overall financial situation. In addition, the investigation
established that the measures will have an overall limited impact on the users
and on unrelated importers. Therefore it is concluded that the overall benefit
of the measures appears to outweigh the impact on the users of the product
concerned in the Union market. 
7.5.        Conclusion on Union
interest
(114)   In view of the above, the
assessment in recitals (145) and (146) to the provisional Regulation is
confirmed. 
8.           Definitive anti-dumping
measures
8.1.        Injury elimination level
(115)   For one exporting producer
the injury elimination calculation was adjusted downward following its claim
that clerical errors had been made by confusing the exchange rate on certain
transactions and the inclusion of intra-group transactions in the calculation. In
the absence of any other comments, recitals (148) to (151) to the provisional
Regulation are confirmed. 
(116)   The same exporting producer
claimed that the Indian exports to the Union are made to wholesalers and that
sales by the Union industry on the Union market are made to end-users and that
therefore the Commission did not compare at the appropriate level of trade.
However, the investigation showed that the Indian exporting producers are
selling to both categories of customers and that they are competing with the
Union producers for the same categories of clients. 
8.2.        Conclusion on injury elimination
level
(117)   No individual injury margin
was calculated for Macro Bars and Wires since this company’s definitive anti-dumping
margin was at de minimis level as stated in recital (51). 
(118)   The methodology used in the
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 
8.3.        Definitive measures
(119)   In the light of the above
and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, a definitive anti-dumping
duty should be imposed at a level sufficient to eliminate the injury caused by
the dumped imports taking into account the subsidy margin imposed Commission
Regulation (EU) No 419/2013.
(120)   Therefore, the dumping duty rates were established by comparing the injury
margins to the dumping margins, while taking the subsidy margins into account
by fully deducting them from the relevant dumping margin. Consequently, the definitive
anti-dumping duty rates are as follows:
 Company || Dumping margin || Countervailing duty || Injury margin || Definitive anti-dumping duty rate 
 GARG Inox || 11.8% || 3.4% || 22.6% || 8.4% 
 KEI Industries || 7.0% || 0.0% || 41.9% || 7.7% 
 Macro Bars and Wires || 0.0% || 3.4% || 30.3% || 0.0% 
 Nevatia Steel & Alloys || 4.1% || 3.4% || 23.8% || 0.7% 
 Raajratna Metal Industries || 16.2% || 3.7% || 17.2% || 12.5% 
 Venus group || 11.6% || 3.0% || 23.4% || 8.6% 
 Viraj Profiles Vpl. Ltd. || 6.8% || 0.0% || 32.1% || 6.8% 
 Cooperating non-sampled companies || 8.4% || 3.4% || 23.7% || 5.0% 
 All other companies || 16.2% || 3.7% || 41.9% || 12.5% 
(121)   The
individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this regulation were
established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore,
they reflect the situation found during that
investigation with respect to these companies. These
duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to 'all other
companies') are exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in India and produced by the specific legal entities mentioned. Imported products produced by
any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this regulation,
including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from
these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to 'all other
companies'.
(122)   One
exporting producer in India offered a price undertaking in accordance with
Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation. 
(123)   In
recent years, the product concerned has shown a considerable volatility in
prices and therefore it is not suitable for a fixed price undertaking. In order
to overcome this problem, the Indian exporting producer offered an indexation
clause based on raw material costs. In this respect it is noted that no direct
and precise link between the fluctuation of prices and that of the index could
be established and, thus, indexation is not considered appropriate. In
addition, the investigation established that there are different types of the
product concerned which are not easily distinguishable and have considerable
differences in prices.
(124)   Furthermore,
the exporting producer produces a range of stainless steel products and may
sell these products to the same customers in the European Union via related
trading companies. This would create a serious risk of cross-compensation and
would render extremely difficult to monitor effectively the undertaking. 
(125)   On
the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the undertaking offer
cannot be accepted.
(126)   Any claim requesting the
application of an individual company anti-dumping duty rate (e.g. following a
change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production
or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission[11] forthwith with all relevant
information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked
to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that
name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate,
the Regulation imposing the definitive anti-dumping duties will be amended
accordingly by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty
rates.
8.4.        Definitive collection of
provisional anti-dumping duties
(127)   In view of the magnitude of
the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to
the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way
of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation be
definitively collected to the extent of the amount of the definitive duties
imposed, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
1.           A
definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of wire of stainless
steel containing by weight:
- 2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or
more but not more than 22% of chromium, 
- less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00
19 and 7223 00 99 and originating in India.
2.           The
rate of the definitive antidumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described
in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies below shall be:
 Company || Duty (%) || TARIC additional code 
 Garg Inox, Bahadurgarh, Haryana and Pune, Maharashtra || 8.4 || B931 
 KEI Industries Ltd, New Delhi || 7.7 || B925 
 Macro Bars and Wires, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 0.0 || B932 
 Nevatia Steel & Alloys, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 0.7 || B933 
 Raajratna Metal Industries, Ahmedabad, Gujarat || 12.5 || B775 
 Venus Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 8.6 || B776 
 Precision Metals, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 8.6 || B777 
 Hindustan Inox Ltd., Mumbai, Maharashtra || 8.6 || B778 
 Sieves Manufacturer India Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, Maharashtra || 8.6 || B779 
 Viraj Profiles Ltd., Thane, Maharashtra and Mumbai, Maharashtra || 6.8 || B780 
 Companies listed in the Annex || 5.0 || B781 
 All other companies || 12.5 || B999   
 
3.           Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs
duties shall apply.
Article 2
Where any exporting producer from India provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that 
- it did not export the goods described in
Article 1(1) originating in India during the period of investigation (1 April
2011 - 31 March 2012) 
- it is not related to an exporter or
producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and 
- it has either actually exported the goods
concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a
significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation,

the Article 1(2) may be amended by adding
the new exporting producer to the list in Annex I.
Article 3
Amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping
duties in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 418/2013 on imports of wire of
stainless steel containing by weight:
- 2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or more
but not more than 22% of chromium, 
- less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00
19 and 7223 00 99 and originating in India, shall be definitively collected.
The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty
shall be released. 
Article 4
This Regulation shall enter into force on
the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union. 
This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President
ANNEX:
Indian cooperating exporting producers not sampled
TARIC Additional Code B781
 Company name || City 
 Bekaert Mukand Wire Industries || Lonand, Tal. Khandala, Satara District, Maharastra 
 Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt. Ltd. || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Bhansali Stainless Wire || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Chandan Steel || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Drawmet Wires || Bhiwadi, Rajastan 
 Jyoti Steel Industries Ltd. || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Mukand Ltd. || Thane 
 Panchmahal Steel Ltd. || Dist. Panchmahals, Gujarat 
[1]               OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51
[2]               OJ L 126, 8.5.2013, p. 1.
[3]               OJ L 126, 8.5.2013, p.19
[4]               OJ L 240, 7.9.2013, p.1
[5]               OJ C 240, 10.08.2012, p. 6
[6]               Case C-595/11 Steinel [2013] nyr.
[7]               Case T- 170/94 Shanghai Bycicles [1997] ECR II-1383,
paragraph 64.
[8]               Case T-210/95 European Fertilizer Manufacturer's
Association (EFMA) v Council [1999] ECR II-3291, paragraph 60
[9]               Council Regulation (EU) No 383/2009 of 5 May 2009
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the
provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pre- and post-stressing wires
and wire strands of non-alloy steel (PSC wires and strands) originating in the
People’s Republic of China OJ L 118, 13.5.2009. p.1; Commission Regulation (EU)
No 1071/2012 of 14 November 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on
imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, originating
in the People’s Republic of China and Thailand OJ L 318, 15.11.2012 p. 10;
Commission Regulation (EU) No 845/2012 of 18 September 2012 imposing
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain organic coated steel
products originating in the People’s Republic of China OJ L 252, 19.9.2012 p.33
[10]             However, it is noted that both the Union industry and
the Indian exporting producers are also present in the lower end of the market
even if to a lesser extent. 
[11]             European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade,
Directorate H, 1049 Brussels, Belgium.