Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India
Date: 2013-08-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: India, countervailing charge, import (EU), originating product, steel, wire













EUR-Lex - 52013PC0573 - EN











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52013PC0573

Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India /* COM/2013/0573 final - 2013/0275 (NLE) */









EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.           Context of the proposal
·      Grounds for and objectives of the proposal
This proposal concerns the application of
Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against
subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community ('the
basic Regulation') in the anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of certain
stainless steel wires originating in India.
·      General context
This proposal is made in the context of the
implementation of the basic Regulation and is the result of an investigation
which was carried out in line with the substantive and procedural requirements
laid out in the basic Regulation.
·      Existing provisions in the area of the proposal
By Commission Regulation (EU) No 419/2013, the
European Commission imposed a provisional countervailing duty on imports of
certain stainless steel wires originating in India.
·      Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union
Not applicable.
2.           Consultation of interested
parties and impact assessment
·      Consultation of interested parties
Interested parties concerned by the proceeding
have had the possibility to defend their interests during the investigation, in
line with the provisions of the basic Regulation.
·      Collection and use of expertise
There was no need for external expertise.
·      Impact assessment
This proposal is the result of the
implementation of the basic Regulation.
The basic Regulation does not contain
provisions for a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of
conditions that have to be assessed.
3.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE
PROPOSAL
·      Summary of the proposed action
The attached proposal for a Council Regulation
is based on the definitive findings on subsidisation, injury, causation and
Union interest. It is therefore proposed that the Council adopt the attached
proposal for a Regulation which should be published no later than 7 September
2013.
·      Legal basis
Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June
2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the
European Community.
·      Subsidiarity principle
The proposal falls under the exclusive
competence of the European Union. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not
apply.
·      Proportionality principle
The proposal complies with the proportionality
principle for the following reasons:
The form of action is described in the
above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision.
Indication of how financial and administrative
burden falling upon the Union, national governments, regional and local authorities,
economic operators and citizens is minimized and proportionate to the objective
of the proposal is not applicable.
·      Choice of instruments
Proposed instruments: regulation.
Other means would not be adequate for the
following reason:
Other means would not be adequate because the
basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options.
4.           BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
The proposal has no implication for the Union
budget.
2013/0275 (NLE)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION
imposing a definitive countervailing duty
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain
stainless steel wires originating in India
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from
countries not members of the European Community[1]
(‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 15 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal submitted by
the European Commission (‘the Commission’) after having consulted the Advisory
Committee,
Whereas:
1.           PROCEDURE
1.1.        Provisional measures 
(1)       The Commission imposed a
provisional countervailing duty on imports of certain stainless steel wires
originating in India by Regulation (EU) No 419/2013[2] ('the provisional Regulation').
(2)       The investigation was
initiated following a complaint lodged on 28 June 2012
by the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (Eurofer) ('the
complainant') on behalf of Union producers representing more than 50% of total
Union production of certain stainless steel wires. 
(3)       In
the parallel anti-dumping investigation, the Commission
imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain stainless steel
wires originating in India by Regulation (EU) No 418/2013[3]. 
1.2.        Parties concerned by the
investigation 
(4)       At the provisional stage
of the investigation sampling was applied for the Indian exporting producers,
the Union producers and unrelated importers. However, as two of the importers
chosen for the sample did not return questionnaire replies, sampling for
importers could no longer be pursued. All available information pertaining to
cooperating importers was used to reach definitive findings, in particular as
far the Union interest is concerned. 
(5)       Seven Indian exporting
producers outside the sample requested individual examination. Two of them
replied to the questionnaires. Five did not reply to the questionnaire. Out of
the two which replied to the questionnaire, one withdrew its individual
examination request. As a result, the Commission has examined the request of
one Indian exporting producer outside the sample:
– KEI Industries Limited, New Delhi (KEI).
(6)       Apart from the above,
recitals (5) to (8), (10) to (12) and (14) of the provisional Regulation are
confirmed. 
1.3.        Investigation period and
the period considered 
(7)       As set out in recital (20)
to the provisional Regulation, the investigation of subsidisation and injury
covered the period from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012 ('investigation period’
or 'IP'). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of injury
covered the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2012 ('period considered').
1.4.        Subsequent procedure
(8)       Following the disclosure
of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided
to impose provisional countervailing measures ('provisional disclosure'),
several interested parties, namely 2 exporting producers, the complainant, and
11 users submitted comments. The parties who so requested were granted a
hearing. The Commission continued to seek information it deemed necessary for
the definitive findings. All comments received were considered and taken into
account, where appropriate. 
(9)       The Commission informed
the interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis
of which it intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive countervailing
duty on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in India and the
definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty
(‘final disclosure’). The parties were also granted a period within which they
could comment on the final disclosure. All comments received were considered
and taken into account, where appropriate.
2.           Product concerned and like
product
(10)     As
stated in recital (21) to the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is
defined as stainless steel wires containing by weight:
–                        
- 2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or
more but not more than 22% of chromium, 
–                        
- less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00
19 and 7223 00 99, originating in India.
(11)     Some users expressed
concerns about the apparent lack of distinction between the various types of
the product concerned and the like product because a wide product mix exists
among all the product types. There was a particular concern as to how a fair
comparison among all types could be ensured in the investigation. As is the
case in most investigations, the definition of the product concerned covers a
wide variety of product types which share the same or similar basic physical
technical and chemical characteristics. The fact that
these characteristics can vary from product type to product type may indeed
lead to cover a wide range of types. This is the case in the current
investigation. The Commission took account of the differences among the product
types and ensured a fair comparison. A unique product control number (PCN) was
allocated to each product type, produced and sold by the Indian exporting
producers and to each one produced and sold by the Union industry. The number
depended on the main characteristics of the product, in this case, the steel
grade, the tensile strength, the coating, the surface, diameter, and the shape.
Therefore, the types of wires exported to the Union were compared on a PCN
basis with the products produced and sold by the Union industry that have the
same or similar characteristics. All these types fell within the definition of
the product concerned and the like product in the notice of initiation[4] and in the provisional Regulation.
(12)     One
party reiterated its claim that the so called “highly technical” product types
are different and not interchangeable with other types of the product
concerned. Hence, they should be excluded from the product definition.
According to the case-law, when determining whether products are alike so that
they form part of the same product, it needs to be assessed whether they share
the same technical and physical characteristics, have the same basic end-uses and the same price-quality ratio. In that regard, the
interchangeability of, and competition between, those products should also be
assessed.[5] The investigation found that the “highly technical” product types
referred to by the party have the basic physical, chemical, and technical
characteristics as the other products subject to the investigation. They are
made from stainless steel and they are wires. They constitute a semi-finished
steel product (which in the majority of cases is then subject to further transformation
in view of producing a broad variety of finished goods), and the production
process is similar, using similar machines, such that producers can switch
between different variants of the product, according to demand. Therefore,
although different types of wires are not directly interchangeable and do not
directly compete, producers are competing for contracts covering a broad range
of stainless steel wires. Moreover, these product types are produced and sold
by both the Union industry and the Indian exporting producers using a similar
production method. Therefore, the claim cannot be accepted.
(13)     In response to definitive
disclosure one party claimed that the analysis carried out by the Commission in
terms of establishing whether the so-called highly technical product types
should be included in the investigation was insufficient. This argument is
rejected. The investigation established that the highly technical product type
fall within the product definition as stated in recital (12) above. The party
wrongly assumes that all the criteria referred to in the case-law have to be
met at the same time; this is incorrect. According to the case-law, the
Commission enjoys a wide discretion when defining the product scope[6], and has to base this
assessment on the set of criteria developed by the Court. Often, as in the
present case, some criteria may point in one and some in the other direction; in
such a situation, the Commission needs to carry out a global assessment, as it
has done in the present case. It is therefore wrongly assumed by this
interested party that product types need to share all characteristics in order
to fall the same product definition. 
(14)     Some
users claimed that the so-called stainless steel wires “series 200” should be
excluded from the product scope. In particular, they alleged this type was
hardly produced by the Union industry. However, this claim is unfounded. First,
the fact that a certain product type is not produced in by the Union industry
is not a sufficient reason to exclude it from the scope of the investigation,
where the production process is such that the Union producers could start
producing the product type in question. Second, as for highly technical wires
(see above recital (12)), it was found that these types of the product
concerned have basic physical, chemical, and technical characteristics
identical or similar to other types of the like product produced and sold by
the Union industry. Therefore, the claim cannot be accepted.
(15)     Alternatively,
they claimed that wire rod should be included in the definition of the product
concerned. However, wire rod is the raw material used for the production of the
product concerned but can also be used for the production of different products
such as fasteners and nails. Therefore, contrary to the product under
investigation, it does not constitute a finished steel product. Through cold
forming production process the wire rod amongst other product can be
transformed into the product concerned or the like product. On that basis, wire
rod cannot be included in the product scope within the meaning of the basic
Regulation.
(16)     On the basis of the above, the definition of the product concerned and the
like product in recitals (21) to (24) to the provisional Regulation are hereby
confirmed. 
3.           SUBSIDISATION
3.1.        Introduction
(17)     In recital (25) to the provisional Regulation,
reference was made to the following schemes, which allegedly involve the
granting of countervailable subsidies:
(a)     Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme
(‘DEPBS’);
(b)     Duty Drawback Scheme (‘DDS’);
(c)     Advance Authorisation Scheme (‘AAS’);
(d)     Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme
(‘EPCGS’);
(e)     Export Credit Scheme (‘ECS’); 
(f)      Focus Market Scheme (‘FMS’);
(g)     Special Economic Zones/Export Oriented
Units (‘SEZ/EOU’).
(18)     The Union industry alleged
that the Commission failed to take into account a number of subsidy schemes,
especially regional ones, and as a result believed that the subsidies found to be received by Indian
producers were underestimated. The allegation is unfounded. The Commission
investigated all of the national and local subsidy schemes contained in the
complaint. However, the Commission found that during the IP the sampled
exporting producers had received subsidies only with regard to the schemes listed
in recital (14) above. 
(19)     The Union industry also
argued that since in the parallel anti-dumping investigation the data submitted
by the sampled Indian producers were found unreliable and Article 18 of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not
members of the European Community[7]was
applied, the corresponding Article 28 of the basic Regulation should have
equally been applied in the current investigation. However, Article 28 of the
basic Regulation applies only if its conditions are met, which has not been the
case with regards to the information provided by the sampled Indian producers.
Therefore, the claim cannot be accepted.
(20)     The investigation has shown that the DEPBS, the DDS and the AAS all
form part of one subsidy mechanism, that is a duty drawback mechanism. India has used various types of this mechanism over a long time, modifying the individual
sub-mechanisms frequently. The investigation has shown that it is appropriate
to analyse these sub-mechanisms together, as exporters typically have to choose
between them (they are mutually exclusive), and in the event one of the
sub-mechanisms is discontinued, switch to another one.
(21)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (25) to (28) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
3.2.        Duty Entitlement Passbook
Scheme (‘DEPBS’)
(22)     One of the sampled Indian
exporting producers argued that the DEPBS should not be considered as a
countervailable subsidy, since the purpose of the scheme is to offset customs
duties on imports. It was furthermore alleged that for the product under
investigation, there is no domestic production of inputs, so that it is a
reasonable assumption that all imports have been taxed at 5%, and that the cap
established by GOI ensures that there is no over-compensation. As explained in
recital (38) to the provisional Regulation this scheme cannot be considered a
permissible duty drawback system or substitution drawback system within the
meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the basic Regulation since it does not
conform to the rules laid down in Annex I item (i), Annex II (definition and
rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and rules for substitution
drawback) of the basic Regulation. In particular, an exporter benefiting from
DEPBS is under no obligation to actually consume the goods imported free of
duty in its production process and the amount of credit is not calculated in
relation to the actual value of the inputs used. Lastly, an exporter is
eligible for the DEPBS benefits regardless of whether it imports any inputs at
all. In order to obtain the benefit, it is sufficient for an exporter to simply
export goods without demonstrating that any input material was imported. The
GOI failed to establish a system which links the amount of duty exempted on the
imported inputs with their consumption in the exported products. From their
side, the companies benefitting from this scheme also did not have a mechanism
in place to demonstrate that they did not receive any excess remission. In
addition, regarding the non-existing of over-compensation in this specific
case, the company failed to demonstrate that this was the case, it could for
example have benefitted from compensation for other imported goods or it could
have benefitted from compensation for imported inputs without having consumed
it for the production of the product concerned. It also has to be noted that
the statement that there is no domestic production of inputs is incorrect since
at least one of the companies investigated produced this domestically while the
other two investigated companies were purchasing from a
domestic producer, and not from a domestic importing trader. Therefore, these arguments cannot be accepted.
(23)     One party argued that in
case of the sale of the DEPBS licence, the actual selling price was below the
licence value and therefore the countervailable benefit was lower than the one
provisionally established. However, the benefit under this scheme was
calculated on the basis of the amount of credit granted in the licence
regardless of whether the license was used to offset customs duties on imports
or whether the license was actually sold. Any sale of a licence at a price less
than its face value is a pure commercial decision which does not alter the
amount of benefit received under this scheme. Therefore, this argument cannot
be accepted.
(24)     The Government of India (‘GOI’) argued that the DEPBS has been withdrawn during the IP and therefore should
not be countervailed. They furthermore argued that since the duty drawback is
not a successor program of DEPB, DEPB may not be countervailed. Indeed the
DEPBS ceased to exist on 30 September 2011, during the IP. However, the
subsidisation continued to exist. As an alternative to the DEPBS the exporters
were found to receive benefits under AAS and especially DDS. As described in
recitals (42) to (44) to the provisional Regulation AAS and DDS were adjusted
to organise a smooth transition from the DEPBS. In addition, the nature of the
benefits under the three schemes, i.e. revenue foregone in the form of
exemption from customs duties, is exactly the same. Companies have thus a
choice which scheme to use for the offsetting of customs duties. Therefore,
despite the fact that the DEPBS ceased to exist halfway the IP, the subsidies
granted by the GOI during the IP should be countervailed because the
overarching system of benefits continued as, for the
reasons set out above in recital (20), all duty drawback schemes form one
subsidy mechanisms with different, often changing sub-mechanisms. This argument can thus not be accepted.
(25)     In its response to the
definitive disclosure, the GOI reiterated its arguments concerning the
withdrawal of the DEPBS after definitive disclosure. However, since no new arguments
were presented which would lead to a change of the conclusion with regard to the
replacement of the subsidization under the ceased DEPBS by the adjusted DDS,
this argument cannot be accepted. 
(26)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (29) to (47) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
(27)     In addition, it was found
that the Indian exporting producer KEI was using the DEPBS in the IP. The
subsidy rate amounted to 0.50%. 
3.3.        Duty Drawback Scheme
(‘DDS’)
(28)     The GOI argued that the DDS
should not be considered as a countervailable subsidy, since the purpose of the
scheme is to offset import duties and excises taxes paid on inputs. As
explained in recitals (58) to (60) to the provisional Regulation this scheme
cannot be considered a permissible duty drawback system or substitution
drawback system within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the basic
Regulation since it does not conform to the rules laid down in Annex I item
(i), Annex II (definition and rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and
rules for substitution drawback) of the basic Regulation. In particular, there
is no system or procedure in place to confirm which inputs are consumed in the
production process of the exported product or whether an excess payment of
import duties occurred within the meaning of point (i) of Annex I and Annexes
II and III of the basic Regulation. Furthermore, an exporter is eligible for
the DDS benefits regardless of whether it imports any input materials at all.
To obtain the benefit, it is sufficient for an exporter to simply export goods
without demonstrating that any input material was imported. The above was
confirmed by the findings made at the visited companies and by the
corresponding legislation, namely GOI’s circular No 24/2001 as explained in
recital (60) to the provisional Regulation. In addition, in its submission, the
GOI admitted itself in paragraph 32 that DDS may result in excess remission.
Therefore, this argument cannot be accepted.
(29)     GOI
further argued that, although the verification system for the consumption of
inputs was not complete, in particular due to the high number of beneficiaries
and the administrative burden involved in controlling all of them, the
verification mechanism in place based on sampling should be accepted. This
argument however cannot be accepted as it is not foreseen in Article 3(1)(a)(ii), Annex I item (i), Annex II (definition and
rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and rules for substitution
drawback) of the basic Regulation.
(30)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (48) to (64) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
(31)     In addition, it was found
that the Indian exporting producer, KEI Industries, was using the DDS in the
IP. The subsidy rate amounted to 0.29%. 
3.4.        Advance Authorisation
Scheme ('AAS')
(32)     One of the sampled Indian
exporting producers argued that the AAS should be considered as a duty drawback
system, because the imported materials are used to produce exported goods. As
explained in recital (76) to the provisional Regulation the sub-scheme used in
the present case is not a permissible duty drawback system or substitution
drawback system within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the basic
Regulation. It does not conform to the rules laid down in Annex I item (i),
Annex II (definition and rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and
rules for substitution drawback) of the basic Regulation. The GOI did not
effectively apply a verification system or a procedure to confirm whether and
in what amounts inputs were consumed in the production of the exported product
(Annex II(II)(4) of the basic Regulation and, in the case of substitution
drawback schemes, Annex III(II)(2) of the basic Regulation). Moreover, the
Standard Input Output Norms (‘SIONs’) for the product concerned were not
sufficiently precise and they cannot constitute a verification system of actual
consumption. The design of those standard norms does not enable the GOI to
verify with sufficient precision what amounts of inputs were consumed in the production
of the exported products. In addition, the GOI did not carry out any further
examination based on actual inputs involved as explained in recital (73) to the
provisional Regulation, although this would normally need to be carried out in
the absence of an effectively applied verification system (Annex II(II)(5) and
Annex III(II)(3) to the basic Regulation). The sub-scheme is therefore
countervailable, and the argument is rejected.
(33)     In the absence of other
comments, recitals (65) to (80) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
(34)     The Indian exporting
producer, KEI Industries, was found not to use AAS in the IP. 
3.5.        Export Promotion Capital
Goods Scheme (‘EPCGS’) 
(35)     Upon the definitive
disclosure, one of the Indian exporting producers provided comments on a calculation
error. This comment was partially warranted and was acknowledged in the
calculation of the subsidy amount. Since the overall subsidy margin for this
company was below de minimis level already before this correction, the
adjustment neither changes the final level of the countervailing duty of this
company nor does it affect the average subsidy margin calculated for the
cooperating not sampled companies or the country-wide subsidy margin. 
(36)     Apart from the above,
recitals (81) to (91) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
(37)     The Indian exporting
producer, KEI Industries, was found not to benefit from the EPCGS in the IP
with regard to the product concerned. 
3.6.        Export Credit Scheme
(‘ECS’)
(38)     The
GOI argued that in recital (92) to the provisional Regulation the Commission
incorrectly cited the legal basis of the ECS. The GOI indicated that the Master
Circular DBOD No. DIR(Exp.) BC 01/04.02.02/2007-2008 (‘MC 07-08’) and Master
Circular DBOD No. DIR(Exp.) BC 09/04.02.02/2008-09 (‘MC 08-09’) were updated
and these were Master Circular DBOD No. DIR(Exp.) BC 06/04.02.002/2010-11 (‘MC
10-11’) and Master Circular DBOD No. DIR.(Exp.) BC 04/04.02.002/2011-2012 (‘MC
11-12) which constituted the legal basis for the ECS in the IP. Indeed the
observation of the GOI is correct in this regard. 
(39)     The
GOI further argued that had the proper updated legal basis been taken into
account the Commission would have to take a note of the fact that the maximum
ceiling interest rate applicable
to export credits, previously made mandatory by the Reserve Bank of India
(‘RBI’) for the commercial banks, ceased to exist before the IP with regard to
export credits in rupees. Therefore, this scheme as far as credits in rupees
are concerned can no longer be considered a subsidy. The investigation
demonstrated that two sampled companies benefited in practice from export
credits from privately owned banks with rates below the reference rate set by
the Bank of India. The investigation has not revealed a commercial rational as
to why these privately owned banks provide credits at discounted and apparently
loss-making rates. These lending practices of the banks could suggest that
there is still government involvement. However, the investigation did not
produce evidence of the level required under WTO rules to show continuing
entrustment or direction of the commercial banks. Therefore, the Commission has
decided not to count the benefit of the discounted rates as a subsidy under
this sub-scheme, in the absence of sufficient evidence of direction and/or a
financial contribution by the GOI.
(40)     Last, the GOI argued that
the latest update of Master Circular - DBOD No. DIR(Exp.) BC.
06/04.02.002/2012-13 (‘MC 12-13’), which had entered into force two months after
the end of the IP, had erased the maximum ceilings on interest rates of the
export credits also with regard to credits in the foreign currency. Invoking
Article 15(1) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation the GOI argues that in such
a case also this element of the export credit scheme should not be
countervailed, because government direction of the banks has been removed.
Although in the submitted MC 12-13 there is a provision which makes it free for
the commercial banks to determine the interest rates on export credits in
foreign currency with effect from May 2012 as claimed by the GOI, such a change
of instruction of RBI to the private banks during the investigation would by
itself be insufficient to exclude this scheme, since government direction may continue
in an informal manner which would have to be the subject of further
investigation. However, in view of the above conclusion on the sub-scheme
concerning export credits in rupees, the Commission has decided not to
countervail this sub-scheme concerning credits in foreign currency at this
stage.
(41)     In
light of the above, the duty rates will be adjusted where applicable.
3.7.        Focus Market Scheme (‘FMS’)

(42)     Upon the definitive
disclosure, the GOI submitted comments on FMS. The GOI argued that the scheme
is geographically related to countries not part of the EU and can thus not be
countervailed by the EU. Nevertheless, the GOI was not able to dispute neither
the practical implementations of the scheme nor that the FMS benefit can be
used for the product concerned, namely the fact that duty credits under FMS are
freely transferable and that they can be used for payment of custom duties on
subsequent imports of any inputs or goods including capital goods. Therefore,
this claim had to be rejected as the investigation has shown that the product
concerned can and does benefit from this scheme when exported to the EU. 
(43)     In the absence of any other
comments, recitals (101) to (111) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
(44)     The Indian exporting producer,
KEI Industries, was found not to use FMS in the IP.
3.8.        Export Oriented Units
Scheme (‘EOUS’)
(45)     Upon the definitive
disclosure the sole exporting producer investigated using EOUS submitted
comments on this scheme. The company claimed that the Commission should use a different
method to calculate the benefit received under the EOUS. The company argued
that certain benefits under EOUS should be treated as a permissible duty
drawback scheme within the meaning of Annex II and III of the basic Regulation
and that they therefore should not be countervailable. 
(46)     It was however found that regardless
of which method of calculation used, the subsidy rate for this scheme would not
exceed 0.95%, meaning that the overall subsidy margin for this company would
remain below de minimis level. Therefore it was not deemed necessary to
analyze this claim further in the context of this investigation.
(47)     In the absence of any other
comments, recital (112) to the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
(48)     The Indian exporting
producer, KEI Industries, was found not to benefit of the EOUS in the IP.
3.9.        Amount of countervailable
subsidies
(49)     Following
the decision not to count the benefits under the ESC as a subsidy as described
in recitals (38) to (41) and correction of EPCGS benefit calculation for one of
the companies as described in recital (35), the duty rates have been adjusted
where applicable. The definitive amounts of countervailable subsidies
established in accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation,
expressed ad valorem, now range from 0.79% to 3.72%. 
 Scheme || Company || Raajratna || Venus Group || Viraj || KEI 
 DEPBS (*) || 0.58% || 0.93%, 1.04%, 1.32%, 2.04% || - || 0.50% 
 DDS (*) || 0.61% || 1.14%, 1.77%, 1.68%, 1.91% || - || 0.29% 
 AAS (*) || 2.43% || 0.15%, 0%, 0%, 0% || - || - 
 EPCGS (*) || 0.09% || 0.02%, 0%, 0%, 0% || 0.03% || - 
 ECS (*) || - || - || - || - 
 FMS (*) || - || 0.13%, 0.71%, 0.07%, 0% || - || - 
 EOU(*) || - || - || 0.95% || - 
 TOTAL || 3.72% || 3.03% (**) || 0.98 %(***) || 0.79 %(***) 
(*) Subsidies marked with an asterisk are
export subsidies
(**) Total subsidy margin on the basis of
consolidated calculation for the Group
(***) de minimis 
(50)     The recalculated subsidy
margin for the cooperating companies not included in the sample is 3.41%. 
(51)     The recalculated
country-wide subsidy margin is 3.72%.
4.           Union industry
4.1.        Union industry 
(52)     Some users questioned the
number of Union producers as stated in recital (116) to the provisional
Regulation. They claim that number of producers was wrongly assessed and in
reality there are fewer producers present on the Union market. 
(53)     The Commission points out
that the above claim was not substantiated and confirms after verification the
information given in recital (116) of the provisional Regulation, namely that
27 Union producers were manufacturing the product concerned in the Union during the IP. This is the number identified on the basis of the complaint, at
standing phase and during the investigation. The Commission contacted all known
Union producers and received data which was used in the context of the current
investigation. 
4.2.        Union production and
Sampling of Union producers
(54)     In the absence of comments,
recitals (117) to (119) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
5.           INJURY
5.1.        Union consumption 
(55)     Some users claimed that the
injury analyses should have disregarded the data relating to 2009 because the
financial crisis which occurred that year had distorting effects in particular
on the Union consumption. However, even if 2009 was excluded from the analysis,
there would still be a growing trend for consumption (+5%) which is an
indication of an improving market. Moreover, the negative effects of the
financial crises are recognised in recital (120) to the provisional Regulation,
but was concluded that the market situation improved. In absence of other
comments, recital (120) to the provisional Regulation is confirmed. 
5.2.        Imports into the Union from the country concerned 
(56)     The subsidy margin
established for KEI Industries is below de minimis threshold foreseen in
Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation (see recital (49) above). Therefore, it
is deemed that this exporting producer has not benefited from subsidy schemes
in the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation
during the investigation period. As a result, its import volumes were excluded
from the volume of subsidised imports from India. One exporting producer,
namely the Venus group submitted that certain transactions were mistakenly
double counted. The Commission agreed with the exporting producer, therefore
these transactions were removed from the total volume of subsidised imports
from India. Accordingly, the volume, market share and the average price of the
subsidised imports were revised. 
(57)     Volume and market share of
the subsidised imports:
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Volume (MT) || 11 620 || 20 038 || 25 326 || 24 415 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 172 || 218 || 210 
 Market share || 8.8% || 10.7% || 12.9% || 12.4% 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 121 || 146 || 140 
 Source : Eurostat and questionnaire replies 
(58)     KEI Industries exported
limited quantities of the product concerned during the IP and the transactions
of the Venus group mentioned above also constituted limited quantities,
therefore the deduction of these import volumes from the total volume of
subsidised imports from India does not result in changes concerning in the
trends as described in recitals (123) and (124) to the provisional Regulation.
Thus these recitals to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
(59)     Average price of the
subsidised imports: 
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Average price (euro/MT) || 2 419 || 2 856 || 3 311 || 3 259 
 Index (2009=100) || 100 || 118 || 137 || 135 
 Source : Eurostat and questionnaire replies 
(60)     As explained above, K.E.I
Industries exported limited quantities during the IP and the removal of certain
transactions of the Venus group affected only limited quantities. The exclusion
of KEI Industries import volumes and the above mentioned transactions of the
Venus group from the total volume of subsidised imports from India does
therefore not result in any significant change in the average price of the
subsidised Indian imports or in the undercutting calculations. The recalculated
undercutting margin is 11.7%. For the rest, the conclusions drawn from the
findings described in recitals (128) to (130) to the provisional Regulation are
confirmed. 
(61)     In response to the final
disclosure the GOI argued that the Commission had applied the pro rata
reduction of subsidized imports only on the import volumes of cooperating
exporting producers in order to take account of the de minimis findings KEI and
the removal of certain mistakenly double counted transactions of the Venus
group. This claim is based on a misunderstanding. The Commission has applied
the pro rata reduction to the entire import volume, including non-cooperating
importers. It therefore has to be rejected.
5.3.        Economic Situation of the
Union industry
(62)     Some
parties claimed that the results obtained by the Union industry should be
considered as reasonably positive in the context of the global economic crisis
and that with the exception of one injury indicator namely, market share, all
other indicators did not point toward the existence of injury. 
(63)     One
party claimed that the average selling prices of the Union industry increased
by around 34% far more than its cost of production which increased by 13% over
the same period. In this respect it needs to be noted that at the beginning of
the period considered, namely in 2009, the Union industry was selling below
cost of production, and only managed to sell above cost of production from 2011
onwards. 
(64)     The investigation showed
that although some injury indicators such as production volumes and capacity
utilisation followed a positive trend, or remained stable such as employment, a
number of other indicators relating to the financial situation of the Union industry,
namely profitability, cash flow, investment and return on investment did not
follow a satisfactory trend during the period considered. While the indicator
relating to investments improved in 2010, it dropped below 2009 figures in 2011
and the IP. Although it is true that return on investments improved from 2009
until 2011 reaching 6.7%, it dropped again to 0.8% in the IP. Similarly
indicators relating to profitability and cash flow improved until 2011 they
started again to deteriorate in the IP. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
Union industry started to improve after 2009, but its recovery was slowed down
by the subsidised imports from India subsequently. 
(65)     On a request by an
interested party it is confirmed that the stock levels established in recital
(153) to the provisional Regulation concerned the activity of the sampled Union
companies.
(66)     The Union industry argued
that the target profit margin of 5% set at the provisional stage was too low.
The party did not substantiate its claim sufficiently. Recital (148) to the
provisional Regulation explains the reasons behind the choice of this profit
margin and the investigation did not reveal any other reasons to change it.
Therefore, the target profit of 5% is maintained for the purpose of the
definitive findings.
(67)     One exporting producer
argued that the Union industry’s difficulties are largely due to structural
problems. Therefore, the target profit margin of 5% was also unrealistic. 
(68)     It is recalled that
according to the case law[8],
the Institutions need to establish the profit margin which the Community
industry could reasonably count on under normal conditions of competition, in
the absence of the subsidized imports. In the present case, it has proven
impossible to carry out this analysis for the Union industry of the product
concerned for the following reasons. Sufficient information to calculate profit
margins for the product concerned is only available as of the year 2007. In
2007, the profit margin was 3.7%; as of 2008, due to the financial and economic
crisis, it became negative. The complaint argued, and the investigation
established, that subsidised imports started to arrive on the Union market as
of 2007, when the volume of imports increased from 17727 tons in 2006 to
24811.3 tons. Therefore, the Institutions have established the target profit
margins on the basis of the real profits observed in other parts of the steel
industry, which have not suffered from dumped and subsidized imports.[9]
5.4.        Conclusion on injury 
(69)     The Commission therefore
concludes that the Union industry has suffered material injury during the IP.
6.           Causation
6.1.        Effect of subsidised
imports 
(70)     One exporting producer
claimed that the provisional Regulation ignored that the Union industry was
able to benefit from the increase in consumption since 2009 and that the
Commission cannot assume that the Union industry will be able to maintain its
market share indefinitely. 
(71)     In response to these
arguments it needs to be noted that the investigation revealed the market share
of the subsidised Indian import grew with a higher pace than the consumption in
the Union market. The volume of Indian subsidised imports increased by 110%
while the consumption increased by 50% over the same period. Furthermore the investigation
also showed that the average Indian price was constantly below the average
price of the Union industry during the same period and undercut the Union
industry average price by 11.7% during the IP. As a result, while the Union
industry indeed benefited from the increased consumption to a certain extent
and it also could increase its sales volumes by 40%, it could not maintain its
market share as it could be expected under improving market conditions and
given the Union industry’s free production capacity. 
6.2.        Effect of other factors
6.2.1.     Non-subsidized imports
(72)     Some
interested parties claimed that the effect of the non-subsidized import needed
to be reassessed in light of the fact that KEI Industries received a de-minimis
subsidy margin and the fact that due to double counting errors certain
transactions of the Venus group were removed from the analysis. They also
argued that the prices of the non-subsidized imports were lower than the prices
of the subsidized imports.
(73)     The
table below shows the development of the non-subsidised export volume and
prices during the period considered. Their volume represented around a third of
Indian exports during the IP and followed the same trend as the subsidized
imports.
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Volume (MT) || 5227 || 9015 || 11 394 || 10 938 
 Volume (Index) || 100 || 172 || 218 || 210 
 Average price || 2268 || 2678 || 3105 || 3056 
 Average price (Index) || 100 || 118 || 137 || 135 
 Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat 
(74)     It is therefore correct
that prices of non-subsidized imports were lower than prices of subsidized
imports. However, the volume of non-subsidized imports is only a third of the
volume of subsidized imports. Therefore, the injury caused by non-subsidized
imports does not break the causal link between the
subsidised imports, from India and the material injury suffered by the Union
industry during the IP. 
6.2.2.     Imports from third countries
(75)     One Indian exporting
producer and GOI reiterated the claim that People’s Republic of China should have been included in the investigation and that the impact the imports from the
People’s Republic of China had on the Union market and the Union industry was
underestimated. 
(76)     As mentioned in recital
(170) to the provisional Regulation, neither at initiation stage nor at
definitive stage there is any evidence of subsidisation that may have justified
the initiation of an anti- subsidy investigation on imports originating in People’s Republic of China. The claim that People’s
Republic of China should have been included in the scope of the investigation
is therefore not founded and is rejected. 
(77)     However, the imports from
the People’s Republic of China showed an increasing trend during the period
considered and reached a market share of 8.3% in the IP as stated in recital
(168) to the provisional Regulation. In addition, the Chinese import prices
were lower than the prices of the Union industry and those of the Indian
exporting producers in the Union market. It was, therefore, further
investigated whether the imports from People’s Republic of China could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry and broken the
causal link between that injury and the Indian subsidized imports. 
(78)     The information available
at provisional stage suggested that the product mix represented by the Chinese
imports was different and that the ranges where the Chinese products were
present were different compared to the products sold by the Union industry or
even those of Indian origin products sold in the Union market.
(79)     After publication of the
provisional measure the Commission received several claims pointing to the
possibility that Chinese low-priced imports during the IP would break the
causal link between dumped Indian imports and material injury suffered by the
Union industry.
(80)     Analysis made on the basis
of the import statistics concerning the two CN codes under investigation showed
that 29% of Chinese imports were made on the lower end of the market (under CN
code 7223 00 99). This partly explains why Chinese prices on average are lower
than those of the Union industry and the Indian exporting producers’. The
statistics for CN code 7223 00 99 also showed that the customers of the Chinese
producers were concentrated in the United Kingdom where the Union industry was
basically not present. 
 Volume (MT) || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 7223 00 19 || 2 974 || 3 286 || 3 436 || 2 995 
 7223 00 99 || 765 || 1 458 || 1 472 || 1 320 
 Source : Eurostat 
(81)     As concern CN code 7223 00
19 the analyses carried out on PCN basis showed that both the Union industry
and Indian producers were mainly competing in the higher end of the market
where prices could be up to four times higher than prices in the lower end
within the same CN.[10]
The investigation also showed that in general price variations are linked to
the product type and the nickel content. Furthermore the investigation showed
that Chinese exporters are predominantly selling the lower quality product
types falling within the above mentioned CN code in the Union market. Therefore,
the product mix becomes a predominant factor in evaluating the Chinese imports.
(82)     As concerns the price level
of imports from the People’s Republic of China, it needs to be pointed out that
from 2009 until the IP the average price of Chinese imports remained above of
the price of the subsidized Indian exporting producers’ prices, as can be seen
from the following table showing the average price of subsidized Indian exports
falling under CN code 7223 00 19. 
             Average price (euro/MT) ||             2009 ||             2010 ||             2011 ||             IP ||             IP+1 
             7332 00 19 ||             2974 ||             3286 ||             3436 ||             2995 ||             3093 
             Source: Eurostat 
(83)     In the IP for the first
time the average Chinese import price dropped below that of the Indian import
price for subsidized imports. However, this observation was found to be of a
temporary nature since the Chinese price level in the year after the IP
increased and was again higher than the Indian prices. 
(84)     Furthermore, the comparison
between the import volumes from India and People’s Republic of China showed that at any point during the period considered and particularly in the IP, imports from
People’s Republic of China were at much lower levels than the imports from India. The import volumes for People’s Republic of China amounted to basically less than
half of the total imports from India. 
(85)     On the basis of the above
it is confirmed that significant proportion of the Chinese imports during the
IP are different from the Union industry product mix and that any direct
competition with the products produced and sold by the Union industry is
limited. 
(86)     Therefore, the imports from
the People’s Republic of China could not have affected the situation of the
Union industry to the extent to break the causal link between the subsidised
imports from India and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Therefore,
recital (168) to the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
6.2.3.     Competition from other
producers in the Union
(87)     One party argued that the
Union producers’ poor financial performance might have been caused by
competition from other Union producers which were not complainants or did not
express their support to the investigation at the initiation of the case. 
(88)     The market share of other
producers in the Union developed as follows: 
   || 2009 || 2010 || 2011 || IP 
 Volume (MT) || 34 926 || 55 740 || 55 124 || 55 124 
 Index (2009= 100) || 100 || 160 || 158 || 158 
 Market share of other producers in the Union || 26.6% || 29.8% || 28.1% || 27.9% 
 Source: Complaint 
(89)     The Union producers which
were not complainants and which did not specifically express support to the
investigation accounted for 44% of total Union sales reported in Recital (139)
of the provisional Regulation. Their sales volume increased by 58% from an
estimated 34926 tons in 2009 to 55124 tons during the period considered.
However, such growth is relatively modest if compared to the growth of the
subsidised imports from India in the same period (+110%). Furthermore, the
market share of those Union producers remained relatively stable during the
period considered and no indication was found that their prices were lower than
those of the sampled Union producers. It is therefore concluded that their
sales on the Union market did not contribute to the injury suffered by the
Union industry. 
6.3.        Conclusion on causation 
(90)     In the absence of comments,
recitals (176) to (179) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.           Union interest
7.1.        General considerations 
(91)     In the absence of comments,
recital (180) to the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
7.2.        Interest of the Union
industry
(92)     In the absence of comments,
recitals (181) to (188) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.3.        Interest of users 
(93)     Following the imposition of
the provisional measures, seven users and one users’ association contacted the
Commission and showed interest to cooperate in the investigation. Following
their request, questionnaires were sent to them out in April 2013. However,
only two users submitted a full questionnaire reply and overall the cooperating
users represented 12% of total imports from India during the IP and 2.5% of the
total Union consumption. The economic impact of the measures on users was
reassessed on the basis of the new data available in the questionnaire replies
and two users were visited to verify the information provided. 
(94)     Users claimed that the
level of profitability of 9%, stated in recital (191) to the provisional
Regulation was too high and was not representative for the users’ industry.
Following the receipt of the additional questionnaire replies the average
profitability of all cooperating users was recalculated and established at 2% on
turnover. 
(95)     It was also found that on
average concerning the cooperating users, purchases from India constituted 44% of the total purchases of the product concerned, and that India represented the exclusive source of supply for two cooperating users. During the IP,
the turnover of the product incorporating the product concerned represented on
average 14% of total turnover of the cooperating users. 
(96)     Assuming the worst case
scenario for the Union market, i.e. that no potential price increase could be
passed on to the distribution chain and that the users would continue
purchasing from India in previous volumes, the impact of the duty on the users’
profitability achieved from activities using or incorporating the product
concerned would mean on average a decrease by 0.25 percentage points to 1.75%.
(97)     The
Commission acknowledges that
the impact will be more important, on an individual level, for those users
which source their entire imports from India. However, these are relatively few
in numbers (two of the cooperating users). Furthermore, they have the
possibility, provided that their Indian producer cooperates, to request the
refund of the duties pursuant to Article 21 of the Basic Regulation, if all
conditions for such a refund are met.
(98)     Some users reiterated the
concern that measures would hit certain type of wires not produced in Europe, namely types included in the so-called series 200 as described in recital (194) of
the provisional Regulation. According to the users, the absence of production
in the Union is due to the limited demand and to the specificity of the
production process. 
(99)     However, the investigation
showed that such type of stainless steel wires are produced by the Union
industry and that they represent a limited share of the Union market. There are
also alternative source of supply available for users from countries not
subject to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures. In addition, two Indian
exporting producers received 0% countervailing duty rate, therefore the
imposition of the measures will have no have significant effects on supplies
from them. Furthermore, other product types of stainless steel wires can be
used for the same purposes. Therefore, the imposition of the measures cannot
have a significant impact on the Union market and on these users. This claim is
therefore rejected.
(100)   Some users pointed out the
longer delivery time for the like product by the Union producers compared to
the delivery time of the product concerned from India. However, the possibility
of merchants and traders of stocking the products and of having them swiftly
available does not undermine the factual evidence of the negative effects of
the subsidised imports. Therefore, this argument has to be rejected. 
(101)   Taking the above into
consideration, even if some users are likely to be negatively affected by the
measures on imports from India more than others, it is considered that in
balance the Union market will benefit from the imposition of the measures. In
particular, it is considered that restoring fair trade conditions on the Union
market would allow the Union industry to align its prices with cost of
production; to keep production and employment; to regain the market share
previously lost and to benefit from increased economies of scale. This should
allow the industry to reach reasonable profit margins that will permit it to
operate efficiently in the medium and long term. In parallel the industry will
improve its overall financial situation. In addition, the investigation
established that the measures will have an overall limited impact on the users
and on unrelated importers. Therefore it is concluded that the overall benefit
of the measures appears to outweigh the impact on the users of the product
concerned in the Union market. 
7.4.        Interest of unrelated
importers
(102)   In the absence of comments,
recitals (197) to (199) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
7.5.        Conclusion on Union
interest
(103)   In view of the above, the
assessment in recitals (200) and (201) to the provisional Regulation is
confirmed. 
8.           Definitive countervailing
measures
8.1.        Injury elimination level
(104)   In absence of any comments,
recitals (203) to (206) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 
8.2.        Conclusion on injury
elimination level
(105)   No individual injury margin
was calculated for KEI Industries since this company’s definitive subsidy
margin was at de minimis level as stated in recital (49) above.
(106)   The methodology used in the
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 
8.3.        Definitive measures
(107)   In the light of the above
and in accordance with Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, a definitive
countervailing duty should be imposed at a level sufficient to eliminate the
injury caused by the subsidised imports without exceeding the subsidy margin
found.
(108)   Therefore, the countervailing duty rates were established by comparing the
injury margins and the subsidy margins. Consequently, the proposed
countervailing duty rates are as follows:
 Company || Subsidy margin || Injury margin || Countervailing duty rate 
 Raajratna Metal Industries || 3.7% || 17.2% || 3.7% 
 Venus group || 3.0% || 23.4% || 3.0% 
 Viraj Profiles Vpl. Ltd. || 0.9% || n/a || 0.0% 
 KEI Industries Limited || 0.7% || n/a || 0.0% 
 Cooperating non-sampled companies || 3.4% || 19.3% || 3.4% 
 All other companies || 3.7% || 23.4% || 3.7% 
(109)   The
individual company countervailing duty rates specified in this working document
were established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation.
Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that
investigation with respect to these companies. These
duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to 'all other
companies') are exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in India and produced by the specific legal entities mentioned. Imported products produced by
any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this
working document, including entities related to those specifically mentioned,
cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate
applicable to 'all other companies'.
(110)   Any claim requesting the
application of an individual company countervailing duty rates (e.g. following
a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new
production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission[11] forthwith with all relevant
information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked
to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that
name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate,
the Regulation imposing the definitive countervailing duties will be amended
accordingly by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty
rates.
8.4.        Definitive collection of
provisional countervailing duties
(111)   In view of the magnitude of
the subsidy margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to
the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way
of the provisional countervailing duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation
be definitively collected to the extent of the amount of the definitive duties
imposed. 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
1.           A
definitive countervailing duty is hereby imposed on imports of wire of
stainless steel containing by weight:
- 2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or
more but not more than 22% of chromium, 
- less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00
19 and 7223 00 99 and originating in India.
2.           The
rate of the definitive countervailing duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described
in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies below shall be:
 Company || Duty (%) || TARIC additional code 
 Raajratna Metal Industries, Ahmedabad, Gujarat || 3.7 || B775 
 Venus Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 3.0 || B776 
 Precision Metals, Mumbai, Maharashtra || 3.0 || B777 
 Hindustan Inox Ltd., Mumbai, Maharashtra || 3.0 || B778 
 Sieves Manufacturer India Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, Maharashtra || 3.0 || B779 
 Viraj Profiles Vpl. Ltd., Thane, Maharashtra || 0.0 || B780 
 KEI Industries Limited, New Delhi || 0.0 || B925 
 Companies listed in the Annex || 3.4 || B781 
 All other companies || 3.7 || B999   
 
3.           Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs
duties shall apply.
Article 2
Amounts secured by way of provisional
countervailing duties in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 419/2013 on imports
of wire of stainless steel containing by weight:
- 2,5% or more of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 28% or more but not more than 31% of nickel and 20% or
more but not more than 22% of chromium, 
- less than 2,5% of nickel, other than wire
containing by weight 13% or more but not more than 25% of chromium and 3,5% or
more but not more than 6% of aluminium, 
currently falling within CN codes 7223 00
19 and 7223 00 99 and originating in India, 
shall be definitively collected. The
amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the countervailing duty
shall be released. 
Article 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on
the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union. 
This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President
ANNEX:
Indian cooperating exporting producers not sampled
TARIC Additional Code B781
 Company name || City 
 Bekaert Mukand Wire Industries || Lonand, Tal. Khandala, Satara District, Maharastra 
 Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt. Ltd. || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Bhansali Stainless Wire || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Chandan Steel || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Drawmet Wires || Bhiwadi, Rajastan 
 Garg Inox Ltd || Bahadurgarh, Haryana 
 Jyoti Steel Industries Ltd. || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Macro Bars and Wires || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Mukand Ltd. || Thane 
 Nevatia Steel & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. || Mumbai, Maharashtra 
 Panchmahal Steel Ltd. || Dist. Panchmahals, Gujarat 
[1]               OJ L 188, 18.7.2009, p. 93.
[2]               OJ L 126, 8.5.2013, p. 19.
[3]               OJ L 126, 8.5.2013, p.1.
[4]               OJ C 240, 10.08.2012, p. 6
[5]               Case C-595/11 Steinel [2013] nyr. paragraph 44.
[6]               Case T- 170/94 Shanghai Bycicles [1997] ECR II-1383,
paragraph 64.
[7]               OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.
[8]               Case T-210/95 European
Fertilizer Manufacturer's Association (EFMA) v Council [1999] ECR II-3291, paragraph
60
[9]               Council Regulation (EU) No 383/2009 of 5 May 2009
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the
provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pre- and post-stressing wires
and wire strands of non-alloy steel (PSC wires and strands) originating in the
People’s Republic of China OJ L 118, 13.5.2009. p.1; Commission Regulation (EU)
No 1071/2012 of 14 November 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on
imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron,
originating in the People’s Republic of China and Thailand OJ L 318, 15.11.2012
p. 10; Commission Regulation (EU) No 845/2012 of 18 September 2012 imposing
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain organic coated steel
products originating in the People’s Republic of China OJ L 252, 19.9.2012 p.33
[10]             However, it is noted that both the Union industry and
the Indian exporting producers are also present in the lower end of the market
even if to a lesser extent. 
[11]             European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade,
Directorate H, 1049 Brussels, Belgium.