COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
Date: 2013-05-23
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: administrative transparency, harbour installation, harmonisation of standards, load, provision of services, trans-European network, transport statistics

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Strasbourg, 23.5.2013  
SWD(2013) 182 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 

establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial 
transparency of ports 

{COM(2013) 296 final} 
{SWD(2013) 181 final} 
{SWD(2013) 183 final} 

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 

establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial 
transparency of ports 

LEAD DG: DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT 

1. 

GENERAL CONTEXT 

Europe is one of the densest port regions worldwide.  
As the world’s principal trading bloc, the EU is highly dependent on the maritime transport 
system. 37% of goods exchanged within its internal market transit through ports. In terms of 
passenger transport, ports service regional and local traffic to link peripheral and island areas. 
Ports are essential facilitators for the economy as they have a crucial function in logistics and 
are a significant generator of jobs. 
The  319  ports  of  the  trans-European  transport  network  (TEN-T)  which  account  for  96%  of 
goods  and  93%  of  passengers  transiting  through  EU  ports  play  a  key  role  in  the  European 
transport system.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

The main problem is the structural performance gap in some TEN-T seaports. The problem is 
exacerbated  by  the  need  to  adapt  ports  to  new  transport  and  logistics  requirements  at  a 
moment of scarce public funding. This creates risks of congestion and puts at risk an efficient, 
interconnected  and  sustainable  TEN-T  and  hence  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal 
market.  
In  a  business-as-usual  scenario  the  expected  transport  growth,  changes  in  transport  and 
logistics requirements and the structural gaps in the current performance of ports will cause 
capacity problems and aggravate the current un-balanced use of the network. This will lead to 
under-capacity problems in certain ports and further congestion in their broad hinterland. This 
will undermine the development of short sea shipping. The low performance of some TEN-T 
ports is a missed opportunity for the economic development of the areas they serve, hence the 
Union  as  a  whole.  Decaying  and  non-adapted  port 
the 
competitiveness of European industries. 
Without tackling these problems, achieving the goals of the TEN-T will be at risk. 
Finally,  there  is  a  major  concern  about  unfair  competition  between  ports  linked  to  public 
funding practices. Port workers' trade unions oppose EU provisions touching on the existing 
port labour regimes in the Member States.  

infrastructure  can  affect 

3. 

ROOT CAUSES 

The  Commission  identified  three  problem  drivers.  The  first  is  the  lack  of  adequate 
connections between ports and the rail, inland waterways and road networks, is addressed by 

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the TEN-T policy and is therefore not further addressed in the impact assessment. The other 
drivers are described below. 

3.1. 

Problem  driver  1:  Sub-optimal  port  services  and  operations  in  some  TEN-T 
seaports 

Three root causes are linked to this issue:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

3.2. 

many of the port services are subject to a weak competitive pressure due to market 
access restrictions;  

the exclusive or special rights, although justified in a number of situations, may lead 
to market abuses and  

in some ports users are faced with too much administrative burden due to a lack of 
coordination within ports. 

Problem  driver  2:  Port  governance  frameworks  not  attractive  enough  for 
investments in all TEN-T seaports 

Two root causes explain the overall unattractive investment climate in several ports:  

(4) 

(5) 

unclear  financial  relations  between  public  authorities,  port  authorities  and  port 
services providers and  

weak  autonomy  of  ports  to  define  infrastructure  charges  and  non-transparent  link 
with costs. 

4. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY 

Articles  58,  90  and  100  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU) 
extend  to  ports  the  objectives  of  a  genuine  internal  market  in  the  context  of  the  Common 
Transport Policy.  
Despite the specific nature of the port sector and its long-lasting local history and culture, the 
port  sector  has  a  strong  international  and  European  dimension.  Because  of  the  latter  and  of 
internal market reasons and cross-border network effects, the proposed initiative targeting the 
TEN-T ports is in line with the subsidiarity principle. 

5. 

OBJECTIVES 

5.1. 

General objective 

The  general  objective  is  to  improve  the  performance  of  the  TEN-T  seaports  in  order  to 
contribute  to  the  goal  of  a  more  efficient,  interconnected  and  sustainable  functioning  of  the 
TEN-T in line with the objectives of the Transport White Paper and the EU 2020 strategy for 
a resource efficient growth.  

5.2. 

Specific objectives (SO) 

SO1.  Modernise port services and operations in all TEN-T seaports  
SO2.  Optimise  port  governance  frameworks  as  to  enable  a  more  attractive  investment 
climate  

5.3. 

Operational objectives (OO) 

5.3.1.  Modernisation of port services and operations 

(a) 

(b) 

OO1. Clarify and facilitate access to the port services market.  

OO2. Prevent market abuse by designated port service providers.  

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(c) 

OO3. To ensure the consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the 
functioning of the port in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the implementation date of the 
initiative.  

5.3.2.  Creation of framework conditions which attract investments in ports 

(d) 

(e) 

OO4. To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between public authorities, 
port  authorities  and  port  service  providers  in  all  (100%)  TEN-T  ports  by  the 
implementation date of the initiative.  

OO5. To ensure that all (100%) TEN-T port authorities are free to autonomously set 
their port infrastructure charges by the implementation date of the initiative, with the 
possibility of environmental modulation of the charges. 

6. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

6.1. 

Discarded policy measures 

The Commission discarded the following measures after the consultation of stakeholders: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Reform of the port labour market is not considered nor proposed in any of the policy 
packages  (PPs)  because  of  the  recent  progress  made  in  the  set-up  of  the  social 
dialogue  between  employers  and  employees:  the  Social  Dialogue  Committee  for 
Dockers should be up and running in the course of 2013. 

From the consultation, it appears that the issue of 'self-handling' is no longer an issue 
to be considered at EU level. 

As the TFEU foresees a wide discretion for Member States to organise Services of 
General Economic Interest as they deem appropriate, none of the PPs impinge upon 
this discretion margin. 

6.2. 

Policy Packages  

6.2.1.  PP1: “Horizontal Instruments and Transparency”  

PP1 combines the use of horizontal instruments, a 'soft' measure on market access and legally 
binding  provisions  on  financial  transparency,  intra-port  coordination  and  port  infrastructure 
access  charges.  The  soft  measure  is  a  non-binding  Commission's  Communication  which 
explains the TFEU rules on non-discrimination and the future Directive on concession.  

6.2.2.  PP2: “Regulated competition”  

PP2 introduces the freedom to provide services to the provision of port services. This freedom 
can be limited if necessary, based on objective and transparent reasons related to the lack of 
space  or  reasons  of  public  interest.  When  limiting  the  freedom,  the  public  or  port  authority 
would have to enter into a contractual arrangement with a port service provider via an open 
tendering procedure, except in duly justified cases.  
Transparency is enforced in those cases where public funding is involved in order to be able 
to track possible distortive state aids and cross-subsidies between port services. If the service 
is provided by an in-house operator or another operator with an exclusive right, a confinement 
obligation ensures reciprocity in the first case and price regulatory oversight avoid abuses in 
both cases.  
The charging for using the port infrastructure is done transparently and based on cost.  
A port users' committee helps to orient the port activities more towards the users and clients 
of the port.  

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6.2.3.  PP2a: “Regulated competition and port autonomy”  

PP2a consists of PP2 with the following variations:  

• 

• 

• 

The obligation to have recourse to open tendering in the event of space restrictions or 
public  service  obligations  applies  not  only  to  new  contracts  but  also  to  substantial 
changes to existing contracts. 

The  regulatory  oversight  of  service  providers  with  exclusive  rights  applies  only  to 
the  markets  which  have  not  been  granted  through  an  open  tendering  (if  no  open 
procedure is used, the market can not be contested).  

Each port is given the right to set itself the structure and level of port infrastructure 
charges  provided  that  the  charging  policy  remains  transparent.  The  initiative  also 
encourages a differentiation according to the environmental performance of ships or 
fuels. 

6.2.4.  PP3: “Full competition and port autonomy”  

PP3  builds  on  PP2a  by  additionally  requiring  at  least  two  competing  and  independent 
operators for each port service where the number of operators is limited as a result of space 
constraints.  There  is  also  a  functional/legal  separation.  To  ensure  that  the  port  keeps 
functioning, the central coordination role of the port authorities is strengthened.  

7. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

7.1. 

Economic impacts 

The  impacts  of  the  PPs  in  terms  of  transport  costs  have  been  estimated.  The  potential 
savings of total port related costs are presented in Table 1 below.  

Table 1: Effects of policy packages on savings in total port costs (PwC, 2013) 

Change (%) in Total Port 
Costs 

Annual Savings (€ million) 

PP1 

PP2 

PP2a 

PP3 

-2.0% 

-3.0% 

-6.8% 

-7.9% 

318.15 

481.47 

1,071.37 

1,245.21 

To  judge  whether  the  policy  packages  attract  more  investment,  they  have  been  assessed 
against four criteria. The results are presented in Table 2.  

Financial transparency will encourage public resources to be allocated more efficiently and 
will  reduce  the  risk  of  distortive  State  aids.  Private  investors  will  see  fewer  risks  of  unfair 
competition resulting from potentially illicit State aids. 

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Table 2: Impact of the policy packages on the investment climate 

Efficient allocation of public funding 

Lower risks of distortive state aid to ports 

Better climate for private investment 

Economic rationality of port charges  

PP1  PP2  PP2a  PP3 

++  

++  

++  

++  

++++  

++++  

++++  

++++  

++++  

++++++  

++++++  

++++++  

++++  

++++++  

++++  

++  

("+" refers to the intensity of a positive correlation: for instance in the case of "lower risks of distortive state aid 
to ports", a "+" means less risk on distortive state aids) 

The overall administrative costs of the policy packages is calculated and presented in Table 
3.  

Table 3: Additional administrative costs per policy package against the baseline scenario (PwC, 2013) 

Recurrent (€ million / year) 

One off (€ million) 

Public sector 

Businesses 

Public sector 

Businesses 

PP1 

PP2 

PP2a 

PP3  

9.0 

7.7 

2.3 

33.0 

16.2 

14.0 

2.2 

3.9 

9.9 

32.4 

24.4 

121.8 

15.7 

15.7 

0.8 

0.8 

For SMEs and microenterprises the total effect is difficult to appreciate. In general, a better 
business  environment  will  help  create  new  SMEs  in  the  port  sector,  opening  up  investment 
and job creation opportunities. 

The impacts on multimodality, short sea shipping and traffic shifts from land to sea have 
also been estimated. There are differential regional impacts due to the uneven (and variable) 
distribution of cargo streams. This explains why specific regions will benefit more from short 
sea shipping than the EU average (Table 4). 

From an international competitiveness perspective, European ports (MED and Baltic) which 
are currently losing transhipment business to non-EU ports, will be strengthened by having a 
sound investment basis. While consideration should be given to possible dominant positions 
resulting from vertical integration, open market access can facilitate international investment 
and could be accompanied by reciprocal access to the markets of third countries for European 
port and terminal operators.  

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Table 4: Potential increases (%) of short sea shipping tonnage between regions (PwC, 2013) 

Potential changes of short sea shipping between different coastal regions  

East Med 

Cent Med  West Med / 

UK / IRL 

East Med 

Cent Med 

West Med / 
Atl 

UK / IRL 

North 
Range 

Scand / 
Balt 

1.51 

8.39 

1.25 

0.16 

0.51 

0.37 

6.50 

6.12 

4.79 

0.07 

4.54 

0.84 

Atl 

1.98 

6.43 

6.56 

3.90 

1.80 

3.09 

North 
Range 

Scand / 
Balt 

0.68 

0.25 

2.67 

3.23 

1.54 

5.04 

0.64 

2.68 

2.35 

1.10 

4.34 

5.35 

0.24 

1.19 

0.83 

1.36 

2.59 

2.49 

Categories  cover:  East  Med  (Greece,  Black  Sea  EU,  Slovenia);  Cent  Med  (Italy,  Malta,  French  Med);  West 
Med/Atl (Spain, Portugal, French Atlantic); UK/IRL; North Range (Hamburg-Le Havre); Scand/Balt 

7.2. 

Environmental impacts 

All the PPs help to mitigate the overall environmental impact of transport. The overall result 
is presented in Table 5: 

Table 5: Effects of policy packages on annual savings in external costs (PwC, 2013) 

Savings in external costs 
(€ million/pa) 

PP1 

PP2 

PP2a 

PP3 

23 

34 

69 

76 

7.3. 

Social impacts 

All PPs will create a better business environment which will lead to more activity and create 
jobs.  As  measures  touching  on  labour  regimes  have  been  discarded,  no  particular  impact  in 
terms of wages, labour relations and labour conditions is expected. 

Table 6: Summary of the aggregate economic, environmental and social impacts 

Impact compared to the baseline 

PP1 

PP2 

Efficiency 

Investments 

Administrative burden 

SMEs 

Transport impact 

Environmental impact 

Social Impact 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

PP2a 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

PP3 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ refers to a positive correlation: e.g. in the case of administrative burden, more + means less burden, in the case 
of environmental impacts, more + means better taking environmental considerations into account 

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8. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

8.1. 

Effectiveness  

All PPs would be effective, though each of them would show results on a different time scale 
and not with the same reliability.  

8.2. 

Efficiency  

With regard to net annual efficiency gains, PP3 scores the best, but is very closely followed 
by  PP2a,  for  which  the  administrative  cost  is  much  lower  than  PP3  and  is  close  to  zero  for 
business. PP1 and PP2 score much worse than both PP2a and PP3. 

8.3. 

Coherence  

All PPs are in line with the completion of the internal transport market and are coherent with 
the EU policy objectives reflected in the Single Market Act, the White Paper on Transport and 
Europe's 2020 growth strategy. PP2, PP2a, and to a greater extent PP3, show important trade-
off between economic and social impacts.  

8.4. 

Summary of the comparison of policy packages 

Table 7: effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the policy packages 

Effectiveness  

001 Clarify and facilitate access to the port services 
market 

002  Prevent  market  abuse  by  port  service  providers 
with exclusive or special rights 

003 Improve coordination mechanisms within ports 

004 Ensure a more transparent framework for financial 
relations between public authorities, port authorities and 
providers of port services 

are 
005  Ensure 
autonomously  set,  allowing  for  the  internalisation  of 
external costs 

infrastructure 

charges 

port 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

Minor 
trade-off 

PP1 

PP2 

PP2a 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

PP3 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

+++ 

Important 
trade-off 

Limited 
trade-off 
except  for 
cargo 
handling  

Limited 
trade-off 
except  for 
cargo 
handling  

(important 
trade-off) 

(important 
trade-off) 

 "+" refers to the intensity of a positive correlation, no negative or neutral correlations have been identified 

9. 

PREFERRED OPTION 

Based  on  the  analysis  set  out  in  the  impact  assessment,  PP2a  is  the  preferred  policy 
option. According to estimates, PP2a will generate savings in port costs of the order of € 1 
billion  per  year.  It  will  induce  additional  short  sea  shipping  traffic  of  around  13.3  billion 
tonne-kilometres  (an  increase  of  up  to  6.5%  on  a  number  of  routes).  This  will  lead  to 
increased port activities, which will create direct and indirect port-related jobs.  

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However, this impact assessment advocates caution as far as market access of cargo handling 
is concerned, because of three aspects:  

– 

– 

There is an important trade-off with social issues.  

Cargo  handling  services  are  already  exposed  to  competitive  pressure  in  some 
ports.  

–  Most of cargo handling services are concession covered by the future Directive 

on concession.  

So,  as  regards  the  clarification  and  facilitation  of  market  access  to  cargo  handling 
services, the PP1 approach might be just as appropriate.  

If  this  variant  of  PP2a1  were  to  be  chosen,  the  impacts  initially  estimated  for  PP2a  would 
decrease slightly in intensity but would remain overall similar in tendency; the savings in port 
costs would still represent up to 10 billion until 2030. The details of the quantified impacts are 
presented in table 8. 

Table 8: Comparison PP2a and 'PP2a variant' (excluding market access measures for cargo handling) 
(PwC, 2013) 

PP2a 

PP2a variant 

Change (%) in total port costs 

-6.8 

Annual savings in total port costs (€ million) 

1071.37 

Increase in Short Sea Shipping (%) 

Induced tonnes Km (billion) in EU ports 

Administrative costs (recurrent – public) (€ million) 

Administrative costs (recurrent - business) (€ million) 

Annual external cost savings (€ million) 

1.63 

13.311 

2.3 

2.2 

 69 

-4 

635 

0.97 

7.205 

2.1 

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The  same  reasoning  may  hold  good  for  passenger  services,  and  a  similar  approach  might 
therefore be envisaged. However due to unavailability of data it was not possible to make a 
separate impact calculation. 

10. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The Commission will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of this initiative through 
a set of core indicators. The data will be gathered using a method developed by the PPRISM2 
project  and  FP7  RTD  project  that  the  Commission  is  launching  to  provide  data  on  a 
continuous basis. 

Regarding  evaluation,  the  idea  is  that,  three  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  proposed 
legislation,  the  Commission  will  evaluate  whether  the  objectives  of  the  initiative  have  been 
attained.  This  evaluation  will  be  based  in  part  on  the  core  progress  indicators  mentioned 
above.  

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‘PP2a variant’ = PP2a with one difference: an explanatory Commission communication on how existing 
rules apply to cargo handling services, instead of proposing new legal provisions on the matter. 
http://pprism.espo.be . 

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