REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON THE EU SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, WITH A FOCUS ON THE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE
Date: 2013-06-11
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: ACP countries, European Development Fund, European neighbourhood policy, democracy, development aid, governance, project evaluation, rule of law

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 11.6.2013  
COM(2013) 403 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

ON THE EU SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 
WITH A FOCUS ON THE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

ON THE EU SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 
WITH A FOCUS ON THE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009 Support to Democratic Governance — towards an 
enhanced  EU  framework  requested  the  European  Commission  to  provide  ‘a  comprehensive 
report on the implementation of the October 2006 Council Conclusions, focusing on the EU 
support to democratic governance, managed by the Commission in all regions, including the 
Governance Initiative and the Governance Facility’. 

This Report presents some key policy documents relevant to governance, and takes stock of 
the Governance Initiative (GI) for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the 
Governance  Facility  for  countries  covered  by  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy.  It  then 
draws lessons from the implementation of the geographical and thematic instruments through 
which  the  EU  supports  democratic  governance.  This  report  does  not  cover  assistance  to  the 
countries in the enlargement zone, where even stronger emphasis is put on good governance 
as part of the political accession criteria. 

2. 

RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 

There has been a strategic shift in EU development policy towards stronger conditionality in 
terms  of  human  rights,  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  the  role  of  civil  society  and  other 
elements of good governance. 
Two Joint Communications1 from the European Commission and the High Representative of 
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been issued in response to the changing 
environment in the EU Neighbourhood. The new approach is based on mutual accountability 
and  a  shared  commitment  to  respecting  universal  values,  human  rights,  democracy  and  the 
rule  of  law.  In  essence,  the  ‘more  for  more’  principle  provides  for  differentiation  based  on 
reform performance. This represents a substantial change in the EU’s relationship with those 
countries that commit to measurable reforms. 

The  Commission  Communication  Increasing  the  impact  of  EU  Development  Policy:  an 
Agenda for Change2, recognises that good governance, along with human rights, democracy 
and  gender  equality,  is  one  of  the  two3  main  priority  areas  of  EU  development  policy.  EU 
support  for  governance  should  henceforth  figure  more  prominently  in  all  of  the  EU’s 
partnerships.  The  Agenda  for  Change  underlines  the  need  to  provide  incentives  for  results-
oriented governance reforms and to support interventions that strengthen actors and processes 
at local, sectoral and national level. 

1 

2 
3 

A  Partnership  for  Democracy  and  Shared  Prosperity  with  the  Southern  Mediterranean,  COM(2011) 
200 and  
A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303. 
COM(2011) 637, endorsed by the Council on 14 May 2012. 
Inclusive and sustainable growth is the other priority 

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EU  general  budget  support  is  also  linked  to  the  governance  situation  and  political  dialogue 
with  the  partner  countries.4  In  the  Communication  on  The  Future  Approach  to  EU  Budget 
Support  to  Third  Countries,  the  Commission  underlined  that  it  will  ensure  that  ‘EU  budget 
support  is  consistent  with  the  overarching  principles  and  objectives  of  EU  external  action 
(Article 21 TEU) and development policy (Article 208 TFEU)’.5 In addition, budget support 
as  an  instrument  of  EU  development  policy  will  be  based  on  performance  assessment  and 
mutual accountability. 

Moreover, the recent Joint Communication on EU support for sustainable change in transition 
societies6,  sets  out  a  number  of  concrete  measures  to  improve  the  way  in  which  the  EU 
supports  emerging  democracies  to  achieve  lasting  reforms.  It  draws  lessons  from  the  EU’s 
experience in supporting democratic transformation processes and highlights the importance 
of  tailor-made  responses  based  on  partner  countries’  needs.  The  Communication  also 
proposes improved ways of sharing the knowledge and experience of the EU and its Member 
States. 

Furthermore,  a  recent  Communication  on  the  The  roots  of  democracy  and  sustainable 
development:  Europe’s  engagement  with  Civil  Society  in  external  relations7  seeks  to  revise 
our  partnership  with  civil  society  organisations,  based  on  the  results  of  the  world-wide 
Structured  Dialogue  on  the  involvement  of  Civil  Society  Organisations  (CSOs)  and  Local 
Authorities in EU development cooperation8 (2010 – 2011). The Communication proposes an 
enhanced and more strategic approach in the EU’s engagement with local CSOs world-wide, 
with due consideration of country specificities. This strategic engagement with CSOs will be 
mainstreamed in all instruments and programmes, with an emphasis on enhancing the role of 
CSOs in democratic governance and accountability.  

3. 

THE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE FOR ACP COUNTRIES 

Rationale and implementation 

3.1. 
In 2006, the European Commission proposed the Governance Initiative for ACP countries9. 

The main component of the Governance Initiative (GI) was an incentive mechanism offering 
ACP partners additional funding, depending on their commitment to democratic governance. 
 2.7 billion from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) was reserved for this 
A total of €
‘governance incentive tranche’. These funds were integrated within the programming cycle of 
the  EDF  for  the  relevant  countries  as  well  as  in  their  respective  National  Indicative 
Programmes (NIPs). 

The initiative was based on the following underlying principles: 

• 

• 

• 

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6 
7 
8 

9 

Ownership rather than conditionality; 

Dialogue rather than sanctions; 

Identifying the most appropriate reforms and support measures, rather than ranking 
good and bad performers; 

The Future Approach to EU Budget Support To Third Countries, COM(2011) 638 final. 
Ibid, p. 2. 
JOIN(2012) 27, issued on 3 October 2012. 
COM(2012) 492 final. 
Structured Dialogue: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/partners/civil-society/structured-dialogue_en.htm. 
Governance in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonised approach within the 
European Union, COM(2006) 421 

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• 

• 

Participation of local stakeholders; 

Tailoring  of  governance  support  to  each  country’s  situation,  notably  in  the  case  of 
fragile states. 

The other component of the GI was continued political and financial support for the African 
Peer  Review  Mechanism  (APRM),  a  self-monitoring  mechanism  created  by  the  member 
states  of  the  African  Union  to  promote  high  standards  of  governance.  The  2006 
Communication  on  Governance  in  the  European  Consensus  on  Development10  regarded 
continental  and  regional  initiatives  as  signs  that  governance  is  being  taken  seriously,  and 
indicated it was time to support the African continent in pushing forward its own initiatives. 

There  were  several  stages  in  the  GI  process.  First,  a  Governance  Profile  was  produced  and 
shared,  where  appropriate,  with  the  partner  countries.  The  profile  provided  an  overview  of 
governance  in  nine  areas,  on  the  basis  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  questions.  Partner-
country  governments  were  then  requested  to  put  forward  a  Governance  Action  Plan  (GAP) 
detailing  the  ongoing  and  planned  initiatives  to  address  the  priorities  identified  in  the 
Governance Profile. The GAP underwent a qualitative assessment by the Commission on the 
basis of three criteria: relevance, ambition and credibility. This assessment was the basis for 
allocation  of  additional  funds  to  the  NIP  of  the  country  in  question.  Finally,  the  GAP  was 
attached to the Country Strategy Paper. In all, approximately €
 2.3 billion was then allocated 
to 70 ACP countries during 2007-2009. 

Support for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the second component of the GI, 
consisted  of  a  €
 2  million  contribution  to  the  UNDP-managed  APRM  Trust  Fund.  A 
contribution  agreement  was  signed  to  that  end  between  the  Commission  and  the  UNDP  in 
December 2008. Some improvements have been recorded, namely the increasing number of 
participating countries, the revision of the questionnaire and the improved capacity of African 
countries  to  advance  APRM  implementation.  Nevertheless,  the  absorption  capacity  of  the 
Trust  Fund  remains  weak.  The  contribution  agreement  was  extended  twice,  expiring  in 
December 2012. 

3.2. 

Follow-up of the Governance Initiative 

3.2.1.  The review of the Governance Initiative of 2009 

The  initial  review  was  circulated  in  2009  as  Staff  Working  Paper  Supporting  democratic 
governance  through  the  Governance  Initiative  —  A  review  and  way  forward.11  It  indicated 
that the GI had laid the foundations for most ACP countries to commit to governance reforms. 
The  GI  was  seen  as  coherent  with  overall  EU  support  for  democratic  governance  and  as 
having  potential  to  promote  reforms  owned  by  partner  countries  and  to  facilitate  political 
dialogue. The Paper also indicated that the GI had contributed to ‘an incremental increase in 
governance as focal sector [in the CSPs of the 10th EDF] and better understanding of the use 
of governance diagnostics in the programming exercise by EU staff, both in the field and at 
headquarters’.12 

The  main  shortcomings  of  the  GI,  as  assessed  in  2009,  was  that  in  many  cases  its  tight 
timeframe did not permit proper and full implementation and did not provide for the highest 
level of ownership by ACP countries, nor allow for consultation with national parliaments and 
civil society. Moreover, it did not sufficiently provide for development of a methodology to 
monitor progress. Furthermore, the financial incentive remained ‘modest’ and the allocation 

10 
11 
12 

COM(2006) 421 final. 
19.1.2009/SEC(2009) 58 final. 
Ibid. 

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process  had  been  criticised  by  many  stakeholders  for  its  ‘lack  of  transparency’  and  for 
‘leading to a purely political process’. The analysis showed that, despite expectations, the GI 
tools had ‘not yet led to enhanced donor coordination, joint action, joint monitoring or joint 
dialogue’. 

Focusing on the shortcomings identified, the 2009 Staff Working Paper proposed a number of 
‘next  steps’  to  improve  the  implementation  of  the  GI.  These  included  updating  the 
implementation tools, better monitoring and enhanced political dialogue. 
3.2.2.  The Mid-Term Review of the 10th EDF 
In  the  Mid-Term  Review  of  the  10th  EDF  in  2010,  governance  was  one  of  the  four  areas 
examined, based on two questions: 

• 

• 

To  what  extent  has  the  Governance  Action  Plan  been  implemented  and  the 
governance situation improved since the adoption of the CSP? 

Based on the governance profile (updated where appropriate), to what extent has the 
governance situation improved? 

The  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  Governance  Action  Plans  (GAPs)  was  fairly 
positive, despite their introduction at a later stage, hence the short period under consideration. 
Most EU Delegations  assessed the GAPs as being implemented ‘more or less on schedule’. 
However,  there  were  also  cases  where  implementation  was  behind  schedule,  with  a 
consequent impact on the governance situation. A positive correlation was noted between the 
quality  of  the  initial  GAP  and  its  implementation.  A  number  of  reasons  why  the 
implementation  of  GAPs  was  not  satisfactory  have  been  identified,  including  lack  of 
ownership, existence of other country-owned governance strategies, late signature of the CSP 
delaying  the  implementation  process,  and  the  lack  of  specific  actions,  indicators,  timetables 
and means of verification. These constraints were in line with the findings of the 2009 Staff 
Working Document. 

3.2.3.  The Governance Initiative Study of 2011 
At the end of 2010, the Commission commissioned an independent study13 to assess the GI 
and formulate recommendations for the future. The study focused on aspects such as: 

– 

– 

– 

the process followed for the allocation of the governance incentive tranches to ACP 
partners under the 10th EDF, including its methodology, coordination and joint work 
with EU Member States; 

the actual and potential influence of the governance incentive tranche process on the 
political dialogue with partner countries and partner countries’ internal dynamics and 
debates on governance; 

the  overall  relevance  of  the  tools  used  in  the  process  and  the  integration  of 
governance in cooperation strategies. 

The  evidence  shows  that  many  stakeholders  welcomed  the  GI  in  its  initial  phase.  It  was  a 
new, more prominent and sophisticated approach to supporting governance. This reflected an 
increasingly  shared  belief  that  governance  is  key  to  development.  The  GI  was  seen  as  a 
novelty with potential for a more harmonised EU governance analysis through the governance 
profile, and which could strengthen the focus on governance in the programming process and 
enhance political dialogue with the partners. 

13 

European Commission, ‘Support Study on the EU Governance Initiative in view of the preparation of a 
Report by the Commission to the Council in 2012 — Annexes to the Final Report’, December 2011, p. 
4. 

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However,  throughout  the  process,  the  GI  encountered  a  number  of  obstacles  that  led  to  the 
diminishing of its influence in partner countries: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Limited ownership of the GI process. In many cases the tight timeframe did not allow 
for  proper  implementation  of  every  aspect  of  the  allocation  method.  This  did  not 
ensure  a  high  level  of  ownership  by  ACP  countries  nor  allow  in  all  cases  for 
consultation with key actors. 

Insufficient  alignment  between  the  GI  and  already  existing  governance  processes 
and plans in a given country. As a result, the GI was in many cases perceived as a 
‘stand-alone’ instrument, not well integrated in other governance programmes of the 
EU or other donors. 

Inflexibility of the tools. Many stakeholders contributing to the review observed that 
the  GI  provided  a  rather  static  framework  to  deal  with  governance.  It  was  not 
responsive  enough  to  cope  with  the  dynamic  nature  of  governance  processes, 
particularly  in  situations  of  fragility  or  in  the  event  of  a  sudden  deterioration  of 
governance.  Furthermore,  the  tools  did  not  fit  well  with  the  governance  dynamics 
within  the  country  or  with  the  time  required  to  apply  a  qualitative  ‘process 
approach’. The update of the GAP was discussed only during the Mid-Term Review, 
which did not allow for reaction to changing situations. 

There were political and institutional capacity constraints on both sides in managing 
a  politically  sensitive  and  innovative  tool  such  as  the  GI  in  a  professional  and 
coherent manner. 

Limited  influence  of  the  financial  incentive  alone.  It  is  important  to  stress  that  an 
incentive-based  scheme  linked  to  (limited)  financing  only,  and  not  coupled  with 
complementary  policy  offers  and  political  dialogues,  has  proven  ineffective.  Other 
modalities, such as budget support, are perceived as more attractive. 

Insufficient harmonisation within the EU. The GI provided a window of opportunity 
for  more  joint  EU  work  on  governance.  However,  even  though  the  Governance 
Profile did provide a good snapshot of the governance situation, it did not become a 
reference document as encouraged by the 2009 Council Conclusions, partially due to 
the existence of the governance assessments of other donors, including those done by 
EU  Member  States.  There  are  a  multitude  of  different  approaches,  instruments  and 
assessment tools within the EU itself. This lack of harmonisation was not conducive 
to the effectiveness of the GI on the ground. 

4. 

GOVERNANCE FACILITY 

As  announced  in  the  December  2006  Communication  on  Strengthening  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy,14 a Governance Facility for the European Neighbourhood area was set 
 300  million  over  the 
up  in  2007.  The  Commission  had  planned  to  devote  an  amount  of  €
period  2007-2013 
the  national  allocations  already  programmed  for 
to 
neighbourhood partners. 

in  addition 

Between 2007 and 2009 the Governance Facility provided limited additional financial support 
to certain partner countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), based on 
an assessment of the progress made on implementing the broadly defined governance aspects 
of the ENP Action Plans, with particular emphasis on areas such as democracy, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 

14 

COM(2006) 726, 4 December 2006. 

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The results of the review of the ENP carried out over 2010 and 2011, coupled with the Arab 
Spring events, led to a new approach to strengthening the partnership between the EU and its 
neighbours. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood provides for a more differentiated 
approach,  not  only  in  terms  of  funding,  as  was  the  case  under  the  Governance  Facility,  but 
also  encompassing  the  full  spectrum  of  incentives  proposed  by  the  EU,  including  deeper 
market access and greater mobility. 

As noted above, incentive schemes linked exclusively to funding without enhanced political 
and policy dialogue, such as the Governance Facility, have proven ineffective.  

Reflecting this new approach to an incentive-based policy, the umbrella programmes Support 
for Partnership,  Reform and Inclusive Growth  (SPRING),  for  the  Southern Neighbourhood, 
and  Eastern  Partnership  Integration  and  Cooperation  Programme  (EaPIC),  for  the  Eastern 
Neighbourhood, were set up in 2011 to channel a substantial part of additional EU funding in 
tandem  with  complementary  policy  offers.  In  line  with  the  ENP  Review  Communication,  a 
series  of  benchmarks  are  used  to  assess  whether  a  country  is  genuinely  engaged  in 
democratisation and whether it can expect to benefit from additional funding: the holding of 
democratic and credible elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly; existence 
of a free press and media; the rule of law; the fight against corruption; reform of the security 
and law enforcement sectors; and respect for human rights. 

5. 

STOCKTAKING OF PAST EU SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 

the  Development  Cooperation 

Democratic  governance  is  supported  through  geographic  instruments  such  as  the  European 
the  European 
Development  Fund, 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument as well as thematic programmes financed by the 
European  Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  and  the  Instrument  for  Stability.  In 
addition to the programme-based approach, democratic governance is also supported through 
specific interventions in key governance areas and through the mainstreaming of governance 
in other areas of cooperation. 

Instrument  and 

Lessons learned from the past experience of EU support in the area of democratic governance, 
include the following: 

• 

• 

Support for democratic governance is to be embedded in local realities. Governance 
reform  is  a  gradual  process  entailing  transformation  of  a  society.  Therefore, 
knowledge of the local context is key in designing interventions in these areas. For 
fragile  situations,  the  EU  is  committed  to  the  OECD  Principles  for  good 
international  engagement  in  fragile  states  and  situations,  which  put  the  accent  on 
fostering closer relationships with beneficiary countries that face problems of weak 
governance  and  conflict.  As  the  experience  of  the  Governance  Profile  and  the 
Governance Action Plans suggests, understanding the local dynamics and adapting to 
country-specific  situations  is  essential  for  successful  interventions  in  the  area  of 
democratic  governance.  As  regards  the  country  context,  the  new  Programme  and 
Project  Cycle  Management  (PPCM)  guidelines  call  for  systematic  context  analysis. 
Political  Economy  Analysis  (PEA)  is  among  the  tools  that  can  be  used  for  better 
understanding how political and  economic processes interact and how  interests  and 
incentives drive the behaviour of different actors over time. 

The  role  of  regional  or  continental  initiatives  on  governance  such  as  the  African 
Peer  Review  Mechanism  (APRM)  can  be  further  explored  in  terms  of  reinforcing 
ownership.  Processes  at  regional  level  allow  the  countries  themselves  to  shape 
priorities  and  to  strengthen  domestic  accountability.  For  instance,  the  Africa-EU 

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• 

• 

• 

Partnership  on  Democratic  Governance  and  Human  Rights  provides  a  forum  for 
formulating  shared  governance  agendas  and  recommendations.  While  paying 
particular attention to the ownership principle, experience can be shared with African 
partner  institutions  in  order  to  jointly  develop  new  strategies  focusing  on  the  main 
priorities  of  the  African  Governance  Architecture,  including  the  improved  APRM 
process. 

Engagement with civil society is essential to build stronger democratic processes and 
accountability systems and to achieve better development outcomes.15 This involves 
enhancing efforts to promote a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries: 
promoting  the  meaningful  and  structured  participation  of  CSOs  in  the  domestic 
policies of partner countries, the EU programming cycle and international processes, 
and  increasing  the  capacity  of  local  CSOs  to  effectively  perform  their  roles  as 
independent development actors. 

Developing  and  enhancing  existing  local  capacities  helps  promote  effective 
institutions  and  improves  the  government’s  capacity  to  design  and  implement 
policies  with  the  active  engagement  of  all  domestic  stakeholders  and  to  deliver 
services  to  final  beneficiaries.  New  ways  of  supporting  democratic  governance, 
including  innovative  ICT  tools,  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  participation  and 
information  flows  when  paired  with  a  strategic  capacity  development  approach. 
Commission  participation  in  the  Busan  High  Level  Forum  on  Effective  Institutions 
can also for its part enhance the effectiveness of EU support in the area of democratic 
governance. 

Rethink  the  incentives  and  conditionality.  Different  EU  external  policy  frameworks 
such  as  enlargement  policy,  the  ENP  and  the  Cotonou  Agreement  with  the  ACP 
countries  offer  different  incentives  and  apply  varying  conditionality  relating  to  the 
nature and extent of reforms undertaken. Past experience in these areas suggests that 
conditionality  and  an  incentive-based  approach  work  best,  when  a  critical  mass  of 
funding  is  needed  to  generate  significant  results,  where  allocations  are  linked  to 
objectives with clear indicators and benchmarks, accompanied by coherent political 
and  policy  dialogue.  Such  an  approach  is  stressed  for  example  in  the  2012  Joint 
Communication Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit16 and 
its accompanying documents. The experience of the GI also indicates that incentive 
mechanisms  work  better  if  based  on  clear  differentiation,  actual  achievements  and 
regular performance monitoring. Monitoring is key in assisting reform, as it can also 
play  a  role  in  spurring  partner  countries  to  accelerate  reforms.  The  impact  of 
monitoring  can  be  further  increased  by  involving  multiple  stakeholders  in  the 
process,  especially  by  recognising  civil  society’s  important  role,  and  by  greater 
transparency of the government’s performance.  

In a field such as governance, results — in terms of changing the norms and practices 
of  managing  public  affairs  —  are  by  definition  not  subject  to  a  linear  logic,  nor 
quickly  achieved.  Therefore  a  system  of  results-based  performance  assessment, 
based  on  indicators,  plays  an  important  role.  Selecting  the  most  appropriate 
indicators  and  defining  who  should  be  assessing  performance  are  also  among  the 
lessons  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  GI.  Moreover,  there  is  a  growing  body  of 
indicators  and  performance assessments in the governance domain, which could be 
tapped into while rethinking approaches to  result-based systems of cooperation. As 

15 
16 

COM(2012) 492 final. 
JOIN(2012) 13 final. 

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• 

• 

for fragile states, work is on-going to develop sets of indicators specifically relevant 
to them as part of the International Dialogue on Peace-Building and State-Building. 

Flexibility.  Increasing  performance  is  also  linked  to  the  issue  of  inflexibility  of  the 
tools.  In  crisis-affected  countries,  the  Commission  has  the  possibility  of  adopting  a 
so-called Crisis Declaration allowing for more flexible procedures to be used for the 
implementation  of  development  cooperation.  To  date,  several  ACP  countries  have 
benefited from this procedure. 

Strengthen  harmonisation  within  the  EU.  Building  on  the  European  Consensus  for 
Development, the GI was to contribute to harmonisation and increasingly joint work 
on governance at EU level. The Governance Profile, for example, was seen by many 
as  a  useful  tool  for  joint  analysis  of  the  governance  situation  on  the  ground.  The 
Lisbon  Treaty  provides  further  possibilities  to  work  together  at  EU  and  Member 
State  level,  both  in  assessing  a  country  situation  and  in  designing  support.  Joint 
analysis and joint programming as set out in the Agenda for Change, along with the 
key  role  of  EU  Delegations  in  conducting  political  and  policy  dialogue  on  the 
ground, can also foster such harmonisation at EU level. 

6. 

CONCLUSION 

Support  for  democratic  governance  remains  a  top  priority  in  EU  development  cooperation. 
The new approach to budget support provides an important political signal in this context, as 
it aims to strengthen the contractual  partnership  on EU budget support between the EU and 
partner countries in order to build and consolidate democracies, pursue sustainable economic 
growth  and  eradicate  poverty.  The  approach  is  based  on  mutual  accountability  and  shared 
commitment to fundamental values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and calls 
for close coordination between Commission services, the EEAS and Member States, also as 
regards enhanced and coherent policy and political dialogue which should be closely linked to 
any incentive scheme or funding of governance reform in partner countries. 

Fostering ownership is key to support for democratic governance. Country ownership calls for 
the involvement of all relevant domestic actors in defining the development path and required 
governance  arrangements.  The  importance  of  ownership  has  been  underlined  in  the  Busan 
Declaration,  which  calls  for  implementing  approaches  that  are  tailored  to  country-specific 
needs. The political will of the authorities in partner countries at all levels and their genuine 
commitment  to  reform  remain  a  prerequisite  for  successful  reform,  particularly  in  sensitive 
areas such as democratic governance. 

In  addition,  working  more  strategically  with  CSOs  is  key  in  all  sectors  and  themes.  In  line 
with the new approach to civil society, CSOs are currently recognised as fully fledged actors 
in  governance  at  country,  regional  and  global  level.  At  country  level,  local  CSOs  and  their 
role  in  policy  making  and  accountability  are  at  the  heart  of  the  new  approach.  Ensuring  a 
consistent  and  strategic  relationship  with  civil  society  at  country  level  is  facilitated  if  EU 
Delegations  and  Member  States  progressively  develop  roadmaps,  with  an  emphasis  on 
enhancing the role of civil society in democratic governance. 

Finally,  the  Commission,  the  EEAS  and  Member  States  alike  can  make  good  use  of  the 
wealth  of  experience  the  EU  has  accumulated  in  the  area  of  democratic  transition.  The 
implementation  of  the  ideas  in  the  recent  Communication  on  EU  support  for  sustainable 
change in transition societies would also be useful to this effect. 

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