COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Date: 2013-06-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EAEC, nuclear energy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, safety standard

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 13.6.2013  
SWD(2013) 200 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Council Directive 

amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the
nuclear safety of nuclear installations 

{COM(2013) 343 final} 
{SWD(2013) 199 final} 
{SWD(2013) 201 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Council Directive 

amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-
thirds of its low-carbon electricity. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and 
its people. The costs of a nuclear accident could be so large, that they are potentially ruinous 
to national economies. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk 
of a nuclear accident in a Member State of the EU by applying high nuclear safety standards 
and a high quality of regulatory oversight. The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 
renewed  political  attention  worldwide  on  the  measures  needed  to  ensure  robust  levels  of 
nuclear safety. 
Based upon a mandate from the European Council in March 20111, the European Commission 
(EC), together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-
wide  comprehensive  risk  &  safety  assessments  of  nuclear  power  plants  ('Stress  Tests').  The 
results  identified  differences  in  nuclear  safety  approaches  and  industry  practices  in  the 
participating countries2.  

The mandate from the European Council included the request to the EC to review the existing 
legal  and  regulatory  framework  for  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and  to  propose  any 
improvements that may be necessary. Any legislative proposals should take into account the 
conclusions of the Stress Tests and the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident, 
as  well  as  the  input  from  an  open  public  consultation  and  stakeholders'  views.  The 
consultation  showed  that  a  large  majority  are  in  favour  of  reinforcing  the  EU  legislative 
framework. 

This  Impact  Assessment  takes  into  account  the  above-mentioned  factors,  describing  the 
challenge of ensuring sufficient levels of nuclear safety in the EU. It defines the general and 
specific objectives for the enhanced prevention and mitigation of nuclear accidents. A number 
of policy options are proposed and analysed, ranging from maintaining the current situation to 
more  profound  reforms.  Each  option  has  been  assessed  for  its  estimated  safety,  economic, 
environmental and social impacts.  

The  selected  option  amends  the  existing  Council  Directive  2009/71/Euratom  establishing  a 
Community  framework  for  the  nuclear  safety  of  nuclear  installations3  ('Nuclear  Safety 

1 
2 

3 

European Council, EUCO 10/1/ 11  
Peer  Review  Report  –  Stress  Tests  performed  on  European  nuclear  power  plants,  25  April  2012 
(http://www.ensreg.eu/node/407) 
OJ L 172, 2.7.2009 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Directive'), by strengthening existing / introducing new general nuclear safety principles and 
requirements, complemented by harmonised Euratom nuclear safety criteria and procedures to 
verify their implementation at national level. It also provides for greater independence of the 
regulators  and  increased  public  transparency  about  the  performance  of  the  industry  and  the 
regulators.  While  some  of  the  underlying  measures  of  the  preferred  option  can  be 
implemented  without  delay,  others  require  technical  development  work  with  input  from 
Member States.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The  accident  at  the  Fukushima  Daiichi  nuclear  power  plant  (NPP)  in  2011  resulted  in 
significant  environmental,  economic  and  social  damage,  and  raised  concerns  about  possible 
health  effects  in  the  affected  population  in  Japan.  Although  triggered  by  an  earthquake  and 
tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range 
of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the 
Fukushima  accident  reveals  quite  substantial,  and  recurring  technical  issues  as  well  as 
persistent  institutional  failures  similar  to  the  ones  from  the  post-accident  evaluations  of  the 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident 
once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so 
at a time when use of nuclear power is being debated as possible option to meet global energy 
demands in a sustainable manner.  

The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear 
power  reactors  in  the  world.  Many  of  the  EU  NPPs  were  constructed  already  three  to  four 
decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated 
since then. In May 2011, the "stress-tests" were launched to assess if current safety margins 
are  sufficient  to  cover  various  unexpected  events.  The  results  show  various  strengths  and 
weaknesses  across  all  NPPs,  including  the  clear  need  to  implement  for  a  number  of  plants 
measures to increase the robustness against several types of internal and external hazards. The 
tests also showed significant differences in national approaches to the assessment of beyond-
design basis accidents that make an adequate assessment of current safety levels difficult or 
impossible.  For  example,  in  some  cases  earthquake  risk  was  not  considered  in  the  original 
design basis  but  only introduced  at a later stage, and/or underestimated. New approaches to 
seismic  hazard  and  risk  assessment  have  since  been  developed,  but  not  all  operators  have 
reassessed site hazards and seismic risks with recent methodologies, data and criteria.  

3. 

SPECIFIC ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED 

Based  on  various  sources  of  expertise,  such  as  corresponding  initiatives  by  the  IAEA  and 
WENRA  as  well  as  lessons  learned  from  the  EU  Stress  Tests  and  Fukushima  accident 
investigations,  key  areas  for  improvement  of  nuclear  safety  have  been  identified.  These 
problem areas concern technical issues (in particular plant siting and design), the regulatory 
oversight,  aspects  related  to  nuclear  safety  governance  (regulatory  independence  and 
transparency) as well as the issue of emergency preparedness and response. 

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

Technical issues 
Regulatory oversight issues 
Regulatory independence issues 
Transparency issues 
Emergency preparedness and response issues 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
 
The  main  shortcomings  identified  include  gaps  in  ensuring  comprehensive  and  transparent 
identification  and  management  of  key  safety  issues,  failure  to  implement  important  safety 
measures and the absence of a consistent approach among Member States to the regulation of 
nuclear risks despite their transboundary nature. 

The current Euratom nuclear safety legislation, in particular the Nuclear Safety Directive, sets 
up  a  legally  binding  Euratom  framework  based  upon  internationally  recognised  general 
principles and obligations. However, the scope of this Directive being limited to these overall 
principles, its main weakness is that it has no means to address at a sufficiently detailed level 
the technical safety issues arising from the Fukushima nuclear accident and identified in the 
course of the Stress Tests. Furthermore, the current provisions of the Directive do not appear 
to be sufficient in the area of the independence of national regulatory authorities. Moreover, 
the  Stress  Tests  show  that  cooperation  and  coordination  mechanisms  between  all  parties 
having responsibilities for nuclear safety, for example in the form of as peer reviews, should 
be strengthened. The current provisions of the Directive concerning transparency should also 
be  further  enhanced.  In  addition,  the  issue  of  adequate  on-site  emergency  preparedness  and 
response should also be considered. 

Notwithstanding  the  role  of  the  Stress  Tests  in  enhancing  the  safety  of  EU  NPPs,  their 
weakness is related to their non-binding nature. As a voluntary, one-time exercise they do not 
guarantee that the identified measures will be fully implemented and regularly updated. 
Through  the  IAEA,  safety  principles,  standards  and  international  Conventions4  governing 
nuclear  safety  have  been  developed  and  agreed.  However,  these  safety  standards  are  not 
legally binding, while the international Conventions are legally binding but not enforceable. 
Euratom  legislation  benefits  from  clear  and  strong  mechanisms  for  sanction  for  its  proper 
transposition and implementation. Following the events at Fukushima, IAEA Member States 
generally acknowledge the need to enhance the effectiveness, governance and enforceability 
of the international legal framework for nuclear safety. 

4. 

EURATOM COMPETENCE, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Any legislative revision should build upon and enhance the approach of the current Nuclear 
Safety Directive. The legal basis remains Articles 31 and 32 of the Euratom Treaty. 

Any revision proposal should aim at strengthening even further the role and independence of 
the competent regulatory authorities as it is clear that only strong regulators endowed with all 
the necessary powers and independence guarantees can oversee and ensure the safe operation 
of  nuclear  installations  in  the  EU.  Close  cooperation  and  information-sharing  between 
regulators, taking into account the potential cross-border impacts of a nuclear accident, should 
be encouraged.  

Given  the  wide  consequences  of  a  nuclear  incident  and  particularly  the  public  need  for 
information in such a case, an EU wide approach on transparency issues is essential. This can 
ensure  that,  irrespective  of  state  borders,  the  public  is  properly  informed  on  all  relevant 
nuclear safety matters to ensure uniform level of transparency and information throughout the 
EU. 

In  Europe,  the  Stress  Tests  have  confirmed  that  there  are  not  only  continued  differences 
between the EU Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and 
management of key safety issues, but that also significant gaps remain. Strengthened Euratom 
legislation  could  include  a  set  of  technical  provisions  at  an  appropriate  level  of  detail  for  a 

4 

In particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449 of 5 July 1994) 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
framework  legal  instrument.  These  provisions  should  ensure  a  common  EU  approach  to 
nuclear safety. 

The experience from the Fukushima accident and the valuable insights coming from the Stress 
Tests  have  clearly  shown  that  a  strong  and  transparent  monitoring  system  (including  peer-
reviews) is an essential element to ensure the effective and continuous implementation of any 
safety regime.  

In accordance with the proportionality principle, the envisaged revision should not go beyond 
what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives.  Furthermore,  taking  into  account  the  different 
situations in the Member States, a flexible and proportionate approach as regards the level of 
applicability should be defined. A mechanism of developing EU-wide technical criteria with 
special regard to the principle of proportionality should be envisaged in which the knowledge 
and practical experience of the experts from the Member States is fully used. 

5. 

OBJECTIVES 

General objectives 

• 

• 

To  protect  workers  and  the  general  public  from  dangers  arising  from  ionising 
radiations  from  nuclear  installations,  by  achieving  proper  operating  conditions, 
preventing accidents and mitigating accident consequences; 

To  maintain  and  promote  the  continuous  improvement  of  nuclear  safety  and  its 
regulation at Euratom level;  

Specific objectives  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

To  continuously 
the  overall  nuclear  safety  architecture  (e.g.  by 
strengthening  existing  /  introducing  new  general  nuclear  safety  Principles  and 
Requirements). 

improve 

To  continuously 
the  specific  nuclear  safety  architecture  (e.g.  by 
complementing the above-mentioned safety principles and requirements by Euratom 
Nuclear Safety Criteria). 

improve 

To  continuously  improve  the  nuclear  safety  assessment  methodologies  (e.g.  by 
encouraging  the  consistent  and  comprehensive  use  of  risk-informed  methods  for 
decision-making support); 

To  ensure  cooperation  and  coordination  between  all  parties  having  responsibilities 
for nuclear safety on technical matters, including peer-reviews; 

To strengthen the role of the national regulatory authorities; 

To strengthen the effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; 

To enhance nuclear safety transparency; 

To reinforce on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements. 

6. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

POLICY OPTION 0  

• 

Leaving  the  current  Euratom  framework  Directive  (Nuclear  Safety  Directive) 
unchanged. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
• 

Using the existing mechanism of cooperation between the EC and the Member States 
on the implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests process through 
ENSREG. 

POLICY OPTION 1  

• 

• 

• 

Legislative action (legally binding act) at Euratom level. 

Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing general Principles 
and  Requirements  (e.g.  role  &  independence  of  the  national  regulatory  authorities; 
transparency)  and  adding  new  ones  (e.g.  on-site  emergency  preparedness  and 
response; siting, design & construction, and operation of nuclear installations.  

Using the existing mechanism of cooperation between the EC and the Member States 
on the implementation of the measures arising from the Stress Tests process through 
ENSREG. 

POLICY OPTION 2  

SUB-OPTION 2.1 

• 

• 

• 

Legislative action (combination of legally binding & specifying legally non-binding 
acts) at Euratom level. 

Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing / introducing new 
general  Principles  and  Requirements  (as  Policy  Option  1)  +  introducing  in  the 
Directive  the  mandate  for  the  EC  to  support  these  general  Principles  and 
Requirements,  by  developing  legally  non-binding  Euratom  Nuclear  Safety  Criteria 
(Commission Recommendations).  

These Euratom Nuclear Safety Criteria would be developed in close cooperation with 
experts from the Member States.  

SUB-OPTION 2.2 

• 

• 

• 

Legislative action (combination of a legally binding act & specifying legally binding 
acts) at Euratom level 

Amending the Nuclear Safety Directive by strengthening existing / introducing new 
general  Principles  and  Requirements  (as  Policy  Option  1)  +  introducing  in  the 
Directive the mandate for the EC to specify the general Principles and Requirements, 
by  developing  legally  binding  Euratom  Nuclear  Safety  Criteria  (Commission 
Regulations).  

These  Nuclear  Safety  Criteria  would  be  developed  in  close  cooperation  between 
expert  working  groups  such  as  ENSREG  and  WENRA  and  EC  experts. 
Subsequently, they would be adopted using a "comitology" procedure requiring the 
input of all Member States. 

POLICY OPTION 3  

• 

• 

Legislative action (legally binding act) at Euratom level 

Establishing  a  Euratom  Nuclear  Safety  Regulatory  Agency  to  administrate  and 
further develop the Euratom nuclear safety acquis, as developed under Policy Option 
2, under the supervision of the EC, with the mission to: 

-Promote the highest common standards for safe generation of nuclear power in the EU.  

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
-To  assist  the  EC  to  develop  harmonised  technical  nuclear  safety  requirements  /  standards  / 
criteria, which would be incorporated in proposals for new Euratom nuclear safety legislation; 
to  conduct  inspections  in  order  to  monitor  the  correct  implementation  of  legislation;  to 
develop a Euratom certification system of standard designs of nuclear facilities; to elaborate a 
uniform  licence  content  &  licencing  procedure,  to  intervene  in  case  of  nuclear  accidents  or 
incidents; to formulate opinions and recommendations to the  Commission on nuclear safety 
matters; to collect and analyse data to further improve nuclear safety. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

7. 
Table 1 – Comparison of the Policy Options in terms of their impacts (summary) 

Policy 
Option 

Safety 
Impact 

Compliance 
costs for 
operators  

(per reactor 
unit) 

Regulatory 
costs and 
administrat
ive burden 
for 
Member 
States 

(per 
reactor unit 
per year) 

~€3 
million  

Range: 
~€1-4 
million 

≤€5 
million  

Very 
unlikely 
to reduce 
risks 

Range: 
~€30-200 
million  

Range: 
~€30-200 
million  

Only 
some 
gains in 
safety 

Significa
nt gains 
in safety 
at least 
for some 
NPPs in 
some 
Member 
States 

Significa
nt gains 
in safety 
at least 
for some 
NPPs in 
some 
Member 
States 

≥€200 
million  

≤€5 
million  

≥€200 
million  

≤€5 
million  

0 

1 

2 

3 

EN 

Environme
ntal Impact 

Employme
nt in 
Europe's 
nuclear 
sector 

Afforda
bility 
of 
Energy 

~500000 
persons 

High 

~500000 + 
~500 

High 

∼High 

~500000 + 
~500 + 
~500 

∼High 

~500000 + 
~500 + 
~500 + 
~250 

Very 
unlikely to 
reduce 
risks 

No 
significant 
risk 
reduction  

Significant 
improveme
nts at least 
for some 
NPPs in 
some 
Member 
States 

Significant 
improveme
nts at least 
for some 
NPPs in 
some 
Member 
States 

7 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
8. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

Policy  option  1  produces  some  beneficial  effects  on  nuclear  safety,  due  to  the  inclusion  of 
additional legally binding and enforceable rules (even if these are only at the level of general 
principles and requirements). On the other hand, Policy Options 2 and 3 are likely to result in 
significantly further improvements to the safety of EU NPPs through the adoption of Euratom 
Nuclear  Safety  Criteria,  which  would  provide  for  objective,  verifiable  safety  benchmarks. 
Compared to Policy Options 0 and 1, the additional costs of Policy Options 2 and 3 of at least 
~€200  million  per  reactor  unit  over  the  next  ~5-10  years  seem  acceptable,  especially  when 
compared to the costs of a nuclear accident.  

Policy option 3, which goes further, requires significant changes in the organisational setup of 
the Commission and in the current Euratom safety architecture. As it requires major changes 
of  the  safety  culture  and  architecture  of  the  Member  States,  at  this  time,  it  cannot  be 
considered as a realistic option to achieve immediate benefits for nuclear safety.  

As regards Policy Option 2, both Sub-options 2.1 and 2.2 fully address the objectives outlined 
in  section  5.  A  fully  binding  approach,  as  in  Sub-option  2.2,  would  be  the  most  effective. 
However,  the  advantage  of  Sub-option  2.1  is  that  whilst  it  requires  the  implementation  of 
these general principles and requirements, it offers a more flexible approach for the Member 
States to comply with the recommended Euratom Nuclear Safety criteria. It would allow for 
experience to be gained on how these criteria are applied in practice and make it possible to 
respond  more  quickly  to  new  technical  developments.  Moreover,  following  a  step-wise 
approach,  it  would  also  be  possible,  learning  from  this  experience,  to  transform  the 
recommended  criteria  into  legally  binding  ones  at  a  later  stage.  In  conclusion,  it  is 
recommended to consider either Policy Option 2.1 or 2.2.  

EN 

8 

   EN