COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Legislative proposals to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+
Date: 2013-06-11
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: air safety, air space, air traffic, air traffic control

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Strasbourg, 11.6.2013  
SWD(2013) 207 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Legislative proposals  

to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+ 

{COM(2013) 410 final} 
{SWD(2013) 206 final}

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Legislative proposals  

to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+ 

1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The Single European Sky (SES) initiative aims to improve the overall efficiency of the way in 
which European airspace is organised and managed. The experience gained with SES I since 
2004 and SES II since 2009 has shown that the principles and direction of the SES are valid 
and warrant a continuation of their implementation. But the initiative is experiencing delays in 
its  implementation.  The  SES 2+  package  should  improve  implementation  of  SES II  by 
focusing on certain institutional matters, as well as on further performance improvement of air 
navigation service provisions. 

The  first  problem  area  addressed  in  the  SES2+  impact  assessment  is  the  insufficient 
efficiency  of  Air  Navigation  Service  (ANS)  provision.  ANS  provision  remains  relatively 
inefficient in terms of cost- and flight efficiency, as well as of capacity offered. This is clear 
when compared with the United States, which covers airspace of a similar size. In the US, the 
airspace is controlled by a single service provider, as opposed to 38 en-route service providers 
in Europe. The US service provider controls almost 70 % more flights with 38 % fewer staff. 
The  main  causes  for  this  difference  in  productivity  are  Europe’s  shortcomings  in  setting  up 
and  enforcing  the  performance  scheme,  ineffective  supervisory  authorities  and  the 
disproportionally high number of support staff working for the service providers. 

The  second  key  problem  addressed  is  a  fragmented  ATM  system.  The  European  ATM 
system consists of 27 national authorities overseeing over a hundred Air Navigation Service 
Providers (ANSPs), with the expected differences in systems, rules and procedures. There are 
many  additional  costs  caused  by  Europe  having  a  large  number  of  service  providers,  each 
procuring  their  own  systems,  mostly  training  their  own  staff,  creating  their  own  operating 
procedures  and  being  limited  territorially  to  providing  services  in  a  small  airspace.  To 
overcome  fragmentation,  the  SES  has  introduced  the  idea  of  cross-border  Functional  Air 
Blocks  (FABs)  and  a  centralised  Network  Manager  to  run  certain  network-level  services. 
However,  FABs  are  not  yet  performance-oriented  and  the  Network  Manager  remains  too 
weak. 

The SES 2+ initiative will affect most ANSPs, Member State authorities, airspace users, the 
Commission and EASA. 

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Problems, drivers and root causes 

Problems

Drivers

Root causes

The gaps in ANSP 
performance

Insufficient efficiency of 
ANSP

ANSPs are to a great extent 
natural monopolies

ANSPs operations  lack 
customer focus

Ineffective regulatory role 
of NSAs

Shortcomings  in setting up 
and enforcing the 
performance scheme

Inefficient governance 
mechanism for setting up 
the performance scheme

Performance of FABs is not  
meeting expectations

FABs are not performance 
driven - insufficient value-
added of the current 
scheme

Performance of Network 
Manager is not  meeting 
expectations

Weak role and limited 
scope of the Network 
Manager

A fragmented ATM system

2. 

SUBSIDIARITY 

Articles 58, 90, and 100 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union extend to air 
transport  the  objectives  of  the  internal  market  in  the  context  of  a  Common  EU  Transport 
Policy. 

Actions  by  Member  States  alone  cannot  ensure the  optimal  building  of  capacity  and  safety, 
whilst reducing the cost levels of EU air traffic management services. In agreeing to the SES I 
and SES II packages, Member States acknowledged that fragmentation of European airspace, 
driven by national rules and geographical borders, is at the centre of the problem. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

General objective: 

Improve  the  competitiveness  of  the  European  Aviation  system  vis-á-vis  other  comparable  regions,  and  in 
particular develop further the Single European Sky initiative  

Specific objectives: 

SO1: 

Improve performance of Air Traffic Services in terms of efficiency 

SO2: 

Improve utilisation of air traffic management capacity 

Operational objectives: 

OO1:  Ensure  that  the  provision  of  Air  Navigation  Services  is  transparent,  based  on  market  principles  and 
customer value. 

OO2: 

Strengthen the role of the National Supervisory Authorities 

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OO3: 
reinforcement of the Performance Review Body/Performance Review Unit (PRB/PRU) 

Strengthen  the  process  of  setting  up  targets  and  enforcing  the  performance  scheme  (including  the 

OO4: 

Strategic redirection of FABs 

OO5: 

Strengthen the governance and operational scope of the Network Manager 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

Based on analysis and stakeholder consultation, a broad set of measures in six policy domains 
have been identified, all with the potential to address all the problem drivers described above. 

Root cause of problem areas 

Policy domains 

Policy options considered 

Problem Area 1: Insufficient efficiency of Air Navigation Service provision 

ANSPs are to a great extent 
natural monopolies 

1: Support services  

1.1 — Do nothing 

ANSP operations lack customer 
focus 

2: Focusing ANSPs on 
customer needs 

Ineffective regulatory role of 
NSAs 

3: Ineffective role of 
NSAs 

Inefficient governance 
mechanism for setting up the 
performance scheme 

4: Performance 
scheme governance 
mechanism 

Problem Area 2: A fragmented ATM system 

1.2 — Functional separation of support services  

1.3 — Structural separation of support services 

2.1 — Do nothing 

2.2 — Improved consultation and sign-off on certain investment 

plans by airspace users. 

2.3  –  2.2  plus  giving  airspace  user  groups  a  role  in  ANSP 

governance 

3.1 — Do nothing.  

3.2 — Introduce mutual cooperation, EU-level coordination and 

pooling of experts 

3.3 – 3.2 plus institutional separation of NSAs from the ANSPs 

4.1 — Do nothing 

4.2 — Reduced Member State involvement in the target setting 

process. The PRB under Commission supervision.  

4.3 — Allow Member States to directly nominate  the PRB, but 
let the PRB set targets itself, without comitology. 

FABs are not performance-
driven, and the current set-up 
has insufficient added value 

5: Refocusing of FABs 

5.1 — Do nothing.  

5.2 — Create more prescriptive and enforceable targets/criteria 

for FABs  

5.3  —  Create  a  more  flexible  and  performance-driven  FAB 

model 

5.4 — Top-down approach, with a new entity created from the 
PRB  and  the  Network  Manager  to  design  service 
provision  

Weak role and limited scope of 
the Network Manager 

6: The role of the 
Network Manager 

6.1 — Do nothing  

6.2 — Move operational governance to industry and simplify EU 

and state governance of strategic matters  

6.3 — Create a joint undertaking of industry to run the Network 

Manager  

6.4 — As option 6.2 or 6.3, but with a role for Eurocontrol built 
around 
the  Network  Manager  and  a  more 
comprehensive  centralised  service  provider,  and 
including airspace design in the broad sense 

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Policy Option 1: Support services1. The first option is to do nothing (1.1). Support services 
can  also  be  functionally  (option  1.2)  or  structurally  (option  1.3)  separated.  In  case  of 
functional separation, ANSPs would need to internally organise provision of support services, 
so that these can be clearly distinguished as a separate business unit. If structural separation is 
chosen,  assets  and  staff  required  for  support  service  provision  would  be  transferred  to  a 
separate organisation independent from the core air traffic control service provider. 

Policy  Option  2:  Focusing  ANSPs  on  customer  needs.  The  first  option  is  to  do  nothing 
(2.1).  The  second  option  (2.2)  requires  improved  airspace  user  consultation  and  enables 
airspace user-groups to ‘sign-off’ on ANSP investment plans. Option 2.3 builds on option 2.2 
by  adding  a  compulsory  management/supervisory  board  seat  for  each  of  the  three  airspace 
user groups (airlines, military aviation and general/business aviation). 

Policy  Option  3:  Ineffective  role  of  National  Supervisory  Authorities  (NSAs).  The  first 
option is to do nothing (3.1). Option 3.2 focuses on creating closer cooperation between the 
NSAs  and  encouraging  exchange  of  best  practice  and  pooling  of  national  experts  under 
EASA. Option 3.3 builds on option 3.2 but requires NSAs’ full institutional separation from 
the ANSPs they oversee, instead of the current functional separation. 

Policy  Option  4:  Performance  scheme  governance  mechanism.  If  the  do  nothing  option 
(4.1) is chosen, it would be impossible to reach the initial 2020 SES objectives. With option 
4.2,  the  process  of  setting  targets  would  be  shortened  and  the  possibility  for  Member  State 
influence  would  be  reduced.  Option  4.3  would  turn  the  existing  setting  upside-down  by 
allowing  Member  States  (instead  of  the  Commission)  to  nominate  PRB  members,  while 
adhering  to  strict  independence  criteria.  The  PRB  would  then  set  targets  itself  and  the 
comitology process would be entirely eliminated to ensure process speed and efficiency. 

Policy Option 5: Refocusing of FABs. The do nothing option (5.1) would enable the slow 
process to continue and wouldn’t increase the FABs’ focus on performance. Option 5.2 would 
replace the current FAB criteria with prescriptive targets. Option 5.3 would make the FABs 
more flexible tools for improving performance. Airspace design would be increasingly moved 
to  the  Network  Manager  (the  level  above  FABs).  In  option  5.4,  a  central  planning  entity 
would be created to redesign EU airspace based on 4-6 major concession blocks. 

Policy  Option  6:  The  role  of  the  Network  Manager.  In  the  do  nothing  option  (6.1),  the 
Network Manager would continue to develop based on the current legal scope and functions. 
In  option  6.2,  a  two-level  governance  system  would  be  created.  Member  States  would  still 
retain  a  veto  right  in  matters  relevant  to  national  sovereignty,  but  industry  would  ensure 
operational governance. In option 6.3, the Network Manager would become an Industry Joint 
Undertaking.  Like  options  6.2  and  6.3,  option  6.4  would  require  governance  reform  to 
improve industry’s  role. A key additional feature  of  option  6.4  is  the  concept  of centralised 
services  in  which  certain  new  ATM  services  driven  by  SESAR-related  data  would  be 
centralised. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT 

Given the strong focus on cost-efficiency, the main impacts of this initiative are economic and 
social, whilst the environmental impacts are mostly indirect. 

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Services  such  as  aeronautical  information,  communication,  navigation,  surveillance  or  meteorology, 
which support the core air traffic service providers. 

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5.1. 

Integrated structure and support services 

Option 1.2 (functional separation) brings limited benefits, mainly in terms of transparency of 
costs  related  to  support  services.  Option  1.3  (structural  separation)  is  more  likely  to 
encourage  ANS  competition  and  drive  down  costs  for  air  operators.  However,  efficiency 
gains  could  result  in  more  demanding  working  conditions  and  reduced  employment  in  the 
ANSPs.  Hence,  option  1.3  is  the  most  performance-optimised  one,  while  option  1.2  brings 
incremental  performance  improvements  with  fewer  redundancies  and  distress  for  ANSP 
employees. 

5.2. 

Focusing ANSPs on customer needs 

Both  option  2.2.  (improved  consultation  and  sign-off)  and  2.3.  (governance  board)  would 
have a positive impact on overall efficiency and capacity, but also some negative impact on 
employment conditions in ANSPs. While the benefits of option 2.3 are marginally higher than 
those of option 2.2, option 2.3 carries higher risks and would be more difficult to implement 
politically. Therefore, option 2.2 seems to have the best balance between short- and long-term 
costs and benefits. 

5.3. 

Ineffective role of NSAs 

Option 3.3, which adds institutional separation to option 3.2 (mutual cooperation and expert 
pooling), gives higher benefits, but there are high associated political risks. Although the risks 
associated  with  option  3.2  are  lower,  its  benefits  are  also  significantly  smaller.  Therefore, 
option 3.3 is the preferred one. 

5.4. 

Performance scheme governance mechanism 

Options  4.2  and  4.3  have  similar  broad  outcomes,  but  carry  major  differences  in  associated 
(political) risks. For option 4.2 (reduced Member State involvement), the risk is linked to the 
likelihood  of  Member  States  achieving  agreement  on  the  proposal.  Option  4.3  (direct 
nomination of the PRB by Member States, without comitology) carries a considerable risk of 
the EU losing control of the performance scheme. The choice is based on the risk assessment, 
which tips the scales in favour of option 4.2. 

5.5. 

Refocusing of FABs 

Option 5.4 (top-down FABs) has by far the highest possible efficiency and capacity benefits, 
but  is  also  politically  very  difficult  to  implement  and  contains  some  serious  technical 
feasibility risks. Option 5.3 (flexible FABs) provides roughly the same benefits as option 5.2 
(prescriptive targets), but is better aligned with the underlying principles of the performance 
scheme.  It  also  carries  additional  potential  if  combined  smartly  with  other  options.  It  could 
therefore be recommended as the preferred option, on the condition that a deadline is set for 
revising the FAB concept. 

5.6. 

Role of the network manager 

Option  6.4  (Eurocontrol  as  expanded  Network  Manager)  brings  the  greatest  efficiency  and 
capacity  benefits.  The  only  question  is  whether  it  should  be  combined  with  the  governance 
model in option 6.2 (operational governance by industry) or 6.3 (industry Joint Undertaking). 
Option 6.3 has a slight edge, because the organisation could seek efficiencies more actively if 
it  is  fully  industry-run  than  if  the  Member  States  in  governance  continue  to  defend  their 
national status quos. Since the Network Manager providing centralised services would be an 
ANSP  like  any  other,  it  would  be  logical  to  favour  industry  management  and  choose  a 
combination of options 6.4 and 6.3 as the preferred option. 

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6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

In  total,  20  policy  options  in  6  different  policy  domains  were  assessed.  The  options  were 
further combined to form 3 policy scenarios: 

Policy scenario 1: 
Baseline  

Do nothing 

Policy scenario 2: 
Risk-optimised 

Option 1.2 
Functional separation of support services  
Option 2.2 
Improved consultation and sign-off 
Option 3.2 
Mutual cooperation and expert pooling 

Option 4.2 
Reduced Member State involvement  
Option 5.2 
Prescriptive FAB targets 
Option 6.3 
Industry Joint Undertaking 

Policy scenario 3: 
Performance-optimised 

Option 1.3 
Structural separation of support services 
Option 2.2 
Improved consultation and sign-off 
Option 3.3 
3.2+ Institutional separation of NSAs from 
ANSPs 
Option 4.2 
Reduced Member State involvement 
Option 5.3 
Flexible FABs  
Options 6.4+6.3 
Industry Joint Undertaking + Eurocontrol as 
expanded Network Manager 

Options 2.3, 4.3 and 5.4 were discarded as politically too risky and with limited or uncertain 
benefits.  Option  6.2  was  dropped  as  its  benefits  would  be  only  marginal  compared  to  the 
baseline. 

Scenario 2 seeks to secure moderate improvement, with minimal political risks, given that the 
most politically contentious options, such as structural separation of support services (option 
1.3) and institutional separation of NSAs from the ANSPs (option 3.3) are left out. However, 
this excludes the possibility of applying option 5.3 (creation of more flexible FABs), as this 
would make sense only if ANSP services were unbundled. 

Scenario 3 carries a higher risk of opposition, but has the potential to considerably improve 
performance by introducing more ambitious policy options and by creating synergies between 
the options. 

Comparison of policy scenarios 

Policy Scenario 1 
Baseline scenario 

Policy scenario 2: 
Risk-optimised 

Policy scenario 3 
Performance-optimised* 

SUMMARY OF IMPACTS 
Economic impacts: 
Cost efficiency 
Flight efficiency 
Capacity/Delays 
Administration costs 
Macroeconomic impacts 

GDP p.a. 2020/2030 
Employment 2030 

Of  which  airline  employment 
2020/2030 

Social Impacts: 
Employment 
conditions for workers in 

and 

working 

NSAs 
ANSPs 

Safety 

Environmental impacts 

Noise 
Emissions 

EFFECTIVENESS/ EFFICIENCY/ COHERENCE 
Effectiveness: 

0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

0 
0 

>€
>€
>€

 250 M p.a. 
 1.6 Bn p.a. 
 120 M p.a. 
€ -7.9-9.7 M p.a. 

>€
>€
>€

 780M p.a. 
 2 Bn p.a. 
 150 M p.a. 
€ -13.8-16.8 M p.a. 

~€

 600 M/ €

 700 M 

~€

 750 M/€

 900 M 

~+10 000 
+ 

~+13 000 
~+500/+3000 

+ 
~ -3400 
+ 

0 
++ 

~+80 jobs 
~ -9400 
++ 

0 
++ 

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Policy Scenario 1 
Baseline scenario 

Policy scenario 2: 
Risk-optimised 

Policy scenario 3 
Performance-optimised* 

Specific objectives: 

SO1: Improve  performance  of  ATS  in 
terms of efficiency 
SO2: Improve  utilisation  of  ATM 
capacity  
Efficiency, 
economic impacts 
Coherence 

excluding  macro-

0 

0 

0 

0 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

+ 

 1960 M 

Net benefits ~€
p.a.  
+ 

Net benefits ~€
p.a. 
++ 

 2915 M 

As regards effectiveness, the difference between the two scenarios is made narrower by the 
common  choice  of  the  performance  scheme  in  option  2.2.  However,  in  terms  of  efficiency, 
the  small  additional  administration  costs  in  scenario  3  triple  the  cost-efficiency  gains, 
resulting  in  about  1  billion  more  in  direct  benefits  than  in  scenario  2.  In  addition,  both 
scenarios  would  trigger  growth  in  the  aviation  sector,  which  should  create  10 000  jobs  if 
scenario 2 is chosen, and some 13 000 jobs if scenario 3 is chosen. As regards coherence, the 
performance-optimised  scenario  fits  in  better  with  the  overall  ideology  of  the  performance 
scheme within the SES framework. 

In conclusion, the performance-optimised scenario 3 is considered to be the preferred policy 
choice. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The Commission will evaluate whether the objectives of the initiative were achieved, once in 
2015 and again in 2020. If they weren’t, the Commission will consider which additional steps 
need to be taken in order to achieve them. 

Performance  will  be  monitored  via  the  Performance  Review  Body’s  annual  reports  on  the 
performance  of  the  EU’s  ATM  system,  and  via  the  monthly  reports  issued  by  the  Network 
Manager. The key indicators are: 

Specific objective 

SO1: 
of efficiency  

Improve performance of Air Traffic Services in terms 

Monitoring indicators 

•  Delays (min/flight) 

•  ANSP-related costs to users 

•  Reduction in average flight 

extensions 

•  Reduction in emissions 

SO2: 

Improve utilisation of air traffic management capacity 

•  En-route flight efficiency 

• 

Improvement in runway throughput 
at currently capacity-constrained 
airports 

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