Special Report No 9/2013 ‘EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’
Date: 2013-10-03
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: Democratic Republic of the Congo, EU aid, European External Action Service, aid evaluation, aid programme, civil society, decentralisation, democracy, electoral system, governance, judicial power, police, public finance

EUROPEAN
COURT OF AUDITORS

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EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE  
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF THE CONGO   

EN

 
 
 
 
Special Report No 9 

 2013

EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE  
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF THE CONGO

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
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LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1
Fax +352 4398-46410
E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu
Internet: http://eca.europa.eu

Special Report No 9 

 2013

More information on the European Union is available  
on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013

ISBN 978-92-9241-359-0
doi:10.2865/13761

© European Union, 2013
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Luxembourg

3

CONTENTS

Paragraph

ACRONYMS

I–VI 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1–24 

INTRODUCTION

1–4 

STATE FRAGILITY

5–12 

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

5–9 

SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION

10–12 

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

13–24 

EU COOPERATION WITH THE DRC IN THE PERIOD 2003–11

15–21 

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

22 

HUMANITARIAN AID

23–24 

POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

25–27 

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

28–90 

OBSERVATIONS

28–75 

 EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC IS RELEVANT TO NEEDS BUT HAS ACHIEVED LIMITED  
OVERALL RESULTS

29–34 

EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC IS SET WITHIN A GENERALLY SOUND COOPERATION STRATEGY

35–75 

 EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IS RELEVANT TO THE NEEDS IN ALL AREAS BUT PROGRESS ACHIEVED IS 
UNEVEN AND OVERALL LIMITED

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

 
4
4

76–90 

 THE COMMISSION DID NOT TAKE SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF THE FRAGILE NATIONAL CONTEXT IN THE DESIGN 
OF EU PROGRAMMES

77–81 

RISKS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED

82 

OBJECTIVES WERE OFTEN TOO AMBITIOUS

83–90 

CONDITIONALITY AND POLICY DIALOGUE WERE NOT EXPLOITED TO THEIR FULL POTENTIAL

91–94 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I  — 

SCORING OF PROGRAMMES

ANNEX II  — 

SCORING METHODOLOGY

REPLY OF THE COMMISSION AND THE EEAS

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

 
 
5

ACRONYMS

ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific states

CAF: Country assistance framework

CENI: Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (Independent National Election Commission)

CMJ: Comité Mixte de la Justice (Joint Committee on Justice)

CSDP: Common security and defence policy

CSP: Country strategy paper

CSRP: Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (Police Reform Monitoring Committee)

DCI: Development cooperation instrument

DG: Directorate-General

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

EDF: European Development Fund

EEAS: European External Action Service

EIDHR: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

EUPOL: European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa

EUSEC: EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC

HIPC: Heavily indebted poor countries

IfS: Instrument for Stability

MONUC: United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (replaced by MONUSCO)

NIP: National indicative programme

OECD/DAC: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee

OLAF: European Anti-Fraud Office

PAG: Programme d’Appui à la Gouvernance (Governance Support Programme)

PAMFIP: Projet d’Appui à la Modernisation des Finances Publiques (Support programme for the modernisation 
of public finance management systems)

PAP: Programme d’Appui aux Parlements (Support Programme for Parliaments)

PARP: Programme d’Appui à la Réforme de la Police Nationale (National Police Reform Support Programme)

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6

PEFA: Public expenditure and financial accountability

PFM: Public finance management

REJUSCO: Programme d’Appui à la Restauration de la Justice à  l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(EU programme for the restoration of justice in the eastern part of the DRC)

ROM: Results-oriented monitoring

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UPI: Unité de Police Intégrée (EU support programme for the training of the Integrated Police Unit)

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7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

V.
The task of state reconstruction and improving gov-
ernance in the DRC is going to be a long process. If, 
as a main development partner with the DRC and an 
advocate of good governance and human rights, the 
EU is to continue to support governance in the DRC, it 
needs to improve significantly its aid effectiveness. In 
this respect, the Commission needs to be both more 
realistic on what can be achieved and about the design 
of EU programmes and more demanding of the Con-
golese authorities when monitoring compliance with 
the conditions agreed and the commitments made1.

VI.
The Court recommends that the Commission and the 
EEAS improve the EU’s cooperation strategy with the 
DRC, better assess the risks in connection with the 
successful implementation of programmes, establish 
objectives that are achievable in the national context 
and strengthen the use of conditionality and policy 
dialogue.

I.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is widely 
recognised as one of the most fragile states in the 
world. The incapacity of the state to deliver basic ser-
vices to its population is a convincing indicator of fra -
gility. Fundamental elements of good governance such 
as human rights and democracy are not respected. 
Having provided about 1,9 billion euro of assistance 
between 2003 and 2011, the EU is one of the most 
important development partners of the DRC.

II.
The Court examined the effectiveness of EU support for 
improving governance in the DRC. More specifically, 
it examined EU support for the electoral process, the 
justice and police and public finance management 
reforms, and the decentralisation process.

III.
The Court concludes that the effectiveness of EU assis-
tance for governance in the DRC is limited. EU sup-
port for governance is set within a generally sound 
cooperation strategy, addresses the main needs and 
has achieved some results. However, progress is slow, 
uneven  and  overall  limited.  Fewer  than  half  of  the 
programmes examined have delivered, or are likely 
to deliver, most of the expected results. Sustainability 
is an unrealistic prospect in most cases.

IV.
Like  other  development  partners,  the  Commission 
faces serious obstacles in its efforts to contribute to 
improving  governance  in  the  DRC. The  absence  of 
political will, the donor-driven dynamics of the pro-
grammes and the lack of absorption capacity account 
for these failures. However, while the Commission is 
well  acquainted  with  the  main  causes  and  conse-
quences of state fragility in the DRC, it did not take 
sufficient account of these challenges when design-
ing EU programmes. Risks have not been adequately 
addressed, programme objectives tend to be overly 
ambitious, conditionality has a  weak incentive effect 
and policy dialogue has not been exploited to its full 
potential and adequately coordinated with EU Mem-
ber States.

1  DRC Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo has declared that ‘The DRC 
needs partners who are demanding but understanding, proactive but 
respectful and critical but clear-sighted.’ (Libération, 12.12.2012).

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8

INTRODUCTION

STATE FRAGILITY

The Commission defines ‘fragility’ as meaning weak or failing structures 
and situations where the social contract is broken due to the state’s 
incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions or meet its 
obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management 
of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety 
of the population and protection and promotion of citizens’ rights and 
freedoms2.

2  COM(2007) 643 final of  
25 October 2007.

3  COM(2006) 421 final of  
30 August 2006.

4  COM(2003) 615 final of  
20 October 2003.

Fragile states are often characterised by public institutions, political 
processes and social mechanisms that lack effectiveness, inclusiveness 
or legitimacy, high levels of poverty and serious underdevelopment. 
Another typical feature in many fragile states is that they are unable to 
exercise effective government authority.

Many EU policy documents, including the European Consensus on Devel-
opment3, recognise state fragility as a particular concern in the context 
of the EU’s development cooperation objectives. In 2007, the Commis -
sion communication ‘ Towards an EU response to situations of fragil-
ity’ emphasised long-term development cooperation as a response to 
fragility.

The need to promote good governance was stressed in the Commission’s 
communications on ‘Governance and development’4 and ‘Governance 
in the European consensus on development’, which sought to develop 
a coherent and common approach to promoting democratic governance.

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

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9

5  World Bank (2011).

6  Trefon, Th., Congo 
Masquerade – The political 
culture of aid inefficiency and 
reform failure, Zed Books, 
London and New York, 2011.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is located in central Africa, 
covers 2,3 million km 2 and has an estimated population of 68 million 5 
composed of approximately 350 ethnic groups (see  Map). It was the sec-
ond most industrialised country in Africa at independence from Belgium 
in 1960. It has considerable mineral and forest resources, agricultural po -
tential and hydroelectric capacity. The DRC also has oil. Despite natural 
resource potential, it is now one of the least developed countries. Eco-
nomic decline started as a result of predatory economic practices, poor 
governance and insufficient investment under former President Mobutu. 
Protracted conflict in the Great Lakes region since the early 1990s has had 
a devastating impact on the economy: infrastructure suffered considerable 
damage, many institutions were destroyed, assets were lost and invest-
ment came to a halt 6.

There has been some macroeconomic recovery since the accession of 
Joseph Kabila to power in 2001 and the end of the civil war. The gov -
ernment has implemented a programme of reforms aimed at restoring 
macroeconomic stability, directing resources towards the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure and reforming the civil service and banking sector. Much 
economic activity takes place in the informal sector beyond govern-
ment control. This is a serious handicap to tax revenues. The national 
budget for 2013  is  8 billion US dollars which is insignificant given the 
country’s size, population and natural resource wealth.

Inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure is a major obstacle to econ-
omic growth, social development, effective public administration, secur-
ity and the building of a sentiment of national unity. An overwhelming 
challenge is a vast and fragmented territory that the government does 
not control.

5. 

6. 

7. 

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10

MAP

Democratic Republic of the Congo – Administrative Map
May 2013

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO — ADMINISTRATIVE MAP

CHAD

SUDAN

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SOUTH SUDAN

CAMEROON

Zongo

Gbadolite

Bosobolo

Bondo

Ango

Libenge

Mobayi-Mbongo

Yakoma

Gemena

Businga

Bambesa

Niangara

Faradje

Dungu

Kungu

Budjala

Lisala

Bumba

Aketi

Buta

Poko

Rungu

Watsa

O R I E N T A L E
O R I E N T A L E
Wamba

Aru

Mahagi

Djugu

Bomongo

Bongandanga

Basoko

Banalia

Makanza

Basankusu

Mambasa

Irumu

GABON

REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO

E Q U A T E U R
E Q U A T E U R

Bolomba

Befale

Yahuma

Djolu

Isangi

KISANGANI

Bafwasende

MBANDAKA

Ingende

Boende

Ubundu

Bikoro

Lukolela

Inongo

Kiri

Monkoto

Bokungu

Opala

Ikela

Lubutu

Punia

Beni

Lubero

UGANDA

NORD-KIVU
NORD-KIVU

Walikale

Rutshuru

Masisi
GOMA
Kalehe

Idjwi

Nyiragongo

RWANDA

Yumbi

Bolobo

Mushie

Kutu

BANDUNDU

Oshwe

KINSHASA

Seke-Banza

Maluku

Kwamouth

Bagata

B A N D U N D U
B A N D U N D U

Lomela

Kailo
KINDU

Katako-Kombe

Pangi

Kole

Lodja

M A N I E M A
M A N I E M A

Kabare

BUKAVU

Shabunda
SUD-KIVU
SUD-KIVU
Mwenga

KASAI-ORIENTAL
KASAI-ORIENTAL

Kibombo

Kasongo

Kabambare

Fizi

Dekese

Mweka

Uvira

Walungu
BURUNDI

Tshela

Luozi

Kasangulu

Kenge

KINSHASA
KINSHASA

B A S - C O N G O
B A S - C O N G O
Madimba

MATADI

Lukula

Moanda

Boma

Songololo

Bulungu

Idiofa

Kikwit

Masi-Manimba

KASAI-OCCIDENTAL
KASAI-OCCIDENTAL
Ilebo

Demba

Dimbelenge

Lubefu

Lusambo

Popokabaka

Gungu

Kimvula

Feshi

Luebo
KANANGA

Kamonia

Kazumba

Dibaya

Miabi

Kamiji

Tshilenge

Ngandajika

Lupatapata

Lubao

Kabinda

Katanda
MBUJI-MAYI

Kongolo

Kabalo

Nyunzu

Kalemie

TANZANIA

Mbanza-Ngungu

Kasonga-Lunda

Kahemba

ANGOLA

N

S

W

0

Kilometres

E

200

Key

National capital

Province capital

Territory boundary

Province boundary

Country boundary

Map created by Lovell Johns Ltd.

© European Court of Auditors.

Luiza

Luilu

Kabongo

Manono

Moba

Kabeya-Kamwanga

Kaniama

Malemba-Nkulu

Mwene Ditu

Kapanga

Kamina

Bukama

Mitwaba
K A T A N G A
K A T A N G A

Pweto

Sandoa

Dilolo

Mutshatsha

Lubudi

Kasenga

Kambove

LUBUMBASHI

Kipushi

Kolwezi

Likasi

Sakania

ZAMBIA

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8. 

9. 

Poverty  and  vulnerability  indicators  show  no  signs  of  improvement. 
In 2011, the DRC’s Human Development Index was 0,286, which gave 
the  DRC  a rank  of 187 out  of 187 countries  with  comparable  data 7. 
About 70 % of the population lives below the poverty line 8. Life expect-
ancy is 48 years 9. The country is unable to meet its citizens’ educational 
needs10. Despite the abundance of natural resources, the DRC paradox-
ically remains a  poor food producer; around  70  % of the population is 
food insecure and some 14  % of children under 5 years suffer from acute 
malnutrition11.

One key development challenge is poor governance. The inadequate 
capacity of government departments to deliver basic services is central 
to the country’s fragility. Poor leadership, the lack of professionalism, 
limited career prospects, inadequate human resources management, 
low salaries12 and poor working conditions are among the causes of an 
inefficient and ineffective public administration. Many ‘public’ services 
have to be paid for to compensate for the state’s incapacity to deliver 
them. Corruption is widespread: Transparency International’s Worldwide 
Corruption Perception Ranking (2011) has the DRC in 168th place out 
of 182 countries evaluated (see also paragraph 82).

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

10. 

After the end of Mobutu’s regime in 1997, the holding of presidential 
and legislative elections in 2006 was a major political accomplishment. 
The elections followed important peace-building efforts which were the 
basis for a government of national unity that helped set up a transitional 
government headed by President Joseph Kabila in June 2003 13.

11

7  The HDI of sub-Saharan 
Africa as a region increased 
from 0,365 in 1980 to 
0,463 in 2011, placing the 
DRC well below the regional 
average.

8  African Development Bank, 
‘Analyse de la pauvreté en 
RDC’, Working Paper No 112, 
August 2010.

9  World Bank country data 
for the year 2011.

10  The adult literacy rate was 
67 % in 2009 and the primary 
completion rate was 59 % in 
2010 (World Bank).

11  http://www.fao.org/
emergencies/resources/
documents/resources-
detail/en/c/162039/. See 
also the Court’s Special 
Report No 1/2012 on the 
effectiveness of European 
Union development aid for 
food security in sub-Saharan 
Africa, in particular Figure 2,  
Table 2 and Annex I  
(http://eca.europa.eu).

12  A mid-level civil servant 
earns less than 100 US dollars 
a month.

13  The government was 
a political compromise 
among the five main 
armed groups: the former 
government army (Forces 
Armées Congolaises 
(FAC)), the Mouvement 
de Libération du Congo 
(MLC), the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD), the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la 
Démocratie/Mouvement de 
Libération (RCD/ML) and the 
Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie/National 
(RCD/N), as well as Mai-Mai 
militias.

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12

14  The results were 
immediately followed by 
claims of manipulation, fraud 
and human rights violations. 
Although 32 million people 
registered to vote in 2011, 
fewer than 19 million (around 
59 %) actually cast their 
ballots. The gap between 
registration and voting is best 
accounted for by the tardy 
arrival of ballots in many of 
the 63 000 polling stations 
and the difficulties people 
had in locating the stations 
where they were supposed to 
vote. In pro-Kabila Katanga, 
registration and voting were 
officially highest. In the 
pro-opposition provinces of 
Equateur, Kasai Oriental and 
Kasai Occidental, they were 
low.

15  The M23 rebellion, with 
Rwandan support, is the most 
recent illustration of armed 
groups operating in eastern 
DRC and contributing to 
the overall volatility of the 
situation and was the main 
foreign affairs challenge 
of the second semester of 
2012. The M23 succeeded 
in capturing Goma, the 
strategic capital of North 
Kivu. It received significant 
attention at the UN General 
Assembly in September 2012 
when Presidents Kabila and 
Kagame refused to publicly 
shake hands. The M23 is 
a rebel movement made up 
mainly of Congolese Tutsis 
who formerly comprised the 
‘Congrès National pour la 
Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP). 
The M23 defected from the 
DRC army in April 2012 amid 
pressure on the government 
to arrest General Ntaganda, 
who was wanted by the 
International Criminal Court 
for crimes against humanity.

16  ‘The DRC: Background 
and current developments’, 
US Congressional Research 
Service report by Ted Dagne, 
Specialist in African Affairs, 
April 2011.

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

The Congolese authorities were dilatory in preparing the November 2011 
presidential and legislative elections foreseen by the Constitution. Fol-
lowing a controversial amendment of the Constitution, the presidential 
election was reduced to a single round, leaving little chance for the 
opposition to emerge victorious. The lack of cooperation with foreign 
partners, mismanagement and poor planning of the voting operations 
strongly affected the credibility of the national electoral commission 
(CENI) and the results of the elections14.

Instability and violence in the eastern DRC remain a major concern. The 
root causes are the weakness of the state, ethnic tensions, land disputes, 
the presence of armed groups, both foreign15 and Congolese, and the 
failure to fully implement peace agreements16. The illegal exploitation 
of the region’s mineral wealth continues to fuel conflict. Many interna-
tional and bilateral partners are involved in security sector reform. As 
witnessed by the DRC national army’s inability to deal with rebels and 
militias, reform results are poor.

EU COOPERATION WITH THE DRC IN THE 
PERIOD 2003–11

EU cooperation with the DRC was suspended from 1992  to 2002 be -
cause of the lack of progress in the political democratisation process, the 
high degree of corruption, economic mismanagement and differences 
between EU Member States’ policies towards the country. During this 
period, the EU maintained an active presence through humanitarian aid 
funded by the DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).

EU development cooperation resumed after the signing of the Global 
and Inclusive Accord in December 2002 and its ratification in Sun City 
(South Africa) in April 2003. EU financial support to the DRC during the 
period 2003–11 came to 1 868 million euro, comprising 72 % (1 344 mil
-
lion euro) in development cooperation, 23,5 % (439 million euro) in hu -
manitarian aid and 4,5 % (85 million euro) in political and security-related 
cooperation.

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17  Council Decision 
2003/583/EC of 21 July 2003 
on the reallocation of funds 
received by the European 
Investment Bank for 
operations carried out in 
the Democratic Republic of 
Congo under the second, 
third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
EDFs (OJ L 198, 6.8.2003, p. 8).

18  The 9th EDF allocation 
is the final allocation after 
adding allocations granted 
as a result of mid-term and 
end-of-term reviews, as well 
as decommitted funds from 
the 7th and 8th EDFs.

15. 

16. 

17. 

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The main instrument for development cooperation with the DRC is the 
EDF. In September 2003, the 9th EDF country strategy paper (CSP) and 
national indicative programme (NIP) were signed for an initial amount 
of 171 million euro, built around three main priorities: (i) macroeconomic 
support aimed at opening access to debt relief; (ii) support for the health 
sector; and (iii) institution building and support for the transition to 
democracy.

In November 2003, 105 million euro was added, following a Council de -
cision 17 to provide financial support for the democratic transition. In 
June 2005, the 9th EDF mid-term review allocated an additional 270  mil-
lion euro and added transport infrastructure as a focal sector. At the end 
of 2011, the total allocation from the 9th EDF was 625 million euro 18.

The initial allocation under the 10th EDF NIP, signed in September 2008, 
was  561,7  million  euro. The  allocation  for  unforeseen  needs  was  in-
creased from 47,7 million euro in 2008 to 120 million euro in 2010, mainly 
for continued rehabilitation efforts in the eastern DRC and to address 
the impact of the world food price rise and financial crises. The 10 th EDF 
allocation amounts to a total of 709 million euro (June 2013).

18. 

The 10th EDF cooperation strategy builds on three focal sectors:

(a)  governance — support for centralised and decentralised govern-
ments, public finance management (PFM) reform and security sec-
tor reform ( justice and police);

(b) 

infrastructure and transport — support to rehabilitate or upgrade 
roads and waterways;

(c)  health.

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19. 

20. 

Support in non-focal sectors mainly targets regional integration meas-
ures and the management of forestry resources.

The  Table provides an overview of the allocations made under the 9th 
and 10th EDF NIPs.

TABLE

ALLOCATIONS UNDER THE 9TH AND 10TH EDFS

9th EDF

10th EDF

Programmable aid

Focal sectors

Governance

Infrastructure

Health

(million euro)

%

23

49

16

130

276

91

Sub-total

497

Non-focal sectors

Sustainable natural resources, 
regional measures, TCF2

72

13

Total programmable

Non-programmable aid

Total

Sub-total

72

569

140

709

%

14

9

19

19

19

19

Programmable aid

Focal sectors

Health

Infrastructure

Macroeconomic support

Institutional support/governance

Sub-total

Non-focal sectors

Elections 

Natural resources, DDR1, others

Sub-total

Total programmable

Non-programmable aid

Total

80

50

106

105

341

105

104

209

550

75

625

1  Disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion of former soldiers.
2  Technical Cooperation Facility. 

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21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

EU THEMATIC BUDGET LINES

During  the  period 2003–11,  suppor t  from  the  EU  general  budget 
amounted  to 147 million euro, mostly under the Development Coopera -
tion Instrument (DCI) for support to non-state actors and food security 
programmes. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) was deployed in the fields of support for victims of torture, the 
promotion of democracy and the rule of law, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and non-state actors. The Instrument for Stability (IfS) 
funded stabilisation measures in the eastern DRC and support for the 
police, such as the support programme for peace and stabilisation in the 
eastern DRC (see paragraphs 52 and 54).

HUMANITARIAN AID

With about 500 million euro over the period 2003–12, DG Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) is the largest donor of humanitarian as-
sistance in the DRC. This support is concentrated mostly in the eastern 
part of the country.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The EU Council’s diplomatic contributions to regional stabilisation efforts 
have included successive nominations of EU Special Representatives 
(EUSR)  with  a mandate  to  focus  on  stabilisation  in  the  African  Great 
Lakes countries, particularly during the post-transition phase in the DRC. 
The emphasis has been on security sector reform and the fostering of 
democratic institutions.

The  EU  has  also  launched  five  common  security  and  defence  policy 
(CSDP) missions in the DRC: two military operations (Artemis and EUFOR 
RD Congo) and three civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa (2005–07), EUPOL 
RDC (2007–ongoing) and EUSEC RDC (2005–ongoing)). The two latter 
civilian missions aim to contribute to the reform of the security sector.

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AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

16

25. 

The Court sought to assess whether EU support for governance in the 
DRC is effective. The audit focused on two questions:

(a) 

Is EU support for governance relevant to needs and achieving its 
planned results?

(b)  Does the Commission take sufficient account of the DRC’s fragile 

context in the design of EU programmes?

26. 

27. 

The audit covered EU support for the electoral process, security sector 
reform ( justice and police), public finance management (PFM) reform 
and decentralisation over the period 2003–11.

The  audit  was  carried  out  between  March  and  December 2012 and 
included:

(a) 

a review of key policy documents in the abovementioned areas, re -
view of the CSPs and NIPs for the 9th and 10th EDFs, and interviews 
with European Commission and EEAS staff in Brussels;

(b)  a review of 16 EU-funded programmes. This review aimed to assess 
the effectiveness of individual interventions, which were scored 
using the Commission’s results-oriented monitoring (ROM) meth-
odology (see Annexes I and II);

(c) 

a visit to the DRC from 28 May to 14 June 2012, during which the 
Court’s auditors interviewed EU Delegation staff, the Congolese 
authorities,  other  main  development  partners  and  civil  society 
representatives. Visits were made to programmes in Kinshasa, Bas-
Congo, South Kivu and North Kivu;

(d)  at  the  audit  design  and  report  drafting  stages,  consultation  of 
a Congo expert specialised in governance and the politics of state–
society relations.

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19  In July 2010, the DRC 
reached the HIPC completion 
point; 12,3 billion US dollars 
of the country’s 13,1 billion 
US dollar debt was forgiven.

20  Document de Stratégie 
pour la Croissance et la 
Réduction de la Pauvreté 
(DSCRP).

21  Programme d’Actions 
Prioritaires (PAP).

OBSERVATIONS

17

EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC IS 
RELEVANT TO NEEDS BUT HAS ACHIEVED LIMITED 
OVERALL RESULTS

28. 

The Court examined whether EU support for governance in the DRC:

(a) 

is set within a sound cooperation strategy which addresses the 
country’s main needs and is in line with EU policy as regards its 
response to situations of fragility;

(b)  has achieved or is likely to achieve expected results.

29. 

30. 

EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC IS SET WITHIN 
A GENERALLY SOUND COOPERATION STRATEGY

The EU’s cooperation strategy is based on an appropriate assessment of 
the political, economic, social and security situation in the DRC. Under 
the 9th EDF, the Commission progressively set out a cooperation strat -
egy which was relevant to the evolving post-conflict situation and the 
absence of a national poverty reduction strategy prior to 2006. Support 
for the electoral process was crucial for institution building and the tran-
sition to democracy. The rehabilitation of infrastructure, notably in the 
health sector, was badly needed to improve the living conditions of the 
population. Macroeconomic support under the heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC) initiative was instrumental in restoring macroeconomic 
stability and paving the way for PFM reform and development19.

The 10th EDF strategy correctly builds on the same principles. It aims to 
address the challenges of both political and infrastructure reconstruc-
tion through support for governance, health, and transport and water 
infrastructure. These objectives are aligned with the priorities set in the 
national poverty reduction and growth strategy document 20 and the 
government’s priority action programme21. A  weakness is that support 
for the 2011 electoral cycle, although consistent with the priority given 
to governance, was absent from the strategy set out in the CSP and the 
financial allocation in the NIP. This reduced the Commission’s capacity 
to react appropriately to the major problems which affected the prepar-
ation of those elections (see paragraphs 11, 40, 41, 87 and 90).

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31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

18

Support for governance is central to the 9th and 10th EDF cooperation 
strategies because good governance is crucial for peace, stability and 
development. This support covers a range of key areas in which it aims to 
contribute to long-term reforms and thus strengthen the state’s capacity 
to assume its basic functions as regards the rule of law, security and the 
management of public resources.

22  The two poorest 
provinces receiving the 
least in development aid are 
Equateur and Maniema. The 
two Kasais are also poor and 
receive little development 
aid.

In line with EU policy for responding to situations of fragility, develop-
ment cooperation is combined with humanitarian assistance funded by 
DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and with political and 
security cooperation, mainly in the eastern DRC, where the government 
does not exercise sovereign control over the territory.

The cooperation strategy therefore follows a comprehensive approach, 
involving security, political, economic and development aid and hu-
manitarian assistance, in accordance with the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development/Development  Assistance  Committee 
(OECD/DAC) Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and the 
EU policy framework.

The EU’s cooperation strategy focuses on support for the central gov-
ernment  and  for  the  eastern  DRC. This  reflects  the  priority  given  to 
strengthening the state’s capacity as well as the need to address the 
huge humanitarian crisis in the region. However, the 10th EDF CSP pays 
little attention to geographical complementarity between the EU’s co-
operation strategy and the programmes of EU Member States and other 
development partners. It appears that other partners also devote a sig -
nificant part of their aid to the East, as well as to the two most pros-
perous provinces (Bas-Congo and Katanga). There is therefore a risk of 
imbalance in the distribution of development aid, to the detriment of 
the poorer provinces22 .

EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IS RELEVANT TO THE NEEDS IN ALL 
AREAS BUT PROGRESS IS UNEVEN AND OVERALL LIMITED

35. 

The Court found that fewer than half of the programmes examined have 
delivered, or are likely to deliver, the planned results and that sustain-
ability is an unrealistic prospect in most cases (see the scores in columns 
‘Results’ and ‘Sustainability’ in Annex I).

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19

23  The constitutional 
referendum was held on 
18 December 2005. The 
combined presidential and 
national/provincial elections 
took place on 30 July and 
29 October 2006 across the 
whole country.

24  EU support programme 
for the 2005–06 electoral 
process.

25  Support programme for 
the 2011-2013 electoral 
process initiated by the UNDP.

26  EU support programme 
for the 2011–13 electoral 
process.

36. 

37. 

SUPPORT FOR THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The immediate priority after the end of the civil war was to steer the 
country away from the path of war and towards reconciliation, unity and 
peace. Following the Pretoria Agreement, the transition process started 
on 30 June 2003 with the setting-up of a transitional government whose 
main mandate was to usher in democracy through fair, competitive, 
transparent and democratic elections. This objective was complicated 
by the transitional government’s awkward power-sharing arrangement 
and the differing views among prominent political leaders on the nature 
of transition and reconstruction. The holding of a constitutional referen -
dum in 2005 and the elections in 2006 marked the end of the transition 
period23. The second electoral cycle started in November 2011.

The main EU objective in the period following the resumption of struc-
tural cooperation with the DRC (see paragraph 13) was to accompany 
the process of political transition and reconstruction of democracy. For 
the first electoral cycles (2005 and 2006), the Commission funded the 
following two programmes as its contribution to a multi-donor trust fund 
managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):

(a) 

(b) 

the ‘Programme d’Appui au Processus Électoral’ (PAPE) 24 adopted 
in  November 2004 provided  a contribution  of 105 million  euro 
from the additional envelope allocated by the Council in July 2003 
(see paragraph 16);

the second PAPE contribution, adopted in November 2005, was 
a 60  million  euro  extension  to  the  previous  programme  that 
was funded from the programmable aid for non-focal sectors of 
the 9th EDF.

38. 

To support the preparation and organisation of the second electoral 
cycle, the Commission also contributed to a trust fund managed by the 
UNDP, which had initiated the ‘Programme d’Appui au Cycle Électoral 
(PACE I)’25 in 2007 to maintain and strengthen the existing institutional 
infrastructure with a  view to preparing the second electoral cycle. The 
EDF has funded two programmes:

(a) 

the 9th EDF provided 3 million euro for ‘Appui à la CENI’ , which was 
launched in November 2007;

(b) 

the 10th EDF provided 47,5 million euro for the ‘Programme d’Appui 
au Cycle Électoral 2011–13’ (PACE II) 26, launched in May 2011.

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20

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

The two EU programmes supporting the 2005–06 electoral process have 
achieved most of their objectives by contributing at the appropriate 
time to the preparatory work that was necessary for the elections to 
take place in a generally satisfactory manner, as confirmed by the EU 
Electoral Observation Mission27. The process is considered by the DRC’s 
foreign partners to have been successful in terms of the organisation of 
logistics when faced with the huge and unique challenge of the situ-
ation in the country. The EU and other foreign partners succeeded in 
having elections held at the presidential and legislative levels. A major 
drawback, however, was the lack of support for local elections, which 
were also scheduled but never took place.

The  objec tives  of  EU  suppor t  for  the 2011 presidential  elec tions 
were not achieved. As intended, the preparation and organisation of 
the 2011 presidential and legislative elections were led by the Congolese 
authorities; however, the process was poorly managed and significant 
delays occurred in launching the preparation process. When the inter-
national community did react, it was too late for the elections to take 
place in a satisfactory manner. There were also delays in setting up the 
CENI28. Those in power carefully selected the members of the CENI and 
excluded potentially pro-opposition civil society representatives.

27  Final report from the EU 
Electoral Observation Mission 
to the DRC covering the 2006 
presidential, legislative and 
provincial elections. Report 
dated 23.2.2007.

28  The presidential term that 
was officially supposed to 
end on 6 December 2011 
was not extended to 
accommodate the serious 
delays in setting up the 
CENI (March 2011) and 
promulgating the electoral 
law (August 2011).

29  Articles 8, 9 and 96.

30  Final report from the EU 
Electoral Observation Mission 
to the DRC covering the 2011 
presidential and legislative 
elections.

In January 2011, the Constitution was amended: the presidential voting 
procedure was reduced to a single round, leaving the opposition little 
chance of emerging victorious. The international community was slow 
to react, arguing that this was an issue of national sovereignty. As far as 
the Commission and the EU Member States are concerned, this is not 
a valid reason: the Cotonou Agreement does provide them with the pos -
sibility to engage in political dialogue and a consultation procedure if 
they consider that the partner country fails to fulfil an obligation stem-
ming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule 
of law29.

The credibility gap that characterised the 2011 electoral process and the 
lack of democratic legitimacy of the electoral results are acknowledged 
by a very large part of the Congolese people and the international com-
munity30. The support provided by the international community, includ-
ing the Commission, risks being perceived as contributing to regime 
entrenchment to the detriment of the population.

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21

SUPPORT FOR THE JUDICIARY

43. 

The establishment of the rule of law is a fundamental part of stabilising 
and rebuilding the DRC. The country’s history of fragility and conflict 
has led to the breakdown of state institutions, which, if these are not 
rebuilt with new strong structures promoting the rule of law, could lead 
to further political problems and violence. The EU has addressed these 
concerns by providing support targeting the eastern DRC, as well as 
supporting the long-term restructuring of central judicial bodies.

31  Co-financed by Belgium 
(3,7 million euro), the 
Netherlands (1,1 million euro) 
and the United Kingdom 
(2,9 million euro). Sweden 
joined at a later stage with 
specific support for activities 
targeting gender-based 
violence.

44. 

The Court examined two programmes:

(a) 

the ‘Programme d’Appui à la Restauration de la Justice à l’Est de la 
République Démocratique du Congo’ (REJUSCO), launched in 2006, 
a  multi-donor funded programme31 to which the EU contributed 
7,9 million euro from the 9th EDF;

(b) 

the justice component of the ‘Programme d’Appui à la Gouvern -
ance’  (PAG),  with  funding  of 9 million  euro  from  the 9th  EDF  in 
January 2007.

45. 

46. 

The REJUSCO programme aimed to contribute to: (i) capacity-building 
for the judiciary in North and South Kivu; (ii) improving the functioning 
of justice so as to guarantee fair and equitable trials; and (iii) increasing 
the confidence of the population of these eastern provinces in their 
judiciary by monitoring trials and prisons and helping to raise the pub-
lic’s awareness of their rights and obligations, notably with regard to 
gender-based violence.

While relevant, these ambitious objectives were only partially met, mainly 
due to the programme’s complexity, the multiplicity of procedures, the 
difficult environment and poor dialogue between partners and the gov-
ernment. As a consequence, the programme was stopped earlier than 
originally planned and the Commission’s contribution reduced. Although 
the quality of some outputs, notably buildings, was poor, the programme 
did contribute to improving the law courts’ functional capabilities. How-
ever, prison conditions are still deplorable, and much remains to be done 
to improve the population’s access to and confidence in the judiciary. 
The unrest in Goma (M23 Movement) caused upheaval in the region 
which may have further undermined the work that has been done using 
EU aid (see paragraph 12).

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22

The justice component of the PAG aims to support judicial reform by: 
(i) strengthening the capacity of the Ministère de la Justice et des Droits 
Humains (MJDH)32, the Comité Mixte de la Justice (CMJ ) and the Conseil 
Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM)33; (ii) improving the functioning of 
the judiciary in Kinshasa Province; and (iii) setting up a long-term policy 
strategy.

32  Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights.

33  Supreme Judicial Council.

The programme was still ongoing at the time of the Court’s visit. Difficul-
ties in recruiting the technical assistance team delayed the implementa-
tion of activities by 2 years. This led to the cancellation of one fifth of the 
programme’s budget. The programme is likely to achieve a large part of 
the planned results as regards strengthening the central judicial institu-
tions and the judiciary in Kinshasa Province. A major problem is that the 
policy reform will not be adopted before the end of the programme due 
to inefficiency on the part of the CMJ. This has led the Commission to 
suspend its financial support to the CMJ.

For both programmes, sustainability of results is not guaranteed  owing 
to the insufficient national budget for the justice sector, persistent weak-
nesses in administrative capacity and the national government’s inad-
equate commitment to sector policy reform.

SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE

One of the main priorities of the institutional reforms launched by the 
Congolese authorities, after years of neglect under Mobutu and the pro-
tracted period of armed conflict, was to provide security to the popu-
lation. The main weaknesses of the Congolese national police are the 
lack of equipment and infrastructure, inadequate training and low and 
irregularly paid salaries, all of which are causes of demotivation. One 
main problem is the culture of trickle-up, whereby police employees 
have to provide resources to their chiefs. The police, like the military, 
live off the population.

The EU’s main objectives at the beginning of the transition period in-
cluded protecting state institutions and strengthening internal security 
in order to safeguard the transition process and facilitate the holding of 
elections. Since 2005, it has aimed to support a wider and longer-term 
process in which the institutional and governance reform of the security 
forces is a key component.

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

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23

52. 

The Court examined three programmes in this area:

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

‘Appui à la formation de l’Unité de Police Intégrée’ (UPI), launched 
in May 2004 with funding of 5 million euro from the 9th EDF intra-
ACP envelope34;

the Support Programme for peace and stabilisation in the eastern 
DRC, launched in June 2008 with an EU contribution of 10 million 
euro from the IfS, including 2,9 million euro for the police;

‘Programme d’Appui à la Réforme de la Police Nationale (PARP)’, 
launched  in  August 2010 with  funding  of 11 million  euro  from 
the 10th EDF.

34  The intra–ACP envelope 
refers to cooperation with 
ACP States that is embedded 
in the regional cooperation 
benefiting many or all ACP 
States. Such operations 
may therefore transcend 
the concept of geographic 
location.

53. 

54. 

The UPI support programme was conducted jointly with EUPOL Kinshasa, 
a CSDP police mission (see paragraph 24). It had a limited number of 
clear and logical priorities. It was successful in establishing a unit of 1000 
highly trained police officers with the necessary logistical support and 
equipment, and it achieved its planned results by ensuring security for 
the constitutional referendum and the elections of 2005 and 2006. The 
Court was unable to obtain any information concerning the redeploy-
ment of personnel  and  equipment once the programme ended. The 
sustainability of these results is therefore unclear.

The police component of the support programme for peace and stabilisa-
tion in the eastern DRC has partially achieved its planned results. It has 
provided buildings, facilities and equipment for two mobile intervention 
units and the regional police headquarters in Goma and Bukavu. Con-
struction works suffered from long delays, in particular in Bukavu, and 
are of poor quality. At the time of the Court’s visit, the facilities financed 
in Bukavu were not yet in use. In Goma, they were not yet operational 
due to the lack of running water and electricity, which were supposed 
to have been installed and funded by the police authorities. So far, the 
programme has not been effective in improving the operational capacity 
of the police in the region. The unrest in Goma (M23 Movement) may 
have further undermined the work that has been done using EU aid (see 
paragraph 12).

55. 

The PARP aims to support the reform of the Congolese national police 
by strengthening the coordination capacities of the Comité de Suivi de 
la Réforme de la Police (CSRP), reorganising the management of human 
and budgetary resources and improving training infrastructure. It is be -
ing implemented in coordination with the technical support provided 
to the CSRP by EUPOL RDC, another CSDP police mission.

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24

56. 

57. 

58. 

The programme was at an early stage of implementation at the time 
of the Court’s visit. It had succeeded in setting up a human resources 
database, which is a  key step for the police reform to be implemented. 
However, the sustainability of this database was a matter for concern 
since there were no plans regarding IT system maintenance after the 
end of the technical assistance funded by the EU.

SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT REFORM

In 2008, the public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) re -
view established that PFM was characterised by deficiencies in most 
areas, including an obsolete legal budgetary framework, flawed budget-
ary planning and implementation and frequent recourse to exceptional 
procedures. Key functions such as accounting and treasury operations 
did not respect the principles of good practice, and external scrutiny 
mechanisms were practically non-existent.

Following the review, the government adopted, and is implementing 
with the support of development partners that include the EU, a strate -
gic plan for public finance reform aimed at addressing these weaknesses 
over the period 2010–17.

59. 

The Court examined three EU programmes:

(a) 

the  public  finance  component  of  the ‘Programme  d’Appui  à la 
 Gouvernance’ (PAG), signed in January 2007  and funded by a  9th 
EDF contribution of 6,5 million euro;

(b) 

the natural resources component of the PAG, funded by a 9th EDF 
contribution of 9 million euro;

(c) 

the ‘Projet  d’Appui  à la  Modernisation  des  Finances  Publiques’ 
(PAMFIP),  signed  in  May  2010  and  funded  by  a  contribution 
of 10 million euro from the 10th EDF.

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25

35  Budget support for 
macroeconomic stabilisation 
in the DRC.

36  Budget support to mitigate 
the impact of the economic 
and financial crisis.

37  Steering Committee for 
the Reform of Public Finance.

38  Strategic plan for public 
finance reform.

39  Inspectorate General of 
Finances.

40  Economic, Financial 
and Budgetary Control 
Committee.

60. 

The Court also examined two targeted budget support programmes:

(a) 

(b) 

‘Appui budgétaire à la Stabilisation économique de la RDC’ 35, signed 
in August and December 2009 and funded by a total of 48,6 mil -
lion euro from the 10th EDF and the DCI;

‘Appui  budgétaire  pour  atténuer  les  effets  de  la  crise  économ-
ique et financière en RDC’36, signed in December 2010 and funded 
by 50 million euro from the 10th EDF under the Vulnerability FLEX 
( V-FLEX) initiative set up in 2009.

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

The three EU support programmes addressing central PFM reforms have 
produced moderate results so far.

T h e   P FM   c o m p o n e n t   o f   t h e   PAG   h a s   s t re n g t h e n e d   t h e   Co m i t é 
d’Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques (COREF)37, which is 
the key interministerial body in charge of coordinating PFM reform. It 
also contributed to adoption of the ‘Plan Stratégique de Réforme des 
Finances Publiques’ (PSRFP) 38 and has reinforced the capacities of the 
Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF) 39 and the National Assembly’s 
Commission Économique, Financière et Contrôle Budgétaire (Ecofin)40 
by providing training, consultancy and equipment and by rehabilitating 
office premises.

Support for the supreme audit institution (SAI) has, on the other hand, 
been largely unsuccessful. While there has been an increase in the num-
ber and capacities of staff, the intended rehabilitation of the SAI’s head-
quarters is at a complete standstill owing to a legal dispute with the 
contractor. The SAI’s operational capacity has been seriously affected as 
a result.

The PAMFIP, a logical continuation of the PAG, aims to strengthen budget-
ary programming, accounting and customs services. The programme was 
at an early stage of implementation at the time of the Court’s visit, but it 
was already hindered by difficulties in recruiting experts and coordinat-
ing certain activities with other donors.

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65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

26

One objective of the two targeted budget support programmes was 
to contribute to improving PFM. However, the programmes did not es-
tablish any links with the government’s PFM reform plan, nor did they 
identify which priorities they were intended to support. It is unclear 
how programmes of this sort can achieve such an objective, given that 
funds were disbursed in a single fixed tranche, with no performance-
related conditions or policy dialogue requirements. The Court notes 
that, although the country is facing a difficult economic and budgetary 
situation and low salaries are one reason for the inefficiency of gov-
ernment departments (see paragraph 9), MPs’ salaries were increased 
from 1 500 US dollars during the transition period to 6 000 US dollar 
in 2006 and 13 000 US dollars in 2012. In 2011, spending on the Presi
-
dency, the Prime Minister, the National Assembly and the Senate ac-
counted for 11 % of total budgetary expenditure and was almost three 
times the amount spent on health41.

41  In 2011, the total budget 
was 6 746 billion Congo/
Kinshasa francs (CDF). 
Budgetary appropriations 
for the Presidency, the 
Prime Minister, the National 
Assembly and the Senate 
amounted to 291 billion CDF 
(4,3 %) while appropriations 
for health came to 
233 billion CDF (3,5 %). Total 
budgetary spending was 
3 515 billion CDF, of which 
393 billion CDF (11,1 %) went 
on the former sector and 
137 billion CDF (3,9 %) on the 
latter.

The adoption of the strategic plan for public finance reform is an indica-
tor of the government’s commitment to PFM reform, which the coordi-
nated support of development partners helps to maintain. However, as 
with EU programmes in other areas, insufficient budgetary resources and 
weak public finance management raise doubts as to the capacity of the 
institutions supported by the PAG and PAMFIP programmes to continue 
their activities and maintain buildings and equipment without donor 
support.

The DRC’s economic future and the prospects of improved governance 
depend closely on the way in which the country’s considerable natural 
wealth is managed. However, the end of conflict and the holding of elec-
tions have not yet transformed the DRC’s natural resources into drivers 
of development. In this context, the natural resources component of 
the PAG aims to strengthen the capacity of key institutions to manage 
the mining and forestry sectors, improve the conditions for attracting 
investment and increase revenues.

When examined about 1½ years before the end of its operational pe-
riod, the natural resources component of the PAG had produced modest 
results. One reason was an inadequate needs assessment, which had 
failed to identify some main weaknesses in the management of natural 
resources, such as illegal exploitation, corruption, the lack of reliable 
data, weak control and customs mechanisms, arbitrary  taxation,  low 
productivity and the low processing rate of commodities. There were 
also weaknesses in the programme’s design, leading to serious delays 
during implementation and to the need to cancel many of the planned 
activities.

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27

69. 

70. 

While the programme has contributed to strengthening the capacities 
of some institutions, many results are unlikely to be achieved. These 
include adoption of a national forestry plan, revision of the mining code 
and strengthening of the exploitation, processing and marketing chain.

42  Support programme 
for the start-up of 
decentralisation in the DRC.

43  Support programme for 
parliaments.

SUPPORT FOR THE DECENTRALISATION PROCESS

Decentralisation in the DRC is the subject of a long political debate that 
returned to the agenda with the adoption of the Constitution in  2006. 
It has three dimensions (political, administrative and fiscal) and aims 
to foster democracy and enhance local political accountability while 
improving service delivery to citizens.

71. 

The Court examined two programmes:

(a) 

the ‘Projet d’Appui au Démarrage de la Décentralisation en RDC’ 
(PA2D)42, signed in May 2010 and funded by a 10th EDF contribu -
tion of 15 million euro;

(b) 

the ‘Programme d’Appui aux Parlements’ (PAP)43, signed in May 2010 
and funded by a 10th EDF contribution of 5 million euro.

72. 

73. 

The PA2D aims to ease the passage towards decentralisation by support-
ing the bodies in charge of steering decentralisation reform at national 
level and strengthening the administrative capacities of the provinces of 
Kinshasa and North Kivu. The PAP aims to contribute to the consolidation 
of democracy in the DRC by strengthening the capacities of the National 
Assembly, the Senate and the two provincial assemblies in Kinshasa and 
North Kivu.

Both programmes were at an early stage of implementation at the time 
of the Court’s visit, but already they had limited prospects of success. 
They were experiencing major problems for a variety of reasons, chief 
of  which  were  the  weaknesses  of  the  Congolese  administration,  the 
postponement of the provincial elections and the national authorities’ 
insufficient political commitment to pursuing the decentralisation objec-
tive. The current Presidency is in a phase of trying to consolidate power. 
Decentralisation requires the sharing of power, which the President is 
reluctant to do at this time. In these circumstances, the sustainability of 
any results that both programmes might achieve is very questionable 
unless there is a major change in the political context.

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44  Article 175 of the 
Constitution stipulates that 
40 % of national revenues 
collected in each province 
is to be devolved to 
them, a process known as 
retrocession, while another 
10 % is to be assigned to 
an equalising investment 
fund (Caisse nationale de 
Péréquation), which would 
be restricted to investment 
expenditure. The overall 
aim is to reduce provincial 
inequalities.

45  Currently, the provincial 
governors perform a double 
role by simultaneously 
representing their provinces 
and carrying out central 
government tasks. The heads 
of local government are 
appointed by the President.

74. 

Despite overwhelming social consensus within the country on the need 
for decentralisation, the government is reluctant to move ahead with 
reform. The Kinshasa-based top-down approach advanced by the DRC’s 
foreign partners, including the Commission, therefore has limited po-
tential for success in promoting the implementation of decentralisation. 
Provincial governments claim to be in favour of receiving the benefits 
of decentralisation but are reluctant to accept the responsibilities of 
service provision that it would entail. One political obstacle is the imbal-
ance between provincial assets: two provinces (Bas-Congo and Katanga) 
contribute to more than half of the country’s tax revenues.

75. 

As a result, the decentralisation process has been considerably delayed.

(a)  Many legal instruments concerning decentralisation have not yet 

been adopted.

(b)  The retrocession process has not yet been implemented44.

(c) 

Local elections, originally due to be held in 2008, and then resched -
uled for 2011, never took place. The provincial elections foreseen 
for 2011 have been put on hold 45.

(d)  The  creation  of 26 provinces,  instead  of  the  current  11,  should 
have been completed by May  2010, but the law has still not been 
adopted.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT TAKE SUFFICIENT 
ACCOUNT OF THE FRAGILE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
IN THE DESIGN OF EU PROGRAMMES

76. 

The Court examined whether the Commission:

(a) 

adequately addressed the main risks to the effectiveness of the EU 
programmes;

(b) 

set clear and achievable objectives;

(c)  made  appropriate  use  of  conditionality  and  policy  dialogue  to 
encourage the Congolese authorities’ commitment to improved 
governance.

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29

77. 

78. 

79. 

80. 

81. 

RISKS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED

External aid is implemented in high-risk environments, and this is even 
more the case in fragile states. Like other development partners, the 
Commission cannot avoid taking risks. However, it should manage the 
risks appropriately in order to mitigate them as far as possible.

The Commission is well acquainted with the situation in the DRC and 
with the causes and consequences of state fragility. When designing the 
EU programmes examined by the Court, it identified many risks and con-
sidered the lessons learned from previous programmes. The Commission 
took account of the difficult context and weak national administration 
when choosing how to deliver aid and implementing a control system. 
However,  the  Commission  did  not  assess  the  likelihood  of  risk  or  its 
potential impact on the programmes. In many cases, the preparatory 
documents merely referred to assumptions and/or risks to the effective-
ness of programmes, although it was well-known that there were serious 
problems concerning, in particular, the national authorities’ insufficient 
commitment to reform and their weak institutional and financial cap-
acity to ensure the sustainability of results after completion of the EU 
programmes.

The programme documents do not mention a number of major risks 
— notably the lack of political will, fraud and corruption — which are 
a  serious matter for concern in the DRC (see paragraph 9). Other risks 
were under-evaluated, such as transport and communication problems, 
the national authorities’ limited absorption capacity (see paragraph 82(c)) 
and the difficulty in recruiting international experts and local contractors 
with the necessary equipment and skilled labour, especially in the re-
mote and often insecure eastern areas of the DRC (see paragraph 82(b)).

The programmes examined by the Court did not systematically include 
measures to prevent or mitigate the main specific risks identified in the 
area concerned, or guidance for project managers and the Commission’s 
services on the course of action to be followed if risks become reality.

The targeting approach followed for the budget support programmes 
adopted in 2009  does not prevent or reduce risks. Budget support funds 
are merged with other resources in the partner country’s budget (known 
as ‘fungibility’) and cannot be traced beyond the stage at which they are 
paid into that budget. They are exposed to the same PFM weaknesses 
and risks as other national budget resources (see paragraph 65).

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30

OBJECTIVES WERE OFTEN TOO AMBITIOUS

82. 

The inadequate assessment of risks largely contributed to the setting of 
overly ambitious objectives for seven of the programmes examined by 
the Court.

46  PAG mid-term evaluation 
report, October 2011.

(a) 

The objective set for the PACE (see paragraph  38) and support for 
the CENI (see paragraphs 11 and 40) of contributing to democratic 
elections was unrealistic given the Congolese authorities’ limited 
availability for dialogue with the international community concern-
ing timely preparations for the 2011 electoral process.

(b)  The  objectives  of  the  REJUSCO  programme  (see  paragraphs 45 
and 46) were too ambitious for the post-conflict situation in the 
eastern DRC. For example, the programme did not take into ac-
count the shortage of construction and consultancy firms with ap-
propriate skilled labour and equipment. It also involved a complex 
management structure and a combination of heterogeneous rules 
and procedures. The programme had to be scaled down during im-
plementation and was eventually shelved following a denunciation 
to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) about works contracts.

(c) 

The mid-term evaluation of the justice component of the PAG (see 
paragraphs 47 and 48) found that, with its 35 planned activities and 
a budget about twice the annual budget of the Ministry of Justice 46, 
the programme was ill-adapted to the Ministry of Justice’s limited 
structure and absorption capacity. It had to be significantly scaled 
down during implementation.

(d)  The natural resources component of the PAG (see paragraphs 67 
to 69) pursues numerous priorities involving a  wide range of ac -
tivities  and  needs  for  expertise. This  has  led  to  significant  diffi-
culties and the need to modify and considerably scale down the 
programme during implementation.

(e) 

The PA2D (see paragraphs 71 to 73) did not adequately take ac -
count of the fact that the decentralisation process was mainly do-
nor-driven. From the outset, the Congolese government has been 
reluctant to support the reform. Many legal instruments concerning 
decentralisation have not yet been adopted, and many observers 
see the whole process as abortive. The EU programme approved 
in 2009 has come to a virtual standstill.

(f )  Objective-setting for the PAP (see paragraphs 71 to 73) did not 
take  sufficient  account  of  the  risk  of  postponed  senatorial  and 
provincial elections, which has seriously delayed realisation of the 
programme’s objectives.

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31

CONDITIONALITY AND POLICY DIALOGUE WERE NOT EXPLOITED TO 
THEIR FULL POTENTIAL

83. 

EU programmes involve not only the funding of planned activities but 
also two other components which must be combined appropriately in 
order to maximise the chances that EU funds are well spent:

(a) 

agreement with the partner country on conditions linked to the 
programme objectives and risks;

(b)  policy dialogue with the government on the definition and imple -

mentation of appropriate reform policies and strategies.

47  Special Report 
No 17/2012 on the European 
Development Fund (EDF) 
contribution to a sustainable 
road network in sub-Saharan 
Africa (http://eca.europa.eu).

84. 

85. 

86. 

CONDITIONALITY

For the EU programmes examined by the Court, the Commission used 
conditionality in a way which considerably reduced the potential in -
centive effect on the national authorities’ commitment to reform and 
the possibility for the Commission to use conditions as a tool in policy 
dialogue with the government.

As the Court has already found in connection with EDF support for road 
infrastructure programmes in sub-Saharan Africa47, the Commission rare-
ly imposed preconditions which the Congolese authorities must meet 
before a programme could start, tendering was launched or a contract 
was signed. Few examples of this approach, such as the requirement 
for the prior adoption of legislation or provision of suitable land, were 
detected in the programmes examined.

The conditions set are not legally binding but are generally presented 
in financing agreements as ‘accompanying measures’ to be taken up by 
the Congolese authorities. These measures are often vaguely defined 
(e.g. to progressively increase spending on maintenance depending on 
budgetary capacity) or unrealistic (e.g. to ensure adequate maintenance).

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32

48  For example the Comité 
de Suivi de la Réforme de 
la Police and the Comité 
d’Orientation de la Réforme 
des Finances Publiques.

49  ‘CSDP missions and 
operations: Lessons learned 
processes’, European 
Parliament, Directorate-
General for External Policies 
(PE 457.062, p. 52), April 2012.

87. 

88. 

Thus it was difficult for the Commission to monitor compliance with the 
conditions and to take timely and appropriate measures where they were 
not met. In only one case did the Commission decide to suspend dis-
bursement of an EU contribution: in view of the irregularities observed 
during the 2011 presidential elections, the Commission decided in co -
ordination with other donors to withhold its final payment. However, 
this was a case of ‘too little too late’.

POLICY DIALOGUE

The Commission was a main actor promoting policy dialogue with the 
Congolese government in coordination with other donors. It partici-
pated actively in the country assistance framework (CAF) and the vari-
ous thematic working groups which are the institutional framework for 
dialogue between line ministries, donors and representatives of civil 
society. It funded interministerial bodies which were to play a key role 
in the reform process and coordination with donors48. The Commission 
also maintained dialogue with the government when programming and 
reviewing the 9th and 10th EDF cooperation strategies, designing and 
monitoring the implementation of individual programmes and conduct-
ing joint annual reviews of EU cooperation.

89. 

However,  the  quality  of  policy  dialogue  was  affected  by  several  key 
weaknesses.

(a) 

Thematic working groups were not an effective forum for coordi-
nated policy dialogue. By mid-2009, most of them operated without 
an action plan and had no clear mission, objectives, responsibili-
ties, budget or timetable. Line ministries were often not actively 
involved and meetings did not address relevant issues. An attempt 
was made to improve the functioning of the working groups, but 
a 2011 evaluation performed by the Ministry of Planning found that 
many problems remained.

(b)  Although  this  unsatisfactor y  situation  was  par tly  the  result  of 
weak national administrative capacity, the Congolese authorities 
have preferred the approach of bilateral policy dialogue with each 
 donor so as to take advantage of potential differences of opinion 
and competition among donors. This has been facilitated by inad-
equate coordination in policy dialogue between donors, including 
between the Commission and EU Member States, particularly in the 
area of support for the police49.

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33

(c) 

The EU and like-minded foreign partners face increased difficulty in 
influencing the direction taken by the DRC authorities with regard 
to  governance. The  DRC  has  natural  resources  which  the  world 
needs, and the engagement of newer foreign partners with no-
strings-attached business agendas (such as China, South Africa, 
Brazil and South Korea) further diminishes traditional development 
partners’ leverage over the DRC government.

(d)  As indicated above (see paragraphs 84 to 87), the Commission’s ap-
proach to conditionality considerably reduces its capacity to take 
full advantage of policy dialogue.

90. 

In this context, policy dialogue with the Congolese authorities has been 
a challenging task for the Commission that has achieved varied and, 
overall, limited results.

(a)  As  suppor t  for  the  electoral  process  was  not  a focal  sector  of 
the 10th EDF cooperation strategy, the Commission did not make it 
sufficiently clear from the outset that supporting democratic elec-
tions remained a key political priority of EU cooperation after the 
transition period. This affected its capacity to react appropriately 
and in a timely manner.

(b) 

In the justice sector, the CMJ has not proved an effective forum for 
dialogue and has been largely unsuccessful in obtaining the adop-
tion and implementation of reform by the Ministry of Justice. This 
led the Commission to withdraw its funding for the CMJ secretariat 
in 2011. The Congolese authorities also demonstrated little appro -
priation of the REJUSCO programme, which was perceived by the 
population as a donor-driven initiative.

(c) 

In the police sector, policy dialogue has been difficult. Although the 
CSRP is an appropriate forum for dialogue, the Congolese authori-
ties have shown moderate commitment to reform and a preference 
for bilateral dialogue with individual donors. It took 5 years for the 
organic police law to be adopted.

(d)  The lack of political will to implement the decentralisation process 

has afforded little scope for useful policy dialogue.

(e)  Policy dialogue in relation to PFM reform has been less difficult, 
notably due to coordinated donor involvement since the 2008 PEFA.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

34

The Court concludes that the effectiveness of EU assistance for gov-
ernance in the DRC is limited. EU support for governance is set within 
a generally sound cooperation strategy, addresses the country’s main 
governance needs and has achieved some results. However, progress is 
slow, uneven and, overall, limited. Fewer than half of the programmes 
have delivered, or  are likely  to deliver, most of the expected results. 
Sustainability is an unrealistic prospect in most cases.

50  DRC Prime Minister 
Augustin Matata Ponyo has 
declared that ‘The DRC needs 
partners who are demanding 
but understanding, proactive 
but respectful and critical 
but clear-sighted.’ (Libération, 
12.12.2012).

In common with other development partners, the Commission faces 
serious obstacles in its efforts to contribute to improving governance 
in the DRC: the absence of political will, the donor-driven dynamics of 
the programmes and the lack of absorption capacity. However, while the 
Commission is well acquainted with the main causes and consequences 
of state fragility in the DRC, it did not take sufficient account of this con-
text when designing EU programmes. Risks have not been adequately 
addressed, programme objectives are often too ambitious, conditionality 
has a weak incentive effect and policy dialogue has not been exploited 
to its full potential and adequately coordinated with EU Member States 
in all areas.

The task of state reconstruction and improving governance in the DRC 
is going to be a long process. If, as a main development partner with 
the DRC and an advocate of good governance and human rights, the EU 
is to continue to support governance in the DRC, it needs to improve 
significantly its aid effectiveness. In this respect, the Commission needs 
to be both more realistic on what can be achieved and about the design 
of EU programmes and more demanding of the Congolese authorities 
when monitoring compliance with the conditions agreed and the com-
mitments made50.

91. 

92. 

93. 

94. 

The Court makes the following recommendations with a view to improv -
ing the effectiveness of EU support for governance in the DRC.

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35

RECOMMENDATION 1
EU COOPERATION STRATEGY

In coordination with other development partners, notably EU Member 
States, the Commission and the EEAS should:

(a)  with a view to programming for the  11th EDF and the design of 
future EU programmes, (i) pay increased attention to ensuring 
an appropriate balance of aid between all provinces, especially 
the poorer ones; (ii) combine support at central level with pro-
grammes at the provincial level that link political and territorial 
decentralisation with improved natural resource management 
strategies and infrastructure rehabilitation and development; 
and  (iii)  reconsider  EU  suppor t  for  improved  management  of 
natural resources on the basis of a comprehensive needs assess -
ment;

(b)  place greater emphasis, in its dialogue with the DRC government, 
on the fact that democratic elections are a key component of 
governance, and carefully assess all risks to ensure that EU pro-
grammes in this area do not support regime entrenchment;

(c) 

promote  improved  DRC  government  accountabilit y  through 
increased support to strengthen the capacity of national over-
sight institutions, in particular the specialised committees of the 
 National Assembly and the supreme audit institution;

(d) 

in all governance areas covered by the EU cooperation strategy, 
systematically consider the need to support the fight against 
fraud and corruption.

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36

RECOMMENDATION 2
RISKS

The Commission should:

(a) 

at the outset of programmes and regularly during their imple-
mentation,  assess  the  likelihood  and  potential  impact  of  the 
main risks to the achievement of programme objectives. This 
will involve (i) appraising the relevance and credibility of the 
country’s policies and action plans for improving governance in 
relation to the available institutional and financial resources, and 
(ii) monitoring progress against commitments made by the DRC 
authorities;

(b) 

establish measures to prevent or mitigate risks and clearly define 
the course of action to be followed if risks become reality.

RECOMMENDATION 3
PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

The Commission should:

(a) 

focus objectives on a limited number of priorities;

(b) 

(c) 

set out a time frame which is better adapted to the programme 
environment;

provide for flexibility during programme implementation so that 
objectives can be reviewed promptly where appropriate.

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37

RECOMMENDATION 4
CONDITIONALITY AND POLICY DIALOGUE

The Commission should:

(a) 

strengthen its use of conditionality and policy dialogue. This will 
involve (i) setting clear, relevant, realistic and time-bound con-
ditions, (ii) periodically assessing compliance with the agreed 
conditions, and (iii) responding firmly, proportionately and in 
a timely manner if the DRC government shows insufficient com -
mitment  to  compliance,  where  appropriate  by  suspending  or 
terminating the programme;

(b)  urge the DRC government to adopt the necessary measures for 
improving the functioning of the thematic working groups, and 
monitor the implementation of those measures;

(c) 

take a more active leadership role towards EU Member States to 
encourage coordinated policy dialogue and increase EU leverage 
over the DRC government.

This  Repor t  was  adopted  by  Chamber  III,  headed  by  Mr  Karel  PINX TEN, 
M e m b e r   o f   t h e   Co u r t   o f   Au d i to r s ,   i n   Lu xe m b o u r g   a t   i t s   m e e t i n g 
of 16 July 2013.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

 
 
 
38

ANNEX I

SCORING OF PROGRAMMES

Programmes

Area

Amount

Appui à la formation de 
l'Unité de Police Intégrée (UPI)

5,00

EU 
instrument

Intra-ACP —  
9th EDF

Programme d'appui à la réforme 
de la Police Nationale (PARP)

e
c
i
l

o
P

11,00

10th EDF

Support for Peace and  
Stabilisation in the eastern 
DRC (police component)

Programme Restauration  
de la Justice à I'Est de la 
République Démocratique  
du Congo (REJUSCO)

Programme d'appui à la 
gouvernance (PAG) — Volet 
Justice

Appui au processus électoral 
en RDC (APEC)

Programme d'appui au pro-
cessus électoral (PAPE / APEC)

Appui à la CENI

Programme d'appui au cycle 
électoral 2011–13 (PACE)

Programme d'Appui Bud-
gétaire pour la Stabilisation 
Économique de la RDC 

VFLEX — Appui budgétaire 
pour atténuer les effets  
de la crise économique  
et financière en RDC

Programme d'appui à la 
Gouvernance (PAG) —  
Volet finances publiques

Programme d'appui à la 
Gouvernance (PAG) —  
Volet ressources naturelles

Programme d'appui à la 
Modernisation des Finances 
Publiques (PAMFIP)

2,90

IFS

7,90

9th EDF

e
c
i
t
s
u
J

9,00

9th EDF

105,00

Additional 
envelope

s
n
o
i
t
c
e
l
E

60,00

9th EDF

3,00

9th EDF

47,50

10th EDF

48,62

10th EDF/DCI

t
n
e
m
e
g
a
n
a
m
e
c
n
a
n
fi
c
i
l

b
u
P

50,00

10th EDF

6,50

9th EDF

9,00

9th EDF

10,00

10th EDF

Relevance

Design

Results

Sustain-
ability

Implementation 
period

(million euro)

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

B

A

C

C

A

B

A

B

B

B

C

B

B

B

C

B

C

C

B

C

A

B

B

C

C

B

B

B

C

D

D

C

C

D

C

C

C

C

D

7.5.2004 – 31.12.2005

12.8.2010 – 12.2.2015 
Rider: 12.2.2016 

20.6.2008 – 30.6.2011

11.7.2006 – 31.12.2010

25.1.2007 – 31.12.2012 
Rider: 31.12.2013

29.11.2004 – 31.12.2010

24.11.2005 – 31.12.2006

13.11.2007 – 31.12.2009

25.5.2011 – 27.5.2014

N/A

N/A

2009

N/A

N/A

2010

C

C

C

B

C

B

25.1.2007 – 31.12.2012 
Rider: 31.12.2013

25.1.2007 – 31.12.2012 
Rider: 31.12.2013

20.5.2010 – 20.5.2015

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39

Programmes

Area

Amount

EU 
instrument

Relevance

Design

Results

Sustain-
ability

Implementation 
period

Projet d'appui au démarrage 
de la decentralisation en 
République Démocratique  
du Congo (PA2D)

Programme d'appui aux  
Parlements (PAP)

TOTAL

n
o
i
t
a
s
i
l
a
r
t
n
e
c
e
D

15,00

10th EDF

5,00

10th EDF

395,42

A

A

C

B

C

B

C

C

20.5.2010 – 20.5.2015

20.5.2010 – 20.5.2014 
Rider: 20.5.2015

Legend: 
On the basis of the scoring methodology in Annex II, the following ratings have been established: 

A

B

C

D

Criterion met

Minor weaknesses

Serious weaknesses

Criterion not met

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40

ANNEX II

SCORING METHODOLOGY

For the purpose of the audit, the scoring of relevance, design, results and sustainability was based 
on the Commission’s ROM methodology. The criteria used are listed below:

Relevance

A

B

C

D

Design

A

B

C

D

Results

Clearly embedded in national policies and European Commission strategy; responds to Paris Declaration commitments on ownership, 
alignment and harmonisation; is highly relevant to needs of target group.

Fits well in national policies and EC strategy (without always being explicit); reasonably compatible with Paris Declaration commitments; 
relevant to target group’s needs.

There are some issues/problems regarding consistency with national and EC policies or the Paris Declaration, or relevance to targeting.

Contradicts national policies or EC strategy or Paris Declaration commitments; relevance of needs is questionable. Major adaptations needed.

Clear and well-structured logical framework; feasible and consistent vertical logic of objectives; sufficiently SMART; OVIs (objectively verifi-
able indicators); risks and assumptions clearly identified and managed; exit strategy in place.

Adequate intervention logic, although it might need some improvements regarding hierarchy of objectives, OVIs, risk and assumptions.

Problems with intervention logic may affect performance of project and capacity to monitor and evaluate progress; improvements necessary.

Intervention logic is faulty and requires major revision for the project to have a chance of success.

⇒ 

For closed projects

A

B

C

D

A

B

C

D

Benefits and capacities drawn from results are available, of good quality and used by all target groups.

Outcomes are mostly of good quality, available and used by most target groups. Room for improvement exists, however without serious 
impact on effectiveness.

Some benefits are available, but not always of the best quality. Improvements are necessary to ensure the project can achieve its purpose in 
terms of quality, reach and availability.

Outcomes are not available in most cases and are of poor quality. Major changes are urged to attain results.

⇒ 

For ongoing projects

Full achievement of results is likely in terms of quality and coverage. Negative effects have been mitigated.

Results will be achieved with minor limitations; negative effects have not caused much harm.

Results will be achieved only partially owing, among other things, to negative effects to which management was not able to fully adapt. 
Corrective measures are necessary to improve the ability to achieve results.

Project will not achieve its purpose unless major, fundamental remedial action is taken.

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41

Sustainability

⇒ 

Financial/economic sustainability

A

B

C

D

A

B

C

D

Potentially very good; costs for services and maintenance are covered or affordable; external factors will not change that.

Likely to be good, but problems might arise namely as a result of changing external economic factors.

Problems need to be addressed regarding financial sustainability either in terms of institutional or target group, costs or the changing 
economic context.

Very questionable unless major changes are made.

⇒ 

Level of ownership

Local structures and institutions are strongly involved in all stages of implementation and are committed to continue producing and using 
results after the end of EC funding. 

Implementation is based in good part on local structures and institutions which are also involved to some degree in decision-making. Likeli-
ness of sustainability is good, but there is room for improvement.

Project uses mainly ad hoc arrangements and not enough local structures and institutions to ensure sustainability. Continued results are not 
guaranteed. Corrective measures are needed.

Project depends completely on ad hoc structures with no prospect of sustainability. Fundamental changes are needed to enable 
sustainability.

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42

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.
The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  consider  that  the  funda-
mental  elements  of  good  governance  such  as  human 
rights, democracy, security and basic public services are 
not sufficiently respected.

III.
Some projects to which the Court’s comment may apply 
were  at  a ver y  early  stage  of  implementation  and  had 
consequently not yet delivered results. The delays as com-
pared to the initial timetables are mainly due to the fra-
gility and post-crisis situation in the DRC. The operational 
periods of the projects have therefore been extended and 
most expected results of the projects and programmes are 
achievable. The timeline for assessing the effectiveness of 
EU programmes needs to take into account the realities of 
working in a fragile state. The Commission considers also 
that progress needs to be recognised where it occurred, 
for instance the 2006 elections and overall public finance 
management. 

As  pointed  out  by  the  Court  in  this  report,  the  national 
budget is insufficient. However, it increased by a factor of 
20 over the last 10 years and is still expected to double 
by 2016. This trend allows the government to progressively 
allocate appropriate funds to related budget items includ-
ing human resource and maintenance budgets, thereby 
improving sustainability in the medium term. 

IV.
Objectives were in line with the EU vision for DRC at the 
time and were expected to capitalise on the positive dem-
ocratic  trend  which  was  expected  after  the  first  demo-
cratic elections in 2006. Risk management does not only 
imply that risk will be avoided, but that the support will 
be adjusted to take account of a  changing political situ-
ation or the time necessary to complete the action. Both 
approaches  have  been  applied  by  the  Commission. The 
Commission  and  the  EEAS  therefore  consider  that  the 
DRC  context  and  risks  have  been  adequately  taken  into 
consideration.

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REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

INTRODUCTION

11.
Although it expressed its regrets over the constitutional 
amendment  that  should  have  aimed  for  a greater  con -
sensus with the opposition, the EU does not consider the 
January 2011 constitutional amendment as illegal or anti -
democratic. The timing of this amendment also allowed 
the opposition political parties to incorporate this change 
in their electoral strategies.

12.
The  instability  in  the  eastern  DRC  is  of  complex  origin. 
Its root causes are linked to regional, national (DRC) and 
local elements. The EEAS and the Commission will soon 
present a joint communication regarding an EU strategic 
framework for the Great Lakes where further analysis will 
be proposed. 

In a state like the DRC where all administrative and social 
structures had been destroyed, the use of preconditions 
would have been ineffective since the purpose of the sup-
port was to rebuild the basic services of the state. On the 
other hand, the delegation has always maintained political 
and sector dialogue with the authorities and has always 
counterbalanced EU support with progress achieved by 
the  authorities. This  is  defined  by  the  Commission  and 
EEAS  as  a  ‘contractual  approach’.  I t  promotes ‘mutual 
accountability’ as proposed by the ‘new deal’ for engage-
ment in fragile states.

Governance issues are dealt with in both political dialogue 
fora and policy dialogue fora. Political positions taken by 
the EU (Delegation and EEAS/Commission) are agreed and 
coordinated with Member States. 

V.
The issue should be examined from both aspects since it 
is also true that aid effectiveness and efficiency cannot be 
improved without governance itself. Without progressively 
providing  the  basic  building  blocks  for  governance  (for 
public finance, legal frameworks, local authority services 
and decentralisation) progress will remain slow and always 
encounter operational difficulties.

VI.
As stated before, the use of conditionality has to be mod-
ulated  to  take  into  account  the  fragility  of  the  DRC  and 
form a part of the political dialogue with the country. The 
term ‘conditionality’ is not really in line with the spirit of 
partnership under which the cooperation is delivered to 
the ACP countries in the framework of the Cotonou Agree-
ment. The  Commission  promotes  mutual  accountability 
and strengthened policy and political dialogue.

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REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

The Commission is working with other donors to ensure 
the best possible coordination between interventions. The 
support for urgency (e.g. envelope B) is concentrated in 
the affected areas of the country and contributes to the 
stabilisation plan and reconstruction of the eastern DRC 
(Starec) supported by all donors. The Commission has in 
fact resisted pressure from the media, which led to devot-
ing all efforts to the east. It should also be taken into con-
sideration  that  the  poorest  provinces  are  also  the  least 
populated and most difficult to access, which implies that 
they are not the most appropriate field of intervention for 
big donors since the global impact of support is reduced. 

EU support for governance is relevant to the 
needs in all areas but progress is uneven and 
overall limited 
Reply to the heading 
The Commission and the EEAS consider that EU support for 
governance is relevant to the needs in all areas but progress 
is uneven and partial.

Progress  is  limited  by  obstacles  and  delays  habitually 
encountered in fragile states but without necessarily put-
ting in jeopardy the overall results that are expected.

35.
Some projects to which the Court’s comment may apply 
were  at  a ver y  early  stage  of  implementation  and  had 
consequently not yet delivered results. The delays as com-
pared to the initial timetables are mainly due to the fragil-
ity and post-crisis situation in DRC. The operational periods 
of the projects have therefore been extended and most 
expected results of the projects, programmes are achiev-
able (and thus the Commission and the EEAS do not agree 
with certain scores in the table in Annex I).

The  timeline  for  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  EU  pro-
grammes needs to take into account the realities of work-
ing in a fragile state. The Commission considers that pro -
gress is advancing in the right direction.

OBSERVATIONS

EU support for governance in the DRC is relevant 
to needs but has achieved limited overall results 
Reply to the heading 
The Commission and the EEAS consider that EU support for 
governance in the DRC is relevant to needs but has achieved 
partial results.

30.
The Commission and the EEAS consider that their capacity 
to react appropriately to the problems which affected the 
elections has not been affected by the fact that the sup-
port to the electoral cycle was not foreseen in the NIP. In 
the Commission’s and EEAS’ views, the EU’s involvement at 
the different stages of the electoral cycle, together with 
the international community, could not have been more 
significant without affecting the DRC’s political and finan-
cial ownership of the process.

34.
While the support of the Commission may not cover the 
entire territory, its geographical distribution is balanced 
including for the components related to governance. 

The  EU’s  cooperation  strategy  for  governance  focuses 
largely on support for the central government (which has 
a national dimension) and for a limited number of prov -
inces including Bas-Congo and Kasai occidental and the 
eastern DRC.

As  far  as  cooperation  in  other  sec tors  is  concer ned: 
the 10th EDF is however unable to cover the entire coun -
tr y  although  the  presence  of  EU  programmes  in  other 
sectors covers important areas in the Oriental and Occi-
dental Kasai, Bandundu,  Equator, North  and South  Kivu, 
Bas- Congo  and  K inshasa.  At  this  stage,  geographical 
complementarity between the EU’s cooperation and the 
programmes of EU Member States is effective but cannot 
meet all needs in some of the poorest parts of the country. 
The EU also has to focus cooperation on a limited number 
of interventions in order to avoid dispersion.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

45

REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

49.
The Commission would like to point out that: 

(1)  even if the budget allocation is not sufficient, its increasing 
levels indicate a positive trend (see reply to paragraph 35);

(2)  a feature of the PARJ programme is precisely to improve ad-

ministrative capacity;

(3) 

the commitment of the current Justice Minister (nominated 
in May 2012) is strong.

53.
The inability to obtain information on redeployment is one 
of the reasons why the 9th and 10th EDF NIP programmes, 
as well as the IFS components, placed much importance 
on improving HR management of the PNC. To date this has 
included a comprehensive census of the PNC, the setting 
up of a computerised databank, training and support in 
the drafting of a new organic law (signed by the President 
on 1 June 2013) on overall PNC management. 

Corrective actions necessary to improve sustainability have 
been taken. 

54.
At present, all of the facilities constructed within the pro-
ject framework are in use by the PNC.

The operational capacities of the PNC have actually been 
improved by the installation and equipment of the provin-
cial police headquarters, notably the command and com-
munication centres in Goma and in Bukavu. 

Indeed, construction works suffered certain delays due to 
a series of unexpected factors such as the non-availability 
of construction fields with proper documentation, proce-
dural constraints, lack of skilled labour and construction 
material in the east, and also bad weather which affected 
the  completion  of  the  project  within  the 18 month  IfS 
implementation period.

As  pointed  out  by  the  Court  in  this  report,  the  national 
budget is insufficient. However, it increased by a factor of 
20 over the last 10 years and is still expected to  double 
within the next 5 years. This trend allows the government 
to  progressively  allocate  appropriate  funds  to  related 
budget items including human resource and maintenance 
budgets,  thus  improving  sustainability  in  the  medium 
term. 

41.
Please see reply to paragraph 11.

The EEAS and the Commission reacted in a timely man -
ner to the constitutional amendment (cf. HR/VP statement) 
and all the necessary clarifications were requested from 
the DRC in the framework of regular political dialogue.

Although it expressed its regrets over the constitutional 
amendment  that  should  have  aimed  for  a greater  con -
sensus with the opposition, the EU does not consider the 
January 2011 constitutional amendment as illegal or anti -
democratic. The timing of this amendment also allowed 
the opposition political parties to incorporate this change 
in their electoral strategies.

42.
The fact that the international community, including the 
Commission, provided financial support to the electoral 
process  is  neither  a guarantee  of  success  and  transpar -
ency of the election nor a sign of support to a regime. The 
EU’s evaluation of the 2011 electoral process, including its 
structural flaws, was clearly expressed in the final report of 
the EU electoral observation mission.

46.
The REJUSCO programme was a ‘Justice d’urgence’ action 
aimed at providing essential support to the judiciary and 
connected areas in the east on the brink of collapse. Its 
overall performance should also be seen in this context. 
The need to distinguish a specific situation in the east that 
did not provide all the necessary conditions for sustain-
ability was an important assumption of the country strat-
egy paper (CSP) and National indicative programme (NIP) 
documents.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

46

REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

73.
Whereas it is true that the PA2D suffers from the govern-
ment’s lack of will to put in place the decentralisation pro-
cess, the PAP is less dependent on government pol icies 
and continues its capacity building of the legislative insti-
tutions. The main obstacle for achieving all the PAP’s objec-
tives — the postponing of the provincial elections — has 
been mitigated by focusing on strengthening the admin-
istration of the four legislative institutions as well as the 
members of the National Assembly.

74.
The Commission is not the promoter of DRC decentralisa-
tion, but the Congolese themselves are. Therefore it is not 
pushing for a ‘Kinshasa top-down approach’. However, the 
DRC is currently a centralised country and decentralisa -
tion cannot be put in place without reforms, including as 
regards public finance management also at central level.

The Commission did not take sufficient account 
of the fragile national context in the design of 
EU programmes 
Reply to the heading
The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  consider  that  the  fragile 
national context made it impossible to achieve programmes 
as they had been initially designed. 

Risks were not adequately addressed 
Reply to the heading
The Commission and the EEAS consider that the risk level 
is high due to the fragility of the country and has properly 
been taken into account.

78.
As  the  Court  notes,  risks  cannot  be  avoided  in  a fragile 
country like the DRC. These are known and it is unrealistic 
to assume that the implementation of programmes could 
run smoothly without major problems. In this context, full 
risk prevention is quite ineffective and risk management 
should focus on responding to problems when they occur. 
The Commission has been able to adapt its interventions 
by adjusting the activities or deadlines for achieving them.

Support to governance in the DRC must also be analysed 
in a political context rather than in the context of the def -
inition and implementation of programmes.

56.
The issue was raised by the Commission which secure gov-
ernment engagement to ensure financing of functioning, 
maintenance costs, etc., thus achieving sustainability of EU 
interventions.

As an example of targeted conditionality, the delegation 
was successful in getting a specific allocation of 325000 US 
dollars  inscribed  in  the  2013  budget  for  precisely  this 
activity.

With the financial contribution of the DRC government, the 
sustainability of this EU intervention has notably improved.

61.
Progress  on  the  PFM  reform  is  steady  and  recognised 
by  the  international  community,  including  the  Bretton 
Woods  institutions,  and  has  the  full  undivided  support 
and commitment of the Prime Minister. In the context of 
this extremely fragile state, the Commission considers that 
promising intermediate results have been achieved.

63.
On the advice of the EU Delegation, the national author-
ising  officer  (NAO)  has  cancelled  the  works  contract  for 
the rehabilitation of the offices of the SAI because of poor 
workmanship on the part of the contractor and intends 
to re-contract with another company. Despite this delay 
and inconvenience, the SAI has been able to continue the 
recruitment of new magistrates. 

64.
The Commission does not anticipate difficulties in recruit-
ing the experts and a ‘Cadre de concentration’ on public 
finance reform has been signed with the Finance Minister 
and eight donors (with the EU Delegation as lead donor).

65.
These  emergenc y  budget  suppor t  programmes  were 
implemented in full coordination with the Bretton Woods 
institutions; they were designed to prevent a serious draw-
back in the process of stabilisation of the DRC. The coun-
try reached the completion point of the heavily indebted 
poor countries (HIPC) initiative, and all observers agreed 
that improvements in macroeconomic balance and PFM 
had occurred.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

47

REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

82. (c)
Please see above and replies to paragraph 49.

82. (e)
The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  consider  that  the  whole 
decentralisation  suppor t  strategy  under  the  10th  EDF 
did take into consideration the risks highlighted. Moreo-
ver, a mid-term review has been undertaken in order to 
improve the programme’s performance and set it ‘back on 
track’. The PA2D might not achieve progress as expected, 
especially concerning support at a national level, but sig-
nificant progress can be made at the provincial level. 

82. (f )
The programme was flexible enough to enable different 
sets of priority actions depending on developments. 

84.
The  use  of  strict  conditionality  in  policy  dialogue  with 
very fragile states has generally proved to be ineffective or 
counterproductive. Political dialogue with the Congolese 
authorities favours a contractual approach, which is more 
realistic and promotes progress of the partner approach. 
For example, the Commission cancelled the 5 million euro 
9th EDF Financing Convention because the DRC failed to 
approve appropriate legislation on the reform of the civil 
aviation  authority ;  it  has  also  withdrawn  from  the  Pace 
Fund, supporting the electoral process, and, through the 
threat of not funding the police academy if a  valid land 
title  was  not  provided,  the  authorities  were  pushed  to 
identify a terrain for its construction. 

85.
The Commission emphasises that it has been successful in 
securing proof of land ownership in all ongoing construc-
tion programmes while it has delayed awarding contract 
pending the production of the required documentation.

The  civil  aviation  project  was  cancelled  because  essen-
tial preconditions were not met. However, this approach 
should not be an obligation in every single project, but 
only taken if necessary. Also, risks on ‘doing and non-doing’ 
must be taken in consideration.

79.
Please see reply to paragraph 78.

81.
Please see reply to paragraph 65.

82.
The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  consider  that  the  risk 
assessment was appropriate and they design projects on 
the basis of their best knowledge at the specific time, tak-
ing into consideration the constraints of the Financial Reg-
ulation. If problems or delays occur, projects are amended 
as foreseen and allowed by the Financial Regulation. 

82. (a)
Please see replies to paragraphs 1, 30, 41 and 42.

The  Commission  suppor t  to  the  electoral  process  was 
embedded in an international framework approach since 
the PACE programme was supported by the international 
community.  The  PACE  I programme  which  suppor ted 
the 2006 elections has been considered as a success. 

Through PACE II, the international community contributed 
to the 2011 electoral process but deliberately avoided tak -
ing the lead. The Commission was an important contrib-
utor to the programme (+/–  20  %) but did not have full 
control of its design and timing. Nevertheless, the interna-
tional partners were aware of the risks of setting overarch-
ing and ambitious targets as it was not conceivable, given 
the nature of the issue, to only set partial targets. 

The main problem of the election was not the lack of dia-
logue with the international community (see report of the 
EU Election observation), which has been started by the 
EU in a timely manner independently of the fact the funds 
were already committed or allocated to the support to the 
electoral process.

82. (b)
The REJUSCO programme was an emergency justice pro-
gramme  intended  to  prevent  the  collapse  of  the  judici-
ar y  system  and  to  keep  up  the  momentum  of  the  fight 
against  impunity  and  for  respect  for  human  rights.  I t 
was not, strictly speaking, part of the justice reform pro-
gramme. The design and implementation problems were 
due to its multi-donor character and other implementation 
difficulties. 

Please see also reply to paragraph 46.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

48

REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

86.
Please see reply to paragraph 84. 

87.
In  fact,  the  Commission  suspended  disbursements  and 
cancelled contracts in a number of cases including on gov -
ernance-related projects. The most recent example was, in 
view of the irregularities observed during the 2011 presi -
dential and legislative elections, the Commission’s deci-
sion (subsequently replicated by the other donors) to close 
PACE II and to definitively cancel its last two payments (a 
total of 12 million euro).

89. (b) 
As  regards  the  Commission  and  the  EEAS,  all  efforts  are 
already deployed to encourage coordinated EU policy dia-
logue. The delegation is promoting regular and frequent 
EU  coordination  meetings  at  political  and  cooperation 
 levels in all areas of political/cooperation activity. In a gen -
eral manner, the Commission and the EEAS consider how-
ever that there is still room for improvement in the coordi-
nation with Member States. 

89. (d)
Please see replies to paragraphs 84 and 87.

90. (a) 
Political, development and humanitarian actions were part 
of a coherent set of EU actions. The EU remained an active 
and credible political partner in the democratisation dia-
logue. In this regard, the EU’s leverage in political dialogue 
does  not  necessarily  depend  on  the  fact  that  the  EDF 
national indicative program focuses on a specific sector 
but on the overall EU–DRC cooperation. European Com-
mission and EEAS reactions to the political context were 
taken after consultation of and in coherence with Member 
States.

Please see also replies to paragraph 41 and 42.

90. (b)
The Commission withdrew its funding precisely because 
the CMJ was not effective.

The  REJUSCO  was  a donor-driven  initiative  and  imple -
mented as such in a context of emergency.

91.
Some projects to which the Court’s comment may apply 
were  at  a ver y  early  stage  of  implementation  and  had 
consequently not yet delivered results. The delays as com-
pared to the initial timetables are mainly due to the fra-
gility and post-crisis situation in the DRC. The operational 
periods  of  the  projects  have  therefore  been  extended 
and most of the expected results of the projects and pro-
grammes are achievable.

The  timeline  for  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  EU  pro-
grammes needs to take into account the realities of work-
ing in a fragile state. The Commission and the EEAS con -
sider also that progress needs to be recognised where it 
occurred, for instance the 2006 elections and overall public 
finance management.

As  pointed  out  by  the  Court  in  this  report,  the  national 
budget is insufficient. However, it increased by a factor of 
20 over the last 10 years and is still expected to double 
by 2016. This trend allows the government to progressively 
allocate appropriate funds to related budget items includ-
ing human resource and maintenance budgets, thereby 
improving sustainability in the medium term.

92.
The development challenges in the DRC have been charac-
terised inter alia by lack of administration, lack of pol icies, 
lack of funds, lack of human resources, lack of polit ical sta-
bility and lack of peace in parts of the country. This pro -
vides a  difficult framework for a  partnership based on the 
fact that (a) the ultimate decisions and progress lie with 
the DRC and (b) the absence of partnership can be a real 
setback to the stabilisation process of this enormous state, 
which came close to the brink of collapse. DRC leadership 
and  ownership  are  essential,  while  a transition  process 
led by donors only would deliver inefficient donor-driven 
projects.

In this context, risks have been correctly assessed by the 
Commission  not  only  in  terms  of  doing,  but  also  with 
regard to the consequences of non-doing. This recognises 
that the risk of non-engagement in the context of the DRC 
can outweigh most risks of engagement. The Commission 
and EEAS views are that EU coordination is working well 
in the DRC.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

49

REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

Recommendation 1 (c)
The Commission and the EEAS will continue to strengthen 
and possibly increase the capacity of national oversight 
institutions, in the context of work sharing arrangements 
with other donors.

Recommendation 1 (d)
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   a g r e e   w i t h   t h e 
recommendation. 

Recommendation 2 (a)
The Commission and the EEAS agree with the recommen-
dation  since  these  are  principles  that  the  Commission 
already applies. 

The risk and impact assessment takes into consideration 
the fragility context of the partner country. 

Recommendation 2 (b) 
The Commission and the EEAS do not accept this part of 
the recommendation. It will continue to take measures to 
prevent or mitigate risk of engagement. 

The course of action to be followed if risks become real-
ity will be defined taking into account the overall political 
situation prevailing at the time and in coordination with 
other donors.

Recommendation 3 (a)
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   a g r e e   w i t h   t h e 
recommendation.

Recommendation 3 (b)
The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  cannot  agree  to  this 
recommendation.

The Commission designs projects on the basis of its best 
knowledge at the specific time, taking into consideration 
the  constraints  of  the  Financial  Regulation.  If  problems 
or delays occur, projects may be amended and possibly 
extended. 

In  line  with  the  Cotonou  Agreement  and  the ‘New  deal 
for engagement in fragile states’ in November 2011, the 
Co m m i s s i o n   p ro m o te s   m u t u a l   a c c o u n t a b i l i t y   b a s e d 
on  agreed  and  achievable  milestones,  in  preference  to 
conditionalities. 

Recommendation 1 (a) 
While sharing the general preoccupations expressed by 
the Court, the Commission and the EEAS do not accept the 
recommendation of the Court. 

Recommendation 1 (a) (i) 
The  Commission  will  continue  to  aim  at  achieving  an 
appropriate balance of aid between all provinces including 
the poor ones in full coordination with other donors and 
taking into consideration that the poorest DRC provinces 
are also the least populated.

Recommendation 1 (a) (ii)
The Commission will continue to involve local actors in the 
implementation of its projects, and within the limit of their 
capacity. The Commission will also support their capacity 
building. 

Recommendation 1 (a) (iii)
The Commission will continue to support the improved 
management of natural resources provided that it is con-
firmed as a sector of the 11th EDF and in the context of 
work sharing arrangements with other donors. 

Recommendation 1 (b) 
The Commission and the EEAS will continue to place great 
emphasis on the importance of democratic elections in its 
dialogue with the DRC. It can be confirmed that this polit-
ical dialogue will be maintained as per established chan-
nels  and  in  the  respect  of  the  defined  prerogatives  and 
roles of the different EU institutions and Member States as 
well as other donors. 

Concerning the risk assessment, the answer of the Com-
mission is provided under recommendation 2.

Concerning the specific risk of ‘regime entrenchment’, it 
is addressed collegially by all EU institutions and Member 
States. Commission programmes are in line with the EU 
political options and are approved by Member States. 

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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REPLY OF THE  
COMMISSION AND  
THE EEAS

Recommendation 3 (c)
Th e   Co m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   c a n n o t   a gre e   to   t h e 
recommendation. 

As  is  nor mal  prac tice,  the  Commission  amends  pro -
grammes  notably  following  ROM  missions  and  policy/
political dialogue with partner countries. 

Recommendation 4 (a)
Th e   Co m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   c a n n o t   a gre e   to   t h e 
recommendation.

The  Commission  applies  the  principles  agreed  interna-
tionally in 2011 for a  ‘New deal for engagement in fragile 
states’. In particular this involves: (i) setting clear, relevant 
and realistic benchmarks taking into consideration the fra-
gility of the country; (ii) periodically assessing compliance 
with these agreed benchmarks; (iii) discussing with part-
ner country compliance gaps and corrective measures in 
the context of political/policy dialogue; and (iv) keeping in 
mind the need to promote aid predictability.

Recommendation 4 (b)
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   a g r e e   w i t h   t h e 
recommendation.

Recommendation 4 (c)
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a n d   t h e   E E A S   c a n n o t   a c c e p t   t h e 
recommendation. 

The Commission and the EEAS are fully engaged in encour-
aging  coordinated  EU  policy  dialogue. The  EU  leverage 
over the DRC is not just a matter of development aid, but 
rather a function of the comprehensive relations between 
the EU and the partner country.

Special Report No 9/2013 – EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

European Court of Auditors

Special Report No 9/2013
EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union

2013 — 50 pp. — 21 × 29.7 cm

ISBN 978-92-9241-359-0
doi:10.2865/13761

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THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO IS ONE OF THE MAIN BENEFICIARIES 

O F  E U  S U P P O R T,  W I T H  A B O U T  1,9  B I L L I O N  E U R O  O F  A S S I S TA N C E  P R O V I D E D 

BET WEEN 2003 AND 2011. 

IN THIS REPORT, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS ASSESSED IF THE COMMISSION 

AND  THE  EEAS  MANAGED  EFFEC TIVELY  EU  SUPPOR T  FOR  GOVERNANCE  AND 

WHETHER THIS SUPPORT ACHIEVED ITS PLANNED RESULTS. IT FOCUSED ON KEY 

AREAS OF GOVERNANCE: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, JUSTICE AND POLICE, PUBLIC 

FINANCE MANAGEMENT REFORMS AND THE DECENTRALISATION PROCESS. 

IT  CONCLUDES THAT  EU  SUPPORT  HAS  BEEN  SE T WITHIN  A  GENERALLY  SOUND 

COOPERATION  STRATEGY,  ADDRESSING  MAIN  NEEDS,  BUT  PROGRESS  HAS  BEEN 

SLOW,  UNEVEN  AND  OVERALL  LIMITED.  SUSTAINABILIT Y WAS  AN  UNREALISTIC 

PROSPECT FOR MOST PROJECTS EXAMINED. THIS WAS IN PART DUE TO THE FRAGILE 

COUNTRY CONTEXT BUT ALSO DUE TO SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WAY IN WHICH THE 

COMMISSION AND THE EEAS HAVE MANAGED THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE DRC.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS