EU development cooperation in fragile states : challenges and opportunities.
Date: 2013-08-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union
Subjects: common foreign and security policy, conflict prevention, cooperation policy, fragile region or state, international cooperation, peacekeeping, the EU's international role

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION 

DIRECTORATE B 

POLICY DEPARTMENT 

STUDY  

EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN FRAGILE STATES: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

Abstract 

The study analyses the strengths and weaknesses of current EU engagement in fragile states, 
and in particular its support to conflict prevention and periods of transition, within the broader 
international  context. 
instruments  and  methods 
implemented by the EU to address the problems of fragile states and identifies what could be 
done to improve them.  

limitations  of  the 

It  examines  the 

Key  weaknesses  of  the  EU’s  programmes  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states  include 
insufficient  analysis  of  the  root  causes  of  fragility,  ineffective  early  warning  systems,  and 
insufficient  coordination  with  other  international  actors  engaged  in  fragile  and  conflict-
affected states. 

These  challenges  are  not  dissimilar  to  those  experienced  by  other  international  actors. 
However, the EU’s performance is exacerbated by a number of factors that are specific to its 
organisational  and  resourcing  arrangements.  These  include  the  internal  fragmentation  of 
policy responsibility at headquarter level, inadequate translation of policy into programming 
at country level and insufficient instrumental coherence. Investing in expertise in fragility and 
conflict-prevention has not, to date, been a priority, particularly at the operational level. 

The  study’s  main  recommendation  is  the  finalisation  of  the  Action  Plan  on  security,  fragility 
and  development,  to  mutually  reinforce  the  EU’s  objectives  in  development  cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security and to 
clarify  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  various  institutions  responsible  for  fragility  and 
conflict at a policy and operational level.  The study also recommends convening a high-level 
coordination  group  on  fragility  at  headquarter  level  to  agree  policies  and  monitor  progress 
and devolving decision-making on integrated programming and flexible resource utilisation in 
fragile and conflict-affected states to Heads of Delegation. 

EXPO/B/DEVE/FWC/2009-01/Lot5/35 

PE 433.724 

April 2013 

EN 

 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

This study was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Development. 

AUTHORS: 

GAVAS, Mikaela, Project Leader, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, UK  
DAVIES, Fiona, Expert, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, UK 
MCKECHNIE, Alastair, Expert, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, UK 
BROWN, Oli, Associate Fellow, CHATHAM HOUSE, UK (review) 
ELIZE Hefer, Project Officer, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, UK (copy-editing) 

Coordination provided by Ecologic Institute.  

ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE: 

Jesper TVEVAD  
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 
Policy Department 
WIB 06 M 051 
rue Wiertz 60 
B-1047 Brussels 

Editorial Assistant: Györgyi MÁCSAI  

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 

Original: EN 

ABOUT THE EDITOR 

Editorial closing date: 26/04/2013. 
© European Union, 2013 

Printed in Belgium 

ISBN: 978-92-823-4409-5 
Doi: 10.2861/2196 

The Information Note is available on the Internet at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN 

If you are unable to download the information you require, please request a paper copy  
by e-mail : poldep-expo@europarl.europa.eu 

DISCLAIMER 

Any  opinions  expressed  in  this  document  are  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  author  and  do  not 
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. 

Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is 
acknowledged  and  provided  the  publisher  is  given  prior  notice  and  supplied  with  a  copy  of  the 
publication.  

 2

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

INTRODUCTION 

1.  THE CHALLENGE OF FRAGILITY 

1.1  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

1.2  CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS OF ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES 

1.3  NEW AGENDAS FOR ENGAGEMENT 

2.  THE EU AND FRAGILE STATES 

2.1  OVERVIEW OF THE EU POLICY FRAMEWORK, THE INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP AND 

INSTRUMENTS FOR ADDRESSING FRAGILE STATES 

2.1.1 

2.1.2 

2.1.3 

The policy framework 

Organisational structures 

The instruments 

6 

8 

10 

10 

11 

12 

13 

13 

13 

16 

19 

2.2  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EU ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE 

STATES 

2.2.1 

FSP 4: Prioritising Prevention 

21 

22 

2.2.2 
Objectives 

FSP  5:  Recognise  the  links  between  Political,  Security  and  Development 
25 

2.2.3 
exclusion 

FSPs  6  &  10:  Promoting  non-discrimination  and  avoiding  pockets  of 
29 

2.2.4 

Efficacy of focusing on four out of the ten FSPs 

31 

3.  PROPOSALS FOR A MORE PROACTIVE, COHERENT AND COORDINATED 

APPROACH 

3.1  RE-ALIGNING EU INSTITUTIONS FOR SUCCESS 

3.2  HARMONISATION AND ALIGNMENT OF EU ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS 

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

4.1  RECOMMENDATIONS 

32 

34 

37 

39 

40 

3

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

ADE 

AGIR 

APF 

Aide a la Decision Economique 

Global Alliance for Sahel Initiative 

Africa Peace Facility 

ASEAN  

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

AU 

BSF 

CAR 

CFSP 

CPG 

CPPB 

CSDP 

CSO 

DAC 

DCI 

DFID 

DG 

African Union 

South Sudan Basic Services Fund 

Central African Republic 

Common Foreign and Security Policy 

Conflict Prevention Group 

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding 

Common Security and Defence Policy 

Civil society organisation 

Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

UK Department for International Development 

European Commission Directorate-General 

DG DEVCO 

European Commission Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation 

DG ECHO 

European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 

DRC 

Democratic Republic of Congo 

ECOWAS 

Economic Community of West African States 

EDF 

EEAS 

European Development Fund 

European External Action Service 

EIDHR   

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

ENI 

ESDP 

EU 

EUSR 

FAC 

FPI 

FSP 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

European Security and Defence Policy 

European Union 

European Union Special Representative 

Foreign Affairs Council 

Foreign Policy Instruments Service 

The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations; or 
Fragile States Principle 

GoSS 

Government of South Sudan 

 4

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

Humanitarian Aid Instrument 

High  Representative  on  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  /  Vice  President  of  the 
European Commission 

Instrument for Stability 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 

Low-income Country 

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development 

Millennium Development Goals 

Multi-donor trust fund 

Multi-Annual Financial Framework 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

Non-governmental organisations 

Official Development Assistance 

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Peace and Security Committee 

HAI 

HR/VP 

IfS 

IPA 

LIC 

LRRD 

MDG 

MDTF 

MFF 

NATO 

NGO 

ODA 

OECD 

PSC 

SHARE  

Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience Initiative 

UN 

United Nations 

UNDP 

United Nations Development Programme 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1 

Spectrum of Peace Interventions 

Figure 2 

Overview of key EU policy statements on addressing fragility 

Figure 3 

The four dimensions of the Integrated Approach to conflict prevention and  

peace-building  

Figure 4 

Overview of the EU’s instruments for CPPB 

10 

14 

14 

19 

5

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The study aims to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of current European Union (EU) engagement 
in fragile states, and in particular its support to conflict prevention and periods of transition, within the 
broader international context. In order to do this, it situates EU performance within overall international 
implementation  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development’s  (OECD)  Principles 
for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States  and  Situations  (FSPs).  The  report  looks  at  the 
extent to which the EU’s instruments, policies and approaches are suited to the objectives of prioritising 
prevention and supporting transition. It also illustrates the operational challenges faced in supporting 
these objectives at country-level using examples from South Sudan and Afghanistan.  

The study finds that the EU has not been able to implement effective, systematic and long-term conflict 
prevention  programmes  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states.  Key  weaknesses  include  insufficient 
analysis of the root causes of fragility, ineffective early warning systems, and inadequate integration of 
conflict-prevention and peacebuilding approaches into programming at country level.    

In  spite  of  the  EU’s  recognition  in  various  communications  of  the  importance  of  linking  relief, 
rehabilitation  and  development  (LRRD),  the  study  finds  that  the  EU  lacks  a  coherent  approach  to 
mainstreaming LRRD into its programming in fragile and conflict-affected states, and has not ensured 
that  its  various  financial  instruments  are  able  to  support  the  post-emergency  transition  from 
humanitarian to development assistance in a systematic way.     

The study finds that, in general, the EU has not coordinated sufficiently with other international actors 
engaged  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states.  EU  cooperation  with  the  United  Nations  (UN)  remains 
largely  ad  hoc:  although  there  have  been  efforts  to  strengthen  cooperation  at  the  operational  level, 
cooperation at the policy level is somewhat lacking. Meanwhile cooperation between EU Delegations 
and EU Member States engaged in fragile and conflict-affected states has in many cases remained at the 
level  of  information  sharing,  with  very  few  examples  of  joint  objective-setting,  joint  programming  or 
clear division of roles to enhance synergies and avoid gaps and duplications. 

The EU has at its disposal a range of tools and resources across the security, diplomatic, development, 
humanitarian,  legal,  trade  and  investment  and  migration  spheres.  The  EU  is  already  a  critical  and 
important actor in fragile states and states in transition. However, this report argues that with its long-
term  and  continued  presence,  the  critical  mass  of  financial  support,  sophisticated  approaches, 
instruments and political and economic power, the EU could significantly improve its effectiveness. In 
general,  the  challenges  faced  by  the  EU  in  engaging  in  fragile  states  are  not  dissimilar  to  those 
experienced  by  other  international  actors.  However,  the  EU  faces  specific  challenges  related  to  its 
organisational and resourcing arrangements: 

 

 

lack  of  organisational  coherence  has, 

Responsibility  for  policy  approaches  to  fragility  and  conflict  is  fragmented  across  a  number  of 
institutions.  In  the  absence  of  an  integrated,  ‘whole-of-EU’  policy  on  security,  fragility  and 
development, it is not clear how these various units relate to each other and the EU Delegations. 
limited  the  effective  development, 
This 
dissemination and uptake of various tools designed to enhance engagement at the operational 
level.  
There is insufficient coherence  between the various financing  instruments  at  the Commission’s 
disposal, leading to gaps in the provision of financing for long-term preventive actions and post-
emergency situations.  

in  turn, 

 6

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

 

 

Commission funding for post-emergency situations that involve a transition from humanitarian 
and development assistance is not sufficiently systematic. 
In spite of its policy commitments, the Commission has not made investing in expertise in fragility 
and conflict-prevention a priority, particularly at the operational level. EU Delegations in fragile or 
conflict-affected  states  often  face  staff  shortages,  or  lack  dedicated  expertise  in  conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding. 

The study urges the EU to: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

Finalise the Action Plan on security, fragility and development requested by the Council 
in 2007. The Action Plan should be based on a whole-of-EU approach that aims to ensure that 
the  EU’s  objectives  are  mutually  reinforcing  across  the  fields  of  development  cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, conflict-prevention and international security.  

Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions responsible for fragility 
and conflict at a policy and operational level. 

Convene  a  high-level  coordination  group  on  fragility.  This  would  comprise  of  the 
Commissioners  of  relevant  Directorates-General  (DGs)  and  the  High  Representative  on 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), tasked 
with agreeing policies and monitoring progress for specific countries of EU focus. The HR/VP 
would head the group and ensure that the European Parliament is consulted regularly so that 
the Parliament’s views are taken into consideration.   

Devolve  decision-making  powers  on  integrated  programming  and  flexible  resource 
utilisation  to  the  Heads  of  Delegation  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states.  This  could 
help to avoid implementation gaps in support of long-term prevention and post-emergency 
transition, and to maximise the speed and flexibility with which emerging gaps and needs can 
be addressed. This approach would need to be backed up by a serious investment in human 
resources at country level, ensuring that EU Delegations are fully staffed and have access to 
the necessary expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 

Determine  the  breadth  and  depth  of  its  engagement  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected 
states.  In  terms  of  breadth,  the  EU  should  consider  in  which  countries  it  wishes  to  focus  its 
efforts to reduce state fragility. In terms of depth, the EU should consider whether it wishes to 
develop a deeper expertise in certain thematic areas in which it has comparative advantage 
and which there are gaps in the international architecture, such as justice and public security, 
and develop specific instruments to support them. 

Communicate  clearly  in  one  document  what  financing  options  exist  for  addressing 
fragility, which EU organisations are responsible for them, which recipients are eligible 
and the terms and conditions  of each  instrument. It  should  also  seek to  address existing 
obstacles to coherence across instruments, for example, by enhancing the adaptation of non-
humanitarian instruments to flexible or fast delivery in contexts of fragility.  

Establish  EU  pooled  funding  arrangements  that  could  mobilise  funding  from  Member 
States outside the EU budget. These could be constituted like a MDTF or a pooled funding 
arrangement jointly managed with the recipient country.  

7

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

For  all  the  current  challenges  faced  by  the  EU,  it  remains  an  indispensable  part  of  the  multilateral 
architecture,  strongly rooted in  shared values, and with the thematic reach  and range  of instruments 
required  to  contribute  to  the  future  agenda  of  international  development. Despite  this,  the  EU’s 
potential for more effective conflict prevention is clearly unfulfilled.  

INTRODUCTION 

In  its  Resolution  on  Situations  of  Fragility  adopted  on  15  November  20071,  the  European  Parliament 
considered fragility to be a complex development challenge. It stressed the need for a well-defined and 
coherent fragility agenda, adapted to the situation, taking long-term considerations into account and 
coordinating the multiple aims and approaches of the different stakeholders in light of the overarching 
objective of reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 

In  2009,  the  European  Commission  launched  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  its  approach  to  conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) from 2001 to 2010 (Aide à la Décision Économique (ADE), 2011). 
The evaluation found that, ‘since 2001 the Commission has implemented a substantial shift in support 
towards CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments. For example, it increased 
its financial support for CPPB from EUR 120 million in 2001 to around EUR 1 billion per year from 2004, 
making  this  support  not  only  a  substantial  (EUR  7.7  billion)  share  of  the  EuropeAid-managed  budget 
over the period (EUR 73.5 billion), but also transforming the Commission into one of the main donors 
with respect to CPPB’. It noted that the EU had considerably strengthened its policy framework and that 
it  had  at  its  disposal  a  wide  range  of  financial  and  non-financial  instruments  which  allowed  it  to 
intervene  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  countries,  ranging  from  ‘classic’  long-term  geographical 
assistance  to  specific  short-term  instruments  and  a  wide  range  of  non-financial  instruments  such  as 
political dialogue, high-level mediation and the deployment of EU observers (ADE, 2011).  

This  study  analyses  the  particular  instruments  and  methods  implemented  by  the  EU  to  address  the 
problems of fragile states. It examines the limitations of these instruments and methods and identifies 
what  could  be  done  to  improve  them,  focusing  on  how  they  could  become  more  anticipatory.  The 
study pays special attention to the ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and  Situations  (FSPs)  endorsed  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC)  (OECD,  2007),  and  in  particular  to  four  of  the 
Principles:  

  prioritising prevention;  
recognising the link between political, security and development objectives; 
 
  promoting non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies; and 
 

avoiding the creation of pockets of exclusion or so-called 'aid orphans'.  

The study is divided into four parts. Part 1 addresses the challenge of fragility. It briefly reviews current 
definitions of the causes and characteristics of fragility, provides an overview of the challenges facing 
international engagement in fragile states, and looks at new agendas for engagement. Part 2 looks in 
detail at the EU and fragile states. It gives an overview of the EU policy framework, institutional set-up 
and  instruments  for  addressing  fragility.  It  then  provides  an  assessment  of  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of EU engagement in fragile states, with a particular focus  on the four  FSPs  listed above. 

1 European Parliament Resolution on the EU Response to Situations of Fragility in developing countries, P6-TA(2007)0540, 15 
November 2007.  See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0540+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 

 8

                                                               
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

Part 3 discusses ways in which the EU can strengthen the coherence of its engagement in fragile states 
and adopt a more anticipatory approach. Part 4 concludes with recommendations. 

The study aims to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of current EU engagement in fragile states, and 
in particular its support to conflict prevention and periods of transition, within the broader international 
context. In order to do this, it situates EU performance within overall international implementation of 
the  FSPs  and  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  its  instruments,  policies  and  approaches  are  suited  to  the 
objectives  of  prioritising  prevention  and  supporting  transition.  It  also  illustrates  the  operational 
challenges faced in supporting these objectives at country-level using examples from South Sudan and 
Afghanistan.  In  general,  the  challenges  faced  by  the  EU  in  engaging  in  international  states  are  not 
dissimilar to those experienced by other international actors. However, the EU faces specific challenges 
related to the internal fragmentation of responsibility at a policy level, inadequate translation of policy 
into  programming  approaches  at  a  country  level,  and  insufficient  coherence  among  the  various  aid 
instruments.    

For  all  the  current  challenges  faced  by  the  EU,  it  remains  an  indispensable  part  of  the  multilateral 
architecture,  strongly rooted in  shared values, and with the thematic reach  and range  of instruments 
required  to  contribute  to  the  future  agenda  of  international  development. Despite  this,  the  EU’s 
potential for more effective conflict prevention is clearly unfulfilled. The EU’s performance is hindered 
by a number of factors that are specific to its institutional and resourcing arrangements. Although the 
basic  building  blocks  are  now  in  place,  or  shortly  will  be,  with  an  agreement  on  the  Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework (MFF) from 2014 to 2020, there are a number of opportunities on the horizon: 

 

 

 

The review of the European External Action Service (EEAS), expected to take place in the middle 
of  2013,  provides  an  important  first  opportunity  to  assess  its  strengths  and  weaknesses,  to 
address some of its shortcomings, and to give a new impetus to its further development.  
The  new  programming  period,  due  to  start  in  2014,  presents  a  key  opportunity  to  ensure  that 
policy translates into practice.   
The on-going negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament on the Regulations 
for  the  Financial  Instruments  from  2014-2020,  present  an  opportunity  for  addressing  existing 
obstacles to coherence across instruments. 

9

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

1. 

THE CHALLENGE OF FRAGILITY 

1.1 

The conceptual framework  

The  World  Bank  defines  fragility  and  fragile  situations  as  periods  when  states  or  institutions  lack  the 
capacity, accountability or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens 
and the state, making them vulnerable to violence (World Bank, 2011a). The OECD similarly considers 
fragile states or provinces to lack the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society and 
notes  that  they  often  have  a  weak  capacity  to  carry  out  basic  governance  functions  (OECD,  2013). 
Situations of fragility have common elements, including poverty, inequality and vulnerability. But they 
are  also  characterised  by  significant  diversity,  in  terms  of  national  income,  endowment  in  natural 
resources and exposure to internal and external stresses.  

Fragile  situations  matter  because  they  are  home  to  an  increasingly  concentrated  proportion  of  the 
world’s poor (OECD, 2013). It is estimated that by 2015, half of the world’s people surviving on less than 
USD 1.25 a day will be found in fragile states. This is because conflict and fragility actively undermine 
development  and  the  fight  against  poverty  is  slower  in  fragile  states  than  elsewhere.  Beyond  the 
humanitarian imperative to address global poverty where it is concentrated, fragility matters because of 
the risk it poses to regional and global stability (OECD, 2013).  

Thus,  the  rationale  for  international  engagement  in  fragile  states  is  driven  both  by  a  security  and  a 
development  agenda.  The  growing  importance  of  international  support  in  tackling  poverty  and 
promoting stability is reflected in the level of aid flows to fragile states, with it being estimated that one 
third of all aid to developing countries goes to fragile states (OECD, 2011a). However, the long trend of 
growth  in  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  to  fragile  states  is  at  serious  risk  given  the  current 
fiscal crunch in OECD countries (OECD, 2011a). This places an imperative to use resources better in order 
to  maximise  their  impact,  tailoring  them  to  the  complexity  of  a  post-conflict  environment  in  which 
multiple  forms  of  support  may  be  required  at  any  given  point  in  time,  and  where  the  coherence 
between these forms of support can have a critical impact on the effectiveness of any one of them.    

Figure 1: Spectrum of Peace Interventions  

Source: Bailey, S. and Pavanello, S., ‘Untangling early Recovery’, Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 28, ODI, London, 
2009 

 10

 
 
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

1.2 

Challenges and dilemmas of engagement in fragile states 

Although diverse, fragile situations offer a specific environment with challenges that are different from 
those found in more stable contexts. The fact that international assistance in fragile situations cannot be 
‘business  as  usual’  is  largely  consensual  (OECD,  2013).  The  call  to  do  things  differently  and  focus  on 
different things was set out in the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and  Situations  (OECD,  2007).  The  FSPs  recognised  that  international  actors  can  affect  outcomes  in 
fragile states in both positive and negative ways. The aim of the Principles is to help international actors 
foster  constructive  engagement  between  national  and  international  stakeholders  in  countries  with 
problems of weak governance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger 
performing countries. The Principles recognise that international engagement will not by itself put an 
end to state fragility, but suggest that the adoption of shared principles can help maximise the positive 
impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm (OECD, 2007). The Principles were validated 
by both development partners and partner countries at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
in Accra in 2008. 

However, in 2011, following a monitoring survey conducted in 13 fragile states2, the OECD found that 
the Principles have stimulated relatively little change in international engagement at the country level 
(OECD,  2011a).  As  a  result,  international  performance  against  the  Principles  is  seriously  off-track.  The 
OECD’s main finding was that most aid actors are neither set up to meet the specific challenges posed 
by fragile environments, nor systematically able to translate commitments made by their headquarters 
into country-level impacts. 

Out of the ten Principles, only two were found to be being applied in a manner that can be considered 
broadly  or  partly  on-track:  non-discrimination  (FSP  6),  and  alignment  of  development  partner 
interventions (FSP 7). Four FSPs were found to be partly off-track:  take context as the starting point (FSP 
1); focus on statebuilding as the central objective (FSP 3); prioritise prevention (FSP 4); and recognise the 
links  between  security,  political  and  development  objectives  (FSP  5).  Key  challenges  in  the  effective 
implementation of these principles included: insufficient understanding of national context to enable 
effective  programming  in  support  of  national  priorities,  limited  development  partner  support  for 
processes aimed at fostering national dialogue and building a national vision, insufficient development 
partner efforts at prevention, and a continuing need for integrated approaches to peacebuilding and 
statebuilding on the ground.  

Application  of  four  of  the  Principles  was  found  to  be  entirely  off-track:  do  no  harm  (FSP  2),  agree  on 
practical coordination mechanisms between international actors (FSP 8), act fast but stay engaged long 
enough  to  give  peace  a  chance  (FSP  9),  and  avoid  pockets  of  exclusion  (FSP  10).  Key  challenges  in 
implementing  these  principles  included:  a  serious  risk  of  development  partners  doing  harm  through 
their interventions because they lack systematic operating procedures to assess and address risks and 
unintended  consequences,  a  lack  of  development  partner  coordination,  the  lack  of  predictability  of 
development partner engagement, and the uneven geographic distribution of aid (OECD, 2011a). 

These  findings  led  the  OECD  to  conclude  that  development  partners  need  to  make  a  more  focused 
effort to ensure that the adoption of policies at headquarters translates into behavioural change on the 
ground.  In  order  to  do  this,  they  need  to  improve  their  capacity  to  work  in  fragile  states,  and  make 

2  Burundi,  Central  African  Republic  (CAR),  Chad,  Comoros,  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  (DRC),  Guinea-Bissau,  Haiti, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo 

11

                                                               
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

greater political efforts to adapt and reform field policies and practices, reinforced with incentives for 
change, to ensure that they can respond faster and with greater flexibility (OECD, 2011a).    

The survey findings also highlighted the extent to which traditional development frameworks, such as 
the MDGs or poverty reduction strategies, fall short of providing an adequate basis for effective action 
to address the challenges of conflict-affected and fragile states, and the need for the political realities 
and political economies of fragile states to be taken much better into account in the way development 
outcomes, priorities and results are defined (OECD, 2011a).    

1.3 

New agendas for engagement 

The recognition that current methods of working in fragile states need serious improvement prompted 
the  g7+  group  of  nineteen  fragile  and  conflict-affected  countries  and  other  members  of  the 
International  Dialogue  on  Peacebuilding  and  Statebuilding  to  develop  a  New  Deal  for  Engagement  in 
Fragile  States  (International  Dialogue  on  Peacebuilding  and  Statebuilding,  2011).  The  New  Deal  was 
endorsed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. It commits fragile states 
and international partners to:  

 
 

 

support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility,  
coordinate  donor  support  around  peacebuilding  and  statebuilding  priorities  agreed  through 
broad in-country consultation that recognise the principle of country ownership and leadership, 
and to  
provide  aid  and  manage  resources  more  effectively,  adapting  approaches  to  the  realities  and 
special needs of fragile contexts in order to achieve better results.   

Central to the New Deal is a commitment to use peacebuilding and statebuilding goals as an important 
foundation to enable progress towards sustainable development in fragile and conflict-affected states. 
The five goals are:   

 
 
 
 
 

Legitimate Politics (foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution),  
Security (establish and strengthen people’s security),  
Justice (address injustices and increase people’s access to justice),  
Economic Foundations (generate employment and improve livelihoods), and  
Revenues  &  Services  (manage  revenue  and  build  capacity  for  accountable  and  fair  service 
delivery). 

The New Deal reflects a shift towards a ‘thick’ conceptualisation of state fragility that looks beyond the 
quality  of  government  policies  and  institutions  to  consider  the  multiple  dimensions  of  state-society 
relations (OECD, 2013). A number of key tools outlined in the New Deal are currently being developed 
and  piloted,  such  as  country-led  fragility  assessments  and  the  development  of  indicators  for  each 
peacebuilding and statebuilding goal.   

Increased knowledge of the transition from fragility, agreement on a new approach for partners to assist 
fragile  states  (OECD,  2011b)  and  the  New  Deal  itself,  all  challenge  international  partners  to  make 
fundamental changes in the way they approach state fragility. Facilitating and assisting country driven 
processes of institutional change, which take decades to complete and which do not proceed linearly, 
cannot  be  led  from  Brussels.  This  requires  a  redefinition  of  the  way  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Commission  and  EU  Delegations  work  with  each  other  in  fragile  situations  to  ensure  that  support  is 
timely and flexible, that it enables rather than disempowers local actors, that it is responsive to windows 
of opportunity, and to ensure that the EU is ultimately accountable for results to taxpayers. 

 12

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

2. 

2.1 

THE EU AND FRAGILE STATES 

Overview  of  the  EU  policy  framework,  the  institutional  set-up  and  instruments  for 
addressing fragile states  

The EU has at its disposal a range of tools and resources across the security, diplomatic, development, 
humanitarian,  legal,  trade  and  investment  and  migration  spheres.  With  its  long-term  and  continued 
presence,  the  critical  mass  of  financial  support,  the  vast  range  of  tools,  instruments  and  political  and 
economic power, the EU could be a critical and important actor in fragile states. However, there is no 
consensus  yet  on  either  the  means  of  setting  precise  objectives,  or  on  the  design  of  policies  and 
implementation  mechanisms  to  reach  those  objectives  that  ensure  coherence  across  the  different 
domains. Nevertheless, despite its internal problems and institutional challenges, the EU is becoming 
increasingly involved in conflict management and peace processes around the world. 

2.1.1 

The policy framework 

A  key  challenge  of  dealing  with  conflict  and  fragility  is  that  it  requires  a  multifaceted  approach  that 
integrates all areas of EU external action. This means that responsibility for conflict and fragility should 
cut  across  all  policies  and  institutions.  While  the  EU  has  developed  a  comprehensive  set  of  policies, 
which  includes  a  general  framework  providing  guidelines  and  objectives  for  EU  foreign  and 
development  policy,  as  well  as  specific  policies  towards  fragility,  it  has  been  unable  to  develop  an 
overall comprehensive strategy driven by a coherent ‘whole-of-EU’ approach. 

The EU has endorsed the  New  Deal  for  Engagement  in  Fragile  States,  along with other key  documents 
such  as  the  OECD’s  ‘Principles  for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States  and  Situations’ 
(OECD,  2007).  However,  the  EU  has  also  sought  to  address  these  challenges  by  formulating  its  own 
policies. 

In the last decade, the EU has adopted a variety of policy statements stressing the need to address state 
fragility and improve its response (see Figure 2). The EU’s first step towards introducing ‘an integrated 
approach’  linking  conflict  prevention,  development  and  security  and  requiring  close  cooperation 
between the Commission and the Council, as well as with international players, was articulated in the 
2001  Communication  on  Conflict  Prevention3  and  the  EU  Programme  for  the  Prevention  of  Violent 
Conflicts4, adopted by the European Council in Gothenburg (see Figure 3). The Gothenburg Programme 
firmly  anchored  conflict  prevention  as  one  of  the  core  goals  of  EU  external  relations.  The  Council 
stressed  that  it  ‘should  be  integrated  in  all  its  relevant  aspects,  including  the  European  Security  and 
Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade’ (European Council, 2001). In the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the prevention of ‘state failure’ became an important objective 
of the EU’s external relations and foreign policy, with serious implications for development and security 
policy.  References  to  failed  states  became  increasingly  prominent  in  official  EU  documents  (Banim, 
2008). The  2003  European  Security  Strategy5 addressed  state  failure as ‘an  alarming phenomenon that 
undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability’ (European Council, 2003).  

3 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0211:FIN:EN:PDF 
4 See http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/3.%20Resources/EU%20Documents/-
EU_EU_Programme_for_the_Prevention_of_Violent_Conflicts.pdf 
5 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 

13

                                                               
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

Figure 2: Overview of key EU policy statements on addressing fragility 

Year  Milestone 

2000  The EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement 

2001  EC Communication ‘Conflict Prevention’ 

2001  EU Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflict 

2003  European Security Strategy 

2003  EC Communication ‘Governance and Development’ 

2004  Action Plan for the Civilian Aspects of ESDP 

2005  The European Consensus on Development 

2005  The EU Strategy for Africa 

2007 

EC Communication ‘Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in 
difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace’ 

2007  Council Conclusions on ‘An EU response to situations of fragility’ 

2007  European Parliament Resolution: ‘Situations of fragility’ 

2007  Council Conclusions on ‘Security and Development’ 

2007  Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 

2011 

EC Communication ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change’ 

2011  Council Conclusions on ‘Conflict Prevention’ 

2012 

Council Conclusions on ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change’ 

2012  Council Conclusions on ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ 

Figure 3: The four dimensions of the Integrated Approach to conflict prevention and peace-
building 

Different time 
dimensions

(when?)

Different types of 
activities

(what?)

Activities of 
different actors

(who/with whom?)

Different  
geographical 
dimensions

(where?)

Source: ADE (for the European Comm ission), Concept Study for the Them atic evaluation of the European 
Comm ission support to conflict prevention and peace-building, 2010

 14

 
  
 
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

The  European  Consensus  on  Development6,  approved  by  the  European  institutions  and  the  Member 
States in 2006, focused on poverty eradication within the context of building a ’more stable, peaceful, 
prosperous, and equitable world’. It committed the Commission to develop a ‘comprehensive approach 
to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises’ (European Union, 2006). In 2007, the 
EU defined the analytical and conceptual ground for tackling its cooperation with countries and regions 
in situations of fragility. In parallel, in the same year, the Council adopted its Conclusions on Security and 
Development7,  where  it  stated  that  ’the  nexus  between  security  and  development  should  inform  EU 
strategies  and  policies  in  order  to  contribute  to  the  coherence  of  EU  external  action’  (Council  of  the 
European Union, 2007). Based on these policy commitments, the Council mandated the EU institutions 
to develop an EU Action Plan on Fragility and Conflict by 2009, outlining concrete measures on how to 
enhance  EU  response  to  fragile  situations  in  four  key  areas:  'whole-of-EU'  approach,  statebuilding, 
making EU assistance more responsive and effective, and international strategic partnerships. However,  
the  setting  up  of  the  EEAS  delayed  the  work  on  the  Action  Plan,  as  changes  were  made  to  the  EU 
institutional set-up and roles redefined. The subsequent Agenda for Change8 called for greater efforts to 
tackle insecurity, fragility and the challenges of transition, giving greater attention to the links between 
insecurity and poverty and committed the EU to finalising and implementing the Action Plan (European 
Commission,  2011a).  Yet,  the  EEAS  has  shelved  the  Action  Plan.  Furthermore,  the  review  of  the 
Gothenburg  Programme  on  conflict  prevention,  which  should  have  resulted  in  implementation 
guidelines, was discontinued during the spring of 2011. The June 2011 Foreign Affairs Council’s (FAC) 
commitment to revisit the issue  of conflict prevention before the end  of  2011, has not been  fulfilled. 
Instead,  in  2011,  the  Council  adopted  another  general  statement  of  commitment  to  address  conflict 
(Council of the European Union, 2011a). 

Nevertheless,  in  2011  the  Council  adopted  two  strategic  frameworks.  The  EEAS  released  the  EU’s 
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in September 2011, some three years after it was 
requested by the 2008 French EU Presidency. The Strategy had four key points:  

security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated;  

1. 
2.  progress is only possible through closer regional cooperation, which the EU pledged to support;  
3.  all  states  in  the  region  would  benefit  from  capacity  building  in  areas  of  core  government 

4. 

activity; and  
the  EU  has  an  important  role  to  play  both  in  encouraging  economic  development  and  in 
helping achieve a more secure environment in which the interests of EU citizens and companies 
were also protected (EEAS, 2011).  

In November 2011, the Council adopted the EU’s Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa9. The strategy 
aimed at establishing a comprehensive framework for a range of policy proposals to address security 
and  development  challenges.  It  also  openly  stated  Europe’s  interests  in  the  region,  largely  stemming 
from its geo-strategic importance. The strategy focused on five priority areas for EU action:  

1.  building robust and accountable political structures;  
2.  contributing to conflict resolution and prevention;  
3.  mitigating security threats emanating from the region;  
4.  promoting economic growth; and  
5.  supporting regional economic cooperation.  

6 See http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf 
7 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf 
9 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=76651 

15

                                                               
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

Specific goals included tackling piracy and supporting stabilisation in Somalia and peaceful transition in 
Sudan  (Council  of  the  European  Union,  2011b).  EU  Member  States  generally  agreed  that  the  Horn  of 
Africa strategy presented a long-term perspective for European policy in the region and the next step 
would be to coordinate on its implementation. 

In 2012, the Council adopted further Conclusions on a Common Security and Defence Policy calling for a 
joint Communication from the Commission and the HR/VP on ‘the comprehensive approach’ (Council 
of the European Union, 2012). However, a common understanding of the ‘comprehensive’ (previously 
referred  to  as  the  ‘integrated  approach’)  has  proved  elusive.  The  Thematic  Evaluation  of  Commission 
Support  to  CPPB10  demonstrated  that  even  a  basic  common  understanding  of  what  the  concepts  of 
CPPB  mean,  and  how  it  might  be  achieved,  ‘were  not  always  univocal  and  shared  at  strategic  level’ 
(ADE, 2011). This has clouded prioritisation and implementation of actions at the global, regional and 
national  levels.  Conflict  prevention  was,  for  example,  not  always  a  priority  for  the  EU  in  terms  of 
strategic action, nor was there clear operational guidance. 

2.1.2 

Organisational structures 

There are several organisational and operational constraints to greater policy coherence at the EU level, 
including limitations of EU instruments, internal organisation and decision-making processes, capacity 
and ability to fully respond to the specific needs and requirements of upstream and preventive policies. 
Some  of  the  acknowledged  obstacles  to  greater  policy  coherence  and  coordination  within  the  EU 
derive from the institutional set up that define the roles and competences of each EU organ, resulting in 
differences  of views and priorities between the EU institutions and  between the EU and  the Member 
States.  

As  many  have  noted,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  offers  the  potential,  through  the  new  senior  positions  in  EU 
external action and the EEAS providing a common support structure, to overcome some of the results 
of the pre-Lisbon ‘pillarization’ that have stymied engagement in fragile states. The role of the EEAS is 
critical  but  there  is  the  danger  that  its  inevitably  slow  development  and  the  on-going  institutional 
tensions may squander this potential (Duke, 2011). 

The  establishment  of  the  EEAS  brought  with  it  the  opportunity  to  bring  together  disparate  bodies 
dealing  with  conflict  prevention  issues  in  the  Commission  and  the  Council  Secretariat.  The  country 
desks of the former Commission DG for Development were subsumed into the EEAS and the remaining 
Commission  policy  units  were  merged  with  the  EuropeAid  agency  to  form  the  new  DG  for 
Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), responsible to the Development Commissioner.  

The  EEAS  was  designed  to  play  a  role  in  shaping  strategy  and  in  programming  development 
cooperation  for  all  regions  of  the  world,  coordinating  all  external  action  and  bringing  together  all 
geographical  desks.  The  objective  was  to  allow  EEAS  to  focus  on  the  overall  political  coordination  of 
external action, whilst leaving the management of programmes to EuropeAid. The stated intention was 
to  improve  the  links  between  development  and  foreign  policy,  combine  the  Commission’s  technical 
expertise with the Council’s political weight, and thus increase the EU’s global role.  

Nevertheless,  the  institutional  arrangements  have  not  been  straightforward.  Within  the  EEAS,  a 
specific division  for  Security  Policy  and  Conflict  Prevention  has  been  set  up.  The  main  tasks  of  this 
Division,  in  addition  to  providing  mediation  support,  are  to  set  up  an  early  warning  and  early  action 

10 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm 

 16

                                                               
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

conflict  prevention  system  and  to  provide  operational  support  to  geographical  services,  both  at 
headquarters  and  in  Delegations,  on  conflict-related  issues.  A  separate  division  on  Global  and 
Multilateral  Issues  addresses  issues  of  importance  to  conflict  prevention,  such  as  counter-terrorism, 
development, multilateral relations, human rights and democracy. At the same time, a Unit for Fragility 
and  Crisis Management has also been created within DEVCO. Beyond DEVCO  and the EEAS, the third 
institutional player for conflict and fragility is the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI) and the Unit 
for  Stability  Instrument  Operations,  also  a  new  creation.  These  units  are  part  of  the  Commission  but 
report directly to the HR/VP. How these various units relate to each  other and to the EU Delegations, 
however, is not entirely obvious.  

Furthermore,  an  inter-organisational  Conflict  Prevention  Group  (CPG)  is  chaired  by  the  Conflict 
Prevention  and  Security  Policy  division  and  composed  of  representatives  from  the  EEAS  geographic 
divisions, including the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) departments and directorates, Crisis Response Department, Coordination Division of the Peace 
and Security Committee (PSC) and the FAC and the Chairs of CIVCOM and the Politico-military Group, 
FPI,  and  the  Commission’s  DGs  DEVCO  and  Humanitarian  Aid  and  Civil  Protection  (ECHO).  Ad  hoc 
members  may 
include  EEAS  thematic  divisions,  other  Commission  directorates  such  as  DG 
Enlargement,  civil  society  organisations  and  Members  of  the  European  Parliament.  The  main  tasks  of 
the  group  will  be  gathering  and  reviewing  early  warning  information,  identifying  early  response 
options,  developing  conflict  risk  analysis  methodologies  and  broadly  mainstreaming  conflict 
prevention into EU external action. 

Concerns about coordination between the EEAS and the Commission were raised on several occasions, 
including in the letter to the HR/VP prepared by 12 Member States on the anniversary of the creation of 
the EEAS11. 

Mainstreaming conflict and fragility across all areas of EU external action has proved and continues to 
be a particular challenge. The Thematic Evaluation of Commission Support to CPPB concluded that ‘the 
Commission’s approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised 
or structured. Efforts produced by the Commission in this respect were mostly undertaken on an ad hoc 
basis’ (ADE, 2011). 

Furthermore,  the  evaluation  identified  serious  shortcomings  regarding  the  capacity  within  the  EU 
institutions, including the Delegations. The number of staff that has a background in CPPB was found 
insufficient  to  handle  the  tasks  at  hand  and  even  more  so  to  mainstream  its  objectives  to  the  policy 
level (ADE, 2011). 

Aside  from  capacity,  mainstreaming  and  coherence  depend  upon  the  necessary  linkages  being 
strengthened within the EEAS, as well as those between the EEAS and the Commission, in particular DG 
DEVCO,  DG  Trade,  DG  Environment,  DG  Enlargement  and  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  and  DG 
ECHO. An inter-service agreement signed by the Commission and the EEAS on 13 January 201212 sheds 
light  on  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two  institutions.  According  to  the  agreement,  the 
Commission and the EEAS jointly plan overall spending strategies on the EU’s external relations budget. 

11 The foreign ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Sweden on 8 December 2011 signed a letter on the first year of the EEAS addressed to the HR/VP highlighting 
some areas in need of improvement including the preparation of the Foreign Affairs Council, coordination between EEAS 
and  Commission, 
in  CFSP.  See 
http://www.eurotradeunion.eu/documents/20111208Lettredes12.pdf 
12 See article: ‘Commission still pulls the strings on EU foreign policy’, EU Observer, 6 February 2012 

involvement  of  Member  States 

role  of  EU  Delegations  and 

the 

the 

17

                                                               
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

The financial instruments are jointly programmed (with leading roles for either the Commission or the 
EEAS depending on the instrument) but implemented solely by the Commission.  

Although  there  are  formal  links  at  the  highest  level,  through  the  Group  of  External  Relations 
Commissioners,  the  existence  of  the  necessary  linkages  at  lower  levels  is  far  less  obvious.  Indeed,  in 
some cases like DG Trade, they are particularly unclear. As noted by the OECD DAC in its peer review of 
EU aid, ‘the value of the EEAS to the development agenda will depend on its ability to bring together 
the EU’s many tools of influence – economic and political, plus civil and military crisis management. To 
do this well, the role of each EU actor must be made clear’ (OECD, 2012). 

To date, progress on coordination between the EU and the Member States has been slow. Although the 
Commission  has  attempted  to  increase  the  role  it  has  played  with  respect  to  CPPB,  it  has  been 
hampered by differences in priorities among the Member States. As a result, EU coordination has been 
limited  to  information  sharing,  with  each  institution  setting  its  own  objectives  and  subsequently 
informing the others of these. As noted in the Thematic Evaluation of Commission Support to CPPB, ‘the 
Commission took initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels, but this generally resulted more 
in  exchange  of  information  than  in  enhancement  of  complementarities.  Coordination  within  the 
Commission,  with  other  EU  actors  and  with  the  wider  international  community  consisted  mainly  of 
exchange  of  information  as  a  minimum  requirement.  It  rarely  gave  rise  to  a  clear  division  of  roles 
between partners so as to avoid gaps and duplication and enhance synergies at strategy, programming 
and implementation levels’ (ADE, 2011). 

Nevertheless, the greater involvement of national diplomats in the EEAS and the EU Delegations offers 
the potential for positive synergies between EU and Member States’ conflict prevention efforts. EUSRs, 
who are generally appointed to situations of conflict or with a high potential to develop into conflict, 
and who inevitably play a role in political dialogue (whether formally or informally), are responsible to 
the  HR/VP.  Consequently,  Member  States’  positions  and  efforts  in  a  situation  or  country  should  be 
consistent and supportive of efforts undertaken by the EUSRs. 

Beyond coordination within the EU institutions and between the EU and its Member States, a further 
significant  challenge  has  been  the  division  of  labour  between  multilateral  organisations.  The  UN  is  a 
fundamental  partner  for  the  EU  in  peacebuilding  activities.  The  two  organisations  have  consistently 
cooperated  in  crisis  management  since  2003  and  the  EU  is  also  one  of  the  major  contributors  to  UN 
peacekeeping operations, both financially and with personnel on the ground. However, a recent report 
of the EU Court of Auditors  analysing the efficiency  and effectiveness  of EU contributions channelled 
through  the  UN  in  conflict-affected  countries  highlighted  several  weaknesses  in  relation  to  project 
design,  monitoring  and  reporting  (European  Court  of  Auditors,  2011).  In  general  terms,  the  two 
organisations have not adopted the same definitions and policies on peacebuilding, and cooperation 
remains largely ad hoc. In particular, although there have been efforts to strengthen cooperation at the 
operational level, cooperation at the policy level is somewhat lacking. 

The OECD DAC has called on the EU to finalise the Action Plan on Security, Fragility and Development 
requested by the Council in 2007: ‘If backed by strong, high-level political drive, implementation of the 
plan  would  ensure  that  the  European  objectives  in  the  fields  of  development  cooperation, 
humanitarian  assistance,  peacebuilding,  conflict  prevention  and  international  security  are  mutually 
reinforcing. Such a whole-of-EU approach requires strong coordination among the relevant bodies and 
structures (the EEAS, DG DEVCO, the FPI, DG ECHO, and CSDP structures) and with the Member States 
engaged in emergency, crisis and transition situations’ (OECD, 2012). 

 18

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

2.1.3 

The instruments 

The  range  of  instruments  that  the  EU  institutions  and  the  EU  as  a  whole  can  bring  to  any  conflict 
situation is fairly unrivalled. Figure 4 gives an overview of the EU’s instruments relevant to CPPB under 
Heading 4 (Global Europe) of the EU budget. 

Figure 4: Overview of the EU’s instruments for CPPB 

Instrument 

Objective 

Geographical 
coverage 

EU institution 
responsible 

Budget 
2007-
2013 
(billions) 

EC 
proposed 
budget 
2014-
2020 
(billons) 

European 
Development 
Fund (EDF)  

Economic development, 
social and human 
development, regional 
cooperation and integration

Geographic 

African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the 
Overseas 
Countries and 
Territories  

Commission 

€26.3 

€34.3 

Africa Peace Facility (APF) - 
African Union-led peace-
building missions 

Africa 

EEAS/ 
Commission 

€0.5 

Development 
Cooperation 
Instrument 
(DCI) 

European 
Neighbourhood 
Instrument 
(ENI) 

Instrument  for 
Pre-Accession 
(IPA) 

Poverty eradication and the 
achievement of the MDGs 

Thematic Programmes: 
‐  Investing in people 
‐  Environment and sus-

tainable management of 
resources 

‐  Non-State Actors and 
Local Authorities 

‐  Food security 
‐  Asylum and immigration
Democratic transition, 
human rights, transition 
towards a market economy, 
sustainable development 

Transition, cross-border co-
operation, regional deve-
lopment, human resources, 
rural development 

Asia, Latin 
America, Central 
Asia, the Gulf 
region and South 
Africa 

Commission 

€16.9 

€23.3 

All developing 
countries 

Commission 

€5.6 of 
the total 

€9.3 

Commission 

€11.2 

€18.2 

Commission 

€11.5 

€14.1 

European 
neighbourhood 
and Russian 
Federation 

EU candidate 
countries and 
potential 
candidate 
countries 

19

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

Emergency and 
humanitarian aid relief and 
food aid. 

Conflict prevention, crisis 
management, peace-
building 

Operational costs of CFSP 
except military costs 

Thematic 

Global 

Commission 

€5.6 

€7.2 

EEAS/Commis
sion 

€2.1 

€2.8 

Global 

Council 

€2 

Human rights and 
democracy, 

Global 

EEAS/Commis
sion 

€1.1 

€1.6 

Humanitarian 
Aid Instrument  

Instrument  for 
Stability (IfS) 

Common 
Foreign 
and 
Security  Policy 
(CFSP) 

European 
Instrument  for 
Democracy  and 
Human  Rights 
(EIDHR) 

Three of the EU’s long-term external assistance instruments refer to CPPB. These are: 

 

 
 

The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (preamble  (10), Article 10, Article 12, Annex IV 
I(B)), which includes geographic programme support to post-crisis systems and fragile states, and 
thematic programmes addressing underlying vulnerability in areas such as food security, health 
and education;  
The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (Article 2,2(e)); and 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (preamble (15), Article 2 (1a), 
Article 2 (4)). 

In addition to the long-term instruments, specific arrangements to engage in fragile states include three 
financial instruments – the Africa Peace Facility (APF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  –  combined  with  the  Humanitarian  Aid  Instrument  (HAI)  and  the 
possibility  of  mobilising  25%  of  the  European  Development  Fund’s  (EDF)  B  envelope,  which  includes 
post-emergency action to facilitate the phasing out of humanitarian aid. 

The  APF  is  the  main  EU  funding  instrument  for  promoting  peace  and  security  in  Africa,  financed 
through the EDF. In 2011, more than EUR 1 billion was allocated to it (European Commission, 2011c). It 
funds  African-led  peace  support  operations  managed  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  African  Union  (AU) 
and validated by the UN; capacity building activities; and supports the Joint EU-Africa Strategy’s Peace 
and Security Partnership.  According to the Commission’s 2011 Annual Report13 on the APF, ‘efforts are 
being made to further strengthen coherence and complementarity between EU activities funded by the 
APF,  EDF  regional  indicative  programmes,  the  IfS,  CSDP  and  others’  (European  Commission,  2011c). 
However,  no  information  about  the  extent  of  formal  and  ad  hoc  coordination  with  the  IfS  and  CSDP 
missions (one of the key instruments of CFSP) is available in either of the annual APF reports that have 
been published to date. 

The  CFSP  budget,  which  includes  civilian  CSDP  missions,  is  charged  to  the  EU’s  budget  with  the 
exception  of  expenditures  arising  from  operations  having  military  or  defence  implications  (which  are 

13 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-
cooperation/peace/documents/2011_annual_report_on_the_african_peace_facility_en.pdf 

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EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

funded by the Member States via the Athena Mechanism). The Lisbon Treaty introduced the possibility 
for the Council to establish a start-up fund made  up of contributions from the Member States, which 
would  allow  for  rapid  access  to  financing  of  urgent  initiatives  which  cannot  be  charged  to  the  EU’s 
budget and which would support civil or military operations and missions. The start-up fund is a partial 
response to the cumbersome procedure of mobilising funds under the Athena Mechanism. Additional 
funds to complement actions under CSDP (including the so-called flanking measures) may come from 
the IfS. 

The EU’s main instrument for short-term interventions  aimed at CPPB is the IfS. The IfS is a horizontal 
instrument that has a global coverage with a clear focus on (re-) establishing ‘the conditions essential to 
the  proper  implementation  of  the  Union's  development  and  cooperation  policies’  (European 
Commission, 2011b). The IfS is different to the other instruments as ‘assistance […] shall be provided 
only  to  the  extent  that  an  adequate  and  effective  response  cannot  be  provided  under  those  [other] 
instruments [of Heading 4]’ (European Commission, 2011b; European Union, 2006). It includes a short-
term component for crisis preparedness and response covering conflict prevention, crisis management 
and peacebuilding – including support to state institutions and independent media, governance and 
rule  of  law,  and  landmine  programmes.  Most  of  the  IfS  support  is  short-term  non-programmable 
funding, managed by the Commission’s FPI service. The EEAS programmes the long-term component. It 
is meant to swiftly react to unforeseen crisis and works ‘complementary to humanitarian aid’ (European 
Union, 2006) and in coherence with the EU’s other external assistance.   

The  evaluation  of  CPPB  (ADE,  2011)  found  that  in  some  cases  the  IfS  catalysed  EU  Delegations  into 
reflecting  on  programming  priorities  with  a  view  to  how  conflicts  could  be  prevented.  The  IfS  also 
contributed  to  an  improved  exchange  of  information  on  CPPB  between  EU  headquarters  and 
Delegations as well as among different DGs in the Commission (ADE, 2011). Other strengths noted by 
stakeholders included: its swiftness in comparison to other EU instruments; and the fact that it laid the 
basis for long-term EU action which could then be handed over to long-term instruments like the ENI, 
the EIDHR or the DCI (ADE, 2011). 

While  from  conception  to  implementation  the  IfS  is  swifter  than  any  of  the  other  EU  external 
instruments, it is still not quick enough for a stabilisation instrument intended to respond to windows of 
opportunity (Görtz and Sherriff, 2012). Once a need is identified, a minimum time lapse of two months 
occurs before the start of an intervention. In some cases, the time span was found to be much longer – 
between  nine  and  eleven  months.  Furthermore,  the  limited  duration  of  the  instrument  (24  months) 
meant  that  some  projects  with  longer-term  conflict  prevention  objectives  could  not  be  completed 
(ADE, 2011), especially as engagement in fragile situations needs to be long-term to be effective (OECD, 
2011b, World Bank, 2011). 

2.2 

An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of EU engagement in Fragile States 

The  EU  has  endorsed  the  OECD’s  Principles  for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States  and 
Situations.  Since  the  ten  Principles  were  issued  in  2007,  the  OECD  has  issued  two  reports  on 
international performance against the Principles in a number of Fragile States, based on the findings of 
country  surveys  conducted  in  multiple  fragile  states.  This  section  analyses  at  global  and  Commission 
performance against four of the FSPs which have a particular focus on preventive interventions. 

21

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

2.2.1 

FSP 4: Prioritising Prevention 

Principle  Four  of  the  Principles  for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States  and  Situations 
presents  a  multi-dimensional  approach  to  conflict  prevention.  This  includes  upstream  or  long-term 
action  focused  on  addressing  the  root  causes  of  state  fragility,  improved  coordination  amongst 
international  actors  in  terms  of  shared  risk  analysis  and  joint  missions,  rapid  action  where  the  risk  of 
conflict and instability is highest, and strengthening indigenous and regional capacities to prevent and 
resolve conflicts. 

FSP 4:  Prioritise prevention. Action today can reduce fragility, lower the 
risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term 
global  development  and  security.  International  actors  must  be  prepared 
to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A 
greater  emphasis  on  prevention  will  also  include  sharing  risk  analyses; 
looking  beyond  quick-fix  solutions  to  address  the  root  causes  of  state 
fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, 
to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities 
of  regional  organisations;  and  undertaking  joint  missions  to  consider 
measures to help avert crises (OECD, 2007). 

This  approach  is  also  reflected  in  the  European  Commission’s  2001  Communication  on  Conflict 
Prevention14 (European Commission, 2001), which highlights the importance of taking a long-term and 
integrated  approach  to  conflict  prevention  in  order  to  address  all  aspects  of  structural  stability  in 
countries at risk. The Communication notes that when people resort to arms, it is generally the result of a 
process  of  gradual  deterioration  whose  causes  are  deep  rooted  and  often  well-known.  The 
Communication  distinguishes  between  long-term  (‘Projecting  stability’)  and  short-term  prevention 
(‘Reacting  quickly  to  nascent  conflicts’),  and  states  that  the  Commission  will  ensure  that  its 
development policy and other cooperation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root 
causes of conflict in an integrated way. 

Although  the  key  elements  of  effective  prevention  are  well  articulated  in  both  the  Fragile  States 
Principles  and  the  Commission’s  Communication  on  Conflict  Prevention,  actual  implementation  has 
fallen short across a range of conflict-prone and conflict-affected situations. The 2011 OECD Report on 
International Engagement in Fragile States assesses implementation of FSP 4 as being ‘partly-off track’ 
(OECD, 2011a). Whereas international actors have undertaken initiatives to strengthen crisis prevention, 
their effectiveness has been mixed. Based on its country surveys, the report finds that there has been 
insufficient analysis of the root causes of fragility in a number of cases. Countries that highlighted this 
weaknesses  included  Burundi,  the  Central  African  Republic  (CAR),  Chad,  Somalia  and  the  Democratic 
Republic  of  the  Congo  (DRC),  all  of  which  also  reported  that  the  EU  is  one  of  their  major  sources  of 
development financing, and/or is a major funder of an international peacekeeping mission. The report’s 
findings are echoed by the Commission’s own Thematic Evaluation of Support to CPPB, which identifies 
failure  to  focus  on  the  root  causes  of  conflict  as  a  major  weakness  in  the  Commission’s  approach  to 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ADE, 2011). 

Failure  to  focus  on  the  root  causes  of  conflict  is  closely  linked  to  weaknesses  in  conflict  analysis.  The 
OECD  2011  report  finds  that  the  strength  and  depth  of  international  partners’  contextual  analysis 

14 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0211:FIN:EN:PDF 

 22

                                                               
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

(assessed  under  Fragile  States  Principle  1:  Take  Context  as  the  Starting  Point)  is  often  limited  by 
insufficient use of local knowledge, their own limitations in capacity, and frequent turnover of staff in-
country. For example, in Chad, survey respondents commented that humanitarian aid is reactive, and 
overlooks  the  structural  causes  of  a  number  of  humanitarian  crises,  whilst  in  the  DRC  it  was  felt  that 
insufficient  use  of  local  knowledge  meant  that  important  dimensions  were  lacking  from  the  donors’ 
contextual analysis, such as the global demand for natural resources. Further, development partners do 
not always translate their efforts to understand context into programming, meaning that initiatives to 
address the root causes of conflict are often too isolated to be able to have a significant impact, as they 
are  not  planned  within  an  overall  strategy  of  crisis  prevention,  and  do  not  feed  into  broader 
development  partner  engagement.  A  case  in  point  is  the  international  community’s  response  to  the 
earthquake  in  Haiti,  where  the  complexity  of  the  Haitian  context  was  not  taken  into  account  in 
immediate post-earthquake planning.   

These  weaknesses  are  also  evident  in  the  Commission’s  own  approach  to  CPPB.  The  2011  CPPB 
evaluation  finds  that  the  Commission  makes  insufficient  use  of  formal  conflict  analysis,  and  that  the 
quality  of  its  conflict  assessments,  as  reflected  in  Country  and  Regional  Strategy  Papers,  is  not 
consistent. Further, the assessments are not systematically taken into account in its programming, and 
there is no obligation to mainstream conflict prevention into sectors not specifically focused on conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding, as is the case with gender and environment (ADE, 2011). This results in 
support that  is too  frequently  focused  on mitigating the consequences  of the root  causes of conflict, 
rather than addressing the causes themselves. 

Weaknesses  in  Commission  capacity  to  analyse  the  root  causes  of  conflict  and  to  ensure  appropriate 
integration  of  conflict  prevention  and  peacebuilding  approaches  at  a  programming  level,  appear  to 
derive  from  several  inter-linked  factors.  Firstly,  the  fragmentation  of  responsibility  for  CPPB  across  a 
number  of  institutions  (Commission  DGs  and  the  EEAS)  does  not  facilitate  an  integrated  response  at 
country-level.  Secondly,  although  a  number  of  tools  exist  for  assessing  conflict  and  mainstreaming 
conflict prevention and approaches (e.g. 2001 Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict, 2008 Programming 
Guide for Strategy Papers on Conflict Prevention and Fragile States, country conflict assessments and 
conflict indicators), the 2011 CPPB evaluation finds that they have not been widely adopted and used. 
In part, this appears to be because they are not well known by those responsible for programming at 
country level, and also because there has been no systematic review mechanism at Commission level to 
ensure that CPPB issues are appropriately integrated in Regional and Country Strategy Papers. Thirdly, 
EU Delegations in fragile or conflict-affected states often face staff shortages, or lack dedicated expertise 
in CPPB. 

A further factor that has been raised relates to the EU’s commitment to national alignment, as per the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The argument advanced here is that, to the extent that national 
strategies  do not pay adequate attention to the root causes  of  conflict, either due to lack of capacity 
amongst  the  national  authorities,  or  because  politically  it  is  not  desirable  for  them  to  do  so,  these 
weaknesses  can  have  knock-on  effects  for  the  EU’s  capacity  to  focus  its  country  programmes  on 
conflict-drivers.  However,  Fragile  States  Principle  7  underscores  the  importance  of  aligning  with  local 
priorities in different ways in different contexts. In particular, where alignment behind government-led 
strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors are 
expected to consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country and seek opportunities 
for  partial  alignment  at  the  sector  or  regional  level.  The  EU  has  substantial  diplomatic,  security  and 
financial  resources,  reinforced  by  the  capacity  and  country  knowledge  of  Member  States.    It  is  less 
encumbered by the much broader membership of the UN, and ought to be able to take a prominent 

23

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

lead  in  conflict  prevention,  even  when  country  governments  are  reluctant  to  address  the  grievances 
that lead to armed conflict.  

The 2011 New Deal for engagement in Fragile States takes this a step further by committing to periodic, 
country-led  fragility  assessments  which  take  into  account  the  views  of  key  national  stakeholders  and 
non-state actors. The fragility assessments, which are currently being piloted, are expected to provide a 
basis  for  a  country-owned  and  led  plan  for  transition  out  of  fragility,  supported  by  a  compact  that 
coordinates  the  international  community’s  response  in  support  of  the  plan.  To  the  extent  that  the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is able to effectively support the g7+ group 
of fragile countries to implement the objectives of the New Deal, such assessments may prove a key tool 
in  ensuring  a  common  understanding  of  conflict  drivers  amongst  stakeholders,  and  mainstreaming 
conflict prevention into country programming. 

Understanding the root causes of fragility is the first step in prioritising prevention, falling into the long-
term category defined by the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention as ‘projecting stability’ 
(European Commission, 2001). The next step in the continuum is the provision of early warning systems 
to identify increasing risk and to act effectively in the short-term (‘Reacting quickly to nascent conflicts’). 
FSP 4 requires the international community’s early  warning systems to be developed within a shared 
framework for risk analysis. However, the 2011 OECD report reveals that international performance has 
fallen  short  in  this  area.  A  number  of  countries,  including  several  with  peacekeeping  missions  (CAR, 
Haiti, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan) reported that development partners do not generally seem to 
operate within a shared framework for conflict prevention, and raised concerns about the multiplicity of 
early  warning  systems  and  lack  of  coordination  between  them.  Some  countries  reported  that  the 
presence  of  early  warning  systems  had  not  led  to  effective  early  responses  (Burundi,  Chad,  Comoros 
and Somalia).    

These findings are echoed by the Commission’s 2011 CPPB evaluation, which finds that early warning 
systems  have  not  enhanced  the  Commission’s  capacity  to  react  to  conflicts,  as  in  more  than  half  the 
cases  surveyed,  it  did  not  anticipate  a  deteriorating  situation.  It  appears  that  where  early  warning 
systems  exist,  they  have  not  been  widely  used,  or  have  not  been  sufficiently  comprehensive.  The 
absence  of  robust,  coordinated  and  widely-used  early  warning  systems  significantly  impedes  the 
capacity of the international community, the EU included, to take action to mitigate conflict risks before 
they escalate. The cost of this weakness is potentially considerable, as it means that interventions are 
more likely to take place in a context where time-horizons are shorter and resource requirements are 
more significant. It also places an undue burden on instruments designed to facilitate rapid response, to 
the extent that their deployment is partially as a result of the failure of preventive mechanisms such as 
early warning systems.        

The  Commission  has  arguably  performed  better  on  the  other  major  component  of  FSP  4,  namely 
strengthening indigenous capacities to prevent and resolve conflicts and supporting the peacebuilding 
capabilities  of  regional  organisations.  In  Africa  in  particular, the  Commission  has  taken  a  lead  in 
supporting regional initiatives aimed at strengthening regional peacebuilding capacities and improving 
resilience, notably in partnership with the AU and other regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental 
Authority  on  Development  (IGAD)  and  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS). 
Recent  regional  resilience  initiatives  include  the  Global  Alliance  for  Sahel  Initiative  (AGIR)  and  the 
Supporting  the  Horn  of  Africa’s  Resilience  Initiative  (SHARE),  which  focus  on  supporting  sub-regions 
affected  by  food  insecurity  to  improve  their  drought  prevention  and  preparedness  capacity,  and 
climate change adaptation. Foremost amongst the EU’s regional initiatives to support peacebuilding is 

 24

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

the African Peace Facility, which has been used particularly to finance AU peacekeeping in Sudan and 
Somalia,  as  well  as  other  less  visible  interventions  (Sherriff  et.  al.,  2012).  However,  the  2011  CPPB 
evaluation raises concerns as to whether there are sufficient linkages between the different levels of the 
Commission’s  geographic  support,  and  notes  that  local  populations  have  not  been  systematically 
involved in the Commission’s work on CPPB (ADE, 2011). 

2.2.2 

FSP 5: Recognise the links between Political, Security and Development Objectives 

Integration lies at the heart of Principle 5 of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States  and  Situations.  It  requires  international  actors  to  join  up  their  interventions  across  the  various 
dimensions of humanitarian and development assistance, and political, economic and security affairs in 
order  to  deliver  a  single,  coherent,  ‘whole-of-government’  response  to  situations  of  fragility.  It  also 
highlights  the  importance  of  addressing  the  trade-offs  that  may  exist  between  peacebuilding  and 
development agendas, particularly in the short-term, and the need for international actors to set clear 
measures of progress in fragile states.     

FSP 5: Recognise the Links between Political, Security and Development 
Objectives.  The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The 
political,  security,  economic  and  social  spheres  are 
inter-dependent. 
Importantly,  there  may  be  tensions  and  trade-offs  between  objectives, 
particularly  in  the  short-term,  which  must  be  addressed  when  reaching 
consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in 
some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to 
lay  the  foundations  for  progress  against  the  MDGs  in  the  longer-term.  This 
underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress 
in  fragile  states.  Within  donor  governments,  a  whole-of-government 
approach  is  needed,  involving  those  responsible  for  security,  political  and 
economic  affairs,  as  well  as  those  responsible  for  development  aid  and 
humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up 
strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and 
impartiality  of  humanitarian  aid.  Partner  governments  also  need  to  ensure 
coherence  between  ministries 
in  the  priorities  they  convey  to  the 
international community (OECD, 2007). 

The whole-of-government (or in the EU’s case, whole-of-institution) approach can be conceived of as 
two levels: static and dynamic. The static level relates to integrated strategy development across various 
dimensions  of  support,  whereas  the  dynamic  level  relates  to  management  of  trade-offs  between 
dimensions,  particularly  as  situations  evolve.  At  both  levels,  the  2011  OECD  report  finds  that 
international engagement is ‘partly off-track’ (OECD, 2011a).    

In the weakest cases, there is limited evidence of development partner efforts to implement whole-of-
government  approaches  in  any  form.  This  situation  seems  particularly  acute  in  countries  with 
peacekeeping missions. CAR (MICOPAX), Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Chad (EUFOR/MINURCAT) all reported 
that  security,  prevention  and/or  humanitarian  issues  handled  by  their  peacekeeping  missions  were 
delinked  from  the  broader  policy  dialogue  in-country,  with  knock-on  effects  for  the  efficiency  of  the 

25

 
 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

international  community’s  integrated  response.  By  contrast,  those  countries  which  have  started  to 
transition  out  of  their  immediate  post-crisis  phase  (Sierra  Leone  and  Liberia),  have  had  the  greatest 
success  in integrating  development  partner  support behind  a national  framework that explicitly links 
political, security and development objectives. This implies that where national governments are able 
to articulate what they consider key connections between the various domains, development partners 
are in turn able to optimise their ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. This recognition is one of the key 
intuitions  behind  the  New  Deal,  which  seeks  to  support  inclusive  country-led  and  country-owned 
transitions  out  of  fragility,  based  on  agreed  peacebuilding  and  statebuilding  goals  (International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011). At the dynamic level, the 2011 OECD report found 
that  to  the  extent  that  attempts  to  manage  trade-offs  between  political,  security  and  development 
objectives  are  made,  the  process  for  managing  them  often  lacks  transparency.  All  too  frequently, 
however, the links between the objectives were considered to exist only on paper. 

A  number  of  countries  credited  the  EU,  under  the  auspices  of  the  EU  Delegation,  of  developing  an 
integrated approach to its interventions, with specific reference made to its use of a LRRD approach in 
CAR  and  Chad.  They  also  reported  that  the  EU  made  attempts  to  coordinate  its  approach  with  other 
stakeholders. In most countries, it was reported that the EU’s proposed strategy was discussed at least 
informally amongst EU Member States and the EU Delegation, and in some cases, there was a formal 
consultation process. Two countries (Timor Leste and South Sudan) reported that the EU was working 
on a single strategy for the Delegation and all Member States active in the country. Several instances 
were also cited of existing joint approaches between the EU and other development partners (e.g. the 
EU  and  the  UK  in  Sierra  Leone).  However,  the  key  question  for  the  EU  is  the  extent  to  which  the 
instruments and approaches available to it facilitate the delivery of an integrated approach in practice, 
particularly  relating  to  the  prioritisation  of  prevention  across  all  domains  of  intervention  and  the  link 
between relief, rehabilitation and development. 

The  Commission’s  Communication  on  Conflict  Prevention  states  that  among  the  EU’s  wide  range  of 
instruments at its disposal for short- and long-term action, development policy and other cooperation 
programmes  provide,  without  doubt,  the  most  powerful  instruments  for  treating  the  root  causes  of 
conflict. The  Communication recognises that in order to ensure the optimal use of these instruments, 
‘[they] must take a genuinely long-term approach, identifying and targeting needs as far “upstream” as 
possible’ (European Commission, 2001). The Communication commits the Commission to ensuring that 
its development policy and other cooperation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root 
causes  of  conflict  in  an  integrated  manner,  and  sets  out  three  main  ways  in  which  this  will  be 
achieved15: 

1. 

2. 

‘On  a  practical  level,  the  instrument  for  ensuring  such  an  integrated  approach  of  conflict 
prevention will be the strategic documents drawn up for each country receiving assistance by 
the Community (Country Strategy Papers) […]. An assessment of potential conflict situations 
will be made in all Country Strategy Papers with the support of appropriate potential conflict 
indicators.’ 

‘For those countries where the above analysis has highlighted conflict risk factors (“countries 
with  conflict  potential”),  conflict  prevention  measures  will  be  made  an  integral  part  of  the 
overall programmes of the Community. Conflict indicators will make it easier to incorporate 
measures  targeting  conflict  prevention  in  various  sectoral  programmes  (in  field
s  such  as 
transport, rural development, energy, environment, health, research or education).’ 

15 Author’s own notation 

 26

                                                              
 
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

3. 

‘Finally, in order to improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of EU conflict prevention 
efforts,  coordination  between  Commission  and  Member  States  must  be  strengthened.  As  a 
small first step, Country Strategy Papers and corresponding documents from Member States 
should be systematically exchanged.’ 

However, the 2011 CPPB evaluation found that mainstreaming of CPPB into the Commission’s support 
was not a widespread practice over the period considered (2001 to 2010). The factors that prevented 
widespread mainstreaming have already been identified under FSP 4: insufficient use of formal conflict 
analysis, inconsistent quality of conflict assessments used in Country and Regional Strategy Papers, lack 
of systematic use of conflict assessments in programming, and lack of any requirement to mainstream 
conflict prevention into sectors not specifically focused on CPPB. Effectively, the undertakings set out in 
points i) and ii) above were not implemented in a systematic way. As identified under FSP 4, the reasons 
for  this  include:  the  fragmentation  of  responsibility  for  CPPB  across  a  number  of  institutions 
(Commission  DGs  and  the  EEAS);  lack  of  widespread  dissemination  and  uptake  of  tools  for  assessing 
conflict  and  mainstreaming  conflict  prevention  and  approaches;  and  staffing  constraints  in  EU 
Delegations  in  fragile  or  conflict-affected  states,  including  staff  shortages  and  lack  of  dedicated 
expertise in CPPB. 

The  failure  of  ‘the  most  powerful  instruments  at  the  Community’s  disposal’  (European  Commission, 
2001)  in  treating  the  root  causes  of  conflict  in  a  systematic  and  consistent  way,  has  significantly 
undermined  the  achievement  of  the  Commission’s  integrated  approach  to  CPPB.  It  has  also  placed 
undue  pressure  on  instruments  established  to  respond  to  the  specific  needs  of  conflict  and  crisis 
situations. Chief amongst these is the IfS. The IfS is viewed as having added a dimension to EU external 
action since its inception in 2007 (Görtz and Sherriff, 2012), filling an important strategic, funding and 
capacity gap that enabled the EU to support a broad range of critical crisis response initiatives, as well as 
capacity building for crisis preparedness, that might not have been possible otherwise. The 2011 CPPB 
evaluation  judged  that  the  IfS  has  the  capacity  to  respond  quickly  (though  not  necessarily  quickly 
enough)  in  situations  of  short-term  need,  and  has  also  in  some  cases  been  used  for  longer-term 
preventive action, because it can be mobilised faster than geographic assistance. However, its limited 
duration  (maximum  18-24  months)  was  considered  to  have  an  impact  on  its  effectiveness,  as  some 
projects  with  longer-term  conflict  prevention  objectives  could  not  be  completed  and  in  other  cases 
long-term  stabilisation  could  not  be  ensured.  The  key  question  here  is  whether  the  IfS  should  be 
adapted  to  fill  the  gaps  left  by  the  failure  to  integrate  CPPB  effectively  into  long-term  geographic 
instruments,  or  whether  the  IfS  should  instead  be  supported  by  complementary  interventions  under 
longer-term  instruments,  as  was  the  original  intention  of  the  2001  Communication  on  Conflict 
Prevention. 

The Commission’s objective of integrating the link between relief, rehabilitation and development into 
its programming in fragile states is faced with similar coherence and instrumentation gaps. The 2011 
CPPB evaluation found that in a number of cases, efforts have been made to link short- and long-term 
support via an LRRD approach, notably by linking programmes financed by ECHO support or EU Budget 
Lines  into  Country  Strategy  Papers  and  using  mechanisms  such  as  specialised  sectoral  assistance 
instruments, the IfS or flexible allocations under the EDF-B envelope to support the transition. However, 
concerns remain over the potential existence of a handover gap, particularly in cases where transition 
timelines  prove  too  ambitious,  and  in  light  of  the  difficulties  in  adapting  Country  Strategy  Papers  to 
respond to changing needs (for example, changing focal areas during implementation or reallocating 
funds between focal areas). 

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Policy Department DG External Policies 

Innovative approaches to transition financing: Lessons from South Sudan 

In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
signed  a  Comprehensive  Peace  Agreement,  ending  22  years  of  civil  war.  The 
negative impact of the war on service delivery in the South had been enormous. 
It  was  estimated  that  70%  of  the  population  had  no  access  to  safe  water  or 
sanitation, 75% had no access to health care, and 80% of children of school-going 
age  were  not  attending  school.  Service  provision  was  fragmented,  with 
education  services  being  administered  by  communities,  and  health  and  water 
services  being  delivered  through  local  and  international  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The newly established Government of South Sudan (GoSS) 
had  weak  to  non-existent  government  capacity  to  plan  and  manage  service 
delivery. 

The  UK  Government  launched  the  South  Sudan  Basic  Services  Fund  (BSF)  in  October  2005,  the  same 
month in which the GoSS was established. The BSF was intended as a transition financing mechanism 
to bridge a gap between the run-down of relief and humanitarian aid programmes financed by the UN 
Common  Humanitarian  Fund  and  ECHO,  amongst  others,  and  the  subsequent  mobilisation  of  major 
development programmes, in particular the MDTF, to which the Commission was a contributor, using 
EDF  resources.  The  BSF  aimed  to  facilitate  the  transition  from  relief  to  development  by  delivering  a 
measurable improvement in basic services as a  contribution to the peace dividend,  at the same time 
developing government’s capacity to direct and manage those services. It was envisaged that once BSF 
funding came to an end, this integrated approach would be handed over to GoSS with the option of 
future support being channelled through government-led development funds, such as the MDTF. 

The  BSF  model  involved  contracting  a  private  sector  fund  manager  to  manage 
multi-year  service  delivery  grants  to  NGOs.  The  fund  manager  was  contracted  to 
the UK Department for International Development (DFID), but its performance was 
overseen by a Fund Steering Committee, chaired by GoSS. The Steering Committee 
was  responsible  for  approving  grant  allocations  in  line  with  the  priorities 
established by the Fund. 

It  was  originally  intended  that  the  BSF  would  run  until  2008,  by  which  point 
development  financing  mechanisms  such  as  the  MDTF  were  expected  to  be  in  a 
position  to  assume  responsibility  for  service  delivery.  However,  this  assumption 
proved far too optimistic, and the BSF was eventually extended for a further four 
years to 2012. In the process, it attracted funding from four other bilateral donors. 

BSF  was  successful  in  meeting  its  primary  objective  of  contributing  to  improved 
coverage  of  and  access  to  water  and  sanitation,  education  and  health  services  in 
South Sudan. By the end of 2011, the BSF was estimated to be supporting between 
20 and 30% of health facilities that opened regularly, without which they would be 
functioning  much  less,  if  at  all.  It  was  widely  seen  as  an  effective  fund,  which 
enabled  donor  funding  to  be  channelled  to  service  providers  more  rapidly  than 
was  the  case  for  development  funds,  and  more  transparently  than  was  the  case 
with humanitarian aid, given Government involvement in the Steering Committee.   

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EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

The  actual  duration  of  the  BSF  (seven  years)  illustrates  the  extended  period  for 
which financing can be required during a transition. The BSF’s transitional model, 
involving multi-year financing to NGO service providers overseen by Government, 
provided  a  greater  degree  of  financial  predictability  for  service  providers  and 
enabled  greater  Government  awareness  of  service  provision.  However,  it  had  a 
limited impact on  Government capacity for planning and  delivering  services,  and 
questions were raised as to the longer-term sustainability of its interventions. 

Following  a  crisis,  the  challenges  related  to  LRRD  planning  are  considered  to  be  twofold  (European 
Parliament,  2012):  first,  understanding  the  factors  that  provoked  the  crisis  and  enabling  the  proper 
reallocation  of  development  resources  to  address  them  adequately,  and  second,  managing  the  ‘grey 
area’  between  the  end-of-relief  programmes  and  the  launch  of  reconstruction  and  development 
programmes. In this context, the  availability  of  Commission  funding  for the post-emergency  phase is 
not  sufficiently  systematic.  Given  the  lack  of  adaptation  of  most  non-humanitarian  instruments 
(thematic  and  geographic)  to  flexible  or  fast  delivery,  and  the  considerable  challenges  faced  in 
reallocating development resources, post-emergency funding has tended to rely on attempts to stretch 
out the limits of the humanitarian phase funded by ECHO, as happened in Haiti, ad hoc allocations from 
the EDF B-envelope in ACP countries, for example Chad, and use of the IfS (European Parliament, 2012). 
Unless  the  Commission  improves  the  tools  at  its  disposal,  particularly  the  flexibility  and  speed  with 
which  development  funding  can  be  accessed  in  post-emergency  situations,  it  will  continue  to  face 
challenges  in  systematically  integrating  an  LRRD  approach  and  facilitating  the  transition  between 
humanitarian and development support in fragile states. 

2.2.3 

FSPs 6 & 10: Promoting non-discrimination and avoiding pockets of exclusion 

In  order  to  avoid  potential  linkages  between  discrimination,  fragility  and  conflict,  Principle  6  of  the 
Principles  for  Good  International  Engagement  in  Fragile  States  and  Situations  requires  international 
interventions in fragile states to promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. Principle 10 
approaches  discrimination  from  a  more  geographic  perspective,  requiring  international  actors  to 
address the problem of ‘aid orphans’ (entire countries that are under-aided relative to need), as well as 
neglected geographical regions within a country and neglected sectors and groups within societies. In 
order  to  avoid  unintentional  exclusionary  effects,  the  Principle  also  requires  international  actors  to 
coordinate amongst themselves when making decisions on resource allocations. 

The  2011  OECD  report  found  that  implementation  of  FSP  6  is  ‘broadly  on-track’,  as  development 
partners express a clear commitment to prioritising non-discrimination in all cases, have mechanisms in 
place  to  take  into  account  the  views  of  vulnerable  groups  in  their  programming,  and  implement 
projects  that  promote  social  and  economic  inclusion  (OECD,  2011a).  However,  in  order  to  improve 
implementation  further,  they  should  pay  greater  attention  to  supporting  and  influencing  partner 
governments’  policies  on  non-discrimination,  and  should  mainstream  approaches  that  promote  the 
inclusion  of  vulnerable  groups  throughout  their  programmes.  A  number  of  countries,  such  as  Sierra 
Leone,  Chad  and  Haiti  highlighted  the  need  for  greater  attention  to  be  paid  to  marginalised  groups 
such  as  the  disabled,  whilst  others,  such  as  South  Sudan  and  Timor  Leste,  voiced  concerns  over  the 
potential risk that youth unemployment poses to continuing peace.  

29

 
 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

FSP 6: Promoting non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable 
societies.  Real  or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and 
conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions 
in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion 
and  human  rights.  These  are  important  elements  that  underpin  the 
relationship  between  state  and  citizen,  and  form  part  of  long-term 
strategies  to  prevent  fragility.  Measures  to  promote  the  voice  and 
participation  of  women,  youth,  minorities  and  other  excluded  groups 
should be included in statebuilding and service delivery strategies from the 
outset. 

FSP 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion. International actors need to address 
the problem of ’aid orphans’ – states where there are no significant political 
barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid 
volumes  are  low.  This  also  applies  to  neglected  geographical  regions 
within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. 
When  international  actors  make  resource  allocation  decisions  about  the 
partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek 
to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of 
field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity 
and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, is 
therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and 
leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem 
of aid orphans (OECD, 2007). 

By  contrast,  implementation  of  FSP  10  was  judged  to  be  entirely  ’off-track’.  International  actors  were 
considered  insufficiently  attuned  to  the  risk  of  aid  worsening  pockets  of  exclusion  and  had  not 
developed strategies to address the problem. Uneven distribution of aid within a country was seen as 
contributing to marginalisation by almost all countries participating in the survey, and possibly risking 
return to conflict. For example, in CAR it was reported that humanitarian aid tended to be focused on 
post-conflict  regions  rather  than  those  currently  experiencing  instability,  while  development  aid  was 
concentrated in Bangui and three other prefectures. 

The absence of clear decentralisation strategies, or their effective implementation, presented another 
risk for geographic exclusion in a number of countries, and insufficient development partner support in 
this area was highlighted as a concern. For example, in Sierra Leone, it was noted that budget support 
donors  have  limited  influence  over  the  geographic  distribution  of  budget  transfers,  yet  the 
marginalisation of certain regions in terms of access to resources was a significant concern.   

In addition, many countries reported that development partners were unable to provide information on 
the  geographic  distribution  of  aid  in-country,  which  inhibited  coordination  and  limited  the  scope  for 
government  and  development  partners  to  rectify  imbalances  in  allocations.  For  example,  in  the  DRC 
and  South  Sudan,  donors  said  that  the  majority  of  their  assistance  benefited  rural  areas,  but  in  the 
absence of data, there was a continuing perception that it was concentrated in urban centres. 

The  2011  CPPB  evaluation  found  that  the  Commission  targeted  its  assistance  on  conflict-affected, 
isolated  or  vulnerable  areas  or  communities  prone  to  conflict  factors,  often  intervening  in  zones  that 

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EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

were not, or were less, targeted by others. A number of countries participating in the 2011 OECD survey 
also  reported  that  the  Commission  was  providing  support  on  decentralisation.  However,  it  is  evident 
that the EU acting in isolation cannot offset the effects of geographic marginalisation in fragile states. It 
is  essential  that  its  interventions  are  coordinated  with  those  of  other  international  actors,  and  where 
appropriate,  national  authorities.  But  as  the  2011  OECD  report  shows,  this  is  an  area  of  considerable 
weakness,  as  in  many  countries,  development  partners  are  either  unable  to  provide  a  sectoral  or  a 
geographic breakdown of their interventions, or do not consider it a priority to do so. 

2.2.4 

Efficacy of focusing on four out of the ten FSPs 

The  analysis  presented  here  has  focused  on  four  out  of  the  ten  Principles  for  Engagement  in  Fragile 
States:  prioritise  prevention  (FSP  4);  recognise  the  links  between  political,  security  and  development 
objectives  (FSP  5);  promoting  non-discrimination  (FSP  6);  and  avoiding  pockets  of  exclusion  (FSP  10). 
These principles were selected with a view to analysing how the EU can make its approach to fragile 
states, through the specific instruments and methods at its disposal, more anticipatory. In particular, the 
focus is on how to effect a shift from reaction to anticipation, prediction and prevention. 

However, the analysis shows that performance against these four principles should not be considered in 
isolation  from  the  ten  principles  as  a  whole.  Under  FSP  4  (prioritising  prevention),  weaknesses  in 
analysing the root causes of fragility point to a failure to implement FSP 1 (take context as the starting 
point)  effectively.  Likewise,  the  weaknesses  identified  in  the  international  community’s  early  warning 
systems,  specifically  the  lack  of  a  shared  framework  for  conflict  prevention  and  the  multiplicity  of 
ineffective systems, points to shortcomings in implementation of FSP 8 (agree on practical coordination 
mechanisms).  

One of the central challenges in implementing FSP 5 (recognise the links between political, security and 
development objectives) relates to the linkages between humanitarian and development interventions, 
and  the  need  to  adopt  an  integrated  LRRD  approach,  particularly  during  and  in  the  immediate 
aftermath of a crisis.  FSP 9 (act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance) looks in 
greater detail at this specific issue, and in general finds that the lack of linkages between humanitarian 
and development assistance is a significant concern in many fragile states. As a result, in countries such 
as  Somalia,  long-term  donor  engagement  is  implemented  through  repeated  cycles  of  short-term 
funding that do not focus on structural issues such as food insecurity and environmental degradation. 
Resources  need  to  be  able  to  be  reallocated  more  rapidly  between  humanitarian  and  development 
programmes  and  activities,  to  avoid  the  sustained  use  of  humanitarian  funding  in  situations  of 
transition.  

linkage  between  geographic  marginalisation  and 

Under  FSP  10,  the 
insufficient  support  to 
decentralisation  points  to  challenges  experienced  in  the  implementation  of  FSP  3  (focus  on 
statebuilding as the central objective), where development partners’ statebuilding efforts have tended 
to focus primarily on the central executive, with decentralised or sub-national administrations receiving 
less attention. Likewise, the inability  of  development partners to  provide a  geographic  breakdown  of 
their  country  assistance  points  once  again  to  weaknesses  in  the  implementation  of  FSP  8  (agree  on 
practical coordination mechanisms). 

It  is  of  significant  concern  that  the  2011  OECD  report  judged  implementation  of  FSP  8  (agree  on 
practical coordination mechanisms) to be entirely ‘off-track’ (OECD, 2011a). It found that a fully inclusive 
coordination  structure,  involving  humanitarian,  statebuilding  and  development  actors  and  the  state 
remains elusive. No country covered in the survey had a coordination mechanism that demonstrated it 

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Policy Department DG External Policies 

can  bring  the  various  actors  together.  Effective  coordination  between  development  partners  and 
government was also considered to be either partial or non-existent in the majority of countries, while 
development partners were also found to have made limited efforts to establish effective coordination 
mechanisms between themselves. In some cases, this lack of coordination leads to unwelcome levels of 
project proliferation, for example, in Timor Leste, where there are over 40 donors, and more than 170 
projects with expenditures of less than USD 100,000. Evidently, such failures in coordination undermine 
the potential impact and effectiveness of any individual actor’s interventions in fragile states. This poses 
a  particular  challenge  to  the  EU,  which  needs  to  improve  its  coordination  across  three  dimensions:  
internally, with EU Member States, and with other non-EU actors. 

3. 

PROPOSALS  FOR  A  MORE  PROACTIVE,  COHERENT  AND 
COORDINATED APPROACH 

The  EU  is  not  alone  in  recognising  the  limitations  of  conventional  approaches  to  responding  to  the 
threat of armed violence in low income countries (LICs). Both multilateral organisations and individual 
countries  have  had  to  modify  both  organisational  arrangements  and  instruments  to  adapt  to  the 
challenges of the early 21st century. 

The  EU  can  benefit  from  the  enormous  amount  of  work  that  has  been  carried  out  within  the 
international community to understand the nature of fragility and to design strategies for reducing the 
risk of armed violence. Examples of such work from outside the institutions of the EU include the OECD 
DAC  policy  guidance  on  statebuilding  (OECD,  2011b),  the  World  Development  Report  2011  (World 
Bank,  2011a)  and  the  UN  Secretary  General's  report  on  peacebuilding  (United  Nations,  2012).  More 
recently, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States sets out a shared strategy for fragile states and 
international  partners  to  support  transitions  from  fragility  to  resilience.  Broad  lessons  from  this  work 
include the following: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fragility is essentially of a political nature arising from deterioration of the relations between state 
and society.  
Countries reduce fragility by developing their own institutions that are seen as legitimate by their 
people and which can deliver basic services. 
Delivery  of development services may influence public confidence in the state, but more  often 
citizens seek personal security, dignity, justice and order, rather than chaos. 
Institutions tend to evolve in relation to a country's fundamental beliefs, history and culture and 
national institutions are likely to differ from country to country, as within the EU itself. 
Outsiders  can  influence  the  process  of  institutional  change  that  underlies  the  transition  from 
fragility  to  resilience,  but  attempts  to  drive  it  have  usually  failed.  External  influences  can  be 
positive,  e.g.  to  provide  space  from  conflict  through  peacebuilding  that  allows  the  national 
political  settlement  to  develop,  to  increase  respect  for  human  rights,  to  promote  the  voice  of 
excluded groups in political dialogue. However, outsiders can also have negative effects through 
creating economic rents from natural resource exploitation, through corruption that consolidates 
extractive elites, or by providing arms to favoured factions. 
Institutional change that leads to good enough governance in the eyes of the countries’ citizens 
takes decades and many electoral cycles in partner governments eager to see short-term results. 
This  requires  balancing  interventions  that  generate  immediate,  visible  benefits  for  the  country, 
and support for longer-term institution building that enables the country to stand on its own feet.  

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EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

 

Getting  this  balance  wrong  can  actually  destroy  existing  institutions  and  create  long-term  aid 
dependency. 
While there may be consensus on definitions of fragility and how to address it, there is as yet no 
shared  understanding  on  how  to  measure  fragility  in  order  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of 
efforts at country and global levels. This is related to the more general difficulties of measuring 
governance  while  recognising  institutional  diversity  (Fukuyama,  2013).  The  g7+  is  supporting 
efforts to develop new indicators using a ‘bottom-up’ series of consultations in a range of fragile 
countries,  and  early  results  indicate  that  people  in  fragile  states  can  favour  different  types  of 
measure  than  the  international  community,  while  other  more  standard  measures  are  seen  as 
politically problematic. 

An issue for the EU is how to select which countries it wishes to focus its efforts to reduce state fragility 
on. Most recent work on fragility has focused on LICs, yet the recent revolutions in the Middle East and 
North Africa and in countries which have acceded to the EU show that fragility is not just a LIC issue. 
Furthermore,  there  are  otherwise  functioning  states  that  have  regional  insurgencies  or  which  are 
affected  by  criminal  armed  violence.  The  EU  needs  to  decide  whether  its  programmes  to  counter 
fragility should be directed to LICs alone, or whether a theme of supporting resilience should cut across 
all its programmes, perhaps also including those which support its Member States. The EU has interests 
that  include  the  broader  Mediterranean  region  and  knowledge  from  working  with  states  that  have 
experienced fragility and conflict, which might suggest a comparative advantage beyond LICs. 

While the EU in principle has the mandate to carry out an integrated political, security and development 
engagement in a fragile situation, more often it will operate in partnership with other international or 
regional actors that include: 

 

 

 

 

 

Multilateral organisations such as the UN, World Bank and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). A UN Security Council mandate is required for peacekeeping operations that affect the 
sovereignty  of  the  country.  The  World  Bank  can  bring  expertise  and  funding  that  is  politically 
neutral.  NATO  has  expeditionary  capacity  and  resources  beyond  the  EU  and  its  own  Member 
States, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and anti-piracy operations. Yet these organisations have 
weaknesses as well as strengths: the UN has its own issues of internal coherence, efficiency and 
lack  of  resources;  the  World  Bank  charter  prohibits  it  from  engaging  in  political  and  security 
activities; and NATO is challenged to take collective decisions and integrate national forces in its 
operations. 
Regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), AU, ECOWAS 
and  the  Pacific  Forum,  can  help  legitimise  foreign  engagement  in  fragile  situations  and  bring 
local knowledge and resources. However, other regional organisations can lack capacity or ability 
to take decisions. 
Significant  OECD  countries,  which  are  not  EU  members,  and  which  have  experience  and 
resources in operating in fragile settings, e.g. Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and the US. 
Emerging  regional  or  global  powers  that  may  be  engaged  in  particular  fragile  situations,  e.g. 
Brazil  (in  Haiti),  India  (in  Afghanistan),  China  (in  anti-piracy  near  Somalia)  and  Turkey  (in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East). 
Countries in the region around a fragile state which can play positive roles (e.g. related to trade 
and cross-border violence), or be spoilers. 

Challenges  in  effective  partnerships  for  the  EU  range  from  the  political  (for  example,  relations  with 
NATO  and  the  UN),  to  operational  (for  example,  how  to  ensure  that  the  impact  of  EU  and  partner 
interventions are greater than the sum of their parts). There are also organisational implications for the 

33

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

EU  with  these  partnerships,  since  relations  with  these  partners  are  the  responsibility  of  different  EU 
institutions (Commission DGs and the EEAS), a point we return to later. 

A  strategic issue  for the  EU  is the balance in establishing a coherent,  coordinated  EU engagement at 
each level of the Union. An approach that establishes a clear EU policy for working with fragile states at 
the level of the Council and the HR/VP – which is translated into policies and strategies at lower levels in 
EU institutions – has an intellectual appeal, but is it politically feasible? At the other extreme, it would be 
possible to develop coherence and coordinate at the level of particular fragile states, and build broader 
policies on this experience. In between, there are possibilities for like-minded Member States to support 
the EU institutions to implement joined-up approaches, with the ‘no-objection’ of other Member States. 
Where to concentrate efforts on these approaches, which are not mutually exclusive, is a political issue 
for the Member States and the European Parliament to consider.  

Within  EU  organisations  there  are  broadly  two  sets  of  issues  related  to  an  enhanced  engagement  in 
fragile states: alignment of EU organisations to fulfil the EU's fragile states objectives; and deployment 
of appropriate instruments to fulfil these aims. 

3.1 

Re-aligning EU institutions for success 

As  highlighted  in  Part  II  of  this  study,  responsibility  for  fragile  states’  issues  is  spread  across  the  EU 
institutions, of which the EEAS and DG DEVCO are two with substantial engagements in fragile states. 
Organisational change to  assign  a  single unit responsible  for the EU's  fragile  states work might  seem 
attractive, but organisational change is difficult in any organisation, imposes short-term costs, and may 
be difficult to negotiate through EU constituencies. Furthermore, no single unit may have the breadth 
of  expertise  and  the  human  and  financial  resources  to  tackle  a  multidimensional  issue  such  as  state 
fragility.  Industrialised  countries  have  tended  to  solve  this  problem  by  appointing  a  high-level 
coordination group, usually located in the office of the head of government, or in the foreign ministry. 
In  addition  to  the  inter-institutional  CPG,  at  Commissioner  level,  the  EU  might  consider  such  an 
arrangement that would convene the Commissioners of relevant DGs and the HR/VP to agree policies, 
make plans for specific countries of EU focus and to allocate resources. The head of the coordination 
unit would be the HR/VP. The European Parliament would be consulted regularly and the HR/VP would 
ensure that the Parliament’s views are taken into consideration. It is, after all, the Parliament that retains 
the last word with regard to funding for these policy areas. 

The locus of the New Deal is clearly at the country level. The New Deal calls for country leadership, and 
‘one vision, one plan’ based on country-led fragility assessments, and compacts between the country 
and its partners. This, and the recent analysis on how to engage in fragile settings, call for international 
partners to be facilitators and enablers, rather than seek to impose ‘best practice’. Iraq and Afghanistan 
show  how  a  ‘capitals’  driven  approach  that  disempowers  legitimate  authority  does  not  deliver  the 
intended  results.  There  is  a  clear  role  for  empowering  the  country  offices  of  partners  to  engage 
substantively with the country on New Deal implementation. Headquarters driven approaches are likely 
to be too slow, make coordination with other partners cumbersome and lack the information needed 
for  effective  decisions  on  strategies,  plans  and  management  of  risk.  Empowerment  of  country  offices 
and  decentralising  decision-making  comes  with  greater  accountability  for  EU  representatives  and 
greater  tolerance  by  Brussels  for  outcomes  arising  from  calculated  risks  that  do  not  demonstrate 
negligence, taken by field staff. It follows that EU representatives in country need the skills, experience 
and judgment to fulfil this role.  If the EU wants to see key principles for engagement in fragile states 
implemented, for example, prioritising conflict prevention, non-discrimination, and avoiding exclusion, 
these will need to be incorporated into the country plans and compacts envisaged under the New Deal. 

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EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

Brussels  may  want  to  monitor,  but  the  influence  of  the  EU  will  be  primarily  through  the  Heads  of 
Delegations, backed up as needed by the HR/VP. Establishing a culture of information- and risk-sharing 
and  the  delegation  of  authority  is  difficult  in  public  bureaucracies,  but  generates  potentially  large 
benefits in improved relations with countries and partners, greater agility to respond as the situation on 
the ground changes and presents opportunities to be seized, and more effective interventions.  

Decentralisation  to  Heads  of  Delegations  has  other  implications,  such  as  giving  them  the  power  to 
decide  on  how  EU  resources  available  to  the  country  will  be  spent,  including  the  flexibility  to  re-
programme  when  circumstances  on  the  ground  change.    Heads  of  Delegation  need  the  authority  to 
decide  on  all  EU  activities  in  the  country  and  to  avoid  supply  driven  interventions  that  lack  country 
ownership. They also need to be the prime interlocutor between the EU and the government and to 
manage  this  relationship  under  strategic  guidance  of  the  HR/VP,  who  in  turn  is  accountable  to  the 
European  Parliament.  An  enhanced  role  for  the  Head  of  Delegation  is  not  a  prescription  to  be  a 
proconsul, but to facilitate and enable positive change within the country,  strengthening rather than 
weakening  the  country's  legitimate  authorities.  This  may  also  require  a  change  in  the  culture  of  the 
Commission from instructing and controlling Delegations to providing timely resources and support to 
do their work. 

Greater decentralisation implies that EU missions need to be adequately staffed in terms of human skills 
and  numbers  and  that  internal  incentives  and  human  resource  management  can  make  this  happen.  
Requirements  for  Head  of  Delegation  need  to  be  set  high  to  ensure  that  those  appointed  have  the 
professional excellence the position requires. Most organisations have difficulty in moving staff to field 
positions in fragile states. The EU’s use of financial incentives, leave arrangements, family considerations 
and  enhanced  promotion  prospects  for  successful  performers  must  reflect  best  practice.  Also,  the 
number  of  staff  in  field  positions  must  be  commensurate  with  more  responsibility  devolved  to 
Delegations, even though the costs of placing staff in fragile settings can be high - every person moving 
to the field will displace more than one position in Brussels. Better risk management from field-based 
staff and lighter internal processes should generate savings in Brussels, as well as greater programme 
effectiveness.  In  addition,  action  may  be  required  to  deal  with  the  loss  of  institutional  memory  and 
country relationships due to shorter rotations of staff than in less fragile situations. Options to consider 
include,  selecting  staff  able  to  stay  in  non-family  postings  and  maintaining  continuity  in  the  team 
working  on  the  country  between  Brussels  and  the  Delegation  so  that  more  than  one  field  posting  is 
possible. 

There are also issues of how the EU relates to coordination arrangements at the country level. While the 
international  community  often  assigns  responsibility  for  coordination  of  international  support  to  the 
UN,  it  would  also  be  possible  for  the  EU  to  take  such  a  mandate  as  its  own  mandate  covers  the  key 
policy areas of political reform, security, development and humanitarian assistance. Even if the EU is not 
in the lead – and we would argue that it is best for the host government to take this leadership role if it 
is able to – the Head of the EU Delegation could have a seat at the table during key discussions between 
the host government and its key partners. This becomes more effective when the EU representative can 
speak  on  behalf  of  Member  States.  An  example  of  this  would  be  the  Board  of  Principles  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina where the Head of the EU Delegation joined the heads of the main multilateral agencies to 
take collectively binding decisions (Ashdown, 2007). 

35

 
 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

How  poor  coordination  weakens  action  on 
Afghanistan  

long-term  prevention: 

lessons  from 

With more than 60 international partners, many of which were engaged in diplomatic, security, 
development and humanitarian activities, strategic coherence and coordination in Afghanistan 
has been a formidable problem. The fall of the Taliban government was the consequence of a 
short  war  in  late  2001  fought  mainly  by  anti-Taliban  Afghan  militias,  particularly  the  Tajik 
dominated  Northern  Alliance,  with  US  special  forces  and  air  support.    Initially  there  were  few 
international  forces  deployed  to  Afghanistan  and  the  NATO  mission  was  essentially 
peacekeeping  in  Kabul.  Three  military  commands  operated  in  Afghanistan:  a  US  led  anti-
terrorism mission, a more conventional US command, and the NATO force.  These operated with 
UN Security Council authorisation and were not unified for at least five years. NATO's mandate 
was eventually extended to cover most of the country. NATO forces were essentially an assembly 
of national units from many countries, many of which operated under ‘national caveats’ which 
defined their missions. Consequently, military activities in Afghanistan were a mixture of counter 
terrorism, counter insurgency and peacekeeping missions carried out by different national units 
under strategies that were, at best, only loosely coordinated.   

A  major  gap  arising  from  this  approach  was  the  lack  of  attention  to  rebuilding  the  police  and 
justice  sectors,  somewhat  surprising  since  order  and  justice  based  on  Pashtun  traditions  was 
essentially  the  core  of  what  the  Taliban  and  tribal  insurgents  could  offer  to  Afghans.    While 
leadership of police and justice was given to two European partners, these sectors were under-
resourced, apart from a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) managed trust fund to 
pay police salaries, and opportunities to press for deep reforms similar to the army were missed. 
This was partly a consequence of the inherent difficulty of police reform, slowness by the Afghan 
government to see the impact of police predation on the legitimacy of the state, and the lack of 
a  well-resourced  multilateral  agency  to  tailor  an  approach  that  would  have  ownership  in 
Afghanistan.  In  addition,  neither  UNDP  nor  the  donors  which  supported  the  fund  for  police 
salaries were willing, or able, to link the fund to reforms to create a police force with wide Afghan 
support. Similarly, in the justice sector there was a lack of realism of what could be achieved -- 
there were only a few hundred lawyers in the country with knowledge of formal law -- and about 
how a modern legal system would relate to tribal and shari'a justice and be seen as legitimate by 
Afghans. 

Ten years after the international engagement with Afghanistan, the mixed effectiveness of the 
police  and  their  predatory  behaviour  has  undermined  attempts  to  build  an  effective  and 
legitimate Afghan state and weakened support for modern institutions. Taliban justice, with all 
its brutality and insensitivity to women, is often seen by inhabitants of rural areas as being more 
effective,  predictable,  impartial  and  just  than  the  poorly  functioning  modern  system.  With  the 
transition to full Afghan responsibility for security in 2014, there have been recent attempts to 
train the police to be more professional and to strengthen the higher judiciary.   

What are the lessons from the Afghanistan experience? 

In  conflict  prone  situations  an  integrated  approach  involving  security,  justice,  political  reform, 
economic  development  and  humanitarian  relief  is  required.  This  poses  huge  challenges  for 
partner governments (which may themselves struggle to achieve strategic coherence), the host 
government  and  multilateral  agencies  which  may  have  limited  mandates  or  relative  strengths 

 36

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

and weaknesses among the strategic themes.  Few international organisations have mandates in 
all these areas – the UN, EU and some regional organisations are among the few – and those that 
do have uneven capacity or lack resources. 

Afghanistan  demonstrates  how  long  it  takes  to  build  local  institutions  that  can  provide 
governance  the  population  considers  tolerably  good.  Such  timeframes  encompass  many 
electoral  cycles  in  partner  countries  and  it  may  at  times  be  difficult  to  demonstrate  results  to 
partner taxpayers, particularly if there are temporary setbacks in governance. Maintaining long-
term  engagement  becomes  difficult  for  bilateral  partners,  who  may  want  visible  short-term 
results  at  the  expense  of  developing  national  institutions.  Multilateral  agencies  may  be  better 
adapted to withstand these pressures and to maintain a portfolio of countries that at any time 
includes a mix of high and low performing countries that ensure overall results 

3.2 

Harmonisation and alignment of EU assistance instruments 

This  study  has  also  identified  the  multiplicity  of  financing  instruments  available  to  the  EU  for  fragile 
states. While some rationalisation and simplification might be helpful in enabling countries and EU staff 
to  understand  what  is  available  and  to  avoid  duplication,  a  broad  arsenal  might  be  useful  if  the  EU 
decides to engage in state fragility beyond LICs. At a minimum, the EU should be able to communicate 
clearly in  one document  what  financing  options  exist  for  addressing  fragility, which  EU  organisations 
are responsible for them, which recipients are eligible and the terms and conditions of each instrument.   

Successful  support  for  country  transitions  from  fragility  to  resilience  will  require  the  EU  to  deploy 
instruments  that  support  the  underlying  transformation  of  institutions  within  the  country.  There  is 
some  evidence  that  poorly  chosen  instruments  not  only  slow  down  the  development  of  institutions, 
but  can  actually  destroy  the  nascent  institutions  that  exist  (Ghani  &  Lockhart,  2008;  OECD,  2010b; 
Glennie et al., 2013). It seems clear that project aid, implemented in parallel to the legitimate state, can 
undermine it. Furthermore, there are trade-offs between short-term results often intended to reinforce 
stability, but which are often not sustainable, with instruments that do more to strengthen institutions 
and  reduce  aid  dependence.  Donor  projects  designed  to  create  visibility  for  the  donor,  for  example 
through donor flags painted on what they finance,  may actually undermine the credibility of country 
authorities responsible for delivering the service (and the credibility of the donor too, if facilities fail to 
deliver services through lack of maintenance or recurrent cost financing, which citizens may blame on 
waste and corruption). 

There  is  some  evidence  that  broad  development  interventions  are  not  critical  to  securing  citizen 
support  for  the  state  during  an  insurgency  or  at  the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  The  World  Bank's  2011 
World  Development  Report  postulates  that  a  new  government  needs  to  do  a  few  things  well  after  a 
conflict in order to create citizen confidence in the state.  Personal security is likely to be high on the list 
of  public  expectations  after  civil  conflict.  Yet  the  international  community  has  had  difficulty  in 
supporting the justice sector, including police and corrections. 

The gap in the international architecture for justice and public security creates an opportunity for the 
EU,  which  includes  two  important  systems  of  justice,  multiple  national  experiences  on  policing  and 
personal security, and strong linguistic capacity. This raises the more general issue of whether the EU 
wishes to develop deep expertise in a number of thematic areas and the instruments needed to support 
them.  While  European  Parliamentarians  may  wish  to  see  certain  themes  and  sectors  supported  in  a 

37

 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

fragile  state,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  these  should  be  supported  through  EU  institutions. 
Other multilateral organisations, Member States and bilateral partners might have more expertise and 
adequate finance. The police example indicates how the EU might decide on focus: the issue may be 
more  amenable  to  multilateral  rather  than  bilateral  intervention,  the  EU  can  bring  expertise  from  its 
Member States and operations outside the EU, there may be a gap in the international architecture, and 
the EU has the resources to make a significant difference. 

The New Deal also calls for the use and strengthening of country systems. In a forthcoming ODI report, 
localised  aid  is  defined  as  aid  that  flows  to  national  institutions  –  the  state,  private  sector  and  civil 
society  organisations  (ODI,  2013).  While  this  includes  direct  budget  support16,  it  also  includes  aid  on 
budget with additional fiduciary controls17, and aid to organisations that in principle  should  not flow 
through the budget, for example civil society organisations (CSOs) which hold state and government 
accountable.  Localised  aid  is  associated  with  strengthening  local  institutions,  stimulates  the  local 
economy,  avoids  distorting the labour  market  and  provides value for money. However, it  can  appear 
more risky than project aid, as local institutions are responsible for managing the money and delivering 
outcomes.  Fiduciary  risks  can  be  managed  in  fragile  states,  even  in  countries  which  rank  low  on 
international corruption perception scales, through support to reforming public financial management 
and  in  allowing  external  agents  to  provide  temporary  financial  controls.18  The  issue  should  not  be 
whether to channel through country systems, but how to work with government and other partners to 
ensure what additional financial controls are put in place to lower fiduciary risks to acceptable levels, 
and to assure constituents that adequate processes will deal with the risk outcomes that are likely to 
occur. 

The MDTF is another instrument that has worked well in post-crisis fragile states, particularly in Asia and 
the Middle East. Donors pool their funds and pool risks and delegate responsibility and accountability 
for fiduciary management and results to an administrator, usually a multilateral organisation such as the 
World Bank or UNDP. MDTFs usually flow through the budget of the beneficiary country, although the 
administrator  may  apply  special  financial  controls  and  carry  out  ex  ante  reviews  of  procurement 
decisions.  As  well  as  implementing  the  Paris  Declaration  principles  of  donor  harmonisation  and 
alignment  of aid with the country  budget,  MDTFs  also  substantially lower the transaction cost to the 
recipient government of having to respond to the reporting and other requirements of multiple donors. 
The EU has contributed to MDTFs in fragile states, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 
which finances salaries and other recurrent costs of government as well as priority investments. EU rules 
on  financial  accountability  have  been  an  impediment  to  its  initial  participation  in  MDTFs,  although 
these issues can be resolved  if there is political will.19  EU financial and operating processes are more 
generally  a  constraint  to  its  effectiveness  in  fragile  situations.  If  reforms  to  its  rules  and  procedures 
applicable  to  fragile  states  are  too  difficult,  then  EU  financial  resources  might  be  more  effective 
channelled through MDTFs, with EU representation in the governance arrangements of the fund. 

As reforms to internal processes applicable in fragile situations might be difficult and take time to reach 
consensus  among  Member  States,  the  EU  might  wish  to  consider  whether  to  establish  EU  pooled 

16 An African Development Bank and World Bank (2011) study on budget aid in fragile situations looked at their financing 
operations (including EU budget support) in four case studies in Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau and Sierra 
Leone and concluded that it is possible to manage risks adequately in these settings. 
17 See for example the case of the Liberia health pooled fund (Hughes, et al, 2012) 
18 Examples of such countries include Afghanistan, where money flowing through Treasury systems has generally been well 
accounted for, and the health sector in Liberia.   
19 According to those involved, the EU contribution to the Afghanistan trust fund was the longest to negotiate and needed 
the direct intervention of the Commissioner and president of the World Bank to resolve. 

 38

                                                               
EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

funding arrangements that could mobilise funding from Member States outside the EU budget. These 
could  be  constituted  like  an  EU  MDTF  or  a  pooled  funding  arrangement  jointly  managed  with  the 
recipient country. It might be easier to start with a single country fund that involved like-minded donors 
with  a  shared  appetite  for  risk  in  the  particular  country  context.  An  EU  pooled  fund  would  lower  the 
transaction  costs  (of  dealing  with  multiple  European  donors)  to  government,  and  the  donors  would 
have  an  instrument  that  could  back  European  diplomacy  and  dialogue  on  reforms  in  the  recipient 
country.  Critical  conditions  for  the  success  of  a  pooled  fund  would  be  creating  an  enclave  of 
streamlined processes and financial instruments that cut across EU organs and instruments to be able 
to fund all relevant areas in the country.  An EU MDTF might allow some innovation that could be ring 
fenced from wider EU systems. The World Bank, for example, has been able to interpret its rules liberally 
and created special risk management frameworks for MDTFs when the downside risks of programme 
failure in a post-conflict state were greater than the additional fiduciary risks. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

This study makes the case that the effectiveness of the EU’s engagement in fragile states, in particular its 
support to conflict prevention and periods of transition, is constrained by a number of key challenges. 
First  and  foremost,  and  in  spite  of  the  commitments  set  out  in  the  2001  Communication  on  Conflict 
Prevention (European Commission, 2001), the study finds that the EU has not been able to implement a 
systematic and long-term approach to prioritising prevention in fragile and conflict-affected states. Key 
weaknesses include insufficient analysis of the root causes of fragility, ineffective early warning systems, 
and inadequate integration of conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches into programming at 
country level.    

Second, in spite of the EU’s recognition in various communications of the importance of LRRD, the study 
finds that the EU lacks a coherent approach to mainstreaming LRRD into its programming in fragile and 
conflict-affected states, and has not ensured that its various financial instruments are able to support 
the post-emergency transition from humanitarian to development assistance in a systematic way.     

Third,  the  study  finds  that  in  general  the  EU  has  not  coordinated  sufficiently  with  other  international 
actors  engaged  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states.  Its  cooperation  with  the  UN  remains  largely  ad 
hoc; although there have been efforts to strengthen cooperation at the operational level, cooperation 
at the policy level is somewhat lacking. Its cooperation with EU Member States engaged in fragile and 
conflict-affected states has, in many cases, remained at the level of information sharing, with very few 
examples of joint objective setting, joint programming or clear division of roles to enhance synergies 
and avoid gaps and duplications. 

The weaknesses demonstrated by the EU in these areas are not necessarily quantitatively different to 
those  demonstrated  by  other  international  actors  engaged  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected  states.  The 
2011  OECD  survey  of  the  implementation  of  the  FSPs  found  that  implementation  of  the  principles  is 
seriously off-track, and that most aid actors are neither set up to meet the specific challenges posed by 
fragile  environments,  nor  systematically  able  to  translate  commitments  made  by  their  headquarters 
into country-level changes (OECD, 2011a). However, the EU’s performance is exacerbated by a number 
of factors that are specific to its organisational and resourcing arrangements:  

 

Responsibility for fragility and conflict at a policy level is fragmented across a number of 
institutions  (EEAS,  DG  DEVCO,  FPI).  In  the  absence  of  an  integrated,  whole-of-EU  policy  on 
security, fragility and development, it is not clear how these various units relate to each other and 

39

 
Policy Department DG External Policies 

the  EU  Delegations.  This  lack  of  organisational  coherence  has,  in  turn,  limited  the  effective 
development,  dissemination  and  uptake  of  various  tools  designed  to  enhance  engagement  at 
the  operational  level.  Notably,  where  early  warning  systems  exist,  they  have  not  been  widely 
used  or  sufficiently  comprehensive  (ADE,  2011).  Formal  conflict  assessments  are  neither 
systematically undertaken at country level, nor systematically integrated into programming (ADE, 
2011).  The  Commission  has  no  review  mechanism  to  ensure  that  conflict  prevention, 
peacebuilding  and  LRRD  approaches  are  appropriately  integrated  into  Regional  and  Country 
Strategy papers, and there is no obligation to mainstream conflict prevention into sectors that are 
not  directly  linked  to  conflict  prevention  and  peacebuilding  (ADE,  2011),  for  example  service 
delivery sectors such as water, health and education. 
There  is  insufficient  coherence  between  the  various  financing  instruments  at  the 
Commission’s  disposal,  leading  to  gaps  in  the  provision  of  financing  for  long-term 
preventive  actions  and  post-emergency  situations.  The  IfS  is  only  expected  to  provide 
assistance for conflict prevention to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot 
be provided under other instruments of Heading 4 (European Commission 2011b, EU 2006). Its 
limited duration (interventions of a maximum of 18-24 months) reflects the fact that longer-term 
preventive  actions  are  expected  to  be  integrated  into  interventions  financed  by  the  DCI  at 
to  mainstream  conflict-prevention  and 
failure 
regional  and  country-level.  However, 
peacebuilding into Country and Regional Strategy Papers, as noted above, has in turn meant that 
long-term  preventive  actions  have  not  been  appropriately  programmed  for  under  the  DCI, 
leading  to  pressure  on  the  IfS  in  some  cases  to  finance  projects  with  longer-term  prevention 
objectives that cannot always be completed (ADE, 2011).  
Commission  funding  for  post-emergency  situations  that  involve  a  transition  from 
humanitarian  and  development  assistance  is  not  sufficiently  systematic.  Most  non-
humanitarian instruments (thematic and geographic) are not adapted to flexible or fast delivery, 
and often face considerable challenges in reallocating development resources, in part because of 
the  difficulty  in  adapting  Country  Strategy  Papers  to  respond  to  changing  needs,  for  example 
changing  focal  areas  during  implementation  or  reallocating  funding  between  focal  areas.  As  a 
result,  post-emergency  funding  has  tended  to  rely  on  attempts  to  stretch  out  the  limits  of  the 
humanitarian  phase  funded  by  ECHO,  ad  hoc  allocations  from  the  EDF  B-envelope  in  ACP 
countries and use of the IfS (European Parliament, 2012).   
In spite of its policy commitments, the Commission has not made investing in expertise in 
fragility  and  conflict-prevention  a  priority,  particularly  at  the  operational  level.  EU 
Delegations  in  fragile  or  conflict-affected  states  often  face  staff  shortages,  or  lack  dedicated 
expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ADE, 2011). 

 

 

 

4.1 

Recommendations 

The study urges the EU to:  

1. 

2. 

Finalise the Action Plan on security, fragility and development requested by the Council 
in 2007. The Action Plan should be based on a whole-of-EU approach that aims to ensure that 
the  EU’s  objectives  in  the  field  of  development  cooperation,  humanitarian  assistance, 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing.  

Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions responsible for fragility 
and  conflict  at  a  policy  and  operational  level.  Attempts  to  enhance  institutional 
coordination  through  the  establishment  of  an  inter-institutional  CPG  are  noted.  The  EEAS, 
through its Conflict and Security Policy Division, which chairs the CPG, should be tasked with 

 40

EU Development Cooperation in fragile states: Challenges and opportunities 

ensuring  that  the  group  is  operational  and  delivers  effectively  against  its  mandate,  which 
includes  gathering  and  reviewing  early  warning  information,  identifying  early  response 
options, developing conflict risk analysis methodologies and broadly mainstreaming conflict-
prevention into EU external action. With regard to the latter, the CPG should ensure that the 
necessary  tools  are  in  place  to  ensure  that  conflict  prevention  is  mainstreamed  into 
programming at regional level across all areas of cooperation. 

Convene a high-level coordination group on fragility, comprising the Commissioners of 
relevant DGs and the HR/VP, tasked with agreeing policies and monitoring progress for 
specific  countries  of  EU  focus.  The  HR/VP  would  head  the  group  and  ensure  that  the 
European  Parliament  is  consulted  regularly  so  that  the  Parliament’s  views  are  taken  into 
consideration.  

Devolve  decision-making  powers  on  integrated  programming  and  flexible  resource 
utilisation in fragile and conflict-affected states to Heads of Delegation, in line with the 
country-level  locus  of  the  New  Deal.  This  would  avoid  implementation  gaps  in  support  of 
long-term prevention and post-emergency transition, and maximise the speed and flexibility 
with  which  emerging  gaps  and  needs  can  be  addressed  in  line  with  the  country  plans  and 
compacts established under the New Deal. This approach would need to be backed up by a 
serious investment in human resources at country level, ensuring that EU Delegations are fully 
staffed and have access to the necessary expertise in conflict-prevention and peacebuilding. 

Determine  the  breadth  and  depth  of  EU  engagement  in  fragile  and  conflict-affected 
states.  In  terms  of  breadth,  the  EU  should  consider  in  which  countries  it  wishes  to  focus  its 
efforts to reduce state fragility. In terms of depth, the EU should consider whether it wishes to 
develop a deeper expertise in certain thematic areas in which it has comparative advantage 
and which there are gaps in the international architecture, such as justice and public security, 
and develop specific instruments to support them. 

Communicate  clearly  in  one  document  what  financing  options  exist  for  addressing 
fragility, which EU organisations are responsible for them, which recipients are eligible 
and  the  terms  and  conditions  of  each  instrument.  It  should  also  seek  to  address  existing 
obstacles to coherence across instruments, for example, by enhancing the adaptation of non-
humanitarian  instruments  to  flexible  or  fast  delivery  in  contexts  of  fragility.  Particular  areas 
that  could  be  considered  include:    streamlining  the  processes  for  adapting  country-level 
programming  established  in  Country  Strategy  Papers  to  respond  to  evolving  needs,  and 
making systematic provision for unallocated contingency allocations analogous to the use of 
EDF B-envelope allocations in ACP countries. 

Establish  EU  pooled  funding  arrangements  that  could  mobilise  funding  from  Member 
States outside the EU budget. These could be constituted like a MDTF or a pooled funding 
arrangement  jointly  managed  with  the  recipient  country.  It  might  be  easier  to  start  with  a 
single  country  fund  that  involved  like-minded  donors  with  a  shared  appetite  for  risk  in  the 
particular  country  context.  A  European  pooled  fund  would  lower  the  transaction  costs  (of 
dealing  with  multiple  European  donors)  to  government,  and  the  donors  would  have  an 
instrument  that  could  back  European  diplomacy  and  dialogue  on  reforms  in  the  recipient 
country.  

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

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Policy Department DG External Policies 

REFERENCES 

Aide à la Décision Économique (ADE) Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict 

Prevention and Peace-building 2001-2010: Vol. 1 – 3, European Commission, Brussels, 2011. 

Ashdown, P., Swords and ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century, Orion, London, 2007. 

Banim, G., ‘EU Responses to Fragile States’, in Weiss, S., Spanger, H-J., Van Meurs, W. (eds.), Diplomacy, 

Development and Defence, Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 2008. 

Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., and Felter J. H., ‘Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of 

Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 4, The University of 
Chicago Press, August 2011, pp. 766-819.   

Berman, E., Callen, M., Felter, J. H. and Shapiro, J. N., Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and 

Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines, NBER Working Paper No. 15547, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010.   

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Policy Department DG External Policies 

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