Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China following a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009
Date: 2013-04-04
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, anti-dumping measure, import (EU), machine tool, originating product

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 4.4.2013  
COM(2013) 178 final 

2013/0095 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in 
the People's Republic of China following a partial interim review pursuant to Article 
11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 
30  November  2009  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not 
members of the European Community ('the basic Regulation'), in the partial interim 
review proceeding concerning the anti-dumping duty in force in respect of imports of 
hand  pallet  trucks  and  their  essential  parts  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation 
and is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive 
and procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

A  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  hand  pallet  trucks  and  their  essential 
parts  falling  within  CN  codes  ex  8427  90  00  and  ex  8431  20  00  originating  in  the 
People's Republic of China was imposed by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No 1008/2011 (OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 1). 

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND 
IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  had  the  possibility  to  defend 
their  interests  during  the  investigation,  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the  basic 
Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The basic Regulation does not provide for a general impact assessment but contains 
an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

On 14 February 2011, the Commission initiated ex-officio a partial interim review of 
the anti-dumping duty in force in respect of imports of hand pallet trucks and their 
essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China. 

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The review investigation, which was limited in scope to the examination of dumping, 
found  because  of  changed  circumstances  of  a  lasting  nature  continuing  dumping  at 
higher level.  

Therefore,  it  is  suggested  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a 
Regulation  in  order  to  amend  the  existing  measures,  which  should  be  published  in 
the Official Journal of the European Union by 13 May 2013 at the latest.  

•  Legal basis 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  European  Union.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves 
no scope for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Union, 
national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens 
is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 

The basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options. 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

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2013/0095 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in 
the People's Republic of China following a partial interim review pursuant to Article 
11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 (‘the basic 
Regulation’), and in particular Articles 9(4) and 11(3), (5) and (6) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  European  Commission  ('the  Commission') 
after consulting the Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

A. PROCEDURE 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Previous investigations and existing anti-dumping measures 
In  July  2005,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1174/20052,  the  Council  imposed  a  definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating 
in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  ('the  PRC').  The  measures  consisted  of  an  ad 
valorem anti-dumping duty ranging between 7,6% and 46,7%. 
In  July  2008,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  684/20083,  the  Council,  following  a  product 
scope interim review, clarified the product scope of the original investigation. 
In  June  2009,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  499/20094,  the  Council,  following  an  anti-
circumvention  investigation,  extended  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to 
'all other companies' imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1174/2005 to hand pallet trucks 
and  their  essential  parts  consigned  from  Thailand  whether  declared  as  originating  in 
Thailand or not.  
In  October  2011,  by  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1008/20115,  the  Council 
imposed  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  hand  pallet  trucks  and  their 
essential parts originating in the PRC following an expiry review pursuant to Article 
11(2) of the basic Regulation. The extended duty as mentioned in recital (3) above was 
also maintained by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011. 

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OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 
OJ L 189, 21.7.2005, p. 1. 
OJ L 192, 19.7.2008, p. 1. 
OJ L 151, 16.6.2009, p. 1. 
OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 1. 

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2. 

(5) 

(6) 

3. 

(7) 

4. 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

Initiation of a partial interim review 

During  the  expiry  review  the  Commission  noticed  a  change  in  the  competition 
landscape  on  the  Union  market  as  of  the  imposition  of  the  measures.  Indeed,  the 
Chinese  exporting  producer  with  the  lowest  duty  rate  –  who  was  granted  market 
economy  treatment  ('MET')  in  the  original  investigation  –  was  able  to  virtually  take 
over  a  very  big  part  of  the  Union  market  and  increased  significantly  its  share  of 
imports in the EU. The Commission also had doubts with regard to the original MET 
determination in view of prima facie evidence of distortions on the steel market in the 
PRC.  In  this  context,  the  circumstances  on  the  basis  of  which  the  existing  measures 
were established were considered to have changed and these changes seemed to be of 
a lasting nature. 

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence 
existed to justify the initiation of a partial interim review, the Commission announced 
by  a  notice  published  on  14  February  2012  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Union6 ('the Notice of initiation') the ex officio initiation of a partial interim review in 
accordance  with  Article  11(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  limited  in  scope  to  the 
examination of dumping in respect of Chinese exporting producers. 

Review investigation period 

The investigation of the level of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2011 to 
31 December 2011 ('the review investigation period' or 'the RIP'). 

Parties concerned 

The Commission officially advised exporting producers, unrelated importers known to 
be  concerned,  the  authorities  of  the  exporting  country  and  the  Union  industry  of  the 
initiation of the partial interim review. Interested parties were given the opportunity to 
make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set 
out in the Notice of initiation. 

All interested parties, who so requested and showed that there were particular reasons 
why they should be heard, were granted a hearing. 

In  view  of  the  potentially  large  number  of  exporting  producers  and  unrelated 
importers,  it  was  considered  appropriate,  in  accordance  with  Article  17  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  to  examine  whether  sampling  should  be  used.  In  order  to  enable  the 
Commission  to  decide  whether  sampling  would  be  necessary  and,  if  so,  to  select  a 
sample,  the  above  parties  were  requested,  pursuant  to  Article  17  of  the  basic 
Regulation, to make themselves known within 15 days of the initiation of the review 
and to provide the Commission with information requested in the Notice of initiation. 
Two  exporting  producers  and  eight  unrelated  importers  came  forward  to  cooperate. 
Sampling  was  therefore  not  necessary  for  both  exporting  producers  and  unrelated 
importers. 

(11)  The Commission sent questionnaires and MET claim forms to all parties known to be 
concerned  and  to  those  who  make  themselves  known  within  the  deadlines  set  in  the 
Notice  of  initiation.  Replies  were  received  from  one  Chinese  exporting  producer, 
Zhejiang  Noblelift  Equipment  Joint  Stock  Co.  Ltd  ('Noblelift'),  and  from  three 
unrelated importers. 

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OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 14. 

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(12)  The  Commission  sought  and  verified  all  information  it  deemed  necessary  for  the 
determination of dumping. A verification visit was carried out at the premises of: 

– 

Zhejiang Noblelift Equipment Joint Stock Co. Ltd, Changxing, the PRC. 

(13) 

In light of the need to establish a normal value for the exporting producer in the PRC 
to  which  MET  was  not  granted,  a  verification  at  the  premises  of  the  following 
producer in Brazil, which was used as an analogue country, took place: 

– 

Paletrans Equipamentos Ltda, Cravinhos, Sao Paulo. 

B. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

1. 

Product concerned 

(14)  The  product  concerned  by  this  review  is  the  same  as  the  one  in  the  original 
investigation  and  clarified  by  the  product  scope  interim  review,  namely  hand  pallet 
trucks  and  their  essential  parts,  i.e.  chassis  and  hydraulics,  originating  in  the  PRC, 
currently falling within CN codes ex 8427 90 00 and ex 8431 20 00. For the purpose 
of  this  Regulation,  hand  pallet  trucks  shall  be  trucks  with  wheels  supporting  lifting 
fork arms for handling pallets, designed to be manually pushed, pulled and steered, on 
smooth,  level,  hard  surfaces,  by  a  pedestrian  operator  using  an  articulated  tiller.  The 
hand pallet trucks are only designed to raise a load, by pumping the tiller, to a height 
sufficient for transporting and do not have any other additional functions or uses such 
as for example (i) to move and to lift the loads in order to place them higher or assist 
in storage of loads (highlifters), (ii) to stack one pallet above the other (stackers), (iii) 
to  lift  the  load  to  a  working  level  (scissorlifts)  or  (iv)  to  lift  and  to  weigh  the  loads 
(weighing trucks). 

2. 

Like product 

(15)  The investigation confirmed that, the product concerned and the product manufactured 
and sold on the domestic market in the PRC, the product manufactured and sold in the 
analogue country, Brazil, and the product manufactured and sold in the Union by the 
Union producers have the same basic physical and technical characteristics as well as 
the same uses.  

(16)  These products are therefore considered to be alike within the meaning of Article 1(4) 

of the basic Regulation. 

(a) Market economy treatment (‘MET’) 

C. DUMPING  

(17)  Pursuant  to  Article  2(7)(b)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  in  anti-dumping  investigations 
concerning  imports  originating  in  the  PRC  normal  value  shall  be  determined  in 
accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6 of the said Article for those producers which were 
found  to  meet  the  criteria  laid  down  in  Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  i.e. 
where  it  is  shown  that  market  economy  conditions  prevail  in  respect  of  the 
manufacture and sale of the like product. For ease of reference only, these criteria are 
set out in a summarised form as follows: 

– 

Business decisions and costs are made in response to market signals and 
without  significant  State  interference;  and  costs  of  major  inputs 
substantially reflect market values; 

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– 

– 

– 

– 

Firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are 
independently audited in line with international accounting standards and 
are applied for all purposes; 

There  are  no  significant  distortions  carried  over  from  the  former  non-
market economy system; 

Bankruptcy and property laws guarantee legal certainty and stability; 

Exchange rate conversions are carried out at market rates. 

(18)  One  Chinese  producer,  Noblelift,  requested  MET  pursuant  to  Article  2(7)(b)  of  the 
basic Regulation and replied to the MET claim form within the given deadlines. 

(19)  The Commission sought all information deemed necessary and verified all information 
submitted in the MET application at the premises of the company in question.  

(20)  The investigation established that the prices paid by Noblelift in the RIP for Chinese 
hot-rolled carbon steel, a main raw material accounting for about 25% of the cost of a 
finished  product,  were  significantly  distorted  as  they  stood  approximately  between 
24% and 31% below international prices over the same period. The international prices 
were  based  on  statistics  for  the  EU  and  North  American  markets  from  the  Steel 
Business Briefing7 as well as from COMEXT import prices. On this basis it was found 
that  Chinese  steel  prices  clearly  did  not  reflect  market  values.  Moreover,  there  is  an 
established  practice  of  State  interference  in  the  market  of  raw  materials.  The  China 
12th  five-year  plan  (2011-2015)  for  the  Iron  and  Steel  sector  contains  a  series  of 
measures which demonstrate that steel companies have no possibility other than to act 
in line with the Chinese Government instructions due to the firm control the Chinese 
State has. It is thus concluded that Noblelift does not fulfil the requirements of the first 
criterion of MET. 

(21)  Furthermore, in the financial year 2010, a related company has given Noblelift a bank 
guarantee for two loans representing a significant proportion of that related company's 
and  Noblelift's  total  assets.  The  guarantees  were  disclosed  neither  in  Noblelift's 
financial statements nor in the related company's accounts. This is not in line with IAS 
24 (Related Party Disclosures) and the auditor had no reservation on this practice. The 
disclosure of related party transactions in the financial statements is important because 
it  draws  attention  to  possible  effects  on  the  financial  position  of  a  company.  In  this 
case, the non-disclosure of significant commitments such as the guarantees in question 
does not allow a proper assessment of the company’s operations and in particular the 
risks  and  opportunities  the  company  is  facing.  Therefore,  it  is  considered  that  the 
company's accounting records have not been properly audited in line with international 
accounting  standards  and,  thus,  it  does  not  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  second 
criterion. 

(22)  Finally, Noblelift received State benefits in the form of preferential income tax as well 
as  grants  which  distort  its  financial  situation  and,  thus,  it  does  not  fulfil  the 
requirements of the third criterion. 

(23)  The exporting producer concerned and the Union industry were given an opportunity 

to comment on the above findings. 

(24)  Following  the  disclosure  of  the  MET  findings,  Noblelift  requested  more  details  with 
regards to the calculation of international market price for steel. The company argued 

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www.steelbb.com/steelprices/ 

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that  distortions  in  raw  material  prices  should  be  dealt  with  by  adjusting  the  normal 
value in the dumping calculation rather than denying MET. However, the prescription 
of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation is very clear and requires that ‘costs of major 
inputs  substantially  reflect  market  values’.  Hence,  any  adjustment  in  the  dumping 
calculations in order to address the distorted input costs would render Article 2(7)(c) 
largely meaningless. The comments could therefore not alter the above findings. 

(25)  Following  the  disclosure  of  the  final  findings,  Noblelift  reiterated  its  arguments.  It 
stated firstly that the Commission failed to disclose the details, i.e. all the data used for 
the calculation of differences in raw material prices.  

(26) 

In  this  respect,  it  is  noted  first  and  foremost  that  the  sources  of  data  for  the 
comparisons  of  steel  prices  have  been  indicated  by  the  Commission  on  several 
occasions.  The  Commission  repeated  the  explanations  provided  earlier  in  the 
proceeding  that,  the  prices  based  on  the  Steel  Business  Briefing  were  copyright 
protected as the service is available on subscription. Consequently, the Commission is 
legally  prevented  from  publicly  disclosing  these  data  directly  but  the  database  is 
otherwise  available  and  can  be  accessed  with  payment  of  the  appropriate  fee. 
Nevertheless,  in  order  to  ensure  a  balance  between  the  protection  of  intellectual 
property rights and the protection of the rights of defence, the data used was verified 
by the Hearing Officer of the Directorate-General for External Trade, who confirmed 
the calculation of the price difference and communicated the result of his verification 
to Noblelift.  

(27) 

It is further noted that the Steel Business Briefing describes exactly the methodology 
used (dimensions, thickness, width, point in transport). Those parameters are general 
and are a guide which is also indicative of the level of detail in price comparisons of 
raw  materials  which  aim  at  establishing  whether  costs  of  major  inputs  substantially 
reflect market values. The Commission has used European and North American prices 
as reference. 

(28)  Noblelift  further  claimed  that  in  the  original  investigation,  differences  between 
domestic steel prices in the PRC and international steel prices were not considered as a 
factor  preventing  the  company  from  meeting  the  first  MET  criterion.  As  stated  in 
recital (22) to the Commission Regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
in  the  framework  of  the  original  investigation,  "For  all  four  companies,  it  was 
established  (…)  that  costs  and  prices  reflected  market  values".8  Indeed,  the  original 
investigation  did  not  establish  a  substantial  price  difference  between  raw  materials 
procured locally in the PRC and those purchased at international prices. However, this 
conclusion  cannot  prevent  the  institutions  from  finding  a  price  difference  in  a  later 
investigation should the circumstances be different and there is a price difference. As 
indicated  in  recital  (76)  below  the  circumstances  have  significantly  changed  since 
2004 (time of the original investigation) and 2011 (the IP of the review at hand), i.e. in 
a  period  of  seven  years.  In  this  regard,  and  in  particular  during  the  expiry  review 
investigation in 2010, prima facie evidence of price distortions in the steel market in 
the  PRC,  due  to  State  interference,  were  collected.  This  constituted  also  one  of  the 
reasons  which  led  to  the  ex-officio  initiation  of  the  current  review  and  indeed  was 
confirmed in the current investigation (see recital (20) above).  

(29)  Next,  Noblelift  reiterated  its  comments  concerning  non-material  impact  of  loan 
guarantees  or  negligible  impact  of  state  benefits.  In  this  respect,  it  is  noted  that  the 
prescription  of  Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation  is  clear  and  does  not  refer  to 

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Commission Regulation (EC) 128/2005 of 27 January 2005 (OJ L 25, 28.1.2005, p. 16). 

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material impact on financial results (“firms have one set of  basic  accounting records 
which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with  international  accounting  standards  and 
are  applied  for  all  purposes”).  In  any  case,  as  stated  above  in  recital  (21),  the  non-
disclosure of significant commitments such as the loan guarantees in question does not 
allow a proper assessment of the company’s operations and in particular the risks and 
opportunities  the  company  is  facing.  As  far  as  state  benefits  are  concerned,  the 
Commission  has  already  replied  to  the  party  in  the  course  of  the  investigation  that 
those benefits represented amounts exceeding 10 million RMB. The claims could not 
be thus accepted. 

(30)  Finally,  Noblelift  argued  that  the  investigation  should  have  been  terminated  due  to 
violation of the 3-month deadline for the MET determination as specified in Article 2 
(7)(c) the basic Regulation. In this respect, reference is made to amendment introduced 
by the Regulation (EU) No 1168/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and 
retroactive effects thereof.9 Further, it is noted that the MET determination was made 
more  than  3  months  after  the  beginning  of  the  investigation  due  to  the  procedural 
aspects and time constraints of the investigation. Indeed, the increased complexity of 
issues raised in the context of MET assessments has shown that the 3-month deadline 
was  virtually  impossible  to  adhere  to.  It  is  noted  however  that  the  timing  of  the 
determination did not have an impact on the outcome.  

(31)  Consequently,  it  is  concluded  that  the  comments  suggesting  that  MET  should  be 

granted are not justified. 

(32) 

In  view  of  the  above  and  pursuant  to  Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  is 
determined not to grant MET to Noblelift. 

(b) Normal value  

Analogue country 

(33)  According  to  Article  2(7)(a)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  for  non-market  economy 
countries and, to the extent that MET could not be granted, for countries in transition, 
normal value has to be established on the basis of the price or constructed value in an 
analogue country. 

(34) 

In the original investigation, Canada served as an analogue country for the purposes of 
establishing a normal value. Given that production in Canada had ceased, Brazil was 
envisaged as an analogue country in the Notice of initiation of the present review. 

(35)  Two exporting producers and an importer objected to the proposal to use Brazil as an 
analogue  country.  The  arguments  against  the  choice  of  Brazil  were  that  there  was  a 
low  degree  of  competition  on  the  Brazilian  market  for  hand  pallet  trucks  due  to  the 
very  small  number  of  domestic  producers  and,  thus,  sales  prices,  profits  as  well  as 
production costs in Brazil are inflated. The exporting producers in question suggested 
India, Malaysia or Taiwan as appropriate analogue countries. 

(36)  Following  these  comments,  the  Commission  contacted  38  Indian,  three  Taiwanese, 
two  Malaysian  and  two  Brazilian  known  producers  of  hand  pallet  trucks  by  sending 
them  the  relevant  questionnaire.  Cooperation  could  be  obtained  from  only  one 
producer in Brazil: Paletrans Equipamentos Ltda, Cravinhos, Sao Paulo ('Paletrans'). 

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OJ L 344, 14.12.2012, p. 1. 

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(37)  Following the disclosure of the final findings and the Commission’s proposal, parties 
reitrated their comments that Brazil was not an appropriate choice of analogue country 
due  to  the  lack  of  competition  on  the  Brazilian  market.  Parties  alleged  that  the 
cooperating  analogue  country  producer  enjoyed  a  monopolistic  position  on  the 
Brazilian  market  reinforced  by  high  import  duties.  Other  comments  related  to 
deficiencies  in  the  non-confidential  questionnaire  reply  of  the  analogue  country 
producer.  Finally,  it  was  claimed  that  adjustments  should  be  made  to  account  for 
differences  between  analogue  country  producer  and  the  exporting  producer  in  the 
country concerned. 

(38)  As concerns the suitability of Brazil as an analogue country, it has to be pointed out 
that while the analogue country producer is the main producer on the Brazilian market, 
it  does  not  monopolise  that  market.  There  is  competition  with  at  least  two  local 
producers  and  a  significant  level  of  imports,  and  the  profit  margin  of  the  analogue 
country producer has been found to be consistent with an open market. 

(39)  As stated in recital (36) above following comments at the early stage of the proceeding 
against  the  use  of  Brazil  as  an  analogue  country,  the  Commission  contacted  45 
producers in four different countries, including the companies suggested by Noblelift. 
Despite  repeated  contacts  by  telephone  and  e-mail  with  these  companies,  only  one 
producer  from  Brazil  submitted  the  requested  information  and  cooperated  with  the 
investigation.  

(40)  With regard to the alleged deficiencies it has to be noted that only one producer in the 
analogue country  cooperated  with  the investigation. Such situation is not uncommon 
but poses difficulties with regard to disclosure of data. Given frequent difficulties in 
obtaining  cooperation  from  analogue  country  producers,  the  Commission  has  to 
guarantee  spot-on  protection  of  confidential  information.  In  the  current  case 
presentation  of  non-confidential  data  created  some  misunderstandings  concerning 
alleged  deficiencies  but  they  were  clarified  with  parties.  In  particular,  one  party 
claimed  that  deficiencies  in  the  reply  of  the  analogue  country  producer  should 
disqualify  Brazil  as  an  analogue  country  and  the  investigation  should  be  terminated 
since the Commission cannot establish the normal value. In this respect it is noted that 
in the current investigation the Commission did have all the necessary information to 
perform a dumping calculation.  

(41)  Consequently,  the  claims  concerning  the  suitability  of  Brazil  as  an  analogue  country 

could not be accepted.  

(42)  With regard to the claims for adjustments, it is noted that the level of trade differences 
between  the  Brazilian  producer  and  the  Chinese  exporting  producer  has  been 
accounted for by means of a level of trade adjustment (see recital (59) below). 

(43)  Finally,  one  party  claimed  that  an  adjustment  should  be  made  to  account  for  an 
allegedly distorting effect of the 14% import duty in the analogue country. This claim 
cannot be accepted as no link can be established between an import duty as such and 
the price level on the domestic market.  

(44)  Consequently,  Brazil  is  considered  an  appropriate  analogue  country  since  there  is 

sufficient competition with at least two producers and a significant level of imports. 

Determination of normal value 

(45) 

In  accordance  with  Article  2(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  Commission  first 
examined  whether  Paletrans's  domestic  sales  of  the  like  product  to  independent 
customers  were  representative.  In  this  respect,  it  was  found  that  the  total  volume  of 

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such sales was equal to at least 5% of the total volume of Noblelift's export sales to the 
Union. 

(46)  The  Commission  subsequently  examined  whether  there  are  types  of  the  like  product 
sold domestically by Paletrans that were sufficiently comparable in terms of functions 
and  materials  used  to  the  types  sold  by  Noblelift  for  export  to  the  Union.  The 
investigation  established  that  a  number  of  types  sold  domestically  by  Paletrans  were 
sufficiently comparable with the types exported by Noblelift to the Union. 

(47)  The  Commission  subsequently  examined  for  the  analogue  country  producer  whether 
each  comparable  type  of  the  like  product  sold  domestically  could  be  considered  as 
being  sold  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade.  This  was  done  by  establishing  for  each 
product  type  the  proportion  of  profitable  sales  to  independent  customers  on  the 
domestic market during the RIP. 

(48)  Where the sales volume of a product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above 
the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80% of the total sales volume 
of that type, and where the weighted average sales price of that type was equal to or 
higher  than  the  cost  of  production,  normal  value  was  based  on  the  actual  domestic 
price. This was the case for all comparable types and the normal value was calculated 
as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of each comparable type made 
during the RIP. 

(49)  For non-comparable types the normal value could be constructed in accordance with 
Article  2(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  by  adding  to  the  manufacturing  cost,  adjusted 
where  necessary,  a  reasonable  percentage  for  domestic  selling,  general  and 
administrative  expenses  and  a  reasonable  margin  for  domestic  profit.  The  selling, 
general  and  administrative  expenses  and  the  profit  were  based  on  actual  data 
pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product, 
by the producer in the analogue country. It should be noted that the price constructed 
on that basis was subject to the adjustments described in recital (59), in particular to 
take account of the difference in level of trade between export sales by Noblelift and 
the domestic sales of the analogue country producer. 

(50)  The  sole  cooperating  exporting  producer  claimed  that  the  Commission  performed 
dumping calculations on the basis of “truncated PCNs” and that no explanations were 
provided concerning the parameters used for conducting the comparison.  

(51)  According  to  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic  Regulation  the  dumping  margin  is  normally 
established  on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  of  a  weighted  average  normal  value  with  a 
weighted average of prices of all export transactions subject to the relevant provisions 
governing fair comparison.  

(52)  With regard to the fair comparison, it has to be noted that the product control number 
is  a  tool  used  in  the  investigation  in  order  to  structure  and  organise  the  substantial 
amounts  of  very  detailed  data  submitted  by  the  companies.  It  is  an  aid  to  conduct  a 
more  detailed  analysis  of  different  product  characteristics  within  the  category  of  the 
product concerned and the like product. 

(53)  The  Commission  has  collected  information  in  relation  to  a  number  of  parameters 
(chassis  material,  chassis  painted,  lift  capacity,  type  of  hydraulic  system,  working 
length, fork, width over forks, steering wheel material, load wheel material, load wheel 
type, brake type) but in order to take into consideration all export transactions it was 
considered reasonable and it was found possible to base the comparison in this case on 
certain  of  those  parameters  that  constitute  the  most  pertinent  characteristics  (chassis 

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material,  chassis  painted,  steering  wheel  material,  load  wheel  material,  load  wheel 
type). 

(54)  Therefore, the comparison was based on the most pertinent characteristics in order to 
increase  the  matching  and  to  ensure  a  fair  comparison.  It  has  to  be  stressed  that  the 
Commission  did  not  disregard  any  information.  However,  it  is  not  uncommon  that 
certain  parameters  used  in  the  product  control  number  have  a  lesser  weight  and  that 
specific  parameters  more  than  others  form  a  better  basis  for  fair  comparison.  No 
products  have  been  disregarded  from  the  comparison  on  the  basis  of  physical 
differences or for any other reasons, nor have any new product types been created. On 
the  contrary,  all  sales  were  included  in  the  comparison.  While  it  was  acknowledged 
that other parameters had some impact on prices, it was found more appropriate, that 
the calculations should be based on the five most relevant parameters as this led to the 
highest level of matching. 

(55)  As  far  as  the  procedural  angle  of  the  issue  of  comparison  is  concerned,  it  has  to  be 
noted that the exporting producer was provided with full opportunity to comment on 
the  calculations  performed  in  this  case.  Full  details  of  the  calculations  have  been 
disclosed and re-disclosed.  

(56)  Consequently, the foregoing claims had to be rejected. 

(c) Export price  

(57)  All export sales to the Union of the Chinese exporting producer were made directly to 
independent  customers  in  the  Union.  Therefore,  the  export  price  was  established  on 
the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the product concerned in accordance 
with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. 

(58)  One  party  claimed  that  the  export  sales  of  chassis  and  hydraulics  should  have  been 

included in the calculation. This claim has been accepted. 

(d) Comparison  

(59)  The comparison between the weighted average normal value and the weighted average 
export price was made on an ex-works basis and at the same level of trade. In order to 
ensure  a  fair  comparison  between  normal  value  and  the  export  price,  account  was 
taken,  in  accordance  with  Article  2(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  of  differences  in 
factors which affected prices and price comparability. For this purpose, due allowance 
in the form of adjustments was made, where applicable and justified, for differences in 
level of trade (estimated price difference for sales to different type of customers in the 
domestic market of the analogue country), transport (comprising inland freight cost in 
the  exporting  country  and  ocean  freight  for  transportation  to  the  Union),  insurance 
(ocean  insurance  cost),  handling,  loading  and  ancillary  costs,  commissions  (paid  for 
export  sales),  bank  charges  (paid  for  export  sales),  credit  costs  (based  on  the  agreed 
payment  terms  and  the  prevaling  interest  rate)  and  packing  costs  (cost  of  packing 
materials used).  

(60)  Following a claim from the sole cooperating exporting producer, an adjustment for the 
differences in thickness of steel used by the producer in the analogue country and the 
exporting producer in the country concerned was made to the normal value as it was 
found  reasonable.  The  adjustment  was  based  on  the  difference  in  thickness  in 
proportion to the contribution of steel to the price of the like product sold in Brazil by 
the analogue country producer. This led to a change in the dumping margin (see recital 
(73)  below).  Following  an  additional  disclosure  (inviting  comments  on  the  steel 
thickness adjustment), one party contested that adjustment as lacking factual basis. It 

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also  pointed  out  that  the  exporting  producer’s  non-confidential  submissions  seeking 
the  adjustment  were  deficient  thereby  violating  other  parties’  rights  of  defence.  The 
Commission  verified  the  data  on  file  on  which  the  steel  thickness  adjustment  was 
based and confirmed that it was warranted. 

(61)  The  sole  cooperating  exporter  presented  claims  for  several  other  adjustments  due  to 
differences in efficiency and productivity, claiming inter alia that the producer in the 
analogue country was less productive (has a lower output per worker) and had higher 
consumption of raw materials per unit. 

(62) 

It  has  to  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  while  differences  in  efficiency  or  productivity 
might  exist  between  companies,  the  guiding  principle  is  to  ensure  comparability 
between export prices and normal value, which does not require that the circumstances 
of an analogue country producer and an exporting producer in a non-market economy 
country  are  completely  aligned.  Indeed,  only  differences  for  factors  affecting  prices 
and  price  comparability  between  an  analogue  country  producer  and  an  exporting 
producer in a non-market economy country warrant an adjustment. 

(63)  Nevertheless, it is to be pointed that the investigation did not reveal any circumstances 
which  would  suggest  that  the  producer  in  the  analogue  country  did  not  have  a 
reasonably efficient production process.  

(64)  As far as cost factors are concerned (e.g. productivity), those should not be picked and 
assessed  individually.  Rather,  a  comprehensive  analysis  would  be  needed  to  assess 
whether  advantages  in  relation  to  one  cost  factor  (e.g.  productivity)  are  possibly 
compensated  by  disadvantages  in  others.  Indeed,  a  lower  use  of  labour  is  often  the 
result of a higher level of automation, which in turn leads to higher costs in other areas 
(depreciation,  capital,  financing,  manufacturing  overheads).  Only  a  comprehensive 
analysis could reveal all differences in cost factors and demonstrate whether prices and 
price comparability are affected, thereby justifying an adjustment. The claims cannot 
therefore be accepted. 

(65) 

In addition to the foregoing, the claims for adjustment for a per unit energy difference 
and  for  a  per  unit  depreciation  and  manufacturing  overheads  difference  were 
unsubstantiated.  In  particular,  in  relation  to  energy  efficiency  it  was  not  explained 
what  elements  in  the  production  process  make  the  Brazilian  producer  inefficient  as 
compared  to  the  sole  cooperating  exporting  producer.  The  amount  of  the  adjustment 
was  based  on  a  ratio  of  labour  cost  difference  per  unit  (based  on  productivity 
difference) related to the share of labour cost in total cost. The link between such ratio 
and  energy  efficiency  and  depreciation  and  manufacturing  overheads  difference  had 
not been explained and was not understandable. The claims are thus rejected.  

(66)  One party also claimed that adjustments should be made for parameters inter alia such 
as lift capacity and fork. In this respect, reference is made to comments concerning the 
parameters of comparison (see recital (50) above) where it is noted that a comparison 
is  based  on  the  most  relevant  parameters  to  ensure  the  highest  level  of  matching.  In 
any case the claims were not substantiated. 

(67)  Another claim was that adjustment should be made due to the fact that the exporting 
producer  uses  patented  technology.  This  claim  has  not  been  further  substantiated. 
Notably,  the  exporting  producer  failed  to  quantify  the  adjustment.  The  only  piece  of 
information  provided  was  a  document  which  was  stated  to  be  the  patent.  In  a  later 
submission  the  adjustment  was  partially  quantified  but  without  any  supporting 
evidence. Therefore, the claim could not be accepted. 

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(68)  Furthermore,  the  claim  for  adjustment  for  difference  in  efficiency  in  use  of  raw 
materials  has  been  covered  by  the  adjustment  for  thickness  of  steel  (see  recital  (60) 
above),  as  the  use  of  different  steel  thickness  might  lead  to  a  lower  overall 
consumption of steel. 

(69)  Finally,  the  exporting  producer  stated  that  it  sold  via  a  different  sales  channel,  in 
particular non-branded products on an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) basis, 
than  the  producer  in  the  analogue  country.  Accordingly,  a  claim  for  an  adjustment 
reflecting this difference was put forward. As specified above (recital (59) a level of 
trade adjustment was made. It was based on an estimated price difference for sales to 
different  types  of  customers,  including  OEM  sales,  in  the  domestic  market  of  the 
analogue  country.  For  confidentiality  reasons  the  extent  of  this  adjustment  could  not 
be  disclosed  as  it  would  reveal  the  normal  value  based  on  data  of  the  sole  analogue 
country  producer.  It  was  therefore  concluded  that  the  differences  for  which  the 
adjustment was claimed have been already accounted for. 

(70)  Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that the exporting producer failed to quantify the 
adjustment  claimed.  It  stated  merely  that  a  40%  adjustment  had  been  granted  in 
another  proceeding.  An  adjustment  granted  in  another  proceeding  (hence  specific  to 
the  particular  circumstances  of  another  proceeding)  cannot  serve  as  such  as  a 
benchmark for quantifying an adjustment in the current case. 

(71)  Following  the  additional  disclosure  (inviting  comments  on  the  steel  thickness 
adjustment),  the  exporting  producer  presented  additional  claims  for  adjustments 
(unrelated to the steel thickness adjustment): adjustment for coating, handle, and steel 
prices in Brazil. 

(72) 

It  is  noted  first  and  foremost  that  the  claims  were  submitted  after  the  deadline  for 
comments and were thus formally inadmissible. In any case the claims were either not 
quantified or not substantiated. The company neither provided evidence for its claims 
nor  did  it  explain  how  the  extent  of  different  adjustments  had  been  or  should  be 
calculated.  

(e) Dumping margin  

(73)  As  provided  for  under  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  weighted  average 
normal  value  by  type  was  compared  with  the  weighted  average  export  price  of  the 
product concerned. The dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union 
frontier price, duty unpaid, is 70,8%.  

(74)  As regards the dumping margins for all other than Noblelift exporting producers in the 
original  investigation,  they  ranged  from  28,5%  to  46,7%.  Given  that  in  the  current 
review  only  Noblelift  cooperated  and  that  the  cooperation  could  be  considered  high 
since  the  vast  majority  of  Chinese  exports  were  those  of  Noblelift,  the  Commission 
revised 
the  country-wide  dumping  margin  for  all  other  exporters  as  well. 
Consequently, the residual dumping margin should be set at the same level as that of 
Noblelift, i.e. 70,8%. 

(75)  One party claimed that the country-wide duty should not be set at the level of the sole 
cooperating exporting producer’s dumping margin as there is no evidence that the vast 
majority of imports were those of that sole cooperating exporter. In this respect, it has 
been confirmed that according to statistical data the vast majority of imports from the 
PRC  were  those  of  the  sole  cooperating  exporting  producer.  The  claim  has  been 
therefore rejected. 

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(76) 

(77) 

(78) 

(79) 

(80) 

D. LASTING NATURE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 

In  accordance  with  Article  11(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  was  also  examined 
whether the changed circumstances could reasonably be considered to be of a lasting 
nature.  

In this regard the original investigation did not establish a substantial price difference 
between prices of raw materials procured locally in the PRC by the Chinese exporting 
producers (including Noblelift) and those at international markets. The circumstances 
have significantly changed between 2004 (time of the original investigation) and 2011 
(the  RIP)  where  the  price  of  hot-rolled  steel,  the  main  raw  material,  stood  between 
24% and 31% below international prices. They did not reflect market values as a result 
of price distortions in the steel market in the PRC (see recital (20) above). Indeed, the 
Chinese steel market changed significantly within these seven years and the PRC has 
shifted in the meantime from a net steel importing country to a sizeable steel producer 
and exporter worldwide, which fact could reasonably be considered to be of a lasting 
nature. 

In  addition,  Chinese  high-tech  enterprises  including  Noblelift  are  receiving  State 
benefits in the form of preferential income tax (15%) since 2008. In the investigation 
period of the original investigation, the companies were subject to the standard rate of 
25%. This changed circumstance could also reasonably be considered to be of a lasting 
nature. 

It  was  therefore  considered  that  the  circumstances  that  led  to  the  initiation  of  this 
interim review are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future in a manner that would 
affect the findings of the interim review. Therefore it was concluded that the changed 
circumstances  are  of  a  lasting  nature  and  that  the  application  of  the  measure  at  its 
current level is no longer justified. 

E. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

In light of the results of this review investigation and since the new dumping margin 
of  70,8%  is  lower  than  the  injury  elimination  level  established  in  the  original 
investigation  (see  recitals  (120)  to  (123)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  128/200510),  it  is 
considered  appropriate  to  amend  the  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  imports  of  the 
product  concerned  both  from  Zhejiang  Noblelift  Equipment  Joint  Stock  Co.  Ltd  and 
from all other exporting producers to 70,8%. 

(81)  One  party  claimed  that  the  newly  established  dumping  margin  should  not  have  been 
compared  with  the  injury  elimination  level  established  in  the  original  investigation. 
Rather, an injury elimination level should be established in every investigation, even 
in  a  partial  review  limited  to  dumping.  According  to  this  party,  the  current  practice 
whereby injury is not assessed, constitutes a breach of the lesser duty rule. The party 
also claimed that a full interim review should have been opened. 

(82) 

In this respect it is noted that since the Commission initiated a partial interim review 
limited  to  dumping,  injury  could  not  be  re-assessed  in  this  framework.  According  to 
Article  11(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  the  continued  imposition  of  measures  may  be 
reviewed,  where  warranted,  on  the  initiative  of  the  Commission.  Hence,  there  is  no 
obligation  for  the  Commission  to  initiate  an  ex-officio  interim  review  covering  both 
dumping  and  injury,  and  in  any  event  it  should  be  warranted.  In  this  case,  the 
information and evidence at the Commission’s disposal was sufficient for the initiation 

10 

OJ L 25, 28.1.2005, p. 16. 

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of an interim review limited to dumping. Moreover, if injury is always to be assessed 
in interim reviews the possibility of having a partial interim review limited to dumping 
as provided for in Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation would be devoid of meaning. 
The  claim  has  to  be  therefore  rejected.  Nevertheless  it  is  recalled  that  the  interested 
party  in  question  has  the  possibility  to  request  a  partial  review  of  injury  pursuant  to 
Article 11 (3) of the basic Regulation. 

(83)  The  lesser  duty  rule  has  been  fully  respected  and  the  newly  established  dumping 
margin  was  indeed  compared  with  the  injury  elimination  level  established  in  the 
original investigation (the latest injury finding). 

(84)  One party claimed that a minimum import price would be better suited in the current 

case. Alternatively, a fixed duty should be imposed. 

(85) 

In this respect it is noted that neither the minimum import price nor the fixed duty are 
suitable  for  products  which  exists  in  a  multitude  of  individual  types  with  varying 
prices,  which  are  also  subject  to  continuous  changes  and  upgrades.  A  multitude  of 
duty  levels  would  be  very  difficult  to  administer.  An  additional  limitation  of  the 
current case is that the minimum import price would have to be based on the normal 
value (since the duty is based on dumping), which is based on confidential data of one 
company in an analogue country market. The claims are thus rejected. 

(86)  The  exporting  producer  expressed  interest  in  an  undertaking  within  the  statutory 
deadlines. However, no formal offer was submitted and thus the Commission was not 
in a position to consider it further.  

(87) 

Interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis 
of which it was intended to amend the duty rates applicable to exporting producers and 
were given the opportunity to comment. 

(88)  The oral and written comments submitted by the parties were considered. 

(89) 

It is noted that pursuant to Article 1(3) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
1008/2011,  the  70,8%  anti-dumping  duty  imposed  to  "all  other  companies"  by  this 
Regulation applies to hand pallet trucks and their essential parts, as defined in Article 
1(1)  of  Council  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1008/2011,  consigned  from 
Thailand whether declared as originating in Thailand or not, 

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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

Article  1(2)  of  Council  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1008/2011,  shall  be  replaced  by 
the following:  

"2. 
The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net  free-at-Union-
frontier  price,  before  duty,  for  the  products  described  in  paragraph  1  and  produced  by  the 
companies listed bellow shall be as follows: 

Company 

Zhejiang  Noblelift  Equipment  Joint  Stock  Co.  Ltd,  58, 
Jing Yi Road, Economy Development Zone, Changxin, 
Zhejiang Province, 313100, PRC 

Rate of 
duty 
(%) 

TARIC 
additional
code 

70,8 

A603 

All other companies 

70,8 

A999 

"  

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  its  publication  in  the  Official 
Journal of the European Union.  

Article 2 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the Council 
The President 

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