COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook
Date: 2013-05-14
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, combined transport, inland waterway transport, international road transport, maritime transport, rail transport, transport economics, transport planning

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 14.5.2013  
COM(2013) 278 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook 

{SWD(2013) 174 final} 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook 

INTRODUCTION 

1. 
Article  14  of  Regulation  1692/20061  provides  that  the  Commission  shall  present  to  the 
European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of  Regions  a  Communication  on  the  results  achieved  by  the  Marco  Polo 
programmes for the period 2003 – 2010.  

The  performance  of  the  programmes  was  assessed  in  the  framework  of  an  external 
evaluation2.  For  the  needs  of  the  Communication,  the  findings  of  the  evaluation  have 
subsequently  been  updated  with  additional  information,  including  operational  data  obtained 
up till November 2012.  

Further,  the  Communication  provides  a  general  outlook  on  the  next  steps  and  the  approach 
towards support for innovative and sustainable freight transport services in the period covered 
by the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014 – 2020. 

Finally,  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  accompanying  this  Communication 
presents  relevant  statistical  data  and  analysis  of  the  specific  issues  mentioned  in  Article  14 
(2a) of Regulation 1692/2006. 

2. 

THE  MARCO  POLO  PROGRAMME  AS  AN  INSTRUMENT  SUPPORTING  SUSTAINABLE 
FREIGHT TRANSPORT SERVICES AT THE EU LEVEL 

The  programme  was  established  as  a  result  of  the  White  Paper  on  the  Common  Transport 
Policy of September 20013. The White Paper paper proposed that more intensive use of short 
sea shipping, rail and inland waterway transport should be key elements in the development of 
intermodality as a practical and effective means to achieve a balanced transport system. 

The  White  Paper  forecasted  that  if  no  actions  were  taken,  road  freight  transport  would 
increase  by  around  50  per  cent  by  2010,  leading  to  additional  road  infrastructure  costs,  an 
increased number of accidents, increased congestion and increased local and global pollution. 
The direct effect would be growth of the international (intra EU) road freight traffic by about 
12 billion tonne-kilometres4 per year.  
Against  this  background,  the  Marco  Polo  I  programme  (2003  –  2006)5  was  established.  A 
budget  of  EUR  102  million  was  made  available  to  support  actions  aiming  at  shifting  the 
forecasted increase of 48 billion tonne-kilometres of freight from roads to short sea shipping, 
rail and inland waterways or to a combination of modes of transport in which road journeys 
are as short as possible.  

1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

Regulation (EC) No 1692/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the second 'Marco Polo' programme 
for  the  granting  of  Community  financial  assistance  to  improve  the  environmental  performance  of  the  freight  transport  system 
(Marco  Polo  II)  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  1382/2003,  as  amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  923/2009,  OJ  L  328/1, 
24/10/2006 
Evaluation of the Marco Polo Programme 2003 – 2010, Europe Economics, April 2011 
White Paper - European transport policy for 2010: time to decide, COM(2001) 370 final, 12.09.2001 
"Tonne-kilometre" (tkm) means the transport of a tonne of freight, or its volumetric equivalent, over a distance of one kilometre; 
Based on Regulation (EC) No 1382/2003 

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When developing the second Marco Polo programme6 (2007 - 2013), the forecasts of freight 
transport growth were recalculated7. As a result, it was concluded that in the absence of any 
action,  international  (intra  EU)  road  freight  transport  would  grow  by  20.5  billion  tonne-
kilometres per year between 2007 and 2013. Marco Polo II was expected to shift a substantial 
part of this growth with a budget of EUR 450 million. 

3. 

KEY FEATURES OF THE PROGRAMME 

The  Marco  Polo  Programme,  established  to  reduce  road  congestion  and  to  make  freight 
transport more efficient and sustainable, is the only EU funding instrument defined in its legal 
framework as a fixed contribution per output. The subsidy is usually calculated on the basis of 
achieved modal shift expressed in millions of tonne-kilometres8. This modal shift can be then 
transformed  in  monetary  terms  into  environmental,  congestion  and  other  benefits  that  the 
Marco Polo actions produce. 

Marco Polo I envisaged three types of actions: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

modal shift actions: shifting as much freight as possible from road to short sea 
shipping, rail and/or inland waterways; 

catalyst  actions:  changing  the  way  non-road  freight  transport  operates  in  the 
EU  and  overcoming  structural  market  barriers  in  European  freight  transport 
through a breakthrough or highly innovative concept; 

common learning actions: enhancing knowledge in the freight  logistics sector 
and fostering advanced methods and procedures of co-operation in the freight 
market; 

Two more actions were added under Marco Polo II: 

(d)  motorways  of 

the  sea:  any 

large-volume,  high-frequency 
innovative, 
intermodal  action  which  directly  shifts  freight  from  the  road  to  short  sea 
shipping.  This  includes  a  combination  of  short  sea  shipping  and  other  modes 
for  hinterland  transport  and  integrated  door-to-door  services  in  which  road 
journeys are as short as possible;  

(e) 

traffic  avoidance  actions:  any  innovative  action  integrating  transport  into 
production  logistics  to  avoid  a  large  percentage  of  freight  transport  by  road 
without adversely affecting production output or workforce. 

In addition, the overall budget was increased from EUR 102 million to EUR 450 million and 
the  duration  of  the  programme  was  extended  from  4  to  7  years.  Marco  Polo  II  further 
introduced  other  changes:  a  wider  geographical  scope,  modified  funding  rules  for  certain 
types  of  actions,  a  new  definition  of  eligible  applicants  and  a  new  approach  to  ancillary 
infrastructure. 

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Based on Regulation 1692/2006. 
Ex-ante  Evaluation  Marco  Polo  II  (2007-2013),  Ecorys,  2004;  estimations  of  freight  transport  growth:  PRIMES  model  and 
EUROSTAT statistics. 
According  to  the  programme's  rules,  the  subsidy  is  calculated  as  the  lowest  value  out  of:  (1)  tonne-kilometres  shifted;  (2) 
cumulative losses over the funding period; and (3) 35% of the eligible costs (50% for Common Learning actions). In practice, for 
most  of  the  modal  shift  based  actions  (excluding  Common  Learning  actions  and  specific  objectives  of  Catalyst  actions)  the 
payment is limited to the maximum of tkm achieved.  

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Marco Polo II was reviewed in 20099 in order to facilitate participation by small and micro 
enterprises  and  to  simplify  procedures.  In  addition,  the  funding  intensity  was  doubled  from 
EUR 1 to EUR 2 for each 500 tonne kilometres shifted off the road. 

Management-wise,  the  implementation  of  the  programme  was  transferred  from  the 
Commission to the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI) in 2008.  

4. 

RESULTS DELIVERED BY THE MARCO POLO PROGRAMMES 

Between  2003  and  2012,  172  grants  were  awarded,  providing  financial  aid  to  over  650 
companies. 

Due  to  the  unique  design  of  Marco  Polo  linking  the  subsidy  with  the  actual  modal  shift 
delivered  by  projects,  the  results  of  the  programme  can  be  quantified,  enabling  the 
programme's real achievements to be assessed. 

–  Effectiveness 

The  effectiveness  of  the  programme  is  measured  in  terms  of  realised  modal  shift/traffic 
avoidance10 (in tonne-kilometres).  

Due to the differing nature of each of the actions, the effectiveness can be directly measured 
for modal shift, catalyst, motorways of the sea and traffic avoidance actions. Catalyst actions 
have  additional  specific  features,  which  will  be  addressed  separately.  Common  learning 
actions do not have a direct modal shift objective and therefore cannot be evaluated based on 
transport shifted off the road.  

For Marco Polo I, the modal shift expected by the selected projects amounted to 47.7 billion 
tonne – kilometres (btkm), which is approximately equal to the overall target established for 
the  programme  (48  btkm).  Eventually,  the  projects  achieved  an  actual  modal  shift  of  21.9 
btkm.  This  figure  represents  around  46  per  cent  of  the  overall  modal  shift  target  and  is  the 
equivalent to around 1,200,000 truck trips over a distance of 1000 km with an average load of 
18 tons of freight. 

In Marco Polo II, the volume of modal shift expected by projects awarded in the calls between 
2007 and  2011  amounts to 87.7 btkm, 17.54 btkm on average per year. At November 2012 
these projects have realised an actual modal shift of 19,5 btkm (some 5 btkm on average so 
far for the four years with figures available). As Marco Polo II is still running, the figures will 
increase over the programme's lifecycle11. 

Since Marco Polo  projects are business services, they are sensitive to market and economic 
conditions. As a result, the economic downturn observed since 200812 has an adverse impact 
on the uptake and effectiveness of the programme and the viability of projects13.  

Catalyst  actions,  in  addition  to  the  modal  shift  objective,  aim  to  identify  and  overcome 
barriers to innovative approaches in non-road freight transport. These barriers of a technical 
and  –  in  some  cases  –  "psychological"  nature  are  specific  to  each  project.  It  is  therefore, 
difficult  to  provide  direct  collective  results  of  all  the  benefits  of  catalyst  actions  apart  from 
those resulting from modal shift.  

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Regulation (EC) No 923/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 266/2, 9/10/2009 
The  metric  for  evaluating  traffic  avoidance  actions  is  expressed  rather  in  vehicle  kilometres  than  the  tonne  kilometres.  The 
vehicle kilometres (vkm) can be converted in tonne kilometres (tkm) where 1 vkm equals 20 tkm 
It is foreseen last Marco Polo II projects will be operating up to 2020 
In  the  freight  transport  sector  there  was  an  overall  decrease  of  the  transport  volumes.  For  details  see  the  Commission  Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Communication. 
11 projects non-started or terminated under MP I (calls 2003-2006) and 30 projects non-started or terminated so far under MP II 
(calls 2007-2010) 

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The effectiveness of common learning actions was assessed on a project by project basis (e.g. 
whether  the  forecasted  number  of  lectures  took  place  or  the  forecasted  number  of  attendees 
was achieved). This is because the objectives of each action were different and no common 
basis  exists  on  which  to  group  the  results.  Common  learning  actions  have  been  relatively 
successful in achieving their stated objectives, with a number of projects having a success rate 
of  100  per  cent.  However,  a  longlasting  impact  of  the  common  learning  actions  on  the 
practices of logistics companies and on the modal split is more difficult to assess. 

–  Environmental benefits 

Improving the environmental performance of freight transport is one of the key objectives of 
the  Marco  Polo  programme.  The  achieved  modal  shift  expressed  in  tonne-kilometres  is 
transformed  in  monetary  terms  into  environmental,  congestion  and  other  benefits,  using  an 
external costs calculator14. The calculator produces an economic valuation for different modes 
and sub-modes of transport based on external cost coefficients15 provided for environmental 
impacts  (air  quality,  noise,  climate  change)  and  socio-economic  impacts  (accidents, 
congestion).  

Based  on  the  modal  shift  figures  delivered  by  Marco  Polo  I  projects,  the  environmental 
benefits  are  estimated16  at  EUR  434  million.  Comparing  this  figure  to  the  funds  paid  to 
projects  with  a  modal  shift  objective  (EUR  32.6  million),  means  that  each  euro  invested  in 
these actions has generated on average EUR 13.3 in environmental benefits and other external 
costs savings. These benefits include 1.5 million tons of CO2 not generated by road traffic. 

As Marco Polo II is ongoing, final results are not yet available. However the interim figures 
(November  2012)  indicate  that  EUR  405  million  in  environmental  benefits  have  been 
produced by the programme so far.  

In  addition  to  the  environmental  benefits  discussed  above,  other  important  indirect  impacts 
may also be considered, for example the effects from decreased traffic on nature protection or 
sensitive areas, such as the Alps or Pyrenees, or knowledge spill-overs and networking effects 
obtained through collaboration between entities involved in the Marco Polo Programme.  

–  Efficiency 

The  efficiency  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of  outputs  (tkm  achieved  for  projects  with  a  modal 
shift objective) to inputs (the committed or paid budget).  

For  Marco  Polo  I  modal  shift  projects  (excluding  common  learning  and  catalyst  actions), 
when  taking  account  of  the  payments  transferred  to  the  beneficiaries,  each  invested  euro 
resulted in a shift of 597 tkm. This can be compared with the average efficiency of 743tkm 
per euro of subsidy17, expected by projects selected under annual calls for proposals18.  
For  the  Marco  Polo  II  programme,  the  efficiency  expected19  by  selected  projects20  with  a 
modal  shift  objective  amounted  to  438tkm/euro  (November  2012).  Any  genuine  figures 
representing efficiency actually achieved are not available at present as the programme is still 
underway.  

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Marco Polo calculator (see more on http://ec.europa.eu/transport/marcopolo/index_en.htm) 
The coefficients and methodology used in the calculator were adjusted over time. The recent versions of the calculator are based 
upon the "Handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport sector" (IMPACT 2008) 
The values produced by the calculator can be regarded only as indicative. 
The  efficiency  expected  by  selected  projects  is  measured  before  any  payments  to  projects  take  place;  hence  it  is  based  on  the 
funds committed  
In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 
Based on funds committed  
Concerning projects selected under the calls for proposals: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 

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A decrease in efficiency during the Marco Polo II programme can be explained by changes to 
the rules governing projects, in particular, doubling the funding intensity from the 2009 call 
(from EUR 1 to EUR 2 per 500tkm) and the new definition of freight21.  

–  Use of funds 

Out of EUR 102 million allocated for the Marco Polo I, EUR 73,8 million were committed. 
The reasons behind this situation is that only a limited number of project proposals complied 
with the criteria and conditions established by the programme (265 proposals submitted and 
55 contracts signed), leading to a lower uptake of the programme than desired. 

Out  of  this  committed  budget,  EUR  41,8  million  were  paid.  The  fact  that  payment  to 
beneficiaries  is  conditional  on  actual  achievement  of  results  is  an  important  aspect  of  the 
programme and demonstrates an efficient allocation of public funds. However, this means that 
in case the actually achieved modal shift figures are lower than those originally calculated by 
the  beneficiaries,  e.g.  because  of  the  adverse  effects  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  budget 
available for the programme is not entirely used.  

A similar trend is forecasted for the on-going Marco Polo II programme.  

In addition, as a general rule, the amounts paid to a project may not exceed the total deficit 
experienced over the funding period (see footnote 8). Therefore if a project produces profit or 
achieves  a  break-even  point  earlier  than  foreseen  in  the  application,  the  subsidy  may  be 
respectively  withdrawn  or  reduced.  This  was  the  case  for  several  Marco  Polo  projects,  and 
also contributed to lower use of allocated funds. 

–  Sustainability 

Sustainability refers to whether or not the project remains operational in some form following 
the end of the funding period. According to the evaluations22 performed on the programmes, 
the majority of services are expected to continue following the end of the Grant Agreement. 
This indicates that short-term funding may have created long-term change even in the current 
evolving market conditions. As a result, programmes are likely to generate additional benefits 
in  terms  of  modal  shift/traffic  avoidance  and  external  costs  savings  after  the  contractual 
lifetime,  but  which,  due  to  non-availability  of  relevant  data,  cannot  be  included  in 
quantification of the programme's impacts. 

–  Competition 

The  Marco  Polo  programme  provides  grants  to  transport  companies  in  order  to  finance  the 
start-up of actions to shift freight transport off the road. The focus on new transport services 
(or upgrades of existing ones) and certain levels of saturation on intermodal routes may lead 
in some cases to competition concerns even if safeguards are established to avoid a degree of 
distortion  which  goes  against  the  common  interest  (i.e.  assessment  of  competition  in  the 
proposals' evaluation process, possibility of terminating or reducing the scope of contracts in 
case of proven competition distortion). 

In  practice,  even  though  a  number  of  complaints  on  distortion  of  competition  have  been 
lodged  by  competitors  to  Marco  Polo  beneficiaries  over  the  lifecycle  of  both  Marco  Polo 
programmes, there is no clear evidence of any significant adverse competition effects23. 

–  Management 

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Including the weight of empty intermodal transport and road vehicles 
Evaluation of the Marco Polo Programme  (2003-2006),  Ecorys, 2007; Evaluation of the Marco Polo Programme 2003 – 2010, 
Europe Economics, 2011 
These  complaints  were  duly  examined  by  the  Commission/EACI.  As  a  consequence  a  reinforcement  of  the  internal  evaluation 
procedure with regard to the competition issue has been introduced since 2011 Call for Proposals. 

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With the capacity to commit more human resources, EACI has proven to deliver added value 
to the implementation process of Marco Polo. The externalisation has allowed a stepping up 
of communication efforts, improving promotion of the programme, enhancing the operational 
controls and providing increased assistance to applicants.  

–  Procedures 

The procedures of the programme are based on the principle of sound financial management 
and were developed with the aim of ensuring a level playing field and striking an appropriate 
balance between the necessary administrative controls on the use of the public money and the 
needs of businesses. However, due to the very operational nature of the programme, in some 
cases these procedures may be seen as complex and may not be fully compatible with the day-
to-day practices of private companies, particularly in the context of an ever-changing financial 
risk environment. 

Other important factors 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

The  uptake  of  the  Marco  Polo  programme  is  considered  not  entirely 
satisfactory. Doubling the funding intensity in 2009 has only partly solved this 
issue.  This  situation  may  be  explained  by  external  reasons  such  as  a  limited 
target  group,  changing  market  conditions  and  an  adverse  economic  climate 
since 2008, but also by internal factors such as the design of the programme, 
which, in order to protect public funds, transfers the main operational risks to 
the beneficiaries; 

The introduction of complementary audit certificates since 2010, has facilitated 
the  verification  of  the  quantities  of  freight  transported  by  the  Marco  Polo 
projects  and  has  decreased  the  risk  of  miscalculation  and  alleged  fraud  but 
further increased the administrative burden for the beneficiaries; 

The  modal  shift  orientation  of  the  programme  (allowing  payments  almost 
exclusively  on  the  basis  of  realised  modal  shift/traffic  avoidance24)  is  one  of 
the  the  reasons  why  the  beneficiaries  face  difficulties  in  financing  ancillary 
infrastructure25,  even  though  the  expenditure  incurred  for  this  type  of 
infrastructure may also be eligible for the financial assistance26; 

The  current  modal  shift  approach  is  not  attractive  for  certain  insular  Member 
States.  This  is  because  freight  transport  links  between  the  islands  and  the 
continent  and  also  between  islands  themselves  are  mainly  maritime  services. 
As  a  result  there  are  limited  possibilities  to  generate  modal  shift/traffic 
avoidance at the levels required by the programme;  
According to limited numbers of beneficiaries surveyed on the Marco Polo27, it 
can  not  be  excluded  that  there  may  be  some  deadweight  in  the  programme, 
meaning that a proportion of supported projects would have gone ahead even in 
the absence of Marco Polo funds. On the other hand, the start-up aid provided 
through  EU  grants  may  have  mitigated  the  business  risk  to  start  these 
intermodal operations and helped some projects to reach the break-even point 
earlier than it would have been possible without funding. It is also likely that a 

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27 

See footnote 8 
The necessary and sufficient infrastructure to achieve the goals of actions, including freight-passenger installations 
Only the portion of the infrastructure's depreciation corresponding to the duration of the action and the rate of actual use for the 
purposes of the action may be taken into account as eligible cost. The eligible costs for ancillary infrastructure shall not be higher 
than 20% of the total eligible costs for the action  
See footnote 22 

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larger scale project was possible as a result of the subsidy being provided. Full 
scope of this deadweight phenomenon is however difficult to quantify; 

(f)  While participation of small and medium enterprises is not a direct objective of 
the programme, it is estimated that they represent around 24 per cent28 of the 
total population of beneficiaries.  

Detailed  figures  on  the  performance  of  the  Marco  Polo  programmes  are  presented  in  the 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the present Communication.  

5. 

CONCLUSIONS ON THE ACHIEVED RESULTS 

The  Marco  Polo  programmes  were  set  up  as  funding  instruments  to  reduce  road  congestion 
and  to  improve  the  environmental  performance  of  the  freight  transport  system.  Unique  and 
important features of the programme are its transparency, the precision with which results can 
be measured and the direct relationship between EU funding and the results obtained. 

The  already  completed  Marco  Polo  I  programme  generated  around  EUR  434  million  in 
environmental benefits, removing 21.9 billion tonne-kilometres of freight off European roads. 
Further significant modal shift and related benefits are expected for the on-going Marco Polo 
II programme.  

However,  the  ambitious  objectives  of  modal  shift  set  by  the  legislator  have  not  been  fully 
achieved  (46%  of  planned  modal  shift  for  Marco  Polo  I).  Furthermore,  the  programmes  are 
considered  as  rather  complex,  and  in  some  cases  not  easy  to  be  used  by  the  European 
companies.  

Nonetheless,  it  should  be  highlighted  that  Marco  Polo  is  based  on  quantifiable  results  and 
payments  are  made  almost  exclusively  for  the  modal  shift  actually  realised.  What  is  more, 
market  conditions  and  the  economic  situation  are  important  elements  in  determining  the 
success  of  projects.  Since  intermodal  transport  solutions  are  more  complex  and  difficult  to 
implement  than  a  pure  road  transportation  system,  the  programme  has  been  particularly 
sensitive to the effects of the economic crisis. Hence, Marco Polo represents a good example 
of efficient use of the EU funds even if the programme's objectives have not been fully met 
and the allocated budget has not been entirely spent.  

Provision  of  public  funding  directly  to  the  market  raised  also  some  competition  concerns 
during the lifecycle of the programme. On the other hand, there was no clear evidence about 
any significant adverse competition effects of financed projects. 

Marco Polo is currently the only European funding instrument focused on the improvement of 
efficiency  of  freight  transport.  Therefore  continued  support  is  considered  useful  and 
appropriate. However, any new scheme supporting sustainable freight transport services will 
need to reflect on the lessons learnt from the previous programmes.  

6. 

NEXT STEPS 

–  Transport policy context 

In March 2011, the Commission issued a strategy for a competitive transport system that will 
increase  mobility  and  accessibility,  remove  major  barriers  in  key  areas  and  contribute  to 
increased  growth  and  employment29.  Amongst  the  main  targets  for  the  EU  transport  policy 

28 
29 

This figure represents only autonomous SMEs (not linked to other enterprises); Source: EACI data 
White  Paper,  Roadmap  to  a  Single  European  Transport  Area  –  Towards  a  competitive  and  resource  efficient  transport  system, 
COM/2011/0144 

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are: deployment of clean fuels, optimisation of the performance of multimodal logistic chains 
and  use  of  more  energy-efficient  modes,  increasing  the  efficiency  of  transport  and  of 
infrastructure use and the development of information systems and market-based incentives. 
The  new  Trans-European  Transport  Network  guidelines  (TEN-T)30  adopted  by  the 
Commission  in  October  2011,  will  provide  main  framework  to  achieve  the  transport  policy 
objectives as specified in the White Paper. 

For the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014 – 2020, the Commission proposed two 
pillars to be retained for the provision of financial aid to EU transport policy.  
An  infrastructure  pillar  will  be  covered  within  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF)31. 
Within  its  transport  component,  the  CEF  is  foreseen  to  upgrade  Europe's  transport 
infrastructure, build missing links and remove bottlenecks. Since funding will be concentrated 
on transport modes that are less polluting, broader deployment of telematics applications and 
use  of  innovative  technologies,  it  will  push  the  European  transport  system  to  become  more 
sustainable. 

An innovation pillar will be implemented by relevant parts of the new research and innovation 
programme (Horizon 2020)32.  

–  Support  for  the  innovative  and  sustainable  freight  transport  services  -  policy 

approach  

With  the  objective  of  improving  efficiency  and  sustainability  of  European  freight  transport 
and  logistics,  the  Commission  proposes  a  new  approach  in  support  of  the  freight  transport 
services in the period 2014 – 2020.  

Based on the achieved results and taking account of the evolving policy context, the Marco 
Polo  II  programme  will  be  discontinued  in  the  current  form.  Instead,  a  follow-up  of  Marco 
Polo will be integrated within the revised TEN-T programme and implemented using funding 
instruments provided by the CEF.  

This  approach  will  lead  to  a  harmonised  and  coordinated  implementation  of  the  European 
transport policy. In this context, the follow-up of Marco Polo will contribute in particular to 
the  efficient  management  and  use  of  the  transport  infrastructure,  allowing  deployment  of 
innovative and sustainable freight transport services on the multimodal core network, which is 
supposed to serve the most important European traffic flows. 

These services should meet the needs of their users, be economically efficient, contribute to 
the objectives of low-carbon and clean transport, fuel security and environmental protection, 
be  safe  and  secure  and  have  high  quality  standards.  They  need  to  promote  advanced 
technological  and  operational  concepts  and  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  accessibility 
within the Union. They also should play an important role in pushing the European economy 
towards  sustainable  growth,  making  the  freight  transport  and  logistics  sector  as  one  of 
Europe’s  growth  engines,  enhancing  trade  and  the  mobility  of  people,  creating  wealth  and 
jobs and maintaining the competitiveness of European companies. 

Therefore, as proposed by the Commission in Art 38 of the new TEN-T Guidelines, the new 
approach shall include the following33: 

30 
31 

32 

33 

Proposal for a Regulation on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, COM(2011) 650/2 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility, 
COM(2011) 665/3 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon 2020 - The Framework Programme 
for Research and Innovation (2014-2020), COM(2011) 809 
The  text  of  the  TEN-T  guidelines  and  this  article  are  currently  subject  to  the  legislative  procedure  and  might  therefore  be 
amended. 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(g) 

(h) 

(i) 

(j) 

(k) 

improve  sustainable  use  of  transport  infrastructure,  including  its  efficient 
management; 

promote the deployment of innovative transport services or new combinations 
of proven existing transport services, including through the application of ITS 
and the establishment of relevant governance structures;  

facilitate  multi-modal  transport  service  operations  and  improve  cooperation 
between transport service providers;  

stimulate  resource  and  carbon  efficiency,  notably  in  the  fields  of  vehicle 
traction,  driving/steaming,  systems  and  operations  planning,  resource  sharing 
and cooperation; 

analyse, provide information on and monitor markets, fleet characteristics and 
performance, administrative requirements and human resources. 

In  this  framework,  attention  will  also  be  paid  to  measures  supporting  interconnectivity  and 
interoperability  of  freight  transport  information  across  the  modes  and  to  facilitating 
deployment of Motorways of the Sea - based services. 

Finally,  this  should  lead  to  focussed  funding,  firmly  integrated  in  policy  and  infrastructure 
orientations,  encouraging  commercial  undertakings  to  switch  to  more  innovative  and 
sustainable solutions, helping them to reduce associated risks and addressing the main failures 
occurring  in  the  freight  transport  sector,  such  as:  lack  of  uptake  of  innovation, 
interconnectivity  problems  between  transport  modes,  difficulty  of  access  to  finance, 
insufficient  internalisation  of  external  costs,  inefficient  use  of  resources  and  lack  of 
cooperation in the market. 

The new approach is expected to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU financial 
aid. The format of the current instrument will therefore be revised with respect to the type of 
actions supported, management structure and implementation processes. Also the consistency 
with the operational structures of the CEF will need to be adequately addressed.  

This  would  possibly  mean  departing  from  the  pure  start  up  aid  for  modal  shift  as  the  key 
element under the current Marco Polo programme. 

–  Measures and implementation 

The CEF foresees that funding for sustainable freight transport services may be delivered in 
the  form  of  financial  instruments  or  in  the  form  of  grants,  where  the  amount  of  Union 
financial aid shall not exceed 20% of the total eligible costs. This maximum funding rate will 
be  adequately  adapted  with  a  view  of  triggering  interest  on  the  market  and  ensuring 
appropriate leverage of the public funds allocated to the programme34.  

As far as grants are  concerned, the proposals should be selected through calls  for proposals 
with  funding  conditions,  eligibility,  selection  and  award  criteria,  in  line  with  the  objectives 
and priorities laid down in the CEF and and in the TEN-T guidelines. 

Operational targets, pertinent indicators and delivery mechanisms of EU support will, where 
relevant,  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  performance  audit  on  the  Marco  Polo 
programme currently being performed by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). 

34 

As  explained  under  footnote  8,  the  subsidy  for  the  current  Marco  Polo  II  programme  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of:  (1)  tonne-
kilometres  shifted;  (2)  total  losses  experienced  over  the  funding  period;  and  (3)  the  eligible  costs.  Based  on  evidence  from 
supported projects, the actual funding rate in the programme on average does not exceed 10% of the total eligible costs. 

EN 

9 

   EN