Special Report No 3/2013 ‘Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?’
Date: 2013-07-17
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU programme, carriage of goods, combined transport, environmental impact, road safety, road traffic, surface transport, transport planning

EUROPEAN
COURT OF AUDITORS

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HAVE THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES 
BEEN EFFECTIVE IN SHIFTING TRAFFIC 
OFF THE ROAD?

EN

 
 
 
 
Special Report No 3 

 2013

HAVE THE MARCO POLO 
PROGRAMMES BEEN EFFECTIVE IN 
SHIFTING TRAFFIC OFF THE ROAD?

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi
1615 Luxembourg
LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1
Fax +352 4398-46410
E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu
Internet: http://eca.europa.eu

Special Report No 3 

 2013

A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013

ISBN 978-92-9241-204-3
doi:10.2865/77812

© European Union, 2013
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Luxembourg

3

CONTENTS

Paragraph

GLOSSARY

I–VI 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1–8 

1–3 

4–8 

INTRODUCTION

THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES AND MULTIMODALITY

MANAGEMENT OF THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES

9–12 

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

13–43 

OBSERVATIONS

13–23 

THE PROGRAMMES HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE

13–16 

OUTPUTS FAR BELOW EXPECTATIONS …

17–21 

… AND LITTLE IMPACT IN SHIFTING FREIGHT OFF THE ROADS

22–23 

THE REAL IMPACT CANNOT BE ASSESSED

24–34 

NOT ENOUGH RELEVANT PROJECT PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD …

26 

 … BECAUSE THE MARKET SITUATION AND THE CONDITIONS TO ENTER DID NOT ENCOURAGE OPERATORS 
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SCHEME

27–28 

UNCERTAINTY ON HOW MUCH TRAFFIC ACTUALLY SHIFTED OFF THE ROAD …

29–31 

… AND HALF OF THE AUDITED PROJECTS OF LIMITED SUSTAINABILITY …

32–34 

… AND PROJECTS WOULD HAVE BEEN STARTED EVEN WITHOUT EU FUNDING

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

 
4
4

35–43 

DAILY MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME HAS GRADUALLY IMPROVED …

37–40 

… BUT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF MARKET NEEDS …

41–43 

… AND CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN EARLIER

44–46 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I  —  DETAILS OF PROJECTS SAMPLED

ANNEX II  —  COMPARISON OF THE MP CALCULATOR COEFFICIENTS OVER TIME

REPLY OF THE COMMISSION

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

 
 
GLOSSARY

5

Ancillary infrastructure: The necessary and sufficient infrastructure to achieve the goals of the funded 
actions (Marco Polo II Regulation (EC) No 1692/2006, Article 2(h)). As Marco Polo projects are transport services 
projects, ancillary infrastructure should merely be adjustments to existing infrastructure that are necessary so 
that the transport service envisaged can be carried out.

Deadweight: Deadweight occurs where funding is provided to support a beneficiary who would have made 
the same choice in the absence of aid. In such cases, the outcome cannot be attributed to the policy, and the 
aid paid to the beneficiary has had no impact. Thus the share of expenditure which generates deadweight is 
ineffective by definition, because it does not contribute to the achievement of objectives.

DG Mobility and Transport: European Commission’s directorate-general for mobility and transport. 

EACI: Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation. In March 2008, this agency took over the daily 
project management of Marco Polo.

Interoperability (of the trans‑European rail system): The capability to operate on any stretch of the rail 
network without any differences, by focusing on making the different technical systems on the EU’s railways 
work together and avoiding operational and infrastructure barriers.

Marco Polo actions: The Marco Polo programmes fund the following five types of actions:

1.  Catalyst action: action under Marco Polo I and II (MP I and MP  II) aimed at overcoming significant structural 

barriers in the freight transport market which prevent the market from functioning satisfactorily;

2.  Modal shift action: MP I and II actions to shift freight from road to rail, inland waterways and short sea ship -

ping or a combination of these transport modes;

3.  Motorways of the sea action: MP II action aimed at modal shift by introducing a door -to -door service which 
shifts freight from long road distances to a combination of short sea shipping and other modes of transport;
4.  Traffic avoidance action: MP II action aimed at avoiding traffic rather than shifting it, by focusing on the 
modification of production/distribution processes to achieve shorter distances, higher loading factors, fewer 
empty runs, reduction of waste flows, reduction of volume and/or weight or any other effect leading to 
a significant reduction of freight traffic on the road;

5.  Common learning action: MP I and II action designed to deliver modal shift indirectly by enhancing know- 
ledge in the freight logistics sector and fostering advanced methods and procedures for cooperation in the 
freight market.

Marco Polo Programme Committee: Management committee consisting of the different representatives of 
the EU Member States and observers from participating third countries dealing with transport services.

Multimodal transport: The carriage of goods by at least two different modes of transport, such as road, rail, 
inland waterway or short sea shipping, from point of departure to destination.

Tonne‑kilometre (tkm): The transport of one tonne (1 000 kg) of cargo over a distance of 1 kilometre. Since 
2009, the rules have allowed tare to be included in the tkm shifted under the Marco Polo programmes.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

V.
Whilst  the  daily  management  of  the  programmes 
improved over time, the Commission did not carry 
out a sufficient analysis of market needs to assess the 
potential to achieve the policy objectives, and correc-
tive actions could have been taken earlier. However, 
important programme weaknesses persist.

VI.
Given the results of the current programmes, the Court 
recommends the Council, the European Parliament and 
the Commission to consider discontinuing EU fund-
ing for transport freight services following the same 
design  as  the  Marco  Polo  programmes  (‘top-down 
supply-push’)  which  led  in  particular  to  the  weak -
nesses identified in this report (insufficient market 
uptake, absence of evidence of achieving the objec-
tives, high administrative burden, poor sustainability 
and deadweight) and making continuation of such 
funding conditional upon an ex ante impact assess-
ment showing whether and to what extent there is an 
EU added value. This would imply making a  detailed 
market analysis of the potential demand and taking up 
the experience and best practices of Member States 
similar national support schemes. Only in the event of 
a positive assessment as to a  meaningful EU action in 
this area, the Court recommends that the Commission 
take a series of actions to strengthen performance in 
future schemes.

I.
Since 2003, the Marco Polo programmes have financed 
transport service projects that shift freight transport 
from road to rail, inland waterways and short sea ship-
ping. The first Marco Polo programme (Marco Polo I) 
had a budget of 102  million  euro and ran between 
2003 and 2006. The current Marco Polo II programme 
runs from 2007 to 2013 and has a substantially larger 
budget of 450 million euro. The aim of the scheme was 
to reduce international road freight traffic, thereby 
improving the environmental performance of freight 
transport, reducing congestion and increasing road 
safety.

II.
The European Court of Auditors assessed whether the 
Commission had planned the programmes, and was 
managing and supervising them, in such a way as to 
maximise their effectiveness, and whether the funded 
projects were effective.

III.
The Court found that the programmes were ineffec-
tive in as much as they did not attain their output 
targets, they had little impact in shifting freight off 
the roads and there are no data to assess the expected 
benefits of diminishing the environmental impact of 
freight transport, easing congestion and improving 
road safety.

IV.
The mechanism used for programme payments made 
EU-funding disbursements conditional upon results, 
the selection procedure ensured that only high- qual-
ity projects were selected and these projects usually 
provided greater benefits for the broader community. 
However,  there  were  not  enough  relevant  project 
proposals put forward because the market situation 
and the entry conditions discouraged operators from 
taking advantage of the scheme. In addition, there 
was uncertainty about the limited quantities reported 
shifted, and half of the audited projects were of lim-
ited sustainability. Furthermore, projects would have 
started even without EU funding (deadweight).

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

INTRODUCTION

7

1. 

2. 

3. 

THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES AND 
MULTIMODALITY

Multimodality is about using two or more different transport modes to 
complete a single freight transport operation. Multimodal transport has 
generally been considered to be environmentally more sustainable as it 
reduces ‘road- only’ transport operations. Increasing the use of multimo-
dality has therefore been one of the EU’s main transport policy objectives 
for many years1.

As part of this policy, in 2003 the EU legislator established a first Mar-
co Polo programme (Marco Polo I, with a  budget of 102  million  euro) 
that ran between 2003 and 2006. It was followed by the current Marco 
Polo II programme (2007–13), which has a substantially larger budget 
of 450  million  euro and extended scope. The objective was to counter 
the rise in international road freight transport by shifting the expected 
aggregate increase to railways, inland waterways and short sea shipping, 
or a combination of those transport modes. This was meant to reduce 
the environmental side-effects of freight transport, ease road conges-
tion and improve road safety and contribute to efficient and sustainable 
mobility (see Figure 1).

For the period after 2013, the Commission has proposed continuing EU 
support for freight transport services, by promoting ‘the deployment of 
innovative transport services or new combinations of proven existing 
transport services, including through the application of “Intelligent trans-
port systems” and the establishment of relevant governance structures2’. 
In the absence of an ex ante assessment, it is however not yet known how 
these broad objectives will be implemented, what are the specific objec-
tives and priorities as well as the amount of funding deemed necessary.

1  The 1992 White Paper 
‘The future development 
of the common transport 
policy’ (COM(92) 494 final 
of 2 December 1992) saw 
shifting the balance between 
modes of transport as a main 
objective. The 2001 White 
Paper ‘European transport 
policy for 2010: Time to 
decide’ (COM(2001) 370 
final of 12 September 2001) 
confirmed the importance 
of revising the respective 
shares of transport modes 
to increase the sustainability 
of the European transport 
system. Intermodal transport 
was to be encouraged 
by investing in good 
connections between 
sea, inland waterways and 
rail. The main objective 
of the 2011 White Paper 
‘Roadmap to a Single 
European Transport Area — 
Towards a competitive and 
resource-efficient transport 
system’ (COM(2011) 144 
final of 28 March 2011) is to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by limiting the 
growth of road congestion 
and establishing efficient 
multimodal links.

2  Article 38 of 
COM(2011) 650 final/2 of 
19 December 2011.

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

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FIGURE 1

MARCO POLO II PROGRAMME OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES (EX ANTE EVALUATION 
REPORT ON MP II, ECORYS, 15 JUNE  2004, P. 1)

Eﬃcient and
Sustainable Mobility

Less congestion

Diminishing Environmental 
Side-Eﬀects

Enhanced Safety

Reducing International 
Road Freight Transport

Modal shift

Traﬃc avoidance

General
objectives

Speciﬁc
objectives

Operational
objectives

Modal shift
action

Motorways of 
the sea action

Catalyst action

Common
learning action

Traﬃc avoidance
action

Actions

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

9
9

3  At that time called 
‘Directorate-General for 
Transport and Energy’.

4. 

MANAGEMENT OF THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES

The Marco Polo programmes are centrally managed by the Commission. 
Project applications are received via annual calls for proposals and evalu-
ated according to the funding conditions and eligibility, selection and 
award criteria. Initially DG Mobility and Transport 3 was responsible for 
the programmes in their entirety, however since March 2008, the Execu-
tive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI) has managed 
the actual implementation of the scheme. Tasks are shared between 
DG Mobility and Transport and the EACI as follows:

(a)  DG Mobility and Transport is responsible for programme manage-
ment, which includes priority-setting, drafting and adoption of the 
annual work programme, drafting of documents for the annual call 
for  proposals  and  publication  of  the  call  in  the  Official  Journal, 
relations with the Member States’ authorities, evaluation of the 
programme’s implementation and impact, and supervision of the 
EACI’s management activity;

(b)  The EACI advises potential applicants, receives, opens and evalu-
ates project proposals, negotiates contract details with applicants, 
prepares Commission decisions for the awards of grants, receives 
periodic project reports, monitors projects, makes payments to 
beneficiaries and reports to the Commission.

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

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5. 

6. 

The rationale behind Marco Polo was that market and regulatory failings 
discourage operators from setting up alternatives to road transport. The 
aim of the programmes is therefore to compensate transport operators 
for the initial losses on new or upgraded transport services that shift 
traffic from the road. The EU subsidy is calculated as the lowest amount 
out of: (i) one euro (before call 2009) or two euro (as of call 2009) for 
every 500 tkm shifted off the road; (ii) 35 % of the eligible costs (50 % 
for common learning actions); (iii) the cumulative deficit for the entire 
duration of the action. An example is given in Box 1 .

In order to achieve the modal shift objective, different types of actions 
are foreseen (modal shift actions; catalyst actions and motorways of the 
sea actions, see the glossary) but the Marco Polo II programme also funds 
projects which aim at encouraging higher efficiency in international 
(mainly intra-EU) freight transport (the traffic avoidance actions).

BOX 1

AN EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF THE MP SUBSIDY AMOUNT

If a Marco Polo project would have been selected on the basis of the 2009 call and realised a modal shift of 
600 million tkm and if this project had eligible costs of 35  million  euro (including 4  million  euro in ancillary 
infrastructure investments), ineligible costs of 9  million  euro and generated 41  million  euro in revenue, the 
following subsidy calculation would apply:

Amount 1: applying the contribution rate for the 2009 call of 2 euro/500 tkm gives an EU contribution for the 
volume shifted off the road of 2,4 million euro ;

Amount 2: applying the maximum intervention rate of 35 % of the 35  million euro in eligible costs gives a sec -
ond figure of 12,25 million euro ;

Amount 3: the operation generated 41  million euro in revenue and 44  million euro in costs (both eligible and 
ineligible), giving a loss of  3 million euro .

In this case, the subsidy would be limited to 2,4 million euro , which is the lowest of the three amounts.

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

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7. 

The  programme  also  covers  projects  which  do  not  directly  provide 
a modal shift (as part of the common learning actions) as well as other 
expenditure (up to 5 % of the budget). As such, between 2009  and 2012, 
around 11,8 million euro in subsidies 4 have gone to:

4  This represents 12,5 % of 
the amounts paid out of the 
programmes.

 — Projects implemented as part of the common learning action, which 
aim to deliver a modal shift indirectly by enhancing knowledge in 
the freight logistics sector and fostering advanced methods and 
procedures for cooperation in the freight market. Around 8,1  mil-
lion euro was paid out by the end of 2011 for 16 projects;

 — Accompanying measures, launched to support current actions and 
further development of the programme. These measures included 
communication activities to promote the programme, studies on 
inland waterways transport services and single wagonload traffic 
and also a contribution to a European programme for the support 
of Short Sea Shipping (for which 3,7 million euro was paid).

8. 

Out of the five types of actions the programme financed, projects of the 
modal shift action type are the core of the programmes and represent 
80 % of the grant agreements signed (see  Figure 2).

FIGURE 2

USE OF MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES FUNDING PER ACTION 
TYPE (ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT, EACI 2010, 5.4, POINT 1)

Traﬃc avoidance
actions 
1 %

Motorways of the sea actions

1 %

Catalyst actions
8 %

Common learning actions

10 %

Modal shift actions

80 %

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

12

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

The objective of the Court’s audit was to find out whether the Marco 
Polo programmes were effective. It did this by assessing whether the 
Commission had planned the programmes, and was managing and su-
pervising them in such a way as to maximise their effectiveness. The 
Court also assessed whether a number of funded projects had achieved 
their objectives.

The audit covered Marco Polo I and the ongoing Marco Polo II up to 
July 2012. The work combined a range of audit procedures: examina -
tion of files, interviews, analysis of impact assessments, evaluations and 
survey results and a review of evaluations of project proposals. The Court 
also assessed the information available within DG Mobility and Transport 
on the support schemes implemented in the Member States, surveyed 
the national transport services support schemes existing at the time of 
the audit and interviewed selected national authorities participating in 
the Marco Polo Programme Committee during project audits.

This work was supplemented by interviews with relevant entities and 
on-site verification of the achievements of 16 completed projects of the 
‘modal shift’ action type (the core of the programme, see paragraph 8 
above) in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands (see Annex I for project content and performance details).  Box 2 
provides a short description of two audited projects.

The 16 audited projects represented 19,5  million euro in commitments 
and 11,4  million  euro in payments. Half of them were approved under 
MP I, the other half under MP II. Four were short sea shipping projects, 
one was a rail/inland waterways combination, and the remaining 11 were 
rail projects. Fourteen beneficiaries of the 16 projects were consortia of 
major transport companies, national railways companies or international 
shipping lines.

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BOX 2

EXAMPLES OF AUDITED MARCO POLO PROJECTS

(a)  Sirius 1 was a rail project carrying natural mineral water from the French production plant to various lo -
gistics platforms in Germany. The aim was to improve capacities and customer service and to support the 
company’s carbon footprint target (40  % reduction between 2008  and 2012 on direct responsibility scope 
and all brands).

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Loading water on trains at the production plant of  
S.A. des Eaux Minérales d’Evian.

(b)  Gulf Stream is a short sea shipping project offering a sea alternative for freight traffic between northern 
Spain and southern England. It is a roll-on/roll-off service operating return sailings every weekend between 
the Spanish port of Santander and Poole on the English south coast to overcome the weekend ban on trucks 
using the French national road network. 

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Trucks leaving the ship, carrying their freight to 
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Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OBSERVATIONS

14

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

THE PROGRAMMES HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE

OUTPUTS FAR BELOW EXPECTATIONS …

The  legislation had set quantified annual  targets for the  modal  shift 
that both programmes were to achieve. For MP I, the annual target was 
12 billion tkm. For MP II, the annual target was increased to ‘a substantial 
part’ of 20,5 billion tkm 5 on the basis of a proposal for a 740  million euro 
funding envelope that was to include infrastructure support. Despite the 
fact that the amounts for infrastructure were rejected in the course of 
the legislative procedure, the original target was mostly maintained.

A comparison between the targets set and the reported programme 
achievements  demonstrates  continued  and  significant  underper-
formance (see Table 1 ).

The reported modal shift data are final only for MP I, where they indi-
cate that 22,1 billion tkm of freight was shifted from the road to other 
modes of transport. Although this result equates to removing from the 
road 1 230 000 truck journeys of 1 000 km (the distance from Berlin to 
Paris) each carrying 18 tons of freight 6, it still represents only 46 % of the 
programme target.

Between 2007  and  2010, MP II achieved only 23,9  % of the committed 
traffic shift (see Table 1). Even though MP II is still running, it will not fully 
shift the targeted substantial part of 20,5 billion tkm/year because there 
has been insufficient response to the yearly calls for project proposals. 
Therefore, the programme funding made available will not allow the 
target to be achieved, even if all projects themselves were to be entirely 
successful.

5  Article 1 of Regulation 
(EC) No 1692/2006 of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
24 October 2006 establishing 
the second Marco Polo 
programme for the granting 
of Community financial 
assistance to improve the 
environmental performance 
of the freight transport 
system (Marco Polo II) and 
repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1382/2003 (OJ L 328, 
24.11.2006, p. 1) stipulates 
that the programme should 
achieve: ‘(…) a traffic shift that 
is a substantial part of the 
expected yearly aggregate 
increase in international 
road freight traffic, measured 
in tonne kilometres (…)’. 
According to Recital 2 of 
the same regulation, the 
yearly aggregate increase 
in international road freight 
traffic was estimated at the 
level of 20,5 btkm, Recital 
4 of the same regulation 
indicates that the programme 
should help to shift ‘at least 
the expected increase in 
international road freight 
traffic, but preferably more’.

6  Source: EACI presentation 
at the MP Info Day, 
28 June 2012.

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… AND LITTLE IMPACT IN SHIFTING FREIGHT OFF THE ROADS

17. 

The programme support for MP I was supposed to shift at least the expect-
ed aggregate increase in road freight traffic as early as 2003. For MPII, the 
aim was changed to become shifting ‘a substantial part’ of the expected 
aggregate increase in road freight traffic. Based on data provided by the 
Commission (DG Eurostat), Figure 3 shows that, in 2003, the roads bore 
46 % of total freight transport in the EU, while maritime transport, rail 
and inland waterways accounted for 38 %, 11 % and 3,5 % respectively. By 
2010, road transport had increased its overall share to 50 % of all freight 
transport, while maritime transport had decreased to 33 % and rail and 
inland waterways remained respectively at 11 % and 4 %.

TABLE 1

TARGETED, COMMITTED AND REPORTED VOLUMES OF FREIGHT SHIFTED FROM THE 
ROAD BY THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES IN BILLION TKM (COURT CALCULATIONS 
BASED ON COMMISSION AND EACI DOCUMENTATION 1)

Annual target

Committed shift2  Reported shift (by EACI)

% achieved3

MP I

2003

2004

2005

2006

MP I Total

MP II

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

12,00

12,00

12,00

12,00

48,00

4

20,50

20,50

20,50

20,50

20,50

MP II 2007–11

102,50

12,40

14,38

9,53

11,40

47,71

27,83

16,33

15,68

14,15

13,70

87,69

7,25

6,33

4,95

3,55

22,08

average for MP I

10,02

3,40

2,82

3,40

0,00 

19,64

average for MP II 2007–10 (31.12.2012)

58,51

43,99

51,94

31,17

46,28

46,00

36,00

20,82

17,98

24,03

0,00

22,40

19,16

Grand total

150,50

135,40

41,72

1  Using the latest data available of 31.12.2012. 
2  Quantities planned to be shifted on the basis of the grant agreements signed by the Commission and, since March 2008, EACI.
3  Reported versus committed shift quantities.
4  For MP II the annual target should be a ‘substantial part’ of 20,5 billion tkm.

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As a result of the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007, trans -
port  volumes in  general have declined. Some  transport  modes have 
recorded severe losses: rail transport having fallen by 17,9  % and inland 
waterways traffic by 10,6 % 7. When faced with the crisis, road transport-
ers reduced their prices to keep their vehicles on the road. This pro-
vided both disincentives to switch to non-road modes and incentives to 
switch from non-road to road- only transport operations (reverse modal 
shift) and highlighted the cyclic vulnerability of the current programme 
design.

7  Source: Eurostat ‘Statistics in 
Focus’ 13/2012, 21.2.2012.

The reported modal shift of 22,1 billion tkm obtained for MP I represent -
ed only 0,3 % of all EU international road freight transport and around 
25 % of the increase in EU international road haulage for the same pe -
riod. The main reason for this is that the growth in international road 
freight transport between 2003 and  2006 (113,7 billion tkm) was much 
higher than originally forecasted (48 billion tkm).

USE OF TRANSPORT MODES FOR INTRA‑EU, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, FREIGHT 
TRANSPORT OVER TIME (DATA PROVIDED BY EUROSTAT TO THE COURT)

18. 

19. 

FIGURE 3

100 %
90 %
80 %
70 %
60 %
50 %
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0 %

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Road

Rail 

IWW 

Maritime 

Air 

Source: Eurostat.

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17

With regard to MP II, at the time of the audit, only a few projects had 
been  completed  and  it  was  too  early  to  make  a final  assessment  of 
their effectiveness and potential impact. However, given the available 
budgetary appropriations and their limited take-up, it is unlikely that 
the programme will have a significant impact on shifting traffic off the 
road (see Table 2).

Road freight transport remains the dominant mode while rail and inland 
waterways are still at very modest levels. Figure 4 shows that, prior to 
2007, road freight transport volumes increased year on year, that be -
tween 2007  and  2009 transported volumes dropped for all modes as 
a result  of  the  crisis  and  that,  as  of  2009,  there  was  a clear  recovery 
in transported volumes, mainly on the road freight and maritime legs 
whereas rail and inland waterways did not manage to increase their 
share.

20. 

21. 

FIGURE 4

EU FREIGHT TRANSPORT BY MODE IN MILLION TKM (FIGURE 3 DATA PRESENTED AS 
A PERCENTAGE SHARE BY TRANSPORT MODE)

2 000 000
1 800 000
1 600 000
1 400 000
1 200 000
1 000 000
800 000
600 000
400 000
200 000
0

Source: Eurostat.

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Road

Rail

IWW

Maritime

Air

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22. 

23. 

THE REAL IMPACT CANNOT BE ASSESSED

The programme funding was supposed to support the policy goals of 
diminishing the environmental side-effects of freight transport, easing 
road congestion and improving road safety. The Court took note of the 
Commission’s estimates that, for each euro invested in the Marco Polo 
I programme, environmental benefits worth 13,30 euro were generated8.

However, the available data on road congestion and on traffic accidents 
do not allow the real impact to be assessed as Eurostat has no agreed 
official methodology and no harmonised statistical data on road con-
gestion, and the data on traffic accidents are incomplete. Moreover, al-
though it is generally acknowledged that alternatives to road-only trans-
port usually provide greater benefits for the broader community, the 
real leverage level is likely to be much lower. This is because of the fact 
that, between 2004 and 2010, the Marco Polo calulcator data9 used were 
outdated and therefore inaccurate. Since 2004, road transport has gradu-
ally become cleaner as a result of research and innovation 10. This was not 
taken into account by the Commission for its calls from 2005  to  2010. 
It was only in the 2011 call that new coefficients and a new methodol -
ogy were used when quantifying the impact of freight transport by rail, 
inland waterways and short sea shipping. In some cases, these are not 
much more beneficial than the road- only option (see Annex II). For ex-
ample: there is no longer much difference between road- only transport 
and diesel trains, small barges or conventionally fuelled roll- on-roll- off 
passenger (‘Ro/Pax’) ships sailing at 20 to 23 knots. As soon as Ro/Pax 
ships exceed a speed of 23 knots, it would even be better for the envir- 
onment to carry the freight by truck.

8  EACI presentation at the 
MP Info Day, 28 June 2012.

9  The ‘Marco Polo calculator’ 
is an automated spreadsheet 
providing a comparison of 
the theoretical external costs 
pertaining to environmental 
factors (such as air pollution, 
climate change, noise) and to 
socioeconomic factors (like 
accidents, congestion and 
infrastructure). The calculation 
is expressed in euro per 
tkm, between the ‘road-only’ 
transport solution and the 
alternative multimodal 
transport solution applied for 
(rail, inland waterways and 
short sea shipping).

10  ‘Ex ante evaluation 
report on MP II’, Ecorys, 
15 June 2004, p. 56: ‘when 
comparing modern truck 
engines with outdated or 
high-speed ship engines, 
road transport might prove 
to be the environmentally 
favourable option’.

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11  This included payments 
of 1,4 million euro for two 
projects implemented as 
part of the Catalyst action 
which did not support modal 
shift: the EU funding was 
paid for the conversion of 
a locomotive and for drafting 
project implementation 
reports.

NOT ENOUGH RELEVANT PROJECT PROPOSALS PUT 
FORWARD …

The projects funded through this programme are one of the few exam-
ples where EU funding has to be disbursed on the basis of results. The 
Court recognises that the EACI has procedures which allow EU funds to 
be spent on projects that best meet the selection criteria. However, there 
are usually not enough high-quality projects proposed (only in 2004, the 
available resources were committed in full, see Table 2).

Thus, the MP programmes have problems in absorbing their appropria-
tions. Of the 101,8  million  euro in financial support available for MP I, 
only 41,8  million euro (41 %) was paid 11. MP II has a programme budget 
of 450 million euro, of which only 77,8 million euro (25 % of the available 
budget) had been paid, mainly as advances, by end-2012. It is therefore 
likely that a significant amount of funding will remain unused and not 
serve the general objectives set.

24. 

25. 

TABLE 2

OVERVIEW OF PROJECTS AND FUNDS AVAILABLE, COMMITTED AND PAID UNDER THE 
MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES, IN MILLION EURO (COURT CALCULATIONS BASED ON 
DOCUMENTATION FROM THE COMMISSION AND EACI 1)

No of 
projects

Budget  
available 

Funds  
committed

% committed 
versus total 
budget

Funds paid

% paid versus 
total budget

MP I

2003

2004

2005

2006

MP I Total

MP II

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

MP I Total

Grand total

13

12

15

15

55

20

28

21

30

18

117

172

15,0

20,4

30,7

35,7

101,8

58,0

59,0

66,3

64,0

56,9

304,2

406,0

13,0

20,4

21,4

18,9

73,7

45,4

34,4

61,9

52,2

33,6

227,5

301,2

86,7

100,0

69,7

52,9

77,3

78,3

58,3

93,4

81,6

59,1

74,1

7,3

12,3

12,8

9,4

41,8

18,7

9,9

23,2

17,1

8,8

77,7

119,5

48,7

60,3

41,7

26,3

41,1

32,2

16,8

35,0

26,7

15,5

25,5

1  Using the latest data available of 31.12.2012. 

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12  Of the 16 projects audited, 
14 beneficiaries, or 87 % used 
consultants.

13  Recital 4 to Regulation 
(EC) No 1692/2006 and 
Recital 8 to Regulation (EC) 
No 923/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 September 2009 
amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1692/2006 (OJ L 266, 
9.10.2009, p. 1) indicated an 
expectation that many small 
and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) would participate in 
the programme. As a result of 
the programme’s complexity, 
the high costs and the high 
thresholds below which there 
would be no co-funding, only 
24 % of MP beneficiaries were 
SMEs (Source: EACI data).

… BECAUSE THE MARKET SITUATION AND THE CONDITIONS TO ENTER 
DID NOT ENCOURAGE OPERATORS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE 
SCHEME

26. 

In addition to the change in market situation (see paragraph 18), a sig -
nificant  reason  for  the  low  take -up  of  appropriations  is  that  getting 
support from MP programmes has proved to be long, risky, complicated 
and costly:

(a) 

It took the beneficiaries audited two years on average to obtain 
access to the scheme (from the date of the first project idea to ar-
rive at signature of the grant agreement). Within this period, it took 
them on average one year from the date of closing the call until 
the date of signature of the grant agreements. They unanimously 
considered this to be too long a wait in a volatile business environ-
ment. The Court found that on several occasions customers were 
lost in the meantime. As changes to initial routes, to the products 
transported or to the starting points and destinations were not 
permitted by the Commission and the EACI for reasons of equity 
of treatment and fair competition, 53 of the 154 projects selected 
(or 34 %) between 2003  and  2010 were ‘non-starters or early ter -
minators’. They represented 64,2  million euro in commitments and 
3,7 million euro in payments;

(b)  Ancillary infrastructure investments remain entirely at the benefi-
ciary’s own risk: although the legislation allows for the possibility 
of partial finance for such infrastructure, the funding mechanism 
usually only provides a subsidy by volume of tkm shifted and in 
practice renders it impossible for the programme to co -finance 
infrastructure investments;

(c) 

The programme conditions are considered by the operators to be 
too complex for the reality of everyday business, which explains why 
many beneficiaries used consultants to prepare the paperwork12;

(d)  Participation in the MP programmes is also costly13: based on the 
travel expenses of the staff made available by the consortium mem-
bers, the consultancy fees and the costs of the man-months worked 
by the beneficiaries’ staff, the average cost of preparing an applica-
tion, for the 16 beneficiaries audited, was 105 000 euro.

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14  In one report an error of 
20 % was identified ex ante 
by EACI.

15  The CMR waybill is 
a document used in 
international road freight 
transport, based on the 
‘Convention on the Contract 
for the International Carriage 
of Goods by Road’ (a United 
Nations Convention, signed 
in Geneva on 19 May 1956).

16  Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1382/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 July 2003 on 
the granting of Community 
financial assistance to 
improve the environmental 
performance of the 
freight transport system 
(Marco Polo Programme) 
(OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, p. 1) and 
Annex I to Regulation (EC) 
No 1692/2006.

27. 

28. 

29. 

UNCERTAINTY ON HOW MUCH TRAFFIC ACTUALLY SHIFTED OFF THE 
ROAD …

Column 4 of Table 1 gives figures for the reported volumes of freight 
shifted off the road. The audit was unable to obtain assurance that they 
were reliable. Firstly, where existing services were upgraded, the freight 
volumes declared as having been transported on the same route be -
fore the project start were accepted by EACI without any checks (these 
quantities are deducted at project completion so that the increase in 
modal shift can be calculated). Secondly, the first ex post financial audits 
of reported volumes of modal shift, which EACI completed only in 2011, 
revealed errors14 and one case of reporting based on gross weight rather 
than net weight.

The Court’s audit of 16 projects revealed that only one project had ex-
act figures for the quantities weighted on arrival at the terminals. In 
six cases, the tool used to record the net weight was not available for 
on-the -spot testing and for the nine remaining projects, this tool dem-
onstrated a limited reliability of the audit trail and the increased risk of 
overpayments. For example, in one project no indication of weight was 
given on the transport document (CMR 15), and in another the tests to 
compare the weight registered in the system with the weights stated 
on the corresponding CMRs gave no match and the beneficiary was not 
sure whether he had reported gross or net weights to the EACI.

… AND HALF OF THE AUDITED PROJECTS ARE OF LIMITED 
SUSTAINABILITY …

As funding one-off operations that are not sustainable would serve little 
purpose, the financed projects are expected to become viable during 
their lifetime, i.e. within a maximum of three years, and continue in op -
eration afterwards. Although the Regulations specifically invoke sustain-
ability as one of the funding conditions16, this has neither been taken 
up in the grant agreements signed nor has sustainability been checked 
after project completion.

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30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

22

Moreover, the difficult operational environment particularly for railways 
has contributed to poor sustainability. Beneficiaries setting up railway 
services have faced high operational risks and, while in operation, have 
experienced difficulties with national railway companies because of un-
foreseen maintenance works, rail and port strikes and the absence of in-
teroperability. In one of the projects audited, this led to the cancellation 
of 20 % of planned departures over the entire project period; in another, 
during the third year of operation, there were 44 incidents causing delays 
in delivery and service disruptions lasting more than a week; in a third 
project the beneficiary was compelled to make four locomotive changes 
along the route from its Romanian production plant to its distribution 
centre in the North of Italy.

17  ‘Evaluation of the 
Marco Polo I programme’, 
Ecorys, 7 November 2007, 
paragraph 3.6.

18  COM(2012) 675 final of 
21 November 2012, p. 6.

Many beneficiaries of the programme have therefore decided to termi-
nate projects well before the end of their contracts, and many of those 
completing  a project either terminated  or significantly changed  the 
scope of the service after the project financing had ended. For 6 of the 
16 projects audited by the Court, the subsidised service was no longer 
operational at the time of the audit (because of insufficient volumes or 
because one of the partners withdrew or went bankrupt) and two others 
continued but were reduced in scope.

… AND PROJECTS WOULD HAVE BEEN STARTED EVEN WITHOUT EU 
FUNDING

The evidence from the Marco Polo projects audited by the Court dem-
onstrated that the EU funding allowed them to start the projects earlier, 
to increase the scale of the service or to have an earlier return on their 
investment.

However, the audit also found serious indications of deadweight as:

 — 13 of the 16 beneficiaries audited confirmed that they would have 
started and run the transport service even without a subsidy;

 — The evaluator Ecorys indicated that ‘the majority of the projects 

would also have started without subsidy’17

 — The Commission as a manager of the programme, indicated in its 
most recent report to the European Parliament and the Council18 
that ‘42 % of beneficiaries stated that their projects would definitely 
have gone ahead without MP funds’.

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23

34. 

35. 

36. 

This is explained by the fact that (i) the transport of heavy goods over 
long distances would use sea, rail or inland waterways for cost reasons 
anyway, especially if shipments can be planned in advance, and (ii) MP 
funding covers such a small part of the total project cost that it cannot 
be seen as a real incentive (in the 16 projects audited by the Court, the 
subsidy covered only 2,8 % of the amount invested by the beneficiaries).

19  ‘Ex ante evaluation 
report on MP II’, Ecorys, 
15 June 2004, Chapter 6.3.

DAILY MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME HAS 
GRADUALLY IMPROVED …

In line with the normal practice of the Commission, the EACI’s work is 
guided by an Annual Work Programme (AWP) approved by the Com-
mission. The Commission supervises the daily management of the MP 
programmes through the EACI’s quarterly reports, quarterly and bian-
nual coordination meetings and quarterly steering committee meetings. 
A dedicated full-time policy officer from the Commission has regular 
contacts with EACI management and staff and participates in working 
meetings and, occasionally, in site visits. The EACI produces Annual Ac-
tivity Reports (AAR) comparing actual performance with the AWP.

The Court found that the EACI has improved its MP project manage-
ment over time by, among other things, (i) tightening the project selec-
tion procedure to ensure that only high- quality projects are selected, 
(ii) organising a helpdesk and functional mailboxes for potential appli -
cants which the beneficiaries audited considered useful and effective, 
(iii) contributing to the knowledge base of the Commission through 
analytical  reports,  (iv)  regularly  monitoring  the  funded  projects  and 
(v) reducing payment delays.

… BUT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF MARKET NEEDS …

37. 

The MP programmes were designed to provide EU funding to partially 
compensate for the considerable outlay incurred by setting up new, or 
developing existing, transport services, in the expectation that increas-
ing the supply of these services would create market demand (‘top-down 
supply-push’ 19).

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24

20  COM(2002) 54 final of 
4 February 2002.

21  Eg. see ‘Ex ante evaluation 
report on MP II’, Ecorys, 
15 June 2004, Chapters 2 
and 7.

22  Fuel costs for shipping 
will substantially increase 
from 2015 as a result of 
new sulphur rules and 
new general sulphur limits 
adopted in September 2012. 
This will return part of the 
freight currently carried by 
ships to the road. Source: 
European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) ‘Technical 
report’, 13.12.2010 and 
COM(2011) 439 final of 
15 July 2011.

23  ‘Evaluation of the Marco 
Polo I programme’, Ecorys, 
7 November 2007.

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

The structure of both MP programmes was based on a Commission pro -
posal20 using the outcome of a consultation of stakeholders organised 
before each of the programmes started.21

However, the Court does not consider this to be sufficient as operators 
will only change from road- only transport to other transport modes un-
der normal market conditions if the circumstances (usually costs, time, 
reliability, volumes to be shipped and proximity of terminals) require 
such a change. To design a successful transport services support pro -
gramme, therefore, there should have firstly been an analysis of why 
multimodal transport services were not being created, or developed, 
under normal market conditions, and how to overcome the potential 
obstacles or barriers hampering or preventing the creation or develop-
ment of such services.

Since 2007, the potential for effectiveness of the MP programmes has fur-
ther declined as a result of external causes: the financial and economic 
crisis has reduced overall transported volumes (see paragraph 18), and 
decisions by national railway companies to stop single-wagon deliver-
ies for reasons of internal costs have had the immediate effect of obli- 
ging smaller companies to reconvert multimodal shipments to road-only 
transport. Moreover, a reverse modal shift (from ship to road) can now 
be expected because of recently adopted legislation22.

… AND CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN EARLIER

A 2007 evaluation report 23 cited a number of problems related to the 
first Marco Polo programme, such as inappropriate thresholds, inflex-
ibility in the rules on tkm, and unclear and complex rules for the submis-
sion, selection and contracting of projects. However, the Commission, 
through its project and programme monitoring, was aware of delays 
in project implementation and difficulties to achieve the target earlier 
(since March 2006).

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25

42. 

43. 

The 2008 impact assessment (IA) 24 provided for a number of possible 
options to improve the programmes by including a  full revision of the 
legal basis, stopping the programme or introducing changes into MP 
II. The Commission’s proposal was limited to budgetary and technical 
amendments to MP II25 (such as doubling the subsidy amount, consider-
ing empty containers and vehicle weight as eligible freight quantities, 
lowering thresholds and increasing flexibility) in an attempt to increase 
the attractiveness of the programme. However, these measures did not 
remedy the important programme weaknesses highlighted above.

Nor did the Commission make an in- depth assessment of the Member 
States’ national schemes supporting multimodality with a view to de -
riving lessons for a possible redesign of the MP programmes. The Court 
considers that there are lessons to be learned from national programmes 
that work on the demand side with limited administrative outlay by pay-
ing lump sums direct to road transport operators that decide to shift 
their trucks or containers from road to ship or rail (e.g. ‘Ecobonus’ and 
‘Ferrobonus’ in Italy26). In one country (Austria), the national schemes also 
contribute to infrastructure investments in the ratio of expected modal 
shift to volumes actually shifted.

24  SEC(2008) 3022 of 
10 December 2008, Option C.

25  Regulation (EC) 
No 923/2009.

26  The Italian administration 
managed both programmes 
with a budget of 
235 million euro (out of which 
193,5 million euro was paid 
out, an uptake rate of 82,3 %) 
with 15 FTE employees and 
at a cost of no more than 
970 000 euro/year, which 
brings the administrative 
cost to 1,2 % of the total 
programme budget.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

26

44. 

45. 

46. 

The Marco Polo programmes are part of the transport policy objective to 
develop alternatives to the road- only transport of freight within the EU. 
The Court found the programmes to be ineffective inasmuch as (i) the 
targets set were only reached to a very limited degree, (ii) they had lit -
tle impact in shifting freight off the roads, and (iii) there are no data to 
assess the expected benefits of diminishing the environmental impact 
of freight transport, easing congestion and improving road safety.

The mechanism used for programme payments made EU funding dis-
bursements conditional upon results and the projects usually provided 
greater benefits for the broader community. However, there were not 
enough relevant project proposals put forward because of the market 
situation and the dissuasive conditions for the business environment 
(namely length of procedures, risks, complexity and administrative costs). 
In addition (i) there is uncertainty about how much traffic was actually 
shifted off the road, (ii) the funded services (projects) were in many cases 
significantly reduced in scope or discontinued and (iii) there is evidence 
that many projects would have started even without EU funding.

The  daily  management  of  the  programmes  has  improved  over  time. 
Among other things, a  sound project selection methodology ensures 
that only high- quality projects are selected. However, the Commission 
did not perform an adequate market analysis to assess the potential for 
success, did not consider new developments and did not take timely 
corrective action to tackle the programme’s ineffectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Council, the European Parliament and the Commission should:

(a)  Consider  discontinuing  EU  funding  for  transpor t  freight  ser-
vices following the same design as the Marco Polo programmes 
(‘top-down supply-push’) which led in particular to the weak-
nesses identified in this report (insufficient market uptake, ab-
sence of evidence of achieving the objectives, high administra-
tive burden, poor sustainability and deadweight).

(b)  Make possible continuation of funding such projects conditional 
upon  an  ex ante  impact  assessment  showing  whether  and  to 
what  ex tent  there  is  an  EU  added  value.  This  would  require 
a detailed market analysis of the potential demand from the 
operators and the taking into account of best practices of similar 
national support schemes. Only in the event of a positive assess -
ment as to a meaningful EU action in this area, the Commission 
should in particular:

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27

(i) 

set realistic targets of freight volumes to be shifted from 
the  road;  regularly  review  the  programme  outputs  and 
results and take prompt action to remedy shortfalls in re-
spect of the targets set;

(ii)  make EU funding conditional upon results (for example, 
pro rata payments for volumes recorded shif ted of f the 
road);

(iii)  assess the needs, limits and conditions for infrastructure 
and  equipment  suppor t  so  as  to  share  par t  of  the  risk 
with operators who build facilities to increase multimodal 
transport;

(iv)  pursue measures to effectively tackle the technical, opera-
tional and infrastructure barriers that could be detrimental 
to the effectiveness of the projects, for example concern-
ing cross border rail traffic;

(v) 

ensure that adequate data are available to demonstrate 
the performance achieved by the funded actions;

(vi) 

reduce, preferably to six months, the time necessary for 
project selection and contracting;

(vii)  make sustainability of projects for at least three years after 

completion a necessary condition;

(viii)  tackle the phenomenon of deadweight, by addressing it 

when evaluating the projects.

This Report was adopted by Chamber II, headed by Mr Harald NOACK, 
Member  of  the  Cour t  of  Auditors,  in  Luxembourg  at  its  meeting  of 
24 April 2013.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

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ANNEX I

DETAILS OF PROJECTS SAMPLED

Projects audited

Call

Country

Short description of project content

MP I

AIN

2003

Belgium

DUE LOKO-MOTION

2003

Germany

BRIDGE OVER 
EUROPE

2004

The Netherlands

BASS

2005

Germany

NEPOL EXPRESS

LUNA

RAIL

2005

2006

2006

Germany

Italy

Belgium

LORRY RAIL

2006

Luxembourg

Improve intermodal barge and rail transport to and from the port of 
Antwerp: increase the frequency of existing services or start up new 
services in anticipation of congestion problems resulting from road works 
planned on the Antwerp Ring.

Project supplying rail traction services and interoperable through-trac-
tion with new multi-current locomotive for a rail-road block train service 
between Munich (Riem, Germany) and Cervignano del Friuli (Italy).

Multimodal (short sea/train/road) connection with the Iberian peninsula, 
with main focus on 45-foot container equipment, offering a viable and 
cost-effective alternative to South–NorthSouth road transport by trailer. 

Project to increase the sea transport proportion of the overall goods 
traffic volume between western and central Europe on one hand and 
the Baltic States and the Community of Independent States (CIS) on the 
other. 

Project to run a regularly scheduled rail connection between Rotterdam 
(Netherlands) and Poznan-Franowo (Poland).

Combined rail shuttle service linking Italy, Germany and the Scandinavian 
market via Switzerland.

The project concerns two rail routes: to/from Golbey (FR) and to/from 
the north of Spain (Tarragona/Barcelona) via the rail/road terminal in 
Le Boulou (FR), connected with each other via a rail hub.

A North–South intermodal rail service for the transport of unaccompa-
nied trailers between rail terminals at Bettembourg (Luxembourg) and Le 
Boulou (Perpignan) using special technology.

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ANNEX I

MP II

Call

Country

Short description of project content

GULF-STREAM

2007

France

ITABEL EXPRESS

SIRIUS 1

VIKING RAIL

2007

2007

2007

Italy

France

Germany

EURO-REEFER RAIL

2008

The Netherlands

KTS

OFE

SCADAE

2008

2008

2008

Italy

Belgium

Italy

Project to provide a direct maritime link between Poole (south coast of 
the United Kingdom) and Santander (northern Spain) for use by trucks 
that cannot drive through France because of weekend bans on the French 
mainland.

Regular block train connection from Pescara (central/southern Italy) to 
Mechelen (Belgium) for household appliances. 

Project for the supply of water by train between the  French production 
plant and the German market.

Rail shuttle between Germany and Sweden to link car parts suppliers 
located in Germany with the manufacturing site in Gothenburg.

Railway service for refrigerated container transport of dairy products and 
other perishables with daily departures from Genk (Belgium) to Busto 
Arsizio (Italy); Zabrze (Poland) to Salzburg (Austria) and Piacenza and 
Padova (Italy); Busto Arsizio (Italy), Slawkow (Poland) and Budapest 
(Hungary) to Zeebrugge (Belgium); Munich (Germany) to Duisburg 
(Germany); and Herne (Germany) to Norrköping (Sweden).

Block train to link various manufacturing plants in Germany, Slovakia and 
Romania to a distribution centre in San Vito al Tagliamento (Italy).

Project to operate a regular railway corridor for containers from 
Zeebrugge and Antwerp (Belgium) to Ottmarsheim (France). 

Project to set up a direct service from the Adriatic ports of Koper 
(Slovenia), Venice, Ravenna and Ancona (Italy) to Thessaloniki (Greece), 
Istanbul and Izmir (Turkey).

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ANNEX II

COMPARISON OF THE MP CALCULATOR COEFFICIENTS OVER TIME 1

Subtypes

2003 call2

2004 call3

2011 call modal shift only4 

Transport 
mode

Road

Rail

0,024

0,012

0,035

0,015

Diesel

Electric

1 000–1 500T

Inland water 
ways

1 500–3 000T (incl.
mixed/ unknown)

0,005

0,010

>3 000T

General/bulk

Container ship

Short sea 
shipping

Ro/Pax (<17kn)

0,004

0,009

Ro/Pax (17–20kn)

Ro/Pax (20–23kn)

Ro/Pax (>23kn)

1  Source: EC/EACI data compiled by the Court. 
2  Source: 2003 call for proposals (OJ C 245, 11.10.2003, p. 52).
3  Source: 2004 call for proposals (OJ C 255, 15.10.2004, p. 8).
4  See 2011 call for proposals (OJ C 309, 21.10.2011, p. 12).
5  The coefficients decrease further if low-sulphur fuel is used.

0,018

0,015

0,004

0,014

0,013

0,010

Conventional 
fuel5

0,007

0,005

0,005

0,009

0,013

0,020

LNG

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,001

0,001

Seawater  
scrubbing

Freshwater 
scrubbing

0,004

0,003

0,003

0,005

0,008

0,011

0,004

0,003

0,003

0,005

0,008

0,011

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31

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

III.
The  programmes  have  delivered  important  modal  shift. 
Marco Polo is about giving limited incentives for switch-
ing  from  road transport  solutions to  more  complex  and 
difficult  to  implement  intermodal  systems. The  already 
completed Marco Polo I programme (MP I) achieved mini -
mum 22 billion tkm spending 41 % of the budget; the final 
results  for  Marco  Polo  II  programme  (MP  II)  are  not  yet 
available because it is still running.

The  main  quantifiable  target  of  MP  I was ‘to  shift  the 
expected yearly aggregate increase’ in international road 
freight traffic. MP II is expected to shift ‘a substantial part’ 
of this increase.

Given the overall budget allocated to Marco Polo by the 
legislative authority and the size of the programme against 
the EU transport sector (MPI represented only 0,01 % and 
MPII around 0,05 % of the EU budget), the Commission did 
not expect a significant change of the balance between 
the modes at EU level. 

Marco Polo allows for quantification of the programme’s 
results, expressed in terms of modal shift. By using the MP 
Calculator (footnote 9 of the Court’s observations) it is pos-
sible to estimate environmental benefits and external cost 
savings delivered by the programme. This is an exceptional 
feature of Marco Polo.

IV.
The programmes have an exceptional mechanism, in that 
the funding disbursements are conditional upon results. 
This ties the financial appropriations strongly to the pro-
gramme’s general objectives, including a quantification of 
the modal shift achievements. 

The programme aims at striking the balance between the 
requirements  of  the  Financial  Regulation  and  the  fund-
ing rules decided on by the European Parliament and the 
Council in the regulations establishing the Marco Polo pro-
grammes and the needs of business. The entry conditions 
were designed to reflect the result-based features of the 
programme and to ensure appropriate levels of administra-
tive control. These entry conditions were revised and mod-
ified over the life cycle of Marco Polo in order to facilitate 
the access to the programme. 

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32

Marco Polo projects were particularly sensitive to the eco-
nomic crisis. This is one of the reasons behind lower than 
desired number of projects supported by the programme.

Since  2010,  EACI  introduced  complementar y  audit  cer-
tificates,  which  gave  additional  certainty  for  the  freight 
transported by Marco Polo projects. This is one of the cor-
rective  measures  introduced  during  the  lifecycle  of  the 
programme.

The  Commission  considers  that  the  funded  transpor t 
services  were  of  satisfactory  sustainability. The  external 
evaluations  per formed  on  the  Marco  Polo  programmes 
(Ecor ys,  2007  and  Europe  Economics,  2011)  show  that 
in  general  the  majority  of  ser vices  (72 %  according  to 
Europe Economics) continue in some form following the 
end of the grant agreement (adapting to changing market 
conditions).

The beneficiaries confirmed that MP subsidy allowed their 
projects to start earlier and increase their scale. 

V.
The Commission would like to point out that:

(1) 

for MP I a relevant market analysis was performed in the frame-
work of the public consultation process and for Marco Polo II 
an ex ante evaluation was carried out in 2004;

(2)  based on the policy feedback, the programmes were subject 
to relevant and timely amendments and modifications over 
their entire life cycle1;

(3)  corrective actions were introduced in a timely fashion and 
in accordance with the standard practices and existing pro-
cedures. 

VI.
The Commission takes note of the recommendation. 

As regards the ‘weaknesses’ identified in this report, the 
Commission recalls its position as provided in the replies 
to paragraphs 15, 16, 26, 27, 31 and 33.

The Commission is aware that the Marco Polo programme 
suffered  from  a number  of  shortcomings.  However,  it  is 
equally of the opinion that the MP programmes have been 
able to help the European transport industry to test inno-
vative solutions and shift a non-negligible amount of traf -
fic off the congested EU roads with a small fraction (from 
0,01 % to 0,05 %) of the EU budget. 

For the future, the Commission considers it advisable to 
provide EU support  for innovative  freight transport ser-
vices in order to pursue the EU transport policy objectives 
(integrated  inter-modal  ser vices,  reducing  congestion, 
reducing environmental impact, innovative solutions, new 
markets and technologies) and to ensure the best interests 
of the EU citizens benefiting from them. 

No  dedicated  funding  regulation  for  Marco  Polo  III  has 
been  proposed  for  the  2014–20  programming  period, 
a general framework for a support of the freight transport 
services was included in the Commission’s proposals for 
the new Trans-European Transport Network ( TEN-T ) guide-
lines and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) already in 
2011.

Any  future  development  of  detailed  actions  in  the  area 
of  freight  transpor t  ser vices  under  the  general  frame-
work stipulated in the TEN-T guidelines, will be based on 
a dedicated  ex ante assessment. including relevant market 
analysis and taking due account of experience and best 
practices of national support schemes. The Court’s recom-
mendation will be considered in this context. 

1  Regulations  1382/2003,  1692/2006,  923/2009  and  a number  of 
changes introduced ad hoc within the legal mandate established by the 
abovementioned regulations.

However,  it  is  up  to  the  legislative  authorities  to  finally 
determine the future framework of this scheme in the con-
text of the MFF, CEF and TEN-T.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION33

OBSERVATIONS

14.
As concerns the ‘significant underperformance’, the Com-
mission considers that the outcome of the programmes 
should also be looked at in the light of changes in mar-
ket situations and the challenges of the economic crisis. 
According to the figures presented in Table 1, in Marco Polo 
I (i.e.  before  the  economic  crisis)  the  targets  set  corres-  
ponded to the estimated market uptake (committed shift) 
by the industry. Moreover, for Marco Polo II, the amount of 
committed shift also corresponds to the substantial part 
of the expected increase of 20,5 btk. In addition, accord-
ing to Table 1 it can be observed that in the first year of 
Marco Polo II the amount of committed shift is higher than 
20.5 btk.

15.
The Commission considers 22,1 billion tkm removed from 
the European roads as a substantial achievement of the 
MPI programme, particularly in view of 41 % of the budget 
spent.

Since the majority of projects continue after the end of 
the funding period, they are likely to generate additional 
modal shift/traffic avoidance (see reply to paragraph 31).

The programme delivered also complementary benefits. 
On the basis of the Marco Polo Calculator (see footnote 9 
of the Court’s observations), the modal shift of 22,1 billion 
tkm has brought up to 434 million euro of environmental 
benefits and external costs savings. Comparing this with 
the budget paid to projects with a modal shift objective 
(32,6 million euro), the Commission considers that each 
euro invested has generated even 13,3 euro of environ-
mental benefits.

16.
As regards the ‘insufficient response’ to the yearly calls for 
project proposals, the Commission draws the attention to 
the adverse effects of the economic crisis, which started 
in 2008, on business. Moreover, the intermodal transport 
solutions are more complex than the road-only transporta-
tion of cargo. Launching a complex project in a  dramati -
cally worsening economic climate bears additional risks. 
This has led to a lower uptake of the programme than orig -
inally expected, before the crisis struck. At the same time, 
the importance of supporting intermodal freight transport 
has  not  diminished,  and  the  political  objectives  of  the 
Marco Polo programme have remained valid.

Common reply to paragraphs 19 and 20
The Commission did not expect a change of the balance 
between the modes at the EU level given the modest size 
of the MP programme:

 —  MPI: 102 million euro, which represented around 0,01 % of the 

EU budget for the financial perspective 2000–06;

 —  MPII: 450 million euro, which represents around 0,05 % of the 

EU budget for the financial perspective 2007–13.

The scope adopted by the co-legislators allowed only for, 
respectively, in the MPI programme to shift ‘the expected 
yearly aggregate increase in international road freight traf-
fic’ (which actually was much higher than forecasted fig-
ures), and in the MPII programme to shift ‘a substantial part 
of the expected yearly aggregate increase in international 
road freight traffic’.

Therefore  the  Commission  considers  that  the  achieve -
ments were significant as concerns the specific objectives 
of the programme.

23.
ESTAT does not collect data on road congestion and this 
activity  is  not  included  in  the  Annual  Statistical  Work 
Programme. As for data on traffic accidents, the Council 
decided on the creation of a Community database on road 
accidents (CARE) in 19932. ESTAT’s yearly table on accidents 
is as complete as realistically possible. 

As for the data provided by the Marco Polo Calculator, the 
Commission considers that the Calculator was as good as 
the underlying methodologies and data available and it 
was updated as soon as the methodological approach for 
valuation of external costs had been agreed at the Com-
mission level3. 

2  Council Decision 93/704/EC (OJ No L329 of 30.12.1993, pp. 63–65).

3  The 2008 handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport 
sector and the Communication ‘Greening transport package’.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION34

Concerning the real leverage level of the programme the 
Commission  estimates  it  to  be  13  euro  of  enviromental 
benefits obtained per 1 euro invested. In addition it should 
also be noted that:

 —  while the road transport has gradually become cleaner, there 
was also technological progress reported by the other modes. 
Therefore, the difference between the old and new coeffi-
cients results not only from better performance of the road 
transport but also from a revised methodology taken up in the 
calculator after 2008 (e.g. CO2 price, differentiation concerning 
types of vessels, fuels, new technologies, electric/diesel trains, 
etc.). 

 —  some costs coefficients have not been included in the cal-
culator due to technical difficulties with their valuation and 
implementation in practice (e.g. missed opportunity costs for 
road infrastructure).

Finally, even though the gap between the road and the 
other transport modes has decreased, overall, non-road 
transport is still more environmentally friendly than haul-
age of cargo by trucks. According to the calculator, only 
one category representing non-road mode delivers worse 
results than the road transport. 

Therefore the Commission considers that the calculator 
provides a good indication of the environmental benefits 
of the MP programme.

25.
The financial and economic crisis is one of the major fac-
tors hampering uptake of the programme and affecting 
the conditions of starting and running Marco Polo projects, 
thus leading to lower absorption of appropriations.

I t  is  also  ack nowledged  that  there  are  projects,  which 
due to MP funding, generate profit or achieve break-even 
point earlier than foreseen in the applications. Since the 
programmes may not pay more to projects than the total 
deficit  experienced  over  the  funding  period  (non-profit 
rule — see also paragraph 5), in some cases the subsidies 
granted to such projects were reduced or even withdrawn. 
This situation, although positive, also contributes to lower 
use of available funds.

26. (a)
The time necessary to develop project ideas by the appli-
cants is beyond the Commission’s control and should not 
be taken into account while calculating time to grant. 

Given the importance of the time-to-grant indicator, the 
procedures in the programme were simplified (amending 
Regulation 923/2009). This allowed shortening the time-
to-grant period (e.g. 209 days in 2011).

Concerning  changes  to  the  projects,  the  flexibility  for 
some would mean unequal treatment for others, particu-
larly those that chose not to apply or were unsuccessful. 
The need to ensure equal treatment and to avoid undue 
competition issues are among the basic principles while 
managing the programme. 

As regards the number of ‘non-starters or early terminators’, 
Marco Polo is a market-driven programme, where market 
and  economic  conditions  are  impor tant  factors  in  the 
success of the projects. Since intermodal transport solu-
tions are more complex than a pure road transportation 
system, the programme has been particularly sensitive to 
the economic crisis. The crisis was one of the main reasons 
explaining the number of unsuccessful projects.

26. (b)
The  rules  applicable  for  catalyst  actions  in  Regulation 
1382/2003  and  original  Regulation  1692/2006,  partially 
allowed a direct reimbursement of expenses incurred for 
ancillary infrastructure and operational equipment (see e.g. 
projects Excite, Ocra).

Regulation 923/2009 simplified the rules for funding for all 
the actions on the basis of three elements: modal shift/
traffic avoidance (with the exception of common learn-
ing actions), eligible costs and cumulative deficit over the 
funding period. 

Therefore,  while  it  is  mostly  the  investor  that  bears  the 
risk of infrastructure investments, in the past a beneficiary 
could obtain partial reimbursement of expenses incurred 
for the infrastructure for a project settled on the basis of 
eligible costs. 

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION35

26. (c)
The programme aims at striking the right balance between 
the requirements of the Financial Regulation and the fund-
ing rules decided on by the European Parliament and the 
Council in the regulations establishing the Marco Polo pro-
grammes and the needs of business. 

26. (d)
Relevant costs related with project development are nor-
mally incurred by companies also in the situation where 
they  run  their  businesses  without  public  suppor t.  It  is 
a standard practice that a certain level of investment (e.g. 
in organisation and project management) should be made 
in any case to start a new project.

27.
Since  2010,  EACI  introduced  complementar y  audit  cer-
tificates,  which  gave  additional  certainty  for  the  freight 
transported  by  Marco  Polo  projects. The  Commission  is 
aware however, that these new rules introduced additional 
requirements for the beneficiaries thus increasing admin-
istrative burden for them. 

The Commission reported in its AAR a residual error rate of 
1,9 % for MPI and 2,9 % for MPII.

29.
Given  the  specificity  of  the  Marco  Polo  projects  (com-
mercial actions), the issue of sustainability is adequately 
addressed  during  the  proposals’  evaluation  process  (as 
a par t  of  credibility  and  viability  analysis).  Indeed,  any 
stricter rules (in particular those conditioning the payment 
of  the  subsidy  on  the  sustainability  of  the  projects)  are 
unrealistic to implement or control and would undoubt-
edly  discourage  applicants  from  the  programme  due 
to increased business risk in case market conditions are 
changed. 

30.
This finding clearly illustrates how complex the business 
environment  is  for  the  Marco  Polo  funded  projects  and 
how  appropriate  the  approach  taken  is  with  respect  to 
sustainability. 

It also shows what Marco Polo is about, i.e. to give limited 
incentives for switching from relatively easy, cheap and 
non risky road transport solutions to more complex and 
difficult to implement intermodal systems.

31.
The external evaluations performed on the Marco Polo pro-
grammes (Ecorys, 2007 and Europe Economics, 2011) show 
that in general the majority of services (72 % according to 
Europe Economics) continue in some form following the 
end of the grant agreement (adapting to changing mar-
ket conditions). Taking into account the dynamic business 
environment, adverse economic climate since 2008 and 
complexity of intermodal solutions compared with road 
only transportation, the Commission considers this figure 
satisfactory. 

This indicates that short-term funding has created long-
term change even in the current evolving market condi-
tions. As a result, programmes are expected to generate 
additional benefits in terms of modal shift/traffic avoid-
ance  and  external  costs  savings  after  the  contractual 
lifetime. 

33.
The Commission considers that the programme has clearly 
an added value for the audited projects, because, despite 
the  deadweight  stated  by  42 %  of  the  surveyed  benefi -
ciaries,  the  EU  funding  allowed  them  to  start  earlier,  to 
increase the scale of the service or to have an earlier return 
on investment.

The deadweight phenomenon is difficult to quantify since 
there might be a lot of factors which may affect the results 
e.g. sustainability issue (a question whether projects would 
have been sustainable without the subsidy), multiplica-
tion factor (bigger projects generating much more modal 
shift), increased credibility and visibility of the beneficiar-
ies (EU project brand), benefits resulting from collabora-
tion between partners (transfer of know-how, best prac-
tices) etc.

34.
The Commission would like to observe that:

(i) 

the programme supports modal shift, i.e. it does not pay for 
cargo already transported by sea, rail or inland waterways. 
It encourages the market to change habits and to shift the 
transport being actually transported on roads to the alterna-
tive modes.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION36

(ii) 

the limited incentives lead to a very high ‘leverage’ effect in 
the MP projects. Nevertheless, these amounts are important 
for beneficiaries usually operating on the small profit margin, 
in the situation where they are expected to compete for cargo 
with the relatively cheap road transport. Actually Marco Polo is 
foreseen to pay for initial losses and to help the beneficiaries 
‘survive’ on the market in the most difficult start-up period.

37.
The programme is addressed both to freight forwarders/
logistics providers, dealing with the organisation of trans-
port links in complex supply chains and to cargo owners or 
their representatives forming the demand side of the mar-
ket. While the first category represents the main MP target 
group, there are number of successful projects submitted 
by shippers (including trucking companies)/manufacturers. 

The  Marco  Polo  target  groups  were  e.g.  analysed  in ‘Ex 
ante evaluation report on MP II’, Ecorys, Chapter 2.2 Needs 
assessment:  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/
evaluations/doc/2004_marco_polo.pdf

38.
The Marco Polo I programme was based on the results of 
the  PAC T  programme  (supporting  combined  transport), 
complemented with analyses and consultations with main 
European transport associations. 

The Marco Polo II programme was supported by an ex ante 
study.

39.
Before the programmes started, the Commission had per-
formed the analysis of obstacles hampering creation and 
development of intermodal services for all the modes of 
transport and proposed specific types of intervention to 
address these modal deficiencies and problems. The Com-
mission refers here to the Consultation Paper developed by 
the Commission in 2001 and distributed to the stakehold-
ers for the needs of public consultations as well as to the 
ex ante study for Marco Polo II, which included a relevant 
market  sur vey  analysis,  lessons  learnt  from  MP  I,  needs 
assessment and a dedicated stakeholder consultation.

40.
These  issues  have  always  been  a major  concern  for  the 
Commission which undertook the following measures:

 — modifications were introduced to the design of Marco Polo II 
programme (increased funding intensity, Amending Regula-
tion 923/2009) during its lifecycle to make it more attractive 
and to further encourage the sector to switch from roads to 
SSS, rail and IWT;

 — specific solutions were proposed under the MP annual work 
programmes and calls for proposals to address the problem of 
potential modal backshift in SSS and rail transport (e.g. political 
priorities and incentives for innovative SSS-services and single 
wagonload traffic);

 — medium and long term measures have been identified and 
proposed at the Commission level to address new require-
ments as regards the sulphur limits in maritime transport, e.g. 
Sustainable waterborne transport toolbox4;

41.
The  figures  of  the  modal  shift  expected  by  the  projects 
selected under the calls 2003 and 2004 were higher than 
modal shift targets set for the MPI programme (12 btkm 
annually) with respectively 12,4 and 14,4 billion tkm. There 
was  no  data  available  giving  reason  to  suspect  that  the 
actual modal shift figures would have been lower than this 
forecast.

The first official report highlighting certain problems was 
indeed the external evaluation of MP I  performed in 2007. 
However, the conclusions of the ECORYS evaluation were 
more balanced, and indicated a rather good effectiveness 
and high leverage of the programme: http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/facts-fundings/evaluations/doc/2007_marco_
polo_1.pdf

4  See ‘Pollutant emission reduction from maritime transport and the 
sustainable waterborne transport toolbox’, SEC(2011) 1052 final.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION42.
‘ Targeted revision of the legal basis’ was the option pur-
sued  as  a result  of  the  ex  ante  assessment. This  option 
addressed  main  recommendations  of  the  2007  ECORYS 
evaluation report and guaranteed that any changes pro-
posed  to  the  programme  would  be  adopted  swiftly  in 
order to be implemented as soon as possible. A major revi -
sion of the programme with policy implications was dis-
carded simply to avoid amendments being adopted too 
late in the lifespan of the programme (2007–13).

Finally, the Regulation 923/2009 entered into force only 
from  the  2010  call  for  proposals  on. Therefore  it  is  too 
early  to  assess  the  long-term  effec ts  brought  by  the 
amendments. 

43.
The Commission acknowledges the potential advantages 
of  programmes  like  Ecobonus  but,  at  the  same  time,  is 
aware that there could also be disadvantages (e.g. admin-
istrative burden and costs, sustainability, efficiency, effects 
on the competition, etc.), especially if such programmes 
were  to  be  implemented  at  the  EU  level,  in  all  the  EU 
Member States. The EU-based programmes have a differ -
ent nature in the sense that they need to be justified on 
grounds of subsidiarity. They need to address problems, 
which cannot be addressed by the Member States them-
selves and achieve objectives, which are not possible to 
achieve  at  the  national  level. There  are  also  significant 
differences between the Member States in terms of geo-
graphical location, freight flows, infrastructure availability, 
modes used, etc. 

While there was no legal obligation for the Commission 
to ‘make  in-depth  analysis  of  national  support  schemes 
to  derive  lessons  for  a possible  redesign  of  the  MP  pro -
grammes’, the Commission, in order to ensure synergy and 
to  avoid  duplication  between  different  funding  instru-
ments  at  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  level,  made  an 
inventor y  of  the  national  support  schemes  and  carried 
out a relevant analysis ( Ex ante evaluation report on MP II, 
Chapter 5 ‘Analysis of European Added Value’). 

37

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44.
The Commission considers that given their very ambitious 
objectives, the programmes may be considered less effec-
tive  than  desired  but  nevertheless  they  have  delivered 
substantial modal shift expressed in billions of tonne kilo-
metres. Marco Polo is about giving limited incentives for 
switching from relatively easy, cheap and non risky road 
transport solutions to more complex and difficult to imple-
ment intermodal systems.

(i)  Marco Polo I achieved minimum 22 billion tkm, which repre-
sents 46 % of the target5. Marco Polo II is still running, hence 
final results are not yet available.

(ii) 

the main quantifiable target of the programmes is ‘to shift the 
expected yearly aggregate increase (a substantial part of it 
for MPII) in international road freight traffic’. Given the overall 
amount of the Marco Polo budget (MPI represented around 
0,01 % and MPII around 0,05 % of the EU budget) and the size 
of the programme against the EU transport sector, the Com-
mission did not expect any significant change of the balance 
between the modes at the EU level. 

(iii)  Marco Polo allows for quantification of the programme's re-
sults, expressed in terms of modal shift. By using the MP Cal-
culator (footnote 9 of the Court’s observations) it is possible 
to estimate environmental benefits and external cost savings 
delivered by the programme. This is an exceptional feature 
of Marco Polo. 

45.
The programme has a unique mechanism at the EU level, 
mak ing  the  funding  disbursements  conditional  upon 
results. This enables the financial appropriations to be used 
in line with the programme’s objectives. 

The conditions for the business environment are not ‘dis-
suasive’. The programme aims at striking the right balance 
between  the  requirements  of  the  Financial  Regulation 
and the funding rules decided on by the European Parlia-
ment and the Council in the regulations establishing the 
Marco Polo programmes and the needs of business. Over 
650 companies have been supported so far and the eco -
nomic crisis is one of the main reasons behind the lower 
than desired uptake of the programme.

5  For achieving this 41 % of the budget was spent.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION38

Marco Polo is about giving limited incentives for switch-
ing from relatively easy, cheap and non-risky road trans-
port solutions to more complex and difficult to implement 
intermodal systems. Therefore Marco Polo projects were 
particularly sensitive to the economic crisis. This is one of 
the reasons behind lower than desired number of projects 
supported by the programme. As regards:

(i) 

since 2010, EACI introduced complementary audit certificates, 
which gave additional certainty for the freight transported by 
Marco Polo projects;

(ii) 

the majority of them continue after the funding period gen-
erating additional modal shift;

(iii)  the deadweight issue in the Marco Polo programme is difficult 
quantify since there might be a lot of factors which may affect 
the results. The Commission considers that the programme 
has clearly an added value for the audited projects, because, 
despite the deadweight stated by 42 % of the surveyed ben-
eficiaries, the EU funding allowed them to start earlier, to in-
crease the scale of the service or to have an earlier return on 
investment.

46.
For Marco Polo I a relevant market analysis was performed 
in the framework of the public consultation process and 
for Marco Polo II a fully-fledged  ex ante evaluation was car-
ried out in 2004.

Recommendation (a)
The Commission takes note of the recommendation.

As regards the ‘weaknesses’ identified in this report, the 
Commission recalls its position as provided in reply to par-
agraphs 15, 16, 26, 27, 31 and 33. 

The Commission is aware that the Marco Polo programme 
suffered  from  a number  of  shortcomings.  However,  it  is 
equally of the opinion that the MP programmes have been 
able to help the European transport industry to test inno-
vative solutions and shift a non-negligible amount of traf -
fic off the congested EU roads, with a small fraction (from 
0,01 % to 0,05 %) of the EU budget. 

For the future, the Commission considers it advisable to 
provide EU support  for innovative  freight transport ser-
vices in order to pursue the EU transport policy objectives 
(integrated  inter-modal  ser vices,  reducing  congestion, 
reducing environmental impact, innovative solutions, new 
markets and technologies) and to ensure the best interests 
of the EU citizens benefiting from them. 

No dedicated funding regulation for a Marco Polo III has 
been proposed for the 2014–20 programming period, but 
a general framework for a support of the freight transport 
services has been included in the Commission’s propos-
als for the new Trans-European Transport Network ( TEN-
T )  guidelines  and  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF) 
already in 2011.

Based on the policy feedback, the programmes were sub-
ject to relevant and timely amendments and modifications 
over their entire life cycle.

Any future development of detailed actions in the area of 
freight  transport  ser vices  under  the  general  framework 
stipulated in the TEN-T guidelines will be based on a  dedi-
cated ex ante assessment. 

Corrective actions were introduced in a timely fashion and 
in  accordance  with  the  standard  practices  and  existing 
procedures.

However,  it  is  up  to  the  legislative  authorities  to  finally 
determine the future framework of this scheme in the con-
text of the MFF, CEF and TEN-T.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION39

Recommendation (b)
The Commission agrees on the need for an ex ante impact 
assessment,  tak ing  due  account  of  best  prac tices  of 
national support schemes.

Recommendation (b) (iv)
The proposals for TEN-T guidelines and CEF identify the 
bottlenecks  and  interoperability  as  some  of  the  main 
objectives of the EU intervention in the area of transport. 

As explained under point (a), this analysis can only be car-
ried out after that the legislative process for the MFF, CEF 
and TEN-T has been completed. This process will provide 
the framework for the Marco Polo follow-up. 

Recommendation (b) (v)
The Commission accepts to ensure that adequate data are 
available to demonstrate the performance achieved by the 
funded actions.

Since this ex ante analysis will be a basis for the design of 
the instrument supporting freight transport services, the 
Commission considers that some of the following recom-
mendations are premature at this stage. 

Recommendation (b) (vi)
Efforts will be made to further reduce the time needed for 
project selection and contracting in line with the Financial 
Regulation.

Recommendation (b) (vii)
Making sustainability of projects for at least three years 
after  completion  a necessary  condition  is  unrealistic  to 
implement or control in the context of the volatile busi-
ness environment. This would discourage applicants and 
increase substantially the business risk in case market con-
ditions are changed.

Recommendation (b) (viii)
Risks related to the deadweight phenomenon and the effi-
cient ways to tackle it will be addressed in the abovemen-
tioned ex ante analysis.

Recommendation (b) (i)
As mentioned under the previous paragraphs, the design 
of the Marco Polo programme type of actions under the 
new TEN-T programme has not been determined yet and 
will result from the policy framework setting and the ex 
ante assessment. The Commission agrees on the need to 
set  realistic  targets  for  the  new  instrument  and  to  take 
prompt actions to remedy shortfalls if necessary. Never-
theless, the focus of the follow-up of the Marco Polo pro-
gramme will not necessarily remain on modal shift and its 
targets will not necessarily be set in respect to the volumes 
shifted off the road.

Recommendation (b) (ii)
The  funding  mechanism  for  the  follow-up  of  the  Marco 
Polo programme type of actions will result from the policy 
context and be based on the ex ante analysis. 

Recommendation (b) (iii)
Such an assessment will be carried out in the context of 
the abovementioned ex ante analysis. 

Special Report No 3/2013 – Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

REPLY OF THE  COMMISSIONEuropean Court of Auditors

Special Report No 3/2013
Have the Marco Polo programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union

2013 — 39 pp. — 21 × 29.7 cm

ISBN 978-92-9241-204-3
doi:10.2865/77812

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SINCE 2003, THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES HAVE FINANCED PROJEC TS THAT SHIFT 

FREIGHT TRANSPORT FROM ROAD TO RAIL, INLAND WATERWAYS AND SHORT SEA SHIP-

PING SO AS TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL ROAD FREIGHT TRAFFIC, IMPROVE THE ENVIRON-

MENTAL PERFORMANCE OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT, REDUCE CONGESTION AND INCREASE 

ROAD SAFET Y. GIVEN THE MANY WEAKNESSES OBSERVED, THE COURT CONSIDERS THE 

PROGRAMMES  NOT TO  BE  EFFEC TIVE  (THEY  DID  NOT  AT TAIN THEIR  OUTPUT TARGETS 

AND  HAD  NO  IMPAC T  IN  SHIFTING  FREIGHT  OFF THE  ROADS; THERE  ARE  NO  DATA TO 

ASSESS THE EXPECTED BENEFITS; THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH PROJECT PROPOSALS; THE 

LIMITED QUANTITIES REPORTED SHIFTED ARE UNCERTAIN; MANY PROJEC TS WERE OF 

POOR SUSTAINABILIT Y AND WOULD HAVE STARTED EVEN WITHOUT EU-FUNDING). THE 

COURT THEREFORE SUGGESTS DISCONTINUING THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES AND, IN 

ORDER TO STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE IN POSSIBLE FUTURE TRANSPORT SERVICES SUP-

PORT SCHEMES, THE COURT MAKES FUNDING CONDITIONAL UPON A DETAILED EX ANTE 

ASSESSMENT  OF THE  POTENTIAL  DEMAND,  AND  ONLY  IF  SUCH  A POTENTIAL  EXISTS, 

PRESCRIBES CLEAR RULES AND CONDITIONS TO RESPECT FOR FUTURE FUNDING.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS