Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions
Date: 2013-07-24
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: bank charges, consumer information, electronic money, financial legislation, financial services, intra-EU payment, provision of services, single market, tax













EUR-Lex - 52013PC0550R(01) - EN











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52013PC0550R(01)

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions /* COM/2013/0550 final/2 - 2013/0265 (COD) */









EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.           CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
Grounds for and objectives of the
proposal
The aim of the present proposal is to help
to develop an EU-wide market for payments, which will enable consumers,
retailers and other undertakings to enjoy the full benefits of the EU internal market
including e-commerce, in line with Europe 2020 and the Digital Agenda. 
To achieve this, and to promote EU wide
services, efficiency and innovation in the field of card payment instruments, and
card based payment transactions in an offline, online and mobile environment, there
should be legal clarity and a level playing field. In addition, business rules
and other conditions should be prohibited if they prevent consumers and
retailers from having accurate information on fees paid in relation to payment
transactions and thereby hinder the creation of a fully effective internal
market. 
General context
The regulatory and legislative framework
for retail payments in the EU has been developed over the past 12 years, with the
advent of the Euro acting as an accelerating factor. Regulation 2560/2001 on
the equivalence of charges for national and cross-border payments in Euros
prompted further initiatives on the completion of an Internal Market in
payments. 
The regulatory and legislative framework is complemented by a number of investigations and decisions under
EU competition law by the Commission over the past years in the field of retail
payments. 
Secure, efficient, competitive and
innovative electronic payments are crucial for the internal market in all
products and services, and this has an increasing impact as the world moves
beyond bricks-and-mortar trade towards e-commerce. In this context the achievement of an effectively functioning
internal market in the area of payment cards has been hindered by the
widespread application of certain restrictive business rules and practices.
Such rules and practices also lead to a lack of information on costs and
pricing of transactions to consumers and retailers that results in sub-optimal
market outcomes including inefficient prices. 
One of the key practices hindering the
achievement of an integrated market reasons is the widespread use in 'four party' schemes, the most common type of card schemes, of so-called Multilateral Interchange Fees
(MIFs). These are collectively agreed inter-bank fees usually between the acquiring payment service providers and the
issuing payment service providers belonging to a certain scheme. Such interchange fees paid by acquiring payment
service providers form part of the fees they charge to merchants (the Merchant Service Charges or MSCs), which merchants in
turn pass on to consumers. Thus, high Interchange Fees paid by merchants result
in higher final prices for goods and services, which are paid by all consumers.
Competition between card schemes appears in practice to be largely aimed at
convincing as many issuing payment service providers as possible to issue their
cards, which usually leads to higher rather than lower fees, in
contrast with the usual price disciplining effect of competition in a market
economy . 
At present, no legislation regulating
interchange fees is in place in the EU, except indirectly in the case of
Denmark for MSCs for face-to-face transactions. However,
many national competition authorities have on-going competition law enforcement
proceedings, including in the UK, Germany and Italy. Also, a number of Member
States are in the process of adopting legislation, including in Poland, Hungary,
the UK and Italy. 
Effects
on consumers
The price increases caused by interchange
fees are harmful to consumers, who tend to be unaware of the fees paid by
merchants for the payment instrument they use. At the same time a series of
incentivising practices applied by issuing payment service providers (such as
travel vouchers, bonuses, rebates, charge backs, free insurances, etc.) steers
consumers towards the use of payment instruments generating high fees for
issuing payment service providers. Scheme rules applied by payment card schemes
and practices applied by payment service providers tend to keep merchants and
consumers ignorant about fee differences and reduce market transparency, for
instance by ‘blending’ fees or prohibiting merchants from choosing a cheeper
card brand on co-branded cards or steering consumers to the use of such cheeper
cards. Even if merchants are aware of the different costs, the scheme rules
often hinder them from acting to reduce the fees. Of
particular importance are so-called ‘Honour All Cards
Rules’ (HACRs) which require merchants to accept all products issued under the
same brand, even if the merchant fees for these cards can vary by a factor of
3-4 within the same card category (i.e. credit / debit) or by a factor
of up to 25 between card categories, such as premium credit card and low-cost
debit cards. The result of the collectively agreed fees and transparency
reducing measures is that banks are not made to compete on this element of
their fees, which leads to higher retail prices to consumers, including those
who do not pay with a card or who pay with low fee cards. In fact, the latter
consumers are subsidising the use by other often wealthier consumers of more
expensive means of payment through higher retail prices. In addition to limited
choice as regards payment service providers, reduced innovation and higher
prices for payment services, the interchange fees also call into question the
Commission's policy to promote and facilitate the use of electronic payments
for the benefit of consumers[1].
Finally, the lack of choice as regards payment service providers, including on
a pan-European level, effectively prevents consumers from reaping all the
benefits from the internal market, particularly as far as e-commerce is
concerned.
Effects on the internal market
There currently is a wide variety of
interchange fees applied within national and international payment card
schemes, which gives rise to market fragmentation and prevents retailers and
consumers from enjoying the benefits of an internal market for goods and
services. Even considering only the international payment card schemes,
interchange fees differ up to a factor of 10, which gives rise to substantial
cost differences between retailers in the respective countries. As a
consequence of the wide differences in fees between Member States, retailers
also have difficulty formulating an EU wide price strategy for their products
and services, both on-line and off line, to the detriment of consumers.
Retailers cannot overcome the fee differences by making use of card acceptance
services offered by banks in other Member States; specific rules applied by the
payment schemes prescribe the application of the interchange fee of the 'Point
of Sale' (country of the retailer) for each payment transaction. This prevents acquiring
banks from successfully offering their services on a cross border basis and retailers
from reducing their payment costs to the benefit of consumers. 
Effects on market entry
Interchange fees also restrict market entry
as their revenues for issuing payment service providers function as a minimum
threshold to convince issuing payment service providers to issue payment cards
or other payment instruments, such as online and mobile
payment solutions, offered by new entrants. Also,
market entry for pan-European players remains difficult, as domestic interchange
fees in EU Member States vary widely and new entrants would have to offer
interchange fees at least comparable to those prevailing in each market they
want to enter. This has an impact on the viability of their business model i.a.
affecting potential economies of scale and scope. This also explains why in a
number of Member States, national (normally cheaper) card schemes have tended
to disappear. The entry barriers interchange fees thus created for online and mobile payment solutions also result in less innovation.
As said, no legislation regulating
interchange fees is currently in place in the EU, except indirectly in the case
of Denmark. However, many national competition authorities have on-going competition
law enforcement proceedings. Also, a number of Member States are in the process
of adopting legislation. The different time paths of the national proceedings
and the intended legislation risk leading to an even more fragmented market. 
The present regulation therefore proposes
to create common rules for interchange fees in the European Union by introducing
maximum fee levels for transactions with payment cards that are widely used by
consumers and thereby difficult to refuse or surcharge by retailers. This will
create a level playing field which will take away the market fragmentation
currently existing as a consequence of diverging fees. It will also allow for
the successful market entry of pan-European newcomers and for innovation based
on an infrastructure existing of a 'level playing field'. Consumers and
retailers will thus benefit from a wider choice of payment service providers
(new as well as incumbent), including on a pan-European level. The regulation
will in addition propose transparency measures to allow retailers and consumers
to make better informed choices of payment instruments. 
Existing provisions in the area of the
proposal
This initiative will complement the
existing legal framework for payment services within the EU, in particular with
respect to the completion of an Internal Market in payments, and migration to
pan-European payment instruments.
Directive 2007/64/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services
in the internal market (the so called 'Payment Services Directive' or PSD)[2] aims to establish standardised conditions and rights for payment
services offered in the market for the benefit of consumers and companies
across the Union. This Directive, which is under revision at the same time the present
proposal is prepared, creates the general framework for payments in the EU. It
is complemented by several Regulations such as Regulation (EC) N°924/2009 on
cross-border payments or Regulaton (EC) N°260/2012 which
sets migration deadlines for the transition of all credit transfers and direct
debits in euros in the EU from national schemes to pan-European schemes. Regulation (EC) N° 260/2012 also clarifies that
no Multilateral Interchange Fees can be charged for each direct debit
transactions.
In addition to the legislative framework, over
the last 20 years, the European Commission and national competition authorities
have conducted a number of antitrust proceedings addressing
anti-competitive practices in the card payment market. The General Court judgment
of May 2012[3]
confirmed the Commission's finding in its MasterCard Decision of December 2007[4]
that MIFs restrict competition as they inflate the cost of card acceptance by
merchants without leading to benefits for consumers. The Court rejected the argument
that MIFs were indispensable for the functioning of a payment card system. To address the competition concerns, the Commission has accepted
commitments by Visa and MasterCard to charge lower MIFs for cross-border (and
some domestic) transactions: the MasterCard undertakings of 2009 (caps for cross-border consumer MIFs to 0.2% for debit cards
and 0.3% for credit cards and changes to the rules it imposes on retailers
through the acquiring payment service providers), and the Visa Europe
commitments of 2010 (along the lines of those of MasterCard, with caps limited
to debit but also covering domestic MIFs when these are fixed by Visa Europe
itself and not the national banks). In 2013, Visa Europe also offered
commitments for credit card transactions cross-border regarding certain countries
where these charges are set by Visa Europe, and on cross border acquiring
rules. Competition proceedings are on-going in a number of other Member States,
including in Poland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the UK, Germany and France. The
French Competition Authority for instance made binding the commitments from the
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires – the domestic card scheme – on 7 July
2011 to reduce its interchange fees to levels equivalent to the ones agreed by
MasterCard and Visa for their cross-border transactions.
While no legislation is in place on
interchange fees in the EU, except indirectly in Denmark[5], a number of Member States are in the process of adopting legislation, including in Poland, Hungary, the UK and Italy. In Poland,
the Parliament is considering draft legislation regulating interchange fees, with MIFs caps progressively falling to 0,5% by the start of 2016,
abolishing the Honour All Cards Rule and allowing surcharging (for credit cards
only). In Hungary, a legislative proposal is under
discussion that would cap domestic credit and debit interchange fees at their
respective cross border level, with the Hungarian Central Bank in charge of
calculating these fees. In Italy, a draft Decree by the Ministry of Economy and
Finance has been published for consultation in December 2012, focusing on
limits to blending, comparability of interchange fees and merchant service
charges, as merchant service charges should take into account the volume of
transactions and should be lower for low value payments. In the UK, the Government is proposing to bring payment systems under economic
regulation, establishing a new competition-focused, utility-style regulator for
retail payment systems[6].
Consistency with the other policies and objectives
of the Union
The objectives of the proposal are
consistent with the policies and objectives pursued by the Union. First, they
will improve the functioning of the internal market for payment services and
more broadly for all goods and services to the benefit of European consumers
and companies. Second, they broadly support other Union policies, in particular
competition policy (by establishing equal obligations, rights and opportunities
for all market players and facilitating cross-border provision of payment
services, thus increasing the level of competition). The impact assessment
accompanying this proposal concluded that the proposed measures would promote market integration for consumers and merchants, favour
pan-European market entry and result in more legal certainty on business models
for existing card schemes and new entrants,. They would
also address the threat of 'exporting' models based on anti-competitive
practices to new, innovative payment services. 
In spite of the General Court judgement confirming
the Commission’s assessment that MIFs as applied within the MasterCard system
restricted competition and did not lead to efficiencies outweighing their harm
to merchants and consumers, international and national card schemes operating
in the EU currently do not seem willing pro-actively to adjust their practices
to comply with the European and national competition rules. Although National
Competition Authorities, in close cooperation with the Commission, are
addressing this situation, competition enforcement according to different timelines
and procedures may not lead to sufficiently comprehensive and timely results to
unlock the market integration and innovation that are necessary to ensure the
competitiveness of the European payments market at a global level. Taking into
account the EU competition rules and the Commission’s experience in competition
cases in payments, the present proposal therefore aims at providing legal
clarity to ensure effective integration and competition,
thereby improving economic welfare for all relevant stakeholders and in
particular consumers. By facilitating economic transactions within the Union,
this will also contribute to the attainment of the wider objectives of the EU
2020 strategy.
2.           RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Consultation of interested parties
Consultation methods, main sectors
targeted and general profile of respondents
On 11 January 2012, The European Commission
published a Green Paper 'Towards an integrated European market for cards,
interent and mobile payments'[7] which was followed by a public consultation. The Commission received
more than 300 replies to its public consultation. The comprehensive feedback by
stakeholders[8] provided relevant information on some recent new developments and
on possible requirements for changes to the existing payments framework. 
A public hearing took place on 4 May 2012
and was attended by some 350 interested stakeholders. 
On 20 November 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution
'Towards an integrated European market for card, internet and mobile
payments’[9]
which is a report on the Green Paper. 
Summary of responses and how they
have been taken into account
The consultation process has allowed the
identification of some key messages related to the scope of this Regulation. Stakeholders
from all categories consistently agreed that there was a need to provide further
legal clarity on multilateral interchange fees (MIFs). This was seen by payment
service providers as particularly relevant in view of the on-going competition
cases launched at European and national level. Secondly, merchants in
particular but also stakeholders from other categories pointed to obstacles for
cross border acquiring, to be remedied for a genuine Single Market for payment
services to emerge. There was also a high level of interest in discussing
business rules, although views tended to be divided along the stakeholder
categories. 
Payment service providers and card schemes
considered that the fact that MIFs differ substantially from one country to
another and for cross-border payments under the same card scheme were not
problematic and did not in their view hinder market integration. On the other
side, merchants, consumer organisations and some non-bank payment service
providers considered that such differences are not justified and that the same
MIFs should apply for national and cross-border transactions, and across Member
States. Public authorities considered that MIFs should be harmonised to achieve
an integrated market. Payment service providers seemed opposed to a regulatory
initiative on interchange fees claiming that it would lead to higher cardholder
fees, and that retailers would not pass on benefits to consumers. On the other
side, retailers took the view that MIFs result in inverse competition favouring
the most expensive means of payment and raise barriers to market entry, whilst
creating a risk of spill-over effect from cards to mobile and internet
payments. Most consumer organisations supported the merchants’ analysis of the
negative impact of MIFs on competition and consumers welfare but expressed
concerns that reducing MIFs could lead to higher card fees and other consumer
charges. Competition authorities supported the need for action to lower MIFs,
in particular for mature four-party schemes. Other public authorities were
divided.
As regards cross-border acquiring, most
schemes and payment service providers saw the need for harmonisation of local
standards and rules, whilst merchants and consumers concurred on the existence
of many local obstacles to cross-border acquiring. Contrary to payment service
providers and schemes, merchants favoured regulatory solutions to
self-regulated standardisation. Schemes and payment service providers favoured
the MIF of the country where the sale is made to apply whilst most merchants
and non-bank PSPs favoured a common MIF to apply across the internal market.
The need for mandatory prior authorisation for cross-border acquiring was
favoured by payment service providers and incumbent card schemes only. 
On business rules, there was no consensus
on the benefits and the need to regulate steering and the Honour All Cards Rule
(HACR) which obliges merchants to accept all cards within the same brand if
they accept one category of cards in this brand. Most schemes and payment
service providers were in favour of the status quo whilst merchants, consumers,
competition authorities and most public authorities were in favour of allowing
merchants to steer consumers towards the use of cheaper means of payment
through regulation – although consumers were against surcharging. An abolition
of the HACR was rejected by payment service providers and schemes but supported
– through regulation – by other stakeholders as enabling the merchant to accept
only cheaper means of payment and having a positive impact on competition, with
consumers striking a more cautious note. A ban on the blending of merchant
services charges towards retailers was supported by most stakeholders – with payment
service providers and schemes of the opinion that unblending was already
implemented after the MasterCard Undertakings and Visa Commitments.
A detailed overview of stakeholder and
Member States views on interchange fees can be found in the Feedback Report to
the public consultation on the Green Paper[10].

The European Parliament in its own-initiative
report on the Green Paper acknowledged the objectives and integration hurdles
identified in the Green Paper and called for legislative action in a number of
areas concerning card payments, while suggesting a more cautious approach
regarding internet and mobile payments due to the lesser maturity of those
markets. Moreover, the Parliament took a firm position
in favour of providing clarity on interchange fees to market participants and
expressed itself in favour of a gradual approach
leading to a ban on interchange fees through regulation.
Impact assessment
The Commission carried out an impact
assessment listed in the Work Programme. This impact
assessment has been prepared in consultation with the ECB. The impact assesment
adressed at the same time options for revision of the Payment Service Directive
and for regulating Multilateral
Interchange Fees.
The impact assessment discusses the issue
of ineffective competition in card payment and
card-based payment markets, resulting in sub-optimal market outcomes and
relatively high fees which are being passed on to merchants and in turn to
consumers. Limited market integration, reduced possibilities for new pan-European
players to enter the market, disappearance of national (in general cheaper)
card schemes and limited innovation are also
highlighted in this context. Interchange Fees are identified as an important
explanatory factor behind these developments. The widely
diverging levels of Interchange Fees between Member States also constitute an
obstacle for market integration. These effects are
reinforced by a number of business rules, which impact transparency, the
ability of retailers to choose an acquirer in another Member State
('cross-border acquiring'), and the ability of retailers to steer their
customers towards more efficient means of payment or to refuse expensive cards
(the HACR).
The impact assessment considers six
scenarios for interchange fees: (i) No action from the Commission, (ii) Regulating
cross-border acquiring and the level of interchange fees for cross-border
transactions, (iii) Mandating Member States to set domestic IFs on the basis of
a common methodology, (iv) Regulating a common, EU-wide maximum level for
interchange fees (a) whether the maximum IF cap – of a different level for
debit and for credit cards- covers both debit and credit cards or just debit
cards and (b) whether the IFs for debit card transactions are to be forbidden
altogether or just reduced to a low level, (v) Whether or not to exempt (normally
more expensive) commercial cards and cards issued by three party schemes from
the regulation of interchange fees and (vi) regulating
Merchant Service Charges i.e. regulating the fees
paid by the retailer to its acquiring bank 
The 0.2% and 0.3% caps examined under the
scenarios (ii) and (iv) for debit and credit card transactions respectively. These levels are based on the so-called 'Merchant Indifference Test'
developed in economic literature, which identifies the fee level a merchant
would be willing to pay if he were to compare the cost of the customer’s use of
a payment card with those of non-card (cash) payments (taking into account the
fee for service paid to acquiring banks, i.e. the merchant service charge). It
thereby stimulates the use of efficient payment instruments through a promotion
of those cards that provide higher transactional benefits, while at the same
time preventing disproportionate merchant fees, which would impose hidden costs
on other consumers. Excessive merchant fees might otherwise arise due to the collective
interchange fee arrangements, as merchants are reluctant to turn down costly
payment instruments for fear of losing business. They
also take into account the levels proposed by schemes (Visa Europe, MasterCard,
Groupement Cartes Bancaires) in competition proceedings and accepted by
the competition authorities as not requiring further
action
The assessment concludes that the most
beneficial option appears to be a combination of: 
·              
a series of measures to enhance effective market
functioning including the limitation of the HACR and
allowing merchants to determine the choice of card brand at the point of sale
for all cards and card-based transactions based on four party
scheme models; and
·              
capping the level of interchange fees for
cross-border transactions with consumer debit and
credit cards (in the first stage) and, in a second
stage, capping the level of interchange fees also for
domestic transactions with consumer credit cards and consumer debit cards. 
The impact assessment and its annex also
provide a detailed explanation of other measures proposed in the Regulation to
ensure market transparency and effective market functioning, including the
abolition of no-steering measures, allowing card identification, co-badging,
the obligation to provide invoices to payees by their payment service providers,
and imposing the unblending of fees. 
These general transparency measures
proposed in the Regulation should lead to a more effective market for all
payment cards and card-based transactions based on four party (card) scheme models.
However, since certain categories of cards
have become so widely used by consumers that merchants find themselves
generally in a position that they cannot refuse such cards or discourage
consumers from using them without the fear of ‘losing business’, further
measures are necessary to ensure an integrated market, effective market
functioning and the removal of anti-competitive business practices in these
areas. This applies with respect to consumer debit and credit cards.
Importantly, in a first phase, allowing
merchants to choose an acquirer outside their own Member State ('cross-border
acquiring') and regulating the level of cross border interchange fees would
provide legal clarity. Although its impact could be limited to large merchants,
it would be conducive to market integration, and could, similarly to the
equivalent provision in the SEPA End Date Regulation, have a disciplining and converging
impact on the level of interchange fees applying in a purely domestic context. 
However, in the longer term also smaller
retailers should be able to benefit directly from measures leading to more
efficient interchange fees and a level playing field for payment service providers. After a
transitional period, the regulation of interchange fees for consumer cards
should therefore be extended to cover also domestic interchange fees. Currently
in eight EU Member States no or very low interchange fees apply to debit
card transactions with no appreciable negative effects on card issuing and card
usage; on the contrary, these tend to be the Member States with the highest
card issuing and usage. In accordance with trends over the last ten years it is
to be expected that debit card issuing and use will continue to increase in the
coming years so that after the transitional period provided for in the
Regulation debit cards can be regarded as ‘omnipresent’ in the EU and there
will no longer be a justification to incentivise card issuing and card usage
through fees passed from retailers to issuing payment service providers.
Already now it is very rare to open a payment account
and not have a card, which in itself entails significant cost savings for payment
service providers. In addition, the proposal for a Directive[11] on inter alia access to
payment account with basic features proposes that Member States shall ensure
that a payment account with basic features includes payment transactions
(including online payments) through a payment card. For
smaller retailers to benefit directly from measures
leading to more efficient interchange fees and a level playing field for payment service providers it would be
necessary also to regulate domestic consumer card fees.
In order to avoid discrimination between small and
large retailers, who can benefit most easily from cross border acquiring, it is
proposed to extend the cap proposed for cross-border transactions during
the first phase also to domestic credit card transactions in the second
phase. The Commission considers however that the maturity of markets in the EEA,
in particular as regards debit cards issuance and usage needs to be further
investigated and the absence of a need for charging interchange fees to
incentivise these must be ascertained. In the meantime, as explained above,
caps of 0.2% and 0.3% for debit and credit card transactions respectively would
apply.
Under the capping of interchange fees, all
in all, retailers would benefit from lower fees, resulting in savings a portion
of which would be passed on to consumers. Consumers already pay through the
incorporation of Interchange Fees (via the MSC) in the retail prices, and banks
are less likely to pass on the benefits of the Interchange Fees to their
account holders than merchants to their clients, given the lower level of
competition in the banking sector and the current lack of consumer mobility in
the field of retail banking. Hence the pass-through by merchants should be
greater in any case than the pass-through by banks. In
Australia, after the intervention, 0.67 AUD reduction per purchase and 77.19
AUD reduction per account per year have been estimated. The impact may however vary from one retail sector to another, the size of the merchant, its use of payment instruments, and the
'basket of purchases'. It will always be difficult to associate the variation
of a specific economic factor to the one of a specific price for a product or
service in a given retail shop.
This does not mean however that costs currently
bearing on retailers would automatically be transferred to consumers by their
banks. Payment systems are inherently complex: the bank of the cardholder
interacts with the cardholder, the bank of the merchant interacts with the
merchant, and both in principle face competition with other banks and different
market circumstances in their behaviour vis-à-vis their respective
consumers. Hence capping interchange fees would be
expected to have a positive effect on card acceptance, which can, on the basis
of scale effects, also positively influence card issuing. A decrease of high interchange fees in most countries generally
seems to be associated with a higher acceptance of cards, and it seems that in
countries with low interchange fees cards usage is higher. Denmark has one of
the highest card usage rates in the EU at 216 transactions per capita with a
zero-Interchange Fee debit scheme. This is also true of international schemes:
in Switzerland Maestro has no interchange fee and is the main debit card
system. In the Netherlands, there is high and increasing card usage and
acceptance, replacing cash. Both Denmark and the Netherlands are characterised
by low bank account fees as compared to countries with higher Interchange Fees
(e.g. France even after competition enforcement, Spain). In Spain, card use
increased after the intervention, with the average transaction value for card
payments decreasing by 15% from 2005 to 2010. In parallel, card transactions
volume and value increased, according to official figures from the Bank of
Spain[12].
As shown above, domestic schemes with no
interchange fees are also characterised with the highest levels of card usage
(ECB data), with the UK and Sweden also having relatively low interchange fees.

The overall impact of interchange fee decreases
on issuing and acquiring payment service providers revenues is difficult to
estimate, as increases in the volume of card transactions (through higher
acceptance) and the savings to PSPs on cash handling could at least partly
compensate the losses due to the cap on interchange fees. Another costs saving
may result from fewer ATM cash withdrawals and more limited Interchange Fee
amounts they have normally to pay to ATM acquiring banks. Hence it is not
obvious that issuing bank revenues decrease as a result. In terms of viability,
a debit card scheme without any IF seems to be perfectly viable from a
commercial perspective without raising the costs of current accounts for
consumers. Denmark for example has a zero-IF on its domestic debit scheme while
an average account holder pays current account fees well below the EU average.
Similarly, in Switzerland the main debit card network is Maestro (part of
MasterCard) which has no MIF. 
In fact, there is no automatic linkage
between decrease of Interchange Fees and increase of card annual fees. Card
fees appear to be more related, for example, to the level of competition in
retail banking. In the US banks tried to increase cardholder fees after IF
regulation but had to back down due to consumers' revolt. In Switzerland there
was a decrease in cardholder fees in parallel with the decrease in Interchange Fees
.In Australia, cardholder fees were increasing fast before caps on interchange
fees were introduced and after the reforms, the growth of cardholder fees slowed
down (between 1997 and 2002: credit cards +218% and between 2003 and 2008:
+122%). In Spain, since the intervention, average annual fees increased each
year by 6.18€ for debit cards, and 11.45€ for credit cards. However, the banks'
card portfolio increased with credit card growth significantly higher than
debit, in spite of the economic crisis. Other trends may perhaps suggest that competition
in the Spanish banking sector is relatively limited: for instance fees for
maintaining current accounts doubled from 2007 to 2012, fees for overdrafts
increased. Increases in retail banking fees seem widespread in in Spain without
a relation with interchange fees. 
There is anecdotal evidence of price
decreases happening in the USA, one year after the MIF regulation was
introduced. In addition, from evidence in Australia, it seems that retailers
would benefit integrally (100%) from lower IFs – as acquiring markets tend to
be more competitive than issuing markets, whilst the potential increase in
cardholder fees is limited to 30-40% of the amount of the IF decrease. In addition after interchange fees are capped and transparency
measures introduced, consumers using low cost means of payment will no longer
'subsidise' the (often wealthier) ones using more expensive means of payment as
merchants cannot steer consumers, especially for the 'must use' cards. 
As competition would play its role again, consumers
and retailers would benefit from new entry in the payments market. Even if cardholder fees increase – which is not a given as the
impact of capping interchange fees on banking revenues is likely to be mixed -
consumers are still likely to benefit from lower interchange fees through lower
retail prices, even if retailers do not pass through 100% of the savings, and
from new entry in the payment market. It has also to be considered that
consumers are very likely to benefit from the services offered by new market
entrants. A real-life example of this, for interchange fees below 0.2%, is the
Netherlands, where the cheap online payment solution (Ideal) was developed
largely because the low interchange fees prevailing there encouraged bank to
innovate. In consequence, Dutch consumers do not have to pay high credit card
subscription fees in order to shop online.
Commercial cards and cards issued by three
party schemes, even though they tend to be more expensive, would not be covered
– as proposed under option v - under the various caps proposed for consumer
cards as they have limited market shares in the EU and different fee structures
and this is not expected to change in the future. However, the measures
proposed for consumer card transactions would be applied to such schemes to the
extent that they issue such cards and make use of licenced payment service providers in a way that
causes their scheme to effectively function in a similar way as a four party
scheme. In addition, the transparency enhancing measures would apply to such
schemes under all conditions.
Regulating merchant service charges as
under option vi would imply covering not only interchange fees but also the other
fees imposed on merchants. This would amount to de facto controlling
prices for merchants, and to retail price regulation. By contrast, capping inter change fees would mean regulating wholesale prices to align
them with the analysis in competition cases to achieve an internal market, as interchange
fess are not final prices to retailers and even less to consumers.
Transparency and steering measures would
remain key to prevent heavy promotion of cards with unregulated Interchange Fees.
Anti-circumvention measures would also need to be
included. 
3.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
Summary of the proposed action
The proposal is divided into two main parts.

The first part introduces rules on
interchange fees. With regard to such fees the proposal
creates a 'regulated' and a 'non-regulated' area. The regulated area consists
of all card transactions that are widely used by consumers and therefore
difficult to refuse by retailers, i.e. consumer debit and credit card, and card
based payment transactions. The non-regulated area consists of all payment card
transactions and card based payment transactions based on those that
fall outside the regulated area including so called commercial cards or cards
issued by three party schemes.
In the 'regulated area', during a
transition period of two years following the publication of the Regulation, maximum levels of interchange fees are imposed for cross-border
transactions (where the card holder uses their card in another Member State) or
cross-border acquired transactions (where the merchant uses an acquiring PSP in
another Member State) only. 
Although the Impact Assessment identified a
ban on interchange fees for debit cards as part of the most beneficial option,
the Commission considers that the maturity of markets in the EEA, in particular
as regards debit cards issuance and usage needs to be further investigated and
the absence of a need for charging interchange fees to incentivise these must
be ascertained before interchange fees for debit cards are entirely abolished.
It is therefore proposed that after the transitional phase of only liberalising
and regulating cross border acquiring, the same maximum fees that apply to
cross border acquired transactions will also apply to domestic transactions.
After two years following the complete entry into force of the legislation, the
Commission will present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report
on its application, assessing in particular the appropriateness of the level of
interchange fee, taking into account the use and cost of the various means of
payments and the level of entry of new players and new technology on the
market. 
After the transitional period all (cross
border and domestic) 'consumer' debit card
transaction and card-based payment transaction based on such a
transaction will have a maximum interchange fee of 0,20% and all (cross
border and domestic) consumer credit card transactions and card
based payment transactions based on those will have a maximum interchange
fee of 0.30%. These caps, since they have been accepted by competition authorities as not requiring further action, appear as
reasonable benchmarks that have already been
implemented without calling into question the operation of international card schemes and payment service, providers,
and retailers and consumers' welfare while they also
provide legal certainty.
The second part of the regulation reflects
rules regarding business rules that will be applicable to all categories
of card transactions and card-based payment
transactions based on those. As
of the entry into force of the regulation, for instance:
·              
The application of the 'Honour All Cards Rule'
will be limited. No discrimination will be nonetheless allowed on the basis of
the issuing bank or the provenance of the card holder and between the cards
carrying the same interchange fee level.
·              
the application of any rule preventing or
limiting merchants from steering customers to more efficient payments instruments
('no steering rules') will be prohibited.
·              
acquiring Payment Service Providers will provide
at least monthly statements of fees to merchants, in which the fees paid by the
merchant over the relevant month concerning each category of cards and each
individual brand for when the acquirer provides acquiring services is
specified; 
·              
the application of any rule withholding
merchants from disclosing to their customers fees they pay to payment services
acquirers will be prohibited.
The Impact Assessment has been modified
following the Impact Assessment Board meeting of 20 March 2013. Notable changes
include the provision of supplementary information on the card market, its
functioning and on the EU case law related to interchange fees, together with a
summary of the economic litteraure related to interchange fees. The possible impact of imposing maximum interchange fees on cardholder
fees, overall consumers' welfare and bank revenues was presented more
prominently, to streamline the presentation of impacts of
the most important options in the main text. The interdependencies between
different options and packages was better explained, together with the rationale for an all-inclusive package including interchange fees, substantiating the reasons for regulating interchange fees through
legislation. 
Legal basis
Article 114(1) of the Treaty on the
functioning of the EU.
Subsidiarity principle
The subsidiarity principle applies insofar
as the proposal does not fall under the exclusive competence of the Union.
The objectives of the proposal cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States for the following reason(s):
By its nature an integrated payments
market, based on networks that reach beyond national borders, requires a
Union-wide approach as the applicable principles, rules, processes and standards
have to be consistent across all Member States in order to achieve legal
certainty and a level playing field for all market participants. The
alternative to a Union-wide approach would be a system of national regulatory
and competition enforcement actions, which would be less effective than EU
action and with greater complexity and higher costs than legislation at
European level. A possible intervention at EU level therefore complies with the
subsidiarity principle. Such an approach supports the Single Euro Payments Area
(SEPA) and is consistent with the Digital Agenda, in particular the creation of
a Digital Single Market. It promotes technological innovation and contributes
to growth and jobs, in particular in the areas of e- and m-commerce.
Moreover, in view of the cross-border
nature of payments markets, any measure taken by public authorities seeking to
reduce or modify the level of wholesale fees (interchange fees) in one Member
State alone would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Community wide payment
market and would not be conducive to market integration as it would not result
in a level playing field across the EU. This would be the case for instance of
different national measures aimed at regulating interchange fees or capping
them, as currently foreseen in several Member States.
The proposal therefore complies with the
subsidiarity principle.
Proportionality principle
The proposal complies with the
proportionality principle for the following reasons:
The proposal does not go beyond what is strictly
necessary to achieve its objectives, namely to help develop an EU-wide market
for payments, which will enable consumers, retailers and other undertakings to
enjoy the full benefits of the EU internal market including e-commerce. These enhanced possibilities of entry by pan-European players, more innovation,
and increased ability for national (in general cheaper) card schemes together
with more limited cash use provide opportunities for retailers and payment
service providers, regardless of whether these are banks or new market entrants.
Effective competition in card payment and card-based payment markets will result
in efficient market outcomes, wider choice of payment service providers,
including pan-European ones and innovative players, and in lower costs to
retailers and consumers. These cost savings should in turn be passed on by
merchants to consumers through lower retail prices.
The interchange fees as such, and their
widely diverging levels constitute an obstacle to market integration and to effective
competition, whose effects are reinforced by a number of business rules reducing
transparency to retailers and consumers, restricting the ability for retailers
to choose an acquirer in another Member State, and retailers from steering
consumers towards more efficient means of payment. 
On the basis of consultations of
stakeholders, as summarised in the impact assessment, the Commission proposes a
combination of measures to enhance effective market functioning, capping the level of interchange fees for cross-border transactions
with consumer debit and credit cards (in the first
stage) and, in a second stage, capping
the level of interchange fees also for domestic transactions with consumer
credit cards and consumer debit cards. 
Not regulating would leave intact the
problems of increased reliance on the two international market players with the
gradual disappearance of (in general cheaper) domestic card schemes. Economies
of scale and scope for potential new pan-European entrants and innovative
players would remain limited, whilst merchants and consumers will continue to pay
for the fragmented and expensive EU payments market (more than 1% of EU GDP or
€130 billion a year, according to the ECB). Leaving these issues to competition
enforcement actions, in particular on the basis of the MasterCard judgement is
likely to take many years and will always be on a case-by-case basis and thus cannot
provide a level playing field. 
It is necessary and proportionate to cover
domestic transactions and not only cross-border transactions which would mainly
benefit big retailers. Cross-border transactions can be addressed rapidly,
creating opportunities for retailers to seek cheaper acquiring services
cross-border, and incentivising domestic banking communities or schemes to
lower their acquiring fees. A similar process has recently taken place as
regards direct debit. The SEPA End Date Regulation limits interchange fees for
direct debit, abolishing cross-border interchange fees for direct debit while
allowing domestic interchange fees to stay in place until 2017. As a result and
faced with a number of merchants moving their acquirer to neighbouring
countries, banks have committed to abolish their interchange fees for direct
debit already by 1 September 2013[13][14]. 
As a consequence of unilateral undertakings
and commitments accepted in the framework of
competition proceedings, a large number of cross-border card payment
transactions in the Union are already carried out respecting the maximum
interchange fees applicable to the first phase of this Regulation. These
elements can therefore be introduced rapidly. However, domestic interchange
fees would need to be modified. It is therefore necessary to grant a transition
period for domestic payment transactions. Moreover, the proposal does not
prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing lower caps or measures of
equivalent object or effect through national legislation
Furthermore, capping
of interchange fees would benefit retailers, which are more likely to pass on
these benefits to their customers than banks are, given the current lower levels
of competition and switching in the banking sector. 
At the same time, consumers already pay the
interchange fees indirectly in retail prices, and consumers using cash or debit
cards currently subsidise the use of more expensive cards by other consumers. It
could be argued that decreasing interchange fees would encourage banks to
increase card holder fees. However, there is no evidence of such a linkage. Card fees appear to be primarily determined by the
level of competition in retail banking. 
Although this proposal favours market
integration, market entry and consumers and retailers welfare, a negative
impact on incumbent payment service providers and banks is far from certain.
Capping interchange fees at these levels is expected to
have a positive effect on card acceptance by merchants so would encourage
consumers to an increased use of cards. Increases in
the volume of card transactions (through higher acceptance) and the savings on cash
handling could at least partly compensate banks for the potential losses due to
the cap on interchange fees. Other cost savings could result from fewer ATM
cash withdrawals.
The 0.2% and 0.3% caps envisaged are based on the so-called 'Merchant Indifference Test', which
identifies the fee level a merchant would be willing to pay if he were to
compare the cost of the customer’s use of a payment card with those of non-card
(cash) payments. The figures were calculated on the basis of this test, using
data gathered by four national central banks. These figures have been accepted
by Visa, MasterCard and the French domestic card scheme Groupement Cartes Bancaires.The proposal
is therefore proportionate to the objectives mentioned above. All of the proposed rules have been subject to a proportionality
test and to ensure appropriate and proportionate regulation.
Choice of instruments
Proposed instruments: Regulation.
Other means would not be adequate for the
following reasons:
Interchange fees levels and restrictive
business rules requires standardisation at technical level and the fullest
possible harmonisation. This argues in favour of a Regulation rather than a
Directive. Furthermore, due to the network character of the payment industry,
most of the benefits of will only materialise once the domestic transition to
Union-wide payment instruments is completed in all EU Member States.
A Directive with potentially differing national implementations runs the
risk of perpetuating the current payment market fragmentation. Finally, it
would delay migration due to the time necessary for national transposition. It
is therefore recommended to use the legal instrument of a Regulation for regulating
interchnage fees and restrictive business rules in the card payments market and
mobile and internet based card markets.
The Regulation complies with the
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the freedom to
conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy or to a fair trial and has
to be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
4.           Budgetary implications
The proposal does not have any impact on
the EU Budget. 
5.           OPTIONAL ELEMENTS 
Review/revision/sunset clause
The proposal includes a review clause.
European Economic Area
The proposed act concerns an EEA matter and
should therefore extend to the European Economic Area.
Detailed explanation of the proposal
The following short summary aims to
facilitate the decision making process by sketching the main substance of the
Regulation.
Article 1 – subject matter and scope –
states that the Regulation concerns rules for the interchange fees regarding
payment card transactions and card based payment transactions within the EU when
the payee and its payment service provider in the payment transaction are
located in the EU and business rules related to those payments.
Article 2 – definitions – aligned, as much
as possible, with those used in Directive 2007/64/EC. However, given the
Regulation’s limited scope in comparison with the Payment Services Directive,
some of the definitions have been tailored to the needs of this proposal.
Article 3 – (Maximum interchange fee for
cross-border consumer debit and credit card transactions) sets caps for
interchange fees to payment service providers of 0.2% and 0.3% for for
cross-border consumer debit and credit transactions, for entry into force 2
months after publication. 
Article 4 – (Maximum interchange fees for all
consumer debit and credit card transactions) sets caps for interchange fees to
payment service providers of 0.2% and 0.3% fo the value of the transaction for
all consumer debit and credit transactions, for entry into force 2 years after
publication 
Article 5 –(Prohibition of circumvention
Fees) establishes that for the purpose of implementing the caps under articles
3 and 4, the net compensation of fees received and paid between the issuer and
the scheme are integrated in the calculation of the interchange fees paid and
received for the purpose of assessing possible circumvention. 
Article 6 – (Licensing) sets that the
licenses delivered by schemes for issuing or acquiring purposes should not be
restricted to a specific territory but cover the entire Union territory 
Article 7 – (Separation between scheme and
processing) establishes that an organisational separation should be in place
between the schemes and the entities which are processing the transactions, and
prohibits territorial discrimination in processing rules whilst mandating
technical interoperability of processing entities' systems
Article 8 – (Co- badging and choice of
application) This article states that the issuer of the payment instrument
decides whether the payment application can reside on the same card or wallet.
The choice of payment application used remains with the consumer and cannot not
be prescribed in advance by the issuer through automatic mechanisms on the
instrument or the equipment at the point of sale. 
Article 9 – (Unblending) This article clarifies
that acquiring banks shall offer and charge payees individually for different
categories and different brands of payment cards and not impose a single price,
and provide the relevant information on the amounts applicable for the
different categories and brands 
Article 10 – (Honour all cards rule) This
article clarifies that payment schemes and payment service providers cannot
impose that a retailer accepts a category or brand if he accepts another
category or brand, except if the brand or category is subject to the same
regulated interchange fee as the former. For example, merchants accepting
consumer debit cards may not be forced to accept consumer credit cards but can
be imposed to accept other consumer debit cards
Article 11 – (Steering rules) This article
clarifies that payment schemes and payment service providers schemes cannot
prevent retailers from steering consumers towards the use of specific payment
instruments preferred by the retailer. This is without prejudice to the rules
on rebates and surcharges established under the Payment Services Directive and
article 19 of the Consumer Rights Directive. Payment schemes and payment
service providers schemes cannot prevent retailers from informing consumers
about interchange fees and merchant service charges
Article 12 – (Information for the payee on
individual payment transactions) states the informations the payment service
provider shall provide to the merchant after the execution of an individual
payment transaction, and provides for the possibiliy for this information to be
provided periodically
Article 13 – Competent authorities regulates
the procedures for designating the national authorities responsible for the
application of provisions in the Regulation
Article 14 – Penalties requires Member
States to establish rules on sanctions for breaches of the provisions in the
Regulation, and to notify the Commission of these
Article 15 – Out-of-court complaint and
redress procedures requires Member States to establish specific requirements
for the settlement of disputes between payees and payment service providers. 
Article 16 – (Review clause) four years
after the entry into force, dealing in particular with the interchange level. This
article sets out the mechanisms for assessing the effective application of the
provisions in the Directive and, if needed, propose changes to it
Article 17 – (entry into force) states the
date upon which the Regulation enters into force
2013/0265 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL
on interchange fees for card-based payment
transactions
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the
European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative
act to the national Parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the
European Economic and Social Committee[15],
Having regard to the opinion of the
European Central Bank[16],
Acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1)       Fragmentation of the
internal market is detrimental to competitiveness, growth and job creation
within the Union. Eliminating direct and indirect obstacles to the proper
functioning and completion of an integrated market for
electronic payments, with no distinction between national and cross-border
payments, is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. 
(2)       Directive
2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council[17] has provided a legal
foundation for the creation of a Union-wide internal market for payments as it substantially facilitated the activity of payment service
providers, creating uniform rules with respect to the provision of payment
services.
(3)       Regulation
(EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council[18] established
the principle that charges paid by the users for a cross-border payment in euro
are the same as for the corresponding payment within a Member State including
card payments covered by this Regulation. 
(4)       Regulation
(EC) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council[19] provided the rules for the
functioning of credit transfers and direct debits in euro in the internal
market but excluded card based payments from its scope.
(5)       Directive
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [20] harmonizes certain rules on contracts concluded between
consumers and traders, including rules on fees for the use
of means of payment, on the basis of which Member States are to prohibit
traders from charging consumers, in respect of the use of a given means of
payment, fees that exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of such
means.
(6)       Secure,
efficient, competitive and innovative electronic payments are crucial if
consumers, retailers and companies are to enjoy the full benefits of the
internal market, and increasingly so as the world moves towards e-commerce.
(7)       Preparation of legislation
is under way in several Member States[21] to
regulate interchange fees, covering a number of issues, including caps on
interchange fees at various levels, merchant fees, the Honour All Cards rules
or steering measures. The existing administrative decisions in some Member
States vary significantly. In view of the harmfulness of interchange fees to
retailers and consumers, a further introduction of regulatory measures at
national level aimed at addressing the level or divergencies of these fees is anticipated.
Such national measures would be likely to lead to significant barriers to the
completion of the internal market in the area of cards, internet and mobile
payments based on cards and would therefore hinder the freedom to provide
services.
(8)       Payment cards are the most
frequently used electronic payment instrument for retail purchases. However,
integration of the Union payment card market is far from complete as many
payment solutions cannot develop beyond their national borders or new pan-Union
providers are prevented from entering the market. The lack of market integration
currently results in higher prices and less choice in payment services for
consumers and retailers, and more limited opportunities to take advantage of
the internal market. There is therefore a need to remove obstacles to the
efficient functioning of the card market, including mobile and internet
payments that are based on card transactions which still pose barriers to the
deployment of a fully integrated market. 
(9)       To enable the internal
market to function effectively, the use of electronic payments should be
promoted and facilitated to the benefit of retailers and consumers. Cards and
other electronic payments can be used in a more versatile manner, including
possibilities to pay online in order to take advantage of the internal market
and e-commerce, whilst electronic payments also provide retailers with
potentially secure payments. Card and card based payments instead of cash use
could therefore be beneficial for retailers and consumers, provided the fees
for the use of the payment systems are set at an economically efficient level,
whilst contributing to innovation and market entry of new operators. 
(10)     One of the key practices
hindering the functioning of the internal market in card and card-based
payments is the widespread existence of interchange fees,
which are in most Member States not subject to any legislation. Interchange fees are inter-bank fees usually applied between the card-acquiring
payment service providers and the card-issuing payment service providers
belonging to a certain card scheme. Interchange fees
are a main part of the fees charged to merchants by acquiring payment service providers for
every card transaction. Merchants in turn incorporate
these card costs in the general prices of goods and services. Competition between
card schemes appears in practice to be largely aimed at convincing as many
issuing payment service providers (e.g. banks) as possible to issue their
cards, which usually leads to higher rather than lower
interchange fees on the market, in contrast with the usual price disciplining
effect of competition in a market economy. Regulating interchange fees would
improve the functioning of the internal market. 
(11)     The
currently existing wide variety of interchange fees and their level prevent the
emergence of 'new' pan Union players on the basis of business models with lower
interchange fees, to the detriment of potential economies of scale and scope
and their resulting efficiencies. This has a negative impact on retailers and
consumers and prevents innovation. As Pan-Union players would have to offer
issuing banks as a minimum the highest level of interchange fee prevailing in
the market they want to enter it also results in persisting market
fragmentation. Existing domestic schemes with lower or no interchange fees may
also be forced to exit the market because of the pressure from banks to obtain
higher interchange fees revenues. As a result, consumers and merchants face
restricted choice, higher prices and lower quality of payment services while
their ability to use pan-Union payment solutions is restricted. In addition,
retailers cannot overcome the fee differences by making use of card acceptance
services offered by banks in other Member States. Specific rules applied by the
payment schemes require the application of the interchange fee of the 'Point of
Sale' (country of the retailer) for each payment transaction. This prevents
acquiring banks from successfully offering their services on a cross border
basis. It also prevents retailers from reducing their payment costs to the
benefit of consumers.
(12)     The application of existing
legislation by the Commission and national competition authorities has not been
able to redress this situation.
(13)     Therefore, to avoid the
fragmentation of the internal market and significant distortions of competition
through diverging laws and administrative decisions, there is a need, in line
with article 114 TFEU, to take measures to address the problem of high and
divergent interchange fees, to allow payment service providers to provide their
services on a cross-border basis and consumer and retailer to use cross-border
services. 
(14)     The application of this
Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Union and national
competition rules. It should not prevent Member States from maintaining or
introducing lower caps or measures of equivalent object or effect through
national legislation.
(15)     This Regulation follows a
gradual approach. As a first step, it is necessary to
take measures to facilitate cross-border issuing and acquiring of payment card
transactions. Allowing merchants to choose an acquirer
outside their own Member State ('cross border acquiring') and imposing a
maximum level of cross border interchange fees for cross border acquired
transactions should provide the necessary legal clarity. In addition, licences for issuing or acquiring of payment
instruments should be valid without geographic restrictions within the Union. These
measures would facilitate the smooth functioning of an internal market for
card, internet and mobile payments, to the benefit of consumers and retailers.
(16)     As
a consequence of unilateral undertakings and commitments accepted in the
framework of competition proceedings, many cross-border card payment
transactions in the Union are already carried out respecting the maximum
interchanges fees applicable to the first phase of this Regulation. Therefore,
the provisions relating to those transactions should enter into force quickly,
creating opportunities for retailers to seek cheaper acquiring services
cross-border, and incentivising domestic banking communities or schemes to
lower their acquiring fees. 
(17)     For domestic transactions,
a transition period is necessary to provide payment services providers and
schemes with time to adapt to the new requirements. Therefore, after a two year
period following the entry into force of this Regulation and in order to
provide for a completion of an internal market for card-based payments, the caps
on interchange fees for consumer card transactions should be extended to cover all,
cross-border and domestic payments. 
(18)     In
order to facilitate cross border acquiring all (cross-border
and domestic) 'consumer' debit card transactions
and card based payment transaction should have a maximum interchange
fee of 0,20% and all (cross-border and domestic) consumer credit card
transactions and card based payment transactions based on those should
have a maximum interchange fee of 0.30%. 
(19)     Those
caps are based on the so-called 'Merchant Indifference Test' developed in
economic literature, which identifies the fee level a merchant would be willing
to pay if he were to compare the cost of the customer’s use of a payment card
with those of non-card (cash) payments (taking into account the fee for service
paid to acquiring banks, i.e. the merchant service charge coming on top
of the interchange fee). It thereby stimulates the use of efficient payment
instruments through a promotion of those cards that provide higher
transactional benefits, while at the same time preventing disproportionate
merchant fees, which would impose hidden costs on other consumers. Excessive
merchant fees might otherwise arise due to the collective interchange fee
arrangements, as merchants are reluctant to turn down costly payment instruments
for fear of losing business. Experience has shown that those levels are
proportionate, as they do not call into question the
operation of international card schemes and payment
service providers. They also provide benefits for retailers
and consumers and provide legal certainty.
(20)     This Regulation should
cover all transactions where the payer's payment service provider and the
payee's payment service provider are established in the Union. 
(21)     In accordance with the
principle of technological neutrality set out in the Digital Agenda for Europe,
this Regulation should apply to card based payment transactions regardless of
the environment in which this transaction takes place, including through retail
payment instruments and services which can be off-line, on-line or mobile .
(22)     Payment card transactions
are generally carried out on the basis of two main business models, so-called three
party payment card schemes (cardholder – acquiring and issuing scheme -
merchant) and four party payment card schemes (card holder- issuing bank-
acquiring bank- merchant). Many four payment card party schemes are using an
explicit interchange fee, mostly multilateral. Interchange fees (fees paid by
acquiring banks to incentivise card issuing and card use) are implicit in three
party payment card schemes. To acknowledge the existence of implicit
interchange fees and contribute to the creation of a level playing field, three
party payment card schemes using payment service providers as issuers or
acquirers should be considered as four party payment card schemes and should
follow the same rules, whilst transparency and other measures related to
business rules should apply to all providers.
(23)     It is important to ensure
that the provisions concerning the interchange fees to be paid or received by
payment service providers are not circumvented by alternative flows of fees to
issuing payment services providers. To avoid this, the "net
compensation" of fees paid and received by the issuing payment service
provider from a payment card scheme should be considered as the interchange fee. When calculating the interchange fee, for
the purpose of checking whether circumvention is taking place the total amount
of payments or incentives received by an issuing payment services provider from
a payment card scheme with respect to the regulated transactions less the fees
paid by the issuing payment services provider to the scheme should be taken
into account. Payments, incentives and fees considered could be direct (i.e.
volume-based or transaction-specific) or indirect (including marketing
incentives, bonuses, rebates for meeting certain transaction volumes). 
(24)     Consumers tend to be
unaware of the fees paid by merchants for the payment instrument they use. At
the same time, a series of incentivising practices applied by issuing payment
service providers (such as travel vouchers, bonuses, rebates, charge backs,
free insurances, etc.) may steer consumers towards the use of payment
instruments generating high fees for issuing payment service providers.To counter this, the measures imposing restrictions on interchange
fees should only apply to payment cards that have become mass products and
merchants generally have difficulty refusing due to their widespread issuance
and use (i.e. consumer debit and credit cards). In order to enhance effective
market functioning in the non-regulated parts of the sector and to limit the
transfer of business from the regulated to the non-regulated parts of the
sector, it is necessary to adopt a series of measures , including separation of
scheme and infrastructure, steering of the payer by the payee and enable selective
acceptance of payment instruments by the payee.
(25)     A separation of scheme and
infrastructure should allow all processors to compete for customers of the
schemes. As the cost of processing is a significant part of the total cost of
card acceptance, it is important for this part of the value chain to be opened
to effective competition. On the basis of the separation of scheme and infrastructure, card schemes and processing
entities should be independent in terms of legal form, organisation and
decision making process. They should not discriminate, for instance by providing each other with preferential
treatment or privileged information which is not available to their competitors
on their respective market segment, imposing excessive information requirements
on their competitor in their respective market segment, cross-subsidizing their
respective activities or having shared governance
arrangements. Such discriminatory practises contribute
to market fragmentation, negatively impact market entry by new players and
prevent pan‑Union players from emerging, hence hindering the completion
of the internal market in cards, internet and mobile payments, to the detriment
of retailers, companies and consumers.
(26)     Scheme rules applied by
payment card schemes and practices applied by payment service providers tend to
keep merchants and consumers ignorant about fee differences and reduce market
transparency, for instance by ‘blending’ fees or prohibiting merchants from
chosing a cheeper card brand on co-branded cards or steering consumers to the
use of such cheeper cards. Even if merchants are aware of the different costs,
the scheme rules often prevent them from acting to reduce the fees.
(27)     Payment instruments entail
different costs to the payee, with certain instruments being more expensive
than others. Except where a payment instrument is imposed by law for certain
categories of payments or cannot be refused due to its legal tender status, the
payee should be free to steer payers towards the use of a specific payment
instrument. Card schemes and payment services providers impose several
restrictions on payees in this respect, examples of which include restrictions
on the refusal by the payee of specific payment instruments for low amounts, on
the provision of information to the payer on the fees incurred by the payee for
specific payment instruments or limitation imposed on the payee of the number
of tills in his shop accepting specific payment instruments. Those restrictions
should be abolished.
(28)     In accordance with Article
55of the proposal COM (2013)547 the payee can steer the payer towards the use
of a specific payment instrument. However, no charges should be requested by
the payee for the use of payment instruments of which interchange fees are
regulated within the scope of this Regulation, as in such situations the
advantages of surcharging become limited while creating complexity in the
market. 
(29)     The Honour all Cards Rule
is a twofold obligation imposed by issuing payment services providers and
payment card schemes on payees to, on the one hand, accept all the cards of the
same brand ('Honour all Products' - element), irrespective of the
different costs of these cards, and on the other hand irrespective of the
individual issuing bank which has issued the card ('Honour all Issuers'
–element). It is in the interest of the consumer that for the same category of
cards the payee cannot discriminate between issuers or cardholders, and payments
schemes and payment service providers can impose such obligation on them. Therefore,
although the 'Honour all Issuers' element of the Honour all Cards Rule
is a justifiable rule within a payment card system, since it prevents that
payees from discriminating between the individual banks which have issued a
card, the 'Honour all Products' element is essentially a tying practice
that has the effect of tying acceptance of low fee cards to acceptance of high
fee cards. A removal of the 'Honour all Products' element of the Honour
All Cards Rule would allow merchants to limit the choice of payment cards they
offer to low(er) cost payment cards only, which would also benefit consumers
through reduced merchants' costs. Merchants accepting debit cards would then
not be forced also to accept credit cards, and those accepting credit cards
would not be forced to accept commercial cards. However, to protect the
consumer and his ability to use the payment cards as often as possible, merchants
should be obliged to accept all cards that are subject to the same regulated interchange
fee. Such a limitation would also result in a more competitive environment for
cards with interchange fees not regulated under this Regulation, as merchants would
gain more negotiating power as regards the conditions under which they accept
such cards. 
(30)     For the effective
functioning of the limitations to the Honour All Cards Rule certain information
is indispensable. First, payees should have the means to identify the different
categories of cards. Therefore, the various categories should be identifiable
visibly and electronically on the device. Secondly, also the payer should be
informed about the acceptance of his payment instrument(s) at a given point of
sale. It is necessary that any limitation on the use of a given brand to be
announced by the payee to the payer at the same time and under the same
conditions as the information that a given brand is accepted. 
(31)     In order to ensure that
redress is possible where this Regulation has been incorrectly applied, or
where disputes occur between payment services users and payment services
providers, Member States should establish adequate and effective out-of-court
complaint and redress procedures. Member States should lay
down rules on the penalties applicable to infringements of this Regulation and
should ensure that those penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive
and that they are applied. 
(32)     Since the objectives of
this Regulation, namely to lay down uniform requirements for payment card
transactions and internet and mobile transactions based on the card payments,
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union
may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out
in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle
of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(33)     This Regulation complies
with the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably
the right to an effective remedy or to a fair trial, the freedom to conduct a
business, consumer protection and has to be applied in accordance with those
rights and principles.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Scope
1.                      
This Regulation lays down uniform technical and
business requirements for payment card transactions carried out within the Union,
where both the payer's payment service provider and the payee's payment service
provider are established therein. 
2.                      
This Regulation does not apply to payment
instruments that can be used only within a limited network designed to address
precise needs through payment instruments only to be used in a limited way,
because they allow the specific instrument holder to acquire goods or services
only in the premises of the issuer, within a limited network of service
providers under a direct commercial agreement with a professional issuer, or
because they can be used only to acquire a limited range of goods or services.
3.                      
Chapter II does not apply to the following:
(a)         
transactions with commercial cards,
(b)         
cash withdrawals at automatic teller machines
and
(c)         
transactions with cards issued by three party
payment card schemes.
4.                      
Article 7 does not apply to three party payment
card schemes. 
Article 2
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Regulation, the
following definitions shall apply:
(1)                   
'acquirer' means a payment service provider
contracting directly or indirectly with a payee to process the payee’s payment
transactions; 
(2)                   
'issuer' means a payment service provider
contracting directly or indirectly with a payer to initiate, process and settle
the payer’s payment transactions; 
(3)                   
‘consumer’ means a natural person who, in
payment service contracts covered by this Regulation, is acting for purposes
other than the trade, business or profession of that person;
(4)                   
'debit card transaction' means an card payment
transaction included with prepaid cards linked to a current or deposit access
account to which a transaction is debited in less than or 48 hours after the
transaction has been authorised/initiated. 
(5)                   
'credit card transaction' means an card payment
transaction where the transaction is settled more than 48 hours after the
transaction has been authorised/initiated; 
(6)                   
'commercial card' means any payment cards issued
to undertakings or public sector entities that are limited in use for business
expenses of employees or civil servants or cards issued to self-employed
natural persons engaged in a business activity that are limited in use for
business expenses of those self-employed natural persons or their employees; 
(7)                   
'card based payment transaction' means a service
used to complete a payment transaction by means of any card, telecommunication,
digital or IT device or software if this results in a payment card transaction.
Card based payment transactions exclude transactions based on other kinds of
payment services. 
(8)                   
'cross-border payment transaction' means a card
payment or card-based payment transaction initiated by a payer or by a payee
where the payer’s payment service provider and the payee’s payment service
provider are established in different Member States or where the payment card
is issued by an issuing payment service provider established in a different
Member State than that of the point of sale; 
(9)                   
'interchange fee' means a fee paid for each
transaction directly or indirectly (i.e. through a third party) between the
payment service providers of the payer and of the payee involved in a payment
card or a payment card-based transaction; 
(10)               
'merchant service charge' means a fee paid by
the payee to the acquirer for each transaction comprising the interchange fee,
the payment scheme and processing fee and the acquirer margin; 
(11)               
'payee' means a natural or legal person who is
the intended recipient of funds which have been the subject of a payment
transaction; 
(12)               
‘payer’ means a natural or legal person who
holds a payment account and allows a payment order from that payment account,
or, where there is no payment account, a natural or legal person who gives a
payment order; 
(13)               
'payment card scheme' means a single set of
rules, practices, standards and/or implementation guidelines for the execution
of payment transactions across the Union and within Member States, and which is
separated from any infrastructure or payment system that supports its operation;

(14)               
'four party payment card scheme' means a payment
card scheme in which payments are made from the payment account of a cardholder
to the payment account of a payee through the intermediation of the scheme, a
payment card issuing payment services provider (on the card holder's side) and
an acquiring payment services provider (on the payee's side), and card based
transactions based on the same structure; 
(15)               
'three party payment card scheme' means a
payment card scheme in which payments are made from a payment account held by
the scheme on behalf of the cardholder to a payment account held by the scheme
on behalf of the payee, and card based transactions based on the same
structure. When a three party payment card scheme licenses other payment
service providers for the issuance and/or the acquiring of payment cards, it is
considered as a four party payment card scheme; 
(16)               
'payment instrument' means any personalised
device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and
the payment service provider and used by the payment service user, or in its
behalf, in order to initiate a payment order; 
(17)               
'card-based payment instrument' means any
payment instrument, including a card, mobile phone, computer or any other
technological device containing the appropriate application, used by the payer
to initiate a payment order which in not a credit transfer or a direct debit as
defined by Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012. ; 
(18)               
'payment application' means a computer software
or equivalent loaded on a device enabling card-based payment transactions to be
initiated and allowing the payer to issue payment orders; 
(19)               
'payment order' means any instruction by a payer
to his payment service provider requesting the execution of a payment
transaction; 
(20)               
'payment card transaction' means a payment
transaction made with a payment card or using the infrastructure of a payment
card transaction and based on the business rules of a payment card transaction;
'
(21)               
'payment service provider' means natural or
legal persons authorized to provide the payment services provider listed in the
annex of Directive 2007/64/EC. A payment service provider can be an issuer or
an acquirer or both; 
(22)               
'payment service user' means a natural or legal
person making use of a payment service in the capacity of either payer or
payee, or both; 
(23)               
'payment transaction' means an action, initiated
by the payer or on his behalf or by the payee of transferring funds,
irrespective of any underlying obligations between the payer and the payee; 
(24)               
'processing' means the performance of payment
transaction processing services in terms of the actions required for the
handling of a payment instruction between the acquirer and the issuer. ; 
(25)               
'processing entity' means any natural or legal
person providing payment transaction processing services; 
Chapter II
Interchange fees 
Article 3 
Interchange fees for cross-border consumer debit or credit card transactions
1.                      
With effect from two months after the entry into
force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or request
for cross-border debit card transactions a per transaction interchange
fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more
than 0,2 % of the value of the transaction.
2.                      
With effect from two months after the entry
into force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or
request for cross-border credit card transactions a per transaction
interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or
effect of more than 0,3 % of the value of the transaction. 
Article 4
Interchange fees for all consumer debit or credit card transactions 
1.                      
With effect from two years after the entry into
force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a
per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an
equivalent object or effect of more than 0,2 % of the value of the
transaction for any debit card based transactions.
2.                      
With effect from two years after the entry into
force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a
per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an
equivalent object or effect of more than 0,3 % of the value of the
transaction for any credit card based transactions. 
Article 5
Prohibition of circumvention 
For the purposes of the application of the caps
referred to in Article 3 and Article 4, any net compensation received by an
issuing bank from a payment card scheme in relation to payment transactions or
related activities shall be treated as part of the interchange fee.
Chapter III
Business rules 
Article 6
Licensing
1.                      
Any territorial restrictions within the Union or
rules with an equivalent effect in licensing agreements for issuing payment
cards or acquiring payment card transactions shall be prohibited.
2.                      
Any territorial restrictions within the Union or
rules with an equivalent effect in four party payment card scheme rules shall
be prohibited. 
3.                      
Any requirement or obligation to obtain a
country specific licence or authorisation to operate on a cross-border basis or
rule with an equivalent effect in licensing agreements for issuing payment
cards or acquiring payment card transactions shall be prohibited.
4.                      
Any requirement or obligation to obtain a
country specific licence or authorisation to operate on a cross-border basis or
rules with an equivalent effect in four party payment card schemes rules shall
be prohibited. 
Article 7
Separation of payment card scheme and processing entities 
1.                      
Payment card schemes and processing entities
shall be independent in terms of legal form, organisation and decision making.
They shall not discriminate in any way between their subsidiaries or
shareholders on the one hand and users of these schemes and other contractual
partners on the other hand and shall not in particular make the provision of
any service they offer conditional in any way on the acceptance by their
contractual party of any other service they offer.
2.                      
Payment card schemes shall allow for the
possibility that authorisation and clearing messages of single card transactions
be separated and processed by different processing entities.
3.                      
Any territorial discrimination in processing
rules operated by payment card schemes shall be prohibited.
4.                      
Processing entities within the Union shall
ensure that their system is technically interoperable with other systems of
processing entities within the Union through the use of standards developed by
international or European standardisation bodies. In addition, processing
entities shall not adopt or apply business rules that restrict interoperability with other processing entities within
the Union.
Article 8
Co-badging and choice of application
1.                      
Any schemes rules and rules in licensing
agreements that hinder or prevent an issuer from co-badging two or more
different brands of payment instruments on a card, telecommunication,
digital or IT device shall
be prohibited. 
2.                      
Any difference in treatment of issuers or
acquirers in schemes rules and rules in licensing agreements concerning
co-badging on a card, telecommunication, digital or IT
device shall be
objectively justified and non-discriminatory. 
3.                      
Payment card schemes shall not impose reporting
requirements, obligations to pay fees or other obligations with the same object
or effect on card issuing and acquiring payment services providers for transactions
carried out with any device on which their brand is present in relation to
transactions for which their scheme is not used. 
4.                      
Any routing principles aimed at directing
transactions through a specific channel or process and other technical and
security standards and requirements with respect to the handling of more than
one payment card brand on a card, telecommunication,
digital or IT device shall
be non-discriminatory and shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
5.                      
Where a payment device offers the choice between
different brands of payment instruments, the brand applied to the payment
transaction at issue shall be determined by the payer at the point of sale.
6.                      
Payment card schemes, issuers, acquirers and
payment card handling infrastructure providers shall not insert automatic
mechanisms, software or devices on the payment instrument or at equipment
applied at the point of sale which limit the choice of application by the payer
when using a co-badged payment instrument. 
Article 9
Unblending
1.                      
Acquirers shall offer and charge payees
individually specified merchant service charges for different categories and
different brands of payment cards unless merchants request in writing acquiring
payment services providers to charge blended merchant services charges. 
2.                      
Agreements between acquiring payment services
providers and payees shall include individually specified information on the
amount of the merchant services charges interchange fees and scheme fees
applicable with respect to each category and brand of payment cards.
Article 10
Honour All Card rules
1.                      
Payment schemes and payment service providers
shall not apply any rule that may oblige payees accepting cards and other
payment instruments issued by one issuing payment service provider within the
framework of a payment instruments scheme to also accept other payment
instruments of the same brand and/or category issued by other issuing payment
service providers within the framework of the same scheme, except if they are
subject to the same regulated interchange fee. 
2.                      
The restriction of Honour all card rules
referred to in paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the possibility for payments
schemes and payment service providers to provide that certain cards may not be
refused on the basis of the identity of the issuing payment service provider or
of the cardholder.
3.                      
Merchants deciding not to accept all cards or
other payment instruments of a payment card scheme shall inform consumers in a
clear and unequivocal manner at the same time as they inform the consumer on
the acceptance of other cards and payment instruments of the scheme. That
information shall be displayed prominently at the entrance of the shop, at the
till or on the website or other applicable electronic or mobile medium, and
shall be provided to the payer in good time before he enters into a purchase
agreement with the payee.
4.                      
Issuing payment service providers shall ensure that their payment instruments are
visibly and electronically identifiable, enabling payees to identify
unequivocally which brands and categories of prepaid, debit, credit or
commercial cards or card based payments based on these are chosen by the payer.

Article 11
Steering rules
1.                      
Any rule in licensing agreements, scheme rules
applied by payment card schemes and in agreements entered into between card
acquiring payment services providers and payees preventing payees from steering
consumers to the use of any payment instrument preferred by the payee shall be
prohibited. This prohibition shall also cover any rule prohibiting payees from
treating payment devices of a given scheme more or less favourably than others.
2.                      
Any rule in licensing agreements, scheme rules
applied by payment card schemes and in agreements entered into between card
acquiring payment services providers and payees preventing payees from
informing payers about interchange fees and merchant service charges shall be
prohibited. 
3.                      
Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to
the rules on charges, reductions or other steering set out in Article 55 of the
proposal COM (2013)547 and in Article 19 of Directive 2011/83/EU[22]. 
Article 12
Information to the payee on individual payment transactions
1.                      
After the execution of an individual payment
transaction, the payee's payment service provider shall provide the payee with
the following information: 
(a)         
the reference enabling the payee to identify the
payment transaction;
(b)                                                                                              
the amount of the payment transaction in the
currency in which the payee's payment account is credited;
(c)                                                                                               
the amount of any charges for the payment
transaction, indicating separately the amount of the interchange fee.
With the payee's prior and explicit consent the
information referred to in the first subparagraph may be aggregated by brand,
application, payment instrument categories and rates of interchange fees
applicable to the transaction. 
2.                      
Contracts between acquirers and payees may
include a provision that the information referred to in the first subparagraph
of paragraph 1 shall be provided or made available periodically, at least once
a month, and in an agreed manner which allows payees to store and reproduce
information unchanged.
Chapter IV
Final provisions
Article 13
Competent authorities
1.                      
Member States shall designate competent
authorities that are empowered to ensure enforcement of this Regulation and
that are granted investigation and enforcement powers. 
2.                      
Member States may designate existing bodies to
act as competent authorities. 
3.                      
Member States may designate different competent
authorities.
4.                      
Member States shall notify the Commission of
those competent authorities by two months after the entry into force of this
Regulation. They shall notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent
change concerning those authorities.
5.                      
The designated competent authorities referred to
in paragraph 1 shall have adequate resources for the performance of their
duties.
6.                      
Member States shall require the competent
authorities to monitor compliance with this Regulation effectively and take all
necessary measures to ensure such compliance. 
7.                      
Member States shall ensure that the designations
referred to in paragraph 1 are subject to the right of appeal.
Article 14
Sanctions
1.                      
Member States shall lay down rules on the
sanctions applicable to infringements of this Regulation and shall take all
measures necessary to ensure that they are applied. Such sanctions shall be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
2.                      
Member States shall notify those provisions to
the Commission by two months after the entry into force of this Regulation and
shall notify without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them.
Article 15
Settlement, out of court complaints and redress procedures 
1.                      
Member States shall establish adequate and
effective out-of-court complaint and redress procedures for the settlement of
disputes arising under this Regulation between payees and their payment service
providers. For those purposes, Member States shall designate existing bodies,
where appropriate, or establish new bodies.
2.                      
Member States shall notify the Commission of
those bodies by two years after the entry into force of this Regulation. They
shall notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent change concerning
those bodies. 
Article 16
Review clause 
Four years after the entry into force of
this Regulation, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to
the Council a report on the application of this Regulation. The Commission's
report shall look in particular at the appropriateness of the levels of
interchange fees and at steering mechanisms such as charges, taking into
account the use and cost of the various means of payments and the level of
entry of new players and new technology on the market. 
Article 17
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on
the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal
of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament                       For
the Council
The President                                                 The
President
[1]               See for example the recent proposal on access to
payment accounts with basic features (COM(2013) 266 final of 8 May 2013).
[2]               http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:319:0001:01:EN:HTML
[3]               General Court 24 May 2012, Case T 111/08, MasterCard
and others vs Commission, nyr.
[4]               Case
COMP/34.579, MasterCard, Commission Decision of 19 December 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/34579/34579_1889_2.pdf
[5]                      Article 80 of the Danish Payment Services and Electronic Money Act,
Consolidating Act no. 365 of 26 April 2011, http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis/Translated-regulations/~/media/Regler-og-praksis/2012/C_Act365_2011_new.ashx.
This regulates MSCs for face-to-face
transactions and an annual fee is to be paid by merchants who are split into 8
different cost categories with the Economic Ministry deciding on the amounts 
[6]               https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/opening-up-uk-payments
[7]               http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0941:EN:NOT
[8]               http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/cim/gp_feedback_statement_en.pdf
[9]               http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0426+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
[10]             http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/cim/gp_feedback_statement_en.pdf
[11]             COM (2013) 266 final 
[12]             Cf. Impact Assessment p. 208
[13]             http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=418&id_article=1895
[14]             http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=418&id_article=1895
[15]             OJ C , , p. .
[16]             OJ C , , p. .
[17]             Directive 2007/64/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services
in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).
[18]             Regulation (EC) N° 924/2009 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-border
payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 (OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11).
[19]             Regulation (EC) No 260/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical
and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and
amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p.
22).
[20]             Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive
93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council ( OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64).
[21]             Italy, Hungary, Poland and the United Kingdom . 
[22]             Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights…